

The Changing Face of the Population of Europe

- Geographical Distribution, Urbanization, Depopulation and
International Migration

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Contents

Preface

1. Introduction.....	7
2. The development of the population	11
3. The geographical distribution of the population of Europe.....	13
4. The fading shadow of mortality.....	16
5. Fertility – new trends, new behaviour; the impossible task of explaining and predicting.....	20
6. The greying of Europe	25
7. Family structures: partnership behaviour and economic environment.....	29
8. International migration pressure on Europe.....	41
References.....	59

List of tables

Table 1.1 The population of Europe by country	9
Table 1.2 Total fertility rates in selected European countries, 1985 and 1999.....	10
Table 2.1 Demographic indicators in the countries of the European Union and selected other European countries	11
Table 3.1 Size, population and population density of European Union countries, 1998/2000.	14
Table 4.1 Life expectancies at birth in Europe, by country, latest figures	18
Table 4.2 Life expectancies at certain ages in Hungary and the United Kingdom, males and females, 1980-1999	19
Table 5.1 Mean age of women at birth of first child, 1960-1999, by country.....	23
Table 6.1 Size and proportion of the population aged 65 and over	27
Table 6.2 Projected increases in the number of older people aged 65-74 and 75 and over, 1985-2025	28
Table 7.1 Crude marriage rates, 1960-1999.....	32
Table 7.2 Mean age of women at first marriage, 1960-1999.....	33
Table 7.3 Proportion of women cohabiting among all women in unions by age, selected countries and years.....	35
Table 7.4 Crude divorce rates in European countries, 1960-1999.....	36
Table 7.5 Female labour force participation rates in EU Member States, 1988-1998.....	38
Table 8.1 Immigration from other EEA countries, 1988-1997.....	43
Table 8.2 Immigration from non-EEA countries, 1988-1997.....	43
Table 8.3 Immigration by country of citizenship, 1997.....	44
Table 8.4 Emigration by country of citizenship, 1997.....	45
Table 8.5 Population by country of citizenship, 1997	45
Table 8.6 World population development 1990-2150. UN medium range forecast, by region	48
Table 8.7 World population development, 1990-2150, UN constant scenario, by region	49

Table 8.8 World population development by region, 1800-2150. Millions. Medium scenario	50
Table 8.9 World population development by region, 1800-2150. Percentage	50
Table 8.10 Total remittances as a proportion of merchandise exports and imports for selected countries	52
Table 8.11 Population development in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050	56
Table 8.12 Proportion of population aged 65 and over in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050	56
Table 8.13 Proportion of population aged 65 and over in the non-European population of Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050	57
Table 8.14 Proportion of the non-European population in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050	58

Preface

A whole series of factors affect both the immediate socio-economic situation in Europe and the Nordic Countries and the development of these regions, factors such as the planned and impending increase in the number of member states of the European Union, the omnipotent challenge of globalisation, demands at local, regional and national levels for sustainable environmental, economic and social welfare of populations. And not to be forgotten, the demographic development at all levels, both close to home and far afield.

The dynamics of population is essentially central to every single aspect of planning at every single imaginable level: from the individual to the workplace to the societal to the global levels. And thus, an understanding of the dynamics of population both historically and in a future perspective is a basic prerequisite for all policy making be it within a company, a municipality, a national government, Nordic institutions, European bodies or international organisations.

The demographic development in Europe is worrying because of the increasing imbalance between the proportion of the population economically active and the proportion inactive which puts pressure on the distribution of welfare and the transfer of resources from the active to the inactive. But of course, population development is not uniform within a country. Rural areas depopulate and age while growth in the metropolitan and urban areas affects the infrastructure there.

Apart from the obvious use of analysing population composition and change in terms of pure and simple numbers, the complex dynamics of migration (internal and international) is playing an increasingly important role in forming populations and affecting the entirety of the infrastructure that must be in place to meet the demands of the population (as it changes over time) – from child care to schooling to family support to housing to environmental welfare to workplaces to health care to care and services for older people. Family formation is a particularly interesting and important demographic and economic phenomenon in these respects as is ageing.

It should be remembered in relation to development and planning that demography is not an uncontrollable dimension. However, very few governments actually have a stated population policy, but elements of such a policy do exist more often than not in the form of other policy initiatives (for example, support for working mothers may have an indirect effect on fertility without that being the stipulated aim of the initiative). The possibilities of regulating immigration in order to combat ageing and declining populations in Europe is of increasing (political) interest in this respect.

In this overview of the demographics of the population of Europe, demographic areas such as geographical distribution, depopulation, urbanization, mortality, fertility, ageing, family formation and international migration are considered. The work has been carried out by George W. Leeson, Senior Research Associate at Nordregio as an exploratory phase to an anticipated larger piece of demographic research.

Stockholm, March 2002

1. Introduction

The population of Europe is constantly changing as is Europe's social and political environment – no more so than in recent years as Europe as a unit has made common moves and experienced common developments on a scale never seen before when the focus was on individual sovereign states.

The European Union (EU) is the obvious manifestation of this situation, created in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht. Linked to this Union via the European Economic Area is the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The European Economic Area was also established in 1993 to facilitate free trade and labour movement within the area. Many observers believe that the states of Europe have been converging in terms of social and economic indicators, but as yet, demographic indicators have not been regarded as objects of convergence or subjects of Commission Directives or the like. Indeed, member states of the Union themselves barely have formal population policies aimed at achieving concrete demographic targets.

However, as the Union and its individual members strive inevitably for convergence in social and economic indicators, it would seem increasingly probable and possible in the light of evidence provided by conventional socio-economic-demographic models that demographic indicators across Europe also begin to converge.

In a very broad sense, the purpose of the overview could be to elucidate whether or not demographic behaviour across Europe is indeed converging in modern Europe. And in this respect, demographic behaviour should be interpreted in the broadest possible sense and not simply be limited to the classical demographic components of fertility, mortality and migration.

Some may claim, however, that social, economic and demographic convergence was actually forced on that part of Europe under the influence of the Soviet Union by the communist dictatorships of the time prior to the onset of the total downfall of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989. By 1991, it had to all intents and purposes gone, and the boundaries of the new Europe were extended. Obviously, European population increased dramatically as a result of this extension of boundaries to include the former states of the Soviet Union, as is illustrated in Table 1.1

In the period prior to 1989-1991, the Eastern European countries had developed some common characteristics with regard to a number of socio-demographic variables (1, 2, 3) which differed sharply from trends and experience in Western European countries in the same period. This was true of fertility, mortality, household formation, marriage patterns, family structures and migration patterns. Since the dramatic (political) changes in these countries, however, some of them now witness equally dramatic changes in demographic behaviour, perhaps most notably with regard to international migration.

But demographic change is not limited to the former communist Eastern European countries. In the West, there have been changes too, especially with regard to fertility with levels reaching hitherto unseen lows before beginning a tentative ascent in more recent years in the north, while southern Europe experiences historically unique levels

of low fertility (Table 1.2). This post war development has been labelled *the second demographic transition* by some (4, for example) as fertility plummeted from the reproduction levels of classic demographic transition theory (5). Compounding what may be the second demographic transition for most developed countries and certainly those of Europe is the marked (double) ageing of their populations (6, 7) to which these countries' welfare systems are still struggling to adjust.

Continuing (or resumed) mortality declines and thereby increased survival is adding to the ageing of the populations, and after a period of stability with regard to international immigration at relatively low levels, Europe now experiences significant levels of gross immigration – without which incidentally the populations would begin to decline. Not surprisingly these – for some – alarming levels of immigration have affected the political debate in the whole of Europe with measures to restrict immigration and improve integration of resident immigrants climbing to the top of most governments' agendas either willingly or reluctantly.

Not only are the populations of Europe experiencing a variety of quite dramatic and country specific demographic developments, as mentioned, but as a group the European populations are becoming increasingly marginalized as global population development sees the populations of the African continent and Asia and South America all contribute to global population growth. With 375 million inhabitants on 1 January 1999, the European Union ranked third in world population well behind China (1242 million) and India (992 million). And while world population increased by 78 million in 1998, the European Union accounted for a mere 1 per cent of this increase. The European Union share of the global population is declining. In 1950, the 15 countries of the present Union comprised 12 per cent of world population. By the end of the 20th century this had decreased to just 7 per cent, and by the year 2050 it is expected to have declined even further to only 4 per cent.

At the national level, of course, this demographic development and its expected future development has given rise to widespread concern with regard to the ability of existing economic and welfare schemes to withstand the pressures arising from population development as well as with regard to the implications of the development for the health sector and the labour force in an increasingly competitive and global market.

Obviously, the fact that fertility seems since the mid 1980s to have settled at permanently low levels – indicating a new norm with regard to family size and the way in which children compete with other consumer goods in the modern family – has brought with it new forms of family formation and dissolution which in turn affect numbers and size of households, numbers of one-parent families. Again these phenomena affect in different ways welfare demands.

Table 1.1. The population of Europe by country, January 1, 2000.

Country	Pop. (mill)	Country	Pop. (mill)
<i>Northern Europe</i>		<i>Southern Europe</i>	
Estonia	1.44	Albania	3.25
Finland	5.17	Bosnia	4.33
Iceland	0.28	Croatia	4.53
Ireland	3.78	Greece	10.55
Latvia	2.42	Italy	57.68
Lithuania	3.70	Macedonia	2.01
Norway	4.45	Malta	0.38
Sweden	8.86	Portugal	9.99
United Kingdom	59.62	Slovenia	1.99
		Spain	39.44
		Yugoslavia	10.54
		Cyprus	0.75
<i>Western Europe</i>		<i>Eastern Europe</i>	
Austria	8.10	Belarus	10.02
Belgium	10.24	Bulgaria	8.19
Denmark	5.33	Czech Republic	10.28
France	59.22	Hungary	10.04
Germany	82.16	Poland	38.65
Luxembourg	0.44	Romania	22.46
Netherlands	15.87	Moldova	4.29
Switzerland	7.16	Russian Federation	145.56
Liechtenstein	0.03	Slovak Republic	5.40
San Marino	0.03	Ukraine	49.85
		Turkey	63.96
		Armenia	3.80
		Azerbaijan	8.02

Note: Figures for Albania 1995, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine 1999, Bosnia 1990, Yugoslavia 1995.

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.

Table 1.2 Total fertility rates in selected European countries, 1985 and 1999.

Country	TFR		Country	TFR	
	1985	1999		1985	1999
<i>Northern Europe</i>			<i>Southern Europe</i>		
Finland	1.64	1.74	Greece	1.67	1.30
Ireland	2.48	1.88	Italy	1.42	1.19
Norway	1.68	1.84	Portugal	1.72	1.49
Sweden	1.74	1.50	Spain	1.64	1.20
United Kingdom	1.79	1.68	Yugoslavia	2.22	1.77
<i>Western Europe</i>			<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
Austria	1.47	1.32	Bulgaria	1.98	1.23
Belgium	1.51	1.61	Czech Republic	1.96	1.13
Denmark	1.45	1.73	Hungary	1.85	1.29
France	1.81	1.77	Poland	2.32	1.37
Germany	1.37	1.36	Romania	2.32	1.30
Netherlands	1.51	1.65	Russian Federation	2.05	1.17
Switzerland	1.52	1.48	Turkey	3.59	2.38

Note: For Yugoslavia 1997, Turkey 1998.

Source: *Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000*, Council of Europe.

The central position of demographic development in all aspects of social and economic life is undisputed. Much of more recent development is so new that its effects on fundamental values and behaviour in European society remain unelucidated, and there is therefore a (growing) need for socio-economic-demographic research in a magnitude of areas if Europe is to meet the demands – whatever they may be – of changing population.

Europe's population as illustrated partly above is by no means evenly distributed between the countries or within the different countries, and neither is demographic development a transnationally consistent phenomenon. Not only are there differences between countries, but the relationship between demographic components in the different regions of Europe changes over time.

This was illustrated excellently in the course of the classical demographic transition across Europe and the more recent reversal of the relationship between fertility levels in northern and southern Europe respectively as seen from the material in table 1.2.

In global terms, the member states of the European Union are indisputably to be regarded as more advanced and developed countries, both in economic and in demographic terms. The classical demographic transition from high levels of mortality and fertility to low levels began here and began early – as early as the end of the 18th century in France. This has made Europe one of the global leaders in terms of demographic development. For the 15 members of the Union, life expectancy at birth in 1997 was 80.9 years for females and 74.6 years for males. This compares to 79.5 and 72.8 respectively for the United States and figures of 40-65 years on the African continent (8). Infant mortality at 5.3 per thousand live births is lower than the United

States level of 6.6 and approximately half the level in industrialized countries in general.

Other factors such as urbanization and depopulation of outlying rural areas are also at the forefront of contemporary demographic development as is the theme of spatial polarization. In the following chapters, these various demographic and related factors will be outlined and summarized with the paper looking mainly at relevant trends towards the end of the 20th century with a view to pinpointing areas of research relevance for regional development within Nordregio's working programme.

2. The Development of the Population

Overall, Europe's population is growing slowly. In 1999, for example, population growth rates varied from -1.58 per cent in Belarus to 1.50 per cent in Luxembourg, but of the larger European countries, growth rates were 0.43 per cent in France, 0.09 in Germany, 0.12 in Italy and Spain, 0.39 in the United Kingdom and -0.53 in the Russian Federation. In 1998, 17 European countries had negative rates of growth, mainly countries from Eastern Europe (9). In the European Union, however, population growth is positive albeit extremely low – just 2 per 1000, with Germany the only country with a negative rate of growth (0.2 per 1000 in 1998) (8).

Table 2.1. Demographic indicators in the countries of the European Union and selected other European countries, 1999.

Country	Crude Birth Rate per 1000	Crude Death Rate per 1000	Total Fertility	Infant Mortality per 1000	Life Expectancy Male Female	
Austria	9.7	9.7	1.32	4.3	75.1	81.0
Belgium	11.2	10.3	1.61	5.3	74.8	81.1
Denmark	12.4	11.1	1.73	4.2	74.2	79.0
Finland	11.1	9.6	1.74	3.6	73.8	81.0
France	12.6	9.2	1.77	4.8	74.7	82.2
Germany	9.4	10.3	1.36	4.6	74.5	80.5
Greece	9.7	9.8	1.30	5.9	75.4	80.4
Ireland	14.2	8.4	1.88	5.5	73.9	79.1
Italy	9.1	9.9	1.19	5.2	75.7	81.6
Luxembourg	12.9	8.8	1.73	2.9	74.7	81.2
Netherlands	2.7	8.9	1.65	5.2	75.3	80.5
Portugal	11.6	10.8	1.49	5.6	72.0	79.1
Spain	9.6	9.4	1.20	4.9	75.0	82.0
Sweden	10.0	10.7	1.50	3.4	77.1	81.9
UK	11.8	10.6	1.68	5.8	75.0	79.8
Norway	13.3	10.1	1.84	3.9	75.6	81.1
Iceland	14.8	6.9	1.99	2.4	73.9	79.1
Bulgaria	8.8	13.6	1.23	14.9	68.3	75.1
Hungary	9.4	14.2	1.29	8.4	66.4	75.2
Russian Fed.	8.4	14.8	1.17	16.9	59.9	72.4

Note: Some life expectancies relate to the year 1998.

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.

The members of the European Union have all with the exception of the Republic of Ireland experienced significant population growth in the course of the 20th century, but there is some diversity in the growth. While Ireland's population grew by only 9 per cent, that of Greece grew by over 300 per cent, but despite this growth in Europe, Europe's global population position as already mentioned has declined.

By the end of the 20th century, there were only moderate relatively differences in demographic indicators across the European Union (table 2.1).

Thus, despite traditionally different cultures, crude birth rates in the Union at the end of the 20th century ranged from only 9.1 per 1000 population in Italy in the south to 14.2 in Ireland in the west, and total fertility rates from just 1.19 in Italy again to 1.88 in Ireland. The interesting feature is perhaps not so much the moderate range of fertility as the structure of fertility patterns by country. What were once seen as high fertility cultures (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) have become the low fertility belt in Europe with levels lower than those experienced in the northern and western countries of Europe in the early-mid 1980s when their fertility was at its lowest (table 1.2). And this latter group of countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands) now finds itself with some of the highest levels in the Union. Infant mortality rates are nowhere in excess of 6 per 100 live births, lowest in the north. Crude death rates are also very similar within the Union, the highest rate being found in Denmark with 11.1 per 1000 population. These crude death rates illustrate the fact that the European populations are old. Life expectancies are around 75 years for males and just over 80 years for females almost everywhere, the exceptions being Portuguese, Finnish and Irish males (all under 74 years) and Danish, Irish and Portuguese females (all around 79 years).

If Bulgaria, Hungary and the Russian Federation are considered and compared with the other countries, the differences though generally speaking not dramatic are clear. Death rates are higher, birth rates are lower, fertility is lower, life expectancies are lower and infant mortality is higher. Somewhere in these figures lies the legacy of these countries' experience and situation in communist Eastern Europe. The life expectancy for Russian males is particularly striking, being at a level (59.9 years) not seen in northern Europe for almost 100 years.

It is interesting to note that at the turn of the 20th century, life expectancies for both sexes was approximately 50 years and infant mortality was more than 100 per thousand live births – comparable to a great number of developing countries today. The changes in just 100 years are striking and pose the sensible question: what bring the future?

The contribution of international migration to the development of European populations is without question. However, whereas Europe traditionally was once an exporter of peoples (to North America and Australasia especially), its role has changed in the post war period – perhaps even more so towards the end of the 20th century.

In the immediate post war period and up until the 1960s-early 1970s, Europe could be divided into two groups of countries as far as migration characteristics were concerned. In some, economic growth relied on the import of foreign labour – notably France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark from both former colonies but

also countries like Turkey and (the former) Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the countries of southern Europe became exporters of labour, especially Italy, Spain and Portugal. This picture changed, however, after the 1970s as a result of an economic slowdown in the wake of the oil crises, changing labour needs in a changing workplace (the growth of the service sector), the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe. As a result of the changing global situation and the factors mentioned above, countries like Denmark for example, witness ethnic groups from the period of labour immigration in the 1960s and 1970s together with the appearance of minorities not seen in the country just 15-20 years ago (Iranians, Iraqis and Somalians). With rates of natural increase hovering around zero (some positive, some negative), the contribution of migration to European population growth is undeniable.

As well as contributing to population growth, migration offers new challenges to Europe both as far as integration is concerned but also with regard to ensuring their positive contribution to increased welfare – in all regions.

3. The Geographical Distribution of the Population of Europe

As already discussed, the population of the European Union is not evenly distributed between the 15 countries of the Union. Nor is it evenly distributed between the various parts of the individual countries. One of the main features of the development in the geographical distribution of population – not just in Europe but globally – in the 20th century has been the movement of people to urban areas and the subsequent depopulation of rural areas. In a broader sense, spatial polarization is also an issue as urban conglomerations grow at the expense of peripheral areas at the national level but also at the European level. It should be remembered that interpretations and forecasts of future trends in this field will be complicated by the new trends in international migration.

Table 3.1 illustrates the diversity in the populations of the 15 countries of the European Union with regard to size and density.

The countries of the European Union vary considerably as can be seen from table 3.1 in terms of areal size, population size and population density. In terms of population size, the variation is from less than ½ million inhabitants in Luxembourg to over 80 million in Germany.

Table 3.1. Size, population and population density of European Union countries, 1998/2000.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Area (1000 sq.km)</u>	<u>Population (1000s)</u>	<u>Density (per sq.km.)</u>
Austria	84	8102.6	96
Belgium	31	10239.1	334
Denmark	43	5330.0	123
Finland	338	5171.3	15
France	544	59225.7	108
Germany	357	82163.5	230
Greece	132	10545.7	80
Ireland	69	3776.6	54
Italy	301	57679.9	191
Luxembourg	3	435.7	164
Netherlands	41	15864.0	382
Portugal	92	9997.6	108
Spain	505	39441.7	78
Sweden	411	8861.4	22
UK	242	59623.4	244

Note: Area – 1998, Population – 2000, Density 1998.

Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2000, Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.

Likewise land area from Luxembourg at 3000 square km. the smallest to France at 544000 the largest. However, with regard to population density, Netherlands leads the field with a density of 382 inhabitants per square km., while Finland at the other end of the scale has only 15 inhabitants per square km.

These differences alone are sufficient to underline the uneven geographical distribution of the population of the European Union between its 15 member countries. Within countries, there are even more marked differences. All countries have enormous density differences from their metropolitan to their peripheral regions: in the United Kingdom, for example, from London, Manchester and Birmingham to the highlands of Scotland, the moors of Yorkshire and mountains of Wales; in Germany from the Berlin area to the more rural regions such as Mecklenburg-Verpommern.

It is hardly surprising that the centres of high population density (300 plus per square km.) in the European Union are located in and around a number of the capitals: London, Berlin, Bruxelles, Amsterdam (and most of Belgium and the Netherlands), Paris, Rome (and Milan), Athens and Madrid. Not all capital regions, however, necessarily have high population densities: Dublin, Copenhagen being examples of this. By far the vast majority of land area in Sweden and Finland have extremely low population density levels, with countries like Greece and Spain having relatively low levels of population density (around 80).

Urbanization is an old, longstanding feature of countries like the United Kingdom and Belgium, whereas the smaller member states such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal

have experienced urbanization at a later date and can expect to continue rapid urbanization in the near future (10).

Since the 1950s, rates of urban growth have usually been highest in those areas where urbanization at the outset was limited. In the final 50 years of the 20th century, Greece experienced the most dramatic increase in levels of urban growth up until the 1970s whereafter Portugal and Ireland dominated the process of urbanization in the European Union.

In this same period, rural areas almost everywhere have experienced depopulation.

Will these trends continue and with what consequences? Or will there be a counteraction leading to counter-urbanization, perhaps even as a form of conscious regional policy?

As already mentioned, urbanization has tended to be universally accompanied in the more developed countries at least where spatial fertility differences are limited by rural depopulation (11). However, this trend need not be unchallengeable. Even though urban populations probably will continue to increase in the future, improved transportation infrastructures, housing economics, relocation of workplaces, changing lifestyles and other factors may encourage population settlement and growth in more outlying areas. There are indications that larger metropolitan areas actually begin to lose population to smaller urban regions in a process termed counter-urbanization (12), a process which sees suburbanization and the growth of urban dormitory areas rather than a general repopulation of more peripheral rural areas still left to fight with chronic depopulation and its social and economic consequences. In this respect, the World Bank has pointed out the declining role of Europe's larger cities as far as accommodating urban population is concerned towards the end of the 20th century (13).

In an historical perspective, it is interesting to observe the reversal of trends in urban population growth. In the United Kingdom, for example, a study of 280 labour market areas revealed that there was a clear relationship between urban population size and growth rates with the six largest cities losing population most rapidly and the 52 rural areas included in the study gaining population most rapidly (14). Likewise in France, a positive relationship between size and net migration rates transformed into a negative relationship by the 1980s, the only settlements still growing by virtue of migration being those with less than 20,000 inhabitants (15). And finally in Germany (16) a clear counter-urbanization trend emerged towards the end of the 1970s. These trends it was anticipated would continue, but there does seem to be some body of evidence that this was not the case but that some of the large cities in Europe followed patterns in the United States with renewed population growth. Much of the slowing down in metropolitan population loss was due to reduced internal migration and increased international immigration, primarily to these areas. London and Paris in the late 1980s and early 1990s are examples of this development. But the trends and claimed reversals of trends are by no means universal. In Scandinavia, peripheral areas continue to experience depopulation, and one of the consequences apart from declining population would seem to be a marginalisation of population with the less economically active groups (aged population and unemployed or unemployable) populating these regions, thereby weakening the local tax base.

All in all, the latter half of the 20th century presents a confusing and even contradictory picture of rural-urban population development trends that make it extremely difficult to foresee developments in the early part of the 21st century. Perhaps larger proportions of national populations will be living in urban areas with increasing proportions living in functional urban areas (urban centres with dormitory towns and rural areas making up the commuter-watershed), but will they be found in the traditional economic core regions or in the more peripheral areas. And what of the development at the European Union level? Will we see a similar development transferred to the EU level with certain national economic magnets attracting not just their own nationals but those of other countries too? And what will this development entail for socio-economic-demographic trends?

Up until now at least, the populations of Europe have been sending researchers and planners conflicting messages as to their expected behaviour. The development of the new economy favours some say the large metropolitan centres and the smaller city prestige environments.

But what then of the future of Europe's population geography? Will the admission in coming years of former communist Eastern European countries to the European Union with its single market and (almost) single currency strengthen the westward flow of emigrants from these countries? How will the European Union react to the continuing build-up of population pressure along its southern borders?

4. The Fading Shadow of Mortality

Across Europe, the shadow of mortality has been lifting throughout the 20th century, the result being that new generations of Europeans can expect to live longer than any other previous generations – and significantly longer than their parents and grandparents and great grandparents, all of whom are likely to be alive when these new generations are born.

But has the shadow been fading uniformly across Europe? Evidence already presented in table 2.1 indicates that this is not the case that the countries of Eastern Europe are being left behind in the surge for immortality.

In the post war years, European countries fell quite nicely and orderly and naturally into a two tier classification as far as life expectancies were concerned with the more developed northern countries leading the way ahead of the less developed southern and eastern countries (17). In 1950, for example, female life expectancy in Norway at the head of the table was approximately 74 years compared with just 55 in Albania. Likewise, male life expectancy at that time in Norway and the Netherlands was approximately 71 years while in Albania it was only approximately 50 years, which it had not been in Norway since the turn of the 20th century 50 years earlier. European life expectancies did converge, however, in the course of the next 20-25 years especially as high mortality countries in the south and east experienced quite dramatic declines while the low mortality countries of the north were finding it difficult to push levels even lower. As a result by the 1970s, female life expectancy in Albania had increased to 70 years, now within 10 years of Norwegian levels, and male life expectancy in Portugal – at 64 years the lowest in 1970 – was within 10 years of that in Sweden. Not only had the countries become more grouped, but France, Greece and

Spain had moved up into the leaders' category and eastern countries were no longer so far behind.

At the end of the 20th century, the situation had changed again, as illustrated in table 4.1. While the countries of the European Union had continued their overall mortality declines and increasing life expectancies at birth – the exception being Portuguese males – the Baltic States and the Eastern European countries are falling noticeably behind again – male life expectancy in the Russian Federation for example is alarmingly low, apparently as a result of the high incidence of suicides and deaths from alcohol abuse. However, other Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Bulgaria also show signs of a stagnating development in life expectancies, especially for males.

Life expectancy at birth for Hungarian males had fallen from approximately 67.5 years in 1965 to 65 years in 1990 managing to increase only slightly to 66.4 years by the end of the century. Bulgaria, Poland and Bulgaria have experienced similar trends in life expectancy with stagnation or at best only slight improvements.

The post war period is thus an interesting period in terms of European mortality development with the above-mentioned east-west differences in development. In the following, Hungary and the United Kingdom will be used as brief examples to give an overview of some of the development.

In Hungary, death rates increased more or less continuously for three decades but there was evidence in the calendar year measures of improvement in the mid 1990s. However, this was short-lived and mortality conditions worsened again by the end of the 1990s. Since the 1960s, infant mortality has improved substantially while that of males aged 35-64 years deteriorated significantly and contributed to declining life expectancies for the adult population. In 1960, male life expectancy at age 45 was 27.6 years (9), but this had declined to just 23.9 in 1993 and only increased slightly to 24.9 years by the end of the century. There would also appear to be quite striking urban-rural differences in especially male mortality levels in Hungary. There was also some increase in female mortality levels between ages 20 and 60 but nowhere near that experienced by males.

In the United Kingdom, mortality experience is quite different with mortality levels falling throughout the period at almost all ages, and with the exception of decreases in infant mortality, the mortality decline at around age 40 was the most significant in the 1970-1990 period.

Table 4.1. Life expectancies at birth in Europe, by country, latest figures.

Country	Life expectancy		Country	Life expectancy	
	Male	Female		Male	Female
<i>Northern Europe</i>			<i>Southern Europe</i>		
Estonia	65.5	76.3	Albania	69.6	75.5
Finland	73.8	81.0	Bosnia	69.7	75.2
Iceland	77.8	81.5	Croatia	68.4	76.0
Ireland	73.9	79.1	Greece	75.4	80.4
Latvia	64.8	75.4	Italy	75.7	81.6
Lithuania	67.0	77.2	Macedonia	70.4	74.5
Norway	75.6	81.1	Malta	74.0	80.1
Sweden	77.1	81.9	Portugal	72.0	79.1
UK	75.0	79.8	Slovenia	71.8	79.3
Spain	75.0	82.0	Yugoslavia	70.0	74.9
			Cyprus	75.3	80.4
<i>Western Europe</i>			<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
Austria	75.1	81.0	Belarus	62.2	74.0
Belgium	74.8	81.1	Bulgaria	68.3	75.1
Denmark	74.2	79.0	Czech Republic	71.4	78.2
France	74.7	82.2	Hungary	66.4	75.2
Germany	74.5	80.5	Poland	68.2	77.2
Luxembourg	74.7	81.2	Romania	67.1	74.1
Netherlands	75.3	80.5	Moldova	64.2	71.5
Switzerland	76.8	82.5	Russian Fed.	59.9	72.4
			Slovak Republic	69.0	77.2
			Ukraine	63.0	74.0
			Turkey	66.5	71.2
			Armenia	72.5	77.0
			Azerbaijan	67.9	73.6

Source: *Recent demographic development in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.*

Table 4.2 presents some of this development for the two countries illustrated by the development in life expectancies at certain ages over more recent years.

Declining life expectancy at birth for Hungarian males is due primarily to increasing mortality in the age range 30-64 years which outweighs the decline in infant mortality which would otherwise lead to an increase in life expectancies at birth. This was not true for females where the increase in adult mortality was not substantial enough to outweigh the decreases in female infant mortality. In contrast, life expectancies at birth in the United Kingdom increase throughout the period and for both sexes as mortality declines at almost all ages. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is particularly the scale of the decline in adult and old age mortality which contributes to the observed increases in life expectancies at birth as infant mortality although declining is already so low in this country that the contribution of this decline to the increase in life expectancy at birth is more modest. And towards the end of the 20th century, al-

Table 4.2. Life expectancies at certain ages in Hungary and the United Kingdom, males and females, 1980-1999.

	Hungary				United Kingdom			
	Age 0		Age 45		Age 0		Age 45	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1980	65.5	72.7	25.4	30.9	70.8	76.9	28.5	33.9
1985	65.1	73.1	25.0	31.2	71.7	77.6	29.2	34.3
1990	65.2	73.7	24.8	31.6	72.9	78.6	30.3	35.1
1993	64.4	73.7	23.9	31.4	73.5	78.8	30.7	35.3
1995	65.3	74.5	24.5	31.9	74.0	79.2	31.2	35.7
1999	66.4	75.2	24.9	32.2	75.0	79.8	32.1	36.1

Source: *Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000*, Council of Europe.

most all of the increase in life expectancy at birth in the United Kingdom is thanks to decreases in mortality at relatively high ages. And in Hungary the latter part of the 1990s saw the scale of the difference in development between on the one hand infant mortality and on the other hand adult mortality decrease and life expectancies at age 45 began to increase thus giving increasing life expectancies at birth too.

In the near future, it will be interesting to follow developments in mortality in the Eastern European countries especially in order to determine whether or not European mortality again begins to converge as these countries continue to undergo radical social, economic and political changes with several of them on the verge of becoming members of the European Union.

To date there have been no comprehensive studies of the (sub)geographical variations in mortality throughout Europe, but national studies would indicate that there are interesting points of issue. There is not apparently any strong relationship between life expectancy at birth and (national) wealth. In 1998, Luxembourg had the highest gross domestic product at market prices per capita in the European Union – higher even than the United States and Japan – but ranked only eleventh in terms of life expectancy at birth for females and eighth for males. On the other hand, France which ranked top in terms of female life expectancy at birth ranks only number twelve in terms of GDP per capita. Nor does there seem to be a clear relationship between mortality and the quality of health care and social provision, although of course the quality of such services is extremely difficult to define and determine in any acceptable transnationally comparable way. Some Southern European countries which score poorly on this quality rating have low mortality levels (18). Likewise the relationship between mortality and levels of education.

Rather than being linked to such empirically definable factors, mortality seems increasingly to be related to life styles and behaviour which cut across the statistical and economical categorization of countries. Examples of such are smoking, alcohol consumption and the consumption of animal fats. For instance, alcohol-related cancer mortality is six times greater in the northwest of France than in southern Italy, and lung cancer mortality is much higher in the United Kingdom and Germany as well as the Benelux countries where smoking has long been widespread and started at least a generation ago among younger people. Mortality from cardiovascular diseases is

generally higher in Northern Europe where the use of animal fats is extensive compared with the Southern European countries where such mortality is lower.

Further research on these aspects would doubtless be assisted by the development of spatial perspectives.

The rate of change in mortality across Europe will probably slow down as life expectancies at birth creep towards what many regard as their natural maximum – perhaps around 90 years. Spatial variation will narrow as may sex differences but social differences may persist.

5. Fertility – new trends, new behaviours: The impossible task of explaining and predicting

In the words of American demographer Lincoln Day (19), fertility is the most evasive demographic component when it comes down to finding universal explanations for its historic development over time, thereby making predictions of its future development as good as impossible. Despite this, understanding fertility and the mechanisms of its change have attracted an enormous amount of research interest throughout the 20th century. This is unlikely to change as we move into the 21st century.

Generally speaking, the countries of Europe have come through the demographic transition and even entered what some demographers call the second demographic transition. When fertility levels reached reproduction levels in the 1930s and 1940s in most of Europe, it was widely thought that they could go no lower. However, apart from a short-lived baby-boom in the mid 1960s, fertility moved down from its reproduction level plateau and began an uninterrupted descent comparable to that seen in the final stage of the classical demographic transition.

And when in the mid 1980s the countries of Northern Europe bottomed with fertility levels at around 1.5 or below, it was predicted that they would increase – and that such low levels were a demographic phenomenon the likes of which would not be seen again. The fertility experience of Spain and Italy has proved such predictions wrong.

It is important to underline that there has never been a European pattern of fertility and probably never will be. Even during the demographic transition there were major differences both with regard to fertility levels and with regard to the date of the onset of the continual fertility decline.

But how did we get here? And more importantly, where do we go from here?

In the mid 1980s, as mentioned, many industrialised countries – not just in Europe – were experiencing historically low levels of fertility, and there was a widespread fear among demographers and decision-makers that this birth shortage inevitably would lead to population decline unless international migration could (and was wanted to) compensate for the negative natural increase of the population. A great deal of research was done at the time to document the consequences of declining and ageing populations which had climbed up the political agenda (20).

Although calendar measures of fertility indicated a plateau at reproduction level in the 1930s and 1940s at what was seen as the end of the classical demographic transition and a subsequent further decline to levels significantly below replacement levels, generational measures of fertility indicated that in fact it seemed more feasible that fertility levels had simply been undergoing a continuous smooth decline since the decline of the transition had begun. In some countries – Denmark, for example – this downward trend had certainly been interrupted by periodic increases (during and immediately after the 2nd World War and in the mid 1960s), but these were by no means indicators of new lasting trends.

As mentioned there has always been and still is a diversity in European fertility levels, but in general trends have been the same, albeit with time lags from north to south and from east to west, and today most countries have fertility levels below reproduction levels, the only exception being Turkey (table 1.2).

Day (19) implied that there is little or no agreement on the cause(s) of these trends. It may be that fundamental norms and values with regard to the need and desire to have children have changed radically and (for a time at least) permanently as societies and their members have become increasingly hedonistic leaving little room for children. Or it may be that the underlying economic structure in modern societies has changed and taken these childbearing norms with it. Evidence around the globe points in all directions. Wealthy nations – with welfare levels more than sufficient to induce childbearing – face massive population decline without compensating international migration while a country like Pakistan in the midst of an economic recession seems to be on the verge of a fertility transition despite the economic climate (21).

Thus, despite some increase in fertility levels in some countries towards the end of the 20th century, fertility remains well and truly below replacement levels of 2.1 in Europe and seems to be a characteristic of post-industrial societies. The distinct geographical variations in the inter-war years were clear to see in a north-south and a core-periphery difference. But as fertility plummeted, these variations became less and less distinct and there was instead a polarization.

Fertility decline has not developed alone. It has been accompanied by quite dramatic shifts in associated behaviour (marriage patterns, divorce patterns, family structures, ages at birth, contraception methods etc) which in turn may or may not be affected by the social and economic climate in a country or region. The postponement of childbearing has always been a natural control of fertility – it was even proposed by Malthus in his *Essays on Population* by way of delaying marriage, and in Europe the average age of women at first birth has increased steadily (Table 5.1) even towards the end of the 20th century when fertility began a tentative upturn in some countries. However, there is still distinct national variation across Europe – a variation which seems to have become more accentuated since 1960. In 1960, the lowest (registered) mean age at birth of first child was 22.1 years in Bulgaria, with the highest being 26.1 years in Switzerland, a difference of 4 years. By the end of the 20th century, the lowest mean age was 23.0 years – still in Bulgaria and also in the Russian Federation. So over a period of 40 years, this mean age had increased by less than one year in Bulgaria where total fertility in the same period had almost halved, falling from 2.32 to 1.23 (9). The highest mean age at birth of first child in Europe in 1999 was 28.9 in the United Kingdom and Spain giving a difference of almost 6 years.

It is interesting to note here that Bulgarian fertility has declined so dramatically with no accompanying significant increase in mean age at first birth, thereby indicating that other factors play a central role in driving the fertility decline. It may be a case not so much of postponing births but stopping one's reproductive behaviour after the birth of the first child at a relatively early age. In contrast, in countries like Denmark, both of these phenomena seem to be present – postponement and stopping once the child is born. In other words, in terms of reproductive behaviour, northern European women start late and stop immediately.

These developments across Europe are made possible by the widespread and easy access to (cheap) efficient modern methods of contraception, to which must be added the access on demand to free abortion.

As mentioned above, however, such period aggregate measures of fertility may well distort the true development of fertility over time. For example, in relation to this mean age at first birth, the period measure development illustrated in table 5.1 for Denmark, with an increase from 23.1 years in 1960 to 27.4 years in 1995, masks the fact that for the generation of women born in 1935, this mean age was 26.2 years, and for the generation born in 1955 it is 26.8 years, a decidedly more modest increase.

The problem is of course that period measures such as total fertility rates and calendar year mean ages at first birth are based on the experience of all female generations in the reproductive age range from 15 to 49 years, and therefore there is a real danger that period measures may exaggerate the (true) generational experience. However, it remains true that generations of women born after the 1950s are unlikely to have completed fertility levels that exceed replacement level fertility (22).

Table 5.1 Mean age of women at birth of first child, 1960-1999, by country.

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1999
<i>Northern Europe</i>									
Estonia			24.1	23.6	23.2	23.2	22.9	23.0	23.8
Finland	24.7	24.6	24.4	24.9	25.6	25.9	26.5	27.2	27.4
Iceland			21.3	21.8	21.9	23.1	24.0	24.9	25.1
Ireland				25.5	25.5	26.1	26.6	27.3	27.6
Latvia					22.9	23.0	23.0	23.3	24.2
Lithuania					23.8	24.1	23.2	23.1	23.7
Norway							25.6	26.4	26.8
Sweden	25.5	25.2	25.9	24.4	25.3	26.1	26.3	27.2	27.9
United Kingdom							27.3	28.3	28.9
<i>Western Europe</i>									
Austria						24.3	25.0	25.6	26.3
Belgium	24.8	24.5	24.3	24.4	24.7	25.5	26.4		
Denmark	23.1	22.7	23.8	23.9	24.6	25.7	26.4	27.4	
France	24.8	24.4	24.4	24.5	25.0	25.9	27.0	28.1	
Germany	25.0	24.4	24.0	24.5	25.0	26.1	26.6	27.5	27.9
Luxembourg								27.9	28.3
Netherlands	25.7	25.2	24.8	25.2	25.7	26.6	27.6	28.4	28.7
Switzerland	26.1	25.6	25.3	25.7	26.3	27.0	27.6	28.1	28.5
<i>Southern Europe</i>									
Bosnia			22.5	22.4	22.8	23.6	23.6		
Croatia			22.0	22.3	22.8	23.6	24.1	25.0	25.4
Greece					24.1	24.5	25.5	26.6	27.2
Italy	25.8	25.4	25.1	24.7	25.0	25.9	26.9	28.0	
Macedonia						23.3	23.4	23.7	24.1
Portugal					24.0	24.2	24.9	25.8	26.4
Slovenia	24.8	24.2	23.7	23.0	22.8	23.1	23.7	24.9	26.1
Spain				25.1	25.0	25.8	26.8	28.4	28.9
Yugoslavia			22.6	22.8	23.2	23.6	23.9	24.5	
Cyprus				24.0	23.8	23.7	24.7	25.5	25.8
<i>Eastern Europe</i>									
Bulgaria	22.1	22.2	22.1	22.1	21.9	21.9	22.2	22.4	23.0
Czech Republic	22.9	22.7	22.5	22.5	22.4	22.3	22.5	23.3	24.6
Hungary	22.9	22.9	22.8	22.5	22.4	22.8	23.1	23.8	24.8
Poland	25.0	23.5	22.8	23.0	23.4	23.5	23.3	23.8	24.2
Romania		22.9	22.6	22.5	22.4	22.6	22.6	23.0	23.5
Russian Federation					23.0	22.9	22.6	22.7	23.0
Slovak Republic	22.7	22.7	22.6	22.8	22.7	22.6	22.6	23.0	23.8

Source: *Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000*, Council of Europe.

The clear and transnational trend towards higher mean ages at first birth could also reflect changes in marriage patterns with marriage itself being postponed. Add to this the common practice of cohabitation – especially but not exclusively in Northern Europe – and the picture begins to become complex and not always helpful in trying to explain developments in fertility.

Whatever the causes, it is tempting to conclude at this stage that fertility behaviour and the associated norms and values as far as marriage and childbearing are concerned do appear to have undergone radical change, and it also tempting to conclude that this change is fundamental and long-lasting – at least until the next change appears on the fertility scene. But does this all mean that modern men and women include having a child in the whole raft of (consumer) choices they are faced with and make constantly? Children compete with this raft of choices and in addition are time consumers par excellence. Is there then a clear and conscious choice NOT to have children – or at least not to have too many? As mentioned it is tempting to see this as a natural consequence of the social and economic changes in Europe with the role of women in society becoming increasingly like that of men. And with that role comes independence and self-determination.

Modern methods of contraception have made it disarmingly simple to determine the exact number of children and the exact timing of births so that they do not interfere with the plans of modern men and women.

Is a larger proportion of women deciding to remain childless? In England & Wales, almost 10 per cent of the 1946-generation of women were childless by age 40. This had risen to almost 20 per cent for the 1960-generation. For Denmark, the corresponding figures are 8 per cent and 15 per cent respectively; for the Netherlands, 12 and 20 per cent. The picture though at varying levels is the same in many countries. However, childlessness is not a contemporary phenomenon by any means. In the past, as much as a fifth of female generations remained unmarried and as a result mainly childless (23), but lifetime childlessness is an important and growing feature of low fertility in Europe although it does not seem to bear any relation to period fertility measures. Childlessness can, of course, be both a voluntary and an involuntary state, but surveys continue to show that the desired family size is two children – whether or not this is a true desire or a statement of the likely fate of most women is unclear.

In the 1970s and 1980s, considerable effort was made to link fertility to economic factors (for example 24-25) in the way described above with decisions on having a child described as rational consideration of the costs involved in relation to the household economy. Children become so-called consumer durables. In times of recession, the argument then is that fertility will be lower than in times of an economic upswing. There is little long-term evidence to suggest that this a universal truth.

It has also been argued that fertility is influenced by generation size and relative economic status (25). This would mean that the baby-bust generations as they enter adulthood would enjoy increased relative economic status thereby giving rise to increased levels of fertility – in theory at least. Easterlin's models did not take into account the influx of women into the workplace since the 1970s, and the high opportunity costs of leaving the workplace to have and bring up children should lead to declining fertility. However, experience in Sweden is a case in point where extensive social policy measures to reduce these opportunity costs and help women to remain in employment even after giving birth seem to succeed in maintaining or even increasing fertility levels. But as always, there are exceptions to the (apparent) rule that female labour force participation depresses fertility. Southern Europe may have

historically low fertility levels, but female labour force participation is lower than that of Northern Europe. In Italy, for example, where total fertility was only 1.19 in 1998, 59.8 per cent of females aged 25-49 are active in the labour force. In comparison, 84.4 per cent of women in this age group are active in Denmark where fertility is 1.73 (8).

Secularization is a socio-cultural change that undoubtedly has influenced fertility levels in Europe – perhaps especially in the Roman Catholic countries of the south. As religion has moved from the public to the private sphere, this may have contributed to the fertility decline in these countries.

Whatever, the relationships are complex and undergoing constant change and reshaping. Add to this the spurious effects of pro-natalist population policies.

6. The Greying of Europe

The massive ageing of populations is a quite recent phenomenon having begun in the 20th century, and today it receives high-profile political attention as it rapidly becomes a global issue. No country in the world can hide from the (inevitable) greying of its population. In historical terms, however, some aspects of ageing are not so recent. Life expectancies have increased before though perhaps more modestly and less rapidly, increases from the low 30s in the 17th century to the low 50s taking as much as three hundred years among some (aristocratic) groups (of especially females).

Understanding the ageing of a population is an issue with many interesting and essential facets. It is of vital importance that we understand the mechanics of population ageing as we should also attempt to understand the dynamics of population development as a whole. Without this understanding we cannot hope to produce population projections which with justification can be applied in all aspects of social and economic planning. Furthermore, we need to understand the consequences of population ageing at a micro and a macro level, that is for the individual (regardless of age) and for society, and this understanding is itself confounded by other factors which are affecting population development at the same time. And finally, there is the political dogfight with regard to the economics of ageing that must be based on trustworthy demographic analysis.

A misunderstanding of population ageing can lead to misguided population projections which then leave decision-makers at all levels with unreliable demographic tools.

Much has been written and said about the magnitude, the causes and the consequences of population ageing (for example, 26-30) in all industrial countries, and global ageing is receiving more and more attention too (31). But in fact an understanding of population ageing demands a look at the past development and characteristics of population. The population distribution we can observe today is the result of past demographic behaviour in terms of fertility, mortality, migration, marriage patterns and the like, and where this behaviour has led to regional or national differences, the differences and the particular characteristics will age with the generations involved. As well as the pure demographic effects (if such phenomena exist), there are short-term social or global events which can effect population quite dramatically – war, massive displacement of populations, for example. This, of course, is particularly

relevant for the aged populations of Europe today, and in view of the major upheavals in Europe through the 1990s, this will also be the case as far as shaping the demographic future of Europe is concerned.

Much of the alarmist approach to ageing populations has been fuelled by experience of and reaction to population change in the United States, where the first 75 years of the 20th century were characterized by relatively high fertility levels and high rates of immigration and accompanying late attention being paid to public expenditure on aged people, especially in the form of health care services. As a consequence, this public expenditure almost exploded and gave the impression that the population had suddenly aged.

Table 6.1 shows the size of the population aged 65 and over in the countries of Europe at the end of the 20th century. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over is also shown.

At the beginning of the 1990s, generally speaking, the proportion of population over age 65 years was higher in Northern and Western Europe than in Southern and Eastern Europe. By way of example, approximately 15 per cent of the populations in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom were aged 65 and over in the early 1990s compared with the populations of Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland which had not yet reached 10 per cent (32). However, by the end of the 1990s, the European picture of ageing is not as clear-cut. In the above-mentioned Northern and Western European countries, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over has either stagnated or indeed declined, whereas in the above-mentioned Eastern and Southern European countries, proportions approach those of Northern and Western Europe. Only a handful of countries in table 6.1 have proportions of the population aged 65 and over that are less than 10 per cent. The extremes of Europe are on the one hand Turkey with just 5.2 per cent of its population aged 65 and over and on the other hand Italy with a figure of 18 per cent.

Again in broad terms, those countries with the lowest proportions of older people in their populations at the beginning of the 1990s have been ageing faster than those countries which at that time already had aged populations. However, the early agers of Northern and Western Europe are now experiencing a double ageing of the population – the aged population is ageing itself with increasing proportions aged 75-80 and over. Table 6.2 illustrates the expected development in the number of older people across Europe in the period 1985-2025, clearly showing this shift.

Table 6.1 Size (1000s) and proportion (%) of the population aged 65 and over, 1.1.2000.

Country	Population	Proportion	Country	Population	Proportion
<i>Northern Europe</i>			<i>Southern Europe</i>		
Estonia	208.6	14.5	Albania	206.0	6.1
Finland	767.2	14.8	Bosnia	303.8	6.8
Iceland	32.3	11.6	Croatia	562.9	12.4
Ireland	423.5	11.2	Greece	1818.0	17.2
Latvia	355.4	14.7	Italy	10370.5	18.0
Lithuania	493.9	13.3	Macedonia	192.2	9.5
Norway	683.0	15.2	Malta	45.3	12.0
Sweden	1532.6	17.3	Portugal	1533.8	15.3
UK	9301.7	15.6	Slovenia	275.4	13.8
			Spain	6589.9	16.7
			Yugoslavia	1381.8	13.0
			Cyprus	75.3	11.3
<i>Western Europe</i>			<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
Austria	1254.9	15.5	Belarus	1332.1	13.3
Belgium	1715.1	16.8	Bulgaria	1324.8	16.2
Denmark	790.4	14.8	Czech Republic	1418.1	13.8
France	9422.8	15.9	Hungary	1467.8	14.6
Germany	13067.5	15.9	Poland	4663.6	12.1
Luxembourg	62.2	14.3	Romania	2961.4	13.2
Netherlands	2152.4	13.6	Moldova	341.7	9.4
Switzerland	1094.3	15.3	Russian Fed.	18197.1	12.5
Liechtenstein	3.3	10.3	Slovak Republic	615.2	11.4
San Marino	4.2	15.8	Ukraine	6915.5	13.9
			Turkey	3307.0	5.2
			Armenia	337.0	8.9
			Azerbaijan	439.1	5.5

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.

Table 6.2 Projected increases in the number of older people aged 65-74 and 75 and over, 1985-2025. Percentage.

Country	65-74	75+	Country	65-74	75+
<i>Northern Europe</i>			<i>Southern Europe</i>		
Finland	14	26	Albania	60	53
Iceland	29	18	Greece	31	30
Ireland	-4	21	Italy	33	32
Norway	-11	31	Malta	19	15
Sweden	-14	14	Portugal	21	33
UK	-3	12	Spain	35	27
<i>Western Europe</i>			<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
Austria	14	7	Bulgaria	48	32
Belgium	26	9	Hungary	25	9
Denmark	-5	17	Poland	49	15
France	39	11	Romania	57	19
Luxembourg	32	5			
Netherlands	18	30			
Switzerland	17	18			

Source: The 1990 Revision of the United Nations Global Estimates and Projections, United Nations 1991.

Indeed, according to the United Nations projections, a number of Western European countries were expected to experience declining young old populations aged 65-74. However, such projections are fraught with error and uncertainty, and there is even disagreement about expected developments between different projection-making institutions (Eurostat, UN and national bodies) (8).

The complex interrelationships of demographic change have led to widespread ageing of Europe's populations both in terms of absolute but also relative size of the aged population. In addition, the early agers of Europe have increased an ageing of the aged population itself. Much of this demographic ageing – and especially perhaps its latter stages – has been accompanied by strong economic growth and quite dramatic social change across Europe and within national boundaries. Interestingly, increasing numbers and proportions of older people in the last quarter of the 20th century were accompanied by the introduction of a series of measures in many countries designed to encourage older workers to leave the work place and take early retirement, something made relatively attractive by the early retirement schemes introduced. Paradoxically then, while the state of health of older people improved and mortality declined giving increased survival and life expectancies, the age at which people were leaving the labour force declined too. And now as these populations face ageing baby-boomers, the situation is confounded by the arrival in an ageing workplace of the baby-bust generations.

This interplay is causing a great deal of concern, particularly with regard to health-care and pensions expenditure. The funding of pension schemes is already a hot issue as the spectre of a declining work force having to support a growing aged population grows threateningly on the horizon. Of course, pressure on healthcare is not simply a

result of population ageing. Advances in medical science – with improvements in methods of treatment – contribute to this pressure.

Add to this the changes in family structure already apparent and widespread in Northern and Western Europe, and now making headway in traditional family strongholds in the south and east. The phenomenon of older people living independently in small (1-2 person) households is more or less the norm in the north and west, while multi-generational households – though under pressure – still prevail in the south and east, but the fertility evidence from Italy and Spain, for example, and the related family structure issues indicate that this may not be so for much longer in the 21st century.

However, even though the family may not be living together in multi-generational harmony, and changing family structures are affecting all generations – even with increasing incidence of divorce among older persons - the family still plays an important role in the social care of older people, and in some cases even in the health care, and this is true regardless of the extent of welfare state provision although of course to varying degrees depending on this extent of welfare state provision (33).

7. Family Structures: Partnership Behaviour and Economic Environment

As mentioned in the previous chapter, changing family structures affect older people – both in as far as they become part of the trend with an increasing incidence of divorce and remarriage but also with regard to the potential for family support (even care) as the changing fundamentals of family structure may influence the propensity to care.

Whereas Europe was once characterized by youthful and near universal marriage patterns, the situation at the turn of the 21st century is quite the opposite with high incidence of cohabitation, much higher age at marriage, higher incidence of divorce/partnership dissolution, high levels of remarriage. A partnership of any sort in contemporary Europe is both fragile, disposable and replaceable. Indeed, marriage/cohabitation has become perhaps yet another victim of societal and individual hedonism with a limited shelf-life and sell-by date.

Perhaps the one single dominant factor driving this development has been the massive influx of women into the labour market, bringing in its wake increased independence of women in partnerships.

Households and the phenomenon of family formation form a key reference point at which demographic experience interacts with economic, social, cultural and even psychological processes. Being one of society's basic and strongest consumer units, the household is of enormous importance for policy makers and planners in all walks of life.

In its strict sense, family refers to the nuclear family united by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing a common residence (34), and until the latter part of the 20th century at least, the terms family and household were often used synonymously. However, this synonymity is becoming an increasingly tenuous issue as households no longer relate to the nuclear family in its essence. Today, households can be a variety of different person-formations, some of which would be regarded as families

while others would not. Basically though there are single-family households (with different adult relationship combinations), multi-family households (with the same adult relationship combinations) and non-family households.

Although the registration of households and household sizes is not universal or comparable across Europe, the trends in household size are nonetheless surprisingly consistent. Since the 1960s, mean household size in the European Union has decreased in all countries (35) and by the late 20th century ranged for example from just over 2 in Denmark to approximately 3.5 in Spain and Ireland, and there are no signs that this trend will be reversed although it may well of course stabilize at around these levels. This development has been driven by two primary factors, namely a decline in the number of large households and an increase in the number of single-person households. The former can be related to declining fertility levels while the latter can be related to both an ageing population and the tendency for younger people to choose the single-life style.

What used to be regarded as the norm: mother, father and two children, is no longer the case in the European Union. At present, in no country do four person households constitute more than 25 per cent of all households.

Behind this simplified statistical picture, however, is a backdrop of complicated patterns of one-parent households, remarriage of adults with children (having their own children), consensual unions (with or without children), maximum two-generation households.

As early as 1986, the complex changes in families and household structures and the wealth of related behavioural phenomena were summed up in the following (36):

“All of these changes are associated with the arrival to adulthood of the post-Second World War generation. There seems to be a fundamental change in attitudes to life which is not caused by political or economic factors peculiar to a region or social background. There would seem to be a major transformation affecting all advanced countries, irrespective of their social and regional structure, and the movement is universal, causes are therefore deep-seated, common to all the Western countries and capable of changing mentalities.”

Marriage Trends

In historical terms, marriage is the institution that establishes families and provides the human framework within which reproduction begins. However, in true Malthusian fashion, younger people across Europe since the 1960s have been delaying their entry into marriage – though not necessarily into cohabitation – and at the same time marriage rates have been declining.

In most countries, crude marriage rates peaked in the mid 1960s, after which there has been a general and continuous decline. Only a few countries depart from this trend, as can be seen from table 7.1. Of course, crude rates are notoriously deceptive and depend on a variety of factors such as age and sex structures, but they do give an impression of an underlying trend in the rate at which people in different countries are marrying. In 1960, the crude marriage rate varied from a maximum of 12.6 per 1000 population in the Russian Federation to a minimum of 5.5 in Ireland, but apart from

these extremes, variation among countries east-west and north-south was extremely modest with most countries experiencing a crude marriage rate of 7-9 per 1000 population. By the beginning of the 1990s, national variations had become even more modest, the lowest rate being 4.3 in Slovenia and the highest 9.8 in Lithuania and with most countries having rates of 5-7 per 1000 population. But in the course of less than 10 more years to the end of the 1990s, the decline had continued almost everywhere – Lithuania more than halving its crude rate to just 4.8 – and the majority of countries now had rates less than 6 per 1000. No regional specific trends or differences are present, although Denmark does seem to stand out with an increase in its crude marriage rate in the course of the 1990s.

What began as a Scandinavian phenomenon – particularly Danish and Swedish – has become a European one.

As crude marriage rates declined, the mean age at first marriage increased (see table 7.2).

Increases in the mean age of women at first marriage can be seen in every single European country up to the late 1990s, but there are some quite marked differences in the size of these increases from country to country, and not all countries experience an interrupted pattern of increase. In Denmark, for example, this mean age increased steadily by almost 7 years from 1960 to 1999, whereas in Portugal, the mean age continued a decline from 24.6 years in 1960 to 23.4 by 1980, after which it increased, finishing, however, in 1999 only 1 year higher than in 1960. In actual fact, the pattern exemplified by the experience of Portugal is the most typical – that is, declining mean age for the first part of the observation period followed by an increase to a higher mean age than at the start of the period. And only Denmark and Sweden experience a steady (and the two largest) increase(s) over the period.

In 1960, it can be seen from table 7.2 that the highest mean age at first marriage for women was in Ireland (26.9 years), which reflects a traditional marriage pattern from the 19th century. The youngest mean age of 21.3 years in 1960 is to be found in Bulgaria. By 1999, the highest mean age is found in Denmark, Iceland and Sweden – all close to 30 years – while the lowest is now in the Russian Federation at 22 years.

Table 7.1 Crude marriage rates, 1960-1999

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1999
<i><u>Northern Europe</u></i>					
Estonia	10.0	9.1	8.8	7.5	3.9
Finland	7.4	8.8	6.1	5.0	4.7
Iceland	7.4	7.8	5.7	4.5	5.6
Ireland	5.5	7.0	6.4	5.1	4.9
Latvia	11.0	10.2	9.8	8.8	3.9
Lithuania	10.1	9.5	9.2	9.8	4.8
Norway	6.6	7.6	5.4	5.2	5.3
Sweden	6.7	5.4	4.5	4.7	4.0
United Kingdom	7.5	8.5	7.4	6.5	5.1
<i><u>Western Europe</u></i>					
Austria	8.3	7.1	6.2	5.8	4.9
Belgium	7.1	7.6	6.7	6.5	4.3
Denmark	7.8	7.4	5.2	6.1	6.7
France	7.0	7.8	6.2	5.1	4.8
Germany	9.5	7.4	6.3	6.5	5.2
Luxembourg	7.1	6.4	5.9	6.1	4.8
Netherlands	7.8	9.5	6.4	6.4	5.7
Switzerland	7.8	7.6	5.7	6.9	5.7
<i><u>Southern Europe</u></i>					
Bosnia	10.1	9.3	8.5	6.9	6.3
Croatia	8.9	8.5	7.2	6.0	5.2
Greece	7.0	7.7	6.5	5.8	5.9
Italy	7.7	7.3	5.7	5.6	4.8
Macedonia	8.6	9.0	8.5	7.4	7.0
Portugal	7.8	9.4	7.4	7.2	6.9
Slovenia	8.8	8.3	6.5	4.3	3.9
Spain		7.3	5.9	5.7	5.2
Yugoslavia	9.0	9.2	7.6	6.2	5.3
Cyprus		8.6	7.9	9.2	12.8
<i><u>Eastern Europe</u></i>					
Bulgaria	8.8	8.6	7.9	6.9	4.3
Czech Republic	7.7	9.2	7.6	8.8	5.2
Hungary	8.9	9.3	7.5	6.4	4.5
Poland	8.2	8.6	8.6	6.7	5.7
Romania	10.7	7.5	8.2	8.3	6.2
Russian Federation	12.6	10.1	10.6	8.9	6.2
Slovak Republic	8.1	7.9	7.9	7.6	5.1

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000. Council of Europe.

Table 7.2. Mean age of women at first marriage, 1960-1999.

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1999
<u>Northern Europe</u>					
Estonia		23.5	22.6	22.5	24.5
Finland	23.8	23.3	24.3	26.0	27.7
Iceland		23.2	23.2	26.7	29.8
Ireland	26.9	24.8	24.6	26.6	27.9
Latvia			22.8	22.3	24.2
Lithuania		24.1	23.0	22.3	23.1
Norway	23.7	22.8	23.5	26.2	28.2
Sweden	23.9	23.9	26.0	27.5	29.8
United Kingdom	23.3	22.4	23.0	25.1	27.0
<u>Western Europe</u>					
Austria	24.0	22.9	23.2	24.9	27.0
Belgium	22.8	22.4	22.2	24.2	26.1
Denmark	22.8	22.8	24.6	27.6	29.7
France	23.0	22.6	23.0	25.6	27.6
Germany	23.5	22.5	22.9	25.2	26.9
Luxembourg		22.8	23.0	25.3	27.4
Netherlands	24.2	22.9	23.2	25.9	27.7
Switzerland	24.9	24.2	25.0	26.8	27.7
<u>Southern Europe</u>					
Bosnia			22.0	23.3	
Croatia	22.4	21.4	22.1	23.1	25.0
Greece	25.1	24.0	23.3	24.8	26.5
Italy	24.8	23.9	23.8	25.5	27.0
Macedonia	22.1	22.1	22.5	22.6	23.3
Portugal	24.6	24.0	23.4	23.9	25.8
Slovenia		23.1	22.5	23.7	26.3
Spain			23.4	25.3	27.5
Yugoslavia	22.0	22.0	22.5	22.8	24.0
Cyprus			23.7	24.1	25.6
<u>Eastern Europe</u>					
Bulgaria	21.3	21.4	21.3	21.4	23.5
Czech Republic	22.0	21.6	21.5	21.6	24.1
Hungary	22.0	21.5	21.2	21.9	24.2
Poland		22.8	22.7	22.6	23.3
Romania	22.1	21.8	21.5	22.0	23.2
Russian Federation	24.7	23.2	22.4	21.9	22.0
Slovak Republic	22.1	22.0	21.9	21.9	23.2

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe.

In Malthusian ideology, the increasing mean age at first marriage – and the particularly high mean ages of Northern European countries especially – would be the main factor contributing to declining fertility, as this was in Malthusian terms the only

means available to control fertility. However, this is not true of contemporary experience. True enough fertility is declining simultaneously, but increasing mean age at marriage does not coincide with delays in forming marital-type unions (cohabitation). The status of marriage as a structure for sexual relationships has been severely weakened. Marriage as an institution for organizing everyday life is also weakening as the economic independence of women – no longer the weaker partner – increases and state social security provision becomes stronger and more widespread.

So, cohabitation seems to be replacing marriage as the structural relationship for males and females in Europe – even when it comes to fertility. With the fall in marriage rates illustrated in table 7.1, cohabitation – which had otherwise been quite a rare phenomenon in the total demographic sense – increased rapidly as a phenomenon associated with the post war generations. Even in the Scandinavian countries where it almost became the norm rather than the exception and where population registration is extremely sophisticated, this essentially private act proved difficult to record, and traditional demographic characteristics such as marital status and legitimacy (births born inside and outside of wedlock) became outdated and if applied gave an unrealistic picture of true demographic behaviour in these areas. Thus, data are scarce and incomplete and even more so when it comes to comparable cross-national data. However, in table 7.3 some of the more readily available data are given for selected countries. Despite the poor quality and degree of detail of these data, the trend is a clear one of an increasing proportion of cohabitations among unions, in particular among the younger generations of women with much higher proportions in Sweden. As these younger generations age, the proportions of cohabiting women among the older generations may increase over time as these younger women remain in this form of union – or the proportions may remain unchanged as these younger women marry as they age (and have children). On the other hand, the increasing incidence of divorce may affect this development too, as it is perhaps more likely that divorcees choose cohabitation in a new partnership rather than marriage.

It is questionable to what extent the increase in cohabitation affects family values. Of course, it weakens the traditional family as a structure, but it may still provide a structure within which what we regard as family values flourish.

From marriage and cohabitation, it seems sensible to move on to divorce, the incidence of which has increased quite dramatically in this same period of time. Its effect on and importance with regard to family values is perhaps the greatest of all the phenomena acting in this field, and of course as cohabitation has increased, we should perhaps instead begin to talk of the break-up of unions, as the traumatic effects on the adults and children involved must certainly be no less in a consensual union than in a formal marriage. The increase of cohabitation does mean, however, that the true extent of break-up/divorce is not available in statistical terms.

The break-up of a union (marital or otherwise) does most certainly have a dramatic effect on the adults involved and any children they may have, and increasing divorce rates are also largely responsible for the growing number of one-parent families.

Table 7.3 Proportion of women cohabiting among all women in unions by age, selected countries and years. Percentage.

Country	Year	Age group					
		16-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40+
Sweden	1975	88	57	23	10	6	4
	1989	90	78	50	28	21	-
Great Britain	1980	13	11	6	2	3	2
	1989	62	32	14	9	6	3
Austria	1981	31	14	6	4	3	3
	1989	45	21	8	4	3	2

Source: (37)

The development in crude divorce rates (number of divorces per 1000 population) is shown in table 7.4, and as can be seen, divorce rates have not increased everywhere over the whole period – indeed the 1990s saw a decline in a number of countries. It should, however, be emphasized and borne in mind when considering the development in these crude rates of table 7.4 that crude rates are indeed as their name implies crude rates and as such are particularly sensitive to changes in age distribution, for example, which may be the cause of an apparent change rather than it being attributable to a real change in behaviour. Examples of this from the table could be the sudden fall off towards the end of the 1990s of crude divorce rates in some of the countries.

Whatever the drawbacks of the rate as a measure of divorce patterns may be, it is clear from the table that divorce rates increased dramatically from 1960 to the late 1990s. In 1960 rates across Europe were generally very low, the highest rate recorded being in Latvia (2.4 per 1000 population). The variation was from this high to the low of just 0.1 per 1000 population in Portugal. It is difficult to identify regional trends and differences, but within the European Union, the southern Member States of Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece have the lowest rates in 1960 (around 0.1 – 0.3), with Denmark and Sweden having the highest rates (1.2 – 1.5). By the end of the 1990s, divorce rates are considerably higher in almost every country included in table 7.4, the exceptions being the (now independent) states of former Yugoslavia, Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, although the last two listed countries experienced increasing rates into the 1990s before dropping off again to 1960-levels at the end of the 1990s. Historically though, the apparent stability of marriage as an institution witnessed in the post war period and up until the 1960s may be an exception. The instability of marriage/unions experienced since the 1960s is due primarily to divorce/break-up of the union, but in the past marital dissolution was also high as a result of higher mortality levels and poverty (which led to desertion).

Table 7.4 Crude divorce rates in European countries, 1960-1999.

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1999
<u>Northern Europe</u>					
Estonia	2.1	3.2	4.1	3.7	3.2
Finland	0.8	1.3	2.0	2.6	2.7
Iceland	0.7	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.7
Latvia	2.4	4.6	5.0	4.0	2.5
Lithuania	0.9	2.2	3.2	3.4	3.1
Norway	0.7	0.9	1.6	2.4	2.1
Sweden	1.2	1.6	2.4	2.3	2.4
United Kingdom	0.5	1.1	2.8	2.9	2.7
<u>Western Europe</u>					
Austria	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.3
Belgium	0.5	0.7	1.5	2.0	2.6
Denmark	1.5	1.9	2.7	2.7	2.5
France	0.7	0.8	1.5	1.9	2.0
Germany	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.9	2.3
Luxembourg	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.0	2.4
Netherlands	0.5	0.8	1.8	1.9	2.1
Switzerland	0.9	1.0	1.7	2.0	2.9
<u>Southern Europe</u>					
Bosnia	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.5
Croatia	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.8
Greece	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.9
Italy		0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6
Macedonia	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.9	1.8
Slovenia	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.0
Spain				0.6	0.9
Yugoslavia	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.5
Cyprus		0.3	0.3	0.6	1.8
<u>Eastern Europe</u>					
Belarus	0.7	1.9	3.2	3.4	4.7
Bulgaria	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.2
Czech Republic	1.3	2.2	2.6	3.1	2.3
Hungary	1.7	2.2	2.6	2.4	2.5
Poland	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Romania	2.0		1.5	1.4	1.5
Moldova	0.9	2.1	2.8	3.0	2.7
Russian Federation	1.5	3.0	4.2	3.8	3.6
Slovak Republic	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.7	1.8
Ukraine	1.2	2.9	3.6	3.7	3.6
Turkey	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
Armenia	0.3	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.3
Azerbaijan	0.7	1.3	1.2	2.0	0.6

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe

If the recent trends continue then a consequence will be more childless couples, more one-parent families (either by choice or by force), more remarriages/reunions, and more step families. It is painfully clear that marriage is no longer a necessary institution as such in modern society. The stigma attached to births outside marriage has all but disappeared; the economic independence of women has robbed marriage of this offer to women of security, even the legal system adjusts to the new trends and provides legal security to partners in a non-marital union (in the event of death or break-up) giving them the same status and rights as a married couple, both in economic terms but also with regard to custody of children.

Ultimately, marriage becomes then an institution for companionship based on emotions rather than an institution designed to provide economic and reproductive survival (38). But this self-same dependence on emotions makes the union more vulnerable and susceptible to dissolution (39).

Female labour force participation

When analysing demographic change since the 1960s in Europe, it has become customary to attribute much of the change with regard to fertility and family structure to the changing role of women in society (and the family), in particular the influx of women into the labour market. In this respect, we shall focus on European Union countries for which data are more readily available. Despite this general consensus with regard to the changing role of women and its effect on some socio-economic behaviour, there are in fact still national differences as far as labour force participation is concerned, as illustrated in table 7.5. Many women must still combine the responsibility of family life with that of paid (full or part time) work, despite achievements in broad terms as far as equality is concerned. Indeed, the sex-related family-work roles seem to be mirror images of one another: while family responsibility can be a hindrance to women's work, work is a hindrance for men's family participation.

Table 7.5. Female labour force participation rates in EU Member States, 1988-1998

Country	Year	Age 15-64	Age 15-24	Age 25-49	Age 50-64
Belgium	1988	45.3	36.8	64.2	15.9
	1993	50.3	32.7	71.0	19.2
	1998	53.8	29.4	74.6	25.9
Denmark	1988	76.6	73.3	87.8	53.5
	1993	77.4	70.0	87.7	59.7
	1998	75.1	71.6	84.4	58.7
Germany	1988	53.8	58.0	62.7	34.9
	1993	60.7	54.0	73.3	41.9
	1998	62.1	46.4	76.3	44.3
Greece	1988	42.6	34.5	52.6	31.6
	1993	42.3	33.0	55.2	26.9
	1998	48.5	36.6	63.5	29.8
Spain	1988	39.2	45.2	46.1	22.4
	1993	42.6	38.0	55.0	23.8
	1998	47.5	36.7	62.4	27.8
France	1988	57.7	43.7	72.8	38.3
	1993	59.6	36.2	77.3	38.5
	1998	61.6	31.9	79.2	44.0
Ireland	1988	40.4	47.7	43.9	21.4
	1993	45.4	43.8	53.7	25.2
Italy	1988	42.8	44.5	54.2	21.2
	1993	42.0	36.0	55.3	21.5
	1998	44.2	32.9	59.8	22.9
Luxembourg	1988	41.7	51.4	50.1	16.6
	1993	46.1	45.5	57.4	20.7
	1998	47.6	33.4	60.5	25.2
Netherlands	1988	49.7	56.1	57.7	23.1
	1993	56.0	59.7	65.8	26.8
	1998	62.5	64.9	73.6	35.0
Austria	1998	62.5	55.5	77.3	33.8
Portugal	1988	56.0	53.9	68.4	37.2
	1993	58.7	43.0	75.1	40.6
	1998	61.9	43.6	77.6	46.4
Finland	1998	70.0	47.4	84.3	56.8
Sweden	1998	72.2	38.3	83.3	73.2
United Kingdom	1988	63.8	65.4	71.5	46.2
	1993	66.0	61.4	74.5	50.2
	1998	66.9	59.8	75.8	52.5

Source: (8)

As it appears from table 7.5, women in Denmark in all but the oldest age group have the highest female labour force participation rates in the European Union in the period 1988-1998 – Sweden having the highest rate for the age group 50-64 years.

If we concentrate on the 25-49 year age group, where family responsibilities are arguably at their highest, then Danish rates are as high as 84.4 per cent in 1998 (compare this with 92.6 per cent for men in the same age group). Of the rest of the EU-15, Germany, France, Austria, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom all have participation rates in this age group of over 75 per cent.

The lowest rate is to be found in Ireland at 53.7 per cent (1993 figure), followed by Italy with 59.8 per cent, but the high rate for Portugal should be seen in the light of the high proportion of Portuguese women working in agriculture. A great deal of the increase in female labour force participation rates is attributable to the growth in part-time employment. In 1997, 5.8 per cent of employed males in the EU-15 were employed part-time, while the figure for females was as high as 32.4 per cent (8). Dutch women have the highest proportion employed in part-time employment (67.9 per cent in 1998) whereas the lowest proportion is found in Greece (10.5 per cent). Denmark with the highest total female labour force participation rates in the EU-15 has a proportion of only 35.8 per cent of employed women working part-time. It is fair to assume in part at least that rates of part-time employment reflect an attempt to combine work and children. Where the rate is low (in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Finland where it is less than 20 per cent), this may reflect the fact that women choose family rather than work or that part-time work simply is not available (opposition from trade unions) or that child-care facilities are readily and cheaply available.

At the regional level, female participation rates may vary quite considerably within a country – for example, differences between northern and southern Italy, and differences between the southern regions of Germany and the older industrial regions of the Ruhr and the Saar.

All in all, the trend in female participation rates has become increasingly similar to those of men, and in a perhaps simplistic fashion, this development is linked to the simultaneous decline in European fertility levels. But why should individuals decide to form households and then have families?

The family can – as in pre-industrial times – be regarded as a production unit which combines time and consumption to produce domestic output, the objective being to maximize household production. In a single-person household, this is a simple equation where maximization is subject to the individual's time and income constraints. In other words, it becomes an optimisation choice between time spent on home production and time spent on market work.

In this respect, it is then a question of whether multi-person households are more efficient producers than one-person households. In a situation with two persons where the one has a higher earned income than the second, while the second has a higher non-earned income, they would both produce the same domestic output. Collaborating or trading would, however, improve their situation. If the first one purchased some of the second one's time for household production, each person's domestic output would

be higher, and as the first person has a comparative advantage in goods (and a higher cost of time) while the second person has a comparative advantage in time, there are gains from such a trade. A combined household on the other hand could improve the situation even more so, since the second person in the example could specialize in home production, while the first person could provide more time to the labour market.

A combined household will always produce at least as much as the sum of the two component households, and the gain increases as the difference between the two persons' wage rates increases. In this optimisation process, it can be shown that at least one household member must specialize fully in either market work or home production (40). As well as the household efficiency gains arising from the division of labour between household members, there may also be joint consumption economies where consumption per capita does not decline proportionately with the number of consumers in the individual household (e.g. dwelling and household appliances). This aspect alone in an economic sense favours multi-person households, but other emotional constraints limit the household size so that economic gain is not indefinite.

Of course, most households are formed initially for reasons of love and companionship, and the economic advantages become (perhaps) more obvious at a later stage. Such households do have greater consumption potential than two random individuals, and this establishes a connection between household creation on the one hand and reproduction/fertility on the other hand.

There is, however, in a multi-person household the threat of conflicting interests between (adult) persons in the household. Each of them has the alternative of not forming or leaving the household and thereby the possibility of an alternative level of welfare, which may or may not be perceived as better than the present one. Therefore, factors such as marriage market opportunities and welfare benefits (to single parents) affect the situation.

These factors which reduce the gains from household co-operation increase the risk that the household will dissolve, but they also reduce the above-mentioned specialization in the household division of labour, which in turn reduces even further the gains from household formation. This would suggest a positive correlation between female labour force participation and divorce.

Household formation (usually) precedes family formation i.e. childbearing. In economic terms, parents produce their child's human capital by combining parental time and purchased goods/services. There is an important interaction between family size and human capital investment in children, and with regard to fertility trends, parents' desire to invest more resources in each child is likely to have an effect on fertility levels. A tendency to invest more contributes to a decline in fertility.

The economic analysis of fertility suggests that wage levels for both men and women should affect fertility levels. Higher real wages means higher real income which gives a couple the (economic) ability to have more children and to have them sooner rather than later. Since most of the tasks associated with children are (still) carried out by women, higher wage levels for women increases the cost of a(n) (additional) child. Higher real income means parents will want to invest more human capital in each child which then raises the cost of each child. This relationship is confounded by the

introduction of subsidized child-care for example. In countries with heavily subsidized child-care (Sweden, for example), women would contribute less child-care time themselves, thereby increasing the chances that women with high income levels would have larger families.

Relationships such as these touched upon above (women's employment and fertility; women's employment and divorce) refer in fact to mutually dependent variables: neither one actually causes the other, but both respond to changes in the budget constraints faced by couples.

8. International Migration Pressure on Europe

Introduction

Two fundamental features have characterized the international economic situation since the 1950s – increasing economic liberalisation and increasing internationalisation, both of which benefited so to speak from the developments in new technologies and telecommunications and in global transport infrastructures. Free market forces have spread and the process of economic integration has advanced dramatically – giant steps have been made towards the realization of a single global market. Global trade has increased far more than production in the last half of the 20th century, the two phenomena diverging even more in the 1990s. Furthermore, this development has been truly global – and not just an industrialised country phenomenon – dictated by a liberalist ideology based on classic economic theory which hypothesises that increased individual freedom gives increased competition and effectiveness which in turn provide increased standards of living. International alliances and organisations are designed to secure and encourage this development, and even at the regional level economic relations are developed and defended by way of institutionalised co-operation (European Union, North American Free Trade Area).

The diametrical opposite in terms of international co-operation is *international migration*. There is of course no common base of ideology to which nations can refer and build co-operation; there is no common political agreement; there are no international rules and regulations.

Just two principles appear to regulate international migration. The first is the Geneva Convention from 1951. The second is the exclusion policy in force in all western European countries since the early 1970s, and this is obviously in opposition to the otherwise liberal principles present with regard to both politics and economics.

Perhaps this lack of co-operation is an indication of the fact that international migration pressure on Europe is modest and certainly no threat. Or alternatively – and more probably – that international migration today is an extremely complex and incomprehensible phenomenon. Even the registration and enumeration of foreign citizens resident in a country can be a daunting task. In France, for example, the official tally depends on the ministry being questioned and in the 1980s these ministries could not agree on the total, thereby resulting in a difference of up to ½ million persons (41).

Traditionally in the post war years, Western Europe experienced immigration of unskilled workers, but globalisation and internationalisation give rise to a much more

varied composition of the migrant group, often dictated by short-term labour market needs for particular skills in relation to particular tasks. Add to this persons taking residence in a country for relatively short periods of time - not in response to a need in the host country but to a personal need/desire. One of the consequences of this development is that countries begin to be increasingly selective with regard to the type of immigrants allowed to take up residence (and work). Canada is often quoted as a textbook example of the way in which a country is both selective but also (and perhaps therefore) efficient in terms of integration of immigrants. Perhaps the ageing populations of Europe will provide a huge service market for immigrant labour as local labour in this area is in short supply or simply does not want that type of work: the Mexico – USA relationship is an example of this development.

Apart from the *geriatric service sector*, it is perhaps difficult to identify labour market areas where (cheaper) immigrant labour would be imported. In much of Western Europe there has been a move away from low-salary jobs in industry, partly because European industries are replaced by imports from the newly-industrialized developing countries, and this has in turn made it possible for Western Europe to maintain relatively high wages for unskilled workers. In many countries, it is also difficult to argue for massive immigration of labour. Levels of unemployment remain high for unskilled workers especially, and as seen earlier, many countries still have a substantial labour reserve among women.

Thus, it would seem initially at least that globalisation on the one hand will lead to increased levels of international migration as far as certain types of skilled (short-term) labour are concerned. On the other hand, it would also lead to reduced levels of international migration as far as the traditional migrant profiles of unskilled labour are concerned. It is certainly difficult to find support for a hypothesis that future massive immigration to Europe will be fuelled by the demands of home-based industries. It seems scientifically more sensible to put forward the argument that future levels of international migration to (Western) Europe will be driven by the demographic development in that region (ageing and declining populations and thus ageing and declining work forces), but counteracting such a development are the large levels of migration needed to counterbalance the natural demographic development in these populations.

In effect then, the pressure of migration is not so much an actual pressure experienced by Western Europe, it is more a question of the potential or even feared pressure – the threat of what may come rather than what is.

It is perhaps an interest in this potential pressure from international migration that gave rise to an extensive on-going research programme in Denmark on international migration and the integration of immigrants, especially in the labour market (42, 43), and certainly in terms of integration, the results are depressing with very high levels of unemployment in certain migrant groups.

The European Union and International Migration

A glance at the international migration statistics from Eurostat (8) illustrates the incompleteness of data in this field. While data for immigration from non-EEA (European Economic Area) countries are available for eight of the 15 member states for the years 1988-1997, there is for example no data published for France and

Luxembourg, and only for certain years for the rest of the member states. On the whole, the Nordic member states (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) have much more comprehensive and readily available data on migration – perhaps because of the registration systems operational in these countries, but in the following, we shall present data only from those member states with relatively comprehensive data (as published by Eurostat). Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present data on immigration from other EEA and from non-EEA countries respectively for the period 1988-1997 for selected EU member states.

Firstly, there is a distinction between EEA and non-EEA immigrants, but having said that, for each country separately the development of the two types of immigration is more or less the same – in other words, if there is an increasing trend for the one, there is also an increasing trend for the other, albeit perhaps with different rates of increase.

Table 8.1. Immigration from other EEA countries, 1988-1997. Thousands.

	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997
Denmark	12	13	14	21	22	21
Germany	165	167	160	188	203	182
Greece	10	6	4	5	5	4
Spain	12	13	12	12	10	22
Ireland	13	23	29	21	25	28
Italy	30	27	21	22	21	
Netherlands	28	33	36	28	33	34
Finland	7	8	5	4	6	6
Sweden	19	23	13	15	16	15
UK	55	70	70	78	81	93

Table 8.2. Immigration from non-EEA countries, 1988-1997. Thousands.

	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997
Denmark	24	28	29	24	33	29
Germany	739	1485	1342	895	757	659
Greece	27	36	28	13	17	18
Spain	12	21	27	22	20	36
Ireland	7	11	12	9	14	16
Italy	56	140	93	78	152	
Netherlands	63	85	81	64	76	76
Finland	3	6	10	7	7	8
Sweden	32	37	33	69	24	30
UK	161	197	146	175	178	192

Source: Eurostat (8).

However, there does not appear to be a European pattern as far as international immigration is concerned. By the end of the observed period, the annual level of EEA-immigration is higher than at the beginning of the period in some countries (Denmark, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom), but lower

or more or less unchanged in the others. Likewise, EEA-immigration has developed differently over the period in question in the different countries but with a great deal of annual fluctuation in the national levels.

Germany stands apart from the rest of the countries in as much as the level of immigration is much higher than elsewhere even when population size is taken into consideration.

When going into more detail, for ease of presentation and interpretation, let us simply look at the immediate migration situation in 1997 in just two Northern European countries – Denmark and the United Kingdom. Table 8.3 illustrates immigration by country of citizenship in 1997 in these two countries.

Table 8.3. Immigration by country of citizenship, 1997. Thousands.

	Denmark	United Kingdom
Total	50.1	284.6
Own nationals	22.7	96.5
Rest of EU	7.6	60.8
Other EEA	2.9	1.2
CEEC	4.6	4.0
Turkey	1.1	2.2
Africa	3.1	17.3
America	2.2	18.7
Asia	5.2	55.8
Oceania	0.3	21.4

Source: Eurostat (8)

Without entering into a discussion of whether respectively 50,000 and almost 300,000 immigrants in the course of a single year is excessive or not, it is interesting to note that the majority of immigrants to both countries are either own nationals, nationals of other EU states or other EEA countries (66 per cent for Denmark, and 56 per cent for the United Kingdom). In other words, in Denmark – where there has been a rather heated debate recently about controlling immigration, not least during the election campaign in late 2001 – only one third of the total number of annual immigrants are from non-EU/EEA states, amounting to 16,500 persons.

However, this is of course, only one side of the coin. In 1997, 39,000 persons emigrated from Denmark, and 225,000 from the United Kingdom, giving net immigration in the two countries in that year of 11,000 and 60,000 respectively. If we, furthermore, consider the citizenship of emigrants from the two countries, the absolute size of what is deemed to be a problem appears (table 8.4).

Table 8.4. Emigration by country of citizenship, 1997. Thousands.

	Denmark	United Kingdom
Total	38.4	224.5
Own nationals	24.3	130.8
Rest of EU	5.2	31.9
Other EEA	2.3	1.7
CEEC	2.0	2.5
Turkey	0.3	0.8
Africa	0.8	7.3
America	1.6	10.7
Asia	1.5	23.8
Oceania	0.3	13.4

Source: Eurostat (8).

It thus turns out that in the case of Denmark, non-EU/EEA net immigration in 1997 amounted to less than 11,000. In the United Kingdom, the same figure amounts to 66,000, but here the picture reflects to a great extent the country's colonial past with quite substantial net immigration from Asia, Oceania and Africa in relative terms.

The final piece of this simple jigsaw puzzle in this overview paper is the national population distribution by citizenship, as shown in table 8.5.

Table 8.5. Population by country of citizenship, 1997. Thousands.

	Denmark	United Kingdom
Total	5275.1	58184.8
Own nationals	5037.4	56057.9
Rest of EU	49.0	805.5
Other EEA	17.1	9.0
CEEC	42.9	84.4
Turkey	36.8	59.0
Africa	19.2	277.1
America	9.3	252.3
Asia	51.0	493.0
Oceania	1.0	87.3

Source: Eurostat (8)7.

The Turkish population resident in Denmark amounts to just less than 40,000 but to this should of course be added those of Turkish origins still resident in Denmark and having Danish citizenship. This population with present immigration levels would increase by 800 persons annually, to which should be added natural population growth (births minus deaths).

National statistics for Denmark (44) show, in addition, that the first two years of residence for immigrants are decisive as far as remaining in the country is concerned. In other words, there is a constant turnover of immigrants with a sizeable proportion leaving again within two years. Immigration is not an absorbing state for all immigrants.

To the dimension of immigration must be added the – perhaps more important – dimension of integration. A real or a perceived absence of integration – and perhaps even a conscious refusal to integrate – would doubtless heighten animosity to even a modest sized group of immigrants, whereas on the other hand, a real or perceived integration would perhaps reduce such animosity even if the group of immigrants was substantial in size.

The Growing World Around Us

Each of us is born into a time and a place, which offers us to a greater or lesser extent a variety of opportunities to improve our situation and that of our families. Not every individual within a country has the same opportunities, and the situation in different countries is likewise very varied as far as the climate for generating these opportunities is concerned in terms of socio-economic factors. Despite the well-known differences in welfare within and between countries, the majority of people choose to stay put (or alternatively have no choice). Some people, however, do choose to move: it may be within their own country (rural-urban migration or rural-rural) or it may be cross-border. Of these three types of human movement, cross-border movements comprise the smallest proportion of the total global number of human movements, and yet they are undeniably highest on the political agenda.

In classical migration theory, the idea of some form of push-pull relationship describes why people choose to migrate. There are factors at home *pushing* them, and there are factors in the place they choose to move to that are *pulling* them. Often these factors will in a sense be mirror images of one another. For example, lack of employment *pushing* and employment opportunities *pulling*.

Basically, the driving force behind human movements is that of wanting to improve one's situation (in socio-economic terms), and a decision to move is never an easy one, especially when it is a question of cross-border movement. Such a move can be riddled with hazards: long arduous journeys, language barriers, cultural differences, animosity, uncertainty, family dissolution.

As we have already seen, the numbers actually migrating to European Union countries hardly represent a deluge, and in actual fact Fort Europe is already a reality for the majority of the world's population standing outside looking in (or at). Legal immigration is more or less limited strictly to family reunions, and here the future appears bleaker and more hazardous as more stringent demands will be made. Even the EU open border policies and free movement of labour have not resulted in a massive flow from the EU of people into Denmark – just 2400 net immigrants in 1997. Within the EU, the push-pull effects seem moderate, therefore, and can be expected to become even more so as national welfare levels approach one another. But to citizens outside the European Union and the EEA and North America, on paper at least, this region of the world may seem eminently attractive when compared with the situation at home.

So as already mentioned, migration pressure for European Union countries is a feared/potential pressure rather than a real, statistically observable one. And the pressure is a result of a combination of demographics on the one hand and global economic/welfare inequalities on the other hand.

Demographically, global development has become increasingly uneven since the onset of the demographic transition in Europe – beginning in France shortly after the French Revolution. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe and most of the known world were characterized by high levels of both mortality and fertility and subsequently low levels of population growth, and towards the end of the 18th century, it was in this demographic climate that Malthus had expounded his theory of population, whereby any growth would eventually meet with unpleasant checks in the form of epidemics, famines and the like, which thereby placed their own natural check on growth.

With declining mortality as a result of advances in medical science, improved sanitation, hygiene, housing etc. etc., populations across Europe exploded and if it had not been for the industrialisation of agriculture and the opening up of the North Americas they would have been subjected to Malthus's checks. This did not happen. The production of food was now able to grow geometrically and follow population growth. By the end of the 19th century, most of Europe's populations were experiencing the beginning of the continual fertility decline, which would have dramatic and far-reaching consequences. And by the 1930s/1940s, fertility levels had fallen to reproduction levels of 2.1 and mortality had continued its relentless decline. Natural population growth was approaching zero once again, and the alarm bells began to ring across Europe and North America as fertility plummeted even further in what has been termed the second demographic transition (4).

For most of the less-developed world, the demographic transition remains a textbook exercise as far as fertility is concerned, while mortality has benefited from the advances in the developed world, the result being that mortality declines much faster than it did during the transition in Europe.

When we begin to discuss global population development – especially with regard to future development and the demographic situation in developing countries – the seriousness and consequences of the development soon drown in a veritable barrage of figures, the one much larger than the other. The billions pile upon the billions and doomsday seems to be waiting just around the demographic corner.

But of course, what has happened historically in terms of the demographic development is infinitely more certain than what may happen in the future. To this inherent uncertainty of population forecasting must be added the inertia of demographic development which makes change a drawn out phenomenon. By way of example, consider the situation in a country with a fertility level of 4 (which could be India). Assume now that this level could immediately be halved. Even with this drastic (and incidentally completely unrealistic) assumption, it would take almost 120 years for this population to stabilize its growth, and in the meantime it will with all probability have increased in size by over 50 per cent anyway.

At the beginning of the 20th century, global population size was an estimated 1½ billion. In the course of the first decade of the 21st century, the women of the world – primarily those in the less developed regions – will give birth to approximately 1½ billion children, while only ½ billion people are expected to die in that decade. Annual growth rates as we proceed into the 21st century are thus approximately 90-100 million, which is greater than the population of Germany – every single year.

A population growth of 1 billion is of course nothing new. But the pace of the growth is historically without precedence. The world’s population increased from 1 to 2 billion in the course of 100 years from around 1830 to 1930. What had taken 100 years then only took another 30 years – world population reached 3 billion in 1960. And the next billion took only 15 years, and the next again only 12 years. And the next again is expected to take just 10 years.

But this expectation is full of ifs and buts, which incline in sum towards an underestimation rather than an overestimation of global population growth. There is then an army of ifs and buts which the United Nations when making forecasts for future global population development attempts to tackle by operating with a range of scenarios – without being able to say which is the most likely, however.

The most recent population forecasts from the United Nations are in many ways the most ambitious so far by virtue of the fact that the forecasts attempt to take into account the long-term effects of HIV/AIDS on population development. This in itself is of course an enormous contributory factor to the unpredictability of development over and above the difficulty of predicting mortality and fertility levels in the future. But as mentioned the United Nations operates with a series of scenarios, the so-called medium scenario of which is most often quoted when discussing global population forecasts. We shall, therefore, follow suit and refer almost always only to this medium scenario.

By 1990, the world’s population was estimated to be just less than 5.5 billion, and while fertility in the developed world was (considerably) less than reproduction levels, in the less developed world it was almost 4 live births per female. According to the medium scenario of the United Nations, world population is expected to reach 7.8 billion by the year 2025, 8.9 billion by the year 2050 and 9.7 billion by 2150. Table 8.6 shows this expected development distributed according to world region.

Table 8.6. World population development 1990-2150, UN medium range forecast, by region. Millions.

	1990	2000	2025	2050	2150
Europe	722	729	702	628	517
Africa	615	784	1298	1766	2308
Asia	3181	3683	4722	5269	5561
Oceania	26	30	40	46	51
North America	282	310	364	392	398
Latin America	440	519	697	809	912

Source: United Nations (45).

Most striking with regard to the regional development is the declining population of Europe together with a dramatic increase in the populations of the African continent and Asia – and to a lesser extent Latin America. While the European population is expected to decline by almost 14 per cent in the next 50 years, those of Asia and Latin America increase by 43 per cent and 56 per cent respectively. Growth from 2000 to 2050 in Africa will amount to a staggering 125 per cent, and an impressive 30 per cent in the following 100 years.

As mentioned, there is however a great deal of uncertainty in population forecasts and the United Nations chooses to illustrate this by working with a series of different scenarios based on different assumptions regarding development in fertility and mortality. Although the medium scenario is most often taken as the most likely development, it too is based on fertility and mortality assumptions which may seem decidedly unrealistic – especially as far as fertility in less developed countries is concerned. The fertility assumption dictates that fertility levels globally will decline/increase to reproduction levels within the next 75 years. For the less developed countries this in fact corresponds to at least a 50 per cent reduction over just two generations. Equally unrealistic may be the assumption for developed countries that fertility levels should actually increase to reproduction levels by 2075. But what if Africa cannot control its fertility?

The extreme forecast of the United Nations assumes unchanged fertility levels globally. The (catastrophic) results of such behaviour are shown in table 8.7.

Table 8.7. World population development, 1990-2150, UN constant scenario, by region. Millions.

	1990	2000	2025	2050	2150
Europe	722	733	713	631	285
Africa	615	794	1656	3916	168889
Asia	3181	3721	5485	8225	73213
Oceania	26	30	43	57	271
North America	282	310	372	409	427
Latin America	440	525	801	1183	12761

Source: United Nations (45).

In world regions with high levels of fertility (Latin America, Asia and Africa), the long-term consequences of not succeeding in reducing fertility levels are overwhelming. By 2150, world population would have exploded to 256 billion, and 169 billion of these would be on the African continent (assuming they could be housed and fed). In India alone, uncontrolled fertility would entail growth from just over 1 billion persons today to almost 3 billion by 2050 and almost 8 billion by the end of the 21st century. And in the course of 150 years, the population of Europe will have dwindled to less than 300 million souls.

Of course, this essentially doomsday scenario is not only unrealistic, it is impossible, but it does illustrate the dramatic growth potential in the populations of less developed countries if fertility levels do not decrease. The probable development of global

population lies somewhere between the medium and high scenarios, and will in any case entail quite alarming increases in populations of less developed countries. Whether this population growth and subsequent pressure on local resources of all kinds will result in a Malthusian check or massive emigration towards the welfare magnets of the world remains to be seen. But figures such as these most certainly add to the perception of pressure on Europe from outside.

So while Europe ages and declines in numbers, the world around us continues its explosive growth and shifts the population-based balance of power in the world. It is difficult to understand perhaps why a declining population in Europe should be a problem in global terms. The inherent worry that seems to underlie much of the political debate related to international migration time and again points to this declining (native) European population and it may have its origins in the history of global development with Europeans playing the role of colonialist, migrant and catalyst for all development – that this race should constitute a rapidly declining minority is perhaps unthinkable, unimaginable and apparently unacceptable.

The demographic development through the 19th and 20th centuries saw then a shift in the global distribution of population, and this is expected to continue as illustrated in tables 8.8 and 8.9. Once again, the development for the African continent is striking – it is the only region of the world which is expected to increase its share of the total population in the course of the next 150 years. The population of today's developed regions constitute 19 per cent of world population today, but this is expected to plummet to just 12 per cent by 2050 and 10 per cent by 2150.

Table 8.8. World population development by region, 1800-2150. Millions. Medium scenario.

	1800	1939	2000	2050	2150
Total	954	2195	5666	8909	9746
Asia	631	1162	3683	5269	5561
Europe	195	573	729	628	517
North America	5	143	310	392	398
Oceania	2	11	30	46	51
Africa	102	175	784	1766	2308
Latin America	19	131	519	809	912

Source: United Nations (45) and Bourgeois-Pichat (46).

Table 8.9. World population development by region, 1800-2150. Percentage.

	1800	1939	2000	2050	2150
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Asia	66	53	65	59	57
Europe	20	26	13	7	5
North America	1	6	5	4	4
Oceania	0	1	1	1	1
Africa	11	8	14	20	24
Latin America	2	6	9	9	9

Source: United Nations (45) and Bourgeois-Pichat (46)

Is this what is threatening Europe in terms of demography? On the one hand, we have seen the ageing and declining populations of European countries which themselves pose an internal threat to each country with regard to how each country will meet the demands of an ageing (indeed a double ageing) population with a declining work force. On the other hand, we have seen a Europe of attractive economically strong countries surrounded by countries with young and increasing populations living in relative poverty when compared with their European neighbours.

As presented in the above, the perceived threat is based only on economic demographics – a question of population size and population development linked to economic welfare. The equation is eminently simple: Small population and strong welfare economies plus large population and weak non-welfare economies equals massive migration.

What may confound the equation in terms of cultural differences is not taken into consideration here.

Apart from Europe's own demographic dilemma, the main problem in the future depends on whether or not these bordering countries and regions experience socio-economic development that reduces the attraction of Europe for potential emigrants. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Europe's own populations will be inclined to solve its demographic problems (die earlier and give birth to more children), and governments may therefore be faced with the Catch-22 situation where international migration is the only solution to their own demographic problems in as much as (controlled) immigration of employable persons could offset the problems of an otherwise ageing and declining population.

It would be naïve to believe that explosive population growth of the size and dimensions outlined above for less developed countries will not lead to migration pressure on Europe. The realities of this scenario are indeed to be found in Europe's own history – in the 19th century, prior to the fertility decline of the demographic transition, Europe was demographically comparable to most of the less developed countries today, and Europeans emigrated to North America especially on a large scale, driven by those same push-pull factors operating in modern times.

History, however, gives us no concrete scientific evidence that the unavoidable migration pressure facing Europe will inevitably develop into a flood of migrants.

The Economics of Migration

There are significant differences in economic performance between the European Union and EFTA countries on the one hand and the countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean rim on the other hand, differences which are sufficient in themselves to drive migrants northwards into the EU area. Although GDP growth rates in the two areas were quite similar from 1960 onwards, there are still important economic differences. The export of (employable) labour and the subsequent flow of remittances is a means whereby the economic gap can be narrowed.

The economic importance of labour emigration to the pushing countries should not be underestimated and is perhaps most readily exemplified by way of (official)

remittance inflows, which around 1990 were estimated globally at just under 70 billion US dollars (47). This makes labour the second most primary commodity traded after oil.

The economic value of this form of income is important for the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean rim too, as can be seen from table 8.10. In some of the countries included in the table, remittances accounted for over 25 per cent of import merchandise costs in 1989, and for between 40 and 95 per cent of exports. Not only do these figures underline the importance of such remittances, they indicate too that countries where remittances account for a substantial proportion of imports/exports have an underlying interest in encouraging the export of labour in return for remittances and savings, which in turn can finance certain infrastructural elements. There is, however, a danger in the dependence of these countries' economies on the economic performance of the countries receiving their emigrants.

Table 8.10. Total remittances as a proportion of merchandise exports and imports for selected countries, 1989. Percentage.

	<u>Share of exports</u>	<u>Share of imports</u>
Algeria	4	5
Cyprus	13	5
Egypt	94	31
Jordan	56	33
Morocco	44	29
Sudan	55	28
Syria	13	19
Tunisia	17	12
Turkey	26	19

Source: (47)

In addition to the migration of labour, environmental conditions in much of Africa and not just northern Africa lead to the possibility of the migration of environmental refugees fuelled by a shortage of water – not just in terms of daily living but also with regard to the chances of high-level agricultural yields which could assist economic development. North African countries face having to import food to feed their (growing) populations even on a subsistence-level basis and by 2025 will have arrived at absolute water scarcity (48).

Further south, the pressure to emigrate to achieve even minimal improvements in one's standard of living seems unabated as poverty seems likely to continue to worsen in the wake of continued negative economic growth rates. Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be firmly rooted in the Malthusian trap where even minimal economic growth is consumed by population growth, leaving no room for improvement in subsistence-level welfare.

Greece stands as the eastern outpost of the European Union in close proximity to the less-developed countries of the Arab world with high rates of population growth (over 2 per cent per annum) and declining employment opportunities and continued

conflicts in the area. Otherwise, Western Europe as seen in the above has been experiencing migration pressure from the south, but also from Asia and to some extent from Latin America (witness the present chaotic economic situation in Argentina with residents hoping to migrate to Italy on the basis of family connections).

Data problems make it difficult to estimate exactly the size of foreign populations resident and on the move in the Mediterranean area – problems further confounded by illegal immigration. Obviously, economic growth in the southern European countries, well-developed social security systems, and the pure geographical proximity all contribute to immigration flows from the south, but it should also be noted that these countries – as opposed to the northern and western European countries – have large informal economies which are in a position to absorb large numbers of illegal immigrants.

Immigration flows to these countries often reflect their colonial past or other historical cultural links. However, there is also a geriatric flow of relatively wealthy retirees from the rest of Europe and even North America, and of highly skilled workers responding to globalisation. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that as many as 50 per cent of all immigrants (legal and illegal) to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were from third world countries (49) with the majority working in the service sector and living in urban areas.

Although a great deal of attention is focused on migration into the European Union from the south across the Mediterranean, the developments in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s provide an ideal setting for emigration to the west. As economic restructuring takes place, overemployment in the agricultural sector will transform to unemployment which may in turn manifest itself as an internal rural-urban flow or as international migration (or more probably as a combination of both).

Data problems again prevent accurate or reliable assessments, but in the early 1990s at least, the labour force appeared to decrease in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, while increasing in Romania and Poland. Employment declined throughout the region by as much as 5 per cent per annum with the state sector suffering in particular, and registered unemployment increased especially in the under-25 age group where unemployment levels were as high as 30 per cent (50).

A comprehensive study of the migration potential from Eastern Europe was carried out in the early 1990s (51) based on interviews with 1000 persons in each of the four countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine. The study identifies the typical potential migrant as: male, single, aged 18-34 years, aiming to work abroad for 3-12 months or for several years; either unemployed and poorly off or with higher education and well off. Germany, the United States, France, Switzerland, Scandinavia and Canada are the stated most popular destinations, but it turns out that few of the interviewed persons have any substantial knowledge of these countries. The study also reveals a respectable potential for short-term migratory movements which would be likely to result in illegal work (from 26 per cent of interviewed Russians to 77 per cent of Albanians) whereas the propensity to migrate permanently is much less (from 6 per cent of interviewed Bulgarians to 21 per cent of Albanians).

Transit migration appears to be playing an increasingly important role in the total migration picture in Eastern Europe. Most of the transit migration flows are highly organized with new routes appearing continually and most have Western Europe (or North America) as their ultimate destination.

Migration versus Greying

As already implied, the greying of the populations of Western Europe is a fact governments will have to live with for quite some time to come. And not surprisingly, this greying of the population has given rise to extensive debate and analysis with regard to solving the economic, welfare and care problems faced by ageing populations. Almost always, the solutions put forward focus on raising retirement ages (surely a mere cosmetic exercise), increasing productivity, reducing unemployment. No sensible person seems willing to suggest securing more births from Europe's reluctant females (and males). And hardly anyone dare suggest increased levels of immigration to offset the demographic imbalance.

But could immigration counteract ageing? And at what price in terms of numbers?

One of the most comprehensive studies of this aspect of immigration to Western Europe was published in 1993 (52). Let us conclude this paper by briefly considering the model and the results of that study.

The model applied in the study was based on the following set of six assumptions:

1. Immigrants are divided into two groups: one from Eastern and Central Europe and the former USSR (denoted Eastern Europe), and one from developing countries. Immigration from Eastern Europe is expected to decline over a 20 year period, while immigration from developing countries is expected to remain constantly high.
2. The population point of departure is the population of Western Europe (15 EU states plus Norway and Switzerland) in 1985.
3. Total fertility is assumed to remain constant at 1.63 for Western and Eastern Europeans, while it is assumed to be 3.0 for immigrants from developing countries and 2.0 for second-generation immigrants from these countries.
4. Life expectancies are expected to increase from 71.9 for men and 78.6 for women to 83.5 and 89 respectively by 2050. This applies to all population groups.
5. The model has three immigration scenarios:
 - Low immigration: from 1985 to 2000, ½ million immigrants from Eastern Europe and ½ million immigrants from developing countries annually. After 2000, no immigration.
 - Medium immigration: from 1985 to 2000, ½ million immigrants annually from Eastern Europe and then zero after 2000. For the whole period until 2050, ½ million immigrants annually from developing countries.

- High immigration: from 1985 to 2010, ½ million immigrants annually from Eastern Europe and then zero after 2010. From 1985 to 2010, the annual number of immigrants from developing countries increases from ½ million to 1½ million annually, and remains constant at this level until 2050.
6. In the model, immigrants progress from zero integration to various levels of integration at rates varying from zero to 10 per cent per annum. For example, an annual integration rate of 10 per cent means that after 25 years, 90 per cent of the immigrant group are fully integrated and become Western Europeans in the model; an annual integration rate of 5 per cent, however, means that after 30 years approximately 70 per cent are fully integrated. For Eastern Europeans, the rate is assumed to be 10 per cent in each scenario, and their children are assumed to be fully integrated. In the case of immigrants from developing countries, the model has three integration levels:
- Low: no integration for immigrants but 5 per cent annually for their children, whose own children (third generation immigrants) are assumed fully integrated.
 - High: 5 per cent annual integration for immigrants and 10 per cent for their children. Third generation immigrants fully integrated.
 - Low-low: no integration for immigrants and 5 per cent annually for their children. 10 per cent annual integration for third generation immigrants from developing countries and second generation immigrants from Eastern Europe.

On the basis of this set of assumptions, the authors choose to work with the following six scenarios for population development in Western Europe from 1985 to 2050:

Scenario 1: Low immigration and low integration

Scenario 2: Medium immigration and low integration

Scenario 3: Medium immigration and high integration

Scenario 4: High immigration and low integration

Scenario 5: High immigration and high integration

Scenario 6: High immigration and low-low integration.

Integration refers to integration of demographic (fertility) behaviour, i.e. adopting the host population's fertility levels.

Population development according to the six scenarios is shown in table 8.11 below, and in table 8.12 population ageing in each of the scenarios is illustrated.

Table 8.11. Population development in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050. Millions.

	Scenario					
	1 low/low	2 medium/low	3 medium/high	4 high/low	5 high/high	6 high/low-low
1990	379	379	379	379	379	379
2010	407	410	409	426	424	426
2020	406	416	414	450	447	450
2030	401	419	416	472	467	472
2040	389	411	405	506	496	506
2050	373	411	405	506	496	506

Source: (52)

Table 8.12. Proportion of population aged 65 and over in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050. Percentage.

	Scenario					
	1 low/low	2 medium/low	3 medium/high	4 high/low	5 high/high	6 high/low-low
1990	14	14	14	14	14	14
2010	17	17	17	16	16	16
2020	20	20	20	18	18	18
2030	25	24	24	21	21	21
2040	29	27	27	24	24	24
2050	30	28	28	24	26	24

Source: (52)

In the course of the projection period, the first three scenarios with low or medium immigration levels and with low or high integration levels all lead ultimately to a declining population indicating that even medium immigration levels cannot offset the effect of the low fertility levels. These three scenarios also entail a continuing and dramatic ageing of the population with at least a doubling of the proportion of the population aged 65 and over.

As expected, therefore, scenarios 4-6 with high immigration levels and low, high or low-low integration levels entail an increase in the size of the population over the projection period. This is a direct result of the high immigration levels and the fact that fertility levels of immigrants from developing countries do not fall to those of the host population immediately. However, even in these scenarios, if the assumptions continue even further into the future, population will begin to decline because of the low fertility levels, so that even high immigration cannot in the long run offset the unavoidable decline in population caused by the low fertility levels – assuming of course that immigrants at some point adopt the fertility behaviour of the host population and that this has remained at the initial low level.

On the other hand, high immigration levels do offset the greying of the population, but they cannot eliminate it completely – after all, the large numbers of immigrants do themselves enter the aged population within the course of the projection. Only if immigrants retain their higher fertility levels will the greying of the population be alleviated even more – the other alternative being even higher levels of immigration once the early-period immigrants themselves age into the 65 and over group.

It must be said, however, that even with high immigration levels and low-low integration the proportion of the population aged 65 and over will still increase from 14 to 25 per cent as opposed to from 14 to 30 per cent with low immigration and low integration. In this light, it is a question of whether this reduced greying is sufficient enough to risk such high levels of immigration and low integration. Experience so far would indicate that it may be a hazardous path to follow.

As far as ageing is concerned, it is interesting to note the ageing of the non-European population itself in the different scenarios (table 8.13).

Table 8.13. Proportion of population aged 65 and over in the non-European population of Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050. Percentage.

	Scenario					
	1 low/low	2 medium/low	3 medium/high	4 high/low	5 high/high	6 high/low-low
1990	2	2	2	2	2	2
2010	6	5	3	4	2	4
2020	13	9	5	6	3	5
2030	30	16	6	9	4	9
2040	54	22	7	13	5	13
2050	73	24	7	17	6	16

Source: (52)

Note: The non-European population comprises immigrants not yet fully integrated in demographic terms.

Table 8.13 reveals that the age distribution of the immigrant population is seriously affected by the different assumptions in the different scenarios – and of course by that fact that immigrants in general are young at the time of immigration. In scenarios 2-6 with immigration over the whole projection period, the proportion of immigrants aged 65 and over in the immigrant population is at all times considerably less than the corresponding proportion for the total population. In scenario 1, however, with an immigration stop after the year 2000 and low integration levels, it is clear that the immigrant population will eventually die out.

Table 8.14 shows the proportion of the non-European population in Western Europe according to the set of six scenarios.

Table 8.14 Proportion of the non-European population in Western Europe according to scenario, 1990-2050. Percentage.

	Scenario					
	1 low/low	2 medium/low	3 medium/high	4 high/low	5 high/high	6 high/low-low
1990	3	3	2	3	2	3
2010	5	6	3	9	5	9
2020	5	7	3	12	7	8
2030	4	8	3	15	7	15
2040	3	8	3	17	8	18
2050	2	9	3	18	8	20

Source: (52)

In scenarios 1 and 3, the proportion of non-Europeans in the total population in the long-run is either declining or constant at a low level (3 per cent), governed by the level of immigration (either low or medium) and the level of integration (either low or high). In scenario 2 (medium immigration and low integration) and scenario 5 (high immigration and high integration), the proportion of non-Europeans in the population increases from just 3 per cent to 8-9 per cent in 2050 corresponding to an increase from respectively 11.4 million and 9.5 million in 1990 to 35.6 million and 38.4 million in 2050. The most significant increases in the proportion of non-Europeans is of course observed in scenarios 4 and 6 with high levels of immigration and low or low-low levels of integration. In these two cases, the proportions increase from 3 per cent to 18 (scenario 4) and 20 (scenario 6) which corresponds to almost 100 million non-Europeans in the population of Western Europe in the year 2050.

The scenarios – none of which are likely to turn out to be the true development of the population in Western Europe – are a useful mechanism whereby one can judge the individual and combined effects of immigration levels and integration levels. But again it should be underlined that this model operates with a strictly limited form of demographic integration based on fertility rather than social, cultural or other forms of integration.

It is clear from the scenarios that immigration levels would have to be unrealistically high to offset Europe's declining population. The power of the low levels of fertility is far too great in Europe. On the other hand, in the short-term at least, immigration can help weaken the greying of the continent, but the effect would be short-lived as the immigrant population itself ages – bringing with it ageing problems over and above the ones related to pensions and health care, for example the fact that Western European care and service models are not geared to the demands of different cultures in old age.

But perhaps the greatest comfort is not to be found in intriguing demographic scenarios of one sort or another, but in the fact that historically Europe's populations have proved to be exceptionally skilled (or just lucky) at adjusting to changing conditions.

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