Mathias A. Färdigh

7.1 Gender and media corruption

Media and journalists are not immune to corruption. Indeed, most media and journalists do an honest job, but in times of falling revenues, a saturated media market, and a contraction of the media business model, there is also a risk of turning to “creative solutions” in what should or should not be published or covered. Still, the research on corruption in the media is largely absent, even more so when it comes to the possible gendered dimension of corruption in media and who performs or is subjected to corrupt acts. Additionally, the literature on corruption and media primarily focuses on the role of the media in fighting corruption and emphasises the importance of free media as a guarantor for improving accessibility to information, which in turn will make it more difficult for those in power to cover up, or get away with, corrupt behaviour (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Freille et al., 2007; Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010; Färdigh, 2013). Other studies focus on the importance of looking beyond the simple models of direct effects of media freedom on the level of corruption (Färdigh et al., 2012; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010).

While the bulk of the research shows that free media are important in combating corruption, the possibility and results of corruption within media have been scarcely examined and perceived predominantly as an area of concern for non-Western democracies (Harro-Loit & Saks, 2006; Li, 2013; McKinley, 2008; Price Trifonova, 2019; Tsetsyura & Grynko, 2009; Tsetsyura & Kruckeberg, 2017; Tsetsyura & Zuo, 2009; Wang, et al., 2018; Yang, 2012). One of the main arguments is that media in non-Western democracies are often confronted by a combination of factors that create fertile grounds for corruption – if there is corruption in society, it would be unrealistic to expect the media to be free of corruption (see, e.g., Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). But even though there is a likely
correlation between the level of media corruption and the level of democracy across countries, the digitalisation and commercialisation of the media has exacerbated the conditions driving irregularities. Corruption is indeed also flourishing in many Western democracies (Transparency International, 2019).

Previous research on corruption has offered a set of propositions to explain the causes and determinants of the cross-national variation in corruption (see, e.g., Treisman, 2007 for an overview). One such explanation is the straightforward and general relationship between the presence of women in a field of society and lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al., 2001), and the suggestion of different contexts arbitrating the relationship between gender and corruption in different ways (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017; Stensöta et al., 2015). Scholars make assumptions regarding anticipated connections between numbers and outcomes and argue that recruiting more women to office is an effective way to curb corruption. Hence, women themselves, compared with men, tend to be less involved in corrupt transactions, and once women reach a “critical mass”, irregularities and corruption will decrease (cf. Dahlerup, 1988).

The pioneering studies in the field demonstrated a correlation between higher levels of women in government and lower levels of political corruption (Dollar et al., 2001). In some studies, the explanation has been that women are less “selfish” than men and that women may follow laws to a greater extent (see, e.g., Swamy et al., 2001). Other scholars suggest that gender matters to corruption in relation to risk-taking in that women, on average, are less likely to take risks than men are (Frank et al., 2011). A third interpretation is to see it as a question of reversed causality in that women are excluded from arenas where corrupt transactions normally take place – corruption prevents women from entering office (Bjarnegård, 2012; Goetz, 2007). More recent studies have demonstrated that the relationship between more women and lower levels of corruption may be conditioned by different settings, such as whether a country is democratic or not (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013).

This chapter departs from three assumptions: first, that corruption and the abuse of entrusted power for private gain is a major obstacle to democracy and impacts societies in a multitude of destructive ways; second, that corruption also exists within the structure of media organisations and in the way journalists carry out their work; and third, that there are anticipated connections between numbers and outcomes in that more women in the media is associated with lower levels of media corruption.

This study is a first attempt to investigate if – and, in that case, how – the gender representation in the news media is connected to corruption, by examining the relationship between the share of women journalists and the level of perceived media corruption in a sample of more than 2,900 country-year observations covering 138 countries between 1995 and 2015, retrieved from
the Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017). Drawing on literature stating a relationship between more women and lower levels of corruption, the basic argument pursued in this chapter is that the share of women likely affects media corruption levels in at least two possible ways: 1) the incidence of media corruption will be lower where a larger share of working journalists are women, and vice versa, or 2) the prevalence of media corruption is associated with the general level of gender equality in society. Drawing from previous research on gender and corruption, the first hypothesis will be referred to as “the fairer sex hypothesis”; the second as the “fairer system hypothesis”.

The chapter will proceed by giving a brief summary of the extant knowledge about media and corruption, gender and corruption, gender and journalism, and how these three areas of research relate to gender in the media and media corruption. Then I will outline the design, data, and variables, and present the basic results from the correlational analysis between gender equality in the media, media corruption, and the most important explanatory factors previously identified by scholars within this area of research (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Stensöta et al., 2015; Sung, 2003; Swamy et al., 2001). I then employ several tests and specifications to investigate if and how more women in the media leads to less-corrupt media, and to what extent gender equality in the media can explain media corruption over time. Finally, I discuss the results and my conclusions.

7.2 Gender equality in the media and media corruption: Mapping the terrain

Media and corruption

To be able to understand media corruption, we first need to examine what we know about the media’s role in the fight against corruption. If we take a look at previous empirical studies on media and corruption, the main picture is reasonably clear – there is a strong and robust negative direct effect of media freedom on levels of corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Freille et al., 2007; Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010). Brunetti and Weder (2003) showed significant effects of media freedom on three different corruption control indices and concluded that corruption levels are likely to be low in countries where media are reasonably free from any kind of restrictions. In addition to investigating the relationship between aggregate media freedom and corruption, Freille and colleagues (2007) elaborated different forms of restrictions on media freedom. The results from their study suggest that it is the absence of, or freedom from, political and economic restrictions that drive the strong relationship between media freedom and corruption. Hence, reducing political and economic influence on the media may be the most efficient way to reduce corruption. Färdigh
and colleagues (2012) replicated Freille and colleagues’ study with an expanded number of observations. Instead of a robust direct effect of media freedom on corruption, they showed that the relationship between media freedom and corruption is best modelled with an interaction between the level of democracy and the level of media freedom, in that media freedom predominantly reduces corruption in well-established democracies.

Theoretically, the role of free media in the fight against corruption is straightforward. The media serve as watchdogs, monitoring those in power, and provide citizens with the information they need in order to be free, self-governing, and to hold those in power accountable for their actions. Thus, accountability is a principal component of democracy, and in the case of corruption, the ability to hold those in power accountable for misconduct is of crucial importance. However, evidence suggests several aggravating circumstances that may impede the media’s capacity to curb corruption. Lack of transparency allows powerful hidden interests to influence journalism. Hence, journalists may receive benefits to purposefully avoid reporting or to produce biased or misleading content (see, e.g., Márquez Ramírez, 2012; Tsetsura, 2005; Yang, 2012). Moreover, allegations of corruption in the media do not necessarily always lead to more than quite modest outcomes (see, e.g., Chang et al., 2010; Costas-Perez et al., 2012), and this is where media corruption comes into play. While the media can serve as the main drivers of accountability, they are not immune to corruption themselves. Instead, there is a risk that media are as corrupt as some of the public and private institutions they are watching over.

Ideally, and at the core of what we think of journalism in a democratic society, we expect journalists to be unbiased, transparent, and independent from any sources of influence. This is, however, not necessarily always the case.

**Gender and corruption**

Much of the previous research conducted within the area of gender and corruption has shown that there is an association between gender and corruption, but when it comes to the question of causality, the results are more ambiguous. Similar to the research conducted within the field of media freedom and corruption, where media freedom is perceived as a “quick fix” in combating corruption, the results from previous research on gender and corruption show that countries with a greater number of elected women also have lower levels of corruption. This has led to somewhat hasty conclusions about direct and immediate effects of the proportion of women in government on the variation in corruption across countries. In one of the two most influential large cross-country studies within this field of research, Dollar and colleagues (2001) launched the fairer sex hypothesis and demonstrated that higher rates of women participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption (see
also Swamy et al., 2001). Moreover, Dollar and colleagues also established that the significant effect of women’s participation in government on corruption remained after accounted-for explanatory factors, such as average year of schooling, economic development, ethnic fractionalisation, and political rights. Other studies similarly demonstrate a relationship between the proportions of women in government and levels of corruption, but instead argue for a reversed causality and corruption as an obstacle to the recruitment of women, which means that corruption is more likely to cause gender inequality than the other way around (see, e.g., Bjarnegård 2012; Goetz, 2007). For example, Sung (2003) showed a spurious relationship between gender and corruption in that an increase in women’s participation is not causally linked to the level of corruption. Instead, Sung launched the fairer system hypothesis and argued that an increase of women participation in government should rather be seen as a natural outcome caused by other aspects of liberal democracy, and that these together cooperate to restrain corruption. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) instead showed that the context is decisive for the importance of the proportion of women in government on the level of corruption across countries, in that a higher share of elected women is associated with lower levels of corruption in democratic countries where the tolerance of corruption among the general public are lower, but not associated with less corruption in authoritarian countries where the tolerance of corruption is higher. They argued that women will be less tolerant and less likely to engage in corrupt acts compared with men in contexts where corruption is stigmatised, but that there will be no corruption gender gap in contexts where a corrupt behaviour is an ordinary part of governance and political life. Similarly, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) showed significant gender differences in corruption levels in contexts with high accountability and no gender differences in corruption levels between women and men in contexts where the risk of being caught and punished is lower.

Consequently, previous research conducted on gender and corruption show that gender and corruption are highly associated, but lack consistent empirical evidence of what it is exactly that creates the right conditions for gender to actually have causal influence on the variation in corruption across countries.

**Gender and journalism**

Research on gender and journalism can predominantly be divided into two main categories or issues: the first category – which is also the independent variable and focus of this chapter – is gender “at work” in newsrooms; the second category is representations of women in news media content. If – and, in that case, how – gender influences journalism is one of the most central problem areas in this research field. In contrast to the relationship between gender and corruption, previous research has found somewhat contradictory evidence regarding
the extent to which gender matters and influences journalism.

In theory, the basic assumption on gender differences is relatively straightforward. Media companies and newsrooms dominated by women are distinguished from media companies and newsrooms dominated by men in a number of different ways. For example, van Zoonen (1998) described what she calls “the gendered nature of journalism” as four major areas, including 1) the selection of topics, 2) story angles, 3) the use of sources, and 4) ethics. The point of departure is the assumption that once women journalists reach a large enough number, or a critical mass, the newsroom culture and the coverage of women will change (see also Chapter 5). Hence, gendered differences, which, in addition to the gendered nature of journalism stipulated earlier, also includes the journalistic work and newsroom culture in a broader sense (such as improved pay equity, less gender discrimination, and more women in executive positions). However, while virtually all scholars agree that journalism has undergone major changes (e.g., commercialisation, popularisation, intimisation, tabloidisation, and personification) – which have taken place in conjunction with growth in the number of women journalists – it is debated whether the critical mass and increasing number of women in fact has led to a “feminisation” of journalism and changed the journalistic work and newsroom culture (see, e.g., Chambers et al., 2004; van Zoonen, 1998). The result from Ross (2001: 542) demonstrates a deep ambivalence about gender as a driver for change, and Ross concludes that “gender alone will not make a difference in changing the culture of newsrooms or in the type of news produced”. Moreover, Djerf-Pierre and Löfgren-Nilsson (2004: 101) concluded that it is problematic to describe changes in journalism in terms of a feminisation when it is evident that “different gender orders and journalistic cultures produce and support different femininities and masculinities in different newsrooms at different times”. Correspondingly, Hanitzsch and Hanusch (2012) found no significant gender differences in professional views between men and women in their comparative study of 1,800 journalists in 18 countries. Instead, their results show that the gender of journalists had no or very little effect on professional journalistic values and newsroom culture, and this regardless of whether on individual, organisational, or national level of analysis.

The inconsistent results in trying to capture when and how more women in journalism makes a difference seems much like shooting at a moving target. Some results show that gender matters, while others show no gender differences. It is also clear that gender differences are difficult to capture empirically, in that most surveys of journalists have not been able to present substantial differences, while content analyses do point to gender related patterns (see, e.g., Chambers et al., 2004; Macharia, 2015; see also Chapters 2, 6, & 8).

National surveys do not show gender to reliably predict differences in professional practices of journalism, but instead that men and women seem to make the same journalistic considerations (see, e.g., Hanitzsch & Hanusch, 2012;
Fairer sex or fairer system?

Weaver et al., 2007). One plausible explanation could be that gender does not matter since journalists, regardless of gender, simply work within the stipulated framework of the journalistic culture and profession. The journalistic culture is basically masculine, which also means that women must adapt to it in order to “fit”. Some researchers address this line of reasoning. Djerf-Pierre (2007) argued that journalism retains its predominantly masculine gender logic. Moreover, social capital such as status, prestige, and power remain associated with masculinity, in that masculinity is linked to core beliefs about journalism’s “mission”. Thus, where femininity has negative symbolic value, a woman may compensate for it by acquiring other forms of capital – professional, cultural, economic, or social.

Consequently, in theory, the supposition of critical mass and the increasing number of women journalists both make sense, and are a pleasant assumption of how it is supposed to be. Empirically, however, there is substantial proof of gender-related patterns in the journalistic content (see GMMP, 1995–2015 and most chapters in this anthology), but no clear evidence of a universal feminisation of journalism or changes of the newsroom culture, which largely depend on the journalistic culture being basically masculine. Women journalists must adapt to this culture in order to fit in.

It is well known that men dominate the ranks of journalists in most countries in the world (see Figure 7.1). However, if we take a look at the estimated percentages of women journalists across the globe, it shows that the majority of the countries for which we have data actually meet the often used criteria

**Figure 7.1 Women journalists around the world, 2015 (per cent)**

Comments: n = 140. V-dem is a new approach to conceptualising and measuring democracy and the figures are provided by country experts who were asked to estimate the percentage of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women (based on available statistics for each country). Question in V-dem: “Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women”.

Source: V-dem (Coppedge et al., 2017)
for a critical mass. Out of a total of 140 countries, there are no less than 114 countries estimated to have 30 per cent or more women journalists.

The five countries with the highest percentages of women journalists in 2015 are Bulgaria (72%), Venezuela (64%), Latvia (64%), New Zealand (59%), and Finland (58%). At the bottom, with the lowest percentages of women journalists, is Mauritania (10%), Solomon Islands (16%), South Sudan (17%), Indonesia (20%), and Chad (21%). However, a country’s percentage of women journalists does not always predict, nor is always reflected in, the actual news content. Instead, countries like Bulgaria (35% women news subjects), Venezuela (23%), and New Zealand (18%) confirm the gap and the inconsistent results from previous results with high percentages of women journalists and low percentages of women news subjects (Macharia, 2015; see also Chapters 2 & 5).

**Corruption in the media**

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate if – and, in that case, how – more women in the media leads to less-corrupt media and affects what is here called media corruption. But for this to be possible, it is necessary to first clarify what the term media corruption refers to and how it manifests itself in journalism. Corruption is both previously and currently a term with different meanings in different contexts. This means that what is perceived and classified as corruption also affects how corruption is measured and what is encountered in studies of corruption.

The standard definition of corruption, frequently used by researchers in this field, is the abuse of public power for private gain. Applied directly to the media field, this would mean that media and journalists in one way or another abuse their role or position as media and journalists for their own gain. Ideally, journalists should remain independent and transparent on any source of influence (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). However, sometimes journalism practitioners may end up in situations where they receive benefits to avoid producing certain media content or purposefully produce biased or misleading media content. This phenomenon is called by many different names – bribery-for-news-coverage (Yang, 2012), brown envelope journalism (Skjerdal, 2010), red envelope journalism (Li, 2013), AC-DC (Attack-Collect–Defend-Collect) journalism, ATM journalism (Quintos de Jesus, 2015), and media non-transparency (Tsutsura & Kruckeberg, 2017) – but all refer to what is defined as media corruption in this chapter and imply that journalists, publishers, or broadcasters in one way or another may be influenced or pressured to either report about certain events in a certain way or not report other events, and that this is not clearly indicated in the finished journalistic outcome or the media (cf. Tsutsura, 2005; Yang, 2012).

Media corruption is manifested in a variety of ways and takes place in relation to decisions made in the context of the news evaluation process and
ultimately deals with editorial decisions about what should or should not be published or covered, as well as perspectives and how stories are framed. Moreover, the news evaluation process can also be divided into three levels of direct and indirect pressures, which also interact with each other: 1) interpersonal, 2) intraorganisational, and 3) interorganisational. At the interpersonal level, the cash is handed directly to the journalists by a news source, it is done with some degree of confidentiality, and it denotes an informal contract between the news source and the journalist (Lo et al., 2005). At the intraorganisational level, the editor, the media advertising department, or the publisher tells the journalist what to write or not write, due to internal pressure (Tsetsura, 2005). At the interorganisational level, the journalists, editors, or broadcasters are part of more or less formal arrangements, with or without a legal contract under which, for example, a company pays a monthly amount of money in exchange for having a certain number of articles published about that company (Klyueva, 2008). Thus, the factors that influence media corruption in any country can be classified as direct or indirect and as interpersonal, intraorganisational, and interorganisational.

Trying to measure media corruption is both difficult and challenging work. The challenge lies first and foremost in the fact that when asked, journalists will basically never acknowledge that they are corrupt or be willing to estimate the level of their own corruption (this applies not only to journalists and media corruption). Instead, another possible way could be to collect data on the causes and factors that we know affect the likelihood of media corruption. This is something Kruckeberg and Tsetsura (2003) have done for 66 countries. They have built an index (CFNC) which, they argue, measures the likelihood of whether or not “cash for news coverage” likely exists among a country’s major newspaper media, using eight different factors:

- long-time tradition of self-determination by citizens
- perception of comprehensive corruption laws with effective enforcement
- accountability of government to citizens at all levels
- high adult literacy
- high liberal and professional education of practicing journalists
- well-established, publicised, and enforceable journalism codes of professional ethics
- free press, free speech, and free flow of information
- high media competition (multiple and competing media)

One could have different thoughts about the indicators Kruckenberg and Tsetsura have chosen to use for their index. One important indicator missing
is, for example, whether journalists are paid at a professional level. This is, however, something they are well aware of and was excluded due to the circumstance that reliable data comparing journalists’ pay to that of other professions in each country were not consistently available. Unfortunately, they only managed to collect data in 66 countries for one period in time (2003). This, of course, also has consequences for the possibilities to do robust analyses across countries and over time.

Another measure of media corruption is one of the five objectives that together form the established Media Sustainability Index (MSI) developed by the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) and collected through another design than the CFNC index. The MSI is based on five objectives and the scoring is completed in two parts. First, panel participants are provided with a questionnaire and explanations of the indicators and scoring system. Second, the panelists’ scores are reviewed by the IREX editorial staff members, who then provide a set of scores for the country, independently of the panel. The overall country score is an average of all five objectives: 1) legal and social norms protect and promote free speech and access to public information, 2) journalism meets professional standards of quality, 3) multiple news sources provide citizens with reliable, objective news, 4) media are well-managed enterprises, allowing editorial independence, and 5) supporting institutions function in the professional interests of independent media (IREX, 2017).

The second objective – whether journalism meets professional standards of quality – is of most interest for measuring the likelihood of whether or not media corruption likely exists among a country’s media. This objective contains eight indicators:

- reporting is fair, objective, and well sourced
- journalists follow recognised and accepted ethical standards
- journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship
- journalists cover key events and issues
- pay levels for journalists and other media professionals are sufficiently high to discourage corruption and retain qualified personnel within the media profession
- entertainment programming does not eclipse news and information programming
- technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing, and distributing news are modern and efficient
- quality niche reporting and programming exist (investigative, economics & business, local, political)
In a similar way as with the CFNC Index by Kruckenberg and Tsetsura (2003), which only captures the level of media corruption in 66 countries on one single occasion, the limitation of the MSI by IREX is that it only covers 27 countries over a nine-year period. The measurement points are too few, and this makes it difficult to use any of the two indicators in order to reliably do robust analyses across countries and over time and answer the question of if – and, in that case, how – more women in the media leads to less-corrupt media.

More recently, new attempts have been made to collect data on media corruption. In the data regularly released from the V-dem Institute in an effort to conceptualise and measure various aspects of democracy across the globe, there is a media corruption measure covering no less than 2,935 country-year observations between 1995–2015 (Coppedge et al., 2017). The V-dem variable consists of significantly more measurement points than the other two media corruption measures and is based on country-expert estimations of the extent of media corruption by answering the question: “Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?” The original responses range from 0–4:

0. The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage

1. Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments

2. It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments

3. It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished

4. Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

The variable is originally measured on an ordinal scale, but converted to an interval scale by the specific measurement model used by V-dem (see §7.3 and Table 7.4 in Appendix 7.1 for more information about how the indicators are constructed).

One way to estimate how well the V-dem variable succeeds in capturing the level of media corruption is to compare it with the other two more established measures in a correlation analysis, where the value goes from -1.000 (a perfect negative match between the media corruption measures), via 0 (the media corruption measures capture completely different dimensions) to +1.000 (a perfect positive match between the media corruption measures).
The result from the correlation analysis shows that the media corruption measure from V-dem is positively correlated with both of the other two media corruption measures, but the strongest correlation is with the CFNC Index (see Table 7.1).

**Table 7.1  Correlations between the V-dem media corruption measure and alternative media corruption measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson's $r$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash for news coverage index (raw score)</td>
<td>0.827***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for news coverage index (mean score)</td>
<td>0.829***</td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media sustainability index (score)</td>
<td>0.656***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and social norms (objective 1)</td>
<td>0.615***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional standards (objective 2)</td>
<td>0.637***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple news source (objective 3)</td>
<td>0.590***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial independence (objective 4)</td>
<td>0.555***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting institutions (objective 5)</td>
<td>0.627***</td>
<td>(463)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: *** Significant at the .001 level.

If we take a look at the estimated level of media corruption across the globe, the data from V-dem shows that about a half of the countries for which we have data have lower levels of media corruption (see Figure 7.2). Out of a total of 140 countries, there are at the same time no less than 79 countries estimated to have a higher level of media corruption than the average for all countries (-0.304).

The top five countries with lowest level of media corruption are France (-3.019), Sweden (-2.282), Denmark (-2.163), Norway (-2.101), and Canada (-2.085). At the bottom, with the highest level of media corruption, is Uzbekistan (+2.689), Azerbaijan (+2.493), Belarus (+2.332), China (+2.159), and Cuba (+2.128).

The media corruption measure is, on average, very similar to the general level of corruption in a country (Pearson’s $r = 0.77$), which is also measured by V-dem. For countries with low levels of general corruption, the media corruption measure is about the same. For countries with high levels of corruption, however, the level of media corruption displays more variation. This means that, apart from France, the measure does not differ that much from what could be seen in terms of countries with low levels of corruption. Among countries with high levels of media corruption, there is a greater variation.

To summarise this section, the results from previous empirical studies on media and corruption, on the one hand, show a strong and robust negative direct effect of media freedom on levels of corruption. On the other hand, evidence also suggests circumstances making this more complicated and less
Fairer sex or fairer system?

Figure 7.2 The level of corruption in the media around the world, 2015

Comments: n = 140. Question in V-dem: “Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?” Answers: (0) The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage; (1) Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments; (2) It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments; (3) It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished; (4) Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it. V-dem has rescaled the variable to a uniform distribution. For the ease of interpretation, the variable has been reversed and rescaled to range between -4 (low levels of media corruption) and +4 (high levels of media corruption).

Source: V-dem (Coppedge et al., 2017)

straightforward. One such circumstance is media corruption. While media, in the best of worlds, can serve as the main drivers for accountability, they are at the same time not immune to corruption themselves. Instead, there is an obvious risk of media being a part of the corrupt system they are expected to reveal.

The central question in this chapter is whether results from previous research on the share of women in parliament and lower levels of corruption also pertain to the relationship between the share of women journalists and lower levels of corruption in the media. Previous research points out two plausible assumptions. The first assumption is that women possess certain characteristics and therefore do not descend to corruption to the same extent as men (the fairer sex hypothesis). Although it is not possible to know if it is the men or women who are responsible for the media corruption per se (corrupt behaviour at the individual level), the hypothesis is that countries with many women journalists would be plagued by media corruption to a lesser extent. The second assumption is, instead, that it is the system in which women live and operate that affects the level of media corruption (the fairer system hypothesis). A fair
system has a high level of democracy, free and fair elections, gender equality, civil liberties, and so forth. In these systems, women are both more noticed and play a greater role in society, and the hypothesis is thus that it is the system as a whole, rather than a specific outcome of the system, that makes it difficult for and counteracts corruption.

Thus, based on these two alternative assumptions, the purpose of this chapter is to examine which of the two is the most appropriate when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind media corruption: Is it the share of women journalists in the media or the system where women journalists live and operate – or both – that affects the level of media corruption?

7.3 Design, data, and variables

Design

To investigate the relationships in this chapter, time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data is used. Compared to cross-sectional analysis, the advantages of the TSCS approach are numerous: 1) the models capture values of the dependent variable in this sample that vary over time, along with a number of control variables – moreover, some countries in the sample made significant changes in their level of media corruption and gender equality in the media over time; 2) the results from selecting one year or an average in a cross-sectional analysis only shows correlation and not causality, with an obvious risk of misleading results and misrepresentation of the larger picture; and 3) the sample sizes increase significantly with TSCS data, leading to greater degrees of freedom and lower standard errors in each model.

Several specifications are employed to investigate the two alternative assumptions in this chapter. At the same time, there are several reasons to suspect that the observations of the dependent variable are not that independent of one another from one year to another (autocorrelation), meaning that if, for example, Sweden has low media corruption in a certain year \((t)\), it also most likely had low media corruption the year before \((t - 1)\). In this chapter, I account for autocorrelation in two ways. First, all models are tested using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and second, I have included a lagged dependent variable by one year in the models. In addition, there are also reasons to suspect individual country differences (heterogeneity), meaning that, for example, Sweden includes unobserved characteristics that differ from, for example, France and Mexico. Unobserved characteristics within each country are controlled for by running fixed-effects (FE) models with country dummies included, so as to estimate the effect of the independent variables only within countries over time.
Data and variables

Another challenge is to find precise, valid, and quantifiable indicators that capture exactly the aspects they are intended to capture. As mentioned earlier, there is a lack of comprehensive media corruption measures. At the same time, high correlations between the established measures that exist for a smaller number of countries and the more extensive measure developed by V-dem indicates high equivalence of measuring the same thing. Therefore, the principal measure of corruption in the media sector I use in this chapter is the media corruption index (vdem_mecorrupt) from V-dem (Coppedge et al., 2017); this is a pioneering measure and the variable is meant to capture the likelihood of journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accepting payments in exchange for altering news coverage. Originally, the variable takes on values ranging from -4 (most corrupt) to +4 (least corrupt), but is rescaled and reversed in the regressions for the ease of interpretation and ranging from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt). From the results in the previous section where V-dem’s media corruption measure was compared with the MSI (IREX) and CFNC (Kruckenberg & Tsetsura, 2003) indices, the conclusion is that the three measures match each other and that the V-dem media corruption measure therefore works well as an operational indicator for measuring corruption in the media sector.

In order to test the fairer sex hypothesis, I use an indicator for the share of women journalists in different countries. The indicator (vdem_femjrnl) is also retrieved from the V-dem dataset and the variable is meant to capture the percentage of journalists in the print and broadcast media sector who are women. The variable originally takes on values ranging from 0–100, but is rescaled in the regression analyses and ranges from 0–1. The basic assumption of the fairer sex hypothesis would, in this case, be that it is the share of women journalists that has a negative impact on the level of media corruption: the more women journalists, the less media corruption. At the same time, it is important to have in mind that both the media corruption measure and the indicator for the share of women in the media are subjective assessments, in that a minimum of five country experts provide data on each country, variable, and year. Originally, the V-dem dataset covers 177 countries from 1900 to 2016. However, in this chapter, the data does not go further back in time than 1995, both with regard to accessibility to the other indicators used in this chapter and not least the difficulty of reliably estimating the share of women journalists more than a hundred years back in time.

Based on a number of recent studies, I also control for additional significant determinants of corruption. There is reason to believe that both media corruption and gender equality in the media are likely to be affected by the overall level of socioeconomic development (see, e.g., Dollar et al., 2001). Wealthier countries exhibit less corruption on average, and when it comes to restraining
media corruption specifically, this could more likely be a costly activity more easily undertaken by richer media in richer countries. In line with this reasoning, it is also more likely that media corruption flourish in poor or less socioeconomically developed countries. Consequently, I include logged GDP per capita (base 10) (vdem_mad_gdppcln/vdem_mad_migdppcln), also retrieved from the V-dem dataset, as a control (Coppedge et al. 2017, 2019).

Next, it stands to reason that media corruption is intimately associated with quality of government, and that reduced media corruption and increased gender equality in the media are both likely consequences from increased democratisation and political freedom. To control for this possibility, quality of government (qog_icrg_qog) and level of democracy (qog_fh_ipolity2) are included as controls. Quality of government and level of democracy are retrieved from The Quality of Government (QoG) time-series dataset (Teorell et al., 2017). The quality of government variable ranges from 0–1, where a higher value indicates higher quality of government; the level of democracy includes imputed values and the variable takes on values ranging from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic).

Several empirical studies have also found media quality to be an important predictor of corruption (see, e.g., Färdigh et al., 2012; Freille et al., 2007). High-quality media that can operate freely are more likely to find and reveal corruption, and also likely to be less corrupt. As an indicator of the quality of the media system, I have included the commonly used freedom of the press measure (qog_fh_fotpsc), originally retrieved from Freedom House (2017a). The variable originally takes on values ranging from 0 (most free) to 100 (not free), but it has been reversed – following common practice and for the ease of interpretation – in both the correlational and the regression analyses so that higher values indicate more press freedom.

Existing literature also suggests that corruption is higher in more ethnically divided societies (see, e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Mauro, 1995). The main argument is that civil servants and politicians would exploit their positions to favour members of their own ethnic group in ethnically divided societies. In this chapter, this applies to journalistic work and the possibility for journalists to favour members of their own ethnic group (see, e.g., Rwanda and the radio station Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines). Moreover, previous research has also shown that the level of ethnic fractionalisation is important to reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias. Consequently, ethnic heterogeneity (qog_al_ethnic) is reversed for the ease of interpretation and included as control where higher values indicate more ethnic heterogeneity.

Finally, in order to test the fairer system hypothesis, the general level of gender equality is an important indicator that can provide information and help determine whether it is the general gender equality, or gender equality
in the media specifically, that drives the relationship. To measure this, the women’s political participation index (vtem_genpp), retrieved from the V-dem dataset, is included as control. The variable ranges between 1 (equality) and 0 (inequality) and examines whether women are descriptively represented in formal political positions and where women’s political participation is understood to include women’s descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

One could always discuss whether the variables used in this chapter are precise, valid, and quantifiable indicators capturing exactly the aspects they are intended to capture. As mentioned earlier, the data from V-dem is based on subjective assessments; however, it is the most valid and reliable data available. Similarly, the control variables included in this study are based on what we know from previous studies and are currently the most common and widely used measures within this area of research (see Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 in Appendix 7.1 for full variable descriptions, original sources, and summary statistics).

7.4 Testing the relationships: Fairer sex or fairer system?
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate if – and, in that case, how – more women in the media leads to less-corrupt media, by examining two possible relationships: 1) between the share of women journalists and the level of media corruption, and 2) between gender equality in society (women’s political participation) and the level of media corruption.

Both the correlational analysis in Table 7.2 and Table 7.6 in Appendix 7.1 provide results of a significant negative relationship between the share of women journalists and media corruption (the fairer sex hypothesis), meaning that countries with more women in journalism also have less corruption. The correlation between media corruption and women’s political participation (the fairer system hypothesis) is also negative and much stronger. However, it is also noticeable that the bivariate relationship between the two main independent variables and media corruption is significantly weaker than the correlation between media corruption and the control variables. Of the controls included in the explanatory model, it is the quality of media systems or the level of press freedom that evidently has the greatest impact on the level of media corruption, followed by the level of democracy and quality of government (See Figures 7.3 and 7.4 in Appendix 7.2 for a more detailed description of how the share of women journalists and women’s political participation vary over time in countries with low, medium, and high media corruption).
Mathias A. Färdigh

Table 7.2  Bivariate correlations of media corruption and the independent variables (Pearson’s r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women journalists</td>
<td>-.185***</td>
<td>2,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s political participation</td>
<td>-.395***</td>
<td>2,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.555***</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>-.742***</td>
<td>2,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-.714***</td>
<td>2,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press</td>
<td>-.791***</td>
<td>2,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity</td>
<td>-.321***</td>
<td>2,849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: *** Significant at the .001 level. n = number of country-year observations. Media corruption, freedom of the press, and ethnic heterogeneity have been reversed so that higher numbers equal more corruption, more press freedom, and more ethnic heterogeneity.

The results from the test of the fairer sex and the fairer system hypotheses are reported in Table 7.3, using several different model specifications accounting for autocorrelation and country effects. The core of the hypothesised fairer sex relationship is that more women journalists will lead to less media corruption, whereas the fairer system hypothesis posits a relationship between higher levels of gender equality in society and less media corruption. In both cases, the coefficient will have to be negative and significant. In Table 7.3, the primary relationships are put to a series of increasingly tougher tests by using different sets of control variables and employing different regression methods. OLS is used to measure the factors that contribute to cross-country differences in media corruption. It points us to what distinguishes countries marked by different levels of corruption. Fixed effects estimations (models 8 and 9) are used to control for unobserved characteristics within each country (heterogeneity) which is deemed to provide more accurate tests of causal relationships.

Models 1 and 2 are simple, baseline regressions testing for how much the share of women journalists and women’s political participation explains the variation in media corruption across countries. With no controls, we can observe that both the share of women journalists and women’s political participation have significant negative effects on media corruption, which means that both more woman journalists and women in politics will decrease media corruption.

In model 3, both women journalists and women’s political participation are tested simultaneously along with country dummies to estimate the effect of the share of women journalists and women’s political participation on media corruption within countries over time. Here, we can see that the effect from the share of women journalists is still significant, but changes direction. This indicates higher levels of media corruption in countries with more women journalists, which is contrary to the fairer sex hypothesis. However, the effect of women’s
Table 7.3  Women journalists and women’s political participation as predictors of media corruption, 1995–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>OLS + PCSE</th>
<th>Lagged DV + PCSE</th>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women journalists</td>
<td>-0.127***</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s political participation</td>
<td>-0.420***</td>
<td>-0.118***</td>
<td>-0.068***</td>
<td>-0.128***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.122***</td>
<td>0.097***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.036*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>-0.127***</td>
<td>-0.127***</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-0.175***</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press</td>
<td>-0.333***</td>
<td>-0.061***</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
<td>-0.028*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>Omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media corruption (t – 1)</td>
<td>0.802***</td>
<td>0.784***</td>
<td>0.802***</td>
<td>0.784***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.454***</td>
<td>0.717***</td>
<td>0.573***</td>
<td>0.807***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-year observations</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (within)</td>
<td>.641</td>
<td>.645</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (between)</td>
<td>.976</td>
<td>.973</td>
<td>.976</td>
<td>.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (overall)</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.943</td>
<td>.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Panel corrected standard errors within parentheses. Media corruption, freedom of the press, and ethnic heterogeneity have been reversed so that higher numbers equal more media corruption, more press freedom, and more ethnic heterogeneity. All variables are rescaled and range between 0–1.
political participation remains negative and significant, albeit weakened. This result corroborates the fairer system hypothesis.

Models 4 and 5 continue the estimation of how much the share of women journalists and women’s political participation explain the variation in media corruption, yet with controls added. In model 5, control variables are introduced, and in model 6, control variables and country dummies. In model 4, the regression coefficient of the share of women journalists has doubled, while the negative effect of woman’s political participation is halved. All control variables, with exception for ethnic heterogeneity, show significant negative effects on media corruption. As an indicator of the quality of the media system, the freedom of the press variable has the strongest negative relationship with media corruption.

When the country dummies are included for estimating the effect of the share of women journalists and women’s political participation on media corruption within countries over time in model 5, the positive effect of women journalists has been reduced to a third of the effect we could see in model 4. Instead, it is the general level of gender equality – here in terms of women’s political participation – that shows the strongest negative relationship with media corruption. The negative effect from the freedom of the press variable on the dependent variable is still there, but weaker, thus the explanation with smallest negative effect. Model 6 returns to a simple baseline, yet also includes a lagged media corruption variable and with control for country dummies. A lagged variable is used to correct for temporal autocorrelation. If we compare the results in model 6 with basic variables in model 3, we find indications of autocorrelations in that the effects from both the share of women journalists and women’s political participation has weakened further. It is instead the media corruption level at \( t - 1 \) that explains a country’s media corruption at \( t \). This means that the level of media corruption in a country remains fairly stable over time and that the corruption in one year is similar to the next.

In model 7, the effect of the lagged media corruption variable remains strong, but there are still significant effects from the majority of the included controls, even with the country dummies included so as to estimate the effect of the share of women journalists and women’s political participation on media corruption within countries over time. The share of women journalists shows significant positive effect on media corruption together with GDP per capita and quality of government, while women’s political participation, level of democracy, and freedom of the press indicators show significant negative effects on media corruption. However, the latter are noticeably smaller and much weaker compared with the coefficient of the lagged media corruption variable.

Models 8 and 9 employ fixed effects to account for country-specific effects outside of models 1–7. This means that changes in individual country differences over time are used to better estimate the effect of the share of women journalists and women’s political participation on media corruption. When
controlling for fixed country effects, the effect of the share of women journalists on media corruption becomes insignificant. However, more notably, the effect of women’s political participation remains unchanged. Since all between-country variation in the data is absorbed by the country-specific dummies in the fixed effect models (8–9), the effects in final model 9 could be interpreted as follows: for a given country, as the general level of gender equality increases by one unit, media corruption decreases by -0.030 units on a scale ranging from 0–1. This means that in the final and toughest test of the causal relationship between media corruption and our independent variables, the results mainly support the fairer system hypothesis. If the general level of equality increases in society, the level of media corruption decreases.

7.5 Conclusion and discussion

The ambition with this chapter was to investigate if – and, if so, how – more women in the media leads to less-corrupt media. Based on the conclusions from previous research, the purpose of this chapter has been to examine if there is a direct effect of the share of women in the media on the level of media corruption (fairer sex hypothesis) or if it is the system where women and men journalists live and operate affects the level of media corruption (fairer system hypothesis). This was tested in three different ways, but the results show large similarities for all three tests: higher levels of press freedom, democracy, and women’s political participation seem to curb the level of media corruption in a country. Therefore, the short answer to these two questions is that, of all controls, it is the fairer system – or the general level of gender equality of society, here measured as women’s political participation – together with a country’s general media freedom and socioeconomic development, that tells us something about the variation in media corruption across countries.

However, in some models, we also could see a positive effect of women journalists on media corruption, which is contrary to the fairer sex hypothesis. Previous scholars point in the direction of anticipated connections between number and outcomes and argue that recruiting more women to office is an effective way of curbing corruption. In line with this reasoning, the argument from previous research applied in this chapter would be that journalistic work dominated by women distinguishes from journalistic work dominated by men. Instead, the results from this chapter show that gender equality and the presence of women journalists in the news media do not just happen in a vacuum. Consequently, gender equality outside the media sphere and on a more general level are most important for the level of media corruption across countries. At the same time, it is important not to turn a blind eye to the problem of ecological fallacies when using aggregated data. Since the measures used in this chapter are
at the media system and societal level – not at the individual level – the results are probably not so much about what individual women (or men) do (or don’t do). Thus, the results do not give any indication of who is responsible for the corruption in media systems with many women, or vice versa.

This leads inexorably back to, on the one hand, Hanitzsch and Hanusch’s (2011) cross-national comparison of gender differences mentioned earlier and the conclusion that gender alone cannot be held responsible for newsroom cultures or professional journalistic values. It also, on the other hand, connects to the term “pink ghetto” and the consequences of an extensive feminisation of the journalism profession, particularly in nations where women are already dominant in the profession but where journalistic work is associated with lower pay, precarious work conditions, and other forms of gender inequality (see Chapter 4).

Finally, the task of determining causality and deciding what is cause and effect is both complex and difficult. At the same time, it is not possible to ignore the fact that there is an inherent path dependency in that the media corruption levels in a country over time are by far the strongest predictor of the level of media corruption within a country from one year to another, and that these media corruption patterns are not easy to break and get rid of. But also, despite this negative relationship of media corruption from one year to another, the fairer system – here in terms of the general level of gender equality in society, media freedom, and socioeconomic development – nevertheless has proven to have a significant negative effect on media corruption.

Note
1. One strategy to handle continuous dependent variables is to use OLS regression with lagged dependent variables in order to correct for temporal autocorrelation. Although the general methodological advice with time-series cross-sectional data is to also correct for panel heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation through panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995, 2011); therefore, my strategy is to do both.

References
Fairer sex or fairer system?

Research Memorandum GD-174, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen, Netherlands.


Klyueva, Anna. (2008, March 6–9). An exploratory study of media transparency in the Urals Federal District of Russia [Conference presentation]. The 11th Public Relations Research Conference (IPPRC), University of Miami, Florida, USA.
Kruckeberg, Dean, & Katerina Tsetsura. (2003). A composite index by country of variables related to the likelihood of the existence of ‘cash for news coverage’ [Research report commissioned by the Institute for Public Relations (USA) and The International Public Relations Association (UK)]. https://www.instituteforpr.org/wp-content/uploads/Bribery_Index_20031.pdf
Fairer sex or fairer system?


## Appendix 7.1 Variables and data sources

### Table 7.4 Variable descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Media corruption (vdem_mecorrpt) | Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?  
 0 = The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.  
1 = Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.  
2 = It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.  
3 = It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.  
4 = Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.  
The variable is originally measured on an ordinal scale, but converted to an interval scale by the specific measurement model used by V-dem ranging from -4 (most corrupt) to +4 (least corrupt). The variable is reversed and rescaled in the regression analysis for the ease of interpretation and ranging from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt). In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 135–137 countries and 2,872 country-year observations (1995–2015).  
Source: Coppedge et al., 2017 |
Table 7.4  (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women journalists</td>
<td>Question: Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women. In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 135–137 countries and 2,872 country-year observations (1995–2015). Source: Coppedge et al., 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GPD per capita</td>
<td>Question: What is the GDP per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm? In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 134–136 countries and 2,837 country-year observations (1995–2015). Source: Coppedge et al., 2019 (original data is from The Maddison-Project; Bolt &amp; Van Zanden, 2014; Bolt et al., 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>The average of the Freedom House/Polity’s political rights and civil liberties indicators (fh_pr and fh_cl), transformed to a 0–10 scale where 0 = least democratic and 10 = most democratic. The variable includes imputed values. In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 148–149 countries and 3,122 country-year observations (1995–2015). Source: Teorell et al., 2017 (original data is from Freedom House, 2017b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>The mean value of the ICRG variables corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. The variable is scaled 0–1, where higher values indicate higher quality of government. In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 108–116 countries and 2,403 country-year observations (1995–2015). Source: Teorell et al., 2017 (original data from the International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group, 2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press</td>
<td>The freedom of the press index is computed by adding the three sub-component ratings: laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, and economic influences. The variable originally ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free), but it is reversed and rescaled in the regression analysis for the ease of interpretation and ranging from 0 (least free) to 1 (most free). In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 148–149 countries and 3,121 country-year observations (1995–2014). Source: Teorell et al., 2017 (original data from Freedom House, 2017a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.4 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity (qog_al_ethnic)</td>
<td>The variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not share a certain characteristic. The variable is originally scaled 0–1, where higher values indicate less probability of the two sharing that characteristic. The variable is reversed in the regression analysis for the ease of interpretation and ranging from 0 (low ethnic heterogeneity) to 1 (high ethnic heterogeneity). In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 143–144 countries and 3,020 country-year observations (1995–2015).</td>
<td>Source: Teorell et al., 2017 (original data from Alesina et al., 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's political participation (vdem_genpp)</td>
<td>Question: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions? In this variable, women’s political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. The variable ranges from 0 (low participation) to 1 (high participation). In the GEM dataset, the variable covers 129–136 countries and 2,781 country-year observations (1995–2015).</td>
<td>Source: Coppedge et al., 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.5 Variable statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media corruption</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-3.02</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women journalists</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>37.16</td>
<td>11.93</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>71.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita</td>
<td>2,837</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>11.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>61.47</td>
<td>22.78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity</td>
<td>3,104</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s political</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Media corruption, freedom of the press, and ethnic heterogeneity have been reversed so that higher numbers equal more corruption, more press freedom, and more ethnic heterogeneity.
Fairer sex or fairer system?: Appendix

Table 7.6  Correlations of variables (Pearson’s r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Media corruption</th>
<th>Women journalists</th>
<th>Logged GDP per capita</th>
<th>Level of democracy</th>
<th>Quality of government</th>
<th>Freedom of the press</th>
<th>Ethnic heterogeneity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women journalists</td>
<td>-.185***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2935)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.555***</td>
<td>.506***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2750)</td>
<td>(2750)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>-.742***</td>
<td>.356***</td>
<td>.545***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2877)</td>
<td>(2877)</td>
<td>(2775)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-.714***</td>
<td>.236***</td>
<td>.742***</td>
<td>.573***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2305)</td>
<td>(2305)</td>
<td>(2287)</td>
<td>(2403)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press</td>
<td>-.791***</td>
<td>.257***</td>
<td>.555***</td>
<td>.895***</td>
<td>.670***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2876)</td>
<td>(2876)</td>
<td>(2774)</td>
<td>(3121)</td>
<td>(2403)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity</td>
<td>-.321***</td>
<td>.229***</td>
<td>.531***</td>
<td>.351***</td>
<td>.506***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2849)</td>
<td>(2849)</td>
<td>(2751)</td>
<td>(3093)</td>
<td>(2389)</td>
<td>(3092)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s political</td>
<td>-.395***</td>
<td>.376***</td>
<td>.432***</td>
<td>.455***</td>
<td>.426***</td>
<td>.402***</td>
<td>.154***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>(2841)</td>
<td>(2841)</td>
<td>(2681)</td>
<td>(2816)</td>
<td>(2273)</td>
<td>(2816)</td>
<td>(2788)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: ***Significant at the .001 level. Media corruption, freedom of the press, and ethnic heterogeneity have been reversed so that higher numbers equal more corruption, more press freedom, and more ethnic heterogeneity.
Appendix 7.2 Additional figures

Figure 7.3  Women journalists in countries with low, medium, and high media corruption (1995–2015)

Comments: The women journalist variable is rescaled for the ease of interpretation and ranging from 0 (low share of women journalists) to 1 (high share of women journalists). 2,176 country-year observations.

Figure 7.4  Women’s political participation in countries with low, medium, and high media corruption (1995–2015)

Comments: The women’s political participation variable ranges from 0 (low participation) to 1 (high participation). 2,176 country-year observations.
The project Comparing Gender and Media Equality across the Globe has been funded by the Swedish Research Council (2016–2020) and is based at the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication (JMG) at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The GEM dataset and its codebook are free to use and can be downloaded in various formats. For access, contact JMG. Please ensure that proper attribution is given when citing the dataset.

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