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Introduction

Pieter Bevelander & Inge Dahlstedt

Scandinavia's foreign-origin population, including both immigrants and their descendants, has steadily increased over the past six decades. Migration flows into the region have been linked to societal phenomena such as growing labour demands, family reunification and the acceptance of refugees fleeing wars and political conflicts. Whereas earlier migration streams were generally expected to integrate relatively easily, concerns about the current streams are high on the political agenda. It is thought that more in-depth knowledge about patterns of integration in the demographic, educational and labour market domains could contribute to improved integration policies.

This report is a product of cross-country comparative and register-based research into selected key features of population change and the integration of population groups with roots in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. With one or two exceptions, these six groups are the largest of the many non-European foreign-origin groups now hosted by the three Scandinavian countries. In accordance with how these countries define their residents of foreign origin, the groups include immigrants and their immediate descendants, that is, children born to immigrant couples. This introduction highlights the comparative research in which this report is embedded and ends with a summative comparison of the groups in the three countries.

The research was motivated by two considerations. Firstly, in Scandinavia and many other European countries, opinions on and responses to the spread and integration of developing-world-origin population groups have often been clouded by a dearth of information, knowledge and insight into the phenomena. If this situation does not improve, the confusion and mistrust that have emerged with respect to these people's ethnic, religious or racial backgrounds in recent years are likely to persist and deepen. Hence, an empirically grounded understanding of these groups and their integration is necessary, especially as they seem set to increase in size. An active and sober public discourse on this sensitive

topic and the formulation and implementation of informed policies are therefore essential.

Secondly, there are essentially two basic motives for admitting foreigners into a country that does not promote immigration as a means of nation-building: economic and humanitarian. The first primarily arises from the need to complement the domestic labour force with foreign workers in times of excess labour demand. The second has to do with the ethical stance that a society, if capable of doing so, has a moral obligation to offer protection to foreigners fleeing war, political persecution and the like. Denmark, Norway and Sweden continue to honour this obligation, despite a growing public debate questioning the contribution made by refugees and their families to the economy and society.

The research in question has sought to achieve three objectives. The first objective is to determine how and when the groups came to the three Scandinavian countries and how they have since developed. Here the study focuses on several key features of population change, namely, overall growth, components of growth and age-sex-structure shifts. The second objective is to analyze two specific aspects of the groups' integration, namely their participation in education and their participation in the labour market. Due to data limitations, our examination of education focuses solely on school enrolments and our examination of labour market integration, solely on employment and unemployment. In order to provide a bridge between the analysis of population change and integration, we examine the composition of the groups by selected traits, such as immigrant generation and duration of residence. The study's third objective is to provide a brief overview of the groups' situation in each of the three countries. This is accomplished through descriptions of each country's national setting in terms of economic development, immigration history, and policy development.

1. Outline of the report

This introductory chapter concludes with a cross-national comparison of the development and situation of the six groups in the three countries. The comparison functions both as a summary and as a guide to the country chapters. The comparison begins with a discussion of the region's national settings, continues with a comparison of the demographic development of the groups in the three countries, and concludes with a comparison of the key findings from our examination of education and labour market integration.

Following this introduction, the three country chapters are presented, beginning with Denmark (Chapter 2) followed by Norway (Chapter 3) and concluding with Sweden (Chapter 4). Each of these chapters begins with a description of the national setting and covers the country's immigration history (mainly in the post WWII era), associated migration and integration issues and selected research on these issues. More specifically, each chapter begins with a review of the country's economic and labour market trends and an overview of how population groups with developing world origins have fared in these areas. This discussion is then followed by a brief discussion of the country's population trends, with particular attention paid to the national level demographic changes that have occurred as a result of the rise of these immigrant groups. Immigration and integration policies pertaining to humanitarian and economic immigration are also described, as are the post-war immigration and rise of foreign-origin groups in each country.

Following these general overviews, each chapter turns to the analysis of the population changes that have taken place within the six selected foreign origin groups. The focus here is on changes in population size and the ageing/rejuvenation of the groups. We make comparisons among the groups and, where appropriate, compare them with the native and total populations of the country. The analyses are cognizant of the fact that, during the past decade, the six groups have passed through distinct and differing phases of development that may not be readily comparable. This section in the country chapters also considers selected features of immigrants, such as duration of residence and composition by generation (as such the findings here are typically discussed separately for immigrants and descendants).

The next section of the country chapters is devoted to the topic of educational enrolment. We look at this key integration issue at differing levels of the countries' educational systems. The analysis allows for disaggregation by *level of education*, that is *ISCED-1997* (International Standard Classification of Education-1997) levels suitably aggregated for the purposes of this study. Three levels are distinguished: low, intermediate and high. Comparisons are made across the different population groups. The groups are also compared with the native (total) population. The early design of the research envisaged that another important aspect of educational-system integration would be studied, namely educational attainment. However, this proved impossible due to a lack of data relating to the educational attainment of immigrants and the fact that many of the descendants had not yet completed their education.

The following sections of the country chapters address the issue of labour market integration. Firstly, common indicators relating to employment and unemployment are discussed and analyzed. Secondly, attention is paid to employment among young people, youth unemployment and employment by cohort. Economic inactivity, especially among women of certain groups, is also accorded considerable attention (The economically inactive include those who are not working, studying or looking for work). The analysis distinguishes between sexes, broad age groups and generations, and as such the findings reveal differing patterns of insertion into various states of labour market activity. These patterns shed light on how men and women of different ages (among both immigrants and descendants) are coping in the region's labour markets. The country chapters conclude with a summary of the key findings and main conclusions.

2. Data, Methods and Limitations

Research into various aspects of demographic behaviour and the integration of population groups originating from different developing countries has repeatedly served to identify cross-group differences. It is for this reason that our research has focused on the largest individual groups, rather than composite groups of people whose origins span many different developing countries. This group-oriented approach not only facilitates the identification of interesting differentials, but is also far more useful to policy analysts and policymakers. Due to various limitations associated with the data in the three Nordic countries, the research has focused on the ten most recent years at the time of data processing, 1998–2008.

From the outset we decided to make use of the similarities among the three countries. Firstly, the countries have much in common in terms of immigration patterns over the last half-century, including the growing presence of population groups with developing world origins. Although their immigration and integration policies differ, the countries also share some basic goals. Secondly, the individual-based population registers of the three countries have many similar features. The information that they contain about population and integration processes is comparable across Scandinavia's national borders and richer than the data that exists elsewhere in Europe and beyond. Thirdly, and related to this, the concepts, definitions and classifications that are used in the three countries are basically the same. Thus, with these salient features, the potential for establishing a common empirical and analytical basis for public policy pertaining to immigration, foreign-origin groups and integration is promising. This research is an attempt to exploit that potential.

Comparisons of the different groups were performed as part of the research. The groups were also compared to the native and/or total populations. The research also placed an emphasis on generational comparisons. As often as was deemed possible, immigrants and their descendants were studied separately. In other words, the different groups – immigrants and descendants – were compared within and across groups, as well as with the native and/or total populations. Here it should be noted that as descendants are less numerous and much younger than immigrants, fewer comparisons

were possible. Also, as some of the groups in the three countries have only come into existence relatively recently, their descendants are either in their teens or younger. In such cases, indicators like fertility, educational enrolment and labour force participation could not be computed or, at best, could only be derived and used in comparisons with the oldest, but still relatively young, descendants.

Gender was another principal dimension of the research. Whenever meaningful, indicators were quantified separately for females and males. Research findings systematically highlight gender differentials. The findings point to both gender equalities and inequalities. In particular, the results contrast gender inequalities in, say, school enrolment and labour force participation across the population groups, as well as between the groups and the native or total populations. They thus help to draw attention to disparities between the various groups and natives regarding gender equality. Gender inequality among immigrants and their descendants has also been compared.

The research is descriptive, not explanatory. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, population change and population compositions are typically analyzed in a descriptive manner because these topics do not easily lend themselves to explanatory analyses. Secondly, although explanatory studies of integration may be preferred to descriptive ones, the explanatory route was not open to the researchers collaborating in this project. Such a route would have entailed more time and greater financial resources than the project could have secured. Even if the requisite time and resources had been available, description, which normally precedes explanation, would have been a natural first step. Thirdly, as the research sought to be relevant for policymaking, the descriptive analysis was considered preferable, because the results are usually more accessible to relatively non-specialized audiences, including policymakers.

The analyses made use of both well-established and novel indicators. Some of the indicators pertain to flows and others to stocks. Some are of period variety, others of cohort type. The novel indicators (like enrolment into education) were developed for parts of the education system and labour market integration analyses. They were invented to help compress large amounts of information into a relatively few statistics. Observations for the various indicators, which formed the empirical basis of the research, were computed from tables prepared by processing individual-level register data in each of the three countries. Due to occasional data limitations, in a few rare instances these tables could not fully conform to the standard tables designed early on in the project to ensure a high degree of comparability across countries.

3. Scandinavian Comparison

The aim of this section of the introduction is to point to some interesting similarities and differences across the three studied countries. The aim is not to comment on everything discussed in the individual country chapters, but to highlight and summarize some key points of interest emerging from the study's four differing research areas. The first sub-section focuses on the country's national settings. While the similarities between Denmark, Norway and Sweden are often noted, we turn much of our attention here to looking at the differences the research found between the three countries. In the other sub-sections – Demographic Dynamics, Educational Enrolment and Labour Market Integration, we focus on the similarities and differences found across the studied groups and their behaviours in the three Scandinavian countries.

3.1 National Setting – A Scandinavian Comparison

The national settings of the three countries are not completely similar, but there are some similarities. In this sub-section two issues are discussed: migration history and policies on immigration and integration.

The history of migration in each of the three countries is quite similar. The common Nordic labour market created in 1954 enabled citizens of the Nordic countries to move freely between the countries. This means that that our three countries share a history of labour exchanges between them. Besides the Nordic agreement, the three countries also, and similarly, recruited labour from other European countries. In all three countries immigration was dominated by labour migration until the 1970ies when the oil crisis hit. In order to address the crisis – which had reduced the countries' demand for labour, all three placed restrictions on labour migration, Sweden in 1972, Denmark in 1973 and Norway in 1975. These restrictions led to changes in migration patterns, with migration after the 1970ies and onward becoming more and more dominated by refugees and family reunion migrants in all three countries.

Table 1.1: Dominant non-Nordic immigrant groups, 1970 to 2008

Decade	Sweden	Norway	Denmark
1970	Chile Turkey Poland	Pakistan Yugoslavia Turkey Chile	Turkey Pakistan
1980	Chile Iran Middle East	Pakistan	Iran
1990	Iraq Yugoslavia	Pakistan	Yugoslavia Somalia Iraq
2000	Iraq Iran Somalia	Pakistan Somalia	Somalia Iraq

Source: Chapter 2 to 4.

In the 1970ies, Turkish migrants figured prominently amongst the immigrant groups of all three countries, while Pakistani migrants also figured prominently in Norway and Denmark (Table 1.1). The Pakistani group dominated immigrant intake in Norway up to the 2000s when the Somali group superseded it. In Sweden and Denmark, Iranian migrants dominated in the 1980ies, Iraqi and Yugoslavian migrants in the 1990ies, and migrants from Somali and Iraqi in the first decade of the millennium.

Table 1.2: Size of the Immigrant and Descendant population

	Sweden	Norway	Denmark
Immigrants	14.7%	10.9%	7.9%
Descendants	4.4%	2.2%	2.5%
Total	19.1%	13.1%	10.4%

Sources: Statistics Sweden, Numbers for 2010, Statistics Norway, Numbers for 2011, Statistics Denmark, Numbers for 2012.

The differences between the countries begin to emerge when we look at the size and proportion of their immigrant and descendant populations. As can be seen in Table 1.2, above, immigrants comprise 14.7 per cent of the Swedish population and descendants, 4.4 per cent. In comparison, 7.9 per cent of the Danish population is comprised of immigrants and 2.5 per cent, descendants.

Since the turn of the century, the differences between the three countries' migration and integration policies have also become more pronounced. The period in the 1970ies when the countries closed their door on labour migration marked the establishment phase of immigrant policy in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Policy development in the three countries has followed differing trajectories since that time. In the studied time period the differences were most apparent between Denmark and Sweden (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In 2002, Denmark introduced an immigration policy (called "Firm and Fair") that comprised a considerable tightening of its immigration rules. The changes in policy included a limitation on family reunions (with more stringent rules on attachment) and more stringent rules on permanent residency and citizenship. Compared to the policy route taken by Sweden, the Danish poli-

cy is rather strict and it has contributed to decreases in the migration of refugees and family reunion migrants to Denmark (see the Somali population in Table 1.5).

Swedish migration policy has taken another route. The current government changed the rules on labour migration in 2008 in response to its appreciation that, since the 1970ies, the country's policy had been too strict and inflexible. This policy change means that labour market authorities now have less power over the issue while employers have more power to decide whether they need to recruit labour from outside of EU (third countries). As a result of this policy change, more labour migrants are now coming to Sweden, especially for low-skilled jobs in the private service sector (Emilsson, forthcoming). The rules governing family reunion in Sweden are also more liberal than they are in Denmark. As a result, 80 per cent of the residence permits granted in Sweden since the 1980ies have been granted to either refugees or family migrants.

Probably the easiest way to describe the strictness of Norway's policy is to say that Norway fits somewhere in between Denmark and Sweden. Brochmann and Hagelund (2012) argue that when Norway created their migration and integration policy, they were clearly inspired by Sweden, but

“... the Norwegians did not yet have ambitions to be an international pioneer in immigrant policy. The Norwegian authorities looked to, but did not go as far as, Sweden.”

(Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012: 240).

The three countries further differ in terms of when they began to establish institutions with specific responsibilities for migration and integration. Sweden, for example, established its State Immigrant Board in 1968, while Denmark and Norway waited until the 1980ies (Denmark in 1983 and Norway in 1988). Sweden was also the first of the three countries to develop an integration policy (1974). Denmark followed in 1998 and Norway in 2004 (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012).

A common feature of the countries' contemporary policies is their attention to rights and obligations. However, the three have chosen differing focal points. On a broad level, Sweden focuses on rights, Denmark on obligations, and Norway on both. “In short (and thus somewhat oversimplified), we can say that Denmark has gone for the ‘stick,’ Sweden for the ‘carrot’, and Norway for both” (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012: 252).

When it comes to the development of introductory programmes for newcomers, a common feature among the countries is that the “work

line” has become more and more pronounced, meaning that employment and the ability of immigrants to sustain themselves have become increasingly important (Djuve and Kavli, 2007). Although the focus of the programmes is the same in the three countries, the path chosen differs between Sweden, on the one hand, and Norway and Denmark, on the other hand. This is visible in Table 1.3 (which has been borrowed and translated from Djuve and Kavli, 2007).

Some of the most important differences between the countries are that Norway and Denmark’s introductory programmes are compulsory and linked to economic benefits, whereas in Sweden the introduction program is voluntary. In Sweden newly arrived immigrants can choose to live where they want to live, this is not possible in Denmark and Norway (although in Norway, individual preferences will be taken into account). In Sweden there are no economic consequences for not participating in the introductory programme, but there are in Norway and Denmark.

Table 1.3: Integration regimes: Variations in the rights and duties of the newly arrived*

	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
Settlement regime	Assigned settlement	Assigned settlement with a focus on own preferences	Individual settlement if possible otherwise assigned settlement
Qualification regime	Obligatory participation		Voluntary participation
Economic regime	Economic sanctions if duties not fulfilled		Dependant on settlement**
“Rights” regime	Consequences for permanent residence permit and citizenship if duties not fulfilled		No consequences

Source: Djuve and Kavli (2007) Table 3.5 p. 55.

* Own translation of the whole table.

** After 2010 Sweden introduced economic sanctions in the introductory programme independent of settlement in the country (Government proposition 2009/10: 60).

In Sweden there is no link between programme participation or passing courses and tests and the granting of permanent residence rights. Both Norway and Denmark demand these as prerequisites for permanent residence and citizenship. Sweden has chosen to support greater individual freedoms from the first day of arrival (particularly with respect to housing policy) whereas Norway and Denmark have chosen to have their states play a more active intervening role. Denmark has placed extensive limitations on family migration, Norway has fewer limitations, and Sweden the least. At the same time, however, Denmark includes the families of non-western immigrants in its introduction programme; this

is not the case in Sweden and Norway. Sweden is the only country of the three that allows dual citizenship.

Table 1.4: Requirements for granting citizenship and residence requirements for permanent residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark

Central Stipulations	Sweden	Norway	Denmark
Acceptance of dual citizenship	Yes	No	No
Language requirement	No	Indirectly	Yes
Knowledge-of-society requirement	No	Indirectly	Yes
Economic self-sufficiency requirement	No	No	Yes
Citizenship ceremony	Voluntary	Voluntary	Voluntary
Oath of allegiance	No	Compulsory if one attends an official ceremony	Compulsory
Right to citizenship when conditions are fulfilled	Several groups but not all	Yes	Only second generation Nordic citizens
Residence requirement for citizenship ^a	5 years	7 years	9 years
Residence requirement for permanent residence	Normally 2 years for family members, while certain other categories gain direct permanent residence ^b	3 years	7 years

Source: Brochmann and Hagelund (2012) *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Table 5.1 p.256. See also Wallace Goodman, Sara (2010) *Naturalisation Policies in Europe: Exploring Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, [<http://eudo-citizenship.eu>].

^a Note that the residence requirements are defined differently in the three countries. In Denmark and Norway, time of residence is defined as legal *stay* in the country. In Sweden this time is based on a *domicile* principle, which means that there is often very little difference between Sweden and Norway in the time requirement as actually practiced.

^b Among the groups that gain permanent residence permits directly are refugees and others in need of protection, persons staying on humanitarian grounds, and persons with work permits over a longer period.

In order to visually show the most pronounced differences between the countries we have borrowed a table from Brochmann and Hagelund (2012). In this table (Table 1.4), each country's requirements for citizenship and permanent residence are displayed. Sweden has no language requirements for permanent residence permits or citizenship, Denmark does, and Norway does, albeit indirectly. Denmark also has a requirement that, in order to be granted permanent residency and citizenship, individuals must be able to economically sustain themselves, Norway

and Sweden have no such requirements. The right to citizenship is, in general, more regulated in Denmark than in the other two countries. When it comes to the residence requirement for permanent residence, the period of stay demanded is shortest in Sweden and the longest in Denmark, the same goes for the residence requirement for citizenship. To summarize the differences highlighted in the table, it can be said that in order to be granted citizenship or permanent residence in the three countries, immigrants must meet more obligations in Denmark, less in Norway and the least in Sweden.

3.2 Demographic Dynamics

This sub-section on demographic dynamics starts with a comparison of the growth of the six studied groups between 1998 and 2008 (see Table 1.5).

Table 1.5: Percentage growth for immigrants and descendants 1998 to 2008 and real size 2008 by country of origin

Percentage growth from 1998 to 2008									
	Sweden			Norway			Denmark		
	Immi-grants	Descen-dens	Total	Immi-grants	Descen-dens	Total	Immi-grants	Descen-dens	Total
Iran	15	67	22	52	149	62	9	72	17
Iraq	189	269	202	301	728	351	97	290	127
Pakistan	170	68	135	30	49	38	12	24	17
Somalia	101	121	106	220	304	239	-4	125	23
Turkey	27	39	31	46	81	57	13	40	24
Vietnam	33	68	42	17	73	32	10	84	28
Real size 2008									
Iran	57,663	14,201	71,864	13,001	2,665	15,666	11,904	2,992	14,896
Iraq	109,444	27,233	136,677	19,197	5,308	24,505	21,283	7,634	28,917
Pakistan	7,687	2,522	10,209	16,615	13,546	30,161	10,827	10,053	20,880
Somalia	25,159	9,970	35,129	17,255	6,378	23,633	10,231	6,458	16,689
Turkey	39,230	26,287	65,517	10,039	5,397	15,436	31,834	26,357	58,191
Vietnam	13,516	5,926	19,442	12,803	6,923	19,726	8,865	4,761	13,626

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

All six groups grew during the study period, albeit to differing degrees. We start with the Iraqi group as it had the highest relative growth in all three countries: the group doubled its total size in Denmark, tripled in Sweden and quadrupled in Norway. In Norway, the Iraqi descendant group, in particular, also increased in size. The Somali group grew in all three countries, but in Norway it tripled in size, and in Sweden, it doubled. It is interesting to note that, in Denmark, while the Somali immigrant group was decreasing in size, the descendant group was actually

growing. The Pakistani group in Sweden doubled in size between 1998 and 2008. The remaining three groups, the Turkish, Vietnamese and Iranian groups, also grew, but at a more moderate pace.

Another interesting thing to note is that, with one exception (Pakistanis in Sweden), the growth among descendants was higher than that of the immigrants, with Iraqi descendants in Norway experiencing the by far the greatest growth. The differences seen in growth rates are to a large extent the result of where in their immigration history the six groups were in the three countries in 1998. As an example, refugees from Iraq had just begun to arrive in Norway in 1998, whereas they were already well established in Sweden and Denmark by that time (Pakistanis had only recently begun to migrate to Sweden as well).

The general conclusion is that all the groups grew between 1998 and 2008 in all three countries, with the exception of Somali immigrants in Denmark. This development was due to a significant outmigration of Somalis from Denmark to other Western destination countries.

Table 1.6: Proportions of population groups after duration of residence – shares of 0 to 9 years and 20 years and more, by country of birth. % 2008

Immigrants	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	0–9	20+	0–9	20+	0–9	20+
Iran	22	41	39	26	22	20
Iraq	68	5	77	2	55	4
Pakistan	68	21	28	50	26*	9*
Somalia	63	2	73	3	34	1
Turkey	27	48	37	34	19*	13*
Vietnam	29	32	18	45	17	9

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

* Turkish group in Denmark have 40 per cent with duration of residence unknown and the Pakistani group 38 per cent unknown.

Turning our attention to Table 1.6 and the groups' duration of residence (as of 2008), a few interesting things can be noted. The first is that more than 50 per cent of Iraqi immigrants had been living in Denmark, Norway or Sweden for less than 9 years in 2008 (68 per cent for Sweden, 77 per cent for Norway and 55 per cent for Denmark). The Somali immigrant group followed the same pattern in Sweden and Norway (63 per cent for Sweden and 73 per cent for Norway). The second thing to note is that almost half (48 per cent) of the Turkish group living in Sweden had been living there for 20 years or more, yet only 34 per cent of this group had been living in Norway for the same length of time. The third interesting thing to note is the difference between the Pakistani groups in Norway and Sweden. While 50 per cent of the group had been living in Norway for

20 years or more, 58 per cent had been living in Sweden for less than 9 years. This means that the Pakistanis are well-established in Norway, whereas they have only quite recently begun to arrive in Sweden.

It is hard to draw any conclusions with respect to the Turkish and Pakistani immigrant groups in Denmark because we don't know the duration of residence for a large share of these groups.

Table 1.7: Standardized crude birth (SCBR) rate by five-year periods for the studied groups by country

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
Immigrants	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	8.4	7.6	11.1	8.5	10.9	7.4
Iraq	19.9	20.0	26.8	22.3	26.7	17.0
Pakistan	16.2	20.6	20.9	19.6	20.8	16.4
Somalia	26.6	25.7	27.9	27.7	32.9	25.0
Turkey	12.8	14.1	17	14.5	15.4	12.1
Vietnam	12.1	11.2	13.4	11	14.0	10.3
Native origin	9.6	11.0	10.2	10.4	10.9	12.0
Total population	9.9	11.4	9.6	9.7	10.9	11.5

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

It is time to turn our attention to the sources of change in the studied groups, that is births, deaths, immigration and emigration (Table 1.7). Starting with births we can see that the standardized birth rates of the selected groups were higher than the native populations in all three countries with one exception: the Iranians. The Iranian groups had lower birth rates than natives in Sweden, Denmark and Norway (except for the period 1999–2003 in Norway). The Iraqis, Pakistanis and Somalis stand out in all three countries because they had a birth rate twice as high as natives, sometimes even higher (It should be noted, however, that their birth rates decreased in Norway and Denmark during the period 2004 to 2008).

The general conclusion is that all of the immigrant groups (with the exception of the Iranians) have much higher birth rates than natives, but in Norway and Denmark there seems to be an adaption towards the native pattern over time. In Sweden there seems to be no adaption over time toward the native pattern.

While the studied groups had much higher birth rates than the natives in each of the countries, they also had much lower death rates (Tables Sweden 2.4; Norway 2.5; Denmark 2.4). The death rates for the immigrant groups ranged from 0.8 to 2.8 deaths per 1,000, while the rates for the native populations ranged from 8.9 to 10.9.

Table 1.8: Crude rate per thousand of natural change (CRNC) among immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	9.8	7.9	13.8	10.6	11.6	6.6
Iraq	24.2	23.7	28.9	27.9	32.3	18.5
Pakistan	17.4	20.3	20.8	18.4	19.4	12.8
Somalia	36.7	34.6	39.2	37.4	45.7	28.8
Turkey	11.4	11.0	22.6	17.3	17.7	11.3
Vietnam	16.7	13.6	19.3	14.8	19.2	12.3
Native origin	-1.7	-0.3	0.9	1	0.4	1.0
Total population	0.0	1.6	3	3.6	1.3	1.6

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

The difference between births and deaths gives us the crude rate of natural change (CRNC), as shown in Table 1.8. Starting with the native populations, it is clear that the rate of natural change is quite low, between zero and one in Norway and Denmark, although there was an increase over time in both countries. In Sweden the native population had a negative rate of natural change, with a slight increase over time, minus 1.7 per thousand in the period 1999–2003 and minus 0.3 in 2004–2008. All the studied groups had a higher rate of natural change than the native populations. The Iranian group had the lowest rates in all three countries and across both five-year periods. The Somali group had the highest rates in the three countries and across both periods. The rates of natural change span from 6.6 (Iranians in Denmark, 2004–2008) to 45.7 (Somalis in Denmark, 1999–2003). Comparing the five-year periods, it is interesting to note that all groups show a decrease in rates from 1999–2003 to 2004–2008, with only one exception, Pakistanis in Sweden. The rate of natural change for each group is very dependent on their age structure, and also on the proportion of new arrivals, as discussed in greater detail in the country chapters which follow.

Another source of change for a population group comes from immigrations and emigrations. From this perspective it is interesting to look at the standardized crude rate of change due to migration (SCMR) (see Table 1.9). Starting with the natives we can see that in all three countries the change due to migration is close to zero or less than zero. With the exception of Somalis in Denmark between 2004 and 2008, all the immigrant groups had positive rates of change due to migration that were above (or well above) the native population's rates. The Iraqi group had the highest rates in all three countries and in both periods, except in Norway between 2004 and 2008.

In general it can be said that all groups grew due to migration, except the Somalis in Denmark. The negative standardized crude rate of change

due to migration explains the Somali group's decline in Denmark (More Somalis have moved from Denmark than to Denmark).

Table 1.9: Standardized crude rate of change due to migration (SCMR) by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	8.1	10.4	53.7	19.5	13.7	8.2
Iraq	91.0	74.0	163.2	42.1	84.4	5.0
Pakistan	24.9	49.0	17.8	13.3	3.2	3.9
Somalia	25.4	64.3	118.5	48.2	8.9	-10.3
Turkey	8.6	11.2	32.5	19	5.7	3.4
Vietnam	15.3	15.1	12.4	11.2	7.4	4.7
Native origin	1.5	1.4	-0.2	0	-0.3	0.1
Total population	6.4	9.1	2.9	5.9	1.8	3.7

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden

3.3 Educational Enrolment

Table 1.10: Share of the male population 16–19 and 20-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in education, by sex and country of origin. The school year 2007/2008

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24
Immigrants						
Iran	84	49	75	39	75	46
Iraq	84	31	69	26	69	28
Pakistan	84	67	67	28	69	34
Somalia	76	34	48	26	62	23
Turkey	74	23	56	21	57	18
Vietnam	66	36	61	38	66	37
Descendants						
Iran	88	56	86	42	82	46
Iraq	87	43	79	-	72	37
Pakistan	84	56	79	38	75	42
Somalia	86	46	-	-	71	27
Turkey	83	30	75	34	73	33
Vietnam	92	52	87	55	90	53
Total population	80	30	83	39	78	38

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicates that the enrolment rate is at the same level or higher than the total population in the same age, gender and country.

In this section on education, we look first at the enrolment of males aged 16 to 19 and 20 to 24 in the education systems of the three countries during school year 2007/2008 (see Table 1.10, above). As expected, in all three countries, enrolment rates were higher in the younger age group

and lower in the older age group. Comparing the groups with the total populations of the three countries, we can see an interesting pattern for Norway and Denmark. The immigrant groups in both these countries had lower enrolment rates than the total population, except for the Iranian population aged 20 to 24. In Norway the Iranian group had about the same enrolment rate as the total population, and in Denmark this group had a higher enrolment rate than the total population. When comparing the immigrant groups in the three countries with each other, it is clear that the Turkish and Somali immigrant groups had the lowest enrolment rates among the studied groups in all three countries, independent of age.

Turning our attention to the descendant groups, the same pattern is visible. The majority of descendants in Denmark and Norway had lower enrolment rates than the total population while all of the descendant groups in Sweden had higher enrolment rates than the total population. Notably, two of the groups – Iranian and Vietnamese descendants – had higher enrolment rates than the natives of all three countries.

Table 1.11: Share of the female population 16–19 and 20–24-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in education, by sex and country of origin. The school year 2007/2008

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24
Immigrants						
Iran	80	60	83	43	76	50
Iraq	83	42	71	33	70	40
Pakistan	78	21	71	23	81	32
Somalia	74	26	51	24	70	30
Turkey	69	30	50	18	70	27
Vietnam	88	32	72	36	73	35
Descendants						
Iran	89	72	85	66	86	61
Iraq	90	62	90	-	78	58
Pakistan	91	65	81	48	80	58
Somalia	89	73	-	-	85	-
Turkey	86	43	75	35	79	47
Vietnam	91	61	92	59	90	64
Total population	81	41	84	49	78	47

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicates that the enrolment rate is at the same level or higher than the total population in the same age, gender and country.

We can see the same pattern for females as we did for the males (see Table 1.11). In Denmark and Norway, the majority of the immigrant groups had a lower enrolment rate than the total population, with the exception of Iranians aged 20–24 years in Denmark. Among the female population the pattern in Sweden is more similar to the Danish and Norwegian pat-

terns. Most groups had lower rates than the total population. The exceptions in this case, however, are Iranian and Iraqi immigrants between 16 and 24 and Vietnamese immigrants (in both age groups), all of whom had higher enrolment rates than the total population.

With respect to descendants, Denmark and Sweden share a pattern in common: all descendants in both age groups had higher enrolment rates than the total population. In Norway, Iranian and Vietnamese descendants had higher enrolment rates in both age groups and Iraqi descendants had higher enrolment rates in the youngest age group.

Table 1.12: Share of 20–24 and 25–29-year-old male immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin. The school year 2007/2008

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	20–24	25–29	20–24	25–29	20–24	25–29
Immigrants						
Iran	34	28	27	25	25	28
Iraq	13	6	11	8	12	12
Pakistan	63	54	22	15	23	17
Somalia	9	4	8	5	6	5
Turkey	15	7	13	4	9	5
Vietnam	26	10	29	14	17	15
Descendants						
Iran	44	25	33	-	28	-
Iraq	30	12	-	-	26	-
Pakistan	43	20	31	15	29	18
Somalia	38	-	-	-	18	-
Turkey	22	7	21	7	15	9
Vietnam	43	17	45	22	32	29
Total population	22	13	27	13	21	17

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicates that the enrolment rate is at the same level or higher than the total population in the same age, gender and country.

The previous two tables contain the enrolment rates associated with any kind of education (i.e. education on all levels from compulsory to Tertiary) in the three countries. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 show the countries tertiary education enrolment rates for males and females, respectively. Starting with a comparison of the male immigrant population, it is interesting to see that Iranian immigrants in both age groups have higher enrolment rates than the total population in all three countries (Table 1.12). Pakistani immigrants have almost the same level of enrolment as the total population, with the exception of 20 to 24 year olds in Norway. Iraqi, Somali and Turkish immigrants had lower rates in both age groups in all three countries.

Among the descendants we find almost the same situation in that Iranian, Pakistani and also Vietnamese descendants had higher tertiary education enrolment rates than the total population in all three countries. The Iraqi, Somali and Turkish descendants seem to do better than both the immigrant generation and the total population in Sweden (this is also the case for Iraqi descendants in Denmark). Turkish descendants have higher enrolment rates than their parents' generation but, in general, they have lower tertiary education enrolment rates than the total population (except in Sweden).

Table 1.13: Share of 20–24 and 25–29-year-old female immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin. The school year 2007/2008

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	20–24	25–29	20–24	25–29	20–24	25–29
Immigrants						
Iran	42	26	33	30	38	30
Iraq	17	6	17	13	21	13
Pakistan	13	13	18	9	20	6
Somalia	8	3	10	3	11	5
Turkey	16	8	12	7	15	6
Vietnam	18	10	26	10	16	14
Descendants						
Iran	56	29	56	-	50	-
Iraq	44	12	-	-	44	-
Pakistan	53	20	42	14	42	18
Somalia	42	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	33	10	26	10	31	13
Vietnam	55	20	55	20	51	33
Total population	30	17	41	17	34	21

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicates that the enrolment rate is at the same level or higher than the total population in the same age, gender and country.

The female population's enrolment in tertiary education is shown in Table 1.13. Among the immigrant groups, only the Iranian group had higher enrolment rates than the total population (except in the 20–24 age group in Norway). Also among the female population, Somali immigrants had the lowest tertiary education enrolment rates together with Turkish immigrant women.

Among female descendants, the Iranian and Vietnamese groups stand out. In both age groups and in all three countries they had higher enrolment rates than the total population. Turkish female descendants had the lowest enrolment in tertiary education of all the groups in all three countries and in both age groups. Also among women, we can see that descendants in Sweden had higher enrolment rates than in Norway and Denmark.

All in all the general impression drawn from this comparison of enrolment rates is that descendants in Sweden are more likely to be enrolled in education than they are in Norway and Denmark. Comparing the immigrant groups in the three countries, the general impression is that Iranian immigrants stand out with quite high enrolments in all three countries.

3.4 Labour Market Integration

The last area of analysis in this study is labour market integration. We begin with a comparison of the employment rates of those aged 25 to 54 in 2008. Because there are so few descendants in this age group, particularly in Norway and Denmark, the analysis is limited to the immigrants of the six groups.

Figure 1.3: Employment rate 2008 male population 25–54 years by country of birth

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Only the immigrant generation.

In Figure 1.3, above, the employment rate for 2008 is shown for the male population in all three countries by country of birth as well as the total male population. The total male employment rate in all three countries was well over 80 per cent in 2008. Most immigrant groups had lower employment rates in Sweden than in the two other countries. Three groups had the same pattern across all three countries, the Iranian,

Turkish and Vietnamese groups. The employment rates of the Iranian group ranged from 62 to 67 per cent in all three countries, the rates of the Turkish group, between 66 to 76 per cent, and the rates of the Vietnamese group, from 69 to 76 per cent.

The Iraqi group did best in Norway (57 per cent) in comparison with Denmark (50 per cent) and Sweden (45 per cent). The Pakistani group did better in both Denmark and Norway (70 and 73 per cent, respectively) than in Sweden. In Sweden, their employment rate was much lower (48 per cent), just slightly higher than that of the Iraqi group. The same pattern is seen for the Somalis. They too had higher employment rates in Norway (47 per cent) and Denmark (44 per cent). Their employment rate in Sweden – 35 per cent – was the lowest rate seen among the six studied groups. Groups with many recent arrivals tended to have lower rates than more well established groups.

Figure 1.4: Employment rate 2008 Female population 25–54 years by country of birth

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Only the immigrant generation.

The female population groups (see Figure 1.4) had lower employment rates than their male counterparts. The total female employment rates in the three countries were just above 80 per cent, thus two or three percentage points lower than the total male rates.

It is hard to see any common patterns in female employment. The Iranian group had about the same employment rates in all three countries (from 55 per cent in Denmark to 59 per cent in Norway) and so did the Pakistani group. The Iraqi group had similar employment rates in Denmark and Sweden (30 and 31 per cent) and a slightly higher rate in Norway (36 per cent). The Somali group followed a similar pattern, having had an employment rate of about 25 per cent in both Sweden and Norway, and a little higher rate in Denmark (30 per cent). The Turkish group had about the same employment rate in Denmark and Sweden and a little lower rate in Norway. The Vietnamese group had the highest employment rate among women in all three countries (in Sweden, together with Iranian women).

In order to see if there was a common pattern among the groups or across the countries we created Table 1.14. This table shows the differences in employment rates between the groups and the total population in the three countries, disaggregated by gender and shown for two years of observation (1998 and 2008), thus also allowing us to gain some insights about the development of the groups' labour market position over time.

Table 1.14: Differences in employment rate 25–64 years by gender and, country and year of observation

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	1998	2008	1998	2008	1998	2008
Males						
Iran	-37	-20	-28	-20	-36	-23
Iraq	-56	-39	-49	-29	-61	-35
Pakistan	-31	-36	-18	-14	-22	-15
Somalia	-65	-49	-42	-40	-73	-40
Turkey	-28	-16	-27	-20	-25	-15
Vietnam	-26	-15	-14	-13	-25	-9
Females						
Iran	-41	-23	-32	-23	-49	-26
Iraq	-61	-50	-56	-46	-71	-51
Pakistan	-48	-43	-49	-47	-52	-42
Somalia	-67	-55	-60	-57	-73	-50
Turkey	-45	-32	-44	-39	-48	-31
Vietnam	-37	-23	-27	-16	-38	-16

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Only the immigrant generation. Italic text indicates the lowest difference in the specific year and group (i.e. closest to the employment rate of the total population).

The first conclusion drawn from Table 1.14 is that all groups, both male and female, improved their labour market situation over time, that is, the differences seen in employment rates were lower in 2008 than in 1998. Among the male population, the Turkish and Vietnamese groups had a smaller difference in Sweden in comparison with the other groups; in Norway it was the Pakistani and Vietnamese groups. In Denmark, the

Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese groups had smaller differences in employment rates compared to the other groups. The Iraqi and Somali groups had the greatest differences in all three countries.

Continuing with the female population, it appears that the Vietnamese and Iranian females had the smallest differences. The greatest differences can be seen among Iraqi, Somali and Pakistani females.

Figure 1.5: Employment rate 2008 Male population between 16 and 24 years by generation

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Figure 1.5 presents the employment rate for males between the ages of 16 and 24 years in 2008 in the total population and in the immigrant and descendant groups. As expected, the employment rate for this age group was much lower than for the group aged 25 to 54 years. The employment rate of the total population of this young age group was around 15 percentage points lower than that of the population aged 25 to 54 in Norway and Denmark. In Sweden the difference was greater, almost 40 per cent. In general, this difference was also clearly visible among the studied groups living in Sweden: all groups – both immigrants and descendants – had much lower employment rates in Sweden than they did in Norway and Denmark.

In the majority of the groups, the descendant generation had higher employment rates than the immigrant generation. Those with lower rates included Iranian descendants in Sweden, Vietnamese descendants in Norway and Iraqi descendants in Denmark. No group of descendants reached the level of employment of the total population in any of the studied countries, but most of them were closer than their immigrant parents.

Figure 1.6: Employment rate 2008 Female population between 16 and 24 years by generation

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Turning our attention to the female population aged 16 to 24 (Figures 1.6), the same differences between Sweden, on the one hand, and Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, can be seen in the total population. The employment rate for the total female population in Sweden in 2008 was more than 20 percentage points lower than that of Norway and Denmark.

While none of the immigrant groups had an employment rate than the total population in any country, the Vietnamese in Norway and the Iranians in Denmark and Norway did not lag far behind. Iranian, Iraqi and to some extent Pakistani immigrants had about the same employment rate in Norway and Denmark. The employment rates of the Somali, Vietnamese and Turkish immigrant groups differed in all three countries. For Sweden the same pattern can be seen for females as for men: the employment rate of all of the immigrant groups was half or less the employment rate of the same groups in Norway and Denmark.

Among female descendants, it is interesting to note that Vietnamese descendants in Norway and Turkish and Vietnamese descendants in Denmark had employment rates than the total population. All other female descendants had lower employment rates than the total population. Iranian, Pakistani and Vietnamese descendants had similar employment rates in both Norway and Sweden. The other groups differed between the countries. In the case of Sweden, the same pattern can be seen as with the immigrant groups and the male population, that is all descendant groups had low employment rates in comparison with the same groups in Norway and Denmark. Although the employment rate

was low among descendants in Sweden, all descendant groups had higher employment rates than the immigrant generation. This pattern was also seen in Norway and Denmark.

So far we have seen some interesting differences in the age group 16 to 24, and in order to see why there are such big differences between Sweden, on the one hand, and Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, we created Tables 1.15 and 1.16, below. These tables show the share of the population between the ages of 16 and 24 years in 2008 who were neither employed or unemployed but engaged in education.

Table 1.15: Male population 16–24 years that are not employed or employed but engaged in education in 2008 by country of birth and generation

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Descendants
Iran	50.3	55.9	25.6	31.4	31.2	26.5
Iraq	43	50.2	23.4	-	17.4	21.8
Pakistan	67	46.2	22.5	24.8	17.7	21
Somalia	41.8	55.5	22.4	-	22.4	22.6
Turkey	37.8	41.9	19.3	22.2	14.5	18.6
Vietnam	51	58.2	23.4	31.3	22.2	31.2
Total	41.8		25.5		20.2	

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicate higher than or equal enrolment as the total population.

Table 1.16: Female population 16–24 years that are not employed or employed but engaged in education in 2008 by country of birth and generation

	Sweden		Norway		Denmark	
	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Descendants
Iran	52.9	60.2	25.7	34.7	24.9	26.5
Iraq	48.9	57.1	27.5	-	28.1	28.7
Pakistan	41.3	58.3	27.5	29.4	27.9	28.8
Somalia	39.5	68.3	22	-	25.5	-
Turkey	37.9	48.1	17.3	25.6	16.6	19.6
Vietnam	47.6	57.7	15.3	27.4	23.4	23.5
Total	44.2		25		19.2	

Source: Statistics Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Note: Italic text indicate higher than or equal enrolment as the total population.

The results indicate that the differences in employment rates are due to differences in engagement in education. Both the total population and the immigrant and descendant groups in Sweden are engaged in education to a greater degree than they are in Norway and Denmark; this is true for both males and females.

A question that can be raised is: Why is a larger proportion of the population engaged in education in Sweden than in the other two Scan-

dinavian countries? The answer might be that there are actual differences between the countries, but it could also be connected to the variable that is used to measure enrolment in Sweden. This variable is called "StudDelt", and unlike the variables used in Denmark and Norway, it includes communal adult education and labour market education. The inclusion of these categories could raise the numbers engaged in education in Sweden.

3.5 Concluding Summary

National settings play a significant role in how immigrant groups integrate into host countries. A lot of factors in these settings can contribute to the success, or lack of success, of differing migrant groups. These include factors such as economic development, whether migration is considered a part (or not) of nation building, the structure of the labour market, the structure of the educational sector, and a country's migration and integration policies (see, for example, Kogan, 2006; Koopmans, 2010).

The three studied countries have chosen differing paths with respect to their migration and integration policies, with Sweden at one extreme, Denmark at the other, and Norway somewhere in the middle. Denmark has put in place a more restrictive immigration policy than the other two countries. This means that there are higher thresholds for getting into the country than there are in Norway and Sweden. The differences between the three countries are also clearly apparent in their integration policies, particularly with respect to citizenship and permanent residency. Denmark, for example, now requires applicants to fulfill numerous obligations in order to qualify for citizenship; Sweden has fewer such obligations; and again, Norway has assumed a position somewhere between the other two. Denmark's more restrictive migration policy has, of course, affected the groups coming to that country. Denmark's Somali immigrant group, for example, shrank so much between 1998 and 2008 as a result of outmigration that it actually achieved a negative rate of change.

Over the ten-year study period (1998–2008), all the groups (except for the Somali immigrant group in Denmark) grew in size. Positive net migration and more births than deaths in the groups (natural change) were behind this growth. The Iraqi and Somali groups stand out for having had the highest rates of natural change in all three host countries (The growth of the Iraqi group was also affected by recent migrations to all three countries). The Pakistani group in Sweden had a high rate of change due to migration as well as a high rate of natural change. These

three groups – the Iraqis, Somalis in all three countries and Pakistanis in Sweden – have a short migration history in the host countries, as shown in our analyses of duration of stay. Duration of stay is key to one's position in a society; there is a vast amount of research that points to the fact that the longer an individual or a group has stayed in a host country the better their position in the society, especially in the labour market (see among others: Borjas, 1985; Chiswick, 1978; Bevelander, 2004).

Turning to education, Sweden stands out in the sense that the enrolment rates in Sweden were higher – at all levels – than in the two other countries for most of the immigrant groups and all the descendant groups in comparison with the total population. For tertiary education the differences between the three countries were not that pronounced, but one interesting finding is that the Iranian and Vietnamese groups have high tertiary enrolment rates in all three countries. The interesting question to ask here is: What is affecting these enrolment rates? On the one hand, the differences between countries suggest that there could be institutional and policy differences (e.g., more generous policies in Sweden compared to Norway and Denmark). On the other hand, selection processes in the migration to the countries and educational backgrounds could also play a part. For example, we know from other research (Dahlstedt and Bevelander, 2010) that the educational levels of Iranian immigrants are high upon arrival in Sweden, both in comparison with the total population and with other immigrant groups, which suggests that this group considers education to be important.

When it comes to labour market integration, there are a couple of interesting things to highlight. Firstly, between 1998 and 2008, all groups (both men and women) improved their employment rates relative to the employment rate of the total population in all three countries. This positive finding also provides a strong indication that it takes time for newcomers to integrate into a labour market (Borjas, 1985; Chiswick, 1978; Bevelander, 2004). While we also found that some groups, particularly females, still had relatively low employment rates in 2008, this finding must be understood in the context that Scandinavia's female employment rates are among the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2012). Another indication that time is of great importance in labour market integration: we found that the groups that had high shares of new arrivals (e.g., the Iraqis and Somalis in all three countries and the Pakistanis in Sweden) also had lower employment rates than the "older" groups in each of the host countries.

The general impression one gets is that Norway and Denmark have had similar results in integrating immigrants and descendants into edu-

cation and the labour market. Most of the studied groups, for example, had similar rates of employment in Denmark and Norway, and these rates were higher than those found for the groups in Sweden. The situation was reversed in education. In this case, the groups had higher enrolment rates in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark (and again, these rates were not only higher, but similar).

Denmark and Norway's higher employment rates, for example, could be due to Denmark's more restrictive immigration policy (i.e., immigrants in Denmark have gone through a more rigorous selection process) and Norway's strong economy. The higher enrolment rates seen in Sweden could be due to a more liberal integration policy, but they could also result from Sweden not having an economy as strong as Norway's and/or having a more liberal immigration policy than Denmark. As stated at the beginning of this introduction, the aim of this project, from the start, has been to undertake descriptive analysis. As such, the possibilities for providing explanations for these inter-country differences are limited and could be the aim for further research.

This introductory chapter and summarizing comparison have highlighted interesting differences and similarities between Denmark, Norway and Denmark. For a more in depth discussion on the countries continue to read the three country chapters.

4. Denmark

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4.1 The National Setting¹

4.1.1 A Brief History of Immigration to Denmark Since the 1950ies

Until the late 1950ies, Denmark was characterized by net emigration and a relatively high unemployment rate. However, by the end of that decade, this situation had changed: high labour demands due to rapid post-war economic expansion triggered substantial labour immigration – mainly from Turkey, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Morocco. Earlier immigrant cohorts had come almost exclusively from the developed countries, especially from other Nordic countries and from Germany.

In the early 1970ies, Denmark became a member of the European Community (EC), through which free movement was permitted across member countries. That development, combined with global economic and oil crises led Denmark, like many European countries, to put a stop to labour immigration from non-European Economic Area (EEA) countries. Despite this ban, immigration continued at a steady albeit slower pace throughout the 1970ies as a result of family reunification

¹ The analysis in this chapter is based on individual data made available by Statistics Denmark to the study in a format designed to preserve anonymity. The chapter uses the prevailing Danish definitions of immigrants and descendants, educational enrolment and employment. These definitions may differ slightly from those used by the other study participants (Norway and Sweden) and should thus be taken into consideration when comparing the findings of the three country studies.

Figure 1.1: Proportion of immigrants and descendants in the total population, by origin, 1980–2010

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF2 and Statistics Denmark, www.statistikbanken.dk, BEF3.

Until the mid-1980ies, immigrants formed only about 3 per cent of the Danish population. Due to minimal immigration from non-Western countries, the majority of Denmark's immigrants originated from Western countries. In 1983, however, the Danish government reformed its immigration policy, creating a more liberal regime in which family reunification, as well as political and humanitarian asylum, became easier to obtain. As a result, the composition of Denmark's immigration source countries shifted relatively quickly from Western to non-Western countries (see Figure 1.1. Figuring prominently in this shift were, in the 1980ies, refugees, and subsequently their families, from Iran, Sri Lanka, Palestine, and in the 1990ies, from Yugoslavia, Somalia and Iraq. By the end of the 1990ies, problems in some residential areas were attracting high levels of media attention and affecting political debates on immigration. In response, Denmark introduced its first Integration Act in 1999 and a new Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs followed in 2001.

In the 2000s, a number of changes were introduced to Danish immigration law that were primarily aimed at limiting further immigration (for greater detail, see sub-section 1.3). The goal was to better manage the integration of immigrants already in the country and to intensify and better manage Denmark's efforts to integrate new immigrants in the future. Probably as a result of these changes, the pattern of immigration to Denmark has again changed, such that in recent years the country has been receiving more immigrants with Western than non-Western origins. As shown in Figure 1.2, below, the number of residence permits granted for education, job and European Union (EU)-certificates for

EU/EEA nationals grew substantially from 2003 onwards while permits for asylum and family reunifications decreased.

Figure 1.2: Residence permits granted in Denmark, by type, 1998–2008

Source: Ministry of Justice.

As suggested above, some immigrant groups have a longer history of migration to Denmark (e.g. immigrants and descendants with origins in Turkey and Pakistan), than others (e.g. refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia). Overall, today, first and second generation immigrants make up about 10 per cent of Denmark's population, and despite recent changes in the country's immigration patterns, 67 per cent of these immigrants originated from non-Western countries (for greater detail, see sub-section 2.5).

4.1.2 Economic Development

During the 1950ies, Denmark changed from an agricultural society to an industrial society. In the following years, the service sector also grew and, owing to an extensive expansion of the public sector, a welfare state developed. From 1957 to 1972, the country experienced a period of economic growth, production changed with the support of new technologies, and for the most part there was a stable labour market. However, along with increased economic growth there arose concerns for labor shortages. During the 1960ies Denmark tried to address the issue through an increased emphasis on higher education. The high school

system was also expanded and financial supports were introduced to ensure that all eligible youth could continue with their studies.

Labour market policy at the time was primarily directed to expanding the public sector. In addition, to encourage more women to enter the labour force, public daycare centres were introduced.

In 1973, Denmark became a member of the European Community (later the EU). The same year a war between Israel and its Arabic neighbors broke out and the first oil crisis hit the world. The ensuing uncertainty and inflation made the world market unstable and an economic downturn followed, leading Denmark to seek loans abroad. During the 1980ies the Danish government tried, with the help of measures that came to be known as the “potato-diet”, to correct the economy and reduce its external debt.

During the 1980ies and 1990ies Denmark’s business structure changed. In the agricultural sector, farms were merged into larger units and mechanization and industrialization went hand in hand with a strategy favouring the large-scale production of pork, bacon and dairy, among others. At the same time, the industrial sector underwent a transition that resulted in an increased focus on services, renewable energy, electronics and medical products.

In 2001, a new liberal-conservative government placed a ban on increases in taxes and duties. The ban contributed to improved economic development and the government’s immigration policy was prolonged to 2005. Positive economic growth continued between 2005 and 2008, leading to the lowest unemployment rate in Denmark’s modern history. In the period of this study’s analysis (1998–2008), Denmark’s unemployment rate decreased from 6.1 per cent (in 1998) to 2.1 per cent (in 2008) (see Figure 1.3). This development led to an increased demand for skilled labour and new initiatives were introduced to allow for the controlled immigration of skilled labour.

Between 2005 and 2008, a running public debate took place in Denmark about how the country’s welfare society could be financed in the future. The debate was triggered partly by a demographic shift towards a more elderly population (and consequently, a smaller workforce), and partly due to the pressure placed on the public budget by debt.

Figure 1.3: Unemployment rate in Denmark, by origin, 1998–2008

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMUDD17.

4.1.3 Immigration and Integration Aims and Policies

Danish immigration policy changed substantially between 2002 and 2008. A new liberal-conservative government took office at the end of 2001, and with the support of the Danish Peoples Party, introduced a number of changes. By 2002, a new immigration policy, called “Firm and Fair” was introduced. Some major changes in the following years included:

- Permanent residency was made dependent on active integration and first possible only after at least seven years of residence
- Family reunification was made dependent on age (over 24 years), and on an evaluation of the attachment of families to Denmark in comparison with their attachment to the countries they had left
- Citizenship requirements were made stricter and
- An immigration and integration exam was introduced to support claims for family reunification and Danish citizenship.

Box 1.1: Major legal amendments respecting immigration and integration, Denmark, 1999–2008

Year	Change
1999	Denmark's first <i>Integration Act</i> introduces a three-year introduction programme for all newcomers including free Danish language training and job training for the unemployed. Under this Act, municipalities assume responsibility for integration.
2002	Residency requirements for Permanent Residence increase (from more than three to more than seven years); stricter attachment requirements are introduced for family reunification; introduction programme and Danish test (level 2) are now required for permanent residence; and applicants must be free of public debt.
2002	Applicants now should be able to speak and write Danish to obtain citizenship.
2002	Introduction of a job card scheme to facilitate the entry of foreign workers in sectors with shortages (e.g., engineers, IT, etc.).
2002	Introduction of a 24-year age threshold (for both spouses) for family reunification to ensure the education of youth and to fight forced marriages.
2002	The right to reunify with parents over the age of 60 is removed; Danish spouses are now required to obtain a 50,000 DKK bank guarantee/collateral to reunify with spouses.
2002	All unemployed individuals who have not resided in Denmark for seven of the past eight years will now receive reduced financial assistance (e.g., introduction/starting allowance)
2002	De facto refugee status is limited.
2003	Amendments to the <i>Integration Act</i> are introduced in order to reduce wait times for settlement in municipalities and provide high skilled migrants with a fast track option.
2003	Well-integrated foreigners now have the potential to obtain permanent residence faster.
2003	Change in the attachment requirements for family reunification: exemption for persons who have lived in Denmark with Danish citizenship for at least 28 years.
2004	Stricter rules for families wishing to reunify with children under the age of 15.
2004	Introduction of a results grant for municipalities if immigrants obtain employment or enrol in education during their introductory period.
2006	Applicants for family reunification and their spouses must sign a declaration of integration whereby they commit to participating in language courses and integration. Spouses in Denmark must declare their support.
2006	Stricter Danish language requirements are introduced (Danish test level 3).
2007	An immigration exam is introduced: people arriving through family reunification must pass this test on language and Danish society.
2007	It is now mandatory to pass an integration exam and Danish language test (test level 2) to obtain permanent residency.
2008	Higher language and subsistence requirements required for permanent residency.
2008	Expansion of a job card scheme: work permits are now granted to persons with job offers which promise an expected salary of over 375,000 DKK, regardless of the sector.
2008	New financial initiatives are introduced. Municipalities are now eligible for a results grant if immigrants pass their language test before the end of their introductory period.

Denmark saw an increase in the immigration of students and workers, such that the number of registration permits granted increased from 33,000 to 70,000 between 1998 and 2008. And, as earlier stated, more immigrants with Western origins are now arriving in Denmark than with non-Western origins. Several analyses have also shown that the policy changes resulted in changes in marriage patterns. Immigrants and descendants are now getting married at a later age than before the changes and fewer marry spouses living outside Denmark. Education enrolments have also been growing steadily.

From the 1950ies to the mid-1990ies the Danish Refugee Council was responsible for integration. In 1978, a new 18-month integration programme was introduced for refugees and persons arriving in Denmark through the family reunification process. An increase in the numbers of refugees arriving in Denmark as a result of the Balkan war in the 1990ies led to new discussions with regard to the responsibility of the integration process and resulted in the municipalities assuming responsibility for Denmark's integration process.

The 1999 *Integration Act* changed the framework for integration work in Denmark, especially with respect to who was included, who was responsible, and the scope and character of the country's integration efforts. Many municipalities were completely new to the task of contributing to the integration of newly arrived immigrants.

Municipalities must offer an integration programme to all newly arrived refugees and reunified family members over 18 years of age. The integration programmes take up an average of 37 hours per week and can last up to three years. They include Danish language training and a number of activities directed towards employment. During the three-year introduction period new refugees must reside in the municipality they were assigned to. The idea is to ensure that all Danish municipalities participate in, and contribute to, the development of a positive integration process. After the introductory period is over, refugees are free to move, but analysis shows that after five years, only 25 per cent of refugees move from the municipalities they had originally been assigned to.

As a result of intense political efforts, many legislative amendments and adjustments to the *Integration Act* were implemented in the 2000s. The purpose was to ensure that refugees and reunified families would meet with challenges and requirements soon after receiving their residence permits. As such, a more active integration policy had to be pursued, both for the new citizens and for Danish society as a whole.

In 2001, this work was further intensified after the liberal-conservative coalition government came to office. One of their initial acts

was to establish a Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs,² with the aim of bringing the administration of foreigners and integration policy into one place. The focus was now directed mainly towards helping newly arrived immigrants find jobs quickly by simplifying job training, improving the efficiency of Danish language training, making better use of the qualifications newly arrived immigrants brought with them and making integration accepted as a common cause.

On the employment front, a number of the new initiatives were designed to establish contacts between individual immigrants and employers. These included wage subsidies, company work experiences and other similar schemes. Danish language training was also made more flexible; newcomers now have the option to work and study at the same time. A number of other initiatives and programmes were also launched, for example, for immigrant women, children and youngsters.

Incentives were also introduced to encourage immigrants to find work. Thus, a lower starting/introduction allowance was introduced in 2002 for people who have been in Denmark less than seven years. An integration contract was introduced, which obliges individuals to participate actively in the integration programme and to become active citizens. Newly arrived immigrants who actively participate and who find employment quickly can obtain permanent residency status earlier than would normally be the case.

In addition, it was recognized that municipalities required incentives to support the process. To that end, a performance grant was introduced in 2004 by the Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. This grant awarded municipalities for the results they achieved. In 2008 a more comprehensive funding reform was introduced, which further strengthened municipal financial incentives in an effort to encourage effective integration efforts.

In 2011, a new central-left government took office and announced a range of new amendments to Denmark's immigration laws and integration process. For example, the starting/introduction allowance for immigrants was abolished in 2012. Next strict rules for acquiring permanent residency were put in place and the immigration test was abolished. New integration initiatives, including an integration barometer were an-

² This Ministry was abolished in 2011 by a new government.

nounced and launched in November 2012.³ In sum, it appears that immigration and integration remain the subject of high political attention.

4.1.4 The Definition of Immigrants and Descendants in Denmark

A definition of immigrants and their descendants was developed in Denmark in the 1980ies. There has been consensus about the use of this definition ever since. It is a purely statistical definition, which does not say anything about whether or not the persons concerned are integrated into Danish society.

All persons whose parents have a foreign background are defined as either immigrants or descendants. The definition is based on the citizenship of one's parents *and* one's place of birth. The definition provides the possibility of changing status across generations, whereby a person with at least one parent who is *both* a descendant of immigrants in Denmark (i.e., he/she was born in Denmark) and who is a Danish citizen will – for statistical purposes – be defined as having Danish origins.⁴

In the statistics, *immigrants* are defined as persons who were born abroad to parents who are *both* foreign born *and* foreign citizens. If there is no information about either of the parents and the person in question was born abroad, the person is categorised as an immigrant.

In the statistics, *descendants* are defined as persons who were born in Denmark to parents neither of whom is a Danish citizen *born* in Denmark. If there is no information about either of the parents and the person in question is a foreign citizen *born* in Denmark, the person is categorised as a descendant. Descendants are also described as second-generation immigrants.

Most analyses on integration are carried out on immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries, since this is where the major challenges with regard to integration lie (see definition in Box 1.2).

Box 1.2: Definition of Western and non-Western countries

- Western countries: EU member states, Iceland, Norway, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and Vatican City.
- Non-Western countries: All other countries.

³ See more about the National Integration Barometer on www.integrationsbarometer.dk.

⁴ In 2001, 47 per cent of the children of descendants were considered to be of Danish origin as a result of this definition.

4.1.5 Immigrants and Descendants in numbers

The total number of immigrants and descendants in Denmark was 580,461 in 2012 (see Table 1.1). This corresponds to 10.4 per cent of Denmark's total population of 5,580,516 persons. Immigrants (7.9 per cent) still constitutes a significantly larger proportion of the population than do descendants (2.5 per cent).

Table 1.1: The population in Denmark, by origin, 1 January 2012

	Danish origin	Western countries		Non-Western countries		Total
		Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Descendants	
Persons	5,000,055	179,224	19,332	262,314	119,591	5,580,516
Percentage of total Population	89.6%	3.2%	0.3%	4.7%	2.1%	100%

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF02.

Figure 1.4 illustrates the breakdown of immigrants and descendants in Denmark by country of origin. The majority of immigrants and descendants (66 per cent) are of non-Western origin. Persons originating from a EU country constitute a further 27 per cent of the immigrant and descendant population, and the remainder originate from Western countries outside the European Union.

Figure 1.4: Immigrants and descendants, by groups of countries of origin, 1st January 2012

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF02.

Note: *EU 15* includes the 15 EU countries which were members of the European Union before 1st May 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. *New EU countries* are the 12 countries which have become members of the European Union after 1st May 2004: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

The six countries of origin examined in this study – Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – are all represented in the top 15 coun-

tries of origin presented in Figure 1.5. As shown in this table, the largest group originates (11 per cent of all immigrants and descendants) originates from Turkey. The second and third largest groups have Polish and German backgrounds.

Figure 1.5: Immigrants and descendants, by country of origin, 1st January 2012

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF02.

4.1.6 Projection of the number of immigrants and descendants in Denmark

According to Statistics Denmark,⁵ Denmark's population is expected to grow from 5,534,738 to 6,046,642 between 2010 and 2050, corresponding to an increase of 9.2 per cent. The proportion of immigrants and descendants with non-Western origins in the total population will increase from 6.6 per cent in 2010 to 7.6 per cent in 2020 and then to 10.2 per cent in 2050 (see Figure 1.6). In terms of absolute numbers, Statistics Denmark estimates that the current number of 363,000 persons of non-Western origin in Denmark will climb to nearly 618,000 persons by 2050, an increase of 70 per cent.

⁵ Statistics Denmark's population projection is based on various assumptions relating to fertility, mortality, immigration and emigration, etc., as described in more detail in the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2010 publication: Statistical overview of integration: Population, education and employment.

The proportion of immigrants and descendants with Western origins is expected to increase from 3.2 per cent in 2010 to 3.7 per cent in 2020 and then to 5.0 per cent in 2050. Their numbers are expected to increase by 66.9 per cent between now and 2050, that is from 179,000 to approximately 300,000 persons.

Lastly, according to Statistics Denmark, the number of people of Danish origin in Denmark will increase by 2.7 per cent, or by approximately 140,000 people, between 2010 and 2050. Figure 3.5 presents an overview of the projected growth of differing groups of immigrants and descendants by their origins.

Figure 1.6: Population projection, by origin, 1980–2050

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF29 (2007–2009) and Statistics Denmark, www.statistikbanken.dk, BEF3 (1980–2006) and FRDK110 (2010–2050).

The total number of persons in their core working years (aged 16 to 64) in Denmark is expected to decline from about 3.56 million to about 3.52 million people between 2010 and 2050 – a decline of almost 40,000 persons. This decline is based exclusively on an expected drop in people of Danish origin in this age group, who now number approximately 283,000 persons.

The number of working age immigrants (from both Western and non-Western countries) is expected to increase by just over 56,000 persons between 2010 and 2050. During the same period the number of working age descendants with non-Western origins is expected to increase from just over 34,000 to about 178,000, and the number of descendants with

Western origins in the same age group is also expected to increase, from just under 8,000 to just over 53,000.

Figure 1.7 provides an overview of the projected trajectory of differing groups of working age immigrants and descendants by their origins up to 2050. As a natural consequence of their young age profile, the proportion of working age descendants is expected to increase noticeably in the years to come. And as shown in the figure, it appears that descendants with non-Western origins will account for the largest proportion of people in Denmark entering their working years over the coming years.

Figure 1.7: Proportion of 16 to 64-year-olds, by origin, 1980–2050

Source: The Immigration Database of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, managed by Statistics Denmark, IMBEF29 (2007–2009) and Statistics Denmark, www.statistikbanken.dk, BEF3 (1980–2006) and FRDK110 (2010–2050).

4.1.7 Age distribution

The age profiles of immigrants, descendants and persons of Danish origin vary greatly, as illustrated in Figure 1.8. Most noticeably, the age profile of descendants is significantly younger than that of people of Danish origin and the proportion of working age immigrants is larger than that of people of Danish origin.

Figure 1.8: Age distribution of the population, by origin, 1st January 2010

Source: Statistics Denmark, www.statistikbanken.dk, FOLK1.

The majority of immigrants, just over 269,000 people or 65 per cent of all immigrants in Denmark, are between 20 and 49 years old (see Figure 1.8). In comparison, only 38 per cent of Danish origin persons fall within this age group.

In 2010, 66 per cent, or almost 85,000 of approximately 128,000 descendants, were between 0 and 15 years of age. The number of young descendants entering the labour force will therefore increase noticeably in the years to come. In comparison, only about 19 per cent of all Danish origin persons were under 16 years old in 2010.

4.2 Demographic Integration

This section has two sub-sections. The first examines trends in the size and age dynamics of the immigrant groups originating from the six non-western countries that are the focus of this study. Where possible, comparisons with natives and the total population will be made. The second sub-section analyzes the composition of the immigrant groups by different traits and variables, including duration of residence and composition by generation.

4.2.1 Population Development

The six selected immigrant groups emerged in Denmark between 1969 and 1998, decades which straddled two periods in Denmark's immigration history. The first period includes the years in which, Denmark, like many Western European countries, recruited foreigners to fill jobs created by rapid post-war economic expansion. The second period comprises the years following the first oil crisis of 1973 and the resultant termination of foreign labour recruitment. In contrast to the first period's economically driven immigration, that of the post-oil-shock period was underpinned by humanitarian considerations.

Two groups – the Pakistanis and the Turks – emerged in Denmark between 1968 and 1973. These groups came as guest workers in response to an invitation to help fill the demand for foreign labour that the expanding economy had given rise to. Like many other European countries, Denmark put an end to labour market oriented immigration for non-EEA nationals in the early 1970ies. This did not, however, mean that immigration from the two countries stopped. The Pakistani and Turkish guest workers were soon to be followed by their wives and children. These family members were part of the first immigration flow in Denmark to arise from the granting of family reunification permits.

The next of the six groups to arrive, between 1974 and 1978, were Vietnamese refugees who were fleeing war at home, particular during its last stages (1972–1975). In the wake of the Vietnamese, came refugees from other strife- and war-torn countries, including Iran, Iraq and Somalia. The first Iranian and Somali refugees came between 1979 and 1983. Last to arrive were Iraqi refugees, including Kurds and other minority groups of the Iraqi Kurdistan.

By far the largest of the six groups are of Turkish origin. By the end of 2008, their number counted 58,200 people. As their roots in Denmark date back to 1969, one could surmise that their high numbers are largely due to the fact that they have been in Denmark for a relatively long time. However the size of the Pakistani origin group would call such a supposition into question. They have existed as a group equally as long, yet at 19,900, they are well below one-half the size of the Turkish group and about two-thirds the size of the youngest of the groups – the Iraqis, who number almost 28,900. Vietnamese immigrants and dependants, the first group that emerged through humanitarian migration, are the smallest in size, with 13,600 persons. The somewhat younger Iranian and the Somali groups are a bit bigger, 14,900 and 16,700, respectively. All together, the six groups numbered 152,199 in 2008, or 2.8 per cent of Denmark's total population.

Figure 2.1 shows that all six groups grew between 1998 and 2008, but the magnitude of their growth differs substantially. While the Iraqis have the largest relative growth, more than doubling the growth rate of Turkish origin immigrants and descendants, the Turks, who were numerous to begin with, still experienced significant growth.

Figure 2.1: Population growth, immigrants and descendants in Denmark, by country of origin, 1998–2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The details of the growth are shown in Table 2.1. Each group grew between 1998 and 2008. By far the largest gains – amounting to 16,200 – were seen among the Iraqis. The increase in the Turkish-origin population has been equally striking, equaling some 11,200. The remaining four groups experienced increases ranging from 2,200 to 3,200. The size of all six groups together rose by 38,500 during the decade.

Table 2.1: Percentage growth and size of the population, immigrant and descendant groups, by country of origin, 1998–2008

	Percentage growth			Stock of population	
	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	1998	2008
Iran	8.5%	71.7%	17.2%	12,712	14,896
Iraq	97.2%	289.5%	126.8%	12,751	28,917
Pakistan	11.7%	24.4%	17.2%	16,969	19,880
Somalia	-4.1%	125.3%	23.3%	13,535	16,689
Turkey	12.9%	40.3%	23.8%	46,994	58,191
Vietnam	9.9%	84.4%	27.9%	10,652	13,626
<i>Danish origin</i>			0.7%	4,950,153	4,985,415
Total population			3.7%	5,313,577	5,511,451

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The table also reveals that the increase of Iraqis is a result of a large increase in descendants, which more than tripled during the period. To a lesser extent, this is also the case of the Somalis where the number of immigrants declined. In truth, all six groups experienced a larger increase in descendants than immigrants over the ten-year period.

And lastly, the table shows that the increase in Denmark's total population during this period was primarily due to increases in the immigrant and descendant populations (the native population contributed only about one fifth to the total growth).

Table 2.2: Shares of the immigrant population by duration of residence and country of origin, 2008

	Duration of residence						Unknown	Total
	0–4	5–9	10–14	15–19	20–24	25+		
Iran	9%	13%	13%	21%	20%	0%	22%	100%
Iraq	7%	48%	25%	13%	4%	0%	3%	100%
Pakistan	12%	14%	13%	14%	9%	0%	38%	100%
Somalia	5%	29%	48%	17%	1%	0%	1%	100%
Turkey	8%	11%	13%	16%	13%	0%	40%	100%
Vietnam	7%	10%	10%	31%	9%	0%	32%	100%

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Many of the early immigrants were not registered properly and as such are marked as having an unknown duration of residence. Also Statistics Denmark changed its population statistics in 2007 and after this change only persons with residence duration since 1986 are included, all others are counted as unknowns.

Table 2.2, above, shows how long the groups had resided in Denmark as of 2008. One can identify when the majority of immigrants arrived in Denmark and how this differs among groups from differing countries of origin. Because of the way the statistics were constructed in the past, the older groups, with the exception of Iraqis and Somalis, have a large share of people identified as having an unknown length of residence. However, the majority of these people have been living in Denmark for more than

25 years. A closer look reveals that a large proportion of immigrants from Iraq and Somali arrived around and after the millennia change.

4.2.2 Population Dynamics

Let us next consider the growth of the groups using crude rates of change, which represent the average annual percentage change in the size of the groups. In Table 2.3, below, births and birth rates are shown in five-year intervals. The crude birth rate (CBR) expresses the number of births per 1,000 inhabitants for each of the selected groups and it shows that the crude rate for all of the groups declined between the two periods.

Table 2.3: Number of births, crude birth rate (CBR) and standardized crude birth rate (SCBR) of immigrants, by five-year intervals and country of origin, 1999 to 2008

	Births		CBR		SCBR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	986	752	13.5	8.6	10.9	7.4
Iraq	3,314	2,709	33.6	19.7	26.7	17.0
Pakistan	1,992	1,517	21.5	15.3	20.8	16.4
Somalia	3,859	2,543	46.8	30.0	32.9	25.0
Turkey	5,017	3,796	19.4	13.2	15.4	12.1
Vietnam	1,349	1,182	21.5	15.1	14.0	10.3
Danish origin	280,706	276,970	11.8	11.8	10.9	12.0
Total population	325,477	321,071	12.2	11.8	10.9	11.5

Source: Statistics Denmark.

While all the groups continued to grow during the second period (including the Somalis), their relative growth decreased during this period and the slowdown was fastest for the Iraqis. The results respecting absolute and relative changes align across the two periods and suggest that the growth of all six groups slowed down over the decade.

In the latest period, the crude birth rate of the Iranians and Turks were almost the same as the total population, while the rate of the Iraqis and Somalis was twice and thrice, respectively, that of the total population.

The standardized crude birth rate (SCBR) takes the groups' differing age structures into account and provides possibly the best comparison across groups (including people of Danish origin and the total population). Yet again all immigrant groups have declining rates, but this time the rates of people with Danish origins and the total population increase. The standardized crude birth rate also shows that as differing variables are taken into account more immigrants are on par with the total population.

Next, we shall consider how the size of the groups has been influenced by natural change and net migration. The immigrant and descendant groups, like the native population, grow over time as births and immi-

grants are added and deaths and emigrants are subtracted. The balance of births and deaths represent the so-called natural change during a given period, while the difference between immigrants and emigrants is typically called positive or negative net migration (or net immigration/net emigration). To explore these issues we use crude rates for the five-year intervals, which express relevant changes per 1,000 persons per annum.

Table 2.4: Number of deaths and crude death rate (CDR) of immigrants, by five-year intervals and country of origin, 1999–2008

	Deaths		CDR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	129	145	1.9	2.0
Iraq	129	162	1.3	1.2
Pakistan	195	239	2.1	2.5
Somalia	91	100	1.1	1.2
Turkey	450	530	1.8	1.9
Vietnam	136	179	2.3	2.8
<i>Danish origin</i>	<i>281,433</i>	<i>266,287</i>	<i>11.4</i>	<i>10.7</i>
Total population	291,274	276,268	10.9	10.2

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Table 2.4 shows the number of deaths and crude death rates (CDR) by five-year intervals. The crude death rates of each of the immigrant groups are significantly lower than for natives or the total population. One reason for this could be that there are fewer elderly among the immigrant groups than in the native group or the total population. This is supported by the fact that the groups with the largest share of long-duration residences (see Table 2.2) have the highest crude death rates amongst the six immigrant groups.

Table 2.5 provides an overview of natural changes, crude rates of natural change (CRNC) and crude rates of change (CRC) in five-year intervals. Again, natural changes are the sum of births subtracted by deaths, while the crude rates offer calculations per capita for comparison.

In general, the results show that natives were responsible for just one third of total population growth during the first five-year period, but during the second period they were responsible for 58 per cent of growth. In comparison, the six groups, altogether, were responsible for just short of 40 per cent of Denmark's growth in the first period, and then only about 24 per cent in the second period.

Table 2.5: The natural change, crude rate of natural change (CRNR) and crude rate of change (CRC), by five-year intervals and country of origin

	Natural change		CRNR		CRC	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	784	478	11.6	6.6	23.5	15.5
Iraq	3,154	2,523	32.3	18.5	120.5	23.0
Pakistan	1,770	1,243	19.4	12.8	26.1	20.1
Somalia	3,733	2,401	45.7	28.8	44.0	8.4
Turkey	4,513	3,170	17.7	11.3	26.5	18.2
Vietnam	1,113	803	19.2	12.3	29.7	20.5
<i>Danish origin</i>	<i>10,965</i>	<i>25,978</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>1.2</i>
Total population	34,203	44,803	1.3	1.6	3.1	5.2

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The crude rates tell a similar story: while still significantly higher than that of the natives, the rates of all six groups decrease substantially between the two periods, especially that of the Somalis. However, even in the second period all groups have a significantly higher positive natural rate of change per capita than natives.

Because crude death rates do not vary much across the groups, it was the decline in birth rates between the first and to second five-year interval which was chiefly responsible for the drop in the rate of natural change. This applies to both levels and cross-group variations, with the exception of the Iranians. In the process, cross-group variations in the birth rates and the rates of natural change fell, but were far from eliminated. Contrary to this, among the natives, the crude birth and death rates during the decade of observation were roughly on a par, just over 10 per 1,000, and this made the rate of natural change insignificantly small.

The crude rate of change is the natural change including the net-migration change. If the rate is below the crude rate of natural change a net-emigration has occurred and if the rate is above the crude rate of natural change, net-immigration has occurred. Except for the Somalis, all the groups experienced net immigration, as detailed in the following tables.

Table 2.6: Immigration, crude immigration rate (CIR) and standardized immigration rate (SCIR), by five-year intervals and country of origin

	Immigration		CIR		SCIR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	2,385	2,076	35.4	28.6	37.9	25.9
Iraq	9,940	2,731	101.6	20.0	97.0	18.7
Pakistan	3,063	3,193	33.5	33.0	27.0	24.5
Somalia	4,351	1,773	53.3	21.3	57.6	20.4
Turkey	4,507	4,878	17.6	17.4	13.9	12.7
Vietnam	1,191	1,146	20.5	17.6	16.7	13.4
<i>Danish origin</i>	<i>106,397</i>	<i>100,973</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>4.1</i>	<i>4.2</i>	<i>4.2</i>
Total population	257,619	312,585	9.6	11.5	9.4	11.8

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Table 2.6, above, shows the immigration history of the six groups across two time periods, including the crude and standardized immigration rates for improved comparison. The crude immigration rate (CIR) shows that all six groups experienced a decline in immigration, albeit at a marginal level in the case of Turks, Pakistanis and Vietnamese. This holds for the standardized rate also. Comparing the population groups by standardized crude immigration rates (SCIR), one can see that the immigration rates of Somalis and Iraqis were remarkably higher than those of the remaining groups in 1999–2003 and then they decreased in 2004–2008 (All the immigrants groups obviously have higher immigration rates than the natives).

In Table 2.7 emigration is shown with a crude and standardized rate. The table reflects the previous table, as the emigration patterns of the six immigrant groups are all above the national and native levels. However, the crude and standardized rates show a lower magnitude in comparison to the rates of immigration resulting in positive net migration, as shown in Table 2.8. The crude rates show that the Somalis had the largest relative emigration pattern and the Vietnamese, the lowest.

Table 2.7: Emigration, crude emigration rate (CER) and standardized emigration rate (SCER), by five-year intervals and country of origin

	Emigration		CER		SCER	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	1,585	1,426	23.5	19.7	24.2	17.6
Iraq	1,309	2,115	13.4	15.5	12.6	13.7
Pakistan	2,447	2,485	26.8	25.7	23.8	20.6
Somalia	4,493	3,472	55.0	41.7	48.7	30.6
Turkey	2,243	2,955	8.8	10.6	8.2	9.3
Vietnam	579	618	10.0	9.5	9.3	8.7
<i>Danish origine</i>	<i>113,190</i>	<i>98,314</i>	<i>4.6</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>4.5</i>	<i>4.1</i>
Total population	208,397	216,576	7.8	8.0	7.5	8.1

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Table 2.8 shows absolute net migration together with crude and standardized crude migration rates across the two five-year periods. In the first period, when both natives and Somalis were migrating from Denmark, the remaining five immigrant groups all had a positive net migration. In the second period, negative net migration increased for the Somalis, while it reversed for natives. Overall, however, a large positive net migration characterized both periods, reflecting a significant immigration trend. The crude rates, taking per capita and age structure into account, again show that levels of migration are significantly higher for all immigrant groups compared to the pattern exhibited by both natives and Denmark as a whole.

Table 2.8: Net-migration, crude migration rate (CMR) and standardized crude migration rate (SCMR) due to migration, by five-year periods and country of origin

	Net migration		CMR		SCMR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	800	650	11.9	9.0	13.7	8.2
Iraq	8,631	616	88.3	4.5	84.4	5.0
Pakistan	616	708	6.7	7.3	3.2	3.9
Somalia	-142	-1,699	-1.7	-20.4	8.9	-10.3
Turkey	2,264	1,923	8.9	6.9	5.7	3.4
Vietnam	612	528	10.5	8.1	7.4	4.7
<i>Danish origin</i>	<i>-6,793</i>	<i>2,659</i>	<i>-0.3</i>	<i>0.1</i>	<i>-0.3</i>	<i>0.1</i>
Total population	49,222	96,009	1.8	3.5	1.8	3.7

Source: Statistics Denmark.

4.2.3 Results after standardization

Standardization helps to answer the question as to how the crude rates were influenced by the groups' age and sex structures. They also help to answer a related question, that is, whether or not the group's age-sex structures contributed to their growth.

To answer these questions, standardised crude rates for the two five-year intervals have been computed using the proportionate age-sex structure of Denmark's total 2008 population as a standard. The standardised rates provide an answer to the following what-if question: What would have been the crude rates, such as the crude birth rate of any given group during a given five-year interval, had the age-sex structure of the group been identical to the standard age-sex structure. This question can be answered for the crude birth, immigration and emigration rates, but not for the crude death rate. The standardised crude death rates were not computed because the numbers of deaths that occurred within the various groups during the period were so small it was considered unwise.

A difference between any actual crude rate and its standardised counterpart provides an indication of the impact on the crude rate of the differences between the actual age-sex structure of the group and the standard age-sex structure. Table 2.3 reveals that actual crude birth rates were consistently higher, often by a considerable margin, than their standardised counterparts. In relative terms, this margin was the smallest in the case of the Iranians and Iraqis, and the largest – exceeding 50 per cent – for the Turks and Vietnamese. Also, as a rule, the groups' actual crude immigration rates exceed their standardised counterparts; however, the relative magnitude of the excess was less, being the largest for the Pakistanis, Turks and the Vietnamese, during the second five-year period. Actual crude emigration rates exceeded the standardised counterpart rate in all but one case (see Table 2.7). The excess was even smaller, in most instances not much more than 10 per cent.

In sum, the features of the age-sex structures of the groups, operating through the crude rates, appear to promote the groups' growth. Table 2.9 shows, in absolute terms, the combined contribution of the age-sex structure effect on growth operating through the crude birth, immigration and emigration rates. In the case of the Pakistanis, Turks and the Vietnamese, the contribution amounts to an addition to the crude rate of change of some ten per 1,000. The contribution in the case of the other groups is much smaller, for example, for the Iraqis during the first five-year interval and the Somalis during the second, when the contribution was negative. Had it been possible to account for the affect on growth operating through

the crude death rate, the results would have shown even a greater contribution of the age-sex structure of the groups to their growth.

Table 2.9 shows the age and sex composition of immigrants and descendants in 2008. The most significant detail revealed by the table is that no descendants have been in the country long enough to be older than 65 years. On top of that, the table reveals that, except for the Turks and Pakistanis, the large majority of descendants are still under the age of 15. The majority of immigrants are between 16 and 64 years old, only a small minority are either very young or very old. There is no significant difference between genders.

Table 2.9: Age-sex composition, by countries and generation in 2008, per cent

	0–15		16–64		65+	
	Immi-grants	Descen-dents	Immi-grants	Descen-dents	Immi-grants	Descen-dents
Iran						
Females	3.7	77.5	88.7	22.5	7.5	0.0
Males	3.4	75.5	91.8	24.5	4.7	0.0
Total	3.6	76.5	90.5	23.5	5.9	0.0
Iraq						
Females	15.4	93.9	81.1	6.1	3.5	0.0
Males	12.6	95.0	84.6	5.0	2.8	0.0
Total	13.9	94.5	83.0	5.5	3.1	0.0
Pakistan						
Females	3.8	48.6	90.5	51.4	5.7	0.0
Males	3.8	47.9	86.7	52.1	9.5	0.0
Total	3.8	48.2	88.5	51.8	7.7	0.0
Somalia						
Females	12.4	98.2	84.0	1.8	3.6	0.0
Males	11.4	98.0	86.6	2.0	2.0	0.0
Total	11.9	98.1	85.4	1.9	2.8	0.0
Turkey						
Females	2.2	56.2	92.0	43.8	5.8	0.0
Males	2.2	56.1	91.6	43.9	6.1	0.0
Total	2.2	56.2	91.8	43.8	6.0	0.0
Vietnam						
Females	2.1	75.6	88.4	24.3	9.4	0.0
Males	2.2	74.1	90.6	25.9	7.2	0.0
Total	2.2	74.8	89.5	25.1	8.4	0.0

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: The same age-composition for the natives is 19.6 per cent for 0–15 year-olds; 64.0 per cent for 16–64 year-olds; and 16.4 per cent for natives older than 65 years.

4.2.4 *Composition of the selected immigrant groups by selected traits*

In this sub-section we examine how long the groups had resided in Denmark, on average, at three points in time (1998, 2003 and 2008) and we look at the fertility rates of immigrant women at different ages over two time periods (1998–2003 and 2004–2008).

Table 2.10 provides an overview of the average length of residence of immigrant men and women from the six countries. In general, apart from the Iraqis and the Somalis, the average length of stay of the groups is similar for the groups, with only a few years' difference, and that their length of residence is increasing over time. Data from previous tables confirms this finding, as they show Iraqis and Somalis arriving during the time period in which this study focuses. The table shows that in 2008 most of the immigrants had been in Denmark about 15 years and that there was only a very small difference between genders (although males had been in Denmark just a little longer). When looking at changes between 1998 and 2008, it is clear that the Pakistanis arrived sometime before the study period and have not immigrated much since then.

Table 2.10: Average length of residence of immigrants, by country of origin, sex and year

	1998	2003	2008	Change 98–08
Iran				
Females	9.4	11.9	15.1	5.7
Males	11.0	14.4	18.1	7.0
Total	10.4	13.4	16.8	6.4
Iraq				
Females	5.1	5.9	9.7	4.5
Males	6.2	7.0	10.9	4.7
Total	5.7	6.5	10.3	4.6
Pakistan				
Females	14.0	16.0	17.4	3.4
Males	15.3	17.2	17.4	2.1
Total	14.7	16.7	17.4	2.7
Somalia				
Females	4.3	7.0	10.7	6.4
Males	4.7	7.9	11.5	6.8
Total	4.5	7.5	11.1	6.6
Turkey				
Females	13.2	16.2	18.6	5.4
Males	14.7	17.1	18.9	4.2
Total	14.0	16.7	18.8	4.8
Vietnam				
Females	10.5	13.3	16.2	5.8
Males	13.0	16.7	19.8	6.8
Total population	11.8	15.0	17.9	6.2

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Table 2.11 examines the partnership patterns of immigrants in 2008. The majority of immigrants, regardless of country of origin or gender, married people with the same origins. Only a minority partnered with natives or with people from other countries. Iranians and females from Vietnam tended to partner with natives more so than the other groups, while male Iraqis seemed to partner more with people from other countries. Only slightly more females than males were in a partnership of some type in 2008. Between countries, however, there were greater differences. The majority of Pakistanis and Turks were in a partnership, as were around half of the Iraqis, Vietnamese and Iranians, but only a quarter of Somalis were in a partnership.

Table 2.11: Proportion of immigrants with a partner, by country of origin, and sex in 2008

	Own	Danes	Others	Share in partnership
Iran				
Females	79%	15%	7%	53%
Males	61%	27%	13%	48%
Total	68%	21%	10%	50%
Iraq				
Females	92%	2%	6%	55%
Males	80%	5%	15%	50%
Total	86%	4%	10%	52%
Pakistan				
Females	94%	2%	4%	72%
Males	90%	6%	4%	68%
Total	92%	4%	4%	70%
Somalia				
Females	91%	6%	3%	30%
Males	91%	5%	4%	26%
Total	91%	5%	4%	28%
Turkey				
Females	97%	2%	1%	74%
Males	92%	7%	2%	74%
Total	94%	4%	2%	74%
Vietnam				
Females	78%	18%	5%	63%
Males	88%	6%	6%	60%
Total population	82%	12%	6%	62%

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Share in partnership is the share of same gender or overall immigrants in a registered partnership.

We next turn to fertility rate patterns, which are examined for immigrants, descendants, natives and the total population, at differing ages across two five-year periods (bearing in mind that only births among immigrant women contribute to the growth of any given immigrant-descendant group). Overall, as Table 2.12 indicates, the fertility rates of

immigrants and descendants decreased between the two periods, while the native fertility rate slightly increased.

Two overall features stand out. First, within each group, the total fertility rate (TFR) declined from the first to the second period. This is in contrast with a slight TFR rise among native women. The TFR drop was greater in groups where the TFR was initially higher, and vice versa. Second, there were major variations in TFRs across the groups. The low TFR among Iranians sank to a level below that of the natives, while, after a rapid drop, the Somali TFR was more than twice as high as the native TFR during the second period.

Iranian and Turkish mothers and daughters appear to have retained the same fertility patterns across their generations. This does not appear to have been the case for mothers and daughters belonging to the other four groups. Among these groups, daughters had consistently lower fertility rates than their mothers.

In general, however, the most recent rates show that descendants are more similar to natives, while the fertility rates of their mothers, except for the Iranians, are higher than natives.

Table 2.12: Total fertility-rates at different ages (total, 39, 29 and 24), by immigrants and descendants, five-year intervals and country of origin

	1999–2003				2004–2008			
	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24
Iran								
Immigrants	1.86	1.77	0.94	0.37	1.40	1.31	0.56	0.15
Descendants	-	-	-	0.00	-	-	0.57	0.15
Iraq								
Immigrants	4.29	4.09	2.54	1.34	2.72	2.57	1.51	0.69
Descendants	-	-	-	-	-	1.52	0.57	0.11
Pakistan								
Immigrants	3.40	3.34	2.28	1.16	2.68	2.56	1.56	0.64
Descendants	-	-	1.33	0.35	-	2.83	0.78	0.18
Somalia								
Immigrants	5.18	4.66	2.36	1.14	3.95	3.47	1.76	0.74
Descendants	-	-	1.34	0.86	-	-	0.72	0.37
Turkey								
Immigrants	2.50	2.42	1.71	1.02	2.00	1.94	1.24	0.54
Descendants	-	-	1.52	0.62	-	2.49	1.24	0.47
Vietnam								
Immigrants	2.39	2.29	1.31	0.59	1.97	1.88	0.97	0.33
Descendants	-	-	1.81	0.14	-	-	0.48	0.13
<i>Danish origin</i>	1.67	1.63	0.84	0.23	1.81	1.76	0.86	0.24
Total population	1.74	1.70	0.89	0.27	1.82	1.77	0.86	0.25

Source: Statistics Denmark.

4.2.5 Summary

All six groups increased in size during the ten-year period of the study, with a total increase of 38,600 persons, but their rates of growth rate decreased over the decade. The slowdown might have been caused by the introduction of Denmark's 2002 'Firm and Fair' immigration policy.

Not all the groups, however, increased at the same pace. The Iraqi and Somali groups, for example, had the largest relative increase during the study period and the Turkish group had the largest absolute increase. All six groups experienced a greater increase in descendants than in immigrants over the ten-year period. When looking at the natural change of the population (births less deaths), the standardized crude rates show that, even taking into account differing age structures and calculating per capita changes, immigrants followed a different pattern than natives, one which was particularly influenced by birth rates.

While in the most recent years, birth rates were beginning to approach those of natives, the lack of elderly people amongst the groups' numbers influenced the natural change in a significantly positive direction. Combined with greater than average positive net migration, one finds the reasons behind the population growth, one exception being a large emigration of Somalis between 2004 and 2008.

An examination of age distribution confirms that the average immigrant is still younger than retirement age, while the majority of descendants are not yet part of the work force.

Only a minority in the groups decided to partner with natives or people from other countries. Iranians and females from Vietnam did, however, tend to partner more with natives, while male immigrants of Iraqi origin tended to partner with people from other countries.

Iranian and Turkish mothers and daughters tended to have the same fertility patterns, which was not the case for mothers and daughters from the other four groups. The daughters of these groups tended to have lower fertility rates than their mothers. In general, though, the most recent rates show that descendants are more similar to natives, while their mothers fertility rates remain higher, with the exception of Iranians.

4.3 Enrolment in the Educational System

This section examines educational enrolments among immigrants and descendants from the six non-Western countries, and in comparison with the total population. The section focuses first on general enrolments in the Danish educational system. Enrolments in tertiary education are then examined and lastly, enrolments in differing types of upper-secondary education are considered. Analytically, the section focuses on enrolments as of the school year 2007/2008 and on the development of enrolment rates between 1997/1998 and 2007/2008, specifically at three points in time (school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008).⁶

4.3.1 *Enrolment in the Danish educational system in general*

Table 3.1: Share of, 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in education, by sex and country of origin, school year 2007/2008, per cent

	16–19		20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants						
Iran	76.1	75.4	50.4	46.1	36.3	33.0
Iraq	70.0	69.0	40.4	28.3	19.2	15.3
Pakistan	80.8	69.4	31.9	33.6	8.8	17.4
Somalia	69.5	61.8	29.9	22.7	13.5	9.1
Turkey	70.3	57.3	27.0	18.2	10.9	7.4
Vietnam	73.1	66.1	34.9	36.6	17.1	18.1
Descendants						
Iran	85.8	82.0	60.7	45.7	-	-
Iraq	78.3	72.0	57.8	37.1	-	-
Pakistan	80.1	74.7	57.9	41.9	21.3	20.2
Somalia	85.3	70.8	-	27.3	-	-
Turkey	78.6	72.9	47.4	32.7	17.2	13.5
Vietnam	89.5	90.0	64.0	53.3	37.8	36.3
<i>Danish origin</i>	78.5	78.5	49.7	40.3	26.9	22.4
Total population	77.7	77.5	46.9	38.1	25.3	21.3

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The overall enrolment rates for female and male immigrants and descendants, aged 16 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29-years-old, from the six selected non-Western countries of origin, as well as for the total popula-

⁶ The school year begins in August and ends in June the following year.

tion, in 2007/08, can be viewed in Table 3.1. Female enrolment rates were higher than male enrolment rates for almost all the groups. However, the highest enrolment rate – 90 per cent – was achieved by 16 to 19-year-old Vietnamese male descendants. Their female counterparts – 16 to 19-year-old female Vietnamese descendants – had the highest enrolment rate of all females. In fact, both female and male descendants of Vietnamese origin had higher enrolment rates than any other group presented in the table, including people of Danish origin.

It should be noted that a number of people in the 25 to 29-year-old age group would have likely finished their education and joined the workforce. This may explain why the enrolment rates for this group look small compared to the other age groups. If this age group is excluded from the analysis, 20 to 24-year-old male and female immigrants of Turkish origin have the lowest enrolment rates (18.2 per cent and 27 per cent respectively). Moreover, if female immigrants of Pakistani origin aged 25–29 are excluded (cf. above), immigrants of Turkish origin have the lowest enrolment rates across all age groups (including those aged 25–29) and origins.

Among immigrants, the only groups that had an enrolment rate close to that of the total population in 2007/2008 were 16 to 19-year-old female immigrants of Pakistani origin and immigrants of Iranian origin.

The growth in enrolment rates from school year 1997/1998 to school year 2007/2008 is shown in Table 3.2. In general, the enrolment rates of immigrants from the six countries of origin grew at a substantially higher rate than those of either descendants or the total population. This is, in part, due to their initially lower enrolment rates. There is no clear tendency in the growth rates of descendants, but it is worth noticing that the figures for 20 to 24-year-old descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins are very high at approximately 19 percentage points. For both groups, this impressive development was mainly driven by significantly higher tertiary enrolment rates over the period.

The overall highest growth rate is found for 20 to 24-year-old female immigrants of Iraqi origin at 31.5 percentage points, but the figures are also high for 16 to 19-year-old and 20 to 24-year-old female immigrants with Iraqi, Pakistani, Somali and Turkish origins. The lowest growth rates are found for 25 to 29-year-old male descendants of Pakistani origin (-8.5 percentage points) and for 16 to 19-year-old male immigrants of Vietnamese origin (-8.3 percentage points).

Table 3.2: Growth in the total enrolment rate of 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008, by sex and country of origin (Percentage points)

	16–19		20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants						
Iran	0.8	-4.0	18.5	5.9	10.4	3.8
Iraq	17.5	9.4	31.5	12.4	15.5	10.1
Pakistan	19.7	9.6	18.4	14.9	5.6	11.6
Somalia	22.7	14.8	26.7	4.9	12.3	3.6
Turkey	21.4	10.4	18.5	7.0	6.8	3.7
Vietnam	-1.6	-8.3	7.2	-2.2	9.0	4.2
Descendants						
Pakistan	-0.3	2.4	18.9	-0.6	-3.1	-8.5
Turkey	5.0	5.3	18.8	7.3	-3.4	-2.9
<i>Danish origin</i>	-0.8	-1.6	7.7	3.9	5.3	5.1
Total population	-0.2	-1.3	6.8	2.7	4.7	4.5

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The gender balance in total enrolment rates, shown in Table 3.3, was determined by calculating the ratios of the enrolment rates of women to men for the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2004 and 2007/2008. For most immigrants across age groups and origins, the ratios have gone up. This means that the women's total enrolment rates have either moved closer to those of their male counterparts, or – in most cases, the women's rates have exceeded those of their male counterparts.

Sixteen to 19-year-old descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins had stable ratios of around 1 over the period, meaning that the male and female enrolment rates were similar. The ratios of the 20 to 24-year-olds, however, show significant growth over the years, meaning that the total enrolment rates of young women were getting higher in comparison with those of the young men. In 2008, the ratio was significantly over 1, indicating that female descendants were enrolling in education to a much greater degree than their male counterparts.

In the total population, 25 to 29-year-olds experienced stable ratios of around 1.2 over the period, which means that the total enrolment rate of women was slightly higher than that of men. Immigrants from most of the six countries of origin, on the other hand, had a sizeable growth in the ratio over the same ten-year period. By far the largest growth is seen among immigrants of Somali origin, with the ratio increasing from 0.21 in 1998 to 1.48 in 2008.

The only drops in ratio are found for 16 to 19-year-old descendants of Pakistani origin as well as small drops for 25 to 29-year-old immigrants of Pakistani origin, people of Danish origin and the total population.

Table 3.3: The ratio of the total enrolment rate of women to men in tertiary education of 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants, by country of origin

School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008

	16–19			20–24			25–29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants									
Iran	0.95	1.05	1.01	0.79	1.07	1.09	0.89	1.08	1.10
Iraq	0.88	1.13	1.01	0.56	0.78	1.43	0.70	0.75	1.26
Pakistan	1.02	1.03	1.16	0.72	0.45	0.95	0.56	0.30	0.51
Somalia	1.00	1.07	1.13	0.18	0.76	1.32	0.21	0.31	1.48
Turkey	1.04	1.10	1.23	0.76	1.15	1.48	1.12	1.23	1.48
Vietnam	1.00	1.14	1.11	0.71	0.91	0.95	0.58	0.57	0.94
Descendants									
Pakistan	1.11	1.08	1.07	0.92	1.19	1.38	0.85	1.03	1.05
Turkey	1.09	1.08	1.08	1.13	1.35	1.45	1.25	1.42	1.27
Danish origin	0.99	1.01	1.00	1.15	1.25	1.23	1.25	1.26	1.20
Total population	0.99	1.02	1.00	1.13	1.22	1.23	1.22	1.23	1.18

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of men's.

4.3.2 Enrolment in tertiary education

Enrolment in tertiary education during school year 2007/2008 is shown in Table 3.4 for 20 to 24-year-old and 25 to 29-year-old female and male immigrants and descendants from the six non-Western countries, persons of Danish origin and for the total population. The enrolment rate of immigrants was, for the most part, below that of the total population.

The enrolment rates of 20 to 24-year-olds in the total population were 33.5 per cent for women compared to 21.4 per cent for men – a gender gap of more than 12 percentage points in the favour of women. This gap, however, becomes much smaller in the next age group (only around 4 percentage points).

Immigrants of Iranian origin and male immigrants of Pakistani origin had, for all age groups, higher tertiary enrolment rates than the total population. For descendants, the general trend was that their enrolment rates were higher than that of the total population. Descendants of Vietnamese origin had especially high enrolment rates and the highest rate was found for 20 to 24-year-old women of Vietnamese origin (51.1 per cent in 2007/2008). Immigrants with Somali and Turkish origins had the lowest tertiary enrolment rates, with the rates for 25 to 29-year-olds as low as 4.5 per cent.

Table 3.4: Share of 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin, school year 2007/2008, per cent

	20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	37.5	24.6	29.9	27.6
Iraq	21.2	11.8	13.1	11.8
Pakistan	20.0	23.2	6.4	17.1
Somalia	10.9	5.6	5.3	5.4
Turkey	15.0	8.7	5.8	4.5
Vietnam	16.4	17.2	13.9	14.9
Descendants				
Iran	49.5	27.5	-	-
Iraq	44.4	25.7	-	-
Pakistan	42.0	29.2	18.3	17.8
Somalia	-	18.2	-	-
Turkey	31.2	15.3	12.9	9.2
Vietnam	51.1	31.6	32.7	29.0
<i>Danish origin</i>	35.3	22.3	22.3	17.8
Total population	33.5	21.4	20.9	17.1

Source: Statistics Denmark.

- marks too few persons.

Growth in tertiary enrolments between school years 1997/1998 and 2007/2008 is shown in Table 3.5. There was no distinct trend in how origins affected growth in tertiary education enrolments. Growth for female immigrants with Iranian and Iraqi origins, in both age groups, was higher than that of the total population, with growth rates as high as 22.7 and 18.5 percentage points for the 20 to 24-year-olds.

The growth rates for 20 to 24 year-old female immigrants with Pakistani, Somali and Turkish origins (at 15.1, 10.7 and 11.7 percentage points, respectively) were only slightly above the growth rate of the total population (9 percentage points). The growth rates for these same groups within the 25–29-year-old age group were, at 4.0, 4.9 and 3.5 percentage points, well below the average for the total population. Notable exceptions were women from Iran and Iraq, whose enrolment rates were double that of natives.

The growth in the tertiary enrolment rates of male immigrants generally fluctuated around that of the total population at 3.4 percentage points for both 20 to 24-year-olds and 25 to 29-year-olds. Notable exceptions were male immigrants with Iraqi and Pakistani origins, for whom growth was considerably higher.

The growth in the enrolment rates of female descendants of Pakistani and Turkish origin was, for 20 to 24-year-olds, much higher than for the total population, while growth for 25 to 29-year-olds was lower. The latter age group, in fact, experienced negative growth in their tertiary

enrolment rates, with a drop of 0.5 and 4.6 percentage points for Pakistani and Turkish female descendants, respectively.

Table 3.5: Growth in the share of 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education from school year 1997/1998 to 2007/2008, by sex and country, per cent

	20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	22.7	1.9	11.1	3.5
Iraq	18.5	7.5	11.3	8.7
Pakistan	15.1	11.9	4.0	13.0
Somalia	10.7	4.7	4.9	3.5
Turkey	11.7	4.7	3.5	2.2
Vietnam	5.1	1.0	9.9	6.8
Descendants				
Pakistan	21.6	3.2	-0.5	-3.5
Turkey	18.9	5.9	-4.6	0.3
<i>Danish origin</i>	9.6	3.8	5.0	3.7
Total population	9.0	3.4	4.5	3.4

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The gender balance in tertiary enrolment rates, shown in Table 3.6, was determined by calculating the ratios of the enrolment rates women to men for the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008.

Almost every group (age and origin) saw positive developments in this ratio, meaning that women's enrolment rates have closed in, or even surpassed, those of men. The only groups who experienced drops in the ratio were 25 to 29-year-old immigrants of Pakistani origin and 25 to 29-year-old descendants of Turkish origin. Even though the latter group had the biggest drop from 1.98 to 1.41, it was still the highest ratio present among 25 to 29-year-olds in 2008. The highest ratio in 2008 for females was also found for descendants of Turkish origin, at 2.04. The lowest ratios in 2008 – across both age groups – were found among immigrants of Pakistani origin: for every 10 immigrant males of Pakistani origin aged 20–24 enrolled in tertiary education in 2008 only 8.6 immigrant females of Pakistani origin were enrolled and for every immigrant male of Pakistani origin aged 25–29, only 3.7 of their female counterparts were enrolled.

In general, in 2008, the ratios were higher among 20 to 24-year-olds than among 25 to 29-year-olds and there didn't seem to be a trend regarding the levels of the ratio among immigrants and descendants compared to the ratio for the total population.

Table 3.6: The ratio of the enrolment rate of women to men in tertiary education of 20–24 and 25–29-year-old immigrants and descendants, by country of origin. School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008, per cent

	20–24			25–29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants						
Iran	0.65	1.03	1.52	0.78	1.10	1.08
Iraq	0.64	0.91	1.80	0.58	0.76	1.11
Pakistan	0.43	0.35	0.86	0.57	0.22	0.37
Somalia	0.22	0.59	1.94	0.19	0.10	0.97
Turkey	0.83	1.31	1.71	1.00	1.16	1.29
Vietnam	0.70	1.03	0.95	0.50	0.44	0.93
Descendants						
Pakistan	0.78	1.11	1.44	0.89	0.90	1.03
Turkey	1.31	1.79	2.04	1.98	1.40	1.41
<i>Danish origin</i>	1.39	1.57	1.58	1.23	1.27	1.25
Total population	1.36	1.52	1.56	1.20	1.23	1.22

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of men's.

4.3.3 Enrolment in upper-secondary education

This sub-section examines the enrolment of immigrants and descendants from the six country of origin in upper-secondary education. Because the term 'upper-secondary education' contains two very different classes of education, the analysis will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with academically orientated programmes and the second dealing with enrolment in vocational education. Academically orientated programmes in Denmark include four degrees: STX, HF, HHX and HTX. These four programmes share the same basic focus – preparation for tertiary education – but they have different types of core curricula. STX and HF share a curriculum bridging several academic disciplines, whereas HHX focus on business subjects and languages and the HTX on natural sciences and technology. Vocational education and training programmes are both more directly geared towards employment.

Enrolment in Academically Orientated Programmes

Academically oriented programmes (AOP) consist in Denmark of high-school degrees primarily meant to prepare the students for tertiary (academic) educational programmes. The first two columns in Table 3.7 show the AOP enrolment rates of 16 to 19-year-olds for 2007/2008. The last two columns in Table 3.7 show growth in AOP enrolment rates for 16 to 19-year-olds, from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008, in percentage points.

Table 3.7: Share of 16–19-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in academically oriented programmes, by sex and country of origin (Per cent). The school year 2007/2008 as well as the enrolment rate growth from school year 1997/1998 to 2007/2008, (Percentage Points)

	Share (2007/2008)		Growth (1997/1998 to 2007/2008)	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	42.6	27.4	-5.5	-9.3
Iraq	28.8	21.4	12.2	5.5
Pakistan	45.5	26.9	26.3	7.6
Somalia	22.5	17.0	19.0	16.0
Turkey	20.5	14.2	9.5	5.3
Vietnam	33.3	34.7	-0.63	13.2
Descendants				
Iran	61.3	51.8	-	-
Iraq	39.2	34.7	-	-
Pakistan	49.3	42.2	7.5	4.9
Somalia	41.2	20.8	-	-
Turkey	36.7	26.6	6.3	6.6
Vietnam	68.1	51.0	9.7	4.4
<i>Danish origin</i>	47.2	35.5	1.4	2.9
Total population	46.0	34.8	1.8	3.1

Source: Statistics Denmark.

The table's first two columns show how immigrants (both female and male) from all six countries of origin had lower AOP enrolment rates in 2008 than the total population. The table also shows that while descendants (both female and male) with Iraqi, Somali and Turkish origins also had lower enrolment rates than the total population, those with Iranian, Pakistani and Vietnamese origins all had higher rates. The highest rates were found for descendants with Vietnamese and Iranian origins: 68.1 per cent for female descendants of Vietnamese origin, aged 16–19, and 51.8 per cent for male descendants of Iranian origin in the same age group. The lowest AOP enrolment rates were found for female and male immigrants of Turkish origin, at 20.5 and 14.2 per cent, respectively.

The two columns at the far right of Table 3.7 show that the growth of the AOP enrolment rate, for almost all immigrants and descendants, was higher than that of the total population between 1997/1998 and 2007/2008. The only exception is for immigrants of Iranian origin, where the growth for both women and men was negative – a drop of 5.5 and 9.3 percentage points, respectively. The highest growth is seen for female immigrants of Pakistani origin at 26.3 percentage points and female and male immigrants of Somali origin with 19.0 and 16.0 percentage points, respectively.

Enrolment in Vocational Education

Vocational education enrolment rates are shown in Table 3.8 for 16 to 19-year-old and 20 to 24-year-old female and male immigrants and descendants from the six selected countries of origin. No strong trends were found for women across these age groups or origins. The analysis did find, however, a small tendency for 16 to 19-year-olds to have higher vocational education rates than 20 to 24-year-olds. The analysis also found that most male immigrants and descendants aged 16 to 19 had lower enrolment rates than the total population. The only exception was 16 to 19-year-old descendants of Turkish origin, who had the highest overall enrolment rate of 24.2 per cent.

Table 3.8: Share of 16–19 and 20–24-year-old female and male immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational educations, by country of origin, school year 2007/2008, per cent

	16–19		20–24	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	9.7	16.0	8.7	15.7
Iraq	12.8	19.9	14.1	11.8
Pakistan	16.2	14.8	8.1	6.6
Somalia	13.5	14.9	13.3	10.7
Turkey	22.6	23.1	9.0	8.1
Vietnam	13.9	12.7	12.6	14.7
Descendants				
Iran	7.4	12.2	6.5	8.7
Iraq	11.4	12.7	6.7	8.6
Pakistan	8.5	11.5	10.4	8.6
Somalia	5.9	12.5	-	9.1
Turkey	17.8	24.2	12.6	14.2
Vietnam	5.4	12.8	9.7	14.2
<i>Danish origin</i>	13.3	24.0	12.3	15.5
Total population	13.2	23.3	11.3	14.2

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Table 3.9 shows growth in vocational education enrolment between 1997/1998 and 2007/2008, in percentage points. The table shows that, while the rate of the total population experienced very little to no growth, almost all immigrants from the six selected countries of origin, had significant positive growth. The only exceptions were 16 to 19-year-old female immigrants of Pakistani origin who had a smaller (but still positive) growth than that of the total population as well as 16 to 19-year-old and 20 to 24-year-old male immigrants of Vietnamese origin, who had a negative growth of, respectively, -4.4 and -1.6 percentage points. Looking at descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins, growth was negative for both 16 to 19-year-old women and men. Enrolment rate growth for those descendants aged 20 to 24, however, was

greater than that of the total population, but still smaller than most of the growth rates experienced by the immigrants.

Table 3.9: Growth in the share of 16–19 and 20–24-year-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational educations from the school year 1997/1998 to 2007/2008, by sex and country of origin, per cent

	16–19		20–24	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	6.2	5.4	3.2	8.1
Iraq	7.4	11.3	11.1	6.2
Pakistan	0.6	2.7	4.2	2.9
Somalia	10.7	6.6	12.3	1.8
Turkey	8.5	9.1	4.9	3.1
Vietnam	3.7	-4.4	2.3	-1.6
Descendants				
Pakistan	-8.9	-3.1	0.3	1.7
Turkey	-1.6	-1.0	1.3	2.1
<i>Danish origin</i>	1.6	-0.5	0.4	0.9
Total population	1.5	-0.6	0.0	0.1

Source: Statistics Denmark.

4.3.4 Summary

There were positive developments in enrolment rates between 1998 and 2008. The enrolment rates of immigrants from the six countries of origin grew, in general, at a substantially higher rate of growth rate than the rates of both descendants and the total population. This is in part due to a lower initial enrolment rate.

Immigrants from Vietnam and Iran, in particular, had high enrolment rates while immigrants with Turkish and Somali origins had lower enrolment rates.

Descendant women had higher enrolment rates than men and the rates increased significantly from 1998 to 2008. This was also the case for immigrants, but to a lesser extent. The growth rates for 20 to 24-year-old female descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins were very high, at approximately 19 percentage points. For both groups, this impressive development was mainly driven by significantly higher tertiary enrolment rates over the period.

Immigrants from most of the six countries of origin, on the other hand, showed sizeable growth in the ratio of female to male enrolment rates over the ten-year period. By far the largest growth was seen among immigrants of Somali origin, with the ratio increasing from 0.21 in 1998 to 1.48 in 2008.

Immigrants of Iranian origin and male immigrants of Pakistani origin had, for all age groups, higher tertiary enrolment rates than the total

population. For descendants, the general trend seen was that their enrolment rates were higher than that of the total population. Descendants of Vietnamese origin had an especially high enrolment rate and the highest rate was found for 20 to 24-year-old women of this group, with a 51.1 per cent tertiary enrolment rate in 2008. Immigrants with Somali and Turkish origins had the lowest enrolment rates; the rates for those aged 25–29 were as low as 4.5 per cent.

Female descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins aged 20 to 24 had notably rates of growth vis-à-vis tertiary education than the total population, but those aged 25–29 had negative growth rates.

Enrolments in vocational education were higher for men than for women for almost all groups. Immigrants with Turkish and Somalia origins had particularly high vocational education growth rates.

4.4 Labour Market Integration

4.4.1 *Introduction*

This section examines the participation of immigrants and descendants (from the six selected countries of origin) in Denmark's labour market and compares it with that of the total population. The analysis includes a description of employment and inactivity rates for the entire group, including youths, as well as various cohort analyses. Box 4.1, below, provides definitions of the central concepts used in this section:

Box 4.1: Definition of labour market concepts

The data used in this section are based on Denmark's so-called Registry-based Labour Force Statistics (RAS). These are annual status observations of the population's participation in the labour market on the last working day of November of the previous year.

- Total population: all persons in the relevant population group – for example, all immigrants and descendants in the age group 16–64 in Denmark as of 1st January.
- Employed persons: employees, self-employed persons and assisting spouses.
- Unemployed persons: persons who are not employed but available for work.
- *Activity rate*: the number of persons *either* studying or employed as a percentage of the *total population*. Please note that this concept differs from the typical usage of “participation rate”, which is the number of persons participating in the labour force (i.e., employed *and* unemployed) as a percentage of the total population.
- *Inactivity rate*: the number of persons neither working, actively seeking work, nor attending any education or training course, as a percentage of the *total population*.
- Employment rate: the number of employed persons as a percentage of the total population. Accordingly, the employment rate is the proportion of employed persons in a particular population group.

<http://www.dst.dk/Vejviser/dokumentation/Varedeklarationer/emnegruppe/emne.aspx?sysrid=000848>

Note: The allocation of the population into the categories employed and unemployed persons and persons outside the labour force was determined by Statistics Denmark on the basis of the international standard developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Source: Statistics Denmark, Declarations of content of the register-based labour force statistics (RAS statistics).

4.4.2 Employment rates from 1998–2008

The employment rates of immigrants from the six selected countries of origin are shown in Figure 4.1 for the age group 25–54 years, that is, the key age group with respect to labour market participation. The figure shows that the employment rates of the immigrant groups are all below the level of the total population. At the same time, it is clear that all the immigrant groups experienced significant increases in employment, most particularly with those with Somali and Iraqi origins. The employment rate among Somali immigrants increased nearly 300 per cent between 1998 and 2008, moving from 10 per cent in 1998 to 38 per cent in 2008. Immigrants from Iraq doubled their employment rate over the 10-year time span, moving from 20 to 40 per cent from 1998 to 2008.

Figure 4.1: Employment rates for immigrants and the total population, by country of origin, 25–54 years old, in 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: "Total pop." is short for total population in Denmark.

Figure 4.2: Employment rates for female immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, 25–54 years old, in 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: "Total pop." is short for total population in Denmark.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide overviews of the employment rates of female and male immigrants between 1998 and 2008. Female employment rates range from 30 per cent to 64 per cent and, as such, are substantially lower than the employment rate for the total female population in 2008 (81 per cent). There has, however, been a positive development since 1998, most notably for women from Iran and Somalia, whose employment rates grew 24 to 25 percentage points, respectively. Women from Vietnam had the highest rates of employment the six groups.

Male immigrants had higher employment rates than female immigrants, but they were still lower than those of the total male population. Again, immigrants from Vietnam had the highest rate (76 per cent) while immigrants from Somalia had the lowest rate (44 per cent). The two national groups with the longest duration of stay, those with Pakistani and Turkish origins, had employment rates of around 70 per cent.

Figure 4.3: Employment rates for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of origin, 25–54 years old, in 1998, 2003 and 2008, per cent

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: "Total pop." is short for total population in Denmark.

Gender gaps were significantly higher in all the immigrant groups than they were in the total population, yet in most of the groups there were positive signs of equalization between 1998 and 2008 (see Figure 4.4). That is true for all groups, except for immigrants of Somali origin, where the gender gap increased over time. The main reason for this is that the large increase in employment that occurred during the period particu-

larly favoured males. The same phenomenon also explains the situation of immigrants from Iraq.

Figure 4.4: Gender gap in employment rates for immigrants and the total population, by country of origin, 25–54 years old, in 1998, 2003 and 2008, percentage points

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note 1: “Total pop.” is short for total population in Denmark.

Note 2: The difference is in percentage points and illustrates the difference in employment rate of men and women, where a positive number means that the female employment rate is below the male rate.

Also worth mentioning is the large gender gap (of more than 30 percentage points) found between male and female immigrants of Pakistani origin. Pakistani male immigrants had an employment rate close to 70 per cent, yet only about 39 per cent of Pakistani female immigrants were employed.

Lastly, it is also worth noting the significant decrease in the gender gap between female and male Iranian immigrants, where the gap in 2008 came within a few percentage points of that of the total population.

4.4.3 Inactivity rates from 1998–2008

Next we examine the share of inactive citizens among immigrants from the six countries of origin and for the total population over the study’s ten-year timeframe. As a reminder, a person is considered to be inactive if he or she is not working, actively seeking work or attending any education or training course (see also Box 4.1). Such persons could, instead, for example, be working at home, be supported by a spouse or family, or be on early pension.

Not surprisingly, inactivity rates increase with age. In the younger age groups, the table shows that the Iraqis, Pakistanis, Somalis and Turks had similar, high levels of inactivity. Iranians and Vietnamese were less inactive and this trend held for these groups at almost any age.

From 1998 to 2008 the inactivity rates of the immigrant groups fell substantially, especially for the youngest in the groups. However, most immigrant groups still had significantly higher inactivity rates than the total population.

Table 4.1: Proportions of immigrants and total population in the age ranges 16–24, 25–49 and 50–54 inactive in 2008 and changes between 1998 and 2008, by sex and country of origin

	16–24		16–24		25–49		50–64	
	Immigrants		Descendants		Immigrants		Immigrants	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Iran	17%	20%	8%	12%	37%	33%	71%	61%
Iraq	29%	22%	12%	15%	63%	46%	91%	79%
Pakistan	32%	24%	13%	14%	55%	25%	82%	53%
Somalia	29%	33%	7%	24%	63%	45%	90%	78%
Turkey	30%	28%	10%	15%	42%	23%	88%	70%
Vietnam	22%	18%	7%	9%	30%	19%	67%	59%
<i>Total population</i>	9%	10%	9%	10%	13%	10%	43%	31%
Change 1998–2008 in pct. Points								
Iran	-15	-	8	-	-10	4	-19	-10
Iraq	-36	-	12	-	-20	-15	-5	-4
Pakistan	-19	4	-7	0	-4	3	-7	-12
Somalia	-42	-17	-1	-	-26	-24	-8	-1
Turkey	-16	7	-3	5	-6	3	-4	-12
Vietnam	-7	3	1	5	-14	-2	-24	-22
<i>Total population</i>	0	3	0	3	1	2	-9	-3

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Populations with less than 10 individuals are not shown.

Significant differences are apparent between immigrants and the total population in the 50 to 64-year-old age group. While the relative divergence is the same as for the younger age groups (i.e. inactivity is approximately twice as high for the immigrant groups), the difference in percentage points is at its highest among 50 to 64-year-olds. Roughly, 60 to 90 per cent of all immigrants aged 50–64, regardless of gender, were inactive, compared to 43 of all women and 31 per cent of all men in Denmark in the same age group. Still, for most of the immigrant groups, there were greater decreases in inactivity rates over time than there were for the total population, again with the largest decreases associated with immigrants with Iranian and Vietnamese origins.

Table 4.1 also shows a large gender gap (of about 30 percentage points) in the inactivity rates of Pakistani immigrant men and women aged 25 to 49 and 50 to 64 (in 2008). The situation depicted in the table

with respect to Iraqis and Somalis is related to a large increase in employment between 1998 and 2003 that particularly favoured males. However, that situation changed between 2003 and 2008, as the gender gaps of all the immigrant groups decreased as a result of increases in employment that particularly favoured females.

4.4.4 Activity rates of young people from 1998–2008

The share of 16 to 24-year-olds that are either studying or employed (“activity rates”) among immigrants from the six countries and for the total population of the same age are shown in Figure 4.5 over a ten-year period. From 1998 to 2008, activity rates increased for all groups, in some cases significantly (e.g., the activity rates for Somali immigrants almost doubled). There remained, however, significant differences among the groups in 2008 (as can be seen, the activity rates ranged between 33 per cent (Somalia) and 75 per cent (Vietnam) in 1998 and between 65 per cent (Somalia) and 82 per cent (Iran) in 2008).

Figure 4.5: Activity rates (either working or studying) for immigrants and the total population, by country of origin, 16–24 years old. 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: “Total pop.” is short for total population in Denmark.

It is worth noting, however, that the activity rate among young Iranian immigrants reached almost the same level as the total population in 2008.

Next the activity rates for descendants are shown in Figure 4.6 from the six countries of origin along with those of the total population for the

youngest age group (those aged 16 to 24-years-old). The figure only contains data for 2008, since this is the only year with sufficient data to support an analysis of descendants.

Figure 4.6: Activity rates (either working or studying) for descendants and the total population, by country of origin, 16–24 years old, in 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: "Total pop." is short for total population in Denmark.

Overall, it can be seen that the current young generation of descendants is doing well compared with the total population. Both descendants of Iranian origin (87 per cent active) and descendants of Vietnamese origin (91 per cent active), have a higher level of activity than the total population (86 per cent). Descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins (both 85 per cent) are almost at the same level as the total population.

4.4.5 Employment amongst students from 1998–2008

It is interesting to see the share of students (aged 16 to 24-years old) who study *and* work at the same time. Focusing on students who also work merits interest with regards to integration, since having a job while enrolled in education is known to improve one's chances of employment after graduation.

From 1998 to 2008, there was a significant increase, across all immigrant groups, in the share of students having a job (see Figure 4.7). In 2008, most groups were within 10 percentage points of each other. The increase

was smallest for Iranian and Vietnamese immigrants, which is explained by the fact that they had relatively high rates to begin with. Still, immigrants from all the countries remained below the level of the total population, with young students from Iran and Pakistan having the highest rates.

Figure 4.7: Share of students who also have a job, by country of origin. Immigrants and population total, 16 to 24 years old, in 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: "Total pop." is short for total population in Denmark.

4.4.6 Cohort analysis of labour market participation from 1998 to 2008

This sub-section examines participation in the labour market via the tracking of cohorts from 1998 through 2003 to 2008. Observing the same groups of people over this 10-year time span highlights important changes in labour market participation patterns. The analysis focuses on three immigrant cohorts, here denoted as Cohorts A, B and C:

- *Cohort A* is the youngest cohort. The immigrants here were 16 to 24 years old in 1998, 21 to 29 years old in 2003 and 26 to 34 in 2008.
- The immigrants in *Cohort B* were 25 to 39 years old in 1998, 30 to 44 years old in 2003 and 35 to 49 years old in 2008.
- *Cohort C* consists of immigrants aged 40 to 54 in 1998, 45 to 59 in 2003 and 50 to 64 years old in 2008.

Figure 4.8 consists of three graphs showing labour market participation rates over time for the three immigrant cohorts and for their same aged counterparts in the total population. The figure also includes a graph showing gender gaps for Cohort B – the cohort most central in terms of labour market participation.

Figure 4.8: Employment rates among different immigrant cohorts, by country of origin and total population, in 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note 1: Total pop. is short for total population, which is the number for all persons in Denmark.

Note 2: The figure with "Gender gap, group B" are in percentage points.

Employment rates increased significantly for all immigrants in Cohorts A and B between 1998 and 2008. While the employment rates of the immigrant cohorts still remained below those of the total population in 2008, the increase seen between 1998 and 2008 was much larger for the immigrant cohort groups than for the total population, a positive sign in terms of labour market integration.

Immigrants from Iraq and Somalia in both Cohorts A and B had very low employment rates in 1998. However, the same groups also experienced some of the largest increases in employment between 1998 and 2008 – increases of 22 and 25 percentage points for Iraqis in Cohort A and B, respectively, and 28 percentage points for the Somalis in Cohorts A and B. In the same time frame, the employment rate for the total population only rose 11 percentage points for Cohort A, and 3 percentage points for Cohort B. Despite this development, the 2008 employment rates of both groups continued to be below the level of other immigrants as well as that of the total population as a whole. It is worth noting that the 2008 employment rate for Somali immigrants in Cohort A was only half that of the total population (40 per cent compared to 80 per cent).

Employment rates for immigrants from Pakistan, Turkey and the total population in Cohort C declined from 1998 to 2008. This is not surprising, since people in this age group (50 to 64-years) are approaching retirement age. For the Pakistani and Turkish immigrants, the decrease was less than that of the total population, but the level of employment rate was still well below that of the total population.

Immigrants from Iran and Vietnam in Cohort C were resilient, with employment rates quite stable over the ten-year period. Though doing better than immigrants from Pakistan and Turkey, the employment rates of the 50–64 year olds from Iran and Vietnam were still significantly below the level of the total population.

Like other cohorts, Iraqi and Somali immigrants in Cohort C had a weak connection to the labour market. Among older immigrants, though, we also see a very positive development for the Somali group over the ten-year period with an increase of 13 percentage points. However, this must be seen in view of the very low employment rate in 1998.

Figure 4.8 depicts gender gaps in employment rates for immigrants of all six countries and the total population. The overall picture is that gender inequality in employment has decreased significantly for all groups except for those of Somali origin. For immigrants from Iran and Vietnam, we see a threefold decrease in the gender gap in employment rates. For immigrants from Iran, the gender gap dropped from 23 percentage points in 1998 to 7 percentage points in 2008. For immigrants from Vietnam, the corresponding decrease was from 26 to 9 percentage points.

Despite these decreases, gender gaps were still relatively strong among the groups in comparison with the total population. Somali immigrants stand out, as they are the only group that had an increase in the gender gap during this period – on the order of 5 percentage points. One explanation for this is that increases in employment since 1998 favoured

Somali men more than Somali women. Despite this development, Somali immigrants – in terms of employment – are the third most gender-equal group amongst the selected immigrant groups, behind only the groups with Iranian and Vietnamese origins.

4.4.7 Labour market participation for the 1998 descendant cohort

Due to data limitations this sub-section examines the participation of descendants in Denmark's labour market for just one cohort (i.e., the youngest cohort). In other words, the analysis concerns the cohort of descendants who were 16 to 24-years-old in 1998, 21 to 29-years-old in 2003 and, finally, 26 to 34-years-old in 2008. Figure 4.9 shows that descendants from all countries of origin experienced an increase in employment from 1998 to 2008.

Figure 4.9: Employment rates among one descendant cohort, by country of origin and total population, in 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Denmark.

Note: Total pop. is short for total population, which is the number for all people in Denmark. Iraq is blank due to insufficient data for this group.

Among descendants of Pakistani origin there was an 18 percentage point increase in the employment rate – from 50 per cent in 1998 to 68 per cent in 2008. The same can be seen for descendants of Vietnamese origin who experienced an employment rate increase of 19 percentage points, including a giant leap from 64 to 79 per cent between 2003 and 2008. Furthermore, compared to the immigrant cohorts, employment rates for

the descendant groups were much closer to that of the total population (they were within 15 percentage points of the total population).

4.4.8 Summary

The employment rates of the study's six immigrant groups were all below the level of the total population. However, all the groups experienced significant increases in employment between 1998 and 2008, particularly those with Somali and Iraqi origins.

Female employment rates ranged from 30 to 64 per cent and were substantially lower than the total female employment rate (81 per cent). There has, however, been a positive development since 1998, most notably for women from Iran and Somalia, who saw their employment rates grow by 24 to 25 percentage points over the 10 year time frame of the study. Female descendants from Vietnam had the highest employment rate among the six compared groups.

Male immigrants had higher employment rates than female immigrants, but their rates were still lower than those of the total population. Again, immigrants from Vietnam had the highest rate (76 per cent) and immigrants from Somalia, the lowest rate (44 per cent). The two national groups with the longest duration of stay, Pakistan and Turkey, had employment rates of around 70 per cent.

All immigrant groups had higher gender gaps than the total population. However, there were positive signs of equalization between 1998 and 2008 for all groups, with the exception of descendants of Somali origin. The gender gap for this group, in fact, widened over time.

Inactivity rates were seen to increase with age but decrease within the descendant generation. In the younger age groups, immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey had similar and high levels of inactivity. The Iranians and Vietnamese were less inactive and this held for almost all ages. From 1998 to 2008 the inactivity rates for the immigrant groups fell substantially, especially among the youngest of these groups. However, inactivity rates were, for most immigrant groups, still significantly higher than those of the total population.

From 1998 to 2008, activity rates increased for all groups, in some cases significantly (e.g., the activity rates of Somali immigrants almost doubled). There remained, however, differences in the 2008 levels compared to the total population. Activity rates among young descendants are remarkably high and for descendants with Iranian and Vietnamese origins even higher than among youngsters in the total population. This

descendant cohort also experienced positive employment rate growth between 1998 and 2008.

4.5 Summary of Results – Denmark

This section presents a summary of the results of the Danish country study on the integration of immigrants and descendants from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam between 1998 and 2008.

4.5.1 *Political developments*

The subject of immigration and integration has figured high in public debates and on the government agenda in Denmark over the past 10 to 15 years. This has brought about a number of changes in immigration and integration law and policy.

Immigration policy changed substantially between 2002 and 2008. A 'Firm and Fair' immigration policy was put in place in the early 2000s which, for the first time, made permanent residency dependent on active integration. It also made family reunification dependent on age as well as on an evaluation of the attachment of families to Denmark in comparison with their attachment to the countries they had left. Citizenship requirements were made stricter and, later, an immigration and integration exam was introduced. These changes might have had effects on immigration, because immigrants have increasingly come to Denmark from Western rather than non-Western countries of origin.

A new concept in the field of integration was introduced in 1999 along with Denmark's first *Integration Act*. This act introduced a three-year introduction programme for all non-EU newcomers that focused on language training and job training for the unemployed. Municipalities were, also, for the first time made responsible for the integration of newcomers. Between 2002 and 2008, the *Integration Act* was subject to several changes. These changes placed an ever increasing emphasis on securing employment during the introduction phase, making individuals responsible for participating in their own integration, and making the process clearer, by, for example, introducing an integration contract.

After a change of government in 2011, new changes with regard to immigration and integration are expected and present evidence of an area that remains the focus of political attention.

4.5.2 Demography

At the time of writing the Denmark's immigrant population (immigrants and their descendants) constituted 10 per cent of the country's total population of 5,580,516. Around 6 per cent of immigrants and their descendants originated from non-Western countries. The largest non-Western national groups originate from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia, Pakistan and Somalia, while the largest Western groups originate from Poland, Germany and Norway. The six groups addressed in this study – immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – constituted 31 per cent of Denmark's foreign population as of 2008 (the last year covered under this analysis).

All six groups increased in size over the ten years covered by this study. All in all the total increase of the six groups was 38,600 persons, an increase that might have been limited by the 2002 introduction of Denmark's "Firm and Fair" policy. Not all the groups, however, experienced the same growth. The Iraqi and Somali groups had the largest relative increase and the Turkish group had the largest absolute increase. Moreover, the descendants of all six groups experienced a larger increase than did the immigrants of these groups.

When studying the natural change of the population, the births, the deaths and the standardized crude rates show that, even when taking into account differing age structures and calculating the per capita change, immigrants have a different pattern than natives. The pattern of descendants, however, comes closer to that of natives. This is a positive sign of integration across generations.

While in the most recent years of the study the birth rates of the immigrant groups were beginning to look similar to those of natives, the lack of older people in the groups influenced the natural change in a significantly positive direction. Combined with a larger than average positive net migration, the reasons behind the groups' total population growth are revealed (One outlier arising from a large emigration of Somalis between 2004 and 2008).

An analysis of age distribution confirms that the average immigrant is still younger than retirement age, while the majority of descendants are not yet even old enough to participate in Denmark's labour force.

Mothers and daughters with Iranian and Turkish origins appear to retain the same fertility patterns, which is not the case for the other four groups. Among the other groups, daughters have lower fertility rates than their mothers. In general, the analysis found that descendants are approaching the patterns of natives, while the fertility rates of their mothers (except for Iranians) are higher than the norm for the total population.

4.5.3 Education

Trends in enrolment rates were positive from 1998 to 2008. The enrolment rates of immigrants from the six countries of origin grew, in general, at a substantially higher rate than those of either descendants or the total population. This is, in part, due to their lower initial enrolment. Several initiatives pushing youngsters towards education and the introduction of an age limit with regard to family reunification might have contributed to this positive development.

Immigrants from Vietnam and Iran had, in general, high enrolment rates while immigrants from Turkey and Somalia had low enrolment rates.

Descendant women had higher enrolment rates than men and these rates increased significantly between 1998 and 2008. This was also the case for immigrants, but at a lower level. The growth rates for 20 to 24-year-old female descendants with Pakistani and Turkish origins were very high – approximately 19 percentage points. This impressive development was driven mainly by significantly higher tertiary enrolment rates during the period of study.

Immigrants of Iranian origin and male immigrants of Pakistani origin had higher tertiary enrolment rates, across all age groups, than the total population. The enrolment rates of descendants were generally higher than those of the total population. Descendants of Vietnamese origin had particularly high enrolment rates. Immigrants with Somali and Turkish origins had the lowest tertiary enrolment rates of the groups studied.

The enrolment rate of female descendants aged 20 to 24 with Pakistani and Turkish origins grew at a notably higher rate than that of the total female population, while the growth rates for 25–29-year-olds were negative.

More men than women in almost all the groups were enrolled in vocational education. Immigrants from Turkey and Somalia were particularly well represented in vocational education.

4.5.4 Employment

Employment rates among the immigrant groups were all below the level of the total population. However, all the selected immigrant groups experienced significant increases in employment between 1998 and 2008. Immigrants with Somali and Iraqi origins experienced particularly significant increases, having had initially very low employment levels. Both a new integration approach, introduced with Denmark's Integration Act and positive economic development contributed to this development.

Female employment rates, ranging from 30 to 64 per cent across the groups, were substantially lower than the employment rate for the total

female population (81 per cent). There have though been positive developments since 1998, most notably for women from Iran and Somalia (with a growth of 24–25 percentage points). Women from Vietnam had the highest employment rate among the six compared groups.

Male immigrants had higher employment rate than female immigrants, but still lower than the total population. Again, immigrants from Vietnam had the highest rate of employment (76 per cent) and immigrants from Somalia the lowest (44 per cent). The two groups with the longest duration of stay, those with Pakistani and Turkish origins, had employment rates of around 70 per cent.

Gender gaps in employment were significantly higher for all the immigrant groups, but there were positive signs of equalization between 1998 and 2008. The gender gap for those with Somali origins, however, showed an opposite tendency, having increased over time.

The inactivity rate defines the proportion of 16 to 64-year-olds in Denmark who are not working, actively seeking work or attending any education. Inactivity generally increases with age, but decreased in the descendant generation. In the younger age groups immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey had similar, high levels of inactivity. Those with Iranian and Vietnamese origins were less inactive, and this held for almost all ages. From 1998 to 2008 the inactivity rates of the immigrant groups fell substantially, especially for the youngest age group examined. However, most immigrant groups still had significantly higher inactivity rates than the total population.

From 1998 to 2008, activity rates (i.e., the proportion of persons working or studying) increased for all groups, in some cases significantly (e.g., the activity rates for Somali immigrants almost doubled). There remained, however, significant differences between the groups and the total population in 2008. The activity rates of young descendants were remarkably high and for descendants with Iranian and Vietnamese origins even higher than their peers in the total population. There were also positive developments in employment rates for descendants between 1998 and 2008.

4.5.5 Summary of the development of each of the six national groups

The first immigrants from *Iran* arrived in Denmark at the beginning of the 1980ies. This population group has had the slowest growth of the six compared groups and what growth was seen in 2008 can be attributed mainly to descendants. This group had a significant smaller birth rate (SCBR) than the other groups and natives. As a result of low intake and

stable emigration, positive net migration was rather limited for this group over the period of study. Of the six groups, the Iranians had the highest proportion of partnerships with natives, with one out of five married to a native partner. Immigrants and descendants of Iranian descent had a remarkably high rate of enrolment for both males and females aged 20–29 and 16–19. They had a higher enrolment rate than all the other groups, even higher than young natives. The employment rate among immigrants of Iranian origin was 59 per cent in 2008 and among descendants, 71 per cent. The rate was particularly high among immigrant women of Iranian origin (55 per cent) compared to the other groups.

The first immigrants from *Iraq* arrived in Denmark at the end of the 1980ies, and the size of this group doubled between 1999 and 2003. The increase can be largely attributed to a growth in descendants, who more than tripled during this period. Birth rates were high between 1998 and 2003, and while they decreased between 2004 and 2008, they still remained higher than those of all other groups (with the exception of the Somalis) and natives. Enrolment rates increased, particularly among 20 to 24-year-old immigrant and descendant women, with the rates of descendants coming close to those of natives during the ten-year period the study focussed on. The employment rate among this group of immigrants was very low, 40 per cent in 2008. The rate was particularly low among immigrant women of Iraqi origin (30 per cent) in comparison with the other groups.

The first immigrants from *Pakistan* arrived in Denmark as guest workers at the end of the 1960ies and since then the population has grown to around 20,000. This growth can be largely attributed to a growth in descendants. New immigrants are primarily arriving due to family reunifications, but emigration is also fairly high which has resulted in a small positive net migration. Birth rates were high at the beginning of the period (1998), but decreased towards the end of the period (2008). They remained, however, still at bit higher than the rates of the other groups (except for the Somali and Iraqi origin groups) and natives. Enrolment rates in education were higher for younger immigrants aged 16–19, but decreased thereafter with the lowest level found for 25–29 year old women: only 9 per cent of this group were enrolled in education. In comparison, 36 per cent of immigrant women from Iran in this same age group were enrolled. Young female descendants had a higher enrolment rate than natives, but the enrolment rate dropped for those aged 25 to 29. The enrolment growth rate of 20 to 24 year old female descendants of Pakistani origin was remarkable from 1998 to 2008. 54 per cent of immigrants of Pakistani descent and 58 per cent of descendants were employed in 2008.

Male immigrants of this group had a particularly high employment rate (70 per cent), but the rate was low among females (39 per cent).

The first *Somali* refugees began to arrive in Denmark in the early of 1980ies and increased in numbers substantially between 1999 and 2003. Half of the group had, at the time of the analysis, been in Denmark between 10 and 14 years. Between 2004 and 2008, more Somalis emigrated than immigrated to Denmark, leaving a negative net migration of 1,700 persons. No other group experienced such a large rate of emigration during the period studied. Immigrants from Somalia had the highest birth rate (SCBR) among the six groups, more than triple that of the native population – though decreasing between 1999–2003 and 2004–2008. Among descendants of Somali origin, education enrolments were very high in the younger ages (16 to 19), but they appear to have decreased with age. Enrolment rates were particularly low among male immigrants of Somali descent, most particularly among those aged 25 to 29 (only 9 per cent of this age group were enrolled in education). The employment rate of immigrants from Somali in 2008 was the lowest of the six groups at 38 per cent, and among descendants, the rate was 67 per cent. The employment rate of immigrant women was 30 per cent in 2008, which was particularly low in comparison with the other groups, but it had increased from as low as 6 per cent in 1998.

Immigrants from *Turkey* were among the first non-Western groups to arrive to Denmark in the 1950ies. The group has grown steadily, mainly as a result of family reunifications. Today the Turkish group is the largest of the non-Western immigrant groups with around 60,000 members. The growth in the immigrants of this group was 13 per cent from 1998 to 2008 and in descendants, 40 per cent. Birth rates were higher than those of natives between 1999 and 2003, but approached national levels between 2004 and 2008. Immigration rates were slightly higher than emigration rates resulting in a small positive – but decreasing – net migration rate. Partnerships were mainly with other people of Turkish origin. Enrolment rates tended to below those of natives. There was positive growth in enrolment rates, however, particularly for Turkish women. The enrolment rate of this group in vocational education was slightly higher than among natives and much higher than among the other groups, such that this level of schooling seemed to be favored by the youth of Turkish origin. The employment rate among immigrants from Turkey was 60 per cent and among descendants, 73 per cent, in 2008. The rate was particularly high among immigrant men (69 per cent).

Vietnamese refugees began arriving in Denmark during the 1970ies, but the group is the smallest of the six counting around 14,000 people.

The main increase in the group has been among descendants. One out of three of these immigrants has been in Denmark 15 to 19 years and one out of three has been in the country for more than 25 years. The group had a significant smaller birth rate (SCBR) than the other groups (with the exception of those of Iranian origin) and natives. New immigration from Vietnam is very low (the lowest among the six groups) and emigration is also low which has resulted in a small positive net migration. Female Vietnamese have a high rate of partnerships with natives. Young Vietnamese immigrants have a low enrolment rate in education, but young descendants have a particularly high rate of enrolment in education – even higher than the native population, for both females and males. Particularly remarkable was the ratio of 20–29 year old Vietnamese enrolled in tertiary education. The employment rate of immigrants from Vietnam was the highest among the six groups, 70 per cent in 2008 (76 per cent among men and 64 per cent among women). 79 per cent of descendants were employed in 2008, a rate which was nearly as high as the employment rate of natives (81 per cent).

5. Norway

Lars Østby

5.1 National Setting

5.1.1 Introduction

For a long period of time Norway considered itself, for right or for wrong, a very ethnically homogeneous country. There has been an increasing awareness, however, that there has always been some heterogeneity, due to the presence of people with Sami and Finnish origins, as well as Rom, other travellers and a small Jewish population. We have also “always” had immigrants, although they have come mostly from neighbouring countries. These immigrants were specialists, who came to play a lead role in both the Christianization and modernization of Norway. They have also been more “ordinary” people, coming to take part in our social and economic life. During the last four decades, however, immigration has been on the increase from around the world. Immigrants from 219 differing countries and autonomous regions are now represented in Norway’s population (For a comprehensive account of Norwegian immigration history in English, see Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008).

Since 1970, Norway has had a net inflow of migrants. Some of the consequences of this flow have been considered problematic right from the start, and have put immigration questions high on the political agenda. In 1974 Norway introduced an immigration ban with the justification that we had to be able to solve the integration problems faced by immigrants already in the country before letting new ones in. The ban ended up influencing the composition of Norway’s immigration streams more so than their size. However, according to Cappelen *et al.* (2011) the ban has also had more long-term effects. The number of labour migrants from non-European countries at the time when the ban was implemented was probably around 10,000, less than the yearly inflow from Poland after 2007.

The Norwegian population (and migration) statistics used in this chapter are based entirely on our population register system. Box 1.1, provides an overview of some of the most critical concepts used (For a

comprehensive description of Norway's population register system for the period this project covers, see Aalandslid and Østby, 2009).

Box.1.1: Definitions of some crucial concepts in this chapter:

- Integration: In our context, the way immigrants and descendants are incorporated into education and the labour market, and how their demographic behaviour changes during their stay in the host country.
- Immigrant: A person born abroad to two foreign-born parents, who at some point have immigrated to Norway.
- Descendant: A person born in Norway to two parents born abroad who also has four grandparents born abroad. Also referred to as Norwegian-born to immigrant parents.
- Refugee: For the period the data for this project covers, the term "refugee" is used with reference to resettlement refugees and asylum seekers who have been granted asylum or residence on humanitarian grounds.
- Asylum seeker: A person who on his or her own initiative, and without prior warning, asks the authorities for protection and recognition as a refugee. A person is called "asylum seeker" until a decision has been made respecting his or her application. Asylum seekers are not considered part of Norway's resident population of Norway until they receive permission to stay.
- Population groups: Immigrants and/or descendants with national backgrounds in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, or Vietnam who are living in Norway. These groups are often called national groups. We also provide statistics for:
- Natives, who are defined as persons living in Norway, with one or two Norwegian-born parents, that is everyone who is not an immigrant or descendant. In many tables, natives are referred to as being of Norwegian origin; and
- The Total Population of Norway, which includes everyone registered as living in Norway.

Source: Statistics Norway.

Since the immigration ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants coming to Norway from third world countries have been refugees and asylum seekers, as well as family members who are reuniting with labour migrants or others already present in the country. In some periods, we have also had a strong inflow from our Nordic and European neighbours. Nordic citizens have had the right to move to, and take work in, other Nordic countries since 1954 (Fischer and Straubhaar, 1996). Under the European Economic Activity (EEA) agreement, citizens of the European Union (EU) enjoy the same rights of movement to Norway as

they do to any other EU member state. From 2005 onwards, when the EU accepted ten new member states, migrant workers from Europe have increasingly dominated Norway's immigration intake. As a result, there is now a clear difference in recruitment patterns for Nordic and EU citizens, on the one side, and other citizens, on the other side, and these are creating social differences in Norway along ethnic lines whereas Denmark and Sweden are members of the European Union (dating from 1973 and 1995, respectively), Norway rejected membership in 1972 and 1994. The country is, however, an EEA member and most of EU's rules and regulations for migration are in effect for Norway as well. Norway is also included in the Schengen area, and has joined the Dublin Convention. For an overview of the regulations of migration in Norway, see Ministry of Justice (2012) and earlier years. For an external assessment of Norwegian migration policy and its consequences, see Cooper (2005).

The broad picture of migration to and from Norway during the last 50 years is provided in Figure 1.1. We can see the shifts in the late sixties, the stable increase in migration during the period 1971–1985, the more unstable situation in the period 1985–2000, and the very strong increase in immigration and net migration since 2005 (A more detailed description is available in English in Henriksen *et al.*, (Eds.), 2011).

Figure 1.1: In- out- and net migration for Norway. Absolute figures. 1958–2011

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

When comparing immigration and integration across Denmark, Norway and Sweden, one should also keep an eye on attitudinal differences, their causes and their consequences. Norwegian attitudes towards this new immigration have always been mixed, but they have probably not been any more negative than those that have arisen in comparable countries (Blom, 2011).

5.1.2 *Economy, Population and the Welfare State*

The Norwegian economy has been fairly good, and has improved, over the post-World War II era. Norway suffered from German occupation during World War II, but managed to rebuild its infrastructure in a surprisingly short time with help from our allies (e.g., the Marshall Fund). Norway's economy had for a long time been based on the export of raw materials from the sea, forests and mountains, and on processing industries that made use of our hydro-electricity. At the very end of the 1960ies oil resources in the North Sea shelf were discovered, and during the decades that have followed oil has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy. Because of this, as well as the manner in which oil income has been introduced into the national economy, Norway has been less affected by changing global economic cycles than other Western industrialized countries over the past four decades. For a recent discussion of the Norwegian economy, see Mjøset and Cappelen (2011). Due to the economic resources created by the oil extraction, Norway has also been less affected than most other countries by Europe's recent financial crises, particularly as far as economic growth and unemployment are concerned. When the recent Euro-crisis started to torment the EU, Norway's main problem was how to attract enough skilled labour to meet its economic needs.

Norway has aimed to keep unemployment at very low levels since before World War II, and compared with other countries, this policy has been quite successful. Although there are differences between political parties respecting just how to achieve "full employment", low unemployment has been considered a key priority, not only by the Labour Party which has governed the country for much of the period since 1945, but by all Norway's governing parties over the past six decades. With such a "full employment policy", it might be, however, that the country has had less flexibility to deal with increased labour demands. That is, Norway has not access to a large stock of potentially available persons not already employed.

By 1954, the Nordic countries had established a common labour market, meaning that citizens of another Nordic country were free to move into another Nordic country and take work without any kind of restrictions (For an analysis of this agreement, see Fischer and Straubhaar, 1996). In the border districts, there was a long tradition of close contact between neighbours and especially around the beginning of the 20th century, Norway attracted a large number of Swedish workers to build and run infrastructure and factories (see Østby, 2005 and Bore, 2005). Yet following the introduction of the common market, the number of inter-Nordic migrants, while not insignificant in Norway, were never anywhere near the numbers who moved from Finland to Sweden towards the end of the 1960ies.

Economic growth was a top-level priority in Western Europe for most of the first two decades after World War II. Beginning at the end of the 1960ies, the need for manpower in some Norwegian industries was met through the recruitment of – what at the time were considered to be temporary – guest workers from Southern Europe and South Asia. This was the time when most of our neighbouring countries started to impose restrictions on immigration, and some of our early initial migrant workers came to Norway after having worked in Denmark, Germany or other countries. In Section 3, we will see that Pakistani immigrants were the first of the study's six groups to arrive around 1970. At the very beginning, groups of the same size also came from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and India. Of these groups, the Pakistanis were to remain the largest group of immigrants in Norway for a long time (For a thorough description of Norwegian immigration see Kjeldstadli, (Ed.), 2003, and (in English) Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008).

Even before 1940, Norway attempted to establish an early type of welfare state, which more and more was based on universal rights for everyone residing in the country (e.g., child allowances, old age pensions, sickness and disability pensions, etc.). Some of these welfare benefits, including most pensions, can be exported if the person with the right to receive them moves to another country (See NOU (2011: 7) and the National Work and Welfare Authorities (Nav, 2011) who describe basic aspects of the Norwegian welfare state).

There is a close connection between migration and the sustainability of a modern, universal welfare state, and during the last decade doubts have arisen it can survive heavy immigration from “not like-minded cultures.” The main reasons for these doubts are two-fold. Firstly, many considered that the contract of solidarity, which should be the basis for the welfare state, would not be accepted by the native population if a

large number of immigrants could get rights to welfare without having made the same financial contributions as non-migrants.

Secondly, the other reason was related to the impression that the net welfare costs resulting from immigration were too high; that immigration would destroy the economic basis for the welfare state. The argument that the costs caused by immigration would be too high was mainly based on an appreciation of the costs associated with the reception and integration of refugees. In addition, the disability rates of permanent labour migrants were considered to be too high to justify large scale labour migration. In this context, the Government established a group chaired by Professor Grete Brochmann to develop a *White Paper on Migration and Welfare – The future of the Norwegian model*. This group presented its report in early 2011 (NOU 2011:7) (The report's summary and chapter on perspectives are also available in English).

In short, they conclude that if the employment rates of immigrants are on par with the rates of natives, then immigration, within the context of the welfare state, will be sustainable. The costs related to labour migrants and to refugees were very different, as were the policies behind their immigration. They based their conclusions respecting the macroeconomic consequences of migration on a report by Holmøy and Strøm (2012). The report concludes that migrants, on average, make a negative net contribution to the state economy, the more negative, the lower their labour market activity are. But, even the average contribution of non-migrants is negative. All groups enjoy the use of oil income for common purposes.

At the same time, another group, chaired by the former head of the Directorate for Immigration and Inclusion (IMDi), Osmund Kaldheim, released a White Paper on integration (NOU 2011:14). One main conclusion from this report was that, by and large, the integration of immigrants into Norwegian society is quite good, with some exceptions that are often related to a lack of participation in the labour market. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009) also recently produced a study on the integration of immigrants in Norway. Their conclusions were very much in line with the two White Papers, underlining that the integration of the children of immigrants in the Norwegian labour market was better than one could find for comparable groups in most other countries.

All three reports place a strong emphasis on labour market participation. In our Nordic comparative project we have, for the same reasons, generated much data to support our analyses of how immigrants fare in the labour market, as well as for examining educational activity, which is a significant basis for labour market participation in post-industrial societies.

The welfare state produces demographic consequences not only for migration, but also for fertility levels. Fertility levels in Norway have been fairly high in the Western European context since World War II. The second demographic transition came later to Norway than to most other European countries. The total fertility rate (TFR) was almost 3 in the early 1960ies, and was above 2 until 1975. The lowest TFR (1.66) came about in 1983 and since then there has been an increase towards almost 2.0 (i.e., 1.93 in 1990 and 1.98 in 2009). This has been seen as a consequence of a generous family policy (For a thorough description of the Norwegian family policy after 1945, see Voldseth, 2011). This comparatively high fertility has been combined with high labour force participation among women in their reproductive ages. The reasons for this development are often seen as related to Norway's family policy that aims to make it possible to combine family life with labour market participation.

As a result of high net immigration, relatively high fertility and increasing life expectancy, the population of Norway is expected to increase quite substantially in the foreseeable future. During the past year, Norway's growth was slightly above the global average of 1.1 per cent. Norway's growth is expected by Eurostat (2011) to be among the highest in Europe, and according to Statistics Norway, the population is expected to reach 7 million by 2063 (see Statistics Norway, 2012 b, http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/03/folkfram_en/; Brunborg *et al.*, 2012a, b; and Tønnesen *et al.*, 2012).

5.1.3 Immigration and Integration Aims and Policies

When the first immigrants from distant countries reached Norway towards the end of the 1960ies, we had no generally accepted policy to meet them. We had had a few thousand war prisoners of Polish, Russian, Yugoslav and other origins from World War II stay in Norway, and we accepted some refugees from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968, and from some other countries. The numbers were never high. The need for policy was felt only when migrant workers came in visible numbers in the early 1970ies (These immigration and integration policies are described in the two Official Norwegian Reports mentioned in the previous sub-section (i.e., NOU 2011: 7 and 11); see also Kjeldstadli, (Ed.), (2003) and Brochmann and Kjeldstadli (2008) who discuss the development and aims of these policies at a broad level).

Based on the fact that the newly arriving migrant workers in the early 1970ies were ending up in considerably worse working and living conditions than normally accepted in Norway, a temporary Immigration

Ban was introduced in 1974, and made permanent in 1975. The argument was that we had to make the conditions acceptable for those already in the country before we could allow more migrants to enter. This ban was just for labour migration. Exemptions from the ban were related to family reunification and formation, and to needs for protection. During the first years after the ban, the main groups of non-European immigrants to arrive in Norway were family members coming to join husbands and fathers who had come earlier as migrant workers. Thus, the ban did not reduce the number of immigrants as much as it changed the composition of immigration intake. Cooper (2005) puts it like this:

“Though it (*Norway*) has not joined the EU and remains outside the reach of most EU policy, many of its independent decisions – particularly regarding its relationship to European borders and migration policy management – have a uniquely European character. The country’s carefully regulated effort to allow only selected migrants to be admitted, together with its commitment to ensuring social equality for those who arrive, closely fits the model to which many other European countries (with varying degrees of success) aspire.”

Restrictions on immigration (primarily via the Immigration Ban) came later than in our neighbouring countries, and partly as a response to their restrictions. During this period, the first oil crisis had created problems for the Norwegian labour market, and the need for foreign labour was not as pronounced as before.

In the 1970ies, new and numerically significant groups of refugees arrived. Most attentions were focused on those from Chile, and towards the end of the decade also on those from Vietnam and some other communist regimes. Small groups of refugees with origins in a number of African countries were also registered. These refugees were less like asylum seekers and more like today’s United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refugees. They were understood more in the context of Norway’s fulfilment of its humanitarian and political responsibilities and less as a group requiring an immigration policy. When asylum seekers started to arrive in the hundreds in the early 1980ies and in the thousands from the mid-1980ies onward, we slowly developed a system for dealing with applications. Norway’s yearly reports to the OECD in the SOPEMI context give a good overview of developments in

the country's immigration and integration policies (see Ministry of Justice, 2012, and earlier issues).⁷

The effects of differing immigration policies on immigration to Norway between 1969 and 2010 were analysed by Cappelen *et al.* (2011). They developed a dataset of statistics on migration to Norway from 179 countries between 1969 and 2010. The data include demographic and economic variables, which are standard in the migration literature. They demonstrate that relative income, income distribution and, in particular, labour market outcomes are important factors in shaping migration flows, and that a number of immigration policy interventions have played an important role in changing the size and geographical composition of migration to Norway. One of their main conclusions was that without a number of the policy measures implemented between 1972 and 2010, immigration to Norway would have been about 6.6 per cent higher, that is 60,000 more immigrants would have arrived in Norway if the rules had not been changed. The immigration freeze in 1974 thus contributed to a major, long-term reduction in immigration.

The stated aim of Norway's integration policies has always been to ensure that those allowed to stay have decent living conditions. As living conditions were seen as clearly dependant upon labour market participation, access to the labour market became an increasingly more important aim. It was quite clear that most refugees did not have the qualifications required to participate in the Norwegian labour market, neither in terms of formal skills or language competence. Thus, finding ways to accommodate these missing skills has been the aim of integration policy. The measures selected for this purpose have changed over time in response to the changing composition of the country's immigrants and to the changing needs of the Norwegian labour market (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008).

Attitudes towards multiculturalism, and in particular towards "diversity", have been more favoured at the policy level than within broader sections of the population. Consequently, there have been discussions for three decades around these concepts. Policy has always been open to diversity, but the first priority has always been integration into education and the labour market. We will later see how integration in these arenas takes place among the six major nationality groups examined in this study.

⁷ SOPEMI is the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration. Its acronym is derived from the French, *Système d'observation permanente des migrations*.

European integration policies have been evaluated three times by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (British Council *et al.*, 2011). Norway's integration policy is considered to be among the more favorable for integration. In the 2011 edition we ranked 7th of 31 European countries; our policy was characterized as "Slightly Favourable" (page 11). Sweden was at the top, the only country recognized as having a "Favourable" integration policy. Denmark, with their "Halfway Favourable" integration policy, was ranked 14th, a position close to the European average.

The MIPEX consists of 7 policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination, with a number of items within each. Altogether, 148 detailed policy indicators are grouped by policy areas, and given a score of 0.50 or 100. The maximum is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. Norway was awarded the top score for political participation, and was at the average for anti-discrimination, access to nationality and long-term residence. For the rest, we ranked between 4 and 8.

The assessment of different policies seems to be partly subjective. For example, Norway's high naturalisation rates (Pettersen, 2012) speak against characterizing our access to nationality as being at the lower end of "Halfway Favourable". Generally, when it comes to the results of integration policies, Norway seems to be doing pretty well (OECD, 2009).

5.1.4 Immigration, the Rise of Foreign-Origin Population Groups and their Integration

As mentioned in Sub-Section 1.1, migration statistics in Norway are based on a population register that was established in 1964. Before then, given small yearly net outmigration, migration had been seen to be of little demographic or statistical importance. Except for our neighbours, Norwegian citizens were the only significant group of migrants before 1970. However, this pattern changed toward the end of the 1960ies in response to increased demands for unskilled labour. The net outmigration of Norwegians decreased, and the immigration of foreign citizens began to increase, a process that continues to this day (For a general description of immigration and integration, see Henriksen *et al.*, (Eds.), 2011).

In 1970, Norway had 60,000 immigrants and descendants. Of these, 25,000 had their origins in another Nordic country and 25,000 in the rest of Western Europe and North America. Only 10,000 came from the rest of the world, including 6,500 from Eastern Europe and 3,500 from Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Figure 1.2: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1970–2012

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

In 1991, the number of immigrants and descendants was 175,000, and by 2011 the number had increased to 600,000. 50 per cent of this group, in both 1991 and 2011, originated from Asia, Africa or Latin America. In 1991, Vietnam was Norway's second largest non-European immigrant source country, second only to Pakistan. By 2011, despite increasing in number from 9,000 to 20,500, Vietnamese-origin immigrants now also rank behind Iraq and Somalia in terms of size.

As we can see from Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the numbers and the composition of immigrants and descendants have undergone basic changes. First came the guest workers beginning in the late 1960ies, then their families, and then came refugees in increasing numbers. Table 2.1 shows the number of immigrants from the different continents; Table 2.2 provides numbers from some regions of interest.

Table 1.1: Immigrants and descendants, by country background. Absolute figures. 1970–2011

	1970	1980	1991	2001	2006	2011
Sweden	11,198	11,018	12,465	23,010	23,489	34,108
Poland	1,198	1,672	4,873	6,432	11,864	60,610
Turkey	236	2,384	6,706	10,990	14,084	16,430
Kosovo	0	0	0	0	0	13,303
Morocco	401	1,286	3,312	5,719	7,031	8,305
Somalia	3	31	1,747	10,107	18,015	27,523
Philippines	70	789	3,731	5,885	8,561	14,797
Iraq	20	38	932	12,357	20,076	27,827
Iran	43	135	6,066	11,016	14,362	16,957
Pakistan	163	6,828	16,341	23,581	27,675	31,884
Vietnam	20	2,072	9,964	15,880	18,333	20,452
Chile	85	947	6,028	6,491	7,084	7,708

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Table 1.2: Immigrants and descendants, by regional background. Absolute figures. 1970–2011

	1970	1980	1991	2001	2006	2011
Nordic countries	26,548	31,210	37,285	53,480	53,551	67,201
Western Europa, except Nordic countries	15,190	22,686	28,208	33,271	38,635	60,325
Eastern Europa	5,806	7,114	14,663	48,257	68,210	159,907
North America, Oceania	8,103	11,810	10,558	9,272	9,214	11,349
Asia (including Turkey), Africa, and Latin America	3,549	22,382	83,954	153,451	217,089	302,140
Total	59,196	95,202	174,668	297,731	386,699	600,922

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Pakistanis were more likely to enter Norway under the exemptions allowed for under the immigration ban than others. Between 1988 and 2007 the Pakistanis became the largest non-Nordic immigrant group in Norway. Taking immigrants and descendants together, they have formed the largest group within the category “Africa, Asia and Latin America” since 1972, but will probably be surpassed in numbers by those from Somalia and/or Iraq in a few years. Among the Nordic countries, Danes were the largest immigrant group up until 1998, when they were surpassed by Swedes. Those from Poland became the largest group in 2008, and from 2009 onward there have been more immigrants from Poland than from all the ex-Yugoslav states taken together. Figure 1.3 shows Norway’s 15 largest immigration source countries as of the beginning of 2012. As shown in this figure, the Polish immigrant and descendant group numbered more than 70,000, a figure almost twice that of the second largest groups (Swedes, followed by Pakistani).

Figure 1.3: The 15 largest groups of immigrants and descendants. Absolute figures. Norway 1.1. 2012

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Descendants have also increased considerably in numbers, as the members of some immigrant groups have shown a clear tendency to partner with persons of the same group (others tend to have children with persons with non-immigrant backgrounds). Most typically, immigrants from Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Morocco have children with a partner of their own origin, whereas Thai immigrants most frequently have a child with a Norwegian partner.

Table 1.3 shows that the proportion of descendants from Pakistan (45 per cent) is at the top among the six origin countries of interest to this study. Vietnam and Turkey have 36 per cent, and the rest around 25 per cent. Iran has the lowest proportion, despite having been in Norway for quite a long period of time. This means that we can already notice here that Iranians have a higher propensity than others to marry, or to have children, with people of differing country origins. Due to high fertility and a young age structure, the proportion of descendants among those of Iraqi and Somali origin is expected to increase for some time.

Table 1.3: Immigrants and descendants, by country of origin. Absolute figures. 2001 and 2011

	2001			2011		
	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	Immigrants	Descendants	Total
Sweden	22,100	910	23,010	32,538	1,570	34,108
Poland	5,698	734	6,432	56,878	3,732	60,610
Turkey	7,507	3,483	10,990	10,583	5,847	16,430
Kosovo	0	0	0	9,525	3,778	13,303
Morocco	3,870	1,849	5,719	4,987	3,318	8,305
Somalia	7,905	2,202	10,107	19,707	7,816	27,523
Philippines	5,105	780	5,885	13,372	1,425	14,797
Iraq	11,212	1,145	12,357	21,272	6,555	27,827
Iran	9,645	1,371	11,016	14,007	2,950	16,957
Pakistan	13,554	10,027	23,581	17,454	14,430	31,884
Vietnam	11,231	4,649	15,880	13,036	7,416	20,452
Chile	5,300	1,191	6,491	6,098	1,610	7,708

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

The number of descendants in Norway increased from 2,000 in 1970 to more than 100,000 in 2012. The large majority of descendants (72 per cent) have their origins in Africa or Asia, and by far the largest group is of Pakistani origin, with more than 14,000 descendants. Of the six countries, 6,000 to 8,000 descendants have origins in Turkey, Iraq, Vietnam or Somalia, and only 3,000 are of Iranian origin. Generally, descendants are still very young: in 2011, 17 per cent (17,000) were above the age of 19 while in 2001, 12 per cent (6,000) were above the age of 19. Because their immigration histories are so different, there are large differences in the age distribution of descendants, and also between the groups. Among Pakistani descendants, 36 per cent were above the age of 19, among Turkish and Vietnamese, around 20 per cent, among Iranians, 7 per cent and among Iraqi and Somali descendants, only 1 per cent. Norway has more descendants of Pakistani origin above the age of 19 (6,000) than from all the other five countries (3,000) taken together. That tells us that the question of how descendants are faring (or integrating) in Norway is, to a large extent, still a question of how Norwegian-born persons of Pakistani origin are doing. But, no further back than 2001, only 15 per cent of Pakistani descendants were over the age of 19. At that time, the number of descendants of Pakistani origin was only slightly higher than the number of Vietnamese and Turkish descendants in 2011.

In many ways, how well descendants integrate will be the real proof of whether integration has failed or succeeded. This is clearly stated by NOU (2011:14), and in texts like Henriksen *et al.*, (2011) and Olsen (2011) that show that descendants have as high or even higher participation rates in higher education than natives, and that their participation in the labour market is closer to that of natives than to the immigrant population.

Since 2006, Statistics Norway has published information on the numbers of non-Nordic immigrants by reason for immigration (or more precisely, the legal grounds for which resident permits were issued). Nordic citizens are allowed to stay in Norway for work, or for other purposes, without requiring any type of permission, but they have to report their migration to the Central Population Register, in the same way as internal migrants do. Based on decisions taken by immigration authorities, the data have been reconstructed back to 1990 and are published in Statistics Norway (2012c; http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvgrunn_en/). Some key features are summarised below in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.4: Immigration from non-Nordic countries by reason for immigration. Absolute figures. 1990–2011

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Of the more than 500,000 first time immigrants to Norway with a Non-Nordic citizenship who arrived between 1990 and 2011, 37 per cent came for family reasons, 32 per cent came for work and 20 per cent, for protection. 125,000 of these have since left the country (more so work and education migrants than others), so among those still in the country, 40 per cent came for family reasons, 30 per cent for work and 23 per cent for protection (Andreassen and Dzamarija, 2011).

During the 1990ies, we can see two clear peaks in refugee arrivals in Figure 1.4. These depict refugees arriving from Bosnia in 1993 and from Kosovo and Iraq in 1999. For the rest of the period, the yearly number of refugees allowed to settle in Norway has been around or under 5,000, UN-HCR quota refugees included. As the number of migrant workers and their family members, and the refugees, became more numerous, the number of family migrants (family establishment or reunion) increased quite regularly, and was the most common reason for immigration for long stretches of time during this period. With the opening up of labour migration from the EU, labour migrants became dominant (up to 50 per cent of the total). Many family members are now following, and further increases can be expected. During recent years, the number of refugees has hardly been above the number of persons coming to study. Norway's immigration policy has for a long period of time targeted refugees and family migrants. Today the policy is more and more directed towards the needs of new types of immigrants, that is, labour migrants and their families.

5.1.5 Summary

Although immigrants have always been present in Norway, the more recent immigration flow started around 1970, albeit on a modest scale. Immigration intake became strongly regulated with the introduction of the 1974 immigration ban. Since the ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants who have come from third world countries have been refugees and asylum seekers, as well as family members reuniting with labour migrants and others already present in the country. The ban did not influence the size of the flow as much as it influenced the composition of the immigrant group. We have also had a strong inflow of immigrants from our Nordic and European neighbours. After the expansion of the EU in 2004, migrant workers from Europe have increasingly come to dominate immigrant inflows to Norway. Thus, there is now a clear difference in recruitment patterns for Nordic and EU citizens, on one side, and other citizens, on the other side, and they are creating social differences in Norway along ethnic lines.

Immigration has been closely related to a fairly good Norwegian economy during the post-World War II era. At the very end of the 1960ies, the oil resources of the North Sea shelf were discovered, and in subsequent decades, oil has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy.

Recently, Norway has had an increasing interest in the connection between migration and the sustainability of a modern, universal welfare state. During the last decade some have doubted whether the welfare

state can survive high immigration from “not like-minded cultures.” Reports to the government have concluded that, by and large, if the employment rates of immigrants are on par with the rates of the natives, immigration within the context of the welfare state will be sustainable.

As a result of high net immigration, relatively high fertility levels and increasing life expectancy, the population of Norway increased considerably towards the end of our period of study, and it is expected to continue to increase substantially in the foreseeable future.

In 1970, Norway had 60,000 immigrants and persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents. Of these 25,000 have origins in other Nordic countries, 25,000 from the rest of Western Europe and North America, and 10,000 came from the rest of the world. The recent immigration flow started around 1970 with guest workers, then their families, and then refugees in increasing numbers. Pakistanis, more than others, continued to arrive. Between 1988 and 2007, those coming from Pakistan became the largest non-Nordic immigrant group in Norway. In 2008, Poland became the largest immigrant source country. There are now almost twice as many immigrants of Polish origin in Norway than there are Swedes.

The number of descendants in Norway increased from 2,000 in 1970 to more than 100,000 in 2012. Many of these descendants have origins in the six source countries of interest to this study. Generally, the descendants are still very young, 17 per cent (17,000) were above the age of 19 in 2011. There are more descendants of Pakistani origin over the age of 19 (6,000) in Norway than from all the other five countries in total (3,000). During recent years, immigration due to labour reasons has dominated immigration intake, but from a 20-year perspective, family related immigrations have outnumbered both labour and protection intake.

5.2 Population Dynamics

In this section, we analyse changes in population size and composition by a number of demographic characteristics. First, we will look at how these six country groups developed over time and compare their composition to those of the total population and ‘natives’ (i.e., those who are neither immigrants or children of immigrant couples). We then analyse the composition of the groups by traits that are specific to immigrant populations, like duration of residence, composition by generation and the national backgrounds of partners. Some of these aspects are closely related to integration, like partner choice and fertility levels. Thus, the issue of integration is woven throughout this section.

5.2.1 Population Dynamics

The population of Norway, compared to the rest of Europe, has had rather strong growth through the whole post-World War II period as a result of consistently high fertility levels, increasing life expectancy and most importantly, in recent years, as a result of strong net immigration (Eurostat, 2011). Immigrants have made a direction contribution to this growth, as well as an indirect one, that is via high descendant birth numbers arising from higher fertility rates and a young age structure. Since the data set was established, their growth has increased. By 2011 their growth rate was 1.3 per cent whereas the growth rate of the total population growth rate has been estimated to be 'only' 1.1. Net immigration has contributed to 70 per cent of Norway's growth. If one includes descendants, the proportion would be close to 90 per cent. Still, unlike most Western European countries, the native population in Norway is also still growing.

When analysing the demographic behaviour and integration of immigrant groups, we find it necessary to separate immigrants and descendants. This is due to the very different age structure of the groups, and to the fact that immigrants have experiences from a different national setting, whereas descendants are born in, and have spent their lives (mostly) in a Scandinavian country. Also relevant to questions of integration, and examined in this section, are patterns of convergence between descendants and national averages.

Development Over Time

Before going into detail about the growth of the six different national groups, we will illustrate a more general aspect of their development. Table 2.1 shows that Pakistan and Turkey were the pioneers of the six groups. The modest start of non-European immigration in the late 1960ies included these countries, but also Morocco, Yugoslavia and India, and some others of less significance statistically. During the seventies, immigrants from Pakistan (in particular) and Turkey continued to arrive in Norway in higher numbers than those from other countries. Boat refugees from Vietnam came shortly after the war in Vietnam ended, and were, at the time, the most numerous refugees seen in Norway since World War II. The next to become visible in Norway were the Iranians, with a rather small number of refugees from the Shah regime in 1977. By the mid-eighties they numbered 500 immigrants and 100 descendants. Unlike other groups, it took almost a decade for their numbers to increase from 50 to 500 (see Table 2.1). In the mid-1980ies, refugees from Iraq and Somalia also reached a significant level. The immigration flows from these countries lasted a long time, and Somalis are

still among the more numerous groups, ranking eighth in 2001 in terms of net immigration (1,400 persons).

Table 2.1: Significant years in the history of the population groups. Norway
Year for the number of immigrants to surpass 500 (50) and number of descendants to surpass 100 (10)

	Immigrants > 500 (>50)		Descendants > 100 (>10)	
Iran	1986	1977	1987	1981
Iraq	1988	1986	1990	1986
Pakistan	1971	1970	1973	1971
Somalia	1988	1987	1989	1985
Turkey	1971	1970	1975	1972
Vietnam	1978	1976	1978	1977

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Figure 2.1a shows the *increase in numbers* in Norway from the six countries between 1999 and 2008. We provide separate diagrams for immigrants and descendants because their dynamics and patterns are so different. For some years, immigrants from Pakistan predominated, but by 2004 they were outnumbered by Iraqis, and then in 2007, by Somalis. We note that immigration from Iraq, Somalia and to some extent Iran has been strong over the last decade, while there has been more modest but consistent net immigration from Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam. During the last years, Iranians were again arriving in increasing numbers (in 2011, more immigrants came from Iran than from Iraq). Due to their young age structure, there are few deceased among immigrants and descendants, such that the number of observations was too small to permit standard mortality analyses.

As the Pakistanis arrived in their largest numbers during the 1970ies, their descendants are by far the largest in size of all the groups throughout the period (see Figure 2.1.b). Immigrants from Pakistan have had comparatively high fertility rates, they do not leave the country and they have a strong tendency to marry within their group. Somalis and Iraqis show the same development, which is different than that of Iran or Vietnam. Taking immigrants and the descendants together (see Figure 2.1.c), Pakistanis still rank on top, but the numbers from Somalia and Iraq are increasing faster. These two groups will likely surpass the group from Pakistan in a few years, as they have more births, higher net immigration and a younger age structure than Pakistani immigrants. Due to significant labour migration to Norway from many EU countries, the numbers of immigrants from Poland and Sweden are now larger than those from Pakistan, even when descendants and immigrants are counted together (Statistics Norway, 2012a, http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef_en/).

Figure 2.1a: Immigrants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999–2008

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Figure 2.1b: Descendants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999–2008

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Figure 2.1c: Immigrants and descendants in Norway by country of origin. Absolute figures. 1999–2008

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Table 2.2 shows strong *population growth* for all groups between 1999 and 2008. The larger and the older groups have the lowest growth. During the first decade after the turn of the millennium, the number of Iraqis and Somalis more than doubled, due to both high numbers of immigrations and high birth rates. At the start of the period, there were not many descendants of Iraqi or Somali origin, so the growth rate for these groups can be recognized as extremely high and thus likely to level off. The strong increase in descendant numbers also reflects the young age structure of the immigrants; they are in their reproductive years, and many couples were separated for a period of time after having become refugees. The numbers from Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, and to some extent Iran illustrate the development of more “mature” populations. Their growth lags far behind that of the newly arrived, more ‘active’ groups from Iraq and Somalia. The total population of Norway increased by 8 per cent over the ten years. If one excludes immigrants and descendants, the population still would have grown, but only by 2.5 per cent. Such growth, even in the non-migrant population, is not common across Europe; it results from age distribution, comparatively high fertility levels and increasing life expectancy. Even the non-immigrant population (i.e., those with two Norwegian born parents and four Norwegian born grandparents) increased by one per cent between 1999 and 2008.

Differences in *duration of residence* can explain many of the differences seen in Table 2.3 respecting the growth of the six countries of origin, as well as of the total population, between 1999 and 2009. In Table 2.3 we distribute the immigrants by time since first immigration

(our definition of duration of stay). Exactly 50 per cent of the Pakistani immigrants had been in Norway for 20 years or longer, the proportion was above 1/4 for Vietnamese, Turks and Iranians, while only 2–3 per cent of the Iraqi and Somali groups came to Norway before 1989. Iranians are quite evenly distributed between the five-year groups; the others have a more distinct peak period.

Table 2.2: Per cent growth and number of immigrants and descendants, 1999–2009 by country of origin. Norway

	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants & Descendants	Immigrants and Descendants	
				1998	2008
Iran	52	149	62.4	9,646	15,666
Iraq	301	728	351.0	5,433	24,505
Pakistan	30	49	37.8	21,889	30,161
Somalia	220	304	238.7	6,977	23,633
Turkey	46	81	56.6	9,859	15,436
Vietnam	17	73	32.1	14,929	19,726
Norwegian origin	-	-	2.5	4,184,587	4,291,053
Total population	-	-	8.0	4,445,329	4,799,252

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Table 2.3: Share of immigrants after duration of stay, by country of birth. Per cent. 2008. Norway

	0–4 years	5–9 years	10–14 years	15–19 years	20 years and more	Total
Iran	14	25	15	20	26	100
Iraq	25	52	13	8	2	100
Pakistan	14	14	10	11	50	100
Somalia	35	38	13	11	3	100
Turkey	18	19	13	16	34	100
Vietnam	10	8	6	30	45	100

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

In addition to immigration, *fertility* is the main driver behind the growth of the groups. Table 2.4 shows the number of births, the crude birth rate (CBR) and total fertility rate (TFR) for the six groups of immigrants for 1999–2003 and 2004–2008. We will focus on birth numbers and on TFR. During the second period, the number of children born by Somali and Iraqi mothers was higher than the number born by Pakistani mothers. Total fertility rates decreased between the two periods for all immigrant

groups. The smallest decrease was experienced by the Somalis whose TFR declined only from 4.45 to 4.4. This might indicate not only persisting high fertility, but also the fact that the proportion of newly arrived immigrants was still very large in this group (see Table 2.3.). As durations of stay increase, fertility rates are generally decreasing. Women with only Norwegian origins increased their TFR from 1.75 to 1.82 between the periods, but the level peaked (at least temporarily) in 2009. In 2004–2008 the TFR for Iranian women was below the national level, for those from Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan it was still 1.3 to 2.5 children above the national average. We will not expect these groups to come down to the present Iranian level. The TFR for immigrant women from Turkey and Vietnam is approaching the Norwegian average, but still 0.6 and 0.2 above it. The fertility patterns of immigrants contribute to Norway's high fertility, however they add only around 0.06 children to Norway's total TFR. Thus without immigrants, Norway's TFR would have been 1.82, while with them it was 1.88 between 2004 and 2008.

Table 2.4: Number of births, total fertility rate (TFR) and crude birth rates (CBR) by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway

	Births		CBR (I)		TFR(I)	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	931	976	15.0	11.9	1.91	1.51
Iraq	1,836	2,999	29.8	28.8	4.29	3.57
Pakistan	2,765	2,884	22.7	20.4	3.40	3.18
Somalia	2,242	3,717	40.3	38.4	4.45	4.40
Turkey	1,417	1,408	24.0	18.3	2.87	2.52
Vietnam	1,810	1,794	20.8	16.4	2.31	2.07
Norwegian origin	250,466	242,594	11.1	10.4	1.75	1.82
Total population	287,120	291,208	12.7	12.5	1.80	1.88

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Table 2.5: Number of deaths and crude death rates of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin

	Deaths		CDR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	67	92	1.2	1.3
Iraq	55	88	0.9	0.8
Pakistan	230	282	1.9	2.0
Somalia	61	90	1.1	0.9
Turkey	78	73	1.4	1.0
Vietnam	122	148	1.5	1.6
Norwegian origin	214,092	200,473	10.2	9.4
Total population	220,096	207,351	9.8	8.9

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Mortality, and *number of deaths*, also shape the demographic structure of a population. However, the number of deaths and the crude death rate are quite low in the six national groups (see Table 2.5). The main reason for this is related to age structure; Norway's immigrants are far from the ages when most deaths occur. It would have been much better to present standardised mortality rates or life expectancies to study this issue, but the number of observations is too low for most groups. One such attempt was made by Østby (2002) that showed a lower mortality rate among non-western immigrants, but a higher rate among descendants. New analyses based on better methods are under way, but they are methodologically very demanding. The difference between the crude death rates for the six groups is closely related to the differences in age structure. A special problem with mortality figures based on register data comes from the fact that some (older) migrants return to their country of origin without notifying the Norwegian authorities. Thus, immigrant mortality rates might be distorted as the result of having been calculated on the basis of incorrect numbers.

In Table 2.6, we show the *natural change* for the immigrant groups and for the population in Norway, with and without immigrants. Based on the results presented earlier in this chapter, this table presents no surprises. We can observe that most of the natural increase in the population of Norway can be attributed to growth in the immigrant population. For all six groups, and across both time periods, the crude rate of natural change (CRNC) is more than 10 per 1,000. The rate decreased from the first to the second period, due to the fact that the proportion of new arrivals within each group was declining, and their age structures were slightly maturing. The extremely high growth rate for Somali immigrants was due to high immigration and to high fertility levels related to family reunifications after a period of living apart. For all groups, we expect the crude rate of natural change to continue to decrease.

Table 2.6: Natural change and crude rate of natural change (CRNC) by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway

	Natural change		CRNC	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	794	770	13.8	10.6
Iraq	1,774	2,896	28.9	27.9
Pakistan	2,513	2,581	20.8	18.4
Somalia	2,146	3,588	39.2	37.4
Turkey	1,283	1,236	22.6	17.3
Vietnam	1,558	1,376	19.3	14.8
Norwegian origin	19,936	20,796	0.9	1
Total population	67,024	83,857	3	3.6

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

We will now focus on the contribution of immigration, emigration and net migration to the growth of the six groups (see Table 2.7). While all the groups experienced strong and persistent *immigration* to Norway during the period, their numbers decreased from 1999–2003 to 2004–2008, with the small exception of the Vietnamese group. The numbers of Vietnamese immigrants actually increased from the first to second period, but nevertheless they had the lowest rates of immigration in both periods, (This was due to the reduced possibility for families to be granted permission to join family members already in Norway). The general increase in immigration from the first to second period (indicated by the number of immigrants in the total population) was caused by increasing labour migration, in particular from Poland and the Baltic states. Immigrants arriving from Iraq and Somalia dominated the immigration inflows of the six national groups during both periods, although their numbers decreased significantly during the second period. Table 2.7 presents an interesting confirmation of the fact that high rates of immigration were followed by significantly lower rates. Standardizing for age (the SCIR) did not alter the picture.⁸

⁸ The CIR (and the age standardised variant SCIR) is not a rate in the formal sense. This is because it is calculated by dividing the number of immigrants by the number in that group already living in Norway, and not by introducing the population at risk (see Glossary of terms).

Table 2.7: Number of Immigrants, crude immigration rate (CIR) and standardised immigration rate (SCIR) by five-year period and country of origin. Norway

	Immigrants		CIR		SCIR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,959	2,441	68.7	33.6	76.3	37.3
Iraq	11,593	6,037	188.7	58.2	162.6	49.4
Pakistan	4,142	3,947	34.3	28.1	36.7	27.8
Somalia	8,029	7,054	146.7	73.6	135.4	66.5
Turkey	2,700	2,341	47.6	32.8	36.6	25.6
Vietnam	1,401	1,723	17.3	18.6	13.5	16.2
Norwegian origin	43,866	38,901	2.1	1.8	2	1.8
Total population	188,726	251,141	8.4	10.8	9.7	10.4

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

The numbers of emigrations (and emigration rates) are much lower than the numbers of immigrations, but it is still important to note that the emigrations were not insignificant for any of the groups (see Table 2.8). The numbers increased for the six countries from the first to the second period, but as the populations grow, both rates decreased. The emigration rates and numbers are declining even for the total population and for those of Norwegian origin. To find such low native emigration rates is probably rather unique in Europe. They should be understood in the context of Norway's very positive economic situation and expanding labour market (present even before the Euro crises hit the rest of Europe). By comparing immigrant emigrations with those of the total population and the Norwegian origin population, we can see that the number of immigrant emigrations was twice that of Norwegian origin persons in the second five-year period.

During the second period, the number of emigrations was higher for Somalis than for any of the other groups, and the rates remained quite high, even after standardizing for age. Although Somali refugees may not be able to return to Somalia (or may not have the will to do so), a significant number are moving to another country when they get a chance to do so. Emigration among refugees is at a surprisingly high level, with the exception of Vietnamese refugees. We are not able to discuss where these emigrants moved, as a large group of them were removed from the register through an administrative decision and not assigned any country of destination.

Table 2.8: Number of emigrants, crude emigration rate (CER) and standardised crude emigration rate (SCER) by five-year period and country of origin. Norway

	Emigrants		CER		SCER	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	864	1,026	15.0	14.1	23.7	23.7
Iraq	1,564	1,677	25.5	16.2	22.4	16.9
Pakistan	1,998	2,080	16.6	14.8	22.5	19.4
Somalia	1,541	2,430	28.2	25.4	26.0	22.4
Turkey	855	984	15.1	13.8	17.7	14.7
Vietnam	397	686	4.9	7.4	5.3	8.0
Norwegian origin	48,629	38,562	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.8
Total population	123,625	112,770	5.5	4.8	5.3	4.7

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

The *net migration* for all six groups is positive (Table 2.9) and the country has had high and increasing immigration for decades (see Figure 1.1). For the last period, net migration was positive even for the population of Norwegian origin. If data had been available for net migration by country background for all European countries, this situation would probably have been found to be quite unique. Net migration for Norway is not being dominated at present by any of the six selected countries of origin. New groups (labour migrants from EU countries) are now, and more so since 2008, taking a leading role in our net migration figures.

Table 2.9: Net migration, crude rate of change and standardised crude rate of change due to migration by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway

	Net migration		CRC		CMR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,095	1,415	67.5	30.0	53.7	19.5
Iraq	10,029	4,360	192.1	70.0	163.2	42.1
Pakistan	2,144	1,867	38.6	31.7	17.8	13.3
Somalia	6,488	4,624	157.7	85.7	118.5	48.2
Turkey	1,845	1,357	55.1	36.3	32.5	19.0
Vietnam	1,004	1,037	31.7	26.0	12.4	11.2
Norwegian origin	-4,763	339	0.7	1.0	-0.2	0.0
Total population	65,101	138,371	5.9	9.5	2.9	5.9

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Natural change is more important than net migration for both groups that are well established in Norway, and for groups with low fertility. In Table 2.10 we can see that natural increases gained in relative importance from the first to the second period for all the countries of origin except Vietnam. In the last period, natural change and net migration had a more equal contribution to total growth than in the first period, while immigration made a more important contribution than natural change to the total growth of the population during the last period.

Table 2.10: Natural change as per cent of net immigration by five-year periods and country of origin. Norway

	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	26	54
Iraq	18	66
Pakistan	117	138
Somalia	33	78
Turkey	70	91
Vietnam	155	133
Norwegian origin	-	2
Total population	103	61

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

Table 2.11 shows the *composition of the six groups by age, sex and generation*. This composition is the result of births, deaths, immigration and emigration, as earlier discussed in this chapter. The total column shows that the proportion of descendants varies around one third for all the

groups, though ranging from 17 per cent for the Iranians to 45 per cent for those of Pakistani origin. This proportion is mainly dependant on the average duration of stay (high among Pakistani and Turkey), on the number of children born (fertility rates) and on the degree of homogamous marriages (high among Pakistani immigrants, see Table 2.13). Iranians have stayed in Norway for quite some time, but have a low proportion of descendants due to low fertility rates (see Table 2.4) and more cross-national marriages than other groups (Table 2.13). The proportion of descendants was higher for Iraq and Somalia, due to higher fertility rates and to homogamous marriages (Table 2.13).

**Table 2.11: The composition of the groups and age-sex sub-groups by generation and year.
Per cent. 2008. Norway**

		Total	0–15 years	16–64 years	65 years and over
Iran					
Female	Immigrants	82	27	96	100
	Descendants	18	73	4	0
Male	Immigrants	84	27	97	100
	Descendants	16	73	3	0
Total	Immigrants	83	27	97	100
	Descendants	17	73	3	0
Iraq					
Female	Immigrants	75	37	99	100
	Descendants	25	63	1	0
Male	Immigrants	81	37	100	100
	Descendants	19	63	0	0
Total	Immigrants	78	37	100	100
	Descendants	22	63	0	0
Pakistan					
Female	Immigrants	55	10	71	100
	Descendants	45	90	29	0
Male	Immigrants	55	10	70	100
	Descendants	45	90	30	0
Total	Immigrants	55	10	71	100
	Descendants	45	90	29	0
Somalia					
Female	Immigrants	72	38	98	100
	Descendants	28	62	2	0
Male	Immigrants	74	37	98	100
	Descendants	26	63	2	0
Total	Immigrants	73	38	98	100
	Descendants	27	62	2	0
Turkey					
Female	Immigrants	62	10	83	100
	Descendants	38	90	17	0
Male	Immigrants	67	10	86	100
	Descendants	33	90	14	0
Total	Immigrants	65	10	85	100
	Descendants	35	90	15	0
Vietnam					
Female	Immigrants	67	5	86	100
	Descendants	33	95	14	0
Male	Immigrants	63	6	84	100
	Descendants	37	94	16	0
Total	Immigrants	65	5	85	100
	Descendants	35	95	15	0

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

The sex distribution among descendants should be a result of sex proportion at birth, as we have seen few signs of sex selective out-migration. But the proportion of descendants in Table 2.11 varies between men and women from different countries. This may result from the sex distribution of *immigrants*. In refugee groups, there will often be more men than women. Consequently, the proportion of descendants

will be higher among women than among men, and this phenomenon is most pronounced for Iraqis.

There is quite a difference in the age structures of immigrants and descendants for each group. All groups have a clear majority of descendants below the age of 15, from 90–95 per cent among the Vietnamese, Pakistanis and Turkish, to 62–73 per cent among the Somalis, Iraqis and Iranians. In this age, of course, there are no gender differences. Above the age of 64 we find virtually no descendants. In the group of adults (16–64), immigrants dominate among those from Iraq, Iran and Somalia, whereas the picture is more balanced, but still with a distinct majority of immigrants, among those from Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam. These patterns reflect the immigration history and demographic behaviour of these groups.

5.2.2 *Composition of the Immigrant Groups by Selected Traits*

In this section, we describe the composition of the selected immigrant groups in terms of a number of demographic variables: average duration of stay, partner background and achieved fertility at different ages. We will start with the average durations of stay, and how these changed from 1998 to 2008.

Table 2.12 shows *average durations of stay* by sex and country of birth for 1998, 2003 and 2008. During this ten-year period, the average duration of stay increased by seven years for Vietnamese immigrants (as much as 9 years for the men), meaning that this population has had only rather modest new immigration. For Iranians, Pakistanis and Turks, duration increased by five years, but for Iraqis and Somalis, only by 2–3 years. Only minor gender differences were seen, except in the case of Vietnamese immigrants. Men from Vietnam have, on average, stayed in Norway four more years than Vietnamese women (in 1998 there was only a one year difference in duration of stay between Vietnamese men and women). This is the result of women (especially elderly women) having joined their family members (often children) in Norway at a later stage. Men from Vietnam had, by 2008, the same duration of stay as Pakistani males, the group with the longest average duration of stay in Norway.

Table 2.12: Average duration of residence in years for immigrants by sex, and country of birth. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

	1998	2003	2008	Change 1998–2008
Iran				
Female	8	9	13	5
Male	9	11	14	5
Total	9	10	14	5
Iraq				
Female	5	5	8	3
Male	5	5	8	3
Total	5	5	8	3
Pakistan				
Female	13	15	18	5
Male	17	19	21	4
Total	15	17	19	4
Somalia				
Female	5	6	7	2
Male	6	6	8	2
Total	6	6	8	2
Turkey				
Female	11	13	15	5
Male	13	14	16	3
Total	12	13	16	4
Vietnam				
Female	11	14	17	6
Male	12	17	21	8
Total	12	15	19	7

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

The next table, Table 2.13, describes marriage patterns by showing the *proportion among the married who have a partner from the same country, from Norway or from a third country*. The table also gives the proportion married in each group. Numbers are given by sex and generation, but the descendants from Iran, Iraq and Somalia are too few and too young to allow for analysis. The difference between immigrants and descendants in terms of the proportion married is due to the much lower age of descendants as well as to the fact that descendants tend to marry much later than immigrants.

Table 2.13: Marriage rate and proportion among the married who have a partner from the same country, from Norway or from a third country, by country of origin, sex and generation. Per cent. 2008. Norway

Country	Sex	Generation	Partner background			Marriage rate
			Own	Norwegian	Other	
Iran	Female	Immigrants	85	8	7	51
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	77	12	12	45
		Descendants	-	-	-	1
	Total	Immigrants	81	10	9	48
		Descendants	-	-	-	1
Iraq	Female	Immigrants	96	1	4	61
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	87	4	9	52
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Total	Immigrants	91	2	6	55
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
Pakistan	Female	Immigrants	96	1	3	77
		Descendants	95	2	3	27
	Male	Immigrants	94	2	3	78
		Descendants	89	3	8	21
	Total	Immigrants	95	2	3	77
		Descendants	92	2	5	24
Somalia	Female	Immigrants	95	1	4	38
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Male	Immigrants	95	1	3	44
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
	Total	Immigrants	95	1	4	42
		Descendants	-	-	-	0
Turkey	Female	Immigrants	91	6	3	73
		Descendants	91	3	6	30
	Male	Immigrants	79	18	3	68
		Descendants	92	3	5	16
	Total	Immigrants	84	13	3	70
		Descendants	91	3	6	22
Vietnam	Female	Immigrants	87	11	3	57
		Descendants	66	24	10	3
	Male	Immigrants	95	2	3	57
		Descendants	76	14	10	2
	Total	Immigrants	91	7	3	57
		Descendants	70	20	10	2

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Marital patterns are often considered to be a good indicator of differences in integration, as the percentage of cross-national marriages is seen as an indication of the state of relations between immigrants and natives. These marital patterns should not necessarily be interpreted as a direct indicator of integration, but they do provide relevant information about integration. All groups had quite high percentages of partnerships with partners of the same group. For immigrants of Iraqi, Pakistani, Somali and Vietnamese origins, the proportion partnering within the same group (whether the partner was an immigrant in Norway before the marriage or not) was more than 90 per cent. For Pakistanis, the proportion among descendants was almost as high as among the immi-

grants, while it was much lower among descendants of Vietnamese origin. For immigrants from Iran and Turkey, the proportion was around 80 per cent.

There is, however a puzzle in this. Pakistani men may have had shorter or more stable relationships with women without immigrant backgrounds and have had children with them without marrying them. The numbers behind the rates in Table 2.13 are low, for example, only 200 Pakistani immigrants (75 per cent of them males) married persons with Norwegian origins. This is counter to counts in the population register that indicate that more than 1,000 children in 2008 had one Pakistani parent and one with a Norwegian background. Thus, there must be more Norwegian-Pakistani couples having children than the number of Norwegian-Pakistani marriages indicates.

We also note that the comparatively low proportion of intra-groups marriages among Turks comes from the fact that 18 per cent of Turk males are married to Norwegians. This is partly due to some Turk males in Norway marrying outside their group, and partly due to Norwegian women marrying men who lived in Turkey before marriage (this is clearly illustrated in Table 2.13). Thus, the relatively high proportion of male Turks with a Norwegian wife is not an indication of Turkish men in Norway finding a spouse among non-migrants (i.e., the majority with Norwegian wives immigrated to Norway for reasons related to marriage).

The majority of young people in Norway start cohabiting when they form a couple. Few natives marry without cohabiting before marriage. Cohabitation is not well addressed in the registers (Wiik, 2012), but the differences between descendants and natives are quite clear. While both groups enter their first unions at the same age, the unions of descendants tend to take the form marriage, while those of natives tend to take the form of co-habitation.

Gender differences among immigrants are of minor importance, but still interesting. Immigrant men from Iran, Iraq and Turkey marry outside their own group more often than do the women. For Somali and Pakistani immigrants, the proportion marrying within the group is very high for both sexes, whereas Vietnamese women marry outside their group more often than Vietnamese men. The small proportions of immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia who marry outside their groups prefer partners who do not have a Norwegian background. This might mean they are marrying someone with their own national background, but who was not living in Norway before the marriage. Among Iranians, Turks and Vietnamese, those finding a partner outside their own group in Norway more often find a partner with Norwegian background.

Descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry people with their own backgrounds in more or less the same proportions as the immigrants of these groups. Descendants from Vietnam, however, tend to marry people from Norway or from a third country more so than do immigrants from Vietnam. We are inclined to interpret this as a sign that Vietnamese descendants are orienting themselves outside the group of Vietnamese in Norway. The pattern among Iranians might be seen in the same way. Vietnamese descendants seem to postpone their marriage, and if they marry, they do not follow the same pattern as the immigrants of this group. Their late marriages should be understood in the context of their pattern of participation in education.

Also among the descendants, a minority who do not marry people within their group marry peoples with Norwegian or other country origins. Pakistani and Turkish descendants seem to prefer partners from a third country, whereas Vietnamese descendants prefer people of Norwegian origin. The most transnationally oriented are the Vietnamese descendants. More than 9 out of 10 descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry within their own group. This seems to be a very high number, but it might be that it might be more common for first-born descendants to marry at a younger age. Their younger brothers and sisters *might* choose differently. More recent data on marital patterns might indicate such a pattern (Henriksen, 2011).

The last “selected trait” examined here involves age specific patterns of fertility. Table 2.13 provides information on *achieved fertility at different ages*, for the periods 1999–2003 and 2004–2008. Due to their young age, no group of descendants can be followed to the end of their reproductive years. We are at best able to give a robust description of the fertility patterns of descendants with Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese background, and only for those in their twenties.

Table 2.14: Total achieved fertility rate (TFR) at age 39, 29, 24 for immigrants and descendants by five-year intervals. Norway

	1999–2003				2004–2008			
	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24	TFR	TFR39	TFR29	TFR24
Iran								
Immigrants	1.91	1.83	1.07	0.44	1.51	1.43	0.70	0.26
Descendants	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.42	0.12
Iraq								
Immigrants	4.29	4.13	2.59	1.31	3.57	3.40	2.01	0.96
Descendants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan								
Immigrants	3.40	3.33	2.24	1.15	3.18	3.10	2.05	1.04
Descendants	-	-	1.22	0.45	-	2.12	1.08	0.34
Somalia								
Immigrants	4.45	4.05	2.18	1.01	4.40	3.95	2.24	1.04
Descendants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03
Turkey								
Immigrants	2.87	2.82	2.13	1.33	2.52	2.44	1.72	1.03
Descendants	-	-	1.08	0.70	-	-	1.12	0.48
Vietnam								
Immigrants	2.31	2.23	1.36	0.63	2.07	2.00	1.17	0.50
Descendants	-	-	0.84	0.07	-	-	0.32	0.10
Natives	1.75	1.71	0.96	0.34	1.82	1.78	0.93	0.32
<i>Total</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>1.76</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>1.88</i>	<i>1.84</i>	<i>0.97</i>	<i>0.34</i>

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway.

We notice the same differences in fertility rates and fertility decline that we previously observed. The Iranians are now well below the Norwegian average, Somali and Iraqi women still have high fertility rates, and fertility rates increase more strongly with increasing age in these groups than in other nationalities. Groups with high completed fertility tend also to have the highest rates at all ages. There are still some differences. Immigrant women from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey all have around one child at age 24 (TFR 24). That number increases by 1.5 children through the rest of the reproductive period for Turks, more than 2.0 for Pakistanis, 2.5 for Iraqis and 3.4 for Somali women. Thus, it is towards the end of the reproductive period that the great differences between the different nationalities occur. This might be related to the recent arrival of some of the groups, particularly refugees from Somalia and Iraq. Women who came as refugees or reunified with a refugee (often their husbands) tend to have high fertility rates in the first few years after their arrival, and then their rates decline (Lappegård, 2000; Østby, 2002). The figures for immigrant women from Pakistan are also comparatively high. These women came from a country where the fertility decline has started only recently, they married at young ages and their labour force participation in Norway has always been low.

With respect to descendants, those of Turkish origin tend to have higher fertility rates than natives in their twenties or those from other countries. Pakistani descendants are about on par with the national level until they reach the age of thirty, and the rates of Vietnamese descendants are at a considerably lower level. The very low TFR24 for Somali descendants should be disregarded, as it only illustrates the weakness of the method. Still, we might conclude that descendant fertility rates tend to come close to the national average, at least during the first part of their reproductive years. It is too early to say whether the descendants will copy their mothers' high fertility patterns after the age of thirty. The oldest group of Pakistani descendants in both periods have somewhat higher rates than natives at the same age, but those born later tend to come close to the native fertility (TFR24 for descendants in 2004–2008, see Table 2.14).

For those groups we could compare across the two periods, we see a reduction in fertility rates for almost all immigrants and descendants, and more so for Iraqi immigrants than for the others (Table 2.1). There is less of a decrease for Somali immigrants that can be linked with high recent immigration, as mentioned above. In parallel with the substantial decrease in immigrant fertility rates, there has been a modest increase in the native total fertility rate, and in the TFR39. We still see a decrease in fertility rates during the younger ages, but we expect them to catch up. Consequently, the gap between immigrant and native fertility rates is still present, but closing. For some groups of descendants, but not for all, there the gap is small and also narrowing.

5.2.3 Summary

Unlike most Western European countries, the native population of Norway is growing, albeit at a low rate. The population of immigrants and descendants is also growing, mostly due to net immigration and to a high number of births of a rather young immigrant population. These factors contribute to Norway having one of the fastest growing populations in Europe.

Starting around 1970, the first labour migrants came from Pakistan and Turkey, as well as from other countries that have not made as prominent a numerical contribution to today's immigrant population. Then followed refugees, a few from Chile, more from Vietnam and Iran, and most recently from Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. At the moment (2012) the largest flows of refugees are coming from Somalia and Eritrea. For many years, Pakistani immigrants were the largest group in

Norway, Iraqis took over in 2004 and Somalis in 2007. Last year, immigrants from Poland became, by far, the largest group.

Descendants are defined as persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents, and their number is closely related to the duration of stay of the national group and to the fertility rates of this group (while in Norway). Immigrants from Pakistan have had comparatively high fertility levels, they do not leave the country and they have a strong tendency to marry within their group. There are twice as many descendants of Pakistani origin than of Vietnamese origin in Norway. Somalis and Iraqis show the same development as Pakistanis (but different from that of the Iranians and Vietnamese).

In some contexts, immigrants and descendants are analysed as one group. However, when conducting analyses of integration, we do not believe this is correct. Taking immigrants and descendants together, Pakistanis still rank on top, but the numbers from Somalia and Iraq are increasing faster.

During the period 1999–2008, all six national groups examined in this study grew considerably. The larger and the older groups had the lowest growth. During the first decade after the turn of the millennium, the numbers of the Iraqi and Somali groups more than doubled, due to both immigration and high numbers of births. At the start of the period, there were not many descendants from Iraq or Somalia, so the growth rates for these groups have been extremely high. During this period, the number of children born by Somali and Iraqi mothers was higher than the number born by Pakistani mothers. The total fertility rate decreased for all immigrant groups during this period. The Somalis experienced the lowest decrease in TFR (from 4.45 to 4.4). The proportion of newly arrived immigrants was very high in this group. In 2004–2008 the TFR for Iranian women was below the national level in Norway, for those from Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan it was still 2.5 to 1.3 children above the national average. It is towards the end of the reproductive years that the great differences between the different nationalities occur.

Descendants of Turkish origin tend to have higher fertility rates in their twenties than do natives or those from other countries. Pakistani descendants are around the national level until the age of 30, and the Vietnamese are at a considerably lower level. They do not follow the pattern of their mothers. For those groups of immigrants and descendants that can be compared, we see a reduction in fertility among almost all of them, but more so for Iraqi immigrants and less so for Somali. Among most groups of descendants, fertility rates tend to come close to the national average, at least during the first part of the reproductive period.

Due to the groups' age structures, both numbers of deaths and the crude death rate are very low. The crude rate of natural change is of course high, due to a young age structure and high fertility rates. All groups have had a strong and persistent *immigration* to Norway, although their numbers decreased from 1999–2003 to 2004–2008. Those arriving from Iraq and Somalia dominated in terms of size during both periods, although their numbers also experienced a sharp decrease. Numbers of *emigrations* were much lower than immigrations, but not insignificant for any of the groups. The numbers of emigrations increased from the first to the second period, but as the populations grew, the rates decreased. During the last period, the number of emigrations was higher for Somalis than for any of the other groups.

The proportion of descendants hovers around one-third for the groups, ranging from 17 per cent for the Iranians to 45 per cent for those with Pakistani origins. In refugee groups, there will often be more men than women. Consequently, the *proportion* of descendants will be higher among women than among men, and this is most pronounced for Iraqis. The sex distribution among descendants should be a result of sex proportion at birth, as we have seen few signs of sex selective out migration.

From 1998 to 2008, the average duration of stay increased by 7 years for Vietnamese immigrants (as much as 9 years for men), meaning that the population has had very modest new immigration. For Iranians, Pakistanis and Turks, immigration has been more substantial, and their duration increased by 5 years. Immigration from Iraq and Somalia has been very strong, such that their average duration of stay increased by 2–3 years.

Differences between immigrants and descendants in terms of the proportion married is due to the much lower age of the descendants, but also due to the fact that they tend to marry at a considerably higher age than immigrants. For immigrants of Iraqi, Pakistani, Somali and Vietnamese origins, the proportion partnering within their group (whether the partner was an immigrant in Norway before or after the marriage) was found to be more than 90 per cent. For Pakistanis, the proportion among descendants was almost as high as among the immigrants, while it was much lower among descendants of Vietnamese origin. For immigrants from Iran and Turkey, the proportion was around 80 per cent.

Male immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Turkey marry outside their same group more often than their female peers. The proportion of Somali and Pakistani immigrants marrying within their same group was very high for both sexes, whereas Vietnamese women marry outside the national group more often than Vietnamese men. The small proportions of immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia who marry outside their

group prefer partners without a Norwegian background. This might mean, however, that they are still marrying people with their own national background, but their partners did not live in Norway prior to marriage. Among Iranians, Turks and Vietnamese, those finding partners outside their own group in Norway more often find a partner with a Norwegian background.

Descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry within their own national group to the same extent as do immigrants from these countries, but their age at marriage is higher. Vietnamese descendants tend to marry people from Norway or from a third country more often than do immigrants from Vietnam.

5.3 Enrolment in the Educational System

We consider education to be the gateway to successful integration for immigrants. This is because education provides most young people in a society like ours a certain degree of freedom in their choice of work (and income). Immigrants live part of their lives outside Norway; the later they come to Norway, the more difficult it will be for them to progress through the educational system here. This might be due to problems with learning a new language, adapting to a completely new and foreign educational system, and/or to general difficulties with inserting oneself and being accepted in a new society. For descendants, however, who are born and raised (mostly) in the host country, such problems are not expected to arise.

In this section we describe the participation of immigrants and descendants (from the six selected countries of origin) at differing ages in Norway's education system and compare their participation rates with those of the total population. Some reflections will be given on differing tendencies in the choice of vocational training versus academic preparation at the secondary level. We also describe participation in tertiary education, and how participation patterns changed during the study's ten-year span (1998–2008). So far, Norway has not implemented a system to register the education of immigrants at time of immigration. As such, most immigrants who have arrived after 1999 and who have not taken any exams in Norway will be identified as having an "unknown" education. Consequently, we examine only *participation* in education, not *attained* education. A survey to collect information on education abroad was conducted over 2011 and 2012, and a system for registering the education of the majority of new immigrants is expected to be implemented towards the end of 2012.

5.3.1 *Enrolment in the Educational System in General*

Table 3.1 shows the educational enrolment rates for the age groups 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29. At age 6–15, we expect everyone in Norway to be in the educational system, irrespective of background. Above the age of 29, most persons will have completed their education. All observations are as of 1st October each year. We will first focus on the situation in 2008 (schooling year 2008/2009).

We notice that the *level of participation* varies much more for immigrants than for descendants, and that this is partly related to differences in duration of stay. The low level of educational activity among Somali immigrants can partly be seen as a consequence of many recent arrivals (see Table 2.3), but immigrants from Turkey are only at a slightly higher level. It might be that more immigrants from Turkey completed their education before migrating, but since we do not have registered education at the time of immigration, that hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Immigrants from Iran have by far the highest level of activity. We can see the same pattern across all three age groups. In the oldest age group (25–29), immigrants from Iran clearly have a higher participation rate than the average in Norway, whether male or female. We expect there to be a slower decline in participation rates among immigrants than among other groups because many immigrants arrive at ages when others are completing their education. Immigrants need a longer time because they need to acquire sufficient competency in Norwegian before they can successfully participate in education. We can see some signs of such a process in Table 3.1, although they are not major.

For those *descendants* that can be followed, we find that participation levels do not differ that much between nationalities, but their order of rank is very much similar to that of the immigrants. Iraqi, Iranian and Somali descendants are too young for us to be able to have information for all age groups. Again, the rates for Somali and for Turks were found to lower than the others. The other groups that we can observe all have participation rates around or above the average in Norway. This is often seen as a positive sign of integration. There is also evidence of a rapid change in the participation rates for descendants in Norway, whereby more and more groups are surpass national participation rates (Nygaard, 2011).

Female participation rates are higher than male participation rates in most groups and in the total population. Among immigrants above the age of 20, the pattern is more mixed. For descendants, the pattern is broken only above the age of 25, except in the case of young Somali descendants.

Table 3.1: Share of 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 years old immigrants and descendants enrolled in education, by sex and country of origin. Per cent. 1st October 2008. Norway

	16–19 years			20–24 years			25–29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants									
Iran	78.7	75.0	82.7	40.8	38.8	43.0	27.3	24.6	29.9
Iraq	69.5	68.7	70.5	28.8	25.6	32.6	10.0	7.8	12.7
Pakistan	68.7	66.5	70.8	25.4	28.2	23.1	11.7	14.4	9.3
Somalia	49.4	47.6	51.4	24.9	26.1	23.6	10.6	12.5	8.7
Turkey	53.3	56.4	50.0	19.6	21.2	18.0	7.2	5.2	9.5
Vietnam	66.8	61.0	72.4	39.7	37.6	35.6	13.6	15.3	12.5
Descendants									
Iran	85.4	86.1	84.6	52.9	41.7	65.6	:	:	:
Iraq	84.7	79.3	90.0	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	80.0	79.1	80.9	42.7	38.3	47.5	15.9	16.4	15.3
Somalia	68.2	71.1	65.3	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	75.0	74.7	75.3	34.1	33.5	34.7	9.5	7.6	11.5
Vietnam	88.9	86.5	91.5	57.0	55.2	58.8	23.5	24.1	22.8
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	84.4	84	84.9	45.9	40.3	51.8	18.4	16.5	20.4
Total population	83.2	82.7	83.6	43.9	38.9	49.2	17.3	15.5	19.1

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

When comparing the six countries, Turks seem to be at the lower end of the educational participation distribution. Somali descendants start at a fairly low level, but the immigrants do relatively better with age. This might be a consequence of having to take compulsory education after the age of 20. Pakistanis are also often below the immigrant average, whereas the Iranians and Vietnamese tend to have high rates across most age groups. Iraqi immigrants are often 10 percentage points below those from Iran. This difference could be related to differences in duration of stay, a hypothesis supported by the high participation rates found for Iraqi descendants.

Developments in participation rates since 1998 throw more light on these patterns (see Table 3.2). On average in Norway, participation rates were rather stable between 1998 and 2008. During this period, the labour market had been quite tight, but it was considerably tighter in

2008 than in 1998. A labour market characterized by a strong and partly unmet demand for labour will often be related to declining participation rates in education. There was a minor increase seen in the participation rates of all men aged 16 to 19, and a decrease for those above the age of 20. For all women, we saw a decrease under, and an increase above, the age of 20. For immigrants and descendants, the changes were much larger. For all groups of immigrants from Vietnam, we saw quite a large decrease, but from a comparatively high level. For Somalis, the decrease came at all ages for males, whereas females tended to keep or increase their levels of participation. Somali male immigrants had a very low participation level in 2003, and then it increased (note that this increase is not shown). This might be due to the very high proportions of recently arrived immigrants in 2003, rather than an indication of a real behavioural change. Some changes might also be the result of a change in Somali migration patterns. Before the Somali regime broke down in 1991, it was the better educated Somalis, in particular, who were emigrating.

Table 3.2: Growth in the total enrolment rate 1998–2008 by age groups, generation, sex and country of origin. Percentage points. Norway

	16–19 years			20–24 years			25–29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants									
Iran	7.1	5.9	8.5	3.4	-1.6	8.6	0.9	-3.7	5.4
Iraq	18.6	18.1	19.3	6	4.5	8.6	1.1	-1.9	6.3
Pakistan	4.7	-0.9	10.2	8.8	9.2	8.4	4.8	6	4
Somalia	1.1	-1.5	4.4	0.6	-2.3	3.9	-4.4	-9.7	-0.2
Turkey	6.7	9.5	3.7	8.8	11	6.6	2.2	-0.3	5
Vietnam	-6.8	-8.1	-6	-7.4	-5.6	-8.9	-5.4	-6.7	-3.7
Descendants									
Iran	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	6.0	6.3	5.7	4.9	0.2	10.0	-3.6	-4.7	-3.1
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	12.2	9.6	14.7	9.1	12.2	5.6	:	:	:
Vietnam	3.7	1.7	5.9	0.7	:	:	:	:	:
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	0.3	1.9	-1.3	1.5	-0.2	3.3	0.8	-0.1	1.8
Total population	0	1.3	-1.4	0.6	-0.9	2.4	0	-0.9	1.0

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway

The very high increases seen in the Iraqi rates, especially for young immigrants, were at least partly the result of changes in duration of stay. In 2008, the proportion of newly arrived immigrants was much lower than before. Still, an increase from 50 to 70 per cent is impressive. We can see a declining participation rate among immigrant men, but not among women, with the Vietnamese as an exception. This might be seen as an indication of immigrants coming closer to Nordic gender pattern the longer they stay in Norway.

We can observe a change since 1998 for only a few groups among the descendants. Turkish descendants, in particular, are approaching national levels quite quickly. This is one of the few indications seen that suggest Turks are improving their education and closing the gap with the national average.

In Table 3.3, we focus on *gender differences in educational enrolment* and how they have changed since 1998. Among young immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, almost every ratio for all three years of observation is above 1.0. This means that more women than men are enrolled at these ages. At the end of the period (2008), women had higher rates than men for all countries of origin, except Turkey. For immigrants older than 19 from Pakistan and Somalia, the female rate of enrolment was consistently lower than the male rate. The difference was quite substantial, the ratio of 0.67 means that the enrolment rate of men is 50 per cent higher than for women. The Pakistani pattern might have been influenced by the fact that immigrants arriving from Pakistan around or above the age of 20 are often coming to marry Pakistanis living in Norway. For this group, it seems more usual for men than women to engage in education. No clear age or time patterns were seen for immigrants from the other four countries of origin.

For descendants, we do not have observations for every age in every year, but those observations we have show a small female majority in education (ratios slightly above 1.0). The same situation is found in the Norwegian average. Among those of Norwegian origin, female dominance in education increases with age. The situation is not so clear, and somewhat different among descendants.

Table 3.3: The ratio of the total enrolment rate in the education of women to men of age 16–19,⁹ 20–24 and 25–29 immigrants and descendants, by country of origin. 1998–2003–2008. Norway

	16–19 years			20–24 years			25–29 years		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants									
Iran	1.07	1.08	1.10	0.85	0.98	1.11	0.87	1.11	1.22
Iraq	1.01	1.19	1.03	1.14	1.09	1.27	0.60	0.87	1.63
Pakistan	0.90	0.98	1.06	0.77	0.70	0.82	0.62	0.76	0.64
Somalia	0.95	0.96	1.08	0.69	0.61	0.90	0.40	0.55	0.70
Turkey	0.98	0.97	0.89	1.12	1.00	0.85	0.82	1.22	1.83
Vietnam	1.13	1.07	1.19	0.98	0.81	0.90	0.74	0.82	0.82
Descendants									
Iran	:	1.02	0.98	:	:	1.57	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	1.13	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	1.03	1.07	1.02	0.98	1.14	1.24	0.86	0.96	0.93
Somalia	:	:	0.92	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	0.93	1.05	1.01		0.96	1.07			0.95
Vietnam	1.01	1.04	1.06	:	0.96	1.07	:	:	0.95
Norwegian origin	1.05	1.04	1.01	1.2	1.24	1.29	1.12	1.13	1.24
Total population	1.04	1.04	1.01	1.18	1.21	1.26	1.1	1.12	1.23

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

5.3.2 Enrolment in Tertiary Education

Table 3.4 focuses on the *enrolment of 20–24 and 25–29 year olds in tertiary education*. The majority of those enrolled in education at this age will be in tertiary education (compare Tables 3.1 and 3.4). However, there are low rates for Somalis in Table 3.4, but not in Table 3.1. That means that among Somali immigrants enrolled in education at ages 20 and above, a relatively large proportion is still attending secondary education. The enrolment rates of immigrants from Turkey aged 20 and above are also rather low, but for them, this does not imply the same delay as among Somalis.

The gender gap seen in table 3.4 is very much the same as that in Table 3.1. The tertiary education enrolment rates of male immigrants from Pakistan and Vietnam, aged 20–24 and 25–29, are higher than their female peers. We find the opposite situation for all the other groups, except for Somalis aged 25–29 and Turks aged 20–24. For the groups of descendants we can observe, descendants of Pakistani and Vietnamese background show a small male majority among students aged 25–29. Between the

⁹ The ratio is calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. A ratio below 1 means that the male enrolment rate is higher than that of females. A ratio above 1 means the enrolment rate of women is higher than that of men.

ages of 20 and 24, the female participation rate is clearly higher than the male rate, for the total population and for most of the descendant groups. While the Norwegian media often gives the impression that the enrolment rates of female descendants are much higher than the male rates, Table 3.4 shows that the gender difference is actually less among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin.

There are large differences in the levels of enrolment between the country groups. Immigrant males from Vietnam and Iran are above the national male average in Norway, all female immigrants except Iranians of age 25–29 are below. Two groups in particular, immigrants from Turkey and Somalia, are well below the national average. The low rate for Somalis, with their recent immigration history, is easier to understand than the low rate for the Turks.

Table 3.4: The share of 20–24 and 25–29 years old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin. Per cent. 1st October 2008. Norway

	20–24 years			25–29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants						
Iran	29.6	26.6	32.9	27.3	24.6	29.9
Iraq	13.8	11.0	17.2	10.0	7.8	12.7
Pakistan	19.5	21.9	17.6	11.7	14.6	9.3
Somalia	9.1	8.3	10.2	3.7	4.9	2.5
Turkey	12.8	13.4	12.2	5.2	3.6	7.0
Vietnam	27.4	29	26.2	11.3	13.6	9.8
Descendants						
Iran	44.1	33.3	56.3	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	36.0	30.8	41.6	14.2	14.8	13.5
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	23.7	21.4	26.0	8.1	6.5	9.8
Vietnam	49.5	44.5	54.6	20.7	21.8	19.5
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	35.5	27.9	43.5	16.2	13.9	18.5
Total population	33.7	26.7	40.9	15.0	13.0	17.0

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

For those descendants that we are able to observe, we see that the differences in enrolment rates between the nationalities are less significant than among the immigrants themselves. Most groups, male as well as female, are well above the national average for their age group. Again, Turkey descendants provide the only major exception. Their enrolment rate was increasing before 2008, and as we have seen in later statistics, their gap with the national average is closing quickly.

The gender gap is high in the Norwegian national average. In the case of descendants and immigrants the gap is generally less pronounced, although it varies between the six nationalities of interest to this study.

Table 3.5 shows *growth in tertiary education enrolment rate* between 1998 and 2008, for those between 20 and 30 years of age. The participation rates of most groups of immigrants and descendants increased during the time period. The same can be seen on a modest scale for the national average, but this was due only to an increase in female participation rates. For immigrants from Vietnam, we register a modest decline in the rates for those at the beginning and the end of their twenties. The level is quite high, but other groups (Iranians, for example) are at a higher level, and their rates continue to increase. Thus, it seems difficult for us see this as an indication that the groups might have reached some kind of “mature” level of participation. For Iranian immigrants, the increase was particularly evident among women, and both descendants and immigrants of Iranian origin have reached levels above the Norwegian average. The difference in level and growth between Iranians and Iraqis is strong and seems to be increasing, not decreasing as we could have expected from their immigration history. Even though the increases in participation in tertiary education were strong among most groups, Table 3.4 reminds us that there still is a wide gap between the participation rates of many groups of immigrants and the national average.

Table 3.5: Growth in the share of 20–24 and 25–29 years-old immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education, by sex and country of origin, from 1998 to 2008. Percentage points. Norway

	20–24 years			25–29 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants						
Iran	8.3	-1.0	17.9	6.0	1.3	10.6
Iraq	5.9	4.4	8.4	2.5	1.5	3.8
Pakistan	12.8	13.5	12.4	6.3	7.6	5.4
Somalia	4.3	2.7	6.4	-0.4	-3.5	2.0
Turkey	8.0	9.1	6.9	2.7	0.5	5.2
Vietnam	-0.7	1.9	-3	-1.0	-2.3	0.9
Descendants						
Iran	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	14.3	7.7	21.5	2.0	4.3	-0.1
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	9.0	13.2	4.2	:	:	:
Vietnam	18.2	:	:	:	:	:
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	1.4	-1.2	4.2	1.9	0.6	3.1
Total population	0.8	-1.6	3.3	1.1	0	2.2

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

The descendants are so young that we can register changes in their rates between 1998 and 2008 only for those of Pakistani origin and for the youngest age group from Turkey and Vietnam. The increase among 20–24 year olds has been astonishing, and brought those from Pakistan and

Vietnam to levels at or above the Norwegian average, whereas descendants with a background from Turkey still have a way to go, but the gap seems to be closing. Among descendants of Pakistani origin, the participation rate doubled from 1998 to 2008, to a level corresponding with popular statements that young Pakistani descendant women will be the new leaders of this group. Among descendants aged 25–29, we can calculate changes only for those with Pakistani origins. The increase for that age group has been quite modest, but with the strong increase seen in their early twenties, one could expect the increase to continue as they age. The growth seen in Table 3.5 also shows that that growth in education enrolment rates can also come for rather mature immigrant groups. It will take time before immigrants and descendants reach the same level of education as the natives, but we can see that many (but not all) groups are on their way to achieving this goal.

In Table 3.6 we have calculated the *ratios of enrolment rates for women to men in tertiary education*, for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. Based on the pattern exhibited by the total population and natives, we can see that there is a strong gender imbalance in enrolment rates, women are more often enrolled than men and the differences increase with time and diminish by age.

Table 3.6: The ratio of the enrolment rate of women to men in tertiary education of 20–24 and 25–29 year old immigrants and descendants, by country of origin. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

	20–24 years			25–29 years		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants						
Iran	0.54	1.02	1.24	0.67	0.71	1.18
Iraq	1.33	1.76	1.56	0.58	1.63	1.22
Pakistan	0.62	0.68	0.8	0.39	0.59	0.58
Somalia	0.68	0.67	1.23	0.06	0.39	0.51
Turkey	1.23	1.43	0.91	0.58	1.28	1.94
Vietnam	1.07	0.85	0.9	0.56	0.76	0.72
Descendants						
Iran	:	:	1.69	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	0.91	1.18	1.35	1.3	0.91	0.91
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	2.65	2.08	1.21	:	0.5	1.51
Vietnam	:	1.16	1.23	:	:	0.89
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	1.35	1.43	1.56	1.16	1.16	1.33
Total population	1.33	1.4	1.53	1.13	1.15	1.31

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

The main aspects of the pattern seen for the majority can be observed among immigrants and descendants, albeit with some differences. In 2008, for example, only a few of the countries had a majority of female

immigrants in university, those from Iran and Iraq in both age groups, Somalis in the youngest one, and Turks in the older age group. The differences fluctuated between the observation years, probably due to the small size of the groups being observed. In 1998, there was a clear male majority among immigrants aged 25 to 29 in all the national groups, but this tendency decreased the longer the groups were in Norway. It is quite surprising to notice that the highest female majority in university among students aged 25 to 29 was among immigrants from Turkey.

Descendants do not show a very regular pattern, due also to stochastic variation in small groups. There was a female majority found in all the younger and more numerous groups after 1998. The difference varied from country to country and from year to year, but the average resembled the Norwegian national average. For the older group, four of the six observations show a male majority. This can be related to the later re-entry of some male descendants into education.

5.3.3 *Enrolment in Academically Oriented Courses*

In Table 3.7, we focus on the *proportion enrolled in academically oriented courses* at the secondary level. While there is always a possibility for change, this proportion is a fairly good indicator of the share of the population preparing themselves for academic studies after completing secondary education. For most immigrants and descendants, and in the case of the total population, it is more common for girls than boys to prepare for academic studies. Generally, girls do much better in school than boys, and at the same time their choice of vocational courses might be considered to be more limited. For immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam, the share in academically oriented courses is well above the national average. The same goes for descendants from Iraq, and from Pakistan and Somalia. This is another indication that the preferences of Pakistanis are moving towards a more academic orientation than seen before. The number of Somali descendants in academically oriented classes is quite low; they are the children of the first Somali immigrants to Norway. Still, this is a sign that those born in Norway of Somali parents do not follow the pattern as their immigrant parents, as shown in this table. The share of Somali boys enrolled in academically oriented programs was more than 50 per cent above the national male average. We notice that the shares for the total population and those of Norwegian origin are the same, meaning that those with and without immigrant backgrounds have the same share enrolled in academic programs.

Table 3.7: Share of 16–19 year old immigrants and descendants enrolled in academically oriented programs, by sex and country of origin 1st October 2008, and enrolment growth rate 1998–2008. Per cent. Norway

	Share 2008			Growth 1998–2008		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants						
Iran	45.7	39	53	-3.7	-8.2	-1.4
Iraq	29.2	26.4	53.7	-0.8	-0.9	-0.6
Pakistan	37.9	36	39.8	4.0	-3.2	11.2
Somalia	24.4	22.3	26.6	0.2	-1.9	2.4
Turkey	21.8	23.9	19.6	2.6	8.9	-3.5
Vietnam	42.0	37.4	46.5	3.9	0.5	7.2
Descendants						
Iran	59.1	60.1	58.0	:	:	:
Iraq	47.5	41.4	53.3	:	:	:
Pakistan	48.5	45.9	51.2	5.1	3.4	7.0
Somalia	51.3	55.7	46.9	:	:	:
Turkey	35.5	30.6	40.6	14.4	14.3	14.8
Vietnam	52.7	49.4	56.5	-2.9	-4.2	1.1
Norwegian origin	40.0	34.2	46.2	0.4	-0.3	1.3
Total population	39.9	34.3	45.8	0.4	-0.3	1.3

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

The growth in these shares from 1998 to 2008 can be estimated only for three groups of descendants, and the growth differs between them. An increasing proportion of immigrants from Pakistan (girls) and Vietnam as well as descendants from Pakistan, and in particular from Turkey, are enrolled in academically oriented programs. Turks, both immigrants and descendants, have not been very active in academic educations for a long time; our observation might be a sign of a change in this situation. The national total had almost the same share in 1998 as in 2008.

In Table 3.8 we study the *share enrolled in vocational training*. Normally, we find students in their late teens in vocational training, and so we put most on emphasis on this age group. Differences in shares for the total population across the Scandinavian countries might be a result of differences in the school systems, although the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) codes are supposed to take care of these. The differences between the countries of origin are much less than for academic orientations (Table 3.7), but the share of Vietnamese immigrants in vocational training is clearly lower than those of the other groups. Contrary to the previous table, there is a male dominance in almost every group, and it is stronger among those of Norwegian origin, than among any other group. The share for both sexes, taken together, shows the dominance of academic orientation among all descendant groups, except those of Turkish origin. With respect to immigrants, par-

ticipation in vocational courses is more frequent among immigrants from Iraq and Turkey than among the other groups.

Table 3.8: Share of 16–19 and 20–24 year old male and female immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational education (ISCED 3C and 4C), by country of origin. Per cent. 1st October 2008. Norway

	16–19 years			20–24 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants						
Iran	28.6	33.4	23.3	6.3	8.2	4.1
Iraq	38.7	40.9	35.9	11.2	10.9	11.5
Pakistan	27.4	29.1	25.9	3.8	4.4	3.4
Somalia	23.8	24.6	22.9	10.9	12.9	8.4
Turkey	28.4	28.2	28.6	4.9	6	3.8
Vietnam	19.6	21.1	18.1	7.6	8.2	7.2
Descendants						
Iran	21.8	22.5	21.0	5.9	5.6	6.3
Iraq	32.2	34.5	30	:	:	:
Pakistan	24.6	27.9	21.3	4.1	4.6	3.5
Somalia	13.8	14.4	13.3	:	:	:
Turkey	35.8	41.9	29.4	8.8	10.9	6.6
Vietnam	28.6	31.1	25.7	5.9	8.4	3.3
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	40.2	47.3	32.7	8.6	10.7	6.5
Total population	39.1	45.8	32	8.3	10.3	6.3

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

For the group aged 20 to 24, the rates are much lower, and closer to the Norwegian average. For some newly arrived groups, particularly those from Iraq and Somalia, the share at age 20–24 is quite high. Newly arrived immigrants will often have a delayed educational career, as we can trace here. There is a gender difference for all groups, more boys than girls, whether of immigrant origin, or not are in vocational training. The differences, however, are quite small for descendants.

The growth from 1998 to 2008 in the share enrolled in vocational training differs quite a bit for the groups (Table 3.9). The total population shows very stable shares, and with an increase in enrolment rates for men but not for women. Immigrants from Iraq, in particular, have seen a strong increase among 16–19 year olds, related to an increase in their average duration of stay. Even Iranian immigrants have experienced a clear increase among their younger members. Young immigrants from Vietnam have had a strong decrease in the share participating in vocational training, across both age groups. Other immigrants had small changes. The changes in enrolment rates in vocational training in Table 3.9 are, for many groups, larger than the changes seen with respect to academically oriented programs (see Table 3.7). For descendants, we can observe a decline in vocational training for the younger age groups from Turkey. This has to be seen in relation to the strong in-

crease for Turkish descendants in academically oriented programs we observed in Table 3.7. Pakistani and Vietnamese descendants at age 20–24 have declining rates in vocational training, but as we remember from Table 3.8, the level is quite low at this age.

Table 3.9: Growth 1998–2008 in the share of 16–19 and 20–24 year old male and female immigrants and descendants enrolled in vocational education, by country of origin. Percentage points. Norway

	16–19 years			20–24 years		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Immigrants						
Iran	8.8	12.1	5.0	-0.9	1.4	-3.4
Iraq	18.9	18.2	19.6	4.2	2.3	6.6
Pakistan	-0.6	1.4	-3.4	-1.5	-0.8	-2.0
Somalia	0	0.1	0.2	-1.6	-1.6	-1.8
Turkey	2.5	-1.9	6.7	0.7	1.0	0.4
Vietnam	-12.5	-8.6	-16.1	-3.7	-9.8	-2.4
Descendants						
Iran	:	:	:	:	:	:
Iraq	:	:	:	:	:	:
Pakistan	-2.1	0.4	-4.6	-5.0	-5.1	-5.0
Somalia	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	-4.4	-6.2	-3.2	1.9	4.3	-0.7
Vietnam	1.9	2.3	1.1	-6.6	-4.1	-9.2
<i>Norwegian origin</i>	-0.5	2.0	-3.1	0.6	1.2	0.1
Total population	-0.8	1.4	-3.2	0.4	0.9	0

Source: Education statistics, Statistics Norway.

5.3.4 Summary

Education is the gateway to successful integration for immigrants, since education provides most young people in Scandinavia with a certain degree of freedom in their choice of work (and income). In this section we have reviewed the participation of selected immigrants and descendant groups in Norway's education system.

Participation levels vary much more for *immigrants* than for *descendants*, partly due to differences in duration of stay. The low level of educational activity among Somali immigrants can partly be seen as a consequence of many recent arrivals. Immigrants from Iran have by far the highest level of activity. In the oldest age groups, both sexes have higher participation rates than the Norwegian averages. Where their numbers were sufficient enough to analyse, descendant participation levels differed less between nationalities. Again, the rates for Turks were lower than the other groups. The other groups all have participation rates around or above the Norwegian average. In most groups, including the Norwegian totals, female participation rates were higher than the male rates. Among

immigrants above the age of 20, the pattern was more mixed. For descendants, this pattern was broken only after the age of twenty-five.

The gender differences found in educational enrolments were interesting, and we have also shown how these differences changed between 1998 and 2008. Among immigrants aged 16–19 from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, almost every female/male ratio was above 1.0. That means that more women than men were enrolled in education. At the end of the period (2008), women had higher rates than men for all countries of origin, except Turkey. The female rate of enrolment was consistently lower than the male rate for immigrants over the age of 19 from Pakistan and Somalia. The Pakistani pattern might be connected with the fact that immigrants arriving from Pakistan, aged around or above 20, often come to marry Pakistanis already living in Norway. For most groups of descendants there was a small female majority in education, as per the Norwegian average.

The majority of those enrolled in education at the ages of 20–24 and 25–29 were in tertiary education. However, a large proportion of Somali immigrants in these age groups were still in secondary school. The enrolment rates of Turkish immigrants, aged 20 and above, were also rather low, but for them, this does not imply the same delay as among Somalis.

We found the gender gap in tertiary education to be very much the same as that found in secondary education. Also in tertiary education, the enrolment rates for immigrants were higher for men than for women from Pakistan and Vietnam. We found the opposite situation for most other groups. Due their small numbers, our study of descendants in this area was limited. We did find that descendants of Pakistani and Vietnamese background, in the age group 25–29, show a small male majority. Between the ages of 20 and 24, the female participation rate was clearly higher than the male rate. The gender difference was smaller among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin.

Immigrant males from Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam had higher participation rates between the ages of 25 and 29 than the Norwegian national male average, while all female immigrants except Iranians aged 25–29 had a lower rate than the national female average. Two groups in particular, immigrants from Turkey and Somalia, were well below the national average.

Again, for the descendants that we could observe, we saw that the differences in enrolment rates between nationalities were less significant than those we saw among immigrants. Most groups, male as well as female, were well above the national average for their age group, with Turkish descendants being the only major exception. The gender gap is high in the Norwegian national average, for the descendants and immigrants it is generally less pronounced, and there is variation among nationalities.

Most immigrant groups and descendants experienced an increased rate of participation in education in between 1998 and 2008. For the descendants we could follow, only some groups experienced changes during the decade. The increases seen among the 20–24 year olds were astonishing; they brought those from Pakistan and Vietnam to levels at or above the Norwegian average, whereas descendants with a background from Turkey still have a way to go.

Throughout the decade, for both the total population and natives, we observed a strong gender imbalance in enrolment rates for tertiary education. Women were more often enrolled than men, but the differences increased with time and decreased with age. The pattern of the majority can be observed among immigrants and descendants as well, but some differences are apparent. It was quite surprising to note that we found Turkish immigrants to have had the highest female majority at university among students aged 25 to 29.

Those with and without immigrant backgrounds had the same proportion enrolled in academic programs at the secondary level. For most immigrant and descendant groups, and for the national total, it is more common for girls than for boys to prepare for academic studies. Immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam had the greatest shares of all groups in academically oriented courses, at rates well above the national average. The same goes for descendants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. This provided another indication that more Pakistanis are pursuing academic schooling than previously was the case. The number of Somali descendants is quite low. Still, the evidence offers a sign that those born in Norway to Somali parents do not follow the pattern of their parents in their preference for academic training. The share of Somali boys enrolled in academically oriented programs was more than 50 per cent above the national average for boys.

The differences between countries of origin in the share enrolled in vocational training were much less than for academic orientations, but the share in vocational training among Vietnamese immigrants was clearly lower than the others. Males dominate in almost every group, and the tendency is stronger among those of Norwegian origin than among any other group.

5.4 Labour Market Integration

5.4.1 *Introduction*

The goal of integration policies is to see immigrants well established in the labour market (NOU, 2011: 7 and 14). And the labour market situation of descendants is seen as the litmus test of these policies. Good performance in the educational system is a prerequisite for successful labour market integration, yet success in education alone will probably not be seen as enough for successful integration. Thus, in this section we study the employment patterns of the different groups of immigrants and descendants and compare them with national employment patterns. Unemployment is also described. To be unemployed means that there is an interest to be employed, and attempts to enter the labour market will be carried out. Worse off are those who are not active in any economic meaning of the word, not in education, not in work and not unemployed. In our presentation, we will also give this group certain attention. This group is often not identified in labour market analyses, but the register statistical system present in Scandinavian countries gives us a basis for such analyses. When we compare our results based on register data and on survey data, we find the latter to be richer in variables. However, due to the presence of high and selective non-responses, the usefulness of these surveys is limited for labour market analyses and the comparison of migrant workers.

The labour market situation of immigrants has been included in register-based labour market statistics since the “new” flows of immigration started in the early 1970ies. Labour migrants had high employment rates during their first years in the country, but in jobs that had low or no requirements for formal education or qualifications. These were often physically quite demanding jobs, and they were quite marginal in the Norwegian labour market. As the number of such jobs decreased, not everyone who had been made redundant had easy access to jobs in the more modern and qualification driven segments of the labour market that were expanding. Consequently, employment rates decreased for many groups. After the immigration ban was made permanent in 1975, the inflow of new labour migrants was halted, but family members (most often wives and minor children) were allowed to enter. Understandably, the labour force participation rate for these women was quite low. They came from countries with no tradition of females working in a modern labour market, to Nordic countries with among the highest female labour force participation rates in the world.

A further contribution to the declining immigrant employment rate was made by refugees, who have had an increasing significance in Norway since the late 1970ies. Refugees from Asia and Africa often had traumatic background, and their qualifications were not well matched with our labour market requirements, and often they were not recognised at all. It took time to acquire a working level knowledge of the Norwegian language, and these groups of refugees had low employment rates. It was probably not fully understood that these low rates were partially related to duration of stay. In 1990, the employment rates for Vietnamese immigrants were even lower than the Somali rate for 2011. but they are now well above the average for Asian immigrants.

5.4.2 *Employment Rates 1998–2008*

In all figures, we give employment rates for men and women separately. The gender differences are basic, and should be possible to study everywhere. Figure 4.1 presents the employment rate for female immigrants and for the total population. The age group highlighted is 25–54, the core age for labour force participation. Levels of participation are very high in the Scandinavian countries, compared to the rest of Europe. It is difficult for groups immigrating for other purposes than work to reach these levels, anywhere in Europe (OECD, 2012). More than 80 per cent of women aged 25–54 are employed in Norway, this per cent is 15–20 per cent above the level of Vietnamese and Iranian women. Both groups consist mainly of refugees and their family members, and they resided in Norway for quite some time. Their educational backgrounds (from their home countries) differ; they range from very low in the case of the Vietnamese to comparatively high in the case of Iranians (Blom and Henriksen, 2009). Immigrants from Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan are 40–50 percentage points below the Norwegian female average in employment rates. Pakistani immigrants are the oldest immigrant group in Norway, but the employment rate among women from Pakistan is still very low. Immigrant women from Somalia have an employment rate almost 60 percentage points below the average in Norway. This can partly be attributed to their recent arrival, but strong efforts will be needed to bring them to the level of the Vietnamese women.

Figure 4.1: Employment rate for female immigrants aged 25–54, by country of birth, and the total female population. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

We can see a systematic increase of between 10 and 20 percentage points for all groups between 1998 and 2008. The increase among Pakistani women is on par with the Norwegian average of 10 percentage points, the increases for the other groups fall somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent. As the proportion of newly arrived immigrants decreases, Iraqi women show a very positive development. The strong increase in employment for all groups is closely related to and increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market.

In Figure 4.2, we have the corresponding rates for men. For the total population, male rates are slightly higher than female rates. The differences between activity rates for male immigrants and the male total are lower than between female immigrants and the female total. Again, Somali immigrants are in the lower end, for males, 40 percentage points below the average. The rest are between 15 and 30 percentage points below the national average. An employment level around 60 per cent is not too bad from a comparative perspective, we can even find countries in Europe with a national average at that level (Eurostat, 2012).

Men had substantially higher employment rates than women in all the immigrant groups examined. In the national average, the difference is only 5 per cent. As with many other social indicators, however, the gender difference is pretty small among Iranians (Blom and Henriksen, 2009), less than 10 percentage points. The difference between male and female employment rates was, at the maximum, almost 40 percentage points, for Pakistanis. For men as well as for women the rates are lower

for Somalis than for any other group. The rates indicate that large numbers of Somali families are without any earned income, meaning that they are more likely to be living in poverty (Henriksen *et al.*, 2011).

Figure 4.2: Employment rate for male immigrants aged 25–54 by country of birth, and the total male population. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

For the total population, growth in male employment since 1998 was not as strong as for females. Still, there was a consistent increase for all groups, in particular among Iraqi immigrants, where employment has increased with duration of stay. Also for the well-established group of Pakistani men, the increase has been substantial. Their level is close to the level of Vietnamese men, but Pakistani female immigrants had only half the employment rate of Vietnamese-origin women.

The *gender employment gap* (Figure 4.3) is only 5 per cent for the total population, much lower than for most of the immigrant groups. Immigrants from Iran and Vietnam, however, had a gap not very much wider than that in 2008 (8 per cent). Iraq, Somalia and Turkey had a gap of 20 per cent, and the Pakistani gap was twice that level. The gender gap was rather stable for the period, all countries taken together, albeit, closing for Vietnamese and widening for Iraqis.

Figure 4.3: Gender gap in the employment rate for male immigrants by country of birth and total population, ages 25–54. Percentage points. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

5.4.3 Employment of Young People 1998–2008

We are able to compare the young immigrants and young descendants of some groups, and for more groups in 2008 than for the two preceding years of observation. Comparing Figure 4.1 with Figure 4.4, we can observe that the differences between countries of origin are smaller for those aged 16 to 24-years-old than for adults. Immigrant females aged 16–24 from Somalia had an employment rate of 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference was almost 60 percentage points for adults (Figure 4.1). The other groups lie between 20 percentage points below the national average. Young Vietnamese immigrant women are at the same level as the national average. Despite their successful participation in education, Pakistani women are still well below the national average. All groups and the total population saw a strong increase in employment rates from 1998 to 2008, Iraqi female immigrants, from 10 to 40 per cent.

Figure 4.4: Employment rate for female immigrants by country of birth, and the total female population, ages 16–24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

For young *male immigrants* (Figure 4.5), the employment rate was between 50 to 60 per cent for all groups in 2008, except, again, for Somalis. They had only half that level of employment. There was a strong increase of around 20 percentage points in the rates of male immigrants aged 16 to 24 from some groups, and in particular those from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, between 1998 and 2008. Even for the total population, the increase has been around 15 percentage points. This could be related to the strong and increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market during this time period.

The *gender gap* (not shown) is much smaller than in the prime working ages, and it is close to zero for the total population aged 16 to 24, and for immigrants from Vietnam and Iran. It appears then, that as immigrants age their employment rates approach the Norwegian average.

Figure 4.5: Employment rate for male immigrants by country of birth, and the total male population, ages 16–24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

Turning to descendants, we have enough observations for those with Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese background to look at the same issues for all three years. For Iranian and Somali descendants, we can make observations only for 2008, and we do not have enough descendants from Iraq to provide any rates. The level for the total population of women 16–24 years of age was around 65, slightly below the rate for descendants from Vietnam (Figure 4.6). All groups of female descendants lie above or well above the level of immigrants of the same age (compare Figure 4.6 to 4.4). Those groups with high immigrant employment rates also have slightly higher descendant employment rates, while those with low immigrant employment rates also have considerably higher descendant employment. Somali female descendants had the lowest level, but with an employment rate of 50 per cent they do almost as well as other descendants in the labour market. The increases seen for descendants aged 16–24 between 1998 and 2008 were not as pronounced as those seen for the same aged immigrants. However, the increase seen for descendants from Vietnam and Pakistan was significant, while the rates for Turkish descendants remained stable, but high.

Figure 4.7 gives the *employment rates for male descendants aged 16–24*. None of the nationalities reached the same level as the national average for men 16–24 (65 per cent); in 2008 all five nationalities had employment rates around 55–60 per cent. Remarkably, there is virtually no difference between male descendants aged 16 to 24 from these five countries. The

rates for 2008 are higher than for the previous years, with strongest increase for Vietnamese descendants, who had very low employment in 1998.

The very positive development which occurred in the Norwegian labour market during this time could be the reason for the increases seen in almost all the employment rates as well as important for evening out the differences seen between the different countries of origin.

Figure 4.6: Employment rate for female descendants of immigrants by parents' country background, ages 16–24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

Figure 4.7: Employment rate for male descendants of immigrants by parents' country background, ages 16–24. Per cent. 1998, 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

5.4.4 Employment by Cohort 1998–2008

Some of the differences seen between 1998 and 2008 could be the result of a change in the composition of the country groups. Young adult immigrants who came from Somalia in 1998, for example, had differing experiences in their home country than those arriving in 2008. That is, the selection processes for Somalis might have changed. To reduce that problem, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show employment rates on a cohort basis. We start with immigrants aged 25 to 39 in 1998, and follow them through to the ages of 30 to 44 in 2003, and up to the ages of 35 to 49 in 2008. The groups would have been, of course, subject to some immigration and out-migration over the time period, but the approach provides us a simple way to see the development of the groups from a differing perspective.

The *employment rate for women in Norway* aged 25–39 in 1998 increased by 14 percentage points to 2008, when they were 35–49 years of age (Figure 4.8). This increase is partly related to improvements in the Norwegian labour market, but changes over the years in the ages of the women's youngest child and in family care responsibilities are probably more important. Norwegian family policy has as a goal making it possible to combine work and family (Lappegård, 2010). Any effects of such a policy should be easiest to spot for the age group under consideration.

By this time, many of the women had left their childbearing period and returned to (or entered) the labour market. The same process is of course taking place among immigrants. As we could expect by now, the

increase in employment rate was strong and the gap with the national average was closing for immigrant women from Vietnam and Iran. Iraqi women also had a larger increase larger in employment than the national average, but they started from a very low level. For immigrant women from Pakistan, Turkey and Somalia, the gap was widening, even though we can observe an increase of around 10 per cent. That increase might be a result of the immigrant women from these countries having larger families, and the fact that their fertility towards the end of their reproductive period is relatively high (see comments to Table 2.13). For the Somali, immigration in this age group has been high, making increasing labour participation more difficult.

Figure 4.8: Employment rate among female immigrants by country of origin, and total female population, age 25–39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008. Per cent. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

For men (Figure 4.9) we can also see an increase in employment from year to year, but not on the level of the women. Men in the total population had an increase of around 10 per cent, from below 80 to close to 90 per cent. The gap was narrowed for men from Iraq and Iran, but not for the rest. For most groups, we can see an increase in employment rates from 1998 to 2003 and further to 2008, with the exception of Somali men. High immigration from Somalia throughout the period might be related to that reduction. The difference between employment rates for men, in general, was clearly less than the difference for women.

Figure 4.9: Employment rate among male immigrants by country of origin, and the total male population, age 25–39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008. Per cent. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

As previously noted, the gender gap is high for some countries, but not for all. When comparing Figures 4.8 and 4.9, we can supplement the comments we provided for Figure 4.3. Even when we follow the same cohort from 1998 to 2008, the Pakistani gender gap is still 40 percentage points, and stable. Iraq, Somalia and Turkey have half that level, with only minor changes during the observation period. For the Vietnamese, the gap has been reduced to 10 percentage points. For the total population, the gap was reduced from 8 to 4 percentage points, and for Iranians almost the same, from 11 to 6. This means that the picture given by comparing cross-sectional data for 25–54 year olds is the same as the one given by the cohort approach for 25–39 olds in 1998 for all groups with a high gender gap in that year. For all groups with a wide gender gap in 1998, it seems that the gap has been quite robust. It only reduced significantly for the Vietnamese. Those with the narrowest gender gap, the total population and the Iranians, show closing gender gaps for the 25–39 cohort, but not in comparisons of cross-sectional data for persons aged 25–54.

For descendants, we can produce such numbers only for those of Pakistani origin. The gender gap for Pakistani immigrants was 40 per cent throughout the period. For descendants 25–39 years of age in 1998, the gap decreased by 13 percentage points between 1998 and 2008 (from 20 to “only” 7 percentage points). Thus, Pakistani descendants do not seem to copy the gender employment pattern of their parents’ genera-

tion. For both men and women the employment rates (employed as per cent of the total population, not of the labour force) for this cohort were only 2–4 percentage points below the national average.

In a situation with almost full employment, as in Norway, unemployment figures do not have the same meaning as in countries without almost full employment. There are, however, some aspects of the unemployment pattern that are worth noticing. Unemployment in Norway is traditionally among the lowest in Europe, and the *unemployment rate for women* was under 2 per cent in 2008 (Figure 4.10). In 2003 it was 2.5 per cent. In 1998, unemployment was not included in the register, and we are not able to include that year in these kinds of tables. For immigrant women, unemployment was several times higher, but still no higher than between 5 and 10 per cent. The unemployment level was lower for most groups in 2008 than in 2003.

Figure 4.10: Unemployment rate for female immigrants by country of birth, and the total female population, ages 25–54. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

The *male unemployment rate* (Figure 4.11) was close to the female rate, but for immigrant men from Somalia had higher unemployment rates than their female counterparts. We take this as a sign that they were trying to enter the labour market after finalising their Introduction Programme (Enes and Henriksen, 2012). Somali men have lower employment rates than most other groups after having finalised that programme, and as we can see, higher unemployment. For the other nationalities, gender differences are minor, and Pakistani men are below the level of Pakistani

women. The unemployment rate decreased for all groups, most notably for Iraqis and Vietnamese, between 2003 and 2008.

Figure 4.11: Unemployment rate for male immigrants by country of birth, and the total male population, ages 25–54. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

In a country like Norway with high rates of participation in education for teenagers and persons in their early twenties, *youth unemployment rates* will be low. For women of age 16–24, the unemployment rate (see Figure 4.12) was only 1.5 per cent for the total population in 2008. This rates was several times higher for immigrants, but was still only between 3 and 5 per cent. The differences between the countries of origin are minor, and all rates were lower in 2008 than in 2003.

Figure 4.12: Unemployment rate for female immigrants by country of birth and the total female population, ages 16–24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

The *unemployment rate for young men* (see Figure 4.13) was for the total population slightly higher (2 per cent) than for women (1.5 per cent). The situation was the same for the young immigrant males and females. Basically, the levels were low. Still, unemployment was higher among the newly arrived than others. The rates decreased from 2003 to 2008 for all groups, but again Somali immigrants were worse off than the other groups, and the difference could not be explained by the proportion that were newly arrived alone. Young male immigrants from Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam had unemployment rates about or below 3 per cent, not much more than the national average.

Figure 4.13: Unemployment rate for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of birth, ages 16–24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

For descendants, we have enough observations only for those with Pakistan, Turkish and Vietnamese origins. Unemployment rates for all females aged 16–24 decreased from 2 per cent in 2003 to 1.5 per cent in 2008. Turkish *female descendants* were above that level, Pakistani females came down to that level in 2008, and for Iranian and Vietnamese female descendants, no unemployment was registered in 2008. These groups are not that large, but still there were 400 female descendants in this age cohort in 2003, and more than 800 in 2008 from Vietnam. Iranians can be observed only for 2008. At that time there were 400 female descendants, but 85 per cent of them were below the age of 20. None were registered as unemployed.

Figure 4.14: Unemployment rate for female descendants, by country background, age 16–24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

Male descendants can be observed for the same groups as females (see Figure 4.15). The unemployment rates of the total male population aged 16–24 were below 4 and above 2, respectively, in 2003 and 2008 (see Figure 4.13). The descendants that we can observe had levels of unemployment around or below that of immigrants of the same age from the same countries. Male descendants of Iranian origin were at or slightly above that level.

Figure 4.15: Unemployment rate for male descendants, by country background, ages 16–24. Per cent. 2003 and 2008. Norway

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

5.4.5 Economically Inactive

In this section, we focus on those *not economically active*. In the terminology used here, this group includes persons who are not registered as employed, are not seeking work (i.e., not registered as unemployed) and not attending education. They are typically working in their own homes or in the shadow labour market, they are disabled or have other forms of pension, or they might be “discouraged workers”. They might have given up the hope of finding a job, or they simply do not want to work in the ordinary labour market. The economically inactive are much more numerous than the unemployed, and consist of many different groups not having found, or not being interested in finding, an economically active role in the formal labour market.

Information on the proportion economically inactive in our standard country groups is found in Table 4.1. The proportion of the total population that was inactive was low in the prime working ages, 25–54 years of age. Eleven per cent of the men and 15 per cent women were inactive in 2008.

Table 4.1: Share of 16–24, 25–54 and 55–64-year-old immigrants and total population who were inactive in 2008, by sex and country of origin. Per cent. Norway

	16–24		16–24		25–54		55–64	
	Immigrants		Descendants		Immigrants		Immigrants	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Iran	13	14	0	4	31	25	66	55
Iraq	26	18	:	:	51	33	85	69
Pakistan	31	22	12	13	57	21	86	61
Somalia	44	33	20	20	63	36	92	70
Turkey	30	15	16	12	51	28	90	75
Vietnam	19	14	5	8	29	21	63	49
Total population	9	8			15	11	34	24

Source: Labour market statistics, Statistics Norway.

For the immigrants, the proportion inactive varies quite a bit. For almost all groups, Somali immigrants had the highest rates. These high levels are partly to be explained by many recent arrivals, and for women also by high number of children in the household and single motherhoods. Recent arrivals might also explain the high rates of Iraqi immigrants. Women had higher non-activity rates than men in almost every group of immigrants, but once again, Iranian immigrants had an insignificant gender gap. The gender gap for Vietnamese was narrower than for most other groups of immigrants.

The non-activity rate for those aged 55 to 64 was very high, between 50 and 90 per cent across immigrant groups, as much as between two and three times the national level for every group. There may be many explanations for this; one is that before coming to Norway older immigrants had spent a considerable share of their adult life elsewhere. Whatever explanations are relevant, the proportion of immigrants who are not active between the ages of 55–64 is a real problem, for the immigrants themselves, and for Norwegian society. The number of immigrants in this age group is not (yet) very high, but it is increasing.

In the prime working ages, inactivity rates were particularly high among women, due to a prolonged period with minor children in the household, and to gender roles quite different from the Norwegian norm. Again, the inactivity rate of immigrants was two to four times higher than the national average. The same holds for the younger immigrants, but for men aged 16–24, the difference was smaller than for women. Family patterns and duration of stay are related to this pattern.

For descendants, however, the picture is much closer to the national average. Descendants with Iran and Vietnam backgrounds have lower non-activity rates than the average 16 to 24-year-olds in Norway, and all descendants have lower rates than the immigrants of the same age and country background. Somali descendants have a level of non-activity far

below immigrants of the same age, but still well above other descendant groups. Gender differences are minor and non-systematic for descendants.

5.4.6 Summary

Integration policy is aimed at incorporating immigrants into the labour market. We have looked at three dimensions of inclusion in this section: inclusion among the employed, the unemployed and those not active either in the labour market or in education.

Compared to the rest of Europe, labour market participation is very high in the Scandinavian countries. One can hardly expect that groups immigrating for purposes other than work can reach the same levels of participation. Women aged 25–54 in the population of Norway have an employment rate 15–20 percentage points higher than that of female immigrants from Vietnam and Iran. Both these groups consist mainly of refugees and their family members, and they have lived in Norway for quite some time, but their educational background (from their home countries) differs. Immigrants from Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan are 40–50 percentage points below the Norwegian female average employment rate. Immigrant women from Somalia have an employment rate almost 60 percentage points below the average in Norway. This can partly be attributed to their recent arrival.

The employment rate of all males in Norway is slightly higher than that for all females. The differences between the activity rates of male immigrants and the male total are much lower than between female immigrants and the female total. Again, Somali immigrants are in the lower end, for males, 40 percentage points below the average. The rest are between 15 and 30 percentage points below the average for Norway.

We can see a systematic increase of between 10 and 20 percentage points in employment for all groups between 1998 and 2008. The strong increase in employment for all groups is closely related to an increasing demand for labour in the Norwegian labour market. Growth in the total male employment rate from 1998 onwards was not as strong as for females. Still, there was a consistent increase in the rates of all groups, in particular among Iraqi immigrants. Also for the well-established groups of Pakistani men, the increases were also substantial. Their level was close to that of Vietnamese men, but Pakistani female immigrants had only half the employment rate of Vietnamese-origin women, and the growth in their rate has been slower than among other female immigrants.

The gender employment gap was only 5 percentage points for the total population, much lower than for most of the immigrant groups. In

2008, however, the gap for immigrants from Iran and Vietnam was not much wider (8 percentage points). The gap for Iraq, Somalia and Turkey was 20 percentage points, and the Pakistani gap was twice that level.

For immigrants, we can observe that the differences between the countries of origin are smaller for those aged 16–24 than for those older than 24. Immigrant females age 16–24 from Somalia had an employment rate 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference was almost 60 for the older women. The other groups were at about 20 percentage points below the national average. For young male immigrants, the employment rate was 50–60 per cent (compared to national average of 65 per cent) for all groups in 2008, except, again, the Somali. For men from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam, there was a strong increase in employment, around 20 percentage points, between 1998 and 2008 for those aged 16–24.

All groups of female descendants lie above the immigrant level of the same age. The level for the total population of women aged 16–24 was around 65 per cent, slightly below the rate for descendants from Vietnam. Descendants of groups with high immigrant employment rates had slightly higher rates than their immigrant cohorts, while descendants of those with low immigrant employment rates had considerably higher employment rates. Somali female descendants had the lowest level, but with an employment rate of 50 per cent they do almost as well as other descendants in the labour market.

Among male descendants aged 16–24, none had reached the national average for men 16–24 (65 per cent); in 2008 all five nationalities had employment rates of around 55–60 per cent. Remarkably, there was virtually no difference among male descendants of the differing countries. The rates for 2008 were higher than for the previous years, with the strongest increase achieved by Vietnamese descendants, who had very low employment levels in 1998.

We compared those aged 25–39 in 1998 with those aged 30–44 in 2003 and 35–49 in 2008. The gap with the national average is closing for immigrant women from Vietnam and Iran. Iraqi women also experienced an increase larger than the national averages, but they had started from a very low level. For immigrant women from Pakistan, Turkey and Somalia, the gap was seen to be widening, even though we could observe an increase on the level of around 10 per cent. For men we also observed an increase in employment, but not rapid as that of the women. Men in the total population had an increase of around 10 per cent, from below 80 to close to 90 per cent. This gap was narrowed for men from Iraq and Iran.

The gender gap was high for some countries, but not for all. Even when we followed the same cohort from 1998 to 2008, the Pakistani gender gap was still 40 percentage points, and it remained stable. Iraq, Somalia and Turkey had half that level. For the Vietnamese, the gap was reduced to 10 percentage points. For the total population, the gap reduced from 8 to 4 percentage points, and the Iranians experienced almost the same drop, from 11 to 6.

For descendants, we can produce such numbers only for those of Pakistani origin. For descendants 25–39 years of age in 1998, the gender gap decreased from 20 percentage points in 1998 to “only” 7 percentage points in 2008. Thus, the Pakistani descendants do not seem to copying the gender employment pattern of their parent’s generation. For both men and women the employment rates for this cohort were only 2–4 percentage points below the national average.

The unemployment rate for young men in for the total population was slightly higher than for women. The situation was the same for young immigrant males and females. Basically, the levels were low. Still, unemployment was higher among the newly arrived than for others. Young male immigrants from Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam had unemployment rates around or below 3 per cent, not much more than the national average. Descendants had low unemployment rates (less than 5 per cent), still above the average for their age group in the total population.

For the total population, the proportion of economically inactive was low in the prime working ages; 11 per cent of men and 15 per cent of women were inactive in 2008. For immigrants, the proportion of inactive was generally much higher, and it varied quite a bit. For almost all groups, Somali immigrants had the highest rates. Women had higher non-activity rates than men in almost every group. But, Iranian and to a lesser extent, Vietnamese immigrants, had an insignificant gender gap.

The non-activity rate of those aged 55–64 was very high for all immigrant groups. In the prime working ages, the inactivity rate was particularly high among women, due to a prolonged period with minor children in the household and to gender roles quite different from the Norwegian average. The rate for immigrants was two to four times higher than for the national average.

For descendants, the pattern was much closer to the national average. Descendants with origins in Iran and Vietnam had lower non-activity rates than the corresponding Norwegian average. All descendants had lower rates than immigrants of the same age and country origins.

5.5 Summary of Results – Norway

5.5.1 *National Context for the Analyses*

Norway has for a long time considered itself an ethnically homogeneous country. While that may not always have been the case, by 2012 immigrants from 219 countries were living in Norway. This development arose as a result of increasing immigration over the past four decades. In 1954, the Nordic countries introduced a common labour market whereby citizens of Nordic countries were free to move and to take work without facing any restrictions. Since 1970, Norway has had a net inflow of migrants from all over the world. In 1974 Norway introduced a ban on labour migration. The aim was to address the integration problems of immigrants already in the country before letting new ones in. In the end, the ban influenced the composition of Norway's immigration streams more than their size.

Since the immigration ban was introduced, the majority of immigrants coming from outside the EU and North America have been refugees, asylum seekers, and family members reuniting with or joining persons already in Norway (the latter mostly for the purpose of marriage). Since the EU expanded in 2004, and again in 2007, migrant workers from across Europe have increasingly dominated Norway's immigration intake.

During the post-World War II era, the Norwegian economy has for the most part been very good. At the end of the 1960ies, oil resources were discovered in the North Sea shelf, and since then oil has played a very important, and increasing, role in our economy. Due to the economic resources created by the oil revenues, Norway has been less influenced by Europe's recent financial crises, especially as economic growth and unemployment are concerned.

For a number of good reasons, Norwegian policy regarding the integration of immigrants has for a long time focused on labour market participation. Based on the fact that newly arriving migrant workers in the early 1970ies were working and living in conditions considerably worse than those normally accepted in Norway, a temporary Immigration Ban was introduced in 1974 and made permanent in 1975.

Attitudes towards multiculturalism, and in particular to "diversity", have been more favourably received at the policy level than by the general population. Consequently, there have been discussions for three decades around these concepts. Policy has always been to welcome diversity, with priority placed on ensuring integration into education and into the labour market.

In 1970, Norway had 60,000 immigrants and persons born to two immigrant parents in Norway; by 2012 more than 10 times that number were living in the country. Initially, guest workers arrived in the late 1960ies, then their families, and then came refugees in increasing numbers. The number of descendants increased from 2,000 in 1970 to more than 100,000 in 2012. The large majority of descendants (72 per cent) have their origins in Africa or Asia, and by far the largest and oldest group is of Pakistani origin.

Among the more than 500,000 first time immigrants with non-Nordic citizenships who arrived in Norway between 1990 and 2011, 37 per cent came for family reasons, 32 per cent came for work, and 20 per cent for protection. Of these, 125,000 have now left the country. These emigrants were more likely to be in Norway for reasons of work or education than for other reasons. Since 2007, labour has been the major reason for immigration to Norway, contributing to slightly less than 50 per cent of all immigration permits since that time.

5.5.2 Population Dynamics

The immigration history of the study's six selected groups – immigrants and descendants with origins in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam – is essential to understand in order to understand their demographic development in Norway. The immigration of workers from Pakistan and Turkey started around 1970. Turkey is geographically much closer to Norway than is Pakistan, and consequently it has been easier for Turks to remain in contact with their country of origin. Both groups have had rather high, but declining fertility. As both groups show a strong tendency to marry within their own national background, the number of descendants has been growing steadily since the late 1970ies.

Boat refugees from Vietnam started to arrive towards the end of the 1970ies, and they continued to arrive for more than a decade. Because their fertility rates are lower than the previous two groups, and because fewer among them marry within their own background, their descendants have increased at a lower rate than those with Pakistani and Turkish origins.

Immigrants from Iran came primarily as refugees; they began arriving in modest numbers in the 1970ies. They have low fertility rates and are less inclined to marry people with their own background. As a result, the group has been growing at a rather low rate for a period of time.

The patterns seen for immigrants from Iraq and Somalia have much in common. Immigration from both countries began in the late 1980ies, and for a while, these countries were major sources of immigration to

Norway. Due to continued immigration (more from Somalia than from Iraq) as well as to their demographic structure and high fertility rates (more so among Somali than Iraqi women), these two groups are growing rapidly. The large majority marry with people with the same backgrounds, and their descendant numbers are growing faster than those of any other group. Still, there are more immigrants and descendants from Pakistan in Norway than these two groups taken together.

For the groups that could be compared, we saw a decrease in fertility between the study's two five-year time periods (1998–2003 and 2004–2008) for almost all the groups of immigrants and descendants, and more so for Iraqi immigrants than for the others. The decrease was seen at all stages of the reproductive period.

The groups' descendants are still young, and those who have married, have done so at rather young ages. Those marrying at later ages may follow a different pattern. Descendants from Pakistan and Turkey marry people of their own origins to the same degree as the immigrants of these groups. Those not marrying a partner with their own background do not adhere to the mainstream behaviour of their group, and are more prone to follow the mainstream pattern in Norway, for example, by cohabiting rather than marrying.

The migration pattern of these groups is clearly mirrored by their durations of stay. Integration into Norwegian society normally improves with duration of stay. The Pakistani and Vietnamese groups have the longest average duration of stay, men from both countries had, on average, stayed in Norway for 21 years by 2008. From 2003 to 2008, the average stay increased by two to four years for all the country groups.

Compared to natives, population growth in all six national groups was very strong. This was largely due to their young age structure (many births, few deaths), marital patterns, high fertility rates and modest outmigration.

5.5.3 Education

Education provides young people with a wide choice of employment opportunities in societies like those in Scandinavia, and is seen as a basic prerequisite for integration. As such we focus on educational participation in this study. We looked at the participation patterns of immigrant and descendant males and females in differing age groups from the six countries, and compared their patterns with those of the total population.

When it comes to education, descendants fare much better than immigrants, and in general, levels of participation vary much more for immigrants than for descendants. This is partly related to differences in

duration of stay. The low level of educational activity seen among Somali immigrants is partly a consequence of many recent arrivals and partly related to the rudimentary schooling system which has existed in Somalia over the last decades. Iranians do better in the educational system than most other immigrant groups, and better even than natives in some contexts. The participation levels of descendants differ less between nationalities than they do among the immigrants. Again, rates for those of Turkish origin are often lower than those of the other groups, who in this case, have participation rates around or above the Norwegian average. Female participation rates are higher than male participation rates across most groups and in the total population. Recently, however, the gap between females and males of Turkish origin seems to be closing.

Contrary to common belief, the gender difference is smaller among most descendant groups than among those of Norwegian origin. The increasing rates of participation seen for most groups from 1998 to 2008 were remarkable and depict a process whereby immigrants and descendants are approaching, and for some groups and in some measures, surpassing the native population.

For most immigrant and descendant groups, and for the total population, more girls than boys prepare for academic studies at the secondary level. The share of immigrants and descendants from Iran and Vietnam in academically oriented courses was seen to be well above the national average, as it was for descendants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. The number of Somali descendants participating in academic was quite low, but the figures indicate they have a greater tendency to pursue academic studies than the immigrant generation.

5.5.4 Labour Market

The aim of integration policies is to see immigrants become well established in the labour market, as the labour market is often considered to be the basis for income and recognition as well as an important element of one's social life. The labour market situation of descendants is seen as the litmus test of these policies. We have studied the employment patterns of different groups of immigrants and descendants and compared them to the national average. Unemployment and non-activity were also examined, the latter identifying a state worse than unemployment as the non-active are not active in any economic meaning of the word. They are neither in education or work (nor are they unemployed).

The immigrants of almost every group had lower employment and higher unemployment and non-activity rates than the total population. The pic-

ture is less consistent for immigrants than for descendants, with the first labour migrants in the early 1970ies being a possible exception. In parallel with the arrival of increasing numbers of refugees, immigrant employment rates decreased, and unemployment increased. High rates of unemployment might be the result of many seeking access to the labour market at the same time. But it also takes time to find a job, especially if one's formal qualifications are foreign to potential Norwegian employers. Discrimination may also be a force at work (Midtbøen and Rogstad, 2012).

Gender differences in employment are significant, have consequences for living conditions and are a sign of a lack of equal opportunities. Between 1998 and 2008, there was a strong and consistent increase in employment for both sexes in all six country of origin groups. However, very few groups reached the Norwegian average, which is among the very highest in Europe.

In Norway, the gender employment gap in 2008 was only 5 per cent, much lower than the gap for most of the immigrant groups with the exception of immigrants from Iran and Vietnam (who had an 8 per cent gap). Those coming from Iraq, Somalia and Turkey had a gap of 20 per cent, while the Pakistani gap was twice that level. The gender gaps remained rather stable between 1998 and 2008 despite significant increases in employment.

The differences between countries of origin were smaller for those aged 16–24 than for those of prime working age (25–54). Immigrant females aged 16–24 from Somalia had an employment rate 35 percentage points below the national level, whereas the difference for adults was almost 60 percentage points. The other groups lie between 20 percentage points below the national average. The employment rate of young males was 50–60 per cent for all groups in 2008, except, again, for young Somali male immigrants, whose rates were only half that level. The gender gap was much smaller for younger males than for those in their prime working years. Descendant employment rates came close to the national averages, and the five countries (all but Iraq) we were able to observe had almost identical employment rates.

The differences between activity rates for male immigrants and the total male population were lower than between female immigrants and the total female population. Somali immigrants were at the lower end (Somali males were 40 percentage points below the average) while the other nationalities were between 15 and 30 percentage points below the national average. These employment rates, and in particular the rates among Somali immigrants and female Pakistani immigrants, present challenges for integration policies. The Iraqi and Somali groups, for ex-

ample, both have a high proportion of new arrivals, yet Iraqi immigrants are better incorporated into the labour market than Somali immigrants.

The proportion of inactive persons in some groups was very high, despite a series of action plans aimed at finding employment for as many immigrants as possible. More women than men were inactive, and inactivity increased greatly with age. In 2008, the inactivity rates for immigrants from Somalia were higher than those of all other groups, and there was a strong gender pattern. Descendants, however, came closer to the national average, and some groups were even at a lower level. Gender differences among descendants were minor.

5.5.5 Summary of the Development of Each of the six National Groups

The first immigrants from *Iran* arrived before the fall of the Shah, and they became a sizeable group after the mid-1980ies. Immigration inflows were higher in the first half of the study period (1998 – 2003) than in the second (2004–2008). Due to very low fertility and more heterogeneous marriages (few marrying within their group), their descendant numbers were clearly lower than those of any other group. Both immigrants and descendants originating from Iran have very high enrolment rates in education, often higher than natives. At the secondary level, they prefer academic oriented programs more than any other group. The gender differences seen were modest. Immigrants and descendants from Iran have employment rates on par with the highest rates for immigrant groups, although still lag some percentage points behind native rate. The gender balance was better than any other immigrant group, only slightly worse than for the natives. Although high, the proportion inactive was by and large lower among Iranians of all ages than among all the other immigrant groups studied. Few descendants of Iranian origin do not work or study.

Immigrants from *Iraq* began arriving in Norway after 1985. They are mostly refugees with families, who have fled from wars. Their inflow has varied greatly from year to year, but the numbers were high throughout our period of investigation. In 1998 they were the smallest of six groups studied here, as of 2005 they became the largest. If one includes descendants, however, the Iraqi group still ranks behind the Pakistani group. Their age structure, short duration of stay in Norway, their fertility rates and strong tendency for homogamy all contribute to an increasing number of descendants. The school enrolment rates of Iraqis increased throughout the period, but had yet not reached the level of natives. Both immigrants and descendants have larger shares than others

in vocational training. As can be expected for groups with a short duration of stay, their employment rates are low, but increasing. The gender gap seen was large, but not at all as large as it is among Pakistani immigrants. Young immigrants seem to do better in the labour market than older immigrants. Their descendants are still too young to be active in the labour market. With the exception of the youngest, inactivity rates are very high among Iraqi immigrants.

Immigrants from *Pakistan* were the first to arrive in Norway in large numbers (around 1970), but despite their long history in Norway, their integration has not been as good as other groups. There are far more descendants of Pakistani origin in Norway than from any other country, and their educational activity and labour market participation lags only slightly behind the Norwegian average. Pakistani descendants still marry other Pakistanis, but they marry at an older age than their parents. Their fertility rates are close to the national average. The educational enrolment rate of Pakistanis increased significantly between 1998 and 2008, but they are still modest. Pakistani immigrants have lower tertiary education enrolment rates than the total population, but among the six countries of origin, and between the ages of 20 and 24, they rank behind only Iran and Vietnam. The employment rates for prime working age men and women from Pakistan increased in the period 1998–2008, but the gender gap was still around 40 per cent. Such a situation has severe implications for poverty rates. Duration of stay provides no explanation for the low rates. The situation is better for young immigrants and the employment rates of descendants are close to those of the other groups and to national level. However, the non-activity rate for women is also extremely high.

Somalis are very new to Norway, and their rates and indicators are strongly influenced by their recent arrival. The situation seem to improve with time, but not as fast or consistently as among the Iraqis. The situation is better for descendants and younger immigrants than for older immigrants. Coming from a country without properly functioning governmental institutions, the integration process will take time. Inflow has been considerable for many years, and outmigration has only occasionally been of any importance. Their fertility rates were higher than any other group during the period of study; the decreases seen were very modest. Their partners are almost never of Norwegian background and their descendants are too young to marry. The school enrolment rate for Somali immigrants was very low compared to all other groups. For the small group of pupils aged 16–19, the share seeking academic programmes is surprisingly high and might be an indication that those in their twenties may attend university.

Immigrants from *Turkey* have many characteristics in common with those from Pakistan. They arrived as labour migrants around 1970 and were joined by their families after 1975. Immigrants and descendants from Turkey lag behind Pakistanis in educational enrolment, despite a strong increase in participation during the last decade. Their participation in the labour market was higher than the Pakistanis, due to a higher participation rate among women, and subsequently we found evidence of a much smaller gender gap. Young immigrants do better, and the descendants are even closer to the national average. There are, for both countries, gender gaps for immigrants at all ages as well as for descendants, albeit at a lower level. Except for prime working age women, non-activity rates are higher among Turks than among Pakistanis. The rates of descendants are also clearly higher than the national averages.

Immigrants (and descendants) from *Vietnam* have made great strides in integration, more so than any other group in this study. The large majority arrived as boat refugees after the end of the war in 1975. Their educational background was rather modest, and their background was further removed from the Norwegian average than any other immigrant group at that time. In 1990, socio-economic indicators such as educational participation and labour market participation were at the levels now seen for Somali immigrants. Like the Somali, the Vietnamese were considered by many observers to be unemployable as well as unwilling or unable to acquire a working level knowledge of the Norwegian language. In our study, Vietnamese immigrants were in many ways the most successful of the six national groups. Their demographic behaviour is approaching the Norwegian average, and their participation in education, especially among descendants, is at a very high level. Their employment rates are above those of the other groups, and females are particularly active in the labour market, resulting in a gender gap only slightly above the national average. The level of inactivity is mostly lower than that of any other country, but still twice the level of the national average.

6. Sweden

Pieter Bevelander & Inge Dahlstedt

6.1 The National Setting

6.1.1 *An Overview of the History of Immigration to Sweden Since 1945*

After the Second World War, most of the refugees who had fled to Sweden from other Nordic countries during the war either returned home or left for new destinations. The Swedish population was at that time homogeneously native and ethnically Swedish, with the exception of a couple of small minority groups. However, successive waves of immigration during the post-war period have led to fundamental changes in the composition of the Swedish population. By 2010, immigrants constituted about 14 per cent of Sweden's total population. About one quarter of the immigrant population was of Nordic origin, one third originated from other European countries and the remainder from non-European countries.

Post-war immigration to Sweden occurred in two waves. In the 1940ies, 1950ies and 1960ies, rapid industrial and economic growth gave rise to labour immigration from Nordic and other European countries. The organized recruitment of foreign labour and a general liberalization of immigration policy facilitated migratory moves to Sweden. Subsequently, lower rates of economic growth and increased unemployment led to a reduced demand for foreign labour in the early 1970ies. As a consequence, migration policy became harsher (Castles and Miller, 2003). Labour immigration from Nordic countries gradually decreased during this period, while that from other countries ceased altogether.

However, the fact that labour migration dwindled did not mean that immigration to Sweden stopped. On the contrary, other types of migration increased. Since the early 1970ies, refugees and tied-movers have dominated Sweden's migration inflow, coming primarily from Eastern Europe and non-European parts of the world. In the 1970ies, and more so in the 1980ies and 1990ies, the proportion of non-European refugees and tied-movers increased. Major contributors to the immigrant population in the

1970ies were refugees from Chile, Poland and Turkey. In the 1980ies, the major immigrant groups came from Chile, Ethiopia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. In the 1990ies, immigration from Iraq, former Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries dominated. A similar pattern has been observed for the past decade, with Iraqis, Iranians and people from the former Yugoslavia and Somalis being the major immigrant groups.

The above pattern is depicted in Table 1.1 which shows the 10 largest immigrant groups by country of origin for each year between 2000 and 2009. When ten new member states joined the European Union in 2004, migration from these countries, particularly Poland, increased. Historical migration patterns from other Nordic countries and Germany are also still prevalent. Family migration is the main cause for migration from Thailand and guest students come from China. Groups that have grown substantially in Sweden over the last decade include immigrants from Iraq, Poland, Germany and Denmark.

Table 1.1: Number of immigrants per year to Sweden, from the 10 largest countries of birth each year

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>Total number of Immigrants</i>	58,659	60,795	64,087	63,795	62,028	65,229	95,750	99,485	101,171	102,280
Sweden	13,482	13,797	13,266	12,588	11,467	11,066	12,821	12,340	13,388	13,985
Finland	3,433	3,349	3,262	3,151	2,716	2,793	2,553	2,494	2,390	2,385
Norway	2,893	3,104	3,443	3,168	2,573	2,425	2,477	2,371	2,239	-
Denmark	1,918	2,418	2,969	3,226	3,203	3,494	4,365	4,319	3,371	3,010
Germany	1,834	1,806	1,883	1,998	2,010	2,147	3,100	3,745	3,492	2,845
United Kingdom	1,343	1,433	1,449	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	2,747	2,316	2,140	1,600	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bosnia-Herzegovina	-	-	-	1,405	-	-	-	-	-	-
Serbia Montenegro	-	-	-	-	1,479	1,756	3,228	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	3,525	6,442	7,617	7,091	5,261
Rumania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,632	2,595	-
USA	1,278	1,250	1,245	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	1,087	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	1,378	2,552	-	-	-	-	2,213
Iraq	6,681	6,663	7,472	5,425	3,126	3,094	11,146	15,642	13,083	9,543
Iran	1,250	1,444	1,587	-	1,610	1,365	2,274	-	-	2,976
China	-	1,060	-	1,434	1,563	1,749	-	2,485	2,925	3,462
Thailand	-	-	1,326	2,075	2,175	2,205	2,571	2,695	3,235	3,165
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,008	3,941	4,218	7,021

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Overall, migration to Sweden has increased steadily since WWII. Even during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, when Sweden's GDP dropped substantially, immigration to Sweden continued to increase and in 2009 over 100,000 individuals obtained residence permits.

Migration statistics for the last decade show that the majority of inflow to Sweden consists of family reunion migrants (see Table 1.2). Refugees and migrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) compete for second place and sometimes dominate. As refugee migration was strong in 2006 and 2007, an increase in family reunions can be observed

for the years 2008 and 2009. The table also shows an increase in guest students over time. During this decade Sweden offered free education and, as a result, attracted an increasing number of foreign students.¹⁰ Moreover, a large group of people from the EEA/European Union (EU) migrated to Sweden during this decade. Lastly, the table shows that there was an increase in temporary migrants between 2005 and 2009. The government's relaxation of rules around temporary migration at the end of 2008 seems to have had an impact on this type of migration during the crisis year of 2009.

Table 1.2: Immigration by admission status, 2000–2009

Year	Refugees	Family	Labour	EEA/EU	Guest students	Adoption	Temporary Labour Migration
2000	10,546	22,840	433	7,396	3,073	876	-
2001	7,941	24,524	441	6,851	3,989	758	-
2002	8,493	22,346	403	7,968	4,585	869	-
2003	6,460	24,553	319	9,234	5,509	782	-
2004	6,140	22,337	209	14,959	6,021	825	-
2005	8,076	21,908	293	18,071	6,837	805	5,985
2006	20,663	26,668	349	20,461	7,331	623	6,257
2007	18,290	28,975	543	19,387	8,920	540	9,859
2008	11,173	33,184	796	19,398	11,186	503	14,513
2009	11,119	34,082	81	17,606	13,487	622	21,582
Total	108,901	261,417	3,867 ¹¹	141,331	70,938	7,203	58,196

Source: Migration Board, Sweden.

6.1.2 Immigrant Population

Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the stock of natives and migrants in Sweden categorized by descent and country of origin. In 2010, the total population of Sweden was almost 9.5 million individuals. Almost one fifth, or 19.1 per cent, of the population had an immigrant background, either because they were born outside Sweden (14.7 per cent) or because both their parents were born outside Sweden (4.4 per cent) (Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1).

¹⁰ This policy changed in 2011. Foreign students from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) are now obliged to pay for their education in Sweden (Prop. 2009/10:65). The EEA includes all European Union (EU) member states as well as Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway.

¹¹ Permanent residents.

Table 1.3: The population of Sweden by origin, 2010

	Swedish born	Foreign born	Descendants	Total
Individuals	7,617,681	1,384,929	412,960	9,415,570
Percentage of total population	80.9%	14.7%	4.4%	100%

Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 1.1 shows the development of the immigrant population in Sweden between 1980 and 2010. Over this 30-year period the immigrant population almost doubled – from 7.5 to 14.7 per cent of the total population. The proportion of people of foreign descent increased from 2.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent of the total population between 1994 and 2010.

Figure 1.1: Percentage increase of immigrants and descendants, 1980–2010

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 1.4 shows the immigrant population in Sweden by country of origin in 2010.¹² The largest immigrant group originates from Finland, with almost 170,000 individuals. The second largest group originates from Iraq, with some 120,000 individuals. Other large groups with over 50,000 individuals have come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Iran and Poland. Over 40,000 people from geographically close countries like Denmark, Norway, Germany and Turkey also live in Sweden. All the other countries listed in Table SWE 2.4 have between 15,000 and 40,000 individuals in Sweden.

¹² Only countries with more than 15,000 individuals are listed.

Table SWE 1.4: The immigrant population of Sweden, 2010

	Immigrants	Proportion of all Immigrants
Bosnia-Herzegovina	56,183	4.1%
Chile	28,378	2.0%
Denmark	45,548	3.3%
Finland	169,521	12.2%
Iraq	121,761	8.8%
Iran	62,120	4.5%
Yugoslavia	70,819	5.1%
China	23,998	1.7%
Lebanon	24,116	1.7%
Norway	43,430	3.1%
Poland	70,253	5.1%
Rumania	19,741	1.4%
Russia	15,511	1.1%
Somalia	37,846	2.7%
Syria	20,758	1.5%
Thailand	31,378	2.3%
Turkey	42,527	3.1%
Germany	48,158	3.5%
Hungary	15,339	1.1%
USA	17,179	1.2%
Other countries	420,365	30.3%
Total	1,384,929	100%

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.1.3 Migration and Integration Policy

As indicated earlier, in the decades following the Second World War, Sweden, untouched by the war, experienced a labour shortage due to rapid economic expansion. The demand for labour was high and in the 1950ies skilled workers from North-Western Europe (mainly from the other Nordic countries) started to complement the Swedish labour force. In the 1960ies the demand for skilled labour shifted as the Swedish industrial sector entered a period of rationalization. While labour immigration continued from other Nordic countries, such as Finland, new immigration source countries, including Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, began to emerge. By the end of the 1960ies the labour shortage had begun to decline and Sweden's trade unions were critical of continued labour migration. In their view, the importation of labour had had negative side effects, such as delays in industrial transformation and pressures on wages due to the increased supply of workers. In 1968 Sweden's labour migration policy was tightened (with the exception of Nordic migrants) and the stream of labour migration dried up. Nordic labour migration also declined in the early 1970ies when living standards in the Nordic countries levelled out and the Swedish economy began to decline as a result of the oil crisis (Lundh and Ohlsson, 1999).

The guest worker system was never a significant part of the Swedish migration system. The possibility of labour migrants being reunited with their families was debated in the 1960ies; the idea being that this would help immigrants settle and feel at home in Sweden. By the end of the 1960ies it had become much more difficult to come to Sweden to work, but the possibilities of coming as a tied-mover had increased. Spouses, children, parents or other dependants could migrate to Sweden if they could prove that they had arranged for accommodation. In practice, Swedish family reunion policy has been rather liberal and the policy change has had some unintended consequences. That is, while the policy had been intended to help labour migrants reunite with their families, it has mainly helped refugees and their families reunite as this type of migration increased (Lundh and Ohlsson, 1999).

It is possible for both skilled and unskilled immigrants to come to Sweden as legal labour migrants, although the system has been fairly regulated and is not very flexible. Prior to 2008, an employer who had the intent of hiring a third country national had to report the vacant position to the County Labour Board. A person from a non-Scandinavian or non-EU country could obtain a work permit if the Migration Board – following consultations with the National Labour Board and the employee union in question – decided that there was a need for this. The National Labour Board carried out a labour market test to confirm the need for foreign labour. The employer also had to guarantee that the guest worker was paid a proper wage, had accommodation, that he or she was covered by insurance and that other terms of employment were fair and in line with the relevant collective agreement. The National Migration Board and the County Labour Boards had overall responsibility for matching supply and demand in the labour market and could determine who entered Sweden as a labour migrant (Johnsson, 2008).

However, the present government changed the rules in 2008, with the aim of making the system more flexible. The idea was that employers (not the authorities) should be the ones assessing needs for foreign labour because they are in the best position to know what skills are actually required (Employers are still obliged, however, to ensure that Sweden's labour market rules are followed). It is easier to obtain a permanent residence permit if a person is *employed* in Sweden, because a temporary permit can become permanent after four years. Citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland have precedence, although guest students and asylum seekers who were previously rejected can now apply for a work permit from within Sweden (Prop. 2007/08:147).

According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (2007), Sweden scores high in terms of granting immigrants access to and rights in the labour market. If you are a migrant and have had a residence permit for one or more years you are eligible to work in most sectors of the economy. If you are a migrant and have been living in Sweden for two years you have equal access to study grants. Migrants who find work have the right to change their permit and, if they lose their job, they do not necessarily have to leave the country. All migrants with a residence permit have the right to work, as do their family members. Family members can also apply for residence permits in their own right after three years. They also have the same rights as their sponsor to education, healthcare and housing. Migrants are eligible for long-term residence permits after five years of legal residence in Sweden.

When Sweden's labour migration policies were made more flexible in 2008, gender concerns could also be brought into the analysis. This was not possible before 2008, since the former labour market regime tended to exclude occupations in which women were traditionally employed (Organization for Security and Economic Co-operation in Europe, 2009). The new government also introduced tax reductions for domestic work, thereby legalizing certain "black market" jobs. This may also have led to an increase in the demand for female migrant workers, although as yet this has not been investigated.

According to Bevelander (2009), 80 per cent of those who have been granted residence permits in the last few decades are relatives or refugees. Today the largest group of immigrants in Sweden consists of relatives and refugees, while labour migrants and students play a more minor role. This is because work permits are difficult for people to obtain if they were not born in a Nordic country, a Western European country or a EU-member country. If we look at the numbers of residence permits granted and registered in 2009, around 40 per cent went to differing groups of relatives. Around ten per cent went to differing kinds of refugees. Twenty five per cent went to people who came to Sweden to work and 16 per cent went to students (Migrationsverket, 2009). It should also be noted that there has been an increase in recent years in the ratio of labour migrants. The fact that relatives and refugees constitute a large proportion of immigrants has affected the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Since refugees and relatives come to Sweden for reasons other than work, their assimilation into the labour market is expected to occur at a slower pace than that of labour migrants.

In 2004, ten new member states from Eastern Europe joined the EU and they were followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania. As these new

member states became part of the European Union, some older member states applied to implement transitional rules for these potential migrants. Sweden did not do so and there was some debate about what the consequences of this might be. Some argued that there would be a problem with a crowd of eastern European migrants coming to the country, eager to take advantage of the Swedish welfare system. Wadensjö (2007) studied the effects of the enlargement of the EU on migration and labour market participation from these countries. The conclusions were that even though it is still too early to determine impacts, some tentative answers have already emerged. For example, the study shows that migration from these countries, particularly from Poland and the Baltic states, increased about four times between 2003 and 2006. The employment rates of these migrants are lower than those of Swedes, although the differences are quite small. As yet, there are also no indications that these migrants are overrepresented in the welfare system.

Today, when it comes to migration and integration policymaking, the most important national actors are the government and the Migration Board. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the different migration and asylum policy areas, while the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality is responsible for policy areas concerning citizenship, discrimination issues, integration, urban development and national minorities. The Migration Board enforces policies relating to visas, asylum, residence permits, citizenship and return migration. When the Integration Board was closed in 2007, regions were given more authority over migration and integration issues. The Integration Board supervised the development of integration issues and when it closed some of these responsibilities were moved to the County Administrative Boards, which now have operative responsibility for negotiating with municipalities on refugee settlement. These Boards are essentially the link between the state and the local level in matters concerning the resettlement and introduction of refugees, because they negotiate and supervise Sweden's introduction programmes and the labour market attachment of immigrants. Health Care Regions also have some responsibilities for providing health care to asylum seekers and refugees, such as emergency health care for asylum seekers (Bevelander and Rönnqvist, 2010).

Sweden's municipalities have been operatively responsible for the introduction of newly arrived migrants since the 1980ies and are financially compensated for this service by the state. The introduction programmes include language education, information about Swedish society and labour market training. In practice, this means that the municipalities have to arrange introduction programmes for some categories of newly arrived im-

migrants (migrants with a residence permit or humanitarian refugees). Other migrants are not generally eligible for introduction programmes, although in some municipalities all migrants are welcome. All migrants are, however, entitled to Swedish language courses. How the reception and introduction of immigrants is structured varies between municipalities. In some municipalities, social services are responsible for organizing the programmes and, in others, a separate unit deals with the programmes. Employment agencies disseminate information about the Swedish labour market and cooperate with municipalities in the introduction programmes. How close the municipalities work with the employment agencies and other authorities varies. It can also be said that voluntary organizations play a somewhat limited role in these areas (Emilsson, 2008).

When the Social Democratic Party lost the election in 2006 and the centre-right parties formed a coalition government, Sweden's policies on the admission and reception of refugees and immigrants changed. The introduction programmes that were put in place to integrate immigrants into society and the labour market have often been targets for critique. It has been argued in different reports and evaluations that the programmes lack effective measures to prepare immigrants for entering the labour market and that cooperation between differing authorities should be improved. Swedish language education programmes have been criticized for not being efficient enough and for having too many people achieving poor results or dropping out altogether (Emilsson, 2008).

Measures have also been taken to increase the potential for immigrants can practice their professions in Sweden. These include efforts to have their skills recognized and to complement them with different forms of higher education. Different measures have been introduced during the last ten years, for example, that make it possible for migrants to validate their home country education. However, research (Dahlstedt, 2009) shows that it is not only formal procedures that are of importance here. Employers differentiate between different kinds of education and, if a person is educated in Sweden, he or she is more likely to get a job. Furthermore, when it comes to foreign education, it is easier for a person with vocational skills to gain employment. New measures have also been implemented in order to make it possible for newly arrived immigrants to move to municipalities where there are better job prospects.

Institutional factors also have an important effect on the labour market integration of immigrants. The rules and regulations relating to the Swedish labour market may induce a stronger insider/outsider situation for immigrants in comparison to, for example, the US labour market. In the US, immigrants tend to end up in lower paid jobs than natives. In

Sweden immigrants are less likely to be employed than natives, but when employed there is little difference between their payment scales (Lundh *et al.*, 2002; Bengtsson, Lundh and Scott, 2005).

There has been extensive debate about refugee settlement in Sweden. This debate is mainly driven by local politicians in cities like Malmö, Södertälje and Gothenburg, which receive a disproportionate number of new immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Today asylum seekers can choose to stay with friends or relatives and, if they lack resources, they can obtain some kind of support to cover their costs. The other option is to stay at a refugee centre. This system was regulated in law in 1994 to counteract the negative aspects of the former system, which had controlled the settlement of asylum seekers. The idea was that a greater freedom of choice would have a more positive effect on the integration of refugees. For example, it was hoped that refugees would become more active, have better job opportunities, and learn about Swedish society through friends and family. The effect of the former compulsory dispersal policy on refugees who arrived between 1985 and 1994 and were granted residence permits was also subject to economic analysis. Comparing immigrants arriving before and after the implementation of the policy, Edin *et al.* (2000) suggest that earnings were 25 per cent lower eight years after arrival as a result of the new policy. Idleness also increased by about six per cent for those groups who arrived during the reform (from 1985 onward), in comparison with those who had come earlier (in 1982 and 1983).

Some municipalities have also questioned the settlement rights of asylum seekers due to the amount of pressure such settlement places on bigger cities. They claim that this system leads to increased segregation and overcrowding and makes it difficult for municipalities to plan and provide services. In 2003, the financial supports provided to refugees settling on their own were reduced in order to relieve the pressure on some big city areas. However, this measure did not have any major effects. Research suggests that asylum seekers who choose to live with relatives or friends have a stronger labour market position and are more likely to own their own homes or apartments over the long run (Bevelander, Emilsson and Hagström, 2008).

Resettled refugees are the only immigrant group who do not have the option of settling in a municipality of their choosing. If accepted by Sweden, they are issued a permanent residence permit, assigned to a municipality and have their accommodation arranged, all before they arrive in the country. According to Hagström (2009), this can help to explain why resettled refugees take longer to enter the labour market than other

groups. Due to the limited availability of accommodation in Sweden's larger cities, the majority of resettled refugees are placed in municipalities with high unemployment rates and shrinking populations.

Qualitative sources suggest that refugees have very different experiences with the labour market and with the institutions responsible for their reception and integration. These differences often depend on age and gender, type of education, placement in Sweden, time of arrival, physical and psychological condition, chance, and language skills, among others (Frykman, 2009; Rönqvist, 2009; Wikström, 2009). Interviews conducted for the above-mentioned studies show that refugees are grateful for the opportunity of starting a new life in Sweden, but somewhat critical of the tendency of authorities and institutions to make decisions and policies without recognizing their perspectives and needs. For example, Frykman found that her Bosnian respondents felt that the Public Employment Office was not very helpful and that other authorities exhibited paternalistic tendencies.

These studies suggest that the different actors involved in the reception and integration of refugees need to be more sensitive to the people who are at the receiving end – in order to make the measures more efficient and to increase the agency of individuals in the integration process.

In the 1990ies, the issue of ethnic discrimination arose on the political agenda. The main reason for this was the apparent problematic situation for immigrants in the labour market in the aftermath of Sweden's economic crisis. Measuring the extent of discrimination in Swedish working life is not an easy task, although different studies have tried to address this issue (see, e.g., Höglund, 2008; Carlsson and Rooth, 2008). These studies claim that it is probable that immigrants and people with dark skins face different kinds of discrimination.

In 1994, Sweden introduced its first law against ethnic discrimination in working life. This law, which was tightened in 1999, compels employers to take active measures against discrimination. This has led to an increased awareness among employers of the importance of the discrimination issue. In 2009, seven laws prohibiting different forms of discrimination were replaced by one law and an Ombudsman was installed. This law aims to combat discrimination and promote equal rights and possibilities, regardless of gender, transgender identity, ethnicity, religion or belief, ability, sexual orientation or age. In the mid-1990ies the American Diversity Management idea was introduced and diffused throughout Sweden by consultants and leaders in the private and public sectors. Where the anti-discrimination paradigm had focused on human rights and the negative consequences of unequal treatment for individuals and society, the diver-

sity movement tried to convince working life organizations that there could be potential benefits in taking a more proactive approach to the demographic changes occurring in society. From this perspective, it can be argued that if organizations adapt their processes and structures to the new circumstances, and to the needs of different categories of co-workers, they will be rewarded. The attention that has been directed towards discrimination issues and the diversity perspective has contributed to the development of new ideas and new personnel policies in organizations. Although there is some evidence that the market- and utility-driven diversity perspective has been seriously challenged in the Swedish context, it does seem to have made a contribution by stimulating discussions about how market adjustment and service are changed as a society changes demographically. The new legislation and demands for active measures against discrimination have put some pressure on organizations to reassess their personnel policies and their recruitment processes. Now it is common for organizations, especially in the public sector, to have policies and plans that cover diversity and integration as well as how these issues can be promoted. What effects these policy changes are having remain to be seen. So far the evidence suggests that awareness grows slowly and in an incremental way (Rönnqvist, 2008).

According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (2007), Sweden does well when it comes to policymaking in the anti-discrimination area. Swedish law covers a wide range of areas (work, training, education and the use of public goods and services) and is applicable in both the private and public sectors. However, MIPEX also concludes that the enforcement could be more efficient. An employer who does not meet the required legal standards can in fact be obliged to compensate the discriminated victim. However, the levels of compensation are probably not sufficient enough to encourage organizations to proactively eliminate discrimination altogether. There is some evidence that leaders of working life organizations generally consider discrimination issues to be of minor importance (see, for example, Fackförbundet ST, 2006). Furthermore, the legislation does not really combat more indirect forms of work life discrimination, such as can occur through network recruitment (Höglund, 2008).

6.2 Demographic Change

This section has two sub-sections. The first looks at two key aspects of population dynamics – changes in population size and to the immigrant groups from the six developing countries covered in this study. Standard demographic indicators are used to analyze population changes. The second sub-section deals with the composition of the selected immigrant groups by selected traits, such as length of residence and composition by generation.

6.2.1 Population Dynamics

We begin our analysis of the demographic integration of immigrants and descendants with an overview of population development in Sweden between 1998 and 2008. Figure 2.1 illustrates this for the six groups. Firstly, the chart shows that all the groups grew to some extent over the decade, some more and some less. In particular, immigrant groups originating from Iraq, Somalia and Pakistan increased during this period. In Table 2.1 we show the extent to which this growth is due to immigration or to natural growth, that is, through a growth in descendants.

Figure 2.1: Population development of immigrants and descendants in Sweden, by country of origin, 1998–2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

In Table SWE 2.1 we can see that that all the immigrant groups increased as a result of immigration and an increased numbers of descendants. A closer look at the table shows that Iraqis, Pakistanis and Somalis have either doubled, or, in the case of the Iraqis, tripled in this ten-year period. However, when looking at the percentage growth of

both immigrants and descendants, the Pakistani group has a larger rate of immigration growth, whereas the Iraqi and Somali groups have a higher growth rate among their descendants. The latter tendency also applies to the somewhat more established groups from Iran, Turkey and Vietnam, which in general have lower population growth rates, and where descendants are growing at a higher rate than are immigrants. Finally, the table shows basically no growth for people of Swedish origin. The growth of 4.5 per cent for the total population in Sweden is thus due to immigration and descendants with non-Swedish origins.

Table 2.1: Percentage growth and population numbers for immigrants and descendants, 1998–2008, by country of origin

	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	1998	2008
Iran	14.6	66.8	22.2	58,793	71,864
Iraq	188.7	268.9	201.8	45,291	136,677
Pakistan	170.1	68.2	135.0	4,345	10,209
Somalia	101.2	120.5	106.3	17,028	35,129
Turkey	26.6	38.5	31.1	49,968	65,517
Vietnam	33.1	68.1	42.1	13,684	19,442
Swedish origin	-	-	-0.3	7,618,755	7,595,421
Total	-	-	4.5	8,854,288	9,256,345

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.2 shows the immigrant population by duration of residence in 2008. As earlier established in Table 2.1, the Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali groups grew significantly during the last decade and, as such, large numbers of these groups have only been in the country for a relatively short period of time. Table 2.2 shows that in 2008 more than 60 per cent of immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia had been in Sweden for less than 10 years. For the other groups the proportion residing in Sweden for less than 10 years is about 25 to 30 per cent, with the majority having been in Sweden for 15 years or longer.

Table 2.2: Population proportions by years of residence and country of origin, 2008

	0–4	5–9	10–14	15–19	20+
Immigrants					
Iran	13	9	9	29	41
Iraq	41	27	16	11	5
Pakistan	58	10	5	6	21
Somalia	50	13	18	17	2
Turkey	17	10	10	15	48
Vietnam	16	13	11	28	32

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.3 shows the number of births, the crude birth rate (CBR) and the standardized crude birth rate (SCBR) for immigrants, Swedes and the total population. The table shows that, with the exception of Iran, all the immi-

grant groups have higher birth rates than natives or the total population. The crude birth rate for Iranian women is slightly higher than that for Swedish-born women, but lower when we standardize for age (see SCBR). In fact, after standardizing for age almost all the groups have lower birth rates. Besides Iran, Vietnam also has an SCBR in parity with the total population in the period 2004–2008. Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali women, however, have crude birth rates and standardized crude birth rates that are two or three times greater than those of the total population.

Table 2.3: Number of births, crude birth rate and standardized crude birth rate among immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Births		CBR		SCBR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,506	3,388	11.4	10.0	8.4	7.6
Iraq	8,053	12,866	25.3	25.0	19.9	20.0
Pakistan	472	809	19.2	21.7	16.2	20.6
Somalia	3,653	4,721	37.5	35.6	26.6	25.7
Turkey	3,718	4,136	14.0	13.6	12.8	14.1
Vietnam	1,367	1,354	18.0	15.1	12.1	11.2
Swedish origin	366,787	399,029	9.7	10.5	9.6	11.0
Total population	467,337	527,804	10.5	11.6	9.9	11.4

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Both the composition and dynamics of a population group are also affected by death. Table 2.4 shows the number of deaths and the crude death rate (CDR) between 1998 and 2008 for immigrants, natives and the total population. The table shows much lower crude death rates for all the immigrant groups compared to natives and the total population. The crude death rate for the total population is consequently lower than that for the Swedish-born population. Both findings are indicators of the fact that, unlike the Swedish born population, relatively few immigrants have reached age cohorts most associated with death.¹³

¹³ Low mortality rates in the immigrant populations could also be due to out-migrations that have taken place without authorities having been notified.

Table 2.4: Number of deaths and crude death rate of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Deaths		CDR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	502	711	1.6	2.1
Iraq	358	678	1.1	1.3
Pakistan	45	53	1.8	1.4
Somalia	78	139	0.8	1.0
Turkey	695	784	2.6	2.6
Vietnam	102	132	1.3	1.5
Swedish origin	430,250	411,450	13.3	10.8
Total population	468,247	455,013	10.5	10.0

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.5 shows the *natural change* of the population by immigrant group, people of Swedish origin and the total population. Since natural change is based on births minus deaths, we see that all immigrant groups grow in size during this period, whereas the number of people of Swedish origin diminishes. Growth of the total population during this period can thus be attributed to growth in the immigrant population.

Table 2.5: Natural change and the crude rate of natural change (CRNC) of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Natural Change		CRNC	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,004	2,677	9.8	7.9
Iraq	7,695	12,188	24.2	23.7
Pakistan	427	756	17.4	20.3
Somalia	3,575	4,582	36.7	34.6
Turkey	3,023	3,352	11.4	11.0
Vietnam	1,265	1,222	16.7	13.6
Swedish origin	-63,463	-12,421	-1.7	-0.3
Total population	-910	72,791	0.0	1.6

Source: Statistics Sweden.

The growth of the Swedish population can also be attributed to immigration being greater than emigration. Table 2.6 shows immigration by the numbers, the *crude immigration rate* and the standardized immigration rate. As shown in the tables at the beginning of this chapter, the crude immigration rate and its standardized variant show that all groups grew over the last decade: Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali immigrants, very much so, and Iranian, Turkish and Vietnamese groups, to a lesser extent. Controlling for age and sex lowers the crude immigration rate for all the groups with the exception of Swedes and the total population.

Table 2.6: Immigration, crude immigration rate (CIR) and standardized crude immigration rate (SCIR) by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Immigrants		CIR		SCIR	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	6,860	9,388	22.3	27.6	19.6	23.3
Iraq	31,966	46,668	100.4	90.6	96.3	81.7
Pakistan	1,309	5,239	53.3	140.5	42.2	76.4
Somalia	4,176	14,037	42.9	105.9	49.1	96.7
Turkey	5,023	7,917	19.0	26.0	14.4	18.4
Vietnam	2,054	2,410	27.0	26.8	19.7	21.0
Swedish origin	56,530	50,197	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4
Total population	289,780	414,629	6.5	9.1	6.4	9.1

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Emigration from Sweden during the period is shown in Table 2.7. The increase in emigration in the second part of the period is particularly noteworthy. All groups, including Swedes, emigrated at a higher rate during 2004 to 2008 than they did during 1999 to 2003.

Table 2.7: Emigration, crude emigration rate (CER) and standardized crude emigration rates (SCER) by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Emigrants		CER		SCER	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,576	4,537	11.6	13.3	11.5	12.9
Iraq	1,722	4,356	5.4	8.5	5.4	7.7
Pakistan	424	1,295	17.3	34.7	17.3	27.4
Somalia	2,484	4,841	25.5	36.5	23.7	32.4
Turkey	1,426	2,276	5.4	7.5	5.8	7.1
Vietnam	361	573	4.8	6.4	4.4	5.8
Swedish origin	70,269	75,000	1.9	2.0	-	-
Total population	161,082	199,435	3.6	4.4	-	-

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Net migration, that is, immigration minus emigration, affects population change. Table 2.8 shows that the net migration for all the immigrant groups is positive, but negative for natives, which means that immigrants constitute a larger proportion of the population by percentage. In other words, increases in Sweden's population during this period can be partially attributed to the net migration of immigrant groups.

Table 2.8: Net migration, crude rate of change (CRC) and standardized crude rate of change (SCRC) due to migration by five-year periods and country of origin

Immigrants	Net migration		CRC		SCRC	
	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008	1999–2003	2004–2008
Iran	3,284	4,351	10.7	14.2	8.1	10.4
Iraq	30,244	42,312	95.0	82.2	91.0	74.0
Pakistan	885	3,944	36.1	105.8	24.9	49.0
Somalia	1,692	9,196	17.4	69.4	25.4	64.3
Turkey	3,606	5,641	13.6	18.5	8.6	11.2
Vietnam	1,693	1,837	22.3	20.5	15.3	15.1
Swedish origin	-13,739	-24,803	-0.4	-0.7	1.5	1.4
Total population	128,698	215,194	2.9	4.7	6.4	9.1

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.9 depicts the composition of the immigrant groups by sex, age and generation. The “total” column shows that about 60 to 80 per cent of the groups consist of immigrants. The “younger” the immigrant group, the fewer descendants there are in any group’s total population. The table also shows that descendants are still largely in the 0–15 age group and that no descendants have yet reached the age of retirement, that is the age of sixty-five. It is clear that, of the groups shown in the table, the Turkish group has the longest migration history in Sweden. This group shows the highest *proportion of descendants* in the age groups 0–15 and 16–64.

Table 2.9: The composition of the group and its age-sex sub-groups by generation and year, 2008

Age groups		Total	0–15	16–64	65+
Iran					
Female	Immigrants	79.7	11.4	92.4	100.0
	Descendants	20.3	88.6	7.6	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.8	11.5	93.1	100.0
	Descendants	19.2	88.5	6.9	0.0
Total	Immigrants	80.2	11.4	92.8	100.0
	Descendants	19.8	88.6	7.2	0.0
Iraq					
Female	Immigrants	78.6	40.3	97.7	100.0
	Descendants	21.4	59.7	2.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.1	41.7	98.0	100.0
	Descendants	19.9	58.3	2.0	0.0
Total	Immigrants	80.1	41.0	97.8	100.0
	Descendants	19.9	59.0	2.2	0.0
Pakistan					
Female	Immigrants	66.3	23.5	82.7	100.0
	Descendants	33.7	76.5	17.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.2	22.5	90.7	100.0
	Descendants	19.8	77.5	9.3	0.0
Total	Immigrants	75.3	23.0	88.2	100.0
	Descendants	24.7	77.0	11.8	0.0
Somalia					
Female	Immigrants	72.2	32.6	97.7	100.0
	Descendants	27.8	67.4	2.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	71.1	32.4	97.6	100.0
	Descendants	28.9	67.6	2.4	0.0
Total	Immigrants	71.6	32.5	97.6	100.0
	Descendants	28.4	67.5	2.4	0.0
Turkey					
Female	Immigrants	58.6	7.9	70.6	100.0
	Descendants	41.4	92.1	29.4	0.0
Male	Immigrants	61.0	8.0	73.0	99.9
	Descendants	39.0	92.0	27.0	0.1
Total	Immigrants	59.9	8.0	71.9	100.0
	Descendants	40.1	92.0	28.1	0.0
Vietnam					
Female	Immigrants	71.6	30.8	88.0	100.0
	Descendants	28.4	69.2	12.0	0.0
Male	Immigrants	67.2	8.0	85.5	100.0
	Descendants	32.8	92.0	14.5	0.0
Total	Immigrants	69.5	8.0	86.8	100.0
	Descendants	30.5	92.0	13.2	0.0

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.2.2 Composition of Immigrant Groups by Selected Traits

In the following sub-section we analyze the composition of the immigrant groups by means of a number of selected traits. The first is the average duration of residence achieved by both females and males in 1998, 2003 and 2008. We also show changes that have taken place over the period 1998–2008. This measure allows for comparison across the

immigrant groups and indicates whether an immigrant group is growing “older”, that is whether it has a longer length of residence over time.

As observed earlier, immigrants from Iran, Turkey and Vietnam show more change over time and have a longer average duration of residence in Sweden than the other three groups. The Pakistani group, in particular, seems to have become “younger” over time due to a new wave of migration.

Table 2.10: Average duration of residence of immigrants by sex, year and country of origin

Immigrants	1998	2003	2008	Change
Iran				
Female	9.4	12.9	15.7	6.3
Male	10.7	14.7	17.7	7.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>10.1</i>	<i>13.8</i>	<i>16.8</i>	<i>6.6</i>
Iraq				
Female	5.4	6.5	7.9	2.5
Male	6.6	7.6	8.4	1.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>6.1</i>	<i>7.1</i>	<i>8.2</i>	<i>2.1</i>
Pakistan				
Female	12.4	14.0	12.5	0.1
Male	14.5	14.3	8.7	-5.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>13.6</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>9.9</i>	<i>-3.7</i>
Somalia				
Female	5.0	7.8	7.5	4.8
Male	5.6	8.8	8.2	2.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>5.3</i>	<i>8.3</i>	<i>8.2</i>	<i>2.7</i>
Turkey				
Female	14.6	17.6	19.6	5.0
Male	15.4	18.0	19.1	3.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>15.0</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>19.3</i>	<i>4.3</i>
Vietnam				
Female	10.1	12.8	15.2	5.1
Male	11.0	14.2	16.8	5.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>10.6</i>	<i>13.4</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>5.4</i>

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.11 shows the marriage rate for immigrants, or rather the extent to which individuals are married to, or live with, a *registered partner*. As an indication of integration, the table shows the *proportion* of those who are married to people from their own groups, to native Swedes, or to people born in a country other than Sweden or their own country. Again, our aim is to find out if there are gender and/or generational differences.

The marriage rate for immigrants is substantially higher than that for descendants, since the latter are much younger. In general, more individuals in the older age groups are married.

The table shows that descendants marry Swedish-born individuals or individuals from other immigrant countries to a greater degree than immigrants. Gender differences can also be observed. With the exception of Vietnam, immigrant and descendent males marry Swedes to a greater

extent than do females. With the exception of Pakistan and males from Turkey, descendants also marry individuals from other countries to a larger extent than immigrants.

Table 2.11: Proportion of persons with a partner by country of origin, background of the partner, sex, generation in 2008

Nationality of the partner		Own	Swedes	Other	Marriage rate
Iran					
Female	Immigrants	85.0	8.8	6.3	49.7
	Descendants	50.0	37.9	12.1	2.7
Male	Immigrants	78.8	9.9	11.3	46.1
	Descendants	44.0	44.0	12.0	1.1
Total	Immigrants	81.8	9.3	8.9	47.8
	Descendants	48.2	39.8	12.0	7.8
Iraq					
Female	Immigrants	94.5	1.1	4.4	63.8
	Descendants	47.2	15.1	37.7	4.9
Male	Immigrants	88.8	2.0	9.2	55.4
	Descendants	35.0	55.0	10.0	2.1
Total	Immigrants	91.5	1.6	6.9	59.1
	Descendants	43.8	26.0	30.1	3.4
Pakistan					
Female	Immigrants	71.8	7.1	21.1	76.1
	Descendants	63.2	17.6	19.1	18.1
Male	Immigrants	64.9	13.0	21.1	42.6
	Descendants	67.3	20.0	12.7	10.2
Total	Immigrants	68.1	10.2	21.6	52.7
	Descendants	65.0	18.7	16.3	13.5
Somalia					
Female	Immigrants	90.9	1.8	7.3	55.9
	Descendants	-	-	-	2.0
Male	Immigrants	92.2	0.9	6.9	53.7
	Descendants	-	-	-	0.5
Total	Immigrants	91.6	1.3	7.1	54.8
	Descendants	-	-	-	1.2
Turkey					
Female	Immigrants	82.3	8.8	9.0	67.0
	Descendants	53.1	32.5	14.5	28.7
Male	Immigrants	69.5	17.0	13.4	67.5
	Descendants	43.2	45.6	11.2	17.9
Total	Immigrants	75.4	13.3	11.4	67.3
	Descendants	49.1	37.8	13.1	23.1
Vietnam					
Female	Immigrants	73.4	14.7	12.0	47.1
	Descendants	13.8	41.4	44.8	3.7
Male	Immigrants	85.4	2.2	12.4	48.1
	Descendants	18.2	18.2	63.6	1.3
Total	Immigrants	79.0	8.9	12.2	47.5
	Descendants	15.0	35.0	50.0	2.5

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 2.12 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) for immigrants, native Swedes and the total population as well as for descendants of immigrants. Women from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam have

fertility rates of between 2.0 to 4.3. These rates are substantially higher compared to Swedish- and Iranian-born women, who have fertility rates of 1.5 and 1.4 respectively. The TFR rates were calculated for three differing ages, an approach which is useful for studying the fertility rates of descendants – most of whom are young – and for comparing their rates with those of immigrants and others. The TFRs show a reduction in levels for all age groups. Comparing the first half of the decade with the second also shows decreasing TFRs for some groups (Iranian, Somali and Vietnamese women). Increasing rates, however, are observed for Iraqi, Pakistani and Turkish women.

When the number of observations allows us to calculate TFRs for descendants, they indicate that descendants have lower total fertility rates that are more in line with the TFR levels of Swedish women.

Table 2.12: Total fertility rate (TFR) at the ages of 39, 29 and 24 for immigrants and descendants by five-year intervals

	1999–2003				2004–2008			
	TFR	TFR 39	TFR 29	TFR 24	TFR	TFR 39	TFR 29	TFR 24
Iran								
Immigrants	1.4	1.3	0.6	0.2	1.4	1.3	0.5	0.1
Descendants	-	1.5	0.3	0.1	-	1.9	0.3	0.0
Iraq								
Immigrants	3.2	3.0	1.8	0.8	3.2	3.0	1.7	0.8
Descendants	-	-	0.9	0.2	-	-	0.7	0.1
Pakistan								
Immigrants	2.8	2.7	1.7	0.8	3.7	3.6	2.3	1.2
Descendants	-	-	0.5	0.1	-	-	0.6	0.2
Somalia								
Immigrants	4.3	3.8	2.0	0.8	4.1	3.6	1.8	0.8
Descendants	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.9	0.1
Turkey								
Immigrants	2.3	2.2	1.4	0.7	2.6	2.5	1.6	0.8
Descendants	-	2.1	1.0	0.4	-	1.9	0.9	0.3
Vietnam								
Immigrants	2.1	2.0	1.2	0.5	2.0	1.9	1.1	0.4
Descendants	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.3	0.0
<i>Swedish origin</i>	1.5	1.5	0.7	0.2	1.8	1.7	0.7	0.2
Total population	1.6	1.5	0.7	0.2	1.8	1.8	0.8	0.2

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.2.3 Summary

With regard to demographic integration, the most important results in the period 1998–2008 are that all six immigrant groups from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam have grown. The Iraqi and Soma-

li groups, in particular, have experienced a considerable increase in numbers. The growth in the groups from Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Vietnam is due to both net migration and to an increased number of descendants. For Pakistan, the main explanation stems from net migration. On the whole, population growth in Sweden during this period was mainly due to net migration and higher birth rates among immigrants and, to a somewhat lesser degree, their descendants. In general, the “older” immigrant groups, those who have been in Sweden for a longer period of time, have more descendants than “younger” groups. Iran, Turkey and Vietnam can be depicted as “older” groups, and Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia as “younger” ones.

With the exception of Iran, all the immigrant groups have a higher crude birth rate than natives. The age structure of the immigrant groups is younger than that of the native population. They all have a far lower crude death rate than the native population as well. In general, immigrants are married to individuals from the same group, whereas their descendants show a greater tendency to have partners who are natives or who are from other immigrant groups. The total fertility rate is higher among most immigrant groups compared to natives. Again, Iranian women are the exception. Descendants show a lower fertility rate than their immigrant parents.

6.3 Enrolment in the Educational System

In this section we describe the educational enrolment of immigrants and descendants from the study’s six selected source countries and compare it with that of the total population. We begin by examining enrolment in any education in. After that, enrolment in tertiary education is scrutinized. The focus is on the status of enrolment in the school year 2007/2008, progress between school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008, and on gender differences within the groups.

6.3.1 *Enrolment in the Swedish Educational System in General*

Table SWE 3.1 provides a detailed overview of *enrolment rates* in school year 2007/2008 for male and female immigrants and their descendants from the six countries studied, aged 16 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29-years-old, and for the total population. The table shows that among individuals in the youngest age group, 16–19 years, immigrant males have a somewhat

higher enrolment rate than immigrant females. However, the children of immigrants show the opposite picture: in this age group females are more likely to be enrolled in education than males. Vietnamese male descendants aged 16 to 19 have the highest enrolment rate (91.6). Turkish descendants in the age group 25 to 29 have the lowest enrolment rate (9.6).

In general, enrolment rates become lower as people get older. The most obvious reason for this is that individuals start work after completing their studies. However, in the 25 to 29-year-old age group, we can see that Pakistani men have a high enrolment rate.

Comparisons across countries and age groups show that immigrants from Turkey and Somalia have the lowest enrolment rates. Compared to the enrolment rates for the total population, Iraqi and Iranian immigrants, Pakistani males and Vietnamese women aged 16 to 19 have similar or higher enrolment levels. In the 20 to 24-year-old age group, Iranian and Iraqi female immigrants and Iranian, Vietnamese and Pakistani male immigrants have higher enrolment rates than the total population. All the descendant groups have higher enrolment rates than the total population in the age group 20–24.

Table 3.1: Proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in education in the age groups 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29, by sex and country of origin. School year 2007/2008

	16–19		20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants						
Iran	80.1	83.8	59.6	49.2	38.0	35.8
Iraq	83.3	83.9	42.2	30.9	25.4	17.6
Pakistan	78.3	84.1	20.6	67.1	23.5	54.8
Somalia	73.7	75.8	25.9	33.7	16.9	22.1
Turkey	68.5	74.0	29.9	22.7	22.4	11.9
Vietnam	88.3	66.1	31.6	35.9	22.1	14.9
Descendants						
Iran	88.6	87.8	71.5	56.1	29.9	29.6
Iraq	89.9	87.2	61.5	43.3	-	-
Pakistan	91.2	84.1	64.7	55.7	23.8	22.4
Somalia	88.8	85.6	73.1	45.8	-	-
Turkey	86.3	82.9	43.1	29.6	14.0	9.6
Vietnam	91.4	91.6	61.3	51.6	22.0	26.1
Swedish origin	80.8	80.1	41.1	28.5	22.6	15.9
Total population	80.9	80.3	41.2	29.6	23.0	16.7

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 3.2 presents an overview of the changes that took place in enrolments from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008 in percentage points. The general tendency is that immigrants and their descendants aged 16–19 and 20–24 have a higher rate of enrolment than the total population or natives. This is partly due to a lower initial enrolment rate for these groups. In

age groups 20–24 and 25–29, the negative growth for Somali men, and to a lesser extent for Somali women, could be due to the large numbers of Somalis migrating to Sweden over the past decade. Their difficulties in gaining employment and joining the educational system could explain their lower enrolment rates over time.

As earlier shown in Table 3.1, high enrolment rates were evident for Pakistani male immigrants in school year 2007/2008. Enrolments also grew for this immigrant group over the last decade. To some degree this can be explained by changes in Denmark's family reunion rules that have particularly affected younger immigrants' decision whether to move to Sweden or wait to marry and live in Denmark. An increase in the number of international students from Pakistan over the last decade could be another explanation. The relatively high growth rates among descendants aged 20 to 24 indicates a growth in the numbers pursuing post-secondary studies.

Table 3.2: Growth in the total enrolment rate of immigrants and descendants in the age groups 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29, by sex and country of origin. School years 1997/1998 to 2007/2008. Percentage points

	16–19		20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants						
Iran	-4.2	-0.4	5.1	-3.1	-4.1	-0.3
Iraq	13.1	9.3	8.8	-8.6	2.3	-4.7
Pakistan	10.8	2.6	-2.8	38.9	-0.4	35.7
Somalia	9.2	4.8	-6.6	-20.4	-4.1	-20.3
Turkey	-2.6	4.0	2.3	1.7	0.4	1.8
Vietnam	12.6	6.5	-3.9	0.6	-0.3	-3.2
Descendants						
Iran	-1.5	9.7	16.9	2.3	-	-
Iraq	1.7	3.4	23.1	6.5	-	-
Pakistan	3.9	-9.5	-0.2	-9.8	-	-
Turkey	6.6	8.7	16.4	3.3	-4.4	-5.4
<i>Swedish origin</i>	-0.1	1.4	-2.3	-4.3	-1.9	-1.5
Total	0.5	1.8	-1.5	-3.6	-1.8	-1.0

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 3.3 depicts gender differences in educational enrolment. This was achieved by calculating the ratios of the enrolment rates of women to men for the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008. The table shows that, in general, descendants have ratios above 1.00. This indicates that more female descendants are enrolled in education than male descendants. The table also shows that the higher enrolment rates observed for women are less pronounced among female immigrants.

Patterns over time are clear for descendants and natives – enrolment rates are increasing for women aged 20 to 24 and 25 to 29. This also

indicates that women born in Sweden to immigrant parents, like native Swedish women, are more likely to be enrolled in post-secondary education than their male counterparts.

There is no clear pattern evident for immigrants, however. Some groups, such as Turkish, Iranian, Vietnamese and Iraqi immigrants, show increasing ratios over time. This either means that the enrolment of women has grown or that of men has diminished. The ratio for Somali and Pakistani immigrants decreases over time.

Table 3.3: The ratio of the total enrolment rate of women to men immigrants and descendants in the age ranges 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29, by country of origin. School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008

	16–19			20–24			25–29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants									
Iran	1.00	1.00	0.95	1.04	1.12	1.20	1.17	1.28	1.06
Iraq	0.94	1.05	0.99	0.85	1.08	1.36	1.04	1.21	1.44
Pakistan	0.83	0.91	0.93	0.83	0.56	0.30	1.25	0.61	0.42
Somalia	0.91	1.00	0.97	0.60	0.84	0.77	0.50	1.11	0.77
Turkey	1.01	1.03	0.92	1.30	1.54	1.31	2.17	1.70	1.88
Vietnam	0.96	0.95	1.04	1.00	0.93	0.88	1.23	1.27	1.48
Descendants									
Iran	1.15	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.27	-	-	1.01
Iraq	1.05	1.06	1.03	1.04	1.32	1.42	-	-	1.34
Pakistan	0.93	1.01	1.08	1.01	1.05	1.16	-	0.94	1.06
Turkey	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.01	1.29	1.45	1.21	1.38	1.44
Swedish origin	1.03	1.01	1.00	1.32	1.32	1.44	1.41	1.29	1.42
Total	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.28	1.29	1.39	1.40	1.29	1.37

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of the men's.

6.3.2 Enrolment in Tertiary Education

Table 3.4 shows enrolment in tertiary education for age groups 20–24 and 25–29. The table indicates a gender gap that was already visible in the earlier tables. Women aged 20–24 have a ten percentage point higher enrolment in tertiary education than men in the same age group. The gap diminishes to four percentage points in the age group 25–29.

Both men and women born in Sweden to immigrant parents have higher enrolment rates than native men and women aged 20–24.

Among immigrant women, only those from Iran have higher tertiary education enrolment levels than native women. Immigrant men from Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam have higher enrolment levels than natives. Immigrant men from Pakistan, Somalia and Vietnam have higher levels

than their female counterparts. Among descendants the opposite relationship is evident – women have higher enrolment rates in tertiary education than men, a finding that is in line with what is observed for natives and the total population.

Table 3.4: Proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education in the 20–24 and 25–29 age groups, by sex and country of origin. School year 2007/2008

	20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	41.9	34.4	25.7	27.5
Iraq	16.5	13.1	6.4	5.7
Pakistan	13.4	63.0	12.9	53.7
Somalia	7.9	9.2	2.9	3.8
Turkey	16.1	15.4	7.7	7.0
Vietnam	18.4	25.8	10.4	10.4
Descendants				
Iran	56.2	44.3	28.5	25.2
Iraq	44.1	30.2	11.7	11.9
Pakistan	52.9	42.8	20.2	20.4
Somalia	42.3	37.5	-	-
Turkey	32.9	21.9	9.6	6.7
Vietnam	55.1	43.4	20.2	17.4
Swedish origin	31.1	21.8	18.2	12.9
Total	30.2	21.8	16.9	12.9

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 3.5 shows growth in tertiary education enrolments between 1997/1998 and 2007/2008. In the age group 20–24 all the groups (immigrants and descendants, males and females) have a higher enrolment growth rate than the total population and natives.

The growth rate is especially high for Pakistani immigrant males in the age groups 20–24 and 25–29. While the growth rate for natives is relatively low, the growth rates for descendants are particularly high and indicate an increase in the post-secondary enrolment of immigrants and descendants in Sweden over time. The increase is less prominent in the age group 25–29 than in the age group 20–24.

Table 3.5: Growth in the proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education in the age groups 20–24 and 25–29, by sex and country of origin. School years 1997/1998 to 2007/2008. Percentages points

	20–24		25–29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Immigrants				
Iran	15.7	8.0	8.2	6.6
Iraq	11.0	3.5	3.3	1.3
Pakistan	6.3	50.3	5.5	46.9
Somalia	6.1	6.9	1.8	-1.8
Turkey	9.5	8.7	4.8	3.9
Vietnam	6.2	10.8	7.7	4.9
Descendants				
Iran	22.9	9.7	-	-
Iraq	36.4	14.5	-	-
Pakistan	15.4	11.8	-	-
Turkey	19.6	10.5	7.7	0.6
Swedish origin	2.5	-1.0	5.0	1.3
Total	3.4	0.1	4.4	1.8

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Table 3.6 shows the gender balance in tertiary enrolment rates as identified through the calculation of the ratios of the enrolment rates for women and men in school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008.

The results indicate that there is a gender imbalance throughout the entire population. Females have a higher enrolment rate over time. The same pattern is visible for the descendants of all the immigrant groups, with the exception of the Pakistani group.

For immigrants, this same pattern is visible for Iran and Iraq in the age groups 20–24 and 25–29 and for Vietnam in the age group 25–29. Turkish immigrants show an increase in female enrolments between 1998 and 2003, after which the rate drops again. Somali women show an increase in the gender ratio, albeit at a low level, but they are still below the enrolment level of Somali men. Pakistani women also lag behind their male counterparts, which could be the result of the large influx of male foreign students from Pakistan over the past decade.

Table 3.6: The enrolment rate ratio of women to men immigrants and descendants in tertiary education in the 20–24 and 25–29 age groups, by country of origin. School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008

	20–24			25–29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
Immigrants						
Iran	0.99	1.17	1.21	0.83	1.00	0.93
Iraq	0.84	1.14	1.64	0.81	0.99	1.26
Pakistan	0.55	0.30	0.21	1.09	0.22	0.23
Somalia	0.82	0.75	0.86	0.20	0.29	0.50
Turkey	1.12	1.31	1.11	1.11	1.47	1.19
Vietnam	0.81	0.85	0.71	0.48	0.64	0.99
Descendants						
Iran	0.96	1.18	1.26	-	-	1.02
Iraq	0.48	1.57	1.45	-	0.34	0.98
Pakistan	1.20	1.08	1.23	-	0.98	0.99
Turkey	1.15	1.36	1.50	0.30	1.26	1.43
Swedish origin	1.25	1.33	1.42	1.14	1.25	1.41
Total	1.24	1.31	1.38	1.12	1.22	1.31

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of the men's.

6.3.3 Summary

Educational enrolment levels vary amongst the immigrant groups. Between the ages of 16 and 19, Iraqi and Iranian men and women, males from Pakistan and females from Vietnam all have enrolment levels that parallel those of native men and women. Moreover, the descendants of immigrants generally have higher enrolment levels than their immigrant counterparts.

A positive development is evident over time. With the exception of the group from Somali, both immigrants and descendants had higher enrolment levels at the end of the period (2008) than they did at the beginning (1998). A major immigration inflow of Somalis to Sweden during the period and difficulties in joining the regular educational system could explain why this group had lower enrolment rates in 2008 than in 1998.

Descendant females have higher enrolment levels than descendant males. For immigrants the pattern is the same, but to a lesser degree.

With respect to higher education, the results show a clear gender gap, with more female students enrolled than male students. Descendants in a number of groups show even higher enrolment rates than natives.

Generally, enrolment rates for immigrants should be expected to be lower than those for natives and descendants, since some will seek – and find – employment rather than continue their education.

6.4 Labour Market Integration

6.4.1 *Introduction*

Studies relating to the economic integration of immigrants in Sweden show a very high labour market attachment during the 1950ies and 1960ies. In this period, income and employment rates were relatively high, with resulting low unemployment rates (Wadensjö, 1973; Ekberg, 1983). During the 1970ies and 1980ies, unemployment was quite low in Sweden compared to most other countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Nevertheless, dating back to 1977, when unemployment began to be reported separately for different nationalities, the rate for foreign citizens was at least double that of Swedish citizens. In the first half of the 1990ies, the unemployment rates of both Swedish and foreign citizens increased dramatically, mainly due to the crisis in the Swedish economy.

However, current research into the employment situation of the 1970ies, 1980ies and 1990ies shows a slightly different picture, namely a gradual decline in immigrant employment rates for both men and women compared to natives. Starting in the 1970ies, a negative trend is observed in the employment rates for immigrants. After 1970, the employment rate for foreign-born men decreased gradually compared to native-born men. Foreign-born women showed an increased employment rate over time, although this was not in parity with the increase observed for native-born women. It seems clear that the deep economic recession of the early 1990ies widened the gap between natives and immigrants even further, whereas the economic recovery of the late nineties seems to have served to reverse the negative development to some extent (Bevelander, 2010).

This section of the chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the employment, unemployment and non-activity rates of the six immigrants groups and their descendants between 1998 and 2008.

6.4.2 *Employment Rates 1998–2008*

Figure 4.1 shows the employment rate for female immigrants from the six countries covered by this study and the total female population in the age group 25–54. The table shows that all the immigrant groups have a lower employment rate than the reference group, that is, the total female population. If we just look at the year 2008, we can observe a 20 per cent point gap in employment between women from Iran and Vietnam

compared to all women. The gap increases to about 30 per cent for women from Turkey and 40 per cent for women from Pakistan. The employment gap between all women and women from Iraq is even larger: 50 per cent in 2008. Finally the largest gap, 55 per cent, is found between all women and women from Somalia.

The picture, however, does include a positive development for most of the groups. With the exception of women from Pakistan, all the groups experience increasing employment over time.

Figure 4.1: Employment rates for female immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, ages 25–54, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.2: Employment rates for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of origin, ages 25–54, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.2 shows the employment rates for immigrant men and the total population in the core working age group 25–54 for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008.

All men show an employment rate of close to and above 80 per cent in these three years. If we focus on the year 2008, we observe that Turkish and Vietnamese males have about 10–15 per cent lower employment rates. Iranians have a gap of about 20 per cent. The gap increases to about 40 per cent for males from Iraq and Pakistan. Somali males have the lowest employment rate of about 35 per cent.

The employment rate for all male immigrant groups, with the exception of Pakistanis, shows an increasing trend over time. For example, Iranian males had a 20 per cent higher employment rate in 2008 compared to 1998.

Figure 4.3: Gender gap in employment rates for immigrants and total population, by country of origin, ages 25–54, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

The gender employment gap depicted in Figure 4.3 is about 3–4 per cent for the total population, which indicates that, in Sweden, males have a higher employment rate than Swedish females. The gap is significantly larger for the immigrant groups. The biggest gaps are visible for immigrants from Pakistan and Turkey. No clear patterns over time were observed. For some groups the gap decreases, whereas for others it is either stable or increases.

6.4.3 Employment Among Young People 1998–2008

This section describes the employment situation of young people between the ages of 16 to 24. Here figures relating to immigrants and descendants from the six countries are compared to the total population by gender and over time. When studying employment and unemployment rates the enrolment of individuals in education in this age category is a strong influencing factor.

Figure 4.4 shows the employment rate for young female immigrants. Overall, about 35–40 per cent of all young people were employed in the period 1998–2008. Again, most of the immigrant groups have substantially lower employment rates than the total female population. Some groups show an increase in the percentage employed over time, for example, women from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam. However, a clear pattern of increasing employment levels due to a better economic situation in Sweden cannot be identified.

Figure 4.4: Employment rates for female immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.5, which shows the employment rates of young male immigrants over time, demonstrates they have higher employment levels than their female counterparts, especially immigrant males from Iran, Vietnam and Turkey. In addition, Iranian, Turkish, Somali and Iraqi males have increasing employment levels over time, thus reflecting Sweden's improved economic situation during the decade. On the other hand, the Pakistani group shows a decline in employment over time. This could be due to the large numbers of immigrants of Pakistani origins who arrived during these years as well as their higher level of participation in education in comparison with other groups.

Figure 4.5: Employment rates for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict the employment rates of young descendants compared to the total population, by gender and over time. Figure 4.6 shows that children born in Sweden to immigrants have lower employment rates than the total population. However, all the groups have higher employment levels than people of the same age who migrated to Sweden (see Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.6: Employment rates for female descendants of immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.7: Employment rates for male descendants and the total male population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.7 shows that the male descendants of immigrants have substantially higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts. In addition, all the groups seem to have been helped by increasing economic activity in Sweden, in that all show increasing employment rates over time. However, this has not been enough to close the gap in the employment rate that exists between these groups and the total male population, even though Turkish males came close in 2008.

6.4.4 Employment by Cohort 1998–2008

The following figures show the employment rate of the 25–39-year-old age cohort in 1998 and how this rate develops between 2003 and 2008. Figure 5.8 is for female immigrant groups. As we can see, the employment rates for all groups increase with increasing age. In addition, the increase is greater for the immigrant groups compared to the total female population. This pattern indicates there has been a so-called “catch up” in employment integration. In other words, the employment gap is narrowing over time.

This figure also shows there are considerable differences in the employment levels of the differing immigrant groups.

Figure 4.8: Employment rates over time of female immigrant groups and the total female population aged 25–39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

By and large, the patterns for females and males, as shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively, are very similar. Increasing age enhances employment integration for all groups, but the observed 10-year period is insufficient for the groups to “catch up” with the total population. Levels for males are generally higher than for females. Some immigrant groups, such as Pakistani and Somali males, also have lower upward trends than others.

Figure 4.9: Employment rates over time of male immigrant groups and the total male population aged 25–39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.4.5 Unemployment Rates 1998–2008¹⁴

Figures 4.10 to 4.13 show the unemployment rates of immigrants from the six countries and the total population in the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. We begin by analyzing the unemployment rates for females and males in the age group 25–54.

All the female immigrant groups have higher unemployment rates than the total female population. However, for most but not all of the groups and for the total population unemployment levels decrease over time: a firm drop between 1998 and 2003 and a somewhat slower decline between 2003 and 2008 for Iranian and Vietnamese women. In the case of Iranian women, the unemployment rate declined by over 50 per cent. Somali women experienced a decrease from 1998 to 2003, but also a substantial increase in the period 2003–2008.

¹⁴ As can be seen in the glossary of terms provided at the end of this report, we ask the reader to note that we use register data to calculate our indicators. For the indicator unemployment this means that an individual can only be in one state, e.g. employed, enrolled in education (see Section 2.4), unemployed or inactive. Regularly published unemployment figures are based on *Labour Force Surveys* in which the informant can be both enrolled in education *and* unemployed, and due to this have higher unemployment rates. This is particularly the case for youth.

Figure 4.10: Unemployment rates for female immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, ages 25–54, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.11 depicts the male unemployment rate for the age group 25–54 by immigrant group and total male population. A similar picture is visible for males as that seen for females (Figure 4.10). Immigrant unemployment levels are substantially higher compared to the total population. Almost all the groups show a drop in unemployment between 1998 and 2003. Except for Iraqi and Somali males, all the other groups experienced a reduction in unemployment in the subsequent period of 2003–2008. Like the total male population unemployment level, the Iranian, Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese levels are just below 10 per cent.

Figure 4.11: Unemployment rates for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of origin, ages 25–54, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.4.6 Youth Unemployment 1998–2008

Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the youth unemployment rates for female and male immigrants in 1998, 2003 and 2008. Figure 5.12 shows that youth unemployment declines between 1998 and 2008 for most of the groups; Somalia being the only exception with an increase in the unemployment of young people between 2003 and 2008. Interestingly enough, in 2008 Iranian, Pakistani women have the same level of youth unemployment as the total female population (4 per cent).

Figure 4.12: Unemployment rates for female immigrants and the total female population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

The unemployment rate for male youths can be seen in Figure 4.13. The unemployment rates for most all the groups drop between 1998–2003 and between 2003–2008. Males from Iraq and Somalia are the exception, with slight increases between 2003 and 2008. Pakistani and Vietnamese males have lower unemployment rates than all males in this age group.

Figure 4.13: Unemployment rates for male immigrants and the total male population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 4.14: Unemployment rates for female descendants and total female population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Lastly, the youth unemployment rates for descendants are pictured in Figures 4.14 and 4.15. Both female and male descendants have lower unemployment rates than their immigrant counterparts, particularly in

2008. Moreover, for the year 2008, we found no general difference between the total population and descendants, both males and females

Figure 4.15: Unemployment rates for male descendants and total male population, by country of origin, ages 16–24, 1998, 2003 and 2008

Source: Statistics Sweden.

6.4.7 Inactive 1998–2008

So-called “inactive” individuals are the focus in this section. Here inactive refers to individuals who are not working, actively seeking work or attending any education or training course. Table 4.1 shows the proportion of inactivity per age category, sex and generation in 2008 and changes in this situation from 1998 to 2008. Again, a comparison with the total population is included.

From the table we can see that all immigrant groups, irrespective of age and sex, have higher inactivity levels than the total population. The highest inactivity level in the age group 16–24 is represented by women from Pakistan, and among the 25–54 and 55–64 age groups, by Somali women. Both these groups have migrated in large numbers to Sweden in recent years, which could explain their levels of high inactivity.

In contrast, and with the exception of men and women from Somalia, female descendants have a somewhat lower inactivity level, and male descendants a slightly higher inactivity, compared with the total population. This can be seen as an indicator of integration.

The table clearly depicts a positive development for many groups who had lower inactivity rates in 2008 than in 1998. Lower inactivity is

seen for all the groups, particularly for those aged 55–64 and is an indication of a gradual reduction in early retirement levels and the fact that people generally work up to the retirement age of 65.

Table 4.1: Proportion of immigrants and total population in the age ranges 16–24, 25–54 and 55–64 who were inactive in 2008 and the changes between 1998 and 2008, by sex and country of origin.

	16–24		16–24		25–54		55–64	
	Immigrants		Descendants		Immigrants		Immigrants	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Iran	16.2	12.3	7.6	11.2	21.9	20.0	56.9	35.0
Iraq	26.2	17.3	9.3	13.2	39.1	26.2	74.9	57.5
Pakistan	44.3	17.4	9.7	12.5	41.1	29.4	65.9	49.0
Somalia	37.9	26.6	17.1	22.2	46.8	33.2	83.0	55.0
Turkey	34.7	21.7	10.2	12.7	34.4	22.0	77.9	51.5
Vietnam	17.5	18.3	6.7	7.5	23.5	19.3	50.4	34.2
Total population	10.9	10.4	10.9	10.4	12.0	10.3	27.1	22.2
Change 1998–2008								
Iran	-1.2	-2.2	2.6	-3.8	-2.5	0.7	-17.7	-11.4
Iraq	-11.5	-5.9	-1.8	0.9	-4.5	-1.8	-10.3	-4.5
Pakistan	7.6	-3.3	-1.7	2.5	-2.6	1.7	-19.6	-0.5
Somalia	-6.1	2.1	-	-	-9.8	6.1	-6.5	-11.9
Turkey	4.2	-4.0	-5.9	-5.3	-6.2	-4.1	-11.0	-18.0
Vietnam	-6.2	3.4	-	-	-4.0	2.9	-14.6	-12.6
Total population	1.3	0.8			1.5	1.6	-8.6	-7.7

6.4.8 Summary

The employment integration of individuals aged 25–54 (the core labour market ages) is relatively low compared to natives. However, a positive trend is visible over time. Both females and males from our six immigrant groups had higher employment rates at the end of the period than at the beginning. The study's gender analysis revealed a gender gap in that males have higher employment levels than females. The largest gap is detected for groups originating from Pakistan and Turkey.

Young immigrants (those aged 16 to 24) have lower employment rates than their native counterparts. For women we see no positive development over time. For males, an increasing employment rate is visible over time. Both male and female descendants in this age group have lower employment rates than natives.

When following the cohort of immigrants in the 25 to 39-year-old age group through 1998 and 2003 to 2008, we can see employment levels increasing for both females and males. The exceptions are Pakistani and Somali males, who do not show any increase in employment between 2003 and 2008.

The unemployment rate for both immigrant females and males drops during the same period, with the exception of Iraqi and Somali immigrants. Female youth unemployment also drops over time for most of the immigrant groups, again with the exception of Somali immigrants. Male youth unemployment also decreases. The exceptions here are Iraqi, Somali and native males. Descendant unemployment levels are mainly in parity with, or lower than, native levels.

Inactivity is higher for all the immigrant groups in comparison with natives. However, inactivity rates drops substantially over the studied period.

6.5 Summary of Results – Sweden

Over the last six decades, Sweden's population of immigrants and their descendants has grown steadily. Migration flows have been associated with societal phenomena such as labour demands in Sweden's growing economy, family reunions, and refugee streams due to wars and political conflicts. Whereas earlier migration streams integrated relatively well, concern about the current streams is high on the political agenda. It is thought that a deeper knowledge of integration patterns in the demographic, educational and labour market domains could lead to better integration policies.

In 2010, almost one fifth of Sweden's population were immigrants or had immigrant parents. Or, to be more exact, in that year 14.7 per cent of Sweden's 9,415,570 inhabitants were immigrants. The descendants of immigrants totalled 412,960, or 4.4 per cent of the total population. The immigrants and their descendants examined in this chapter constitute 20 per cent of the immigrant population in Sweden, with Iraq being the largest immigrant group and Pakistan the smallest.

Since the end of the 1960ies Sweden has implemented a number of policy measures to help immigrants integrate into several areas of society – the most important pertaining to Swedish language proficiency and economic integration. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007), Sweden scores highly when it comes to granting immigrants access to and rights in the labour market.

To summarize the most important results, and return to the study's first objective with respect to demographic integration, it is clear that all six groups grew in size between 1998 and 2008. In particular, the Iraqi and Somali groups substantially increased in number. The growth seen for the Iranian, Iraqi, Somali and Vietnamese groups is due to net migration and an increase in descendants. For Pakistan, the main reason for

growth is net migration. On the whole, population growth in Sweden during this period was mainly due to net migration, higher birth rates among immigrants, and to a somewhat lesser degree, among their descendants. Unlike “younger” immigrant groups, the “older” immigrant groups – who have been in Sweden for a longer period of time – consist mainly of descendants. Iran, Turkey and Vietnam can be depicted as “older” groups and Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia as “younger” ones.

With the exception of Iran, all the groups have a higher crude birth rate than natives. These groups are still younger than the native population and have a far lower crude death rate than natives. In general, immigrants are married to individuals from the same group, whereas all descendants have a higher tendency to marry natives or members of other immigrant groups. Total fertility rates are higher among most groups in comparison with natives. Again, Iranian women are the exception. Descendants have lower fertility rates than their immigrant parents.

The second objective of the study was to analyze two specific aspects of integration: participation in the educational system, that is educational enrolment; and integration patterns in the labour market, with a focus on employment and unemployment.

When it comes to enrolment in education, there is variation amongst the groups. Iraqi and Iranian men and women, as well as males from Pakistan and females from Vietnam, match the enrolment levels of native men and women aged 16 to 19. Descendants of immigrants generally have higher enrolment rates than their immigrant counterparts.

A positive development is visible over time. The great majority of immigrants and descendants had higher enrolment levels at the end of the period (2008) than at the beginning (1998). However, Somali men and women had a lower enrolment level at the end of the period compared to the start. Significant recent immigration to Sweden and difficulties in joining the regular educational system could be contributing to this result.

Descendant females have higher enrolment rates than descendant males. For immigrants, the pattern is the same, but less marked.

With respect to higher education, the results indicate a gender gap, with more female than male students enrolled in tertiary education.

The employment integration of individuals in the core labour market ages of 25–54 is relatively low. However, a positive trend is visible over time. Both females and males from the six immigrant groups had higher employment rates in 2008 than in 1998. The gender gap that was identified shows that males have higher employment levels than females. The largest gender gap is detected for the groups from Pakistan and Turkey.

The employment rates for young immigrants between the ages of 16 to 24 are lower than those for natives. For women we see no positive development over time, while for males an increasing employment rate is visible over time. Male and female descendants in this age group have lower employment rates than natives, but higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts.

Following the cohort of immigrants aged between 25–39 over time, from 1998 to 2003 to 2008, we can see increasing employment levels for both females and males. The exceptions are Pakistani and Somali males, who show no increases in employment between 2003 and 2008.

The unemployment rates for both immigrant females and males drop during the period, with the exception of Iraqi and Somali immigrants. Female youth unemployment also drops over time for most immigrant groups, again with the exception of immigrants of Somali origin. For males, youth unemployment also decreases. The exceptions here are Iraqi, Somali and native males. Descendant unemployment levels are mainly in parity with, or lower than, native levels.

Inactivity is higher for all immigrant groups compared to natives. However, the inactivity rate drops substantially over the period.

With regard to the third objective of the study, which was to gain insights into the impact of selected public policies and practices, particularly those pertaining to immigration and integration on selected aspects of change and integration, we would like to highlight the following issues.

As described in Section 1, with respect to the national setting and immigration and integration policies, no integration policy aimed at immigrant groups deals with demographic aspects. Instead, integration policy focuses on general education for all residents and specific education for newcomers. Here the term “newcomers” mainly refers to refugees or their family members who obtain a residence permit. Labour migrants and other migrants are directed towards adult education for Swedish language training. General schooling and Swedish language training are compulsory for immigrant children. The analysis of the educational enrolment of immigrants and their descendants undertaken in this study shows that descendants have higher enrolments than their immigrant counterparts. This can be recognized as adaptation to the general/native enrolment level and, thus, a positive outcome of Swedish educational policy.

However, the increasing and higher levels of enrolment of descendants compared to natives could also be an indicator of discrimination. In order to get good jobs, immigrants and descendants may have to be involved in education for longer periods and at higher levels. Another fea-

ture that shows a change of behaviour enhanced by educational policy is the higher enrolment rate for females over males in all the groups, including natives, aged 20 to 29.

Labour market integration policies aimed at immigrants are designed to enhance their employment opportunities as soon as possible after arrival in the country. Introduction courses, including language proficiency courses, general labour market information and the upgrading of specific skills, are the main ingredients for incorporating immigrants into the labour market. The results relating to labour market integration (outlined in Section 4) show that the studied groups find it difficult to enter the Swedish labour market, which could lead to the conclusion that Sweden's employment integration policies, complemented by anti-discrimination policies, are ineffective. Major differences between the immigrant groups and natives are clearly evident.

However, while the results also indicate that the groups catch up over time and by generation, they never reach native employment levels. The exception to this are descendants who have a lower youth unemployment rate than natives. A higher enrolment rate in education, with a view to avoiding unemployment and securing a better and higher education level, could be the reasons for this.

Although no direct policies are aimed at the demographic behaviour of immigrants, the observed changes in the demographic behaviour of the descendants from the six immigrant groups, albeit to differing degrees, are voluntary and show an adaption to the behaviour of the population in general.

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Sammanfattning

(Swedish Summary)

Projektets syfte och utgångspunkter

Under de senaste 60 åren har den skandinaviska befolkningen med utländsk bakgrund – d v s både invandrare och barn till invandrare (andra generationen) – stadigt ökat och blivit en del av den skandinaviska befolkningen. Invandringen till de skandinaviska länderna har varit och är kopplade till sociala fenomen så som arbetskraftsinvandring, familjeåterförening och flyktmigration. I takt med att en allt större del av befolkningen har utländsk bakgrund har frågor kopplade till migration och integration kommit allt högre upp på den politiska agendan. I arbetet med integration behövs mer djupgående kunskap om integrationsmönster inom områden så som demografi, utbildning och arbetsmarknad för att förbättra migrations- och integrationspolitiken i Skandinavien.

Föreliggande rapport är resultatet av ett komparativt forskningsprojekt i Danmark, Norge och Sverige. Fokus för projektet har varit att belysa integration på tre viktiga områden: demografi, utbildning och arbetsmarknad för sex invandrargrupper med rötter i Turkiet, Iran, Irak, Somalia, Pakistan och Vietnam. Dessa grupper är (med något undantag) de största utomeuropeiska invandrar- och flyktninggrupperna i de tre skandinaviska länderna. De undersökta grupperna består både av invandrare och deras barn (andra generationen).

Projektet har använt sig av respektive lands befolkningsregister som innehåller information om individer boende i respektive land. Uppgifter om t ex antal barn, utbildning och sysselsättning har analyserats och presenteras i föreliggande rapport. alla statistiska begrepp och mätinstrument har definierats på samma sätt för att uppnå maximal jämförbarhet mellan de tre länderna.

Studien har haft tre viktiga deskriptiva syften. Det första har varit att ge en beskrivning av gruppernas situation i de tre länderna genom en beskrivning av respektive lands ekonomiska utveckling, immigrationspolitik, migrationshistoria och integrationspolitiska utveckling.

Det andra syftet har varit att utröna när i historien de olika grupperna etablerade sig i de tre länderna samt hur grupperna har utvecklats under perioden 1998 till 2008. Fokus har legat på befolkningsföränd-

ringar så som fertilitet, mortalitet, immigration, emigration samt förändringar i köns- och åldersstrukturer.

Det tredje syftet har varit att analysera två viktiga aspekter av integration, nämligen deltagande i utbildning och arbetsmarknad. På grund av begränsningar i datamaterialet har projektet fokuserat på deltagande i utbildning, inte på uppnådd utbildningsnivå. När det gäller deltagande på arbetsmarknaden så är det framför allt två saker som projektet har fokuserat på, nämligen sysselsättning och arbetslöshet. Analysen av deltagande i utbildning och arbetsmarknad görs genom en jämförelse mellan grupperna men också genom en jämförelse inom grupperna på basis av kön, ålder, generation och tid i landet.

Rapporten är upplagd på följande sätt, i första kapitlet beskrivs utgångspunkterna och de metodologiska överväganden projektet har gjort. Kapitlet avslutas med en jämförelse mellan grupperna i de tre skandinaviska länderna. Denna jämförelse fungerar både som en sammanfattning av de tre landskapitlen och som en guide till dessa. De tre efterföljande kapitlen utgörs av landskapitlen där Danmark är först ut, följt av Norge och sedan Sverige. Sist i rapporten finns en sammanställning av definitioner av de statistiska mätverktygen som projektet har använt sig av.

Kort sammanfattning av resultaten

Många faktorer påverkar integrationsprocessen i ett land. Den nationella kontexten med faktorer som den ekonomiska utvecklingen, hur arbetsmarknaden är strukturerad, hur immigrations- och integrationspolitiken är utformad samt landets migrationshistoria är bara några faktorer som har stort inflytande på hur integrationen ser ut för olika grupper i respektive land.

Danmark, Norge och Sverige har trots sina många likheter också valt att gå olika vägar när det gäller till exempel immigrations- och integrationspolitik. Just när det gäller immigrations- och integrationspolitiken så kan Sverige placeras på den ena kanten och Danmark på den andra med Norge mellan de två länderna. Danmark har den mest restriktiva immigrationspolitiken av de tre länderna, Sverige den minst restriktiva och Norge någonstans mellan Sverige och Danmark. Detta innebär att trösklarna för att komma in och bosätta sig i Danmark är högre än i både Norge och Sverige. På samma sätt finns det också uppenbara skillnader i integrationspolitiken i de tre länderna, speciellt i förhållande till medborgarskap och permanent uppehållstillstånd. I Danmark måste sökande för att få medborgarskap uppfylla en mängd olika krav, till exempel krav på språk, kunskap om det danska samhället och krav på ekonomisk försörjning. Norge har krav på språk för att få medborgarskap. Sverige har i jämförelse med Danmark och Norge mycket få sådana krav. Bland de studerade grupperna kan vi se att den

somaliska invandrargruppen har blivit större både i Norge och i Sverige emedan gruppen har minskat i storlek i Danmark, vilket delvis kan kopplas till den mer restriktiva politiken i Danmark.

Under den studerade perioden har alla grupper växt i storlek (utom somaliska invandrare i Danmark). Positiv nettomigration, fler födslar och färre dödsfall i grupperna (d v s naturlig tillväxt) är orsaker bakom tillväxten i grupperna. Två grupper, den irakiska och den somaliska, utmärker sig genom att ha den högsta naturliga tillväxten i alla tre länderna (tillväxten i den Irakiska gruppen påverkades dessutom av en hög immigration till de tre studerade länderna, speciellt under den senare delen av den studerade tidsperioden). Den pakistanska gruppen i Sverige har också en hög tillväxt som beror på både en hög positiv nettoimmigration såväl som naturlig tillväxt. Dessa tre grupper, irakier, somalier i alla tre länderna och pakistanier i Sverige, har en i jämförelse med de andra grupperna kort migrationshistoria i de studerade länderna, vilket visas i analysen av den genomsnittliga vistelsetiden för de olika grupperna där irakier, somalier och pakistanier i Sverige har en låg genomsnittlig vistelsetid. Det finns en stor mängd forskning som visar att just vistelsetiden för en individ eller för en grupp är av avgörande betydelse för positionen i utbildningssystemet och på arbetsmarknaden.

I analysen av deltagande i utbildningen så skiljer sig Sverige från Norge och Danmark genom att andelen av de studerade grupperna som deltar i utbildning är högre på alla nivåer jämfört med totalbefolkningen i Sverige (detta gäller för både invandrare och andra generationen). Denna skillnad kan också ses på den eftergymnasiala nivån, men där är skillnaderna mellan de tre länderna mycket mindre än på lägre nivåer. Ett intressant resultat som förtjänar att nämnas är att iranier och vietnameser har högt deltagande i eftergymnasial utbildning i alla tre länderna. I detta sammanhang kan man ställa sig frågan: Vad är det som påverkar deltagande i utbildning? Å ena sidan kan skillnaderna mellan länderna bero på institutionella och policymässiga skillnader mellan de tre länderna (mer generös policy i Sverige). Å andra sidan kan dessa skillnader bero på och påverkas av selektionsprocesser i migration till länderna. T ex vet vi från tidigare forskning att den iranska gruppen är tämligen högutbildad redan när iranier anländer till Sverige, både i förhållande till andra invandrargrupper och till den infödda befolkningen. För en redan högutbildad grupp kan utbildning vara viktigare och därmed blir deltagandet i utbildning högre.

Ett antal intressanta slutsatser kan dras av analysen av arbetsmarknaden. För det första har alla studerade grupper ökat sin sysselsättning mellan 1998 och 2008, både absolut bemärkelse och i relation till totalbe-

folkningen i de tre länderna (detta gäller både män och kvinnor). Denna positiva trend ger en stark indikation på att det tar tid för nya grupper att etablera sig i ett nytt land och på det nya landets arbetsmarknad. Ytterligare en indikation på att vistelsetiden har stort inflytande på arbetsmarknadspositionen är att i de grupper som har en hög andel nyanlända invandrare (t ex irakier och somalier) är också sysselsättningen lägre. För det andra, även om kvinnor har förbättrat sin sysselsättning under den studerade tidsperioden så är skillnaden mellan de studerade invandrargrupperna och totalbefolkningen i de tre länderna tämligen stora. Detta måste dock förstås i förhållande till att kvinnor i de skandinaviska länderna i ett internationellt perspektiv har hög sysselsättning.

En övergripande slutsats i analysen av både utbildning och arbetsmarknad är att de studerade grupperna har liknande situation i Norge och Danmark emedan grupperna har en annan situation i Sverige. I Sverige deltar de studerade grupperna i högre utsträckning i utbildning jämfört med grupperna som bor i Norge och Danmark. På arbetsmarknaden råder däremot den omvända situationen, de studerade grupperna i Sverige har lägre sysselsättning i jämförelse med Norge och Danmark, i vissa fall avsevärt lägre.

Glossary of Terms

This glossary provides definitions of the terms used in this study. In many cases the definitions pertain to indicators. In order to keep the glossary relatively simple, the definitions do not deal with issues relating to the estimation of indicators when these cannot be computed directly, but have to be estimated from relevant data. The estimation issues are considered in the Methodological note.

The glossary consists of three sections, each of which deals with terms pertaining to population dynamics, integration in the education sector and labor market integration. In each section the items are in alphabetical order. Whenever a particular item is mentioned in a definition of another item, it is italicized. If it is mentioned more than once in a given definition, it is only italicized when it appears for the first time.

In part, the glossary draws on the glossaries of relevant international organizations, in particular the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Population Dynamics

Average duration of residence of immigrants: The average number of years that immigrants of a population group have lived in the country of residence.

Birth: In the case of a population group, any of the births to immigrants of the population group. In the case of a native population, any of the births to natives.

Crude birth rate: The number of births in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of births per 1,000 inhabitants.

Crude death rate: The number of deaths in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.

Crude emigration rate: The number of emigrants, i.e. persons leaving a population due to *international migration* during a given period, divided

by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

Crude immigration rate: The number of immigrants, i.e. persons joining a population due to international migration during a given period, divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

Death: A death taking place in a population.

Descendant of a population group: A person born to two immigrants, both of whom are members of a same population group, provided that his or her birth occurred in the country of parents' residence and that the person resides in it. Also, a person born to a women immigrant, who is a member of the population group and to a non-native man who is not a member of the group, provided the birth occurred in the country of the mother's residence and that the person resides in it. (See *Birth to immigrants of a population group*)

Emigrant: A person who leaves his or her country of residence with the intention of taking residence elsewhere and who, in the process, leaves a population of which he or she is a member.

Immigrant: A person who arrives in a country with a view to taking up residency there and who, in the process, joins a population as its new member.

International migration: Movements of individuals between different countries. From the perspective of a population of a given country, this includes the arrival of people coming to take up residency in the country and joins the population and the departure of residents leaving with the intention of taking up residency elsewhere, thus leaving the population.

Native: A person born to a native mother and/or to a native father. Also, a person born to a woman who, at the time of birth, is a descendant of a population group. In other words, any person who is not an immigrant or a descendant.

Native population: All the resident natives of a country.

Natural change: The difference between births and deaths in a population.

Net migration: The difference between immigrants and emigrants in a population.

Partner: A person who is currently married to another person or who lives in a registered consensual union with another person.

Population: A group of people residing in a given country and sharing a certain characteristic, such as a country of birth. Two types of groups are distinguished: resident persons originating from another country (re-

ferred to as a foreign-origin population group or a population group for short) and resident natives of a given country who collectively make up the native population of the country. A total population of a country comprises the native population and all the existing population groups in the country.

Population group: A group comprising immigrants residing in a given country who were born in the country in which the group has its origins, along with their immediate descendants born in the country of the immigrants' residence. For the sake of convenience, the population groups bear the names of the nationals of the countries in which they have their roots, such as Iranians or Turks.

Proportion of descendants: A proportion that descendants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

Proportion of immigrants: A proportion that immigrants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

Proportion of people with a partner of a given background: A proportion that people with a partner of a given background represent with respect to all people with partners. The types of background distinguished are: member of the same population group, native, other. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

Standard age-sex distribution of a population: A distribution of a population by age and sex, the proportions of which add up to one. It is used to compute *standardized crude rates* of change. The distribution used in this study is an unweighted average of the proportionate age-sex distributions of the total populations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2008.

Standardized crude rate: A crude rate of change that is observed in a population during a specified period if its age-sex distribution is equal to a *standard age-sex distribution of a population* rather than its actual one. The following standardized crude rates are distinguished: standardized crude birth rate, standardized crude death rate, standardized crude immigration rate and standardized crude emigration rate. In addition, two other standardized rates are distinguished: standardized crude emigration rate among immigrants of a population group and standardized crude birth rate of among descendants of a population group.

Total fertility rate: The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if the women were subject to the *age-specific fertility rates* of a given peri-

od throughout their lives and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman.

Total fertility by age x: The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have by age x inclusive if the women were subject to the age-specific fertility rates of a given period and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman. The values used for x are 24, 29 and 39.

Integration in the Education Sector

Enrolment rate: The number of students in a particular age group that is enrolled in educational institutions of a given level of education and/or *sub-level of education* at a given date, divided by the total number of people in that age group on that date. The age groups used are: 16–19, 20–24, 25–29 and 30–34.

ISCED: The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) is the revised version of the International Standard Classification of Education, which was adopted in 1997 by UNESCO's General Conference as a replacement of the former version.

ISCED 1 – Primary education: Education that usually begins at the age of five, six or seven and lasts for four to six years. Programs at the primary level generally require no previous formal education, although it is becoming increasingly common for children to have attended a pre-primary program before entering primary education.

ISCED 2 – Lower secondary education: Education that generally continues the basic programs of the primary level, although here the teaching is typically more subject-focused. This type of education may either be “terminal” (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or “preparatory” (i.e. prepare students for upper secondary education).

ISCED 3 – Upper secondary education: Education that corresponds to the final stage of secondary education. Instruction is often more organized along subject matter lines than ISCED 2. The entrance age for this level is typically 15 or 16 years. There are substantial differences in the usual duration of ISCED 3 programs both across and between countries, typically ranging from two to five years of schooling. ISCED 3 may either be “terminal” (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or “preparatory” (i.e. prepare students for tertiary education).

ISCED 4 – Post-secondary non-tertiary education: Education that straddles the boundary between upper secondary education and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though this might clearly be considered as upper secondary or postsecondary programs in a national context. Although the content of this type of education may not be significantly more advanced than upper secondary

programmes, it serves to broaden the knowledge of participants who have already gained an upper secondary qualification. The students tend to be older than those enrolled at the upper secondary level.

ISCED 5A – Tertiary-type A education: Education comprising programs that are largely theory-based and designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programs and professions with high skills requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architecture. The full-time programs have a minimum, cumulative, theoretical duration of three years, although they typically last four or more years.

ISCED 5B – Tertiary-type B education: Education comprising programs that are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and that focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labor market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programs. These full-time programs have a minimum duration of two years.

Level of education: A broad section of the education “ladder”, i.e. the progression from very elementary to more complicated learning experience, embracing all fields and program groups that may occur at that particular stage of the progression.

Student: A person who attends any regular educational institution, public or private, for systematic instruction at any level of education.

Labor Market Integration

Inactive: A person who at any given time is not employed, unemployed or enrolled in education.

Employed: A person over a specified age who is either in paid employment or self-employed.

Unemployed: A person who, at any given time, has no employment but is available to start work within the next two weeks and has actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks. Also, a person who, during the reference week, has no employment but has been offered a job that is due to start later.

Employment rate: The number of *employed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people employed of that age at that particular time.

Unemployment rate: The number of *unemployed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people of that age at that particular time.

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Scandinavia's Population Groups Originating from Developing Countries: Change and Integration

Scandinavia's foreign-origin population has steadily increased over the past six decades. Migration flows into the region have been linked to societal phenomena such as growing labour demands, family reunification and the acceptance of refugees fleeing wars and political conflicts. Whereas earlier migration streams were generally expected to integrate relatively easily, concerns about the current streams are high on the political agenda.

This report is a cross-country research into selected key features of population change and the integration of population groups with roots in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

The research has sought to achieve three objectives. The first is to determine how and when the groups came to the three Scandinavian countries and how they have since developed. The second is to analyze two aspects of the groups' integration, namely their participation in education and their participation in the labour market. And the final objective is to provide a brief overview of the groups' situation in each of the three countries with regards to economic development, immigration history and policy development.

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