Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and Decline of the New Order (1986–98)

Stefan Eklöf

Under Indonesia’s authoritarian New Order regime, the continued existence of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was meant to demonstrate the ostensibly democratic character of the regime. In essence, this small nationalist-Christian coalition was meant to fill the role of a pliant state corporatist party. From the later 1980s, however, the PDI became more openly critical of government policies and came to stand out as the major proponent of reform within the formal political system. The government responded in 1996 by engineering the removal of the popular Megawati Sukarnoputri as PDI leader, a move that significantly damaged the popular legitimacy and moral standing of the regime.

Against this background the book assesses broader questions of political culture, political participation, regime maintenance and opposition in the late Suharto era. The political culture perspective provides a fresh understanding of politics under the New Order and its influence on the systems of power and political relations in post-Suharto Indonesia.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia
INDONESIAN POLITICS IN CRISIS
The Long Fall of Suharto 1996–98

The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) is funded by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden via the Nordic Council of Ministers, and works to encourage and support Asian studies in the Nordic countries. In so doing, NIAS has been publishing books since 1969, with more than one hundred titles produced in the last ten years.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and Decline of the New Order (1986–98)

Stefan Eklöf

NIAS Press
Contents

Preface ... vii
Note on Orthography and Translation ... x
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ... xi
1. Questions and Perspectives ... 1
2. Parties and Political Culture in Twentieth-Century Indonesia ... 23
3. The Foundations of New Order Political Culture ... 44
4. From Merger to Nadir: The PDI 1973–86 ... 63
5. Pancasila Democracy and Sukarno Revival in the 1987 Election ... 78
6. Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92) ... 105
7. A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election ... 141
8. Challenging the New Order: The 1993 MPR Session ... 171
9. The Democratic Party and Party Democracy ... 193
10. The PDI under Megawati ... 223
11. The Deposing of Megawati ... 245
12. From the 1997 Election to the Fall of Suharto ... 278
13. Conclusion ... 291
Bibliography ... 309
Index ... 332
Preface

When in the mid-1990s I first started work on the doctoral thesis which is the origin of this book, Indonesia and its political life were enigmas to me, as well as sources of great fascination. Although I had already travelled for several months on different occasions in the country and even begun to put together my first sentences in Indonesian, the country’s apparent political stability, paired with its exotic culture and history, indicated to me the existence of a fundamentally different political culture which, I believed, could only be understood through unique indigenous Indonesian models of explanation.

However, as I learnt more about the country over the years – through reading, travelling and talking to people – it felt as if the veils of mystery gradually were lifted and my fascination over the more exotic qualities of Indonesian politics and society gave way to an intellectual interest in the more mundane aspects of the country’s contemporary development. Although, as Mohammad Hatta once reputedly said, only someone who does not understand Indonesian politics would claim to fully understand it, I felt that, gradually, Indonesian politics became more explainable and understandable – and also less mysteriously fascinating. The process was at times painful, both because of the hardships and upheavals Indonesia went through as I was working on my study in the second half of the 1990s, and because I was forced to reassess my sometimes mistakenly romantic understanding of Indonesian culture and society.

Many people have contributed in various ways to the preparation of the present book. Throughout most of my time as a doctoral student at the Department of History at Lund University, I have been fortunate to have two supervisors, both of whom I would like to thank in particular. Professor Eva Österberg of the Department of History has been my main supervisor. Eva has been a tremendous source of support and encouragement, even though my research subject – chronologically and geographically – is far from Eva’s own field of expertise. The fact that Eva, without hesitation, supported my research in such
an ‘unusual’ (in the context of Swedish historical research) subject as contemporary Indonesian politics, demonstrates a remarkable self-confidence and intellectual openness on her part – although she herself would rather say that she had trust. These are in any case qualities which I have come to value highly and think are among the most important for a researcher to have. Eva also has an outstanding ability to make comparisons and put a problem or question in perspective, thereby linking the unique historical developments to their larger context and to theoretical models and concepts. Over the years, I have often been impressed by her clarity of thought and her ability to lift the discussion – whether in seminars, lectures or conversations – to higher theoretical ground and to distinguish what is unique from what is general and what is important from what is trivial. These qualities on Eva’s part have contributed in many ways, directly and indirectly, to the shape of the present thesis.

My co-supervisor since 1996 has been Dr Robert Cribb, then of the Department of History, University of Queensland. I first met Robert when he was a visiting research professor at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen, and he was kind enough to agree to assist in supervising my thesis work. Robert then suggested that I focus on the PDI as a fruitful way of studying contemporary Indonesian political culture. As one of the world’s leading experts on Indonesian history and politics, Robert has taught me enormous amounts about Indonesia, and I continue to be impressed by his vast and broad knowledge, as well as by his understanding of the historical dimensions of contemporary developments in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general. Robert also drew my attention to the importance of working with the language in academic writing in order for the text to be clear and precise. No clouded or imprecise terms or lines of arguments passed his thorough readings of my texts, and his comments often forced me to give more careful thought to what exactly I was arguing and on what grounds. His criticism of my texts aimed at achieving the precision, coherence and stringency which are the hallmarks of Robert’s own writings, and which are among the most important defining characteristics of good academic writing.

Numerous other people have also contributed to the present thesis. Dr Bill Case and Professor Bob Elson (both Griffith University), Professor Vincent Houben (then Leiden University but now at Humboldt University); Dr Thomas Lindblad (Leiden University), Professor Kim Salomon (Lund University) and Professor Cees van Dijk (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde) have all read and commented on earlier texts, and I am most grateful for their help and valuable suggestions. In addition, I want to thank the members of the
Preface

postgraduate seminar in the Department of History in Lund for their often careful readings of sections of my work and their many useful comments and suggestions.

In Indonesia, many people have contributed to my understanding of Indonesian politics and society, through formal interviews and in conversations. The staff of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta has been very helpful, and I would especially like to thank Dr Clara Joewono and Mr M. Djadjiono, both of CSIS, for their invaluable help during my research in Indonesia. Other Indonesian academics and political observers whom I would like to thank for their help include Dr Daniel Dhakidae, Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Dr Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Dr J. Kristiadi, Mr Tommy Legowo, Mrs Purwani Diyah Prabandari and Dr Sjamsuddin Haris.

The institutional basis for my doctoral research has been the Department of History in Lund, where I have spent most of my time as a doctoral student. The department has provided a stimulating intellectual and social environment, and I have felt very much ‘at home’, even though I have been the only Indonesianist in the department. The research conducted in the department spans a wide range of subjects and chronological and geographical areas and is characterised by a tolerant and intellectually open-minded atmosphere, which is well able to accommodate a subject outside the mainstream of the department’s research areas – such as my own.

In addition to the Department of History in Lund, I have also been fortunate to spend longer and shorter periods at other prominent research institutes in Europe, Asia and Australia. In 1995, I spent one semester at Leiden University, and in 1997 I spent one academic year at Griffith University, Brisbane. In 1998, I was affiliated with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta for two months, and I have also held several shorter scholarships at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen. I have felt very welcome at all of these institutions, and my stays there have contributed in various important ways to the present thesis, for all of which I am very grateful.

Several institutions have provided funding for salaries, travel and other expenses in the course of the project. My main financing has come from the Faculty of Humanities at Lund University. Other sources I would like to thank for their kind support are Bokelunds historisk-geografiska stipendiefond, Crafoordska stiftelsen, the ERASMUS Programme, Fil. dr Uno Otterstedts fond, Knut och Alice Wallenbergs stiftelse, Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, Landshövding Per Westlings minnesfond, the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies and the Swedish Institute. I would also like to thank the Centre for East and
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

Southeast Asian Studies at Lund University. Although the Centre has not contributed directly to the current project other than through the kind provision of free photocopies in the Lund Asia Library, the Centre has funded other research activities which I have been involved in and from which the present project has benefited.

Lund, May 2003

Note on Orthography and Translation

In 1947 the official Indonesian spelling conventions were changed so that ‘u’ replaced ‘oe’, and in 1972 further changes were made so that ‘c’ replaced the former ‘tj’, ‘j’ replaced ‘dj’, ‘kh’ replaced ‘ch’ and ‘y’ replaced ‘j’. The new spelling conventions have been used for all geographic names and the names of parties and organisations. As regards proper names, the spelling preferred by the individuals concerned, which generally coincides with the spelling used in the Indonesian press coverage, has been employed as far as possible. In cases where the old and the new spellings have appeared to be equally commonly used, the new spelling has generally been chosen.

All translations from Indonesian are, unless otherwise stated, by the author. Quoted passages from English-language sources, however, follow the translations of the cited source, unless otherwise stated.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BAIS Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
Bakin Badan Koordinasi Intiilen Negara (State Coordinating Intelligence Agency)
Bakorstanas Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional (Co-ordinating Agency for National Stability)
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Deperpu Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat (Central Advisory Council)
DPA Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisory Council)
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council)
GBHN Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of State Policy)
GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement)
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin se-Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Upholders of Indonesian Freedom)
Komnas HAM Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission for Human Rights)
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Litbang [Body for]Research and Development ([Badan] Penelitian dan Pengembangan)
Litsus Penelitian Khusus (Special Investigation)
LPU Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Institute)
MARI Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Assembly)
Masyumi Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPP</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Partai (Party’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPRS</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (Rise of the Islamic Scholars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opsus</td>
<td>Operasi Khusus (Special Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkindo</td>
<td>Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmusi</td>
<td>Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratic People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSB</td>
<td>Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah (Philanthropic Donation with Prizes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAGA</td>
<td>Solidaritas Indonesia untuk Amien dan Mega (Indonesian Solidarity for Amien and Mega)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPDI</td>
<td>Yayasan Pengkajian Demokrasi Indonesia (Foundation for Research on Indonesian Democracy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

Questions and Perspectives

INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1980s, Indonesia’s President Suharto and his military-dominated ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) regime were at the height of their power. Since the transfer of power in 1966 from the previous regime, the so-called ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama) under Indonesia’s first president Sukarno, the country had undergone unprecedented economic development, which had raised the standards of living for the vast majority of Indonesia’s population, an achievement which formed the basis for the regime’s and the president’s main claim to legitimacy. Politically, the New Order reigned supreme, having put much effort into repressing or sidelining potential challenges to the political status quo. All major surviving social and political organisations had been co-opted and forced to denounce their ideological roots and identities, and most organisations had been forced to elect compliant leaders who depended on the government for their political careers and economic prospects. By the mid-1980s, thus, Indonesia was left with little open opposition and no serious political threats to the power structure of the regime. The government could even argue with some credibility that its authoritarian rule reflected a specific national political culture modelled on the pre-colonial Javanese kingdoms or traditional indigenous village organisation.

From the latter half of the 1980s, however, a number of challenges to the regime arose, both from within the ranks of the regime itself and from various groups in society at large. These challenges arose in the wake of the thorough social and cultural transformation which the country had undergone, mainly as a result of the economic modernisation which the New Order had presided over. A major challenge from within the system originated with the smaller of Indonesia’s two legal non-government parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). The party, which was the product of a government-imposed merger of three nationalist and two Christian parties in
1973, had for most of its first 13 years of existence up to 1986 been rendered impotent by almost continuous infighting and government interference in the party’s internal affairs. In 1986, however, a change in the party’s leadership and the adoption of new political strategies signalled the beginning of an eventually potent challenge to the paramount position of President Suharto and the political arrangements of the regime. In the lead-up to the 1987 general election, the PDI skilfully exploited the popular appeal of Suharto’s predecessor as president, Sukarno, as a symbol of opposition to the regime. The party also started to develop a clearer political identity and managed to attract support from influential groups and individuals outside the party, including senior military officials and oppositional groups outside the state structure. This challenge, and the government’s and President Suharto’s direct and indirect responses to it, dominated much of Indonesia’s political scene under the late New Order period, that is, from the late 1980s up to the fall of Suharto in May 1998.

The significance of the challenge from the PDI was not so much about real political influence, of which there was no prospect under the authoritarian regime, nor about concrete policies, of which there was little substantial discussion, nor about manifest ideology, the discussion of which was suppressed. Instead, the impact of the challenge from the PDI, more than anything else, was about Indonesia’s national political culture, that is, the forms and principles for the nation’s political life. This contestation over Indonesia’s political culture in the late New Order period is the subject for the present study.

The study focuses on political culture as a way of looking beyond the short-term fluctuations in and rhetoric of politics to consider the enduring features of Indonesia’s political life in the late New Order period. Political culture thus understood is a non-static product of history, and as such is shaped – but not determined – by the unique Indonesian political and social developments, mainly during the twentieth century. The purpose of the study is to understand, hermeneutically and historically, how and why certain political practices, arrangements and efforts aimed at achieving legitimacy – that is, political culture – worked or failed, as it were, in Indonesia during the particular period under study. For the purpose of highlighting the main aspects of this political culture and its contestation, six central questions will be pursued throughout the study:

1) What were the limits of permissible political discussion and activity, as observed from the perspective of the PDI, under the late New Order, and
Questions and Perspectives

did the limits shift or change during the period? If so, how did they change and for what reasons?

2) Which were the significant differences, if any, between the political culture represented by the PDI, or by different factions of the party, and the political culture represented by the regime?

3) Which symbols, concepts and political rituals did the PDI make use of to challenge the regime, and how were these employed and to what effect?

4) Which opportunities did the PDI have to challenge the regime without transgressing the limits of permissible political discussion and activities, and how did the party, or sections in the party, make use of such opportunities?

5) How did the regime, at various times, respond to the challenge from the PDI and how did these responses contribute to reproducing or changing the political culture?

6) How did the challenges from the PDI affect the legitimacy of the Suharto regime and in what ways, if any, did the challenges directly or indirectly contribute to the fall of Suharto and the New Order in 1998?

An understanding of New Order political culture and its reproduction and contestation will provide key insights for understanding Indonesian politics in the post-New Order period. The demise of Suharto in May 1998 did not bring about an overhaul of the political structures of the New Order, and the political culture which dominated the previous regime continues to exercise strong influence at the time of writing, five years after the former president’s resignation. For better or worse, the New Order provided the most readily available and influential political traditions on which to build a new, reformed political system. Most political actors in the post-Suharto era of Reformasi, moreover, have gained most or all of their political experience under the late New Order, and consequently an understanding of their political concepts and behaviour in the political reform process after Suharto requires an understanding of the political culture in which they were accustomed to work throughout most of their political careers.

An additional purpose of the present study is to trace the development of the PDI from a compliant state corporative institution to a more independent and critical party. The party’s successor, the Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle, PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan), became the largest party in Indonesia’s first post-Suharto election in 1999, and two years later its leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, became the country’s president. An under-
standing of these crucial developments in Indonesia’s contemporary history requires an understanding of the PDI’s development in the immediately preceding period, during which the identity and popularity of Megawati and her party were established. Apart from the primary purpose of highlighting the political culture of the late New Order, the present study also aims at providing a political, historical account of the party which at the time of writing is Indonesia’s largest and most influential political party.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND ITS CONTESTATION

The concept of political culture first gained prominence in the social sciences, particularly American political science, in the 1950s. The general purpose of the concept then was to shift the focus of interest in political science from the role of formal political institutions and to highlight the influence of cultural dispositions, such as beliefs, values, attitudes and socio-religious orientations, on political developments and behaviour. In many of those earlier studies of political culture, the concept represented a regulating structure for politics and was at times ascribed an almost deterministic relevance. Political culture studies thrived for a few years in the latter half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, focusing on empirical studies which tried to establish the links between political culture and behaviour. However, largely because of the failure to demonstrate such causal links convincingly, political culture studies eventually foundered and, as observed by William Liddle, remained unfashionable in mainstream political science at least up until the mid-1990s. As we shall see, a major problem with the concept of political culture in these early studies was the dominating understanding of culture as essentialist and more or less static.

In the context of Indonesian studies, a review in 1964 by Harry Benda of Herb Feith’s The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962), in which the reviewer criticised Feith as well as mainstream Indonesian studies for interpreting Indonesia ‘selectively, in accordance with preconceived Western models’, encouraged students of Indonesian politics to interpret modern Indonesian politics more from the perspective of what was supposed to be traditional indigenous, particularly Javanese, culture. The challenge was above all taken up by a group of trained area specialists at Cornell University, with Benedict Anderson’s essay ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’ (1972) being the single most influential study. Anderson argued that contemporary Indonesian politics could be largely understood from the perspective of a supposedly traditional Javanese concept of power. In brief, Anderson described this concept of power as
an abstract divine energy associated with sexual potency and emanating from the leader to society. Because the source of power in Javanese thinking was allegedly homogenous and divine, power did not raise the question of legitimacy. 'Power is neither legitimate nor illegitimate. Power is,' according to Anderson.5

In spite of Anderson being one of the severest critics of the New Order within the academic community, his essay inspired a trend among Indonesian scholars which aimed, more or less directly, to legitimise the country’s authoritarian regime. Researchers were thus encouraged to search for supposedly indigenous Indonesian – mainly Javanese – models of political legitimacy and government.6 The mainstream argument of these studies was that the New Order’s restrictions on political liberties could be justified in terms of supposedly long-standing indigenous political traditions. The attempt to associate the New Order with a refined high culture with long historical roots, moreover, served to conceal the murkier and more brutal practices of the New Order’s political culture and helped the militarily dominated regime to acquire a more civilised image.

This unintended, from Anderson’s point of view, political use of his arguments stemmed primarily from the inadequate understanding of the concept of culture that dominated political culture studies at the time. In the case of Anderson’s study, the application of an essentialist concept of culture resulted in at least two problematic propositions.7 First, Anderson described Javanese culture as static, as illustrated by his uncomplicated use of the present tense to describe supposedly traditional notions.8 Second, as convincingly argued by Philip Quarles van Ufford, the 'Javanese Idea of Power' did not represent shared cultural notions, but rather legitimations of power.9 Anderson mainly built his study on older Javanese court chronicles, constructed on the behalf of royalties who sought justification for their rule after wars had been won and their rule established. From these sources, there is little way of knowing to what extent the Javanese idea of power, as described by Anderson, was shared by the majority of Javanese who were not in power.

The discourse about the 'Javanese Idea of Power' was thus beset with two interrelated problems with regard to the concept of culture. First, the generally simplistic notions of culture employed failed to take account of the ways in which cultures change and develop in historical and social contexts. Second, the failure to problematise the influence of unequal power relations on the reproduction of culture led to a confounding of 'culture' with traditional elite ideologies and attempts at legitimisation, which in turn opened the way for authoritarian regimes to make use of supposedly traditional cultural notions and values to justify their rule and restrictions on political liberties.
At the heart of both of these problems was the understanding of the concept of culture. Anderson and his followers understood culture in the normally understood sense of differential culture. Culture, from this perspective, is regarded as a set of behavioural and representational characteristics which sets a certain population apart from the rest of mankind. According to the differential view of culture, a people’s culture represents in some sense its essence, reducible to a set of inherent properties. According to Jonathan Fried- man, such an understanding of the concept of culture has been particularly influential in Western thinking since at least the seventeenth century, and formed the base for much of the modern and early modern projects aiming at the creation of national and ethnic identities.¹⁰

This [understanding of culture as differential] could easily take the form of racism [...] and was always of the form ‘X is a member of population Y, therefore he has the characteristic set of traits of that population.’ A culture is thus identical to the properties expressed in each and every individual member of the culture – like a gene pool, we have here a culture pool. They do what they do because they are what they are. The key term here is essentialism. [...] This notion is the product of relationship between the Western (or other) observer and the people he or she observes. It is inculcated with numerous prefabricated linguistic usages, that those observed are ‘an ethnographic object’ with definite boundaries, that what goes on within those boundaries can be accounted for by a code of meaning that we have discovered, read, interpreted or whatever – in other words, that there is an objective semantic content corresponding to a given delineated population.¹¹

In accordance with this understanding of culture as differential and as an essentialist entity, culture was used by Anderson and other students of Javanese political culture as an objective semantic grammar or tool for interpreting contemporary or recent Indonesian political developments and phenomena, with little concern for the processes in which that culture was reproduced and shaped by history and in social and political contexts. The result, as we have seen, was that a particular ethnographic construct called ‘Javanese culture’ became a major explanatory variable in the study of Indonesian politics, obscuring more mundane categories of explanation, such as coercive power, repression, gender, class and the negotiation between conflicting social and political aspirations.

In order to rectify these problems, the concept of political culture needs to acknowledge the social situations and particular relations of power and authority
Questions and Perspectives

in which culture is produced and reproduced. Jonathan Friedman, drawing on the work of Fredrik Barth, has proposed an alternative definition of culture which takes these factors into account:

Cultural meaning is unequally distributed in populations and is not a shared framework or paradigm. [The context of cultural reproduction is] one in which there are multiple voices already present in society, positioned according to relations of power and authority where coherence exists when attributed meaning can be hegemonically maintained. [Culture] is a relatively instable product of the practice of meaning, of multiple and socially situated acts of attribution of meaning to the world, of multiple interpretations both within society and between members of society and [...] between societies.12

Culture, in this definition, is not a static or monolithic object independent of social and historical developments and relations. Culture, by contrast, is perpetually reproduced in social and political contexts, a process conditioned by the existing power relations and structures of dominance, as well as by the aspirations and actions of the actors who participate in the process. Political culture, as the term implies, refers to the processes of cultural reproduction and contestation in the sphere of politics. Following the definition of Eva Österberg, political culture involves ethos as well as practice, and the concept, moreover, refers to values, attitudes, beliefs, ideas, principles, rules and regulations, as well as the attribution of meaning to the boundaries, arenas, institutions, strategies and forms for political action, negotiation and decision-making, all of which are perpetually created, reproduced and amalgamated in a myriad of everyday social and political situations and interactions.13

Political culture in this sense should be understood as an abstraction from reality and not, as proponents of an essentialist concept of culture would argue, a fundamental category which can be used for analysing or causally explaining political developments and behaviour. As an abstraction from reality and as a heuristic tool, however, the concept of political culture is useful to highlight the fundamentally important but largely latent or less visible aspects of politics, as well as to provide an understanding of politics in a particular place during a certain period of time, and under certain constellations of power and social relations. Political culture thus understood is bound to a particular historical context and does not exist as an autonomous explanatory category which can be transferred to a different time or historical context.

As argued by Österberg, employing the concept of political culture serves to shift the focus away from the short-term political tactics, negotiations,
conflicts and statements – l’histoire événementielle in the vocabulary of the French Annales historians – to the struggle over which forms and character the national political life should take on. To shift the focus from l’histoire événementielle, however, does not necessarily imply a history of la longue durée. In terms of its durability, political culture in the sense understood here more closely corresponds to a conjoncture, with a validity of, typically, a few decades or a generation. A shorter time perspective, as argued by Kim Salomon, is also more apt than la longue durée to highlight the moral and political questions raised by contemporary history, and to give more prominence to the role of individual actors in shaping history – or in this case, political culture.

POLITICAL CULTURE, HEGEMONY AND CONTESTATION

Political culture, as understood here, is closely linked to the regime which dominates a particular polity. For the present purposes, a regime will, following Stephanie Lawson, be defined as the principles, norms, arrangements and procedures for taking decisions that are practised by those in power. In contrast to the popular use of the word regime to denote governments, often with derogatory connotations, this definition serves to distinguish between ‘regime’, defined as the dominant political system and political arrangements of a particular polity, from ‘government’, defined as the groups and individuals in power within that polity.

In general, a regime maintains its power and authority by means of both legitimacy, that is, consent on the part of the ruled, and coercion. Contrary to popular belief, consent and coercion are not inherently antagonistic, so that a large degree of consent would in principle diminish the need for coercion and vice versa. Instead, as argued by Maurice Godelier, the combination of these two indissoluble elements constitutes the strength of the power of domination. The modern state dominates and regulates the use of legitimate violence within its boundaries, and at the same time those in power will seek to control the symbolic production, here understood as the dissemination of ideas through the control of ideological ‘sectors’ of society, such as cultural and religious institutions, the education system and the media. Those in power will use the symbolic production to enhance their own legitimacy and the legitimacy of the regime. In this context, legitimacy and violence are closely linked, because, as argued by Godelier, ‘consent is always backed by the threat of violence, even though the latter remains on the horizon, keeping a low profile’. The use of legitimate violence by the state may furthermore enhance
Questions and Perspectives

the legitimacy of the regime and of those in power, particularly if the deployment of violence is seen to be in the interest of the community at large. This perpetual process of regime maintenance, employing the combined elements of coercion and consent, will be a major conditioning factor for the political culture of a particular polity and regime.

A strong regime will represent and propound what may be labelled a hegemonic political culture. The concept of hegemony is mainly associated with the Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci, who developed the concept in order to analyse how class-rule is maintained. The central proposition of the concept of hegemony is that the ruling class in a given society maintains power not only through control over the means of production, but also through control over symbolic production. The hegemonic ideology of the ruling classes is disseminated through 'ideological' institutions, such as culture, religion, education and the media, and because of the pervasive influence of this ideological dissemination, the subordinate classes can be made to believe that class rule is just or natural, and consequently legitimate. Class rule can thus be maintained through consent and passive compliance on behalf of the subordinate classes, that is, 'false consciousness', rather than through the use of coercion or physical violence.

Regime maintenance, however, is not the only factor influencing the reproduction of political culture. Non-state actors, through their political statements and behaviour, will also influence the hegemonic political culture. As participants in a historical process, they are not simply passive bearers of a dominant political culture, but, to borrow the words of Paul Willis, 'active appropriators who reproduce existing structures only through struggle, contestation, and a partial penetration of those structures'. The concept of hegemonic political culture does thus not imply that a general consensus prevails over the de facto existing structures of domination, although those in power may try to convey such an impression. James Scott has criticised mainstream studies employing the concept of hegemony, most importantly because the concept of hegemony as conventionally understood fails to take account of the perspective of the subordinate classes. For the application of the concept of hegemony to that of political culture, three points argued by Scott are central. First, hegemony in its classic definition fails to take account of the degree to which 'most subordinate classes are able, on the basis of their daily material experience, to penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology'. The fact that members of the subordinate classes conform outwardly and behave acquiescently in power-laden situations does not mean that they privately
subscribe to the hegemonic ideology, although ethnographic evidence may lead to such a conclusion. Second, analyses of hegemony often ‘confound what is inevitable with what is just’. Systems of domination force the subordinate classes to comply for pragmatic reasons, but there is no reason to believe that those disadvantaged by a power relationship automatically will adopt the attitude that the prevailing conditions are just or natural and thereby inherently legitimate. Third, a hegemonic ideology represents, by definition, an idealisation, inevitably creating contradictions which allow the ideology to be criticised in its own terms. In the terminology proposed by Scott, the subordinate classes will appropriate the ideology of the ruling classes and use it as a platform for implicit or explicit criticism against the prevailing conditions and structures of domination. Consequently, the ideological struggle takes place within the existing hegemony, and a ‘shared’ ideology does not guarantee consent or harmony.

Scott’s contribution to the concept of hegemony is important for the present purposes because his arguments indicate the ways in which the weaker political actors under the late New Order, in this case the PDI, could contest the political culture of the regime without openly or directly confronting those in power. To paraphrase Scott’s arguments as they relate to the PDI: First, because the PDI and most of its representatives generally acquiesced in the premises and arrangements of the prevailing hegemonic political culture, they did not necessarily agree with them. Second, the compliance of the PDI with the dominant political culture may have been driven more by pragmatism than by conviction that the system’s foundations were just, legitimate or natural. Third, the discrepancies between the rhetoric and idealisations of those in power and the social and political realities provided the party with a platform for criticising the government and the prevailing political culture from its own premises. These efforts on behalf of the PDI – and other actors – to contest the hegemonic political culture and the efforts of those in power to maintain that hegemonic political culture formed the two main dynamic factors in reproducing the late New Order political culture.

THEORY AND THE CRISIS IN INDONESIAN STUDIES
As work on this dissertation approached its final stages, there seemed to be a general perception among scholars in the field that Indonesian studies, at least as practised outside Indonesia, was in crisis. The state-centred paradigm which
Questions and Perspectives

dominated the mainstream of Indonesian political studies under the New Order had failed to predict the quick unravelling of the regime in May 1998 and seemed inadequate even to understand those events after they had occurred. Gerry van Klinken has even charged that many Western students of Indonesian politics had come to regard the New Order as ‘normal’ because the regime allegedly reflected an ‘entrenched social stratification and a widespread acceptance of authoritarian ideas’. This static quality, according to van Klinken, partly stemmed from the domination of state-centred analyses which tended to regard other political processes, for example those in the political parties, as uninteresting because they were so ineffectual.

Although these observations aptly describe much of the mainstream political science analyses of the New Order, they also ignore important parts of the scholarship produced on the New Order during the period. Throughout the New Order, there existed a significant leftist critique of the regime – of which van Klinken himself, incidentally, was a prominent representative – and various non-state actors and organisations, such as business organisations, Muslims, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pro-democracy activists and labour unions, received considerable scholarly attention, especially during the late New Order period.

Against this background, and in retrospect, it seems more likely that the failure of the scholarship on the New Order to explain the quick unravelling of the regime was related to an inadequate understanding of the interaction between the state and non-state actors and the capacity of the latter to undermine the regime’s hold on power. This inadequate understanding arguably stems from a general lack of interest in theoretical concepts and comparative models amongst analysts of the late New Order. The lack of interest in theoretical concepts among scholars towards the last years of the regime contrasted with the lively interest of several scholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s in understanding the New Order in terms of comparative theoretical models. These earlier attempts to analyse the regime comparatively mainly focused on explaining its apparent stability and longevity, partly in reaction to earlier critical leftist descriptions of the New Order, which tended more to emphasise the authoritarian and militaristic aspects of the regime and its dependency on foreign aid. In order to explain the New Order’s apparent success in maintaining its power thus, Karl Jackson described the New Order as a ‘bureaucratic polity’, whereas Harold Crouch emphasised the neopatrimonial aspects of the regime and Dwight King propounded state
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

corporatism in order to understand state-society relations. Ruth McVey, meanwhile, compared the New Order to the late colonial state and described the regime as a beamtenstaat which emphasised effective administration over politics. Benedict Anderson analysed the New Order primarily in terms of the state’s dominance over, and autonomy from, society, whereas Donald Emmerson advocated the concept of bureaucratic pluralism to highlight the pluralistic features of the New Order state apparatus. William Liddle, meanwhile, propounded what has been termed ‘restricted pluralism’, and tried to highlight the regime’s limited response to non-state actors. In the mid-1980s, Richard Robison, moreover, applied a structuralist class analysis to the New Order, focusing on the political economic underpinnings of the regime.

In spite of the multitude of comparative perspectives employed, most analysts agreed about the central features of the New Order as they had been established around the mid-1970s. These included the authoritarian character of the regime; the strength of the state vis-à-vis society; the government’s claim to legitimacy based on its economic achievements; the proliferation of corruption, rent-seeking and patronage; the prominent role of the military; and, increasingly, the dominance of President Suharto’s personal power. The disagreement between the proponents of the various models rather concerned the relative importance ascribed to each of these features and which theoretical perspective best served to explain the socio-political dynamics at different points of time under the New Order. In spite of the attempts by some analysts, notably William Liddle, to highlight the role of non-state actors, these were generally seen to wield little crucial influence and were not seen as credible agents of political change or as capable of posing any threat to the regime.

From the late 1980s, the prominence of different non-state actors and institutions, such as NGOs, students, labour and pro-democracy activists, rose in Indonesia, signalling an increasing discontent with the regime. At the same time, however, the interest among scholars in applying theoretical perspectives to analyse the New Order seemed to be declining in favour of more narrative accounts of Indonesian elite politics or studies of particular organisations and institutions. To the extent that theoretical concepts were applied, they were mostly derived from the earlier, state-centred comparative analyses which generally took little account of non-state actors. As a consequence – and in retrospect – scholarship on the late New Order had difficulties in integrating the increasing importance of non-state actors and new political aspirations on the one hand and the continuing heavy state dominance of the formal political
system and arenas on the other. The result was that much of the scholarship on the late New Order, at best, provided an inadequate understanding of the political processes leading to the fall of Suharto and the New Order in May 1998, as well as of new political constellations and developments which emerged in the wake of the regime transition.

Simon Philpott has in a recent (2000) study, entitled *Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity*, criticised the alleged self-containment, conservatism and orientalist bias of Indonesian studies, as well as its alleged lack of interest in self-reflection and theoretical development. Philpott’s concern about the lack of theory in studies of contemporary Indonesian politics seems well-founded, especially, as we have seen, in relation to the late New Order period. Similar complaints about the lack of theory in Indonesian (and Southeast Asian) studies were, moreover, voiced by several scholars in the field during the 1990s and earlier. Philpott, however, goes further than most of these critics, by questioning the very epistemological assumptions of the positivist and empiricist paradigm which dominated Indonesian and Southeast Asian areas studies throughout the post-colonial twentieth century. According to Philpott, in spite of vigorous theoretical developments in neighbouring disciplines, particularly the social sciences, in the post-war twentieth century, Indonesian political studies, which comprised the mainstream of Indonesian area studies, remained largely undisturbed, and few scholars in the field ventured to question the usefulness or meaning of central categories of analysis, such as state, culture, tradition and modernity.

In spite of some problems with Philpott’s study, much of his criticism deserves to be taken seriously, particularly concerning the relative lack of theory in studies of the late New Order. The application of theoretical concepts and the problematisation of central categories of analysis, however, are in no way incompatible with an empiricist methodology. Conversely, theories are by definition abstractions, and for these to have scientific value they must relate to observable phenomena and be tested for their relevance in dialectics with information provided by the empirical investigation. As such, social science theories and concepts should guide the empirical investigation heuristically and at the same time provide modes of explanation and interpretation in the course of the investigation. Employed in such an open-minded way, theoretical concepts can help the researcher to overcome the difficulty in distinguishing historically important aspects from more fleeting and less fundamental categories and developments. For these purposes, theoretical concepts should
be used pluralistically – or even eclectically, as argued by Peter Burke – in order to enhance the level of abstraction, inter-subjective relevance and comparability of the study.

SOURCES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Three main sources highlight the reproduction and contestation of New Order political culture as they relate to the PDI. All of these have been used in the present study. The three sources are print media, party proceedings and documents, and interviews.

The bulk of the empirical investigation has consisted of going through the front page and national political section of all issues of two Jakarta newspapers, *Kompas* and the *Jakarta Post*, during the period. The choice of these two newspapers was made because *Kompas* is Indonesia’s largest newspaper, has a generally high quality in its reporting and is also one of the newspapers which has the most extensive coverage of national politics during the period; the *Jakarta Post* is Indonesia’s leading English language daily and also has a generally high quality of reporting. Because of its limited circulation and specific readership of intellectuals, businessmen and non-Indonesian nationals, the paper was generally permitted greater leeway when commenting on sensitive political issues than its Indonesian counterparts.

Interesting events, as signalled by the *Kompas* and *Jakarta Post* material, were followed up in additional publications. These media include several major national and regional Indonesian dailies, weekly and bi-weekly newsmagazines, student and illegal publications, and international press. The eminent press-clipping service at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta greatly facilitated the collection of additional Indonesian newspaper material. The reports in the weekly and bi-weekly magazines often provided more in-depth information and interviews with leading political actors. * Tempo* was the leading weekly news magazine up until its banning, together with two smaller weeklies, *Editor* and *DeTIK*, in 1994. The demise of *Tempo* allowed a number of other weeklies to emerge, and for the later years of the period, several weeklies carry thorough coverage of political news. In addition, there also emerged from around this time a vigorous student press and a number of illegal publications, such as the *Suara Independen*, which operated outside the normal restrictive press climate. Many of these published simultaneously in print and on the Internet, and in 1996 *Tempo* also started to publish regularly on the Internet under the name of *Tempo Interaktif*. The international media includes...
the two Hong Kong-based weeklies, *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *Asiaweek*, as well as leading dailies from other countries in the region, particularly Australia. Most of these publications had correspondents permanently stationed in Jakarta throughout most of the period, and they also normally operated outside the press restrictions of the New Order. Another valuable source has been the quarterly reports published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which survey major political and economic developments in Indonesia.

There are obvious problems with criticism of the sources when using New Order newspaper material, because of the press restrictions already mentioned. The press was supposed to be ‘free, but responsible’ and thus to exercise self-censorship. Government and military authorities applied pressures on the press in a number of ways in order for the press to exercise this self-censorship. These included the issue of guidelines concerning what to write about and what not to write about; telephone calls with ‘appeals’ (*imbauan*) from senior officials to newspaper editors; media briefings; written warnings; blacklisting, that is, the exclusion of outspoken journalists from press conferences and other sources of official information; the firing or demotion of critical journalists; and, in the last instance, banning. However, the press also often found ways around the self-censorship, and editorial opinions and the analyses by academics and other intellectuals in the media could often be surprisingly critical, as long as they avoided the most sensitive issues, such as ethnic and religious conflicts or the business interests of the Suharto family, and refrained from direct criticism of government and military officials. Moreover, there developed a ‘shadow language’ of added meaning in newspaper reports and opinions expressed in the media, requiring the reader to read between the lines – although cynics alleged that one should rather ‘read between the lies’. Such added meaning could, for example, be expressed through parallelism, through evoking associations or through ‘criticism by praise’.

Journalists also, according to David Hill, had to develop ‘dexterity and political tact which often meant giving the government the first and last word’. This strategy probably lay behind the ‘inverted logic’ described by Riswandha Imawan, whereby the public allegedly interpreted statements from officials as meaning the very opposite of what they said.

These problems and the need for interpretation have been taken into account when using Indonesian press material in the present study. The Indonesian press material has been interpreted hermeneutically and confronted with reports and analyses from foreign media or media operating outside the press restrictions, as well as with the other types of sources, that is, party
documents and interviews. Conflicting pieces of information have been analysed from the perspective of criticism of the sources and the plausible version of events has been used to construct the chain of developments surrounding the PDI as related here. In order to study the reproduction and contestation of the New Order’s political culture, moreover, the press material provides a rich and interesting source material through the statements of officials and politicians in the media. In this context, the material has not been analysed so much from a conventional perspective of criticism of the sources – that is, the extent to which the statements are reliable, truthful or correspond to an objective reality – but more in terms of how they served and functioned, as it were, to reproduce or contest the hegemonic political culture.

The second type of source consists of party proceedings and documents. These include congress reports, party statutes, speeches and political programs and manifestos. Most of these have been published by the PDI’s central board, mainly for internal party use, and were for the most part collected directly from party representatives, often in connection with interviews. A generally useful type of source has been speeches by leading party representatives where political aspirations and analyses often were laid out more clearly than in press reports. These recurring speeches, primarily those presented by successive PDI leaders on the party’s anniversary on 10 January each year, have been useful to indicate changes in the party’s official stance during the period. Proceedings and decisions from congresses and other central decision-making bodies have also been useful as original sources to the party’s political stances, the more critical or complex of which were not always reported in the press. These formal decisions and stances have also been contrasted with the public statements and opinions of individual party representatives, which often highlighted contradictions and internal disagreements in the party’s political line and aspirations.

The third type of source material is interviews, a number of which were carried out with party leaders and representatives as well as government and military officials and political observers, mainly in 1997 and 1998. To some extent, especially concerning the latter part of the period under study, the interviews have served to supplement the printed sources because party representatives could be more openly critical of the government and of political conditions in private interviews than in the media. The main purpose of the interviews, however, has been heuristic in the sense that Paul Thompson has advocated, that is, to suggest alternative analyses and modes of interpretation for the investigation.
Thompson's advocating of the heuristic purpose of interviews lies close to the programme for a hermeneutic method that has been suggested by the Swedish historian Göran B. Nilsson. Nilsson emphasises that history needs to be written 'forwards' (framlängeshistoria), departing from the historical situation as experienced by the actors involved. This perspective means that the strategies and analyses of the actors involved are interpreted as logical and sensible from the experience of those actors and the information available to them. In line with Thompson, Nilsson also proposes that the historian take in the analyses of the actors involved. History written forward in this way helps to avoid historical determinism in which later historical developments are seen as necessary outcomes of history.

Nilsson's methodological programme also includes a systematic problem seeking, where the researcher avoids mechanically harmonising contradictory pieces of information in the source material, but rather focuses on differences and incongruities. These should then be evaluated from a perspective of criticism of the sources to distinguish which information should be considered more reliable. 'False' pieces of information, such as 'slips of the memory, miscalculations, propagandistic simplifications, half truths, lies, blue-eyed expectations and unrealistic doctrines' should, however, not be automatically discarded, but used as pieces of source material for understanding the actors and their strategies in their historical circumstances. These methodological points of departure have all been central for highlighting the reproduction of political culture in the present study.

OBJECT AND PERIOD UNDER STUDY

The present study deals with the late New Order, that is, the last 12 years of the Suharto regime, from 1986 to 1998. Although there was a great deal of continuity throughout the whole New Order period, especially after the mid-1970s, and arguments certainly can be made for alternative periodisations, a number of crucial developments and features in Indonesian politics distinguish the late New Order from the preceding period and motivates the use of the term for the present purposes. These characteristics mainly developed from the second half of the 1980s and continued to be of central importance up until the fall of Suharto in 1998. Among the most important developments were the increasing rivalry between sections of the military and the president; the latter’s increasing reliance on modernist Muslims and politico-bureaucrats for support; increasing dissatisfaction in the military as well as in society at large.
with high-level corruption, especially connected to the president and his family; growing social and economic disparities paired with a decreasing social tolerance for such inequalities; an increasing concern about, and elite positioning for, the impending presidential succession; a regime which appeared increasingly isolated from society at large; the suppression of any substantial discussions about political reform within the framework of the regime; and, largely as a consequence these developments, a narrowing social base for the regime.56

These developments coincided with the PDI’s emergence as a major, and eventually potent, challenge to the regime and its political culture. The emergence of this challenge, through which the contestation of political culture can be studied, is the main rationale for choosing the late New Order as the period under study, as well as for choosing the PDI as an object of study. By contrast, in the preceding period from the party’s founding in 1973 and up until around 1986, the PDI rarely challenged the regime. The party, as we shall see, was almost constantly beset with internal conflicts, largely fuelled by government intervention, and the party had little credibility with the general public. The PDI was appropriately nicknamed the ‘chicken flea party’ (partai gurem), to illustrate its insignificance.57 The party’s weakness during its first 13 years of existence and the general absence of manifest attempts to challenge the regime or contest the hegemonic political culture thus makes it of little value as an object of study for the purposes of the present thesis.58

The beginning of the PDI’s development as a more vigorous and significant political organisation began with the government’s appointment of a new party leadership under Soerjadi in May 1986. Although there was no definite break with the past, the party under Soerjadi’s leadership, and later under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri, gradually came to adopt a more critical and even oppositional stance towards the government and to challenge the hegemonic political culture. On numerous occasions during the period, these developments led to open rifts and conflicts both within the party and between the party, or factions within the party, and government and military representatives. Such manifest instances of conflict and discord provide the main sources for studying the underlying contestation over political culture, and the PDI therefore provides a fruitful and well delimited object for studying the contestation of political culture under the late New Order.

The period under study ends with the resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998, which generally is considered to mark the end of the New Order. Although the subsequent developments – in which, as mentioned above, the
PDI’s successor, the PDI-P, became the largest party in the 1999 general election and its leader Megawati Sukarnoputri became vice-president and eventually, in July 2001, president – are significant in Indonesia’s and the party’s history, they occurred in a very different context from the relatively stable New Order regime and its corresponding political culture. Because that political culture and its contestation are the objects of study at hand, the developments after the demise of the New Order are beyond the scope of the present study.

The text follows an overall chronological disposition, although sections within each chapter are thematically disposed. The chronological disposition has been chosen over an overall thematic disposition because the former serves better to highlight the political developments and chains of events throughout the period. These developments are the sources through which the New Order’s political culture, understood as a continually reproduced amalgam of ethos and practice, can be studied. The political developments have thus been be analysed with the purpose of discerning the patterns and recurrent features of the series of events, acts, statements and discussions during the period. The present study, in other words, aims to study the New Order’s political culture – understood as a conjuncture – through linking it empirically with the political history – that is, l’histoire événementielle – of the late New Order.

NOTES

1 For some examples of earlier studies of political culture, and for a discussion of the concept, see Pye and Verba (1965).
2 Liddle (1996a: 9–10).
3 Benda (1964). For Feith’s reply, see Feith (1965).
4 Anderson (1972); reprinted in Anderson (1990: 17–77). For a discussion of the influence of Benda’s argument and a review of some other central studies in this tradition, see Reid (1977: 78–79).
5 Anderson (1990: 23).
6 See Antlöv (1995: 42) for Anderson’s influence on Indonesian scholarship of political culture. See also Pemberton (1994) for the New Order’s invention of ‘Java’. Anderson, probably because of his academic writings and negative testimonies in the U.S. congress about human rights conditions in New Order Indonesia, was prohibited from entering Indonesia during most of the New Order; see Anderson (1996b) for a personal account of his experiences with the New Order regime.
7 Other problems may be identified as well, such as Anderson’s failure to discuss the influence of non-Javanese political traditions on modern Indonesian political culture.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

11 Friedman (1994: 73); italics in original.
12 Friedman (1994: 74); see further Barth (1989).
13 This elaboration of the concept of political culture is adopted from Österberg's definition of the concept; see Österberg (1989: 76), Österberg (1993: 127–128) and Österberg (1998: 118); see also Demertzis (1985) for a more extensive theoretical discussion about the concept of political culture.
14 Österberg (1989: 76). The perspective on history as structured by processes with three different time spans, *la longue durée*, *la conjoncture* and *l'histoire événementielle*, originates with Fernand Braudel's (1949) work *La Méditerranée* and was subsequently developed and employed by other scholars in the *Annales* tradition; see further Braudel (1977) and Burke (1990).
17 Legitimacy is here understood in the conventional sense of belief in legitimacy (*Legitimitätsglaube*), as proposed by Max Weber; e.g. Weber (1956: 23, 157 and 659). Several scholars have criticised this definition because of its alleged relativism; that is, there can be no objective or independent evaluation of the ethical and moral content of legitimacy; e.g. Habermas (1984: 147) and Beetham (1991: 9). As we shall see, however, James Scott (1985: 322–326), has proposed a solution to this problem.
19 This definition is derived from Scott (1985: 315).
20 Godelier (1978: 767); original italics in the first clause excluded here.
21 E.g. Gramsci (1971).
22 This summary is derived from Scott (1985: 315–316).
25 Scott (1985: 317)
30 Mackie and MacIntyre (1994: 6). See e.g. Caldwell (1975) and May (1978) for studies emphasising the repressive character of the New Order and Mortimer (1973) for the regime’s reliance on foreign aid.
31 See Jackson (1978), Crouch (1979) and King (1982) respectively. The corporatist model has been further developed by Reeve (1985), Reeve (1990) and MacIntyre...
(1994b) and has, as we shall see, influenced the present study to a larger extent than the other perspectives.

32 McVey (1982).
33 Anderson (1983) and Emmerson (1983) respectively.
34 See Liddle (1985) and Liddle (1987b). The label is not used by Liddle himself, but employed by MacIntyre (1991: 16) in his useful survey of the major comparative models of the New Order; idem (1991: 6–21).
35 Robison (1986).
36 Mackie and MacIntyre (1994: 4 and 6).
39 Philpott frequently falls into the same positivist paradigm which he sets out to criticise. For example, he is apparently undisturbed by statements such as ‘this [the forging of an Indonesian identity under Dutch colonialism] is true’ (p. 58) or ‘their [the Indonesian republican government in 1946] moral legitimacy is beyond doubt’ (p. 66). In other places, however, he uses quotation marks around terms such as ‘truthful’ (p. 54), ‘logic’ (p. 56), and ‘reality’ (p. 74), apparently to indicate that he does not acknowledge the underlying epistemological presumptions behind these terms.
41 Burke (1992: 165).
44 Eng (1997: 440–441); see also Stanley (1996) for the alternative press.
45 Sensitive or critical stories in international media, however, were frequently censored or the magazines carrying such stories were stopped from being distributed in Indonesia. Critical correspondents could also experience difficulties with getting visa renewals. In 1986, moreover, an article by senior correspondent David Jenkins in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (10 April) about the business interests of Suharto and his family sparked a major diplomatic row between Australia and Indonesia; see Liddle (1987a: 217) and Robison (1990: 182–197).
46 *EIU Country Report Indonesia*.
47 Hill (1995: 44–47); see also Surbakti (1997) for the New Order’s restrictions on the press. More repressive methods were also occasionally employed, apparently even including the murder of oppositional journalists; see Hendratmoko (ed.) (1997).
49 Heryanto (1990: 294); cf. also Lubis (1989). The expression ‘read between the lies’ was reportedly coined by Aristides Katoppo; Hill (1995: 46)
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

56 For the tensions between the military and Suharto and the president’s increasing reliance on Muslims and civilian politico-bureaucrats, see Robison (1993), Hefner (1993) and Bertrand (1996). For corruption and related issues, see Aditjondro (1998) and Schwarz (1994: 98–161). The significance of social and economic inequalities during the period has been a matter of some controversy; see Tjiptoherijanto (1997), Mallarangeng and Liddle (1997: 171–172), Booth (1998: 37–39) and Eklöf (1999a: 68–70). On the positioning for the presidential succession, see e.g. Schwarz (1994: passim) and Robison (1995), and on the insistence on ideological conformity, see Morfit (1986) and Goodfellow (1995: passim).
57 E.g. Sihbudi (1987).
58 A brief survey of the party’s development from 1973 to 1986 is given in chapter 5. Moreover, the party during this period has already been extensively studied by Cornelis Lay (1987).
CHAPTER 2

Parties and Political Culture in Twentieth-Century Indonesia

POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDONESIA: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

As mentioned above, studies of politics under the New Order have been dominated by a state-centred paradigm, and even though several types of non-state institutions, such as NGOs and labour unions, gained more scholarly attention during the late New Order, the political parties generally continued to receive little interest from scholars. Especially among foreign students of Indonesian politics, the contrast with the relatively large interest in political parties during the first two decades of Indonesian independence is striking. Several exhaustive studies thus exist about Indonesian political parties and the party system during the 1950s and 1960s.\(^1\) With the parties’ marginalisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, interest shifted to politically more powerful state institutions, particularly the military. Although most general studies of politics under the New Order discuss the two legal political parties, the PDI and the United Development Party, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), often at length, they generally do so in the context of a discussion of government dominance, resulting in the dismissal of the parties as significant political actors or credible agents of change.\(^2\) As Gerry van Klinken has observed, most analysts seemed to regard the political processes in the parties as uninteresting because they were so ineffectual.\(^3\)

A couple of major studies have traced the development of the political party system in Indonesia since its emergence in the early twentieth century and up until the 1980s. These include Rusli Karim’s *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia* (The journey of political parties in Indonesia; 1983) and Riswandha Imawan’s unpublished doctoral thesis, “The evolution of political party systems in Indonesia: 1900 to 1987” (1989). Karim’s study is the more valuable of the two, being more analytical and more carefully researched. The most valuable study for understanding the development of the party system, however, is
David Reeve’s *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (1990). Although Reeve, as the title indicates, is not primarily interested in the development of the political party system, he traces the intellectual history of a central feature in Indonesian political thinking, the family principle, which will be discussed at more length shortly, and its application in twentieth-century Indonesian political history. In doing so, Reeve also provides key insights into the changes that the party system underwent from the colonial period up until the New Order.

Concerning the New Order more specifically, little work has been done on the political parties, and as yet there exists, to the present author’s knowledge, no English-language monograph on either of the two New Order parties, the PDI and the PPP. In Indonesia itself, the parties have attracted somewhat more scholarly attention, but there are still no published major general studies of the PDI. The extensive and thoroughly researched, but unpublished, thesis by Cornelis Lay, ‘Perkembangan PDI 1973–1986 dan Kegagalannya dalam PEMILU 1977 dan 1982 serta Prospeksnya sebagai Kekuatan Sosial Politik’ (The development of the PDI 1973–1986 and its failure in the 1977 and 1982 general elections together with its prospects as a socio-political force; 1987), is the major work documenting the PDI’s first 13 years. Another valuable thesis by Marcellianus Djadijono (1985) has thoroughly covered the period from 1981 to 1985. Both of these studies have been used in the present study for understanding the PDI’s development in the lead-up to the period under study.

Several books in Indonesian have covered certain aspects or periods of the PDI’s development, especially during the last years of the Suharto period. *PDI dan Prospek Pembangunan Politik* (PDI and the prospect for political development; 1991) is valuable for the 1987 election and the party’s development around that election. Arif Zulkifli’s *PDI di Mata Golongan Menengah Indonesia* (The PDI in the eyes of the Indonesian middle class; 1996) studies the reporting and reactions of newspaper readers to Megawati’s election as party leader in 1993. Two important journalistic accounts, *Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah* (Megawati Soekarnoputri: Never give up; 1996) and *Peristiwa 27 Juli* (The 27 July incident; 1997), cover Megawati’s removal as party leader in 1996 and subsequent events in 1996 and 1997. The latter work has also been published in English as *Jakarta Crackdown* (1997). In addition, several books published in 1996–98 compile newspaper articles about the government’s intervention in the party and Megawati’s subsequent struggle to regain the party leadership.
Parties and Political Culture in Twentieth-Century Indonesia

Both PDI leaders during the period under study, Soerjadi and Megawati, have been the subject of political biographies. Soerjadi’s background and tenure as party leader from 1986 to 1993 has been covered in a generally positive account by Ohiao Halawa (1993). Megawati’s biography, meanwhile, has been studied by Angus McIntyre in a more critical paper called *In Search of Megawati Soekarnoputri* (1997), which is valuable for Megawati’s background and rise to prominence in the mid-1990s. The most extensive political biography of Megawati so far is Ahmad Bahar’s *Biografi Politik Megawati Soekarnoputri 1993–1996* (Political biography over Megawati Soekarnoputri 1993–1996) (1996), a popularly written, but largely hostile, account based on print media.

Numerous shorter articles, published in both Indonesian and English-language journals, have covered particular developments and periods in the PDI’s history, especially up until the late 1980s when the Sydney-based quarterly *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, RIMA, published regular surveys of Indonesian political developments. Many of the English-language articles, however, are summaries of newspaper reports with little attempt at analysis or source criticism, which makes it difficult to use them for reconstructing or understanding the developments concerned, particularly in the light of the problems with using Indonesian newspaper material discussed above. Where appropriate, however, these summaries have been used in the present study for reference. The articles by Indonesian researchers vary in quality, but some contain important pieces of information and analysis.

The rest of this and the following chapter trace the origins and development of the political party system in Indonesia from the early twentieth century and up until the New Order’s restructuring of the party system, which resulted in the foundation of the PDI and the PPP in 1973. The purpose is to provide a historical understanding of how the political party structure and much of the hegemonic political culture of the New Order emerged, not only as a product of relatively short-term political events and power politics in the 1960s and early 1970s, but as a result of a longer historical and intellectual development in Indonesia. The origins of this development can primarily be traced to the late colonial period in the first half of the twentieth century, when political parties, formed after Western models, began to be founded in the Dutch East Indies. Parallel with the development of the political parties in the colony was the emergence of much of the intellectual and ideological foundations of the Indonesian state, formulated by leading nationalist politicians and intellectuals.
The modern political party institution, with its close links to parliaments and elections, first emerged in Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century and spread, from the end of the century, to most parts of the non-Western world. A political party in this modern sense differs from political parties in the more loosely defined sense of factions or cliques, which have been common in many non-Western and pre-modern political systems. In order to make this distinction, and for the present purposes, a modern political party will be defined as *any representative organisation based on individual, conscious and voluntary membership which seeks to place candidates for public offices through participating in elections under a given label*.\(^{11}\)

The emergence of political parties in Indonesia is intimately linked to the rise of Indonesian nationalism in the Dutch East Indies from around the turn of the century 1900. The first period of the nationalist movement up until the mid-1920s saw a rising political awareness among indigenous Indonesians coupled with increasing demands for indigenous political participation, including calls for independence from the Netherlands. A number of political parties were founded in the period, based either on ethnic or religious affiliation or socialist ideology. The early twentieth century also, however, saw the rise of bitter conflict and rivalry among different sections and leaders of the nationalist movement. There were deep ideological divisions between several of the parties, largely reflecting deep-seated social divisions in Indonesian society. Even though most of the major parties, at least from the early 1920s, agreed on the demand for a separation from the Netherlands, there was little agreement about the forms and ideological direction of an independent Indonesian state. The ideological differences between the generally conservative leaders of the first major mass-based political party, the Islamic Union, SI (Sarekat Islam), and the more radical leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), were particularly bitter and irreconcilable.\(^{12}\)

In 1926–27, the PKI launched a badly planned rebellion, which lacked the support of the other major sections of the nationalist movement, and which was suppressed by the colonial authorities. Thousands of PKI supporters were arrested or exiled and the party was banned for the remainder of the colonial era.\(^{13}\) The demise of the PKI paved the way for a unification of the remaining
nationalist parties and for the emergence of a new generation of nationalist political leaders from the second half of the 1920s. Many of those new leaders were later to become prominent political leaders after Indonesian independence and the political ideas and concepts that they formulated continued to be of great importance in Indonesian politics long after most of them had died or left the political scene.

Foremost among the new leaders was Sukarno, the son of a Javanese school teacher and his Balinese wife. In the first half of the 1920s, Sukarno observed the fighting and discord between the leaders of the indigenous political parties, and these conflicts, together with the failure of the PKI rebellion, seem to have convinced Sukarno that the ideological and other differences between different groups and individuals would have to be subordinated under the banner of nationalism with the primary goal of establishing an independent Indonesian state. In 1927, shortly after the PKI’s failed rebellion, Sukarno and a group of academic activists founded the Indonesian Nationalist Association, PNI (Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia), a name that was changed in the following year to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), still abbreviated as PNI. Even though the party was suppressed by the colonial authorities and eventually dissolved in 1931, it was the precursor to the party with the same name, which was founded in 1946 and which in 1973 formed the largest element in the party merger which resulted in the birth of the PDI.

From the beginning, the PNI’s central objective was *merdeka* – freedom, that is, national independence for Indonesia – and there was little concern for which type of political system an independent Indonesian state might adopt. The party’s ideology was nationalism, which for Sukarno was a unifying, spirited ideology which he believed had the potential to bridge the differences between the various groups and segments of Indonesian society. He also realised that spelling out a detailed programme about what would come after independence would obscure the ideal of independence and create divisions rather than unity. Sukarno’s strategy appeared, at least superficially, to be successful. Shortly after the founding of the PNI all major nationalist forces had united under its banner to struggle for independence.

In the popular nationalism, as noted by George Kahin, there was a sense of ‘shared purpose’, not only for independence from the Netherlands, but also for far-reaching social change. This desire was shared by Indonesia’s nationalist leaders towards the end of the colonial period, most of whom regarded greater social justice as an essential priority for an independent Indonesia. However,
just as with the question of which political system an independent Indonesia should have, the details of such social reform appear to have been little talked about and the potential for conflict within Indonesian society in connection with social change was downplayed. Sukarno, as well as many other nationalists, was attracted by Marxism, but he was troubled by the prospect of class struggle within Indonesian society. Sukarno’s solution to combine the ideals of unity and national independence with class struggle was his concept of *Marhaenism*, which later became the ideology of the PNI. The term was supposedly derived from a farmer by the name of Marhaen, whom Sukarno claimed to have met in the countryside in West Java in the 1920s. Marhaen, like the majority of Indonesians, was poor but differed from the Marxist proletarian in that he owned his simple means of production. Moreover, arguing that imperialism had wiped out Indonesia’s indigenous industrial and middle class, Sukarno held that virtually all Indonesians belonged to the *Marhaen* class, united by the common historical experience of exploitation and impoverishment. Even those Indonesians who were comparatively better off than the majority were *Marhaens*, provided that they united with and took the side of the *Marhaen* class.\(^{18}\) Thus, with the concept of *Marhaenism*, Sukarno sought to diffuse, at least in theory, the threat of a disrupting class struggle in independent Indonesia and instead frame the class struggle in national terms. Class struggle, in Sukarno’s synthesising vision, became synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

*Marhaenism* was consistent with another set of ideas which gained widespread influence in the nationalist movement from the 1920s and to which Sukarno expressed his commitment; the so-called ‘family principle’ (*kekeluargaan*). The family principle was most vigorously propounded and popularised by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, previously known as Soewardi Soerianingrat, a prince of Yogyakarta who had been a prominent radical leader in the early nationalist movement. Dewantoro pictured society as an organic whole in which harmony, collective responsibility and interdependency were the guiding principles of social behaviour and interaction. Society, in Dewantoro’s view, should function as a family, in which the individual’s rights of self-determination were coupled to the demands of the collectivity. Around 1930, he wrote:

> Borne up by the principle of the ‘fullness and holiness of life’, we can do no other than give primacy to the complete and holy Family, with its Father and Mother, who in every good family, stand side by side, have the same rights but different tasks, have a unity of interests, a unity of strengths, and a unity of soul.\(^ {19}\)
In spite of the assertion of equal rights, however, but in keeping with traditional patriarchal Javanese society, Dewantoro’s vision for Indonesia’s political system consisted of a benevolent paternalistic political order which he called ‘democracy with leadership’. Individual rights and choices were to be subsumed under the organic totality of society, with the preservation of society’s interdependent harmony as the guiding principle. Dewantoro used the Javanese terms *kawula* (servant) and *gusti* (master) to describe the harmonious relationship between the individuals of society. In Dewantoro’s ideal conceptual image of a Javanese kingdom, the bond between *kawula* and *gusti* formed a union of mutual obligations between distinct and hierarchically organised, but in-separable, individuals. The synthesis between *kawula* and *gusti* allowed the micro-cosmos, that is, the Javanese realm, to be in harmony with the macro-cosmos, that is, the universe, linked by the ritual obligations of the *gusti*. The collective interests of society as a whole, thus, were to take precedence over the rights and interests of individuals as well as over the conflicting interests of different groups in society. Such conflicts of interests were to be resolved according to a set of ethics, including collective responsibility, unselfishness and spiritualism, which supposedly was in tune with the highest laws of nature and morality.

The main inspiration for the family principle seems to have come from the traditional ideologies of the Javanese courts, and the ethics and political culture that Dewantoro and other proponents of the family principle advocated were essentially traditionally aristocratic and socially conservative. Nevertheless, several progressive nationalist leaders who advocated far-reaching social change as an inseparable part of the nationalist struggle, including Sukarno, embraced the family principle, as did several later post-independence Indonesian leaders and politicians. For these and other nationalists, part of the attraction of the family principle was that it represented a supposedly indigenously derived alternative to Western models of political organisation and to the perceived materialistic orientation of Western society. The subsumption of divisions and conflicting interests in favour of unity and an abstract collective good also offered a way to patch up the divisions in the nationalist movement and appeared to provide a model for building a nation out of Indonesia’s ethnic, religious and social diversity.

A competitive multi-party system, however, sat uncomfortably with the family principle. Although few of the political parties which had been formed during the early phases of the nationalist movement were characterised by any coherent ideology or programme, they generally claimed to represent certain segments of Indonesian society. These segments were usually defined in openly
or potentially antagonistic religious, ethnic or class terms. The bitter conflicts between the political parties, especially the conflict between the SI and the PKI in 1921–23 and the emergence of two rival successors to Sukarno’s own PNI following his arrest in 1929, contributed to convincing Sukarno that a multi-party system was bound to create divisions and disunity in society, damaging not only the national struggle, but also the organic harmony of society envisioned in the family principle. At least from the early 1930s, Sukarno began to advocate the idea of a vanguard-party (Partai-Pelopor), which should unite the whole nation and lead the way to independence. Although Sukarno admitted that other parties might be formed in the course of the national struggle to represent various social levels of Indonesian society, he saw those parties as less good and as subordinated to the vanguard party. After independence, Sukarno envisioned that the lesser parties would disappear and yield to the will of the Marhaen people, which would be represented by one party.25

There were additional reasons for most of the early nationalist leaders to reject the Western type of parliamentary democracy. Applying a Marxist perspective, Sukarno and other leading nationalists criticised Western democracies for their association with capitalism and for fostering individualism and economic injustice and inequality.26 For the advocates of the family principle, moreover, parliamentary democracy allegedly allowed majority votes to determine what was right in the place of ethical principles, such as what was ‘good’ or ‘just’. In their search for an alternative to the majority vote as the main principle for decision-making, leading nationalists turned to indigenous traditional political systems to find models on which to build a national political system. Apparently inspired by strongly Islamic West Sumatra, Sukarno thus envisaged that differences of opinion should be solved through deliberation, musyawarah, in order to reach a consensus, mufakat.27 The concepts of musyawarah and mufakat were of Islamic origins, and the extent to which they were in common usage in the Indonesian archipelago outside West Sumatra is uncertain.28 For Sukarno and other early nationalist, however, the idea of musyawarah and mufakat was elevated to the status of representing an indigenous political culture with deep historical and cultural roots – ‘invention of tradition’, as it were.29

Sukarno incorporated the family principle and the ideal of consensual decision making as the fourth principle of Pancasila, the five principles which he formulated in June 1945 and proposed as the basis for the Indonesian state. The five principles were:30
Parties and Political Culture in Twentieth-Century Indonesia

1) belief in one God;
2) a just and civilised humanity;
3) the unity of Indonesia;
4) the people’s sovereignty led by the wisdom and prudence found in deliberation among representatives;31
5) social justice for all of the Indonesian people.

Sukarno designed Pancasila to be broad enough to be acceptable to all Indonesians, regardless of ethnicity, religion or political beliefs. Pancasila was thus not meant to be an ideology which could serve as a guide to political action or policy making in an independent Indonesia. Sukarno himself once reportedly said that the ‘strong point of Pancasila is precisely its vague formulation’.32 He did not claim that Pancasila was an ideology, but rather described the five principles as a Philosophische grondslag (philosophical basis) for an independent Indonesia, or a Weltanschauung on which to set up the Indonesian state.33

Addressing a committee set up during the last days of Japanese occupation in order to prepare for Indonesian independence34 on 1 June 1945, Sukarno said:

Brothers and Sisters, we have already been in session for three days; many opinions have been expressed – of different kinds – but we must look for agreement, look for agreement of mind. Together we must look for unity of philosophical basis, look for one Weltanschauung, which all of us agree to. … In short, we must all look for one modus. … This is not a compromise, but we are together looking for one thing with which we, in common, are agreed.35

Pancasila, and thus the family principle, were subsequently incorporated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which was drafted during the last months of Japanese occupation of Indonesia. The constitution, intended to be temporary,36 provided for a strong presidency and for popular sovereignty to be exercised by the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), a body which would be composed of the legislature, the People’s Representative Council, DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), regional representatives and group representatives, to be regulated by law. In general, the hastily drafted constitution left many questions unanswered or to be regulated by law. The document, for example, said nothing about elections or about political parties, but the implication seemed to be that there would be one state party. The constitution was adopted on 18 August 1945, the day after Sukarno had proclaimed Indonesian independence in Jakarta, signalling the start of a four-
year-long military and diplomatic struggle to achieve independence from the Netherlands.

With the main exception of the PKI, which had ceased to exist after the party’s unsuccessful rebellion in 1926–27, most of the political parties established during the pre-war period displayed little in terms of elaborate ideologies or programmes. Most parties proclaimed a central principle, in general nationalism or a religion, and there was a widespread commitment to national independence coupled with greater social and economic equality. There was, however, little elaboration about what kind of political system an independent Indonesia would adopt and even less discussion about how greater social and economic equality would be achieved after the colonial yoke had been cast off. There was a reluctance to admit that there existed deep-seated divisions within Indonesian society and that social and political change was certain to lead to sharp and potentially violent conflicts between Indonesians. The insistence on unity under the banner of nationalism and for the goal of independence was probably a rational strategy at the time, and it served, at least for the time being, to unite most of the nationalist movement. In spite of this superficial unity, however, the deep-seated divisions in Indonesian society remained, and neither nationalism nor Pancasila nor the 1945 Constitution provided any concrete models for negotiation between the different groups and their aspirations. For Sukarno and several other leading nationalists, the family principle with its claims to embody an indigenous political culture seemed to provide a solution. Through musyawarah among the responsible representatives of different groups and aspirations, divisions and differences of opinion and interests would be phased out and a mufakat would be established in the interest of the collective good.

**POLITICAL PARTIES: FROM DOMINANCE TO DECLINE**

The 1945 Constitution, with its strong presidential powers, was abandoned in practice already in October 1945 after domestic political pressure. In the last months of 1945 and the early months of 1946, most of the old political parties that had been banned or that had withered during the late colonial period or the period of Japanese occupation re-emerged, and several new parties were also established. Consequently, as observed by David Reeve, politics on the national level largely became a matter of negotiations between political parties. In 1949, when Indonesian independence gained international recognition, there was no suggestion to revert to the authoritarian provisional 1945
Constitution. Instead, a federal system with a bicameral parliamentary system and free elections was adopted under the 1949 Constitution. That constitution was replaced the following year by the 1950 Provisional Constitution, which prescribed a unitary system with the government answering to a unicameral Parliament. The 1950 Constitution also strengthened the provisions for political and civil liberties that had been included in its predecessor, and the period stands out as the freest and most democratic in the country’s history, at least up until the demise of the New Order in 1998. Decisive political influence lay with the political parties, and the president and vice-president, both of whom were supposed to stand above politics, had largely ceremonial roles with little formal political influence. The military was subordinated to the civilian government and had no formal political influence.

From the early 1950s, most of the dominant political parties began to build up their mass organisations, often with wide regional or nationwide reach, in order to mobilise popular support in anticipation of the parliamentary election, which eventually was held in 1955. Ahead of the election, four of the big political parties appeared to be particularly successful in penetrating and politicising local society. These were the PNI, now formally dissociated from Sukarno, who as president was supposed to stand above politics; the PKI, which had been re-established in 1946; and two Islamic parties, the traditionalist Revival of the Islamic Scholars, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), and the modernist Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims, Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia). Clifford Geertz, drawing on his field work in a middle-sized town in Central Java in 1952–54, has most influentially described this penetration of the national political parties in the local social context:

As well as its political organization proper, each party has connected with it, formally or informally, women’s clubs, youth and student groups, labor unions, peasant organizations, charitable associations, private schools, religious or philosophical societies, veterans’ organizations, savings clubs, and so forth, which serve to bind it to the local social system. Each party with its aggregation of specialized associations provides, therefore, a general framework within which a wide range of social activities can be organized, as well as an over-all ideological rationale to give those activities point and direction. The resultant complex, as much a social movement as a political party proper, is usually referred to as an aliran, the Indonesian term for a stream or current.

The party penetration of local society found resonance largely because it occurred at a time when traditional forms of social organisation had been
weakened, first by dislocation caused by the depression of the 1930s, then by the Japanese occupation and finally by the upheavals of the independence struggle. For the people of Geertz’s town in the 1950s, party politics thus provided a ‘fertile new source of social forms on the basis of which the under-organized village [sic] could finally be reshaped’. However, aliran and party allegiances still largely followed older and traditional forms of social organisation. The PNI thus had its main support among the abangan (nominally Muslim) peasants in Java, as well as among the Javanese priyayi (aristocracy), the civil service and white-collar workers in the urban areas. The PKI drew its main support from the landless agricultural labourers and poor peasants, mainly Javanese abangan. The NU had its main constituencies among the traditionalist santri Muslims in East and Central Java, most of whom were well-to-do farmers and rural dwellers. Masyumi’s followers came mainly from modernist Muslim urban entrepreneurs and businessmen, who were more geographically spread out than the supporters of the other three big parties, each of which had its main constituencies in Java. In the case of all four parties, however, the pattern of traditional ethnic and religious allegiances being transferred to party or aliran support was predominant, with ethnic or religious affiliation largely determining party affiliation. Indonesian political observer Soedjatmoko has thus suggested that the ‘political parties should not […] be seen as aggregations of individual choices regarding political objectives and means […] but much more as the political representatives of cultural solidarity groups, which are tied together by primordial loyalties of great intensity…’ The role of local power brokers – such as the leaders of religious and ethnic groups, village chiefs, landowners and union organisers – were generally more important than the direct appeals and policy declarations of national political leaders for attracting party members and supporters. This social base was the main source of strength for the political parties at the national level, and without such support the parties were very weak and often little more than creatures of their leaders.

The 1955 election produced a near stalemate between the four big parties, with the PNI gaining 22.3 per cent of the votes, Masyumi 20.9 per cent, the NU 18.4 per cent and the PKI 16.4 per cent. Between them, the big four parties commanded almost 80 per cent of the votes, and no other party gained more than 3 per cent of the votes. More than anything else, the votes of the big four parties reflected the strength of their aliran support. Political programs and policies were less important, as demonstrated by the poor performance of the Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia), an intellectually dominated cadre party which had the most articulated and elaborated policy
platform in the election. The party, however, put no effort into mobilising an *aliran* mass base and gained only 2 per cent of the votes.46

As a democratic exercise, the 1955 election was a success. The voter turnout was over 90 per cent, and for more than half a century of Indonesian independence, the 1955 election remained the country’s only free general election. Its results, however, were troublesome for several reasons. The electoral stalemate meant that the four large parties in Parliament each effectively had a veto over government policy, and consequently, as put by Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, ‘policy tended to become a holding operation, bereft of long-term vision’.47 The election had also brought about increasing corruption at the centre, with politicians scrambling for the spoils of office, and parties, particularly the PNI, appropriating public assets for use in their respective election campaigns.48 The ideological and political divisions between the parties and the political elites were, moreover, exacerbated during the long and intense election campaign. As argued by Eliseo Rocamora, the election meant that political parties increasingly began to stake out mutually exclusive areas of ‘ideological or, more properly, cultural identification’, on the basis of which they claimed their constituencies.49 The strengthening of such *aliran* lines of division in national politics, following Rocamora, combined with the accumulated animosity between party politicians and frustrations over economic problems to make party politics after 1955 assume a ‘life-and-death aspect’.

The rivalry between the political parties was particularly aggravated by the two main lines of conflict: between left and right, and between Java and the outer islands. The rise of the PKI indicated the existence of widespread social discontent in Indonesian society and was deeply worrying to many members of the political establishment who regarded the party as subversive, anti-religious and prone to inciting social and political upheaval. In the eyes of many leading politicians, the reputation of the PKI was also tainted by the party’s abortive rebellion against the republican government in Madiun, Central Java, in 1948, which had left thousands of people dead.50 The Java–outer islands conflict was exacerbated by the new parliamentary make-up, which meant that the influence of outer islanders, who particularly had been represented by Masyumi and the PSI, declined in favour of the three big Java-based parties, the PNI, the NU and the PKI. In the last years of the 1950s, these conflicts began to manifest themselves in social and political upheaval in several regions around the country.

The apparent inability of the party-controlled governments to take effective action to resolve the country’s problems provided the adversaries of the par-
liammentary system with arguments for its abolition. In 1956, Sukarno, who, as we have seen, had been averse to a multi-party parliamentary system long before Indonesia gained independence, proposed to 'bury the parties' in favour of a 'Guided Democracy' (demokrasi terpimpin). Just as in his earlier writings, Sukarno saw political parties as divisive, and as a first step in his attempt to abolish the parliamentary system the president, in the following year, set up a National Council (Musyawarah Nasional), led by himself and supposedly modelled on the traditional Indonesian village council. Decisions would be reached through musyawarah (deliberation) in order to achieve mufakat (consensus) and not through voting. The National Council would consist of representatives of so-called functional groups (golongan karya). In contrast to the ideologically based political parties, functional groups were based on the role which different groups played in society, generally defined by their main occupation, such as workers, peasants, students, artists, intellectuals and the military, but also by more general categories such as age, sex and religious allegiance. This essentially corporatist organisation of political representation, characterised by non-competitive functional groups rather than antagonistic class-based or ideologically based organisations, sat very comfortably with the family principle and its vision of a harmonious and naturally integrated society.

The army, although not ideologically consolidated, was also in general averse to the parliamentary system which gave civilian politicians decisive influence over military affairs and excluded senior officers from government and political decision-making. There was considerable support within the armed forces for a political system based on functional group representation, which would provide the military with a legitimate political representation and was likely greatly to enhance its political influence. Many army leaders, moreover, felt contempt for the civilian politicians and were convinced that the military would do a better job in running the country. From the army’s point of view, the incompetence of the party politicians was underlined in 1956–58, when the government proved unable to cope with a number of regional rebellions that broke out in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia. In 1957, Sukarno, pressed by the army’s central command under the army chief-of-staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution, declared martial law in order to deal with the rebellions, but the measure also served to strengthen the role of the military in politics. As a justification for this greater role for the military in politics, General Nasution in 1958 formulated the concept of the ‘middle way’, which later, in the mid-1960s, became the doctrine of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the military.
According to Nasution’s concept, army officers should participate actively in politics, to ensure that civilian governments ruled in the national interest, but they should not seek to achieve a dominant position.53

In the years from 1957 to 1959, Sukarno, encouraged or pressed by the army, gradually moved against the parliamentary system and ended the dominance of the political parties in national politics. On 5 July 1959, Sukarno dissolved, by decree, the popularly elected Constituent Assembly, which had worked for three years to draft a new constitution, and instead restored the 1945 Constitution. This move – which had no legal or constitutional basis, but was backed up by the president’s personal authority and the power of the military – strengthened his own position. The following year, Sukarno dissolved Parliament after it unexpectedly had rejected the government’s budget proposal, and instead appointed a Mutual Cooperation People’s Representative Council, DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – Gotong Royong), in which over half of the seats went to functional group representatives. With the exception of the PSI and Masyumi, which were dissolved under the threat of being banned for their alleged roles in the regional rebellions, however, the shift from political party to functional group representation was not so significant, because several of the functional groups’ representatives were party members and retained their party loyalties.54

Daniel Lev, in his study of the transition to Guided Democracy, has documented the willing acquiescence of many major political party leaders in the demise of the parliamentary system.55 Although many party leaders undoubtedly were driven by personal interest and opportunism in their willingness to help dismantle the parliamentary system, there were also genuine fears among the political elite that mass politics was getting out of hand, particularly with increasing social and political unrest and evidence of rising support for the PKI. From the other side of the political spectrum, party politicians also feared the increasing political role of the military, or even the prospect of a military take-over.56 The only authoritative mainstream balance to these forces seemed to be the president, and thus many party politicians were prepared to comply with the president’s dismantling of the parliamentary system, even if doing so meant abandoning the political institutions through which they exercised their influence and which were the basis for their own political legitimacy. Those leaders who complied were generally accommodated within the new system, and the period of Guided Democracy from 1959 to 1966 consequently showed a great deal of continuity in terms of elite influence with the parliamentary system.
In his attempt to 'bury the parties' and back up his personal power by mass mobilisation, Sukarno also tried to organise the population in various state-sanctioned organisations, such as youth, workers, peasants and other functional groups. As we have seen, however, a large part of the population was already organised in such corporatist mass organisations, with the main difference being that they were affiliated with one or another of the major political parties. Sukarno's attempt to reorganise these groups were generally unsuccessful, however, and the president soon realised that the political parties remained the most effective institutions for mobilising mass support. As the rivalry between the president and the military increased from the early 1960s, Sukarno began increasingly to rely on the political parties, especially the PKI but also the left wing of the PNI and another smaller nationalist party, the Indonesian Party, PARTINDO (Partai Indonesia), for support. The PKI especially strengthened its influence from around 1962, because of the party's ability to mobilise mass support for the president and his policies. For all of the remaining major parties, however, the mobilisation of such mass support became the most important way to exercise political influence. Since no elections were held under Guided Democracy, the parties shifted their organisational focus from electoral activities to such mass actions, largely conducted through party-affiliated mass organisations along functional group lines. As a result of this development, all of the three major parties, the PKI, the PNI and NU, improved their party organisation during Guided Democracy, increasing their numbers of local branches, organising more sectors of the population in their affiliated organisations, and consolidating their internal organisation.\(^{57}\)

Although mass mobilisation was a characteristic of Guided Democracy, popular participation, as Ruth McVey has argued, was only ceremonial and left the population at large without channels of political influence. Ideological differences and fundamental political, economic and social questions were swept under the carpet and clouded by Sukarno's fiery nationalist rhetoric and symbol-mongering. Popular political participation was thus reduced to theatrics, and at the same time economic decline and social unrest convinced an increasing number of the military and civilian political elite of the need to limit or even eliminate the influence of popular opinion and demands on national decision-making. This growing elite sentiment was a major factor undermining Guided Democracy and one which paved the way for the establishment of a politically more exclusionary regime centred on the military.\(^{58}\)
The question of why parliamentary democracy failed in Indonesia at the end of the 1950s has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. The older historiography, most prominently represented by Herbert Feith’s study *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (1962), emphasised structural factors, or even cultural dispositions, as argued by Harry Benda in his review of Feith’s book. More recent analyses tend to give more weight to the role of political actors, particularly Sukarno and the army, and to the context of political events surrounding the dismantling of the parliamentary institutions. While acknowledging the merits of each of these perspectives, the present study, which particularly focuses on the political parties rather than the decline of constitutional democracy as such, would like to emphasise the rise of *aliran* politics in combination with Sukarno’s role as the most crucial factors in the transformation of the political party system. The first free and democratic election in 1955, paradoxically, heralded the decline of parliamentary democracy and a return to a more authoritarian political system based on the family principle and its organic view of society. As we have seen, the election strengthened the influence of communal politics and *aliran* lines of division in national politics, with the parties becoming the representatives of socio-cultural or religious solidarity groups. As argued by William Liddle, the divisions between the parties and their respective general ideological positions in the early years of independence reflected widespread social and political cleavages in Indonesian society. Sukarno, however, blamed the parties for creating the divisions, and his solution was Guided Democracy, led by himself and based on the family principle, according to which group interests should be subordinated under the national interest. This organic vision of society, however, could only be achieved, albeit superficially, through the repression of dissenting voices and by eliminating or disabling existing channels for popular political representation, such as parliamentary institutions and the political parties. These measures, however, did not reduce or resolve the deep-seated divisions which existed in society. Conversely, as the major remaining political parties instead turned to mass action to gain political influence, communal conflicts and *aliran* lines of division on the local level were aggravated and politicised, which, combined with the economic decline, led to increasing social tension and unrest in many places. The polarised and increasingly tense atmosphere of mass mobilisation in turn produced a consensus among the non-left political elite about the need to limit popular political participation and paved the way for the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the politically more exclusionary New Order regime.
NOTES

1 Feith (1962) is the most important study of the party system in general before the mid-1960s. The history of the Communist Party, PKI, has been especially well researched; see Hindley (1964), McVey (1965), Mortimer (1974) and Törnquist (1984). The history of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI, between 1946 and 1965 has been studied by Rocamora (1975), and Sjamsuddin (1984) has covered the party’s development between 1963 and 1969. The two Christian parties, Partai Katolik and Parkindo, have been researched by Webb (1978). The Islamic parties under the Old Order have been less well researched; however, see Boland (1971) for the Masyumi and NU. For the early New Order period, Ward (1970) has analysed the foundation of the Indonesian Muslim Party, Parmusi.

2 This predominant analysis is typified by Liddle (1992: 457), who concluded that the PDI and the PPP would have little to contribute to a debate about political reform because they allegedly were too discredited among both the military and intellectuals.


4 Again illustrating the domination of state-centred analysis, two major published works in English have focused on the government’s electoral vehicle, Golkar; see Suryadinata (1989) and Boileau (1983). The major English-language study of the PPP is the unpublished doctoral thesis by Abdul Hakim (1993). Another less extensive but well-researched unpublished thesis by Ewan Ward (1994) has studied the development of the PDI from 1973 to 1993.

5 Haribuan (1996) and Luwarso (1997b) respectively.

6 Luwarso (1997a). In addition, Wardhanana (1997) studies how the events in 1996 were covered by television, and Fachmi and Amirudin (1997) deals with the trials against Megawati’s supporters in the latter half of 1996.


8 A revised version of the paper appears in McIntyre (2000).

9 For some of these, see van Dijk (1979), van Dijk (1981) and van de Kok (1987). In the 1990s, the survey articles continued in the Leiden-based Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, but these articles generally devoted less interest to the developments in the PDI. An exception is van Dijk (1997), which surveys the events surrounding Megawati’s demise as party leader in 1996.

10 The more important ones used in the present study include Kaisiepo (1982), Sihbudi (1990) and (1993) and Bastaman (1995).

11 This definition is derived from combining the definitions of Sartori (1976: 63), Epstein (1982: 9) and Reeve (1985: 2).

12 See McVey (1965: passim). The SI was originally founded in 1909 as the Islamic Commercial Union (Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah) and changed its name to the SI in 1912. The origin of the PKI was the Indies Social-Democratic Association, ISDV (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging), founded in 1914. The party
Parties and Political Culture in Twentieth-Century Indonesia

changed its name in 1920 to the Communist Association in the Indies, PKI (Perserikatan Kommunist di India), and in 1924 the name was changed again to the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI.

13 See McVey (1965: 323–346) for the PKI rebellion.
14 For the early history of the PNI, see Ingleson (1979).
15 Legge (1972: 90).
18 Reeve (1985: 27–29) and Legge (1972: 72–74)
19 Cited in Reeve (1985: 10).
21 For these ideas, see Moertono (1981) and the essay by Anderson (1972) discussed above.
23 The intellectual history of the family principle is somewhat unclear, however. David Bourchier (1994: 58), drawing on the unpublished work of Marsillam Simanjuntak (1989), has argued that the family principle and the integralistic concept of the state were not the products of indigenous political tradition, but rather derived from Hegelian political philosophy transferred to Indonesia by nationalist figures who had come in contact with European political thinking. Andrew MacIntyre (1994a: 2–3) has drawn attention to the similarities between the family principle and the ‘organic statism’ described by Stepan (1978) in the context of Peru as well as similar principles in other Latin American countries. For the present purposes, however, the important point is that, whatever the intellectual origins of the family principle, the problem of how to combine the principle with aspirations for progressive social reform, egalitarian political participation and popular sovereignty, remained unresolved.
25 Reeve (1985: 30 and 33–34); see also Soekarno (1963: 282 and 283).
26 Reeve (1985: 26). Mohammad Hatta, although a leading proponent of parliamentary democracy when Indonesia gained independence, also expressed similar criticism; see Reeve (1985: 38).
28 Musyawarah is derived from the Arabic shūrā and mufakat from muwāfaka. The former concept is central in Islamic political theory, which emphasises deliberation as a model for political decision-making. The latter concept, however, is not a central term in Islamic political theory. I am grateful to Ann Kull for her help in tracing the background of the concepts of musyawarah and mufakat.
30 The order of the five principles given here was adopted when Pancasila, later in June 1945, was incorporated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and which
subsequently became the conventional order. Sukarno originally put the principles with the following titles and in the following order: 1) nationalism; 2) internationalism; 3) democracy; 4) social justice; and 5) belief in one God; see Sukarno (1969).

31 The fourth *sila*, which envisaged the family principle as the basis for Indonesia’s political system, is the most difficult to translate. In Indonesian, it reads *kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan*

32 Caldwell and Utrecht (1979: 97); italics in original.


34 In October 1944, the Japanese, who occupied Indonesia between 1942 and 1945, had promised that the country would become independent in the near future in order to foreclose the re-establishment of Dutch colonial rule in the archipelago after the end of the Pacific War.


36 The constitution contained the additional provision that the highest legislative assembly, the MPR, would meet within six months of its formation to determine the constitution. Sukarno also explicitly said that the 1945 Constitution was to be provisional and that the MPR, after an independent state had been established and peace prevailed, was to ‘frame a complete and perfect constitution’; Yamin (1959: 410), cited in Nasution (1992: 29).


39 See Nasution (1992: 450–510) for translations of the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions. The latter was explicitly provisional, prescribing the formation of a constituent assembly to enact, together with the government, a permanent constitution; see Nasution (1992: 507).


41 Geertz (1963: 14).

42 Geertz (1959: 36).

43 See e.g. Skinner (1959) and Liddle (1970).


46 For the 1955 election, see Feith (1957)


49 Rocamora (1973: 145).

50 For the Madiun affair, see Anderson (1976).

52 See MacIntyre (1994a: 1–2).
54 Ricklefs (1994: 266 and 268).
55 Lev (1966: passim); cf. also Liddle (1973: 1).
57 Rocamora (1973: 147–149 and 144).
58 McVey (1994: 10).
59 Benda (1964). For Feith's reply, see Feith (1965).
60 E.g. Feith (1994), Lev (1994) and Mackie (1994). This shift in focus also illustrates the declining interest in theory, as discussed above, among students of Indonesian politics towards the end of the New Order.
61 Liddle (1978b: 171).
CHAPTER 3

The Foundations of New Order Political Culture

THE NEW ORDER TAKES POWER

By the mid-1960s, after six years of Guided Democracy and theatrical mass mobilisation, Indonesian politics had become highly polarised, left and right. The bitter ideological conflict was most clearly manifested in the rivalry and hostility between the PKI and the right-wing army leadership. In this politically tense atmosphere, on 30 September 1965, a group of leftist military officers launched an coup attempt, apparently aimed at replacing the army leadership with officers more sympathetic to Sukarno and the PKI. The coup, in which six top army generals were killed, was badly planned and executed, however, and was quickly defeated by troops led by Major-General Suharto, the commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve, Kostrad (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat).1 The abortive coup provided Suharto and the army with a pretext to eliminate the PKI, and they initiated a concerted campaign against the party, in which the PKI was portrayed as treacherous and morally corrupt.2

The army also gathered a coalition of anti-communist forces, including students, religious organisations and political parties with their affiliated mass organisations. These groups were encouraged to hold demonstrations and other actions, including violent actions, against the PKI and organisations associated with the party. In the middle of October, an elite army unit was dispatched to Central Java with the task of crushing the PKI. For this purpose, the military took advantage of the existing social tensions and conflicts in the local communities and recruited local civilian adversaries of the PKI to identify, intimidate and even kill PKI members and supporters. The military also gave paramilitary training to youth groups, particularly political and religious youth organisations, in order for them to take part in the physical elimination of the PKI. The army’s campaign against the Communist Party thus combined with a range of social, economic, religious and political conflicts, mostly of local character and scope, and resulted in a large-scale massacre of real and imagined
The Foundations of New Order Political Culture

communists. In the five months from October 1965 to March 1966, an estimated 500,000 people were killed by the army directly, or by civilian adversaries of the Communist Party, often with army encouragement. Most of the PKI leadership were killed, and those who were not killed were either arrested or fled the country. The massacres were most intense in East and Central Java and Bali, all of which were PKI strongholds, but killings took place in most regions. In addition to those killed, hundreds of thousands communist sympathisers were arrested.3

In Jakarta, meanwhile, the army-led anti-communist coalition gathered force. The coalition included many and diverse civilian groups, the most important of which were the traditionalist Muslims of the NU, groups of modernist Muslims who had formerly been organised or associated with Masyumi, Christians, former PSI-sympathisers, anti-communist leftists of the PNI, high school and university students, various youth groups, intellectuals and conservative bureaucrats. As noted by Cribb and Brown, the coalition was reminiscent of the pre-war Indonesian nationalist movement, 'encompassing fundamentally contradictory views but united by a passionate opposition to a single enemy, the communists now taking the place of the Dutch'.4 It was also, as Michael Vatikiotis has pointed out, largely a middle-class coalition.5 Among these groups there were high hopes that a New Order – as opposed to the Old Order of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy – would be more open and pluralistic. These aspirations largely referred to the sphere of elite politics, however. The Communist Party, with its mass support, was not to have any legitimate political role, and in general, as we have seen, there was a broad consensus among the elite about the need to end or strictly limit popular political participation.

Sukarno tried to rally his supporters to counter the threat of the New Order coalition, but he failed to establish broad enough support. Instead, during the last months of 1965 and in early 1966, he came increasingly to rely on leftist sympathisers, which alienated many moderate groups and leading figures who might otherwise have supported the president. The army, meanwhile, continued to encourage demonstrations by youth groups, students and Muslims in Jakarta. There were daily demonstrations, now not only against the PKI, but also against Sukarno, against individual cabinet ministers who were seen as sympathetic to the PKI and against the government’s economic policy failures. Political and social unrest, largely fanned by the army, eroded the president’s authority and made his position increasingly untenable. Eventually, on 11 March 1966, Sukarno was forced, under military pressure, to hand over power to Suharto, instructing the latter to ‘take all measures considered necessary to
guarantee security, calm and stability.\textsuperscript{6} A few months later, the transfer of power was ratified by the country’s highest legislative body, the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara), which by then had been purged of communist and pro-Sukarno elements. In March 1967, the assembly stripped Sukarno of all powers and titles and named Suharto acting president. The following year, Suharto was elected as president for a five-year term. Sukarno, meanwhile, was implicated as a suspect in the 30 September coup attempt and placed under house arrest with his visitors severely restricted. He died, broken and by all accounts severely depressed, on 21 June 1970.\textsuperscript{7}

From the outset, much of the legitimacy of Suharto’s military-dominated government rested on the army’s claim to have restored order after the upheaval of the massacres in 1965–66. The terrible army-sponsored massacres of 1965–66 left a significant long-term imprint on Indonesia’s political culture, creating a latent fear of large-scale violent social and political upheaval, described by Clifford Geertz as an awareness that ‘the abyss is there’.\textsuperscript{8} Discussions of the role of the military in sponsoring and performing the killings, however, were repressed under the New Order, and in the official historiography the upheavals were instead portrayed as spontaneous acts of wrath and revenge by the masses in reaction to the alleged treason of the PKI. The masses were thus implicated as dangerous and prone to violence, which justified restrictions on political liberties and broader political participation. The military, by contrast, portrayed itself as the essential vanguard against the resurgence of social upheaval and mass violence and those in power portrayed the regime in general as the guarantor of order and stability. Furthermore, as observed by Richard Tanter, the memory of the massacres functioned to maintain a measure of terror in the minds of people, thus decreasing the need for the New Order regime to employ direct repression and terror in order to maintain the political status quo.\textsuperscript{9}

After the transfer of power in March 1966, Suharto’s first decree in the name of the president had been to ban the PKI, a measure which by then had mainly symbolic significance. The party had in practice already ceased to exist, its organisation shattered and its members either dead, arrested, hiding or trying to conceal their former association with the party. The party posed no political threat to the new regime, but the ideology of anti-communism, as demonstrated by Rob Goodfellow, emerged as a useful justification as well as tool of intimidation for the regime.\textsuperscript{10} According to this ideology, the PKI represented the antithesis of the New Order, and of order and stability in general. During the first years of the New Order, anti-communism provided a
focus for uniting the coalition of civilian and military politicians and intellectuals, but the ideology was soon transformed into an instrument of coercion and intimidation used by the army against its political adversaries.\footnote{11}

In the years immediately following the destruction of the PKI, however, several groups in the New Order coalition competed for political influence, and apart from the government’s draconian repression of communism, the political climate was relatively open, especially in comparison with the last years of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. There was no given blueprint for what political system the New Order should adopt, apart from a general commitment to the family principle, the 1945 Constitution and a broad acceptance of the military’s legitimate role in politics. A central matter of debate and source of disagreement concerned the role of the political parties. The 1966 MPRS session had adopted the goal of ‘simplification’ (penyederhanaan) of the party system,\footnote{12} but the remaining parties, particularly the PNI and the NU, were still influential and commanded considerable popular support through their party organisations and affiliated mass organisations. In addition, there were hopes from former Masyumi and PSI politicians, many of whom had been released from prison after Sukarno’s fall, that their parties would be rehabilitated. Parts of the military leadership also saw the political parties as natural and necessary vehicles for aliran political representation. At the other end of the political spectrum, there was pressure from idealistic young intellectuals and a small group of radical army generals – the so-called ‘New Order radicals’ – to abolish or severely limit the influence of the political parties, which were seen as reactionary, opportunistic, divisive and representing narrow primordial loyalties.

The government and the central army leadership under Suharto, meanwhile, took what has been described as a ‘centrist’ position, seeking a compromise that would be able to accommodate the political parties rather than to overhaul the entire political structure and thus risk jeopardising political stability.\footnote{13} This position was not based on any commitment to a political party system, but rather dictated by pragmatic political concerns.

In early 1968, the government presented a compromise draft legislation for political reforms to the MPRS, which eventually was accepted by the political parties.\footnote{14} The agreement allowed the political parties to continue to exist, but imposed restrictions on the elections and circumscribed the influence of the parties in favour of functional groups, the most prominent of which was the military. The Parliament, DPR, would consist of 360 political party representatives to be elected in the general elections scheduled for 1971 and an additional 100 legislators appointed by the government. It was understood that
the military would be allotted 75 of the appointed seats. The highest legislative assembly according to the constitution, the People's Consultative Assembly, MPR, would consist of all 460 members of Parliament and an additional 460 appointed representatives of functional groups and political parties, together with regional representatives to be elected by the provincial parliaments.\(^\text{15}\)

Harold Crouch has identified two main reasons for the government's decision at the end of the 1960s to pursue a compromise with the political parties and not to embark on a thorough restructuring of the political system.\(^\text{16}\) First, as we have seen, there were differences of opinion within the army about the proper role to be awarded to the political parties, and, moreover, the army leaders had little idea of precisely what reforms they would like to undertake. In such a situation, attempting a thorough overhaul of the political system, which certainly would exacerbate existing tensions in society, risked threatening the cohesion of the military itself. Second, the military leadership was anxious to maintain broad civilian support, both in order to facilitate government, especially in the regions, and to ensure stability in the legislative bodies to be elected in 1971. Before the election, there was even speculation that the military might admit the PNI as a junior coalition partner in a post-election government.\(^\text{17}\)

With these considerations in mind, the government had every intention of playing it safe in the election and ensuring that the result would confirm its hold on power. To ensure such an outcome, the regime, immediately after the passing of the electoral bill in late 1969, started to extend its influence inside the larger parties, as well as to develop its own electoral vehicle. The strategies and \textit{modi operandi} which the regime thus developed, particularly in the lead-up to the 1971 election, would become salient features of the New Order's exercise of power and central elements of its political culture.

**THE EMASTULATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 1971 ELECTION**

In April 1970, the PNI held a congress in Semarang, Central Java, to elect a new party leader to replace its former chairman, Osa Maliki, who had died the year before. There were two main contenders for the post: the chairman of the party's Jakarta chapter, Hardi, and the chairman of the Central Java chapter, Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo. The latter was a long-time associate of Suharto and was expected to be more sympathetic to the government and the military than his rival, who emphasised the independent role of the political parties in
The Foundations of New Order Political Culture

creating a democracy.¹⁸ In order to secure Hadisubeno’s election, the government employed a multi-pronged strategy of persuasion, intimidation, manipulation and bribery towards the congress delegates, echoing the strategy that had been successfully employed the year before in the province of West Irian to secure a favourable outcome in the so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’, which had been proscribed by the United Nations to ratify the 1963 transfer of sovereignty over the province to Indonesia. That operation had been led by one of Suharto’s personal assistants, Brigadier General Ali Moertopo, who headed the military intelligence body Special Operations, Opsus (Operasi Khusus).¹⁹ Moertopo now employed a similar strategy towards the PNI congress. Before the delegates left for the congress, many were summoned by their respective local military authorities and instructed to support Hadisubeno, lest they encounter difficulties later. After arriving in Semarang, the delegates were variously treated to lavish hospitality or intimidated by security personnel to push them to support the government’s candidate.²⁰ According to Brian May, a Western correspondent in Indonesia at the time:

Murtopo personally set up a post near the conference hall; and his officers, dressed in civilian clothes, visited delegates in their hotels and forced them to sign away their votes. Some PNI members put up a strong resistance; at least one was interrogated all night and threatened with arrest on the ground that he had belonged to a communist-controlled student organization in 1955; several had their party cards torn up; others were forbidden to enter the hall. After eight days the conference chairman announced that Hadisubeno had been elected; he did not take a vote, but said that 230 out of 238 delegates had signed in the new chairman’s favour.²¹

Similar tactics were employed to ensure a compliant leadership of the Indonesian Muslim Party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia), a party set up in early 1968 to represent the modernist streams of Islam in place of the defunct Masyumi. In November of the same year, the party held its first congress and elected a former senior Masyumi leader, Mohammed Roem, to the position of chairman. The government, however, refused to recognize Roem’s election because of his past links with Masyumi, which was anathema for the army because of the party’s association with the regional rebellions in the 1950s. Thus ignoring the congress decision, the government continued only to recognize the leadership of the party’s former chairman, Djanarwi Hadikusumo. This situation, however, failed to splinter the party, which continued to prepare
for the elections and at the same time began to adopt an increasingly critical
stance towards the government. Then suddenly, in October 1970, one of the
party’s deputy chairmen, Djelani Naro, who apparently had been included in
the party’s central board at the government’s request and who had close
relations with Ali Moertopo, announced that he had taken over the party
leadership because the established leadership had acted against the party’s
interests by opposing the government. Naro’s initiative provided the govern-
ment with a pretext for stepping in to settle the party’s so-called internal
dispute, and a few weeks later a minister of state, M. S. Mintaredja, was
appointed general chairman by presidential decree. Those within the party who
resisted the move were subsequently threatened and intimidated by security
officers until they either complied or withdrew from politics.22

The third major party, the NU, appeared to pose no great problem for the
government, and the party was consequently spared the Opsus intervention
experienced by both the PNI and Parmusi. The party had been a staunch ally of
the army in the anti-communist campaign of 1965–66, and could with relative
ease adapt itself to the new power constellations under the New Order. The
government appears to have concluded that if the NU were given status and
funds for their social and religious activities, its leaders would support Suharto
just as they had supported Sukarno under Guided Democracy.23

As preparations for the 1971 elections got under way from the end of 1969,
the government began developing its own electoral vehicle in the form of the
Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama
Golongan Karya), commonly referred to as Golkar.24 The organisation had
originally been founded by army officers in 1964 as an umbrella organisation
for various anti-communist groups. In 1968, Golkar comprised 249 functional
organisations, including bodies for labour, peasants, civil servants, women,
youth, intellectuals, artists and religion. Its leadership was dominated by senior
army officers, but the organisation was very ineffective and the central
leadership had no authority to impose policy and other directives on its mem-
ber organisations.25

In order to consolidate Golkar’s organisation, the government issued a
regulation in December 1969 according to which any functional group repres-
entative in the legislatures affiliated with a political party would be replaced.
This regulation also aimed at providing the impetus for the establishment of
regional and local branches of Golkar.26 Moreover, the bureaucracy was mo-
bilised in support of Golkar, and civil servants were pressed to sign declarations
of ‘monoloyalty’ to the government, which implied support for Golkar. Al-
though there was no formal prohibition for the majority of civil servants to be members of a political party, the government let it be understood that those who were party members were likely to be dismissed or would at the very least be unlikely to get promoted.27

Golkar was not a political party, either in name or function. The organisation was developed by the government to act as its electoral vehicle, as a recipient of votes for the government in the 1971 elections, and not as a channel for political participation. Golkar consequently had no individual memberships and no cadre of politicians or activists of its own. Its proclaimed ideology was Pancasila, which, as we have seen, offered no guide to action or political programme, but rather was a general philosophy which promised that no single ideology would prevail and that the stalemate would be preserved so that ideological differences could be set aside.28 Politics were to be suspended in favour of (economic) development (pembangunan), which would lead to a harmonious and prosperous society. Golkar, moreover, was consistently portrayed as a progressive political reform alternative to the backward-looking political parties. For example, according to Ali Moertopo:

Golkar is the only socio-political force outside the compartments of ideologies based on Nasakom [nationalism, religion and communism], and which is based on nothing but the ideology of Pancasila; Golkar is the only socio-political force which is oriented towards reform [pembaruan] and development [pembangunan], and the only one which is able to unite all the diverse functional groups under one symbol in the elections.29

The promise of unity after the upheavals of the 1960s probably had a large appeal for the electorate in the 1971 election, as did presumably the promises of economic development and prosperity – especially in view of the dramatically improved economic situation before the 1971 election compared with Sukarno’s last years in office. As noted by David Reeve, who witnessed the election first-hand, there seemed to be a general distrust at the village level of ‘politics’, in the wake of the 30 September 1965 coup events, which extended to a general distrust of the political parties.30 Golkar’s and the government’s message that the nation should put ideological differences aside and give priority to economic development and progress, paradoxically, was a clear political stance which in this context seemed to appeal to broad segments of Indonesian society. The view of Harold Crouch that ‘Golkar did not seek to present a programme that could unite former supporters of the PNI, the
Muslim parties, and even the PKI\textsuperscript{31} is thus not completely accurate. The message that economic development should take precedence over other, so-called political, concerns was nothing less than a political stance, the attraction of which lay in its simple straightforwardness and its potential for uniting different ideologies and segments of society much in the same way as nationalism had done in the 1920s and 1930s or anti-communism had done in the mid-1960s. Just as in those instances, laying out a detailed programme for future policies would have been likely to shatter that unity and blur the attraction of the message.

Apart from Golkar, nine political parties were allowed to participate in the July 1971 election. The three major parties, the PNI, Parmusi and the NU, have already been discussed. In addition, two smaller Christian parties, the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) and the Protestant Indonesian Christian Party, Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia) took part in the election. The socialist-oriented Proletarian Party (Partai Murba) and a small nationalist army-affiliated party, the League of Upholders of Indonesian Freedom, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia), also contested the election, as did two smaller Islamic parties. All candidates of the political parties and Golkar were screened by the authorities before the election in order to see whether they fulfilled several criteria, including formal education, political history and loyalty and commitment to Pancasila.\textsuperscript{32} The campaign themes, moreover, were circumscribed by the government, with the contestants expected to refrain from criticising the government or government policies.\textsuperscript{33}

Before the election, it was widely believed that the outcome would approximately confirm the parliamentary status quo with around 60 per cent of the seats being held by political parties. Golkar was expected to come out as one of the 'big four', collecting perhaps 30–35 per cent of the votes, which also was the organisation's target.\textsuperscript{34} In the lead-up to the election, however, Golkar launched a fierce campaign, described by some of the other contestants as a 'bulldozer' campaign. As mentioned, the bureaucracy was mobilised to support Golkar's election effort. This tactic probably had a significant importance for the outcome, because it was state bureaucracy which organised and carried out the elections. The imposition of monoloyalty for civil servants further deprived the PNI of the support of its previously most important constituency. Golkar also made extensive use of government and military equipment as well as state controlled media in conducting its campaign, and through the patronage of high-ranking government officials and ethnic Chinese businessmen affiliated with senior government and military officials, the organisation could raise
substantial funds for the campaign. Parts of these funds were used for outright vote-buying and for handing out gifts to voters. Moreover, the military was mobilised to conduct a massive campaign of intimidation and terror to pressure people into voting for Golkar. These combined tactics resembled those which had been employed by the government to ensure compliant leaderships in the PNI and Parmusi before the election, but on a much larger scale. Such tactics, as mentioned above, were to remain a central characteristic of the New Order throughout its tenure of power.

Some of the political party leaders tried to fight back. The formerly compliant PNI leader Hadisubeno proved to be one of the government’s severest critics in the campaign. The party evoked the image and teachings of Sukarno, particularly his leftist Marhaenism, which was the PNI’s official ideology, and two of the former president’s children, Guntur Sukarnoputra and Rachmawati Sukarno, campaigned for the party. When in response the military suggested that all Sukarno’s teachings be banned, Hadisubeno challenged the government to ban the PNI as well. He also, famously, declared that ‘[i]en Suhartos, ten Nasutions, and a cartload of generals do not add up to one Sukarno’. Unfortunately, Hadisubeno collapsed and died at the height of the campaign, in April 1971, which inevitably gave rise to suspicions that he had been murdered. There are no substantial indications that such was the case – Hadisubeno suffered from diabetes and had shortly before reportedly undergone a kidney operation – but the fact that Subchan, an outspoken NU leader in the campaign, was convinced that Hadisubeno had been murdered and therefore seriously feared for his own life, illustrates the climate of terror in which the campaign was conducted.

The result of the election was a landslide victory for Golkar, which exceeded by far even the most up-beat expectations for the organisation. It collected 62.8 per cent of the votes nationwide and gained absolute majorities in all but three of the country’s 26 provinces. The disastrous result for most of the political parties reflected the fact that the ruthless ‘Golkarisation’ campaign ahead of the election had broken the aliran base of the major political parties. The main exception was the NU, which still enjoyed grassroots support in the party’s heartlands in East and Central Java through its network of local religious leaders (ulama) and Islamic schools (pesantren). The functionally organised mass organisations of the parties, which under Guided Democracy had been their main sources of strength, were largely defunct. In their place, a variety of state-sponsored mass organisations had emerged, all of which pleaded allegiance to Golkar and its programme of ‘development yes, politics no’.
After the 1971 election, the separation of the political parties from their constituencies was justified in terms of the so-called ‘floating mass’ doctrine, particularly propounded by Ali Moertopo. According to this doctrine, the ‘general population, especially [those living] in villages and whose way of thinking was not yet rational enough’ should be protected from the influence of the political parties with their ‘narrow orientation to various ideologies’. The population at large would be a ‘floating mass’ who would only express their political aspirations in the general elections once every five years, when they would be free to choose between Golkar and the political parties. In between elections, the ‘floating mass’ was not supposed to engage in politics at all, and would therefore, in theory, be free to direct all their efforts to economic development. Although the floating mass doctrine was never officially endorsed as a government policy, it was largely implemented in practice at the local level. This circumstance served to disadvantage the political parties in relation to Golkar, which for practical purposes had a permanent representation at the local level through the bureaucracy.

There was little doubt among observers that Golkar’s victory mainly was conditioned by the heavy-handed tactics of the government and the military, and even senior government officials openly admitted that such factors had influenced the outcome. Such admissions, however, did little to diminish the government’s claim that the election had forcefully demonstrated broad popular support, not only for the government, but also for Golkar as a progressive socio-political force. The government also interpreted the election result as a popular vote of no confidence in the political parties and the political party system in general, and as such the election strengthened the government in its attempts to reform the political system, aimed at the ‘simplification’ of the party system.

THE RISE OF STATE CORPORATISM

Already in 1970, President Suharto had proposed that the political parties form two groups (apart from Golkar) in the election, in order to ‘safeguard national stability and the smooth continuation of [economic] development and to avoid confusion and discord’. The groups would consist of one ‘spiritual’ group, comprising all seven religious parties, and one nationalist group, consisting of the PNI, Murba and IPKI. The idea was generally received positively by the parties, but the two Christian parties, Parkindo and the Catholic Party, fiercely opposed the idea of being grouped together with the Muslim parties. Senior
leaders of the two Christian parties instead wanted their parties to form a separate group, and there seems to have been considerable support within the parties for the idea of merging into one Christian party. The idea of a separate Christian political representation, however, was rejected by President Suharto, but the Christian parties were instead allowed to be grouped with the nationalist parties. In March 1970, two groups were thus established. The United Development Group (Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan) consisted of all four Muslim parties, that is, the NU, Parmusi and the two smaller PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) and Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah). The Democratic Development Group (Kelompok Demokrasi Pembangunan), meanwhile, consisted of the PNI, the Catholic Party, Parkindo, IPKI and Murba.

The groups had little practical significance in the election, in which each party campaigned individually and independently of the group, and even Minister of Home Affairs Amir Machmud later admitted that the scheme had failed. Strengthened by its success in the 1971 election, however, the government moved to achieve the goal of simplifying the party system. In October 1971, shortly before the new Parliament was scheduled to assemble, President Suharto announced that the legislature would have four factions: the Armed Forces, Golkar, the Spiritual-Material Group consisting of the Islamic parties and the Material-Spiritual group consisting of the PNI and the two Christian parties. Officially, the reason for grouping the parties together was to improve parliamentary efficiency. At the suggestion of some of the parties, however, the confusing names ‘Spiritual-Material’ and ‘Material-Spiritual’ were changed to those which had been used prior to the election, that is, the United Development Group and the Democratic Development Group.

The parties were subsequently pressured to agree to merge to form two parties following the lines of the parliamentary groups. Some party leaders, particularly from the NU and the PSII, opposed the imposed mergers, but these were effectively sidelined by the covert interventions of Ali Moertopo. The Catholic Party and Parkindo were also reluctant to merge with the PNI, Murba and IPKI, but in the end they were left with no other choice if they wanted to keep any political representation. On 5 January 1973, the four Muslim parties merged into the United Development Party, PPP, and five days later, the five parties of the Democratic Development Group merged to form the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI. The relative ease with which the mergers had been achieved illustrates the weakness of the political parties in the wake of the 1971 election and the success of the government’s concerted efforts since 1969 to break the influence of the parties. According to Brian May:
That their [the political parties'] demise passed off so smoothly, with scarcely more than whispered protests, was not only the result of Suharto's ruthlessness and superb tactics and the weakness and opportunism of most of the leaders. There was no real political structure. The parties had no deep social base; they were like fungi clinging to an artificial tree.51

The 1973 party mergers represented the final stage in the government's effort to achieve the 'simplification' of the party system. As we have seen, the attempts to 'bury' or emasculate the political parties had begun already in the years following the 1955 election, with Sukarno and the army being the loudest adversaries of political party dominance. The strong position of the political parties left both the president and the military with little political influence, and Sukarno, as well as many army leaders, including Nasution, shared the conviction that a multi-party system was unsuitable for the Indonesian social and cultural context. Inspired by Dewantoro and his ideas about the family principle, both instead wished to establish a political system based on functional group representation.52 In the early years of Guided Democracy, Sukarno attempted but failed to replace the party system with such a functional group representation. Instead, ironically, in spite of the strong anti-party bias of Guided Democracy, the president came more and more to rely on the support of political parties, especially the PKI, towards the end of his tenure.

The New Order coalition arose largely from resentment of Sukarno's rapprochement with the PKI and the failure of Guided Democracy to produce a sustainable alternative to the party system. From the outset, a pronounced long-term aim of the New Order was the simplification of the party system. This simplification did not only mean the reduction of the number of political parties, but more important, according to Ali Moertopo, to 'reorganise the attitude and working pattern of the political parties to become programme oriented'.53 The parties, thus, should be separated from their ideological roots and identities and deprived of their social bases, particularly their aliran constituencies. The aliran pattern of politics and social organisation of the Sukarno period was suppressed and replaced by state corporatism and a developmentalist agenda in which there was no room for the political parties to act as channels for bottom-up political aspirations.

Several prominent students of Indonesian politics have attempted to answer the question of why the government imposed the party mergers in 1973. William Liddle, for example, has suggested that the mergers were a 'fairly subtle attempt to read Muslims qua Muslims out of political life' or that the mergers
The Foundations of New Order Political Culture

primarily were intended for their symbolic value, either in that a system with few parties was thought to be more stable, or as the last act in a drama to satisfy the New Order radicals. According to Brian May, the reason was that two parties could be more easily managed than seven. Benedict Anderson, meanwhile, has asked if the intention was ‘permanently to discredit [aliran] thinking – by holding visibly impotent aliran parties in constant view, by forcibly merging historically antagonistic Muslim streams within the PPP and marhaenist and Christian streams in the PDI, and by imposing mercenary and mediocre leaders on both’. Michael Vatikiotis has suggested that the fusion of rival parties was intended to ensure the ‘endemic weakness’ of the PPP and the PDI, and a similar argument has been advanced by Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre.

Although all of these explanations probably hold some relevance, especially from the perspective of the effects that the mergers came to have, the most straightforward answer is that the military, like Sukarno a decade earlier, sought to establish a political system based on corporate group representation and an organic view of society. Such a system was incompatible with a multi-party system with more or less autonomous parties channelling the aspirations of their respective constituencies and the state functioning as an arena of competition between conflicting interests and ideologies. The government aimed to suppress ideological differences in society, and the political parties were the embodiment and representatives of such differences on the national and regional political levels. Suharto himself, in his autobiography, expressed the reason for the mergers through the use of a metaphor:

The way forward is already determined, the central pillar [poros] is already determined, that is, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, pointing us towards our shared hopes and aspirations. If the central pillar, the one and only, is already there, why must the vehicles be that many; why must there be nine vehicles? Why must there be reckless speeding and violations? If there are carelessness and violations, there may be incidents. If there is an accident, our way forward is likely to be disturbed or even blocked, so that in the end we can not go anywhere at all.

Given the strong anti-party bias in Indonesian politics, not least within the army and the New Order coalition, the question concerning the party mergers should rather be: Why did the government not do away with the political parties altogether? Suharto, in his autobiography, does not answer that question, but there appears to have been two main reasons for the government to allow a crippled political party system to continue to exist. One obvious reason,
in view of the early New Order’s heavy reliance on foreign aid and support, was the need for the regime to seek international legitimacy from Western countries based on the pretence of commitment to democratic institutions such as elections and political parties. The other reason was probably a recognition of the fact that the political parties were closely associated with major elite groups – the *jaringan* (networks) as described by John Sidel – most of which had been prominent in Indonesian politics since the pre-war period. These included networks of modernist and traditionalist Muslim leaders, ethnic Chinese and Catholic politicians and activists, former PSI sympathisers and intellectuals, as well as moderate Sukarnoist nationalists. Many of the members of these elite *jaringan* were also members of families which had long been prominent in Indonesian politics and to a large extent they comprised the civilian groups that had supported the New Order’s rise to power in the mid-1960s. The government probably felt that these elite groups, as long as they complied with the political arrangements and the overall political goals of the regime, should be entitled to some political role and representation, although not necessarily in the government. The programme orientation which the government tried to impose on the parties in this context meant that the aspirations and expertise of such elite groups should be channelled through the political parties and be used at will by the government as input for working out the details of programmes and policy implementation. The parties, in other words, were described in terms such as ‘national assets’ (*aset nasional*), ‘capital for national development’ (*modal dasar pembangunan nasional*) and other similar expressions, all of which were frequently pronounced by New Order government and military officials in relation to the PDI and the PPP. The political system, however, was designed to rule out any possibility of a change in government, and the parties were not supposed to aspire to national leadership, or, as we have seen, to confront or criticise the government. The marginal role envisaged for the parties in this system was illustrated by the circumstance that, in contrast to the early New Order when the political parties had been represented in the cabinet, no member of the PDI or the PPP was ever appointed to a cabinet position by President Suharto after the party mergers.

As we have seen, the simplification of the party system, culminating in the party mergers of 1973, were integral parts of the government’s reorganisation of the political system and society at large into a state corporatist system. Internationally, three scholars, Dwight King, David Reeve and Andrew MacIntyre, have been the most influential advocates of state corporatism as a description of state-society relation under the New Order. For the purposes
of the present study, the model of state corporatism will provide the main perspective for understanding the New Order political system, especially the party and parliamentary system. State corporatism, in the influential definition of Philippe Schmitter, refers to:

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.64

This definition of the constituent units of state corporatism serves well to describe how the two post-merger political parties under the New Order were intended, from the point of view of the regime, to function. On a theoretical level, the New Order parties resembled functional groups for the political elites, with the PDI representing the nationalist and Christian political elites and the PPP representing their Muslim counterparts. It does not, however, automatically follow that party politicians saw, or wanted to see, themselves as members of state-controlled corporatist parties. The question of party independence in relation to the government consequently lay at the bottom of many of the conflicts and contestation over the political culture which is the theme for the present study. The application of state corporatism to understand the PDI’s ascribed position under the New Order is thus not meant to provide an accurate description of the New Order political system, but instead to illustrate the political thinking behind the party’s founding. The application of the model to the present study will serve a heuristic purpose; that is, to draw attention to some major differences in character between New Order Indonesia and parliamentary democracies in the West, despite the common labels of many institutions, such as parliaments, elections and parties, in the two types of systems.

NOTES

1 For the coup attempt, see Crouch (1993: 97–134), Anderson and McVey (1971) and Andersson et al. (1977).

2 Indications that the PKI masterminded the coup were slight, however, and consisted primarily of the fact that the PKI leader, Dipa Nusantara Aidit, was present at Halim Air Force Base which served as the coup makers headquarters, and
of an editorial in the PKI daily *Harian Rakjat* on 2 October 1965 in support of the coup. Speaking against the theory of PKI involvement is also the fact that the party did not organise any major mass actions in support of the coup. The party, moreover, stood little to gain from an open confrontation with the army at the time; see Mortimer (1974: 418–444). For the campaign against the PKI, see van Langenberg (1990a: 46–47), Cribb (1990a: 29) and Crouch (1993: 138–141).

3 For the massacres, see Cribb (ed.) (1990).


8 Geertz (1972: 331).

9 Tanter (1990: 269).


12 Nasution (1966: 160), which uses the form *penjederhanaan*.

13 Reeve (1985: 263–264) and Crouch (1971: 177–178); see also Sundhaussen (1982) for the political thinking of the military at the time of the transition to the New Order.

14 Discussion of the bill continued over a number of relatively marginal issues and was eventually passed in late 1969.


20 McDonald (1980: 103).


24 The organisation was formally renamed Golkar shortly after the 1971 election, but the short name had been in common usage since the mid-1960s; Boileau (1983: 64).


27 Boileau (1983: 52–53). The precursor of the monoloyalty doctrine was a 1959 presidential decree according to which senior government employees were prohibited from being affiliated with any political party; Imawan (1989: 179–180).
The Foundations of New Order Political Culture

29 Moertopo (1982: 199–200). Nasakom, one of Sukarno’s key concepts, meant to symbolise the unity of the country’s three main ideologies; see Weatherbee (1966: 40–41). In practice, Nasakom was in the last years of Guided Democracy largely a euphemism for Sukarno’s efforts to strengthen the influence of the PKI at all levels of the government and bureaucracy.
33 Nishihara (1972: 34–35).
35 For studies of the 1971 elections, see Nishihara (1972) and Ward (1974). See also May (1978: 245–271) for the uglier sides of the election campaign.
36 Cited in May (1978: 262); see also Crouch (1993: 258–259) for the PNI’s campaign under Hadisubeno.
38 Ricklefs (1994: 299). Of the larger political parties only the NU managed to defend its share of the votes compared with the election in 1955, collecting 18.7 per cent of the votes, which was almost identical to its 18.6 per cent in 1955. The PNI suffered the heaviest losses and dropped its share of the votes from 22.3 per cent in 1955 to 6.9 per cent. Parmusi, meanwhile, only got 5.4 per cent, compared with 20.9 per cent for its counterpart in the 1955 election, Masyumi. Parkindo and Partai Katolik also declined compared with their 1955 results, and neither Murba nor IPKI collected enough votes to be represented in Parliament; see Cribb (1992: 535–540) and Nishihara (1972: 40–50 and tables I–XIII) for the election results.
39 See Ward (1974: 189). The idea was first launched by Nurcholish Majid, who at the time was leader of the Islamic Students’ Association, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam); idem (1974: 188–189).
43 Ali Moertopo (1982: 200), for example, admitted that ‘the dispensation of money, the support of officials, especially from the military, the formation of Korpri [Korps Pegawai Negeri, the Civil Servant Corps] within various ministries, institutions and companies, and also [...] various forms of intimidation [...] all had obviously influenced Golkar’s victory’. Moreover, a 1972 report of the MPRS leadership under its chairman General Nasution also concluded that the ‘government apparatus from the top to the bottom’ had helped to achieve Golkar’s success. The report was subsequently banned by the military intelligence authorities; Crouch (1993: 267 n. 232).
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

48 Brian May (1978: 282), quoting Ali Moertopo, has implied that the names 'Spiritual-Material' and 'Material-Spiritual' were deliberately chosen to symbolise the demise of the different identities of the parties, and, by extension, the general insignificance of the political parties envisaged under the New Order. See further Soeharto (1989: 265) for a rather obscure attempt to explain the background to the concepts.
50 According to the PNI's general chairman, Mohammad Isnaeni, who participated in the meeting on 10 January 1973 that resulted in the merger, the head of the military intelligence and security organisation Kopkamtib, General Soemitro, angered by the resistance from the Christian parties, said that those who did not agree to the merger would be left behind; cited in Lay (1987: 187 n. 107).
52 See Reeve (1985: 11).
54 Liddle (1978b: 184 n. 183).
55 May (1978: 285). The number seven refers to the number of parties in the Parliament; the total number of parties that merged was nine, also including IPKI and Murba, both of which failed to gain representation in Parliament after the 1971 election.
59 Continuing his traffic metaphor, the president only says: 'So I suggested, let us just decrease the number of vehicles. We do not need too many. But we also do not need only one vehicle. Two or three vehicles, all right'; Soeharto (1989: 266).
61 Ali Moertopo, for example, expressed this stance when he said in 1971 that Golkar wants to govern, not to dominate politics; see Tempo (29 May 1971); cited in Imawan (1989: 197).
63 See e.g. King (1979), King (1982), Reeve (1990), MacIntyre (1989), and MacIntyre (1994b).
64 Schmitter (1979: 13).
The first 13 years of the PDI’s existence were above all marred by conflicts between different factions and leaders in the party, more so than the PPP. In the context of the two party mergers in 1973, the PDI was largely a residual category, in which the non-Islamic parties were lumped together, comprising parties based on socialist, nationalist and Christian ideologies. In addition to the ideological differences, the parties were also mutually suspicious of one another’s commitment and motives. The two Christian parties were seen by the other parties, and particularly by the PNI, as lacking commitment to the merger, and their Christian identity was associated with Dutch colonialism and imperialism and capitalism in general. The Christian parties, on the other hand, were suspicious of Murba’s socialist and alleged Trotskyist background, as well as of the PNI’s Marhaenist ideology and association with leftist politics under the Old Order. There were, moreover, suspicions that IPKI, because of its association with the army, had been planted in the PDI as an extension of the military’s influence. A further source of conflict in the early years was the differing visions as to what the new party should be. The smaller parties expected the PDI to become a new party, based on the integration of the five merging parties’ diverse ideological backgrounds and organisations. In the PNI, by contrast, the dominating expectation was that the PDI would be a continuation of the PNI, with the smaller parties assimilating and dissolving into the PNI’s organisation.

There were ideological differences within the largest party, the PNI, as well. Although the party had been purged of leftist elements and Sukarno supporters in the early years of the New Order, commitment to Marhaenism remained strong among many of its leaders, the so-called ‘hard-liners’ (garis keras), as opposed to the less ideologically committed ‘moderates’ (moderat). The latter group was in general more accommodative to the government than the hard-liners.

Against this ideologically and historically diverse background, the newly founded PDI had difficulties in working out a common platform and identity.
which would be acceptable and meaningful to all of its component parties and factions. The result was a compromise, worked out shortly after the merger, through which the party adopted three broad basic principles, derived from the Pancasila, as its political platform. These were democracy, nationalism and social justice. From the perspective of the PNI, the platform was a reformulation of the party’s Marhaenist ideology, but the other parties also considered the three principles to be reflections of their respective ideologies. The platform, thus, was broad and general enough to be acceptable to all five merging parties, but at the same time, just as Pancasila itself, the party platform provided little in terms of ideological direction or guidance for political action and policy.

In general, however, ideological or political issues were obscured by almost continuous factionalism and internal conflicts, which consumed most of the party’s energy and morale between 1973 and 1986. Although the conflicts to some extent followed ideological divisions or former party lines, they stemmed much less from disagreements about principles or ideology than from a vying for positions, particularly in the party’s central and regional executive bodies.

The conflicts during the party’s first two years of existence mainly concerned the number of representatives each component party should have in the PDI’s central board. The PNI – or the ‘PNI-in liquidation’ (PNI (in likwidasi)) as the former party now formally was called – only held three out of 11 seats in the PDI’s first central board, with the four smaller parties holding two each, and there was strong dissatisfaction in the former PNI over the discrepancy between this representation and the relative strength in terms of votes in the 1971 election between the PNI on the one hand and the other parties on the other. The PDI chair was held by the PNI’s first chairman, Mohammad Isnaeni, who was widely seen in the PNI-in liquidation as too accommodating of the other parties. Consequently, a meeting in February 1974 of the former PNI’s provincial chapters nominated its second chairman, Soenawar Soekowati, who was one of the leading proponents of greater influence for the PNI in the new party, to become general chairman of the PDI.

In the course of 1974, the conflict developed into a personal conflict between Isnaeni and Soenawar, with rival factions in the government and military apparently supporting each of the candidates. With the party thus appearing to head towards disintegration only a year after its foundation, President Suharto intervened in early 1975 and reportedly invited Sanusi Hardjadinata, another former PNI politician, to replace Isnaeni as general chair. Sanusi agreed to the request on condition that his long-standing associate
and one of the PNI hard-liners, Usep Ranawidjaja, would simultaneously replace Soenawar as deputy chairman.\(^9\)

The internal conflicts in the party continued, however, as Isnaeni and Soenawar, both of whom still enjoyed support among the rank-and-file of the former PNI, gradually joined forces and began to challenge the leadership of Sanusi and Usep. Ahead of the party’s congress in April 1976, Soenawar still harboured ambitions to be elected party leader. The government tried to secure the smooth election of Sanusi both by mediating between the two camps ahead of the congress and by applying pressure on the congress delegates. The government’s intervention secured Sanusi’s unanimous election by the congress, but his legitimacy in the party was weakened by the general notion that he had been elected as a result of government interference.

A few months after the congress, Sanusi’s leadership came under attack from a new direction, but apparently one linked to the Soenawar-Isnaeni group. Two members of the central board, Achmad Sukarmadidjaja of IPKI and Muhidin Nasution of Murba, expressed their dissatisfaction with Sanusi’s allegedly dictatorial leadership and a number of other complaints. The attack also involved an attempt to implicate the PDI chief in the so-called Sawito affair, in which a former civil servant and mystic, Sawito Kartowibowo, attempted to wrest power from Suharto and transfer it to former Vice-president Muhammad Hatta. The attempt to discredit Sanusi failed, however, mainly because of the government’s support in dissociating the PDI chairman from the conspiracy.\(^10\)

Ahead of the 1977 election, Sanusi tried to impose a ceasefire among the rival factions in the party. The attempt failed, however, when Jusuf Merukh, a Soenawar supporter in the party’s Jakarta chapter, shortly before the election, tried to sabotage the party’s election performance by appealing to voters to vote for Golkar rather than the PDI. The split between the supporters of Sanusi-Usep and Isnaeni-Soenawar in several of the provinces also damaged the party’s image and performance in the election.\(^11\) In addition to – and presumably in part as an effect of – the internal conflicts and ensuing low morale, the PDI had difficulties in presenting an attractive political programme, and the party’s campaign was largely overshadowed by the PPP’s more vigorous attempts to challenge the government from an Islamic platform.\(^12\) The PDI mainly tried to campaign on a broad and loosely articulated welfare programme, including calls for poverty reduction and improvements in living conditions, education and job opportunities. Sukarno’s eldest son, Guntur Sukarnoputra, also campaigned for the party, although not as extensively as he had done in 1971, and no other member of the Sukarno family took part in the campaign.\(^13\)
The outcome of the election on the national level was that the PDI vote decreased from the 10.1 per cent which the five constituent parties had achieved together in 1971, to 8.6 per cent. Regionally, the party’s decline was most marked in the provinces of East Nusa Tenggara and the Moluccas, both of which had large Christian constituencies. Golkar, by contrast, made its largest gains in these two provinces, indicating that those constituencies largely had transferred their loyalties to Golkar rather than to the PDI after the 1973 merger.14

After the election, it appears that Sanusi and Usep lost their support from the government. In September 1977, PDI deputy chairman Achmad Sukarmadidjaja (IPKI), issued a statement in the name of the central board declaring the party’s nomination of Suharto as presidential candidate for the period 1978 to 1983. Sanusi immediately responded by disputing the statement’s validity on the grounds that the central board had not yet taken such a decision. The issue was subsequently manipulated, and rumours of the alleged nomination by the PDI of Sanusi as president and Usep as vice-president were spread, apparently by the nominally civilian State Coordinating Intelligence Agency, Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara), at the behest of Ali Moertopo. The main target for the government’s covert intervention seems to have been Usep, who was seen as too critical and believed to oppose the dual function of the military. His nomination by the PDI’s parliamentary faction for the post of deputy house speaker was subsequently rejected by Golkar and the military faction in Parliament, resulting in the election of Isnaeni against the will of the majority of the PDI legislators.15

Shortly afterwards, in November of the same year, Sukarmadidjaja announced a reshuffle of the central board which replaced Sanusi, Usep and their supporters with the Isnaeni-Soenawar group. The move was contested by Sanusi and the majority of the central board as lacking a legal base. Sanusi in vain sought the support of a number of government and military agencies for his arguably strong case. Instead, in January 1978, less than two months before the MPR session, the president froze both the rival central boards and instructed Bakin to form a caretaker board to take over the party leadership until after the MPR session. The result, called the ‘16 January central board’, was a compromise that retained Sanusi as chairman, as well as Usep as a deputy chairman, and included both Isnaeni and Soenawar and several of their supporters. The compromise appears to have had the sole purpose of ensuring the smooth running of the MPR session.16

The rivalry continued after the MPR session, and Sanusi accused Isnaeni and Soenawar of trying to install local and regional boards sympathetic to
themselves. Another conflict issue was the composition of the congress committee, which was to be appointed to arrange the party’s second congress, scheduled for 1980. In November 1978, Sanusi issued a letter which dismissed Isnaeni and Soenawar from the central board, mainly on the grounds that they were responsible for creating trouble in the party. Soenawar, claiming to act in the capacity of ‘mandatory of the PNI’, answered by dismissing Sanusi and replacing him with Isnaeni. The result was that the PDI again appeared to have two central boards, each of which claimed to be the only legal one. A number of clashes between the supporters of the two sides also ensued in January 1979 over control of the party’s central headquarters. At this time, both the Sanusi-Usep camp and the Isnaeni-Soenawar camp seem to have believed that they had the support of Bakin, but these notions appear to have been parts of a government-sponsored scenario aimed at sidelining both the rival groups in favour of a group of younger politicians in the party. Talk of the need of ‘regeneration’ in the party, which had been mentioned for a long time already, intensified from around this time, and Hardjantho Sumodisastro, a member of the ‘16 January central board’ and up until then an Isnaeni supporter, emerged as the major spokesman for the ‘young generation’ (generasi muda) in the party. This young generation mainly consisted of politicians in their forties and included, apart from Hardjantho, the secretary of the party’s parliamentary faction, Soerjadi, and the secretary general of the Sanusi-led central board, Sabam Sirait. Suspicions of government support for a third-party solution were confirmed when a meeting of provincial representatives, led by the East Java chairman Marsoesi, was convened in Pandaan, East Java at the end of February 1979, obviously with the government’s approval. The meeting delegates claimed to represent 24 out of the party’s 26 provincial boards, and the resulting declaration demanded the resignation of all four leaders, Isnaeni, Soenawar, Sanusi and Usep. The meeting furthermore called on the government to assist in solving the party’s problems and to allow the party to hold a congress.

The immediate effect of the Pandaan meeting was that the Isnaeni-Soenawar and Sanusi-Usep camps reconciled their differences a few days after the meeting was closed and reinstated the ‘16 January central board’. The government, as represented by Admiral Sudomo, chief of the military security and intelligence body Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban) still, however, refused to grant the party permission to hold a congress until the differences had been resolved with the Pandaan group, which still
called for the resignation of the four senior leaders. With the government thus refusing to let the differences be settled through existing party mechanisms, that is, a congress, the task to ‘mediate’ was entrusted, reportedly on the president’s order, to Bakin and led by Yoga Sugama. The Bakin initiative apparently aimed at having Hardjantho elected as party leader, but the scheme met with resistance from the other camps in the party. Eventually, in November 1979, and after more than half a year of fruitless negotiations, Bakin withdrew its mediation attempt after a secret letter from Yoga Sugama to the central board, suggesting a number of candidates for the party’s congress committee, was leaked to the media.19 The attempts on behalf of the government to rejuvenate the party leadership had thus failed for the time being and under embarrassing circumstances for Bakin and Yoga Sugama and, by extension, Ali Moertopo.

Bakin’s ‘hands-off’ policy did not end the government’s involvement in PDI’s affairs, however. A few weeks later, on 15 December, a group of PDI members, led by a member of the Jakarta provincial board, A. P. Batubara, and the East Java chairman, Marsoesi, and reportedly aided by security officers dressed as hoodlums, occupied the party’s central headquarters and announced that they had taken over the party leadership. The occupation ended four days later when Batubara handed over the keys of the headquarters to the commander of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, and the police sealed the premises. The incident provided the government with a pretext to intervene again, and the initiative to resolve the leadership conflict now fell to Sudomo, who started to hold meetings with the rival factions in the party. Officially, his main task was to forge a consensus among the different camps to allow a congress to be held without open divisions. Sudomo also asked the PDI board members to refrain from publicly making any comments and asked the press not to report any statements by the board members, and instead himself took the role as the party’s spokesman.20 This circumstance gave rise to the joke that the abbreviation PDI in fact meant Partai Domokrasi Indonesia, ‘Domo’ being short for Sudomo.

The efforts to bring together the rival camps and agree on the composition of a congress committee continued throughout most of 1980. Sudomo, although he claimed only to mediate, was intent on having a compliant leadership elected at the congress and, according to Sanusi, the Kopkamtib chief set up a number of criteria for the new leadership, including that they must be able to work, individually and as a team, with Golkar and that they must not attack government policies. Although Sudomo did not mention any names, the PDI
chief was certain he intended to see Hardjantho, Isnaeni and Soenawar as PDI leaders. Sanusi's role in the process was to lead the party up until the congress and preside over the smooth election of the new leadership. For these services, he would reportedly be awarded with a senior position in the civil service.21 Sanusi, however, resigned in October 1980, three months before the congress. Officially, he cited his mental health as the reason, which, judging from his later statements, appears to have been a euphemism for his disgust with the autocratic and manipulative interventions of the government in the party's affairs.22

The party's leadership until the congress was continued collectively by the central board.

The composition of the congress committee, meanwhile, was announced in the middle of November 1980, but immediately gave rise to controversy. Four of its members, Mrs Walandou (Parkindo), Usep Ranawijaya, Abdul Madjid (PNI) and Zakaria Raib (Murba), refused to sit on the committee. These four – and other party functionaries – complained of irregularities in the preparation of the congress, including concerns about the role of local military authorities in the appointment of congress delegates representing the party's local branches. The four dissidents subsequently boycotted the congress and issued a statement calling it illegal. The party's central board responded by expelling them from the party at the end of January 1981 and by recalling from their seats the three who sat in Parliament, Mrs Walandou, Usep and Majid. Later the same year another legislator who sympathised with the group was also recalled.23

About a week before the congress was scheduled to open on 13 January 1981, Soenawar, after meeting President Suharto, outlined the party's future strategy. The party, he announced, would become a cadre party instead of a mass party,24 thus signalling the party's full adoption of the floating mass doctrine. The strategy outlined by Soenawar also included a programme which was subsequently adopted by the congress as the PDI's so-called 'four political stances' (4 sikap politik). These were: support for the New Order based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; support for the dual function of the military; support for the national leadership of President Suharto; and the party's active participation in national development with a 'corrective-constructive' (korektif konstruktif) attitude.25

The congress took place in an atmosphere of high tension, largely because several branches were represented by rival delegates, and there were numerous complaints about threats and intimidation from security officers present as well as from the security personnel organised by the congress committee. Few
supporters of the Sanusi-Usep faction appear to have attended the congress, and the main line of division ran between the supporters of Isnaeni-Soenawar on the one hand and Hardjantho's supporters on the other. The government, as represented at the congress by Sudomo, seems initially to have favoured Isnaeni for the post of general chairman, but after much confusion about who would actually stand for nomination, a meeting between the three contenders called by Sudomo resulted in a consensus in support of Soenawar. At the congress, the process of selecting the general chair and the rest of the central board was prepared in committees to avoid a floor vote, which was believed to favour Hardjantho. The composition of the central board was announced around midnight of 16 January 1981 and was received by the congress delegates with loud and angry protests. Soenawar became general chairman, and the board was dominated by his supporters. It also, however, included Hardjantho and some of his supporters, as well as Isnaeni. The board was thus a compromise between the three leaders, but few of their supporters seemed satisfied with its composition, and several of the new board members protested and some even threatened to refuse to take up their positions.

The new board excluded the supporters of Sanusi and Usep, and was dominated by accommodative politicians. From this point of view, the congress can be seen as the culmination of a process initiated in 1977, when Sanusi appeared to lose his support from the government, and more accommodative and pragmatic elements within the party, aided by the government or military agencies, gained more influence in the party at the expense of more critical and ideologically motivated politicians. With the 1981 congress, the influence of the hard-liners of the former PNI was reduced to a minimum, and critical politicians from the other merged parties, such as Mrs Walandou and Zakaria Raib, were also sidelined. The compliant character of the PDI was expressed in the party’s four political stances adopted by the congress, and the reliance of its leaders on the government rather than any broader constituencies which the party might still have was manifest in the congress’ decision that the party should be a cadre party and not a mass party.

The dissatisfaction with the development of the PDI among the PNI hard-liners was expressed by Sudariyanto, a leading functionary of the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement, GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia), which was associated with the PNI. After the congress, he said that the PDI would neither become a mass party nor a cadre party and that there was in fact no future for it. The disappointment with the PDI was also manifested in the founding of a number of ostensibly non-political organisations.
claiming adherence to Marhaenism. These were founded and supported by senior PNI leaders, some of whom aspired for their respective organisations to develop into socio-political forces.29

After the expulsion of the four dissidents who had rejected the congress, the internal conflicts subsided and the party experienced its longest period so far with no open internal conflicts, from the end of 1981 to August 1983.30 Ahead of the May 1982 election, the party hoped to improve its result, and chairman Soenawar said that if it could not gain 10 per cent of the votes, the party should 'give up and close shop'.31 The party fared badly, however, collecting only 7.9 per cent of the votes, down by 0.7 points from the previous election. The decline was more evenly spread than it had been in 1977, but the party was particularly hard hit by a 7.3 point drop – from 19.1 per cent to 11.8 per cent – in the populous province of Central Java.32 Overall, the party’s decline can be explained by a combination of its low credibility and morale as a result of the internal conflicts, its lack of internal consolidation, especially on the regional and local levels, and its unfocused and insubstantial campaign themes.33 The PDI again tried to utilise the appeal of Sukarno, now with the tacit permission of the government, as will be discussed below, but the party had little credibility with the former president’s supporters for shouldering his heritage. The party’s heavy losses in Central Java, a traditional stronghold for the PNI and one of the provinces in which Sukarno continued to enjoy widespread popularity, demonstrated the failure of the party’s strategy to capitalise on the former president’s image.

The latent conflicts between Soenawar and Hardjantho came into the open again in August 1983, when Soenawar, in a reaction to the president’s independence day speech, said that Indonesia was a ‘secular state’ (employing the English term). The PDI leader probably meant that the Indonesian state was ‘secular’ as opposed to theocratic, but in the subsequent debates and mass media reporting, his statement came to be interpreted as an advocating of secularisation. Soenawar’s critics argued that his statement ran counter to the first principle of Pancasila, belief in one God, according to which Indonesia could neither be described as a religious state – that is, adhering to a single religion – nor as a secular state. Soenawar’s statement invited strong reactions from several intellectuals, politicians and religious scholars, as well as government representatives. Coordinating Minister for the People’s Health Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara said that the conclusion of the PDI chair was very dangerous and not in accordance with the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, that is, Pancasila. The speaker of Parliament, Amir Machmud, called on the
PDI’s house faction to withdraw its support for Soenawar’s statement, a demand supported by the military faction in the house. President Suharto, meanwhile, rejected the use of foreign terms when talking about the Indonesian form of government. These strong reactions from the government appear to have encouraged Hardjantho to attack Soenawar over the issue, with the result that the PDI board split into two: One ‘PDI central board secular state’ under Soenawar and one ‘PDI central board Pancasila’ under Hardjantho.34

Most observers agree that the issue, which essentially revolved around semantics, was not of fundamental political or ideological importance.35 The issue rather functioned as a pretext for Hardjantho to challenge Soenawar’s leadership. Several PDI functionaries were also convinced that the government had deliberately provoked the conflict by forcefully denouncing Soenawar’s statement,36 although the government’s alleged purpose for doing so is not clear. The government did not interfere openly in the conflict until more than a year later, in October 1984, when Minister of Internal Affairs Supardjo Rustam began mediating between the two rival board. A tentative settlement was reached in November, after Soenawar’s camp had issued a declaration saying that the ‘PDI has never known the terms secular state or religious state’.37

The conflict between Soenawar and Hardjantho flared up again in 1985, however, now over whether or not the party should hold a congress in January 1986. According to the party’s statutes, a congress should be held every five years and Hardjantho consequently demanded that a congress be convened, because the last congress had been held in January 1981. He apparently also harboured expectations to become party leader at the congress. Soenawar, however, referring to the upcoming election in 1987 and the alleged lack of funds, asserted that it was not possible to convene a congress under the present conditions, and therefore, according to the party statutes, the central board would instead call a smaller meeting of provincial representatives instead of a congress. In December 1985, a decision, mediated by the minister of home affairs, was reached that a congress would be organised, but the Soenawar camp was apparently intent on delaying the congress, citing technical difficulties.38

The conflict would probably have continued, had not Soenawar suddenly died on 12 January 1986. The vacancy of the PDI chair made holding a congress urgent in order to settle the leadership question so that the party could concentrate on preparing for the general elections to be held the following year. There were several contenders for the PDI chair ahead of the congress, now scheduled for mid-April. Among the names most frequently mentioned were Isnaeni, Hardjantho, Soerjadi, Supreme Court Judge I. G. N. Gde Djaksa and
two of the late Soenawar’s followers, Jusuf Merukh, who headed the congress organisation committee, and Achmad Subagyo. The half-brother of President Suharto, Probosutedjo, who had been active in the PNI in the 1960s, was also suggested by some PDI members, but he declined the nomination because he was already a Golkar member.

Gde Djaksa appeared to have the support of several of the largest regional boards, and he also claimed to have the support of the government. However, the prospects for Djaksa, who was a Balinese Hindu, were thwarted when some party representatives demanded that the PDI be led by a Muslim, an issue which risked stirring up a religious conflict in the party. The sidelining of Djaksa favoured the secretary of the PDI’s parliamentary faction, Soerjadi, who, at 47, emerged as the major spokesman for the young generation in the party. Also speaking in favour of Soerjadi was that he had largely stood outside the earlier conflicts in the party and was thus perceived as a neutral alternative. The government, as we have seen, had long been in favour of a rejuvenation of the party's leadership to end the long-standing personal rivalries, and Soerjadi was, moreover, widely seen to have a good relationship with the government and to be accommodative and cooperative. The government, however, does not appear to have favoured any particular candidate ahead of the congress, but seems to have been ready to accept any of a number of the main contenders – or alternatively, the government was split over the issue.

Ahead of the congress, the PDI was urged by the government to resolve the leadership question, which was the most important and controversial issue for the congress, through musyawarah (deliberation) aiming at mufakat (consensus) among the more than 1,000 delegates representing the party’s 300-odd local branches. Hardjantho, who for practical purposes acted as the party’s chairman until the congress, said in the beginning of April that the congress would reject the principle of the dictatorship of the majority and instead implement Pancasila democracy based on deliberation and mutual cooperation (gotong-royong). However, whereas the PDI leaders, backed by senior government officials, thus rejected a majority vote – which, incidentally, was believed to favour Isnaeni – for solving the leadership question, they seemed unable to negotiate a solution to the leadership question between themselves.

The congress, which opened on 15 April 1986, was scheduled to last for three days. On the afternoon of the third day, however, the organisational committee of provincial and national board representatives, entrusted with the task of setting up an election committee which in turn would propose the
leadership line-up, had still not reached an agreement on the composition of the election committee. At this point, Sabam Sirait and Jusuf Merukh, who led the organisational committee, left the congress premises to consult with the director-general of social and political affairs, Hari Soegiman. This consultation – or ‘pre-consultation’ (prakonsultasi) as Sabam later claimed it was – had apparently not been mandated by the organisational committee. At the meeting the two PDI representatives reportedly sought to obtain the government’s approval for their suggestion of a new central board led by Achmad Subagyo. The discovery of the plot caused a commotion among the congress delegates and resulted in the extension of the congress to the following afternoon. After mediation by Minister of Internal Affairs Supardjo Rustam, the organisational committee finally, after noon on 18 April, managed to set up an election committee, which immediately decided to entrust the government with the task of appointing a new central board. The congress delegates, apparently weary and suspicious of the manoeuvrings of the party’s national and provincial leaders, endorsed the decision with resounding acclamation, and thus the party congress closed.47

The congress was widely described in the newspapers and by commentators as a total and embarrassing failure,48 and in several respects the event stands out as the absolute nadir of the PDI’s history. The party’s low standing at this time is also illustrated by the fact that none of three major international surveys of Indonesian politics in 1986 found it worthwhile even to mention the PDI congress.49 The congress had failed even to organise an election committee to nominate a new central board, and the party had instead enthusiastically transferred its right to elect its leaders to the government. The party seemed bereft of any political identity that it previously may have had, and the discussions at the congress of national political issues and programs were completely overshadowed by the failure to elect a central board. Sabam Sirait, unconvincingly, argued that the congress was not a failure because it had actually reached a decision on the leadership question; that is, to give the government the mandate to appoint the new central board.50 Apologists also drew attention to allegedly important decisions which had been taken on other issues, such as the decision to nominate President Suharto for another term in office and the reiteration of support for the dual function of the military and for Pancasila.51 More than anything else, however, those decisions demonstrated that the PDI seemed to have resigned itself to a minor role on the margins of the political system with little prospect of playing any significant political role except as a ‘chicken flea’ on the centres of power.
During its first 13 years, the history of the PDI was above all characterised by almost continuous infighting between different factions and leaders in the party. The conflicts were generally more about positions and influence in the party than about ideology or political commitment. Those involved in the party frequently sought support from government and military agencies and figures in order to advance their position in the party. In the paternalistic state corporatist political culture of the New Order, representatives of the regime readily involved themselves in the struggles of the PDI, at times even supporting competing factions in the party. The party, as a consequence, appeared to have little integrity or credibility as an independent political actor. Paired with the poor election performance of the PDI in the 1977 and 1982 elections, these circumstances, as we shall see, led the government to begin to worry that the PDI might disappear altogether.

NOTES

2 Lay (1987: 156–157 and 181–185). Neither Murba nor IPKI have been the subject of any more extensive studies and their background and history remain somewhat obscure.
4 Sihbudi (1990: 68).
8 It appears that Ali Moertopo and Sujono Humardhani supported Soenawar in the conflict; see Lay (1987: 235 n. 281), whereas Isnaeni appears to have had the support of Admiral Sudomo; see Pour (1997: 253–256).
14 This impression also conforms with the opinions of several leading PDI politicians, particularly concerning the constituencies of the Catholic Party; see Lay (1987: 156 n. 163). The PDI declined 21.4 per cent in East Nusa Tenggara and 18.6 per cent in the Moluccas, and Golkar gained 28.8 per cent and 24.1 per cent respectively in...
those provinces. The PDI also declined in the provinces of West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi, all of which had substantial Christian populations. The party’s decline in those provinces was 5.3 per cent, 7.6 per cent and 6.9 per cent respectively; see Liddle (1978a: 131) for the figures.

19 Van Dijk (1979: 142) and van Dijk (1981: 103–104).
23 Van Dijk (1981: 112–115 and 123–124) and Lay (1987: 415–416). Recalling parliamentarians from their seats was a sanction sporadically used by the political parties and Golkar to ensure discipline in their organisations.
26 It is uncertain what the agreement between the three rivals contained. According to Lay (1987: 442), Harjantho, as compensation for his support for Soenawar, was promised the party chair in the following period, after 1986. Isnaeni, meanwhile, was persuaded to step back because he had already held the position.
29 Van Dijk (1981: 111–112). The two most important organisations were the Consultative Foundation of the Greater Marhaen Family, LMKBM (Lembaga Musyawarah Keluarga Besar Marhaen), founded in 1980 and supported by some of the four congress dissidents, and the Marhaen People’s Movement, GRM (Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen), founded in March 1981.
From Merger to Nadir: The PDI 1973–86

39 Tempo (19 April 1986) and van de Kok (1987: 145). Golkar had introduced individual memberships in 1984, with Suharto and his wife registering as the organisation’s first members; see Suryadinata (1989: 127).


41 Soerjadi did, however, support Sanusi when he dismissed Isnaeni and Soenawar from the party’s central board in 1978; see van Dijk (1979: 135–136).

42 Djaksa, as mentioned, claimed to have the support of the government, and he based this claim on the fact that, shortly before the congress, he was granted permission to resign from the supreme court; see van de Kok (1987: 146). According to Lay (1987: 463 and 473 n. 782), who bases his claim on interviews with senior PDI functionaries at the time, the commander-in-chief of the military, General Benny Moerdani, indicated ahead of the congress that Djaksa was the government’s first candidate of choice and Soerjadi the alternative, whereas Minister of Internal Affairs Supardjo Rustam reportedly supported Achmad Subagyo.

43 E.g. Pelita (29 March 1986).

44 Berita Buana (2 April 1986). His statement echoed the official view of Pancasila Democracy; see e.g. Babari (1987: 603). Cf. also Morfit (1986).


46 According to Lay (1987: 465–466), the central board made a secret agreement before the congress according to which the executive body would be expanded from its current 13 members to 30, mainly to allow representatives of the younger generation to be included, while still leaving room for the mainly elder incumbent board members. The party leadership question, however, still appeared to be unsettled.

47 Tempo (26 April 1986); see also Lay (1987: 453–468) about the congress.

48 See e.g. the editorials in Kompas (21 April 1986) and Jakarta Post (21 April 1986).

49 See the year-ender article in Asia Survey by William Liddle (1987a), Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1987 Yearbook (1987: 152–159) and EIU Country Report Indonesia, nos 1–2 (1987). The internal strife in the PPP in the same year, by contrast, was discussed in all of the surveys.


CHAPTER 5

Pancasila Democracy and Sukarno Revival in the 1987 Election

FACING THE 1987 ELECTION

On 2 May 1986, less than two weeks after the closing of the PDI’s failed congress, the government announced the party’s new central board, which was immediately sworn in. The new line-up completely did away with the party’s old leadership, and none of the 13 members of the old board were retained. Unsurprisingly, Soerjadi was appointed chairman of the new 20-member board, which was dominated by younger party activists, mostly under the age of 50. Soerjadi was an experienced and relatively well-known politician, having been a leader of the PNI-affiliated student organisation GMNI in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as a member of Parliament between 1966 and 1982. He was also, as we shall see, rumoured to be close to sections of the regime, particularly the military leadership.

Several of the other new board members were relatively little known in national politics, such as the secretary general, Nicolaus Daryanto, a former activist in the Catholic Party, whose main political experience had been in two provincial parliaments during the early New Order. The majority of the new party leaders were academics or professionals, and several of them were involved in running or managing businesses. Observers considered it positive that most of the new PDI leaders had their means of income from non-political activities, because it was hoped that the new leaders would be more likely to put the interests of the party and the nation ahead of their own personal or group interests. Professional managerial skills had apparently also been an important selection criterion for Minister of Internal Affairs Supardjo Rustam, and when he presented the new PDI line-up, the minister emphasised the need for such skills for developing the party.

On 19 May the new PDI leaders were received by President Suharto, who thus officially endorsed the new central board. Soerjadi and the new board also
Pancasila Democracy and Sukarno Revival in the 1987 Election

appeared to enjoy broad support among most of the party’s provincial chapters, all of which had been consulted by the government in the selection process. Soon after his appointment, Soerjadi began to travel to several of the provinces to consolidate his leadership and improve the management skills of the party’s provincial chapters and local branches. As a consequence of these efforts and the support which Soerjadi enjoyed as party leader, the consolidation was achieved with relative ease, and in March 1987, shortly before the start of the election campaign, Soerjadi announced that the party reorganisation had been carried out more quickly than expected. The party’s prospects for the elections, however, were still uncertain, and Soerjadi refused to set a target for the party’s performance, probably remembering the embarrassment which his predecessor, Soenawar, had caused for himself when he said ahead of the 1982 election that the party should ‘give up and close shop’ if it could not attract 10 per cent of the voters. Soerjadi instead took a modest stance, saying that ‘small is beautiful’ and referred to the party’s smallness as a challenge.

There was no doubt that Golkar would win the election, scheduled for 23 April 1987. In general, the factors which had ensured Golkar’s success in the 1971 election had been responsible for the organisation’s victory in the two subsequent elections as well, those in 1977 and 1982, in which Golkar had gained 62.1 per cent and 64.3 per cent of the votes respectively. The most important factors in Golkar’s election success were the monoloyalty doctrine requiring civil servants to support the organisation, the implementation in practice of the floating mass doctrine which deprived the political parties of their grassroots organisations, Golkar’s greater access to funding and facilities compared with the PDI and the PPP, the tacit support of the military and the bureaucracy for the organisation, including the linking of government development funding to voter support for Golkar, the circumscription of electoral debate and criticism of government policies, the repression and intimidation of political dissidents and the manipulation of the voting process and figures, particularly on the local levels. These were constant features of all general elections during the New Order, even though, as we shall see, the emphasis and relative importance of the various factors varied slightly between elections.

With any chance of elections leading to a change in government thus ruled out, the central function of the elections was that of a national ritual serving to renew the government’s ruling mandate and to provide the regime with an aura of democratic legitimacy. In the official rhetoric of the New Order, a general election was described as a ‘Festival of Democracy’ (Pesta Demokrasi). In this
ritual festival, the campaign period preceding the polls served as a catharsis during which political frustrations could be vented in the tense and sometimes chaotic and violent atmosphere. The campaign would be followed by a ‘quiet week’ during which no mass campaign activities were allowed. The quiet week would set the atmosphere for the polling day which, in contrast to the campaign period, should take on a solemn and peaceful character, representing the culmination of the national ritual through which national unity and social harmony again were restored after the upheavals of the election campaign.\textsuperscript{10}

A difference in the 1987 election compared with earlier elections was that all three contestants now officially had to adhere to \textit{Pancasila} as their only basic principle, thus eliminating any manifest ideological differences between Golkar and the two political parties. As we have seen, already in 1971 the election contestants had been required to be ideologically committed to \textit{Pancasila} and the 1945 Constitution and this requirement had subsequently been passed into law in 1975. This law, however, still allowed the political parties to adhere to the ideological principles which they had already adopted before the passing of the law, such as Islam in the case of the PPP and nationalism, democracy and social justice in the case of the PDI.\textsuperscript{11} In 1985, however, the government, in spite of heavy opposition from the PPP, forced through an amendment of the 1975 Law in Parliament, abolishing the right of the parties and Golkar to adhere to any principle in addition to \textit{Pancasila}. The new law instead stated that ‘[t]he political parties and Golongan Karya are based on Pancasila as their only principle’.\textsuperscript{12}

Beyond its symbolic significance, it is uncertain what effect the new legislation had on the character and quality of the 1987 election campaign. The new law affected the PPP more than the PDI, because it deprived the PPP of its formal association with Islam and because the new law ruled out any legitimate role for Islamic political aspirations under the New Order. This emasculation of political Islam, which the New Order considered a major threat, probably was the government’s main reason to press on with the law.

As for the PDI, the party’s original political platform of nationalism, democracy and social justice was already derived from the principles of \textit{Pancasila}, but the new law, at least in theory, made it more difficult for the PDI to interpret these principles in terms of leftist ideologies or principles, such as \textit{Marhaenism}.\textsuperscript{13} More than anything else, the 1985 Law on the Political Parties and Golkar aimed to preclude the rise of any alternative ideologies, whether liberalism, Marxism, \textit{Marhaenism} or Islam, which might challenge the existing relations of social and political power. As argued by Michael Morfit, \textit{Pancasila}
in the New Order version was extraordinarily static and did not envision any fundamental social change or historical development. Opposition, moreover, was seen as contradictory to Indonesian culture and not in line with the ideals of Pancasila, deliberative democracy and the family principle. With regard to the political parties, the imposition of ideological conformity and adherence to Pancasila was thus meant to ensure that the PDI or the PPP would not develop into agents of change or opposition parties, thereby challenging the regime.

OLD AND NEW CAMPAIGN THEMES

In terms of political ideas and programs, the new PDI leadership brought little change ahead of the 1987 election, and the compliant line which the party had followed in previous years was continued. In his first major speech as party leader, held on the party’s 14th anniversary on 10 January 1987, Soerjadi reaffirmed the party’s support for Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the New Order, the dual function of the military and, in exuberant terms, for President Suharto:

The Indonesian Democratic Party with all its rank-and-file [...] fully supports, and declares itself firmly united behind, the National Leadership of President Soeharto. The support for the Leadership of President Soeharto is not just political, but comes from the innermost hearts of the members of the PDI with all their sincerity, chastity, purity and honesty. Even though President Soeharto himself acknowledges that there are shortcomings here and there in the national development, the PDI already sees as well as feels the results, which are so great, of the national development under the leadership of President Soeharto.15

The election campaign started on 24 March 1987 and was limited to 25 days. As during earlier instances, the scope for permissible discussion was circumscribed. A government regulation issued in 1985 required the campaign themes and material of the election contestants to be concerned with the ‘National Development [sic] as an experience of Pancasila’. The regulation also banned a number of issues from discussion. These included all expressions of anti-religious sentiments, as well as all statements which might arouse feelings of regionalism or ethnicity. Actions or opinions which might disturb national unity and integration were also prohibited, as was any questioning of the ‘truth’ of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. It was not allowed to ‘belittle’ (memperkecil) or ‘trivialise’ (meremehkan) government policies or government or
military officials, and negative appraisals of the other election contestants were also banned. These and other similar restrictions effectively ruled out any discussion about several of the most important issues in the nation’s development.

The PDI’s campaign themes were largely the same as in 1982, concentrating on issues of economic policy, wealth distribution, corruption and education policy, but the use of the term *Marhaenism*, which had been employed in the 1982 campaign to attract the sympathisers of the former PNI, seemed to be all but absent in 1987. In general, the PDI leaders were careful not to transgress the campaign rules, and avoided direct criticism of the government. When the chairman of the party’s Jakarta chapter, Ipik Asmasoebrata, for example, stressed the need to eradicate corruption, a statement which might easily have been interpreted as indirect criticism towards the government, he took care to add that the government could not be blamed for the problem because only a few officials were corrupt. Reiteration of the party’s support for the government was also frequent, such as when secretary general Nico Daryanto, in a TV campaign speech, said that the ‘PDI is determined in its heart [to remain] loyal to the national government which is supported by all layers of society’.

In spite of this generally compliant attitude on the part of party leaders, observers noted that the new PDI leadership made efforts to revitalise the party’s programme ahead of the election and to present fresh and sometimes bold stands on a number of issues. In comparison with the previous election in 1982, the party’s campaign was much more vigorous and more successful in projecting an image of the PDI as a party of the future. However, as noted by Sukamto et al., the party’s campaign themes were overall similar to those of the party’s previous election campaign in 1982. The party’s strategy included appeals to women, youth and the poor, but there were few concrete suggestions as to how the PDI planned to improve the situation for these groups. The difference between the PDI’s 1987 campaign and earlier election campaigns lay not so much in any difference in campaign themes and ideas as in the party’s improved effectiveness in communicating its ideas.

One of the party’s candidates for Parliament, Kwik Kian Gie, especially stood out for his frankness and criticism of government policies, particularly in the field of economic policy. Kwik was an ethnic Chinese Indonesian businessman and a Dutch-educated economist with mainly nationalist and socialist economic ideas. He was generally received positively by the media, and as another of Indonesia’s leading economists, Christiano Wibisono, put it, his
intense attacks on those in power ‘truly refreshed the democratic climate’. In early April, Kwik presented a seven-point programme, which he claimed was the PDI’s economic programme. The points raised by Kwik included demands that the tax revenue collection from private companies be improved, that private companies contribute to a national social safety scheme, that minimum wages be raised, that monopolies and cartels be prohibited and that consumer interests be strengthened. Kwik also broke the taboos by directly criticising the government’s deregulation policies, saying that they were reactive and lacking in planning and focus. He also said that the government still had to show how it would be able to continue the country’s development with the lower revenues from oil export. Moreover, Kwik regretted the rampant corruption which caused the state finances to ‘leak’, as well as the government’s policy of borrowing money from abroad to make up for the budget deficit. No government or Golkar representative seems to have responded to Kwik’s attacks, however, probably because of a combination of respect for the economist’s debate and intellectual skills and a feeling that much of the criticism was justified. Golkar – which expected to sustain or even improve its large election majority – probably also felt little need to counter the virtually insignificant threat from the PDI to its hegemony.

Although these and other statements by Kwik Kian Gie were directly critical of government policies, and indicated alternative policy directions, the PDI presented no detailed policies or calculations which might serve to implement the seven-point programme. Kwik, moreover, seems to have been the sole proponent of the seven-point programme in the election campaign, and it is uncertain how firmly established the programme was within the party. The lack of detailed and comprehensive policies also affected another of the PDI’s main themes in the campaign, education policy. The party’s central proposal, which had also been advocated in earlier election campaigns, was that 25 per cent of the state budget be allocated to education, more than twice the contemporary figure. The party presented few concrete suggestions, however, as to how the extra funds were to be used, apart from general calls for, for example, quality improvements and more equal access, socially and geographically, to the education system.

In the course of the campaign, some Indonesian intellectuals criticised the three election contestants for having almost identical programs. Kwik Kian Gie countered this criticism by accusing these intellectuals of not understanding the Pancasila political process, in which the PDI, the PPP and Golkar, through the deliberations in the MPR, had already agreed on the Broad Out-
lines of State Policy, GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara), and therefore should not be expected to differ from one another in their political concepts. Only in details of the implementation of the GBHN should the three election contestants differ, according to Kwik. In the same speech, however, he also said that only matters of great and fundamental importance could be voiced in an election campaign, and in an apparent attempt to ward off criticism against the lack of concrete policy debate in the campaign, he claimed that a general election was neither a classroom nor a seminar room. Kwik, however, was unclear about exactly which matters he considered to be of great and fundamental importance. With no ideological differences between the three election contestants, and with all of them agreeing about the broad policy directions for the nation as laid down in the GBHN, there seemed to be little left to discuss in the campaign, unless, implausibly, Kwik considered the details of the implementation of the GBHN to be important and fundamental issues. At the same time, however, Kwik’s seven-point programme and his criticism of the government’s economic policies indicated that he did disagree with the government on important issues which were not clearly laid out in the GBHN.

Kwik’s attempt to counter the criticism of the lack of debate and competition among the election contestants highlighted a fundamental problem in the New Order elections. On the one hand, the election contestants were expected to present concrete policies and programs, but on the other hand, they were not allowed to have any differences in ideological orientation on which such programs could be based, and many issues, as we have seen, were banned altogether from discussion. Moreover, the three election contestants had already formally agreed about which broad policies the nation should follow, which, in theory, further reduced the scope of meaningful debate. The result was that the campaign themes propounded by the three election contestants, in spite of the PDI’s attempts to take fresh and bold stances on certain issues, were largely seen as irrelevant by the electorate. For example, according to a survey by the weekly newsmagazine Tempo among university, college and Islamic boarding school students shortly after the poll, an astonishing fewer than 5 per cent of the respondents answered that political considerations were the most important factor in deciding how to vote. The most important factors were instead the image of the election contestants (34.3 per cent), the influence of the respondents’ parents (23.8 per cent), the candidates nominated by the parties (13.2 per cent) and the influence of religious leaders (12.7 per cent).
In a bid to improve the PDI’s capacity for policy making and in order for the party to be able to play a more significant role in national politics, Kwik launched the idea in early April 1987 that the PDI would form a ‘shadow cabinet’ (kabinet bayangan). Speaking at a rally in Bojonegoro, East Java, Kwik said that the PDI had already decided to form such a shadow cabinet after the election, and that it would be made up of people with the same capacity and weight as the actual cabinet appointed by the president. In another speech, on 17 April, he further elaborated on the idea, but was careful not to make it look like an affront to the government:

This ‘shadow cabinet’ is not being set up with the intention of taking the position of the government. It is not being set up with the intention of taking the position of the cabinet ministers. But in accordance with Pancasila, the spirit of mutual cooperation [gotong royong] and deliberation [musyawarah], the members of the PDI’s ‘shadow cabinet’ will be the fellow discussion partners of the ministers.

The words Pancasila, mutual cooperation (gotong royong) and deliberation (musyawarah) were all central concepts in the New Order’s discourse on democracy, and by employing them, Kwik attempted to present his idea within the framework of the dominating political culture, taking pains to make the proposal not seem controversial and a challenge to the government. Government representatives, however, reacted adversely to the idea. State Secretary and Golkar chairman Sudharmono said that the socio-political organisations only had a role up until the election of legislative representatives and that forming the cabinet was the commissioned task of the president. Meanwhile, another Golkar leader, M. Panggabean, said that a shadow cabinet was not in accordance with Pancasila democracy, was not needed and would disturb national stability. More than anything else, these reactions demonstrated that the principles of deliberation and Pancasila democracy, in the official view, did not extend to the sphere of government and that the political parties had no business concerning themselves with such matters. The PDI leaders readily understood those points, and Kwik’s idea of forming a shadow cabinet did not get the support of the party’s leadership. As a consequence, the idea was shelved for the time being.

Although the PDI managed to communicate its political ideas better in 1987 than in earlier elections, the party’s campaign was overshadowed by its
successful use of Sukarno’s image to attract supporters, and this factor probably had a larger impact on the party’s electoral performance than any improvements in the party’s programme or communication skills. The PDI’s efficient use of Sukarno’s image in 1987, however, was only possible because of the government’s decision to rehabilitate Sukarno’s memory, an endeavour begun nine years earlier, in 1978.

Since the rise of the New Order, the regime had had trouble with the role to be awarded to Sukarno in the official historiography, both because of his undeniable importance in leading the country towards independence, and because the former president continued to command widespread support and sympathy long after he was manoeuvred out of power by Suharto and the army in 1966. As already mentioned, Sukarno died under house arrest in 1970, and during the first eight years after his death, up to 1978, the regime suppressed his memory. He was given a rushed national funeral and was buried in far-away Blitar, East Java, rather than in Bogor, close to Jakarta, as had been the wish of his family.36 Shortly after the funeral, an embargo was imposed on publishing Sukarno’s political writings, and all references to the former president in relation to the state philosophy Pancasila, which he had formulated in 1945, were omitted. Official history texts downplayed his role in Indonesia’s history to the point that his role largely was confined to that of having proclaimed independence in 1945.37 Sukarno, in the words of Pierre Labrousse, passed into ‘purgatorial silence’.38

The enforced silence came to an unexpected end on 24 January 1978, when Ali Moertopo announced to a group of PDI members commemorating the party’s fifth anniversary in Solo that President Suharto had decided to renovate Sukarno’s tomb. Shortly afterwards, Ali Moertopo and members of a PDI seminar in East Java made a pilgrimage to Blitar, where the main plans for the renovation were presented.39 Suharto’s decision to restore his predecessor’s memory probably had both personal and political reasons. The timing was significant, as one windu (eight-year cycle) had passed according to traditional Javanese time reckoning, and Suharto may have felt that the occasion was suitable for asking forgiveness (minta maaf) from Sukarno.40 The timing and the highly publicised nature of the initiative, however, indicate that a main purpose of renovating Sukarno’s grave was political. Suharto’s position at the time was vulnerable because of widespread discontent with the president’s rule, particularly among Muslims, students and sections of the military.41 The months from August 1977 to January 1978 had been marked by vehement student protests against the regime and against the lack of political freedom, the
social and economic gap between rich and poor and the corruption in
government circles. Much of this criticism focused on Suharto personally and
on members of his family. The president’s plans to build an elaborate
mausoleum for his family in Central Java seemed especially repugnant to the
opposition and became a major rallying point for the protesters. Against this
background of protests and declining support, especially from Muslim
constituencies, Suharto apparently tried to use the restoration of Sukarno’s
memory to woo Sukarno’s and the PNI’s old constituencies of nominally
Muslim Javanese (abangan). The move was also meant to bolster the PDI’s
electoral performance, which, as we have seen, had been poor in the 1977
election. The main reason for doing so from the government’s point of view was
to avoid a polarised situation from arising in which the government would be
pitted against an Islamic opposition, as represented by the PPP. The govern-
ment thus had an interest in keeping a balance between the PDI and the PPP in
order that Golkar – and by extension the government – could claim to occupy
a centrist position between the potentially antagonistic forces represented by
the two political parties.

The rehabilitation of Sukarno’s memory, however, was not meant to revive
the populist mass politics of Guided Democracy. Suharto’s strategy was instead
to suppress the image of Sukarno as a man of the people. To this effect,
Sukarno’s formerly modest grave was rebuilt as a spectacular marble mauso-
leum, where visitors had to register with security guards and remove their shoes
to be able to view the former president’s resting place through thick protective
glass. Sukarno thus became separated from the people and was instead
turned into an officially sanctioned object of worship and an icon of the state.
Nor did the government wish to see a revival of Sukarno’s political ideas and
leftist politics. The government therefore tried to check the lively debates on
various aspects of the former president’s teachings and historical role which
surfaced in the years following the rehabilitation of his memory. In doing so,
government spokesmen generally took the view that it was best to forget about
Sukarno’s past mistakes, and that digging up questions about the past might
damage national unity and stability. The rehabilitation of Sukarno’s memory
was aimed at creating an objectified symbol which would represent national
unity and loyalty. These objectives were not served by emotionally loaded
arguments about Sukarno’s proper historical role and past mistakes, or by a
revival of his leftist political ideas, such as Marhaenism. The official attitude of
the New Order towards Sukarno is neatly summed up in Suharto’s own words
about his predecessor. ‘I shall carry him high and bury him deep’, Suharto said.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

The government’s new strategy with regard to Sukarno meant that the PDI, for the first time, was allowed to use the former president’s symbolism to bolster its performance in the 1982 general election. The army even covertly supported the party’s election campaign. Pictures of Sukarno, as well as slogans using his and his children’s names, were prominent in the party’s campaign, especially in Central Java, and party leaders frequently referred to the former president and his achievements.

The Sukarno family, meanwhile, was split over the PDI’s capitalisation on Sukarno’s image. The former president’s sister and one of his daughters, Sukmawati Sukarno, took part in the party’s campaign rallies, leading the crowds in shouts of ‘long live Sukarno’ (Hidup Bung Karno) and urged voters to vote for the PDI. Yet other members of the family criticised the PDI for twisting Sukarno’s memory and for using him unfairly and illegitimately. As we have seen, moreover, the attempt to capitalise on Sukarno’s image was not very effective, and the party’s most serious decline in performance was recorded in Central Java, a former PNI stronghold where Sukarno continued to enjoy widespread popularity.

SUKARNO AND THE 1987 ELECTION

In September 1986, the PDI submitted the party’s list of candidates for the general elections to the General Elections Institute, LPU (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum). Among the over 600 names listed were three of Sukarno’s children: Guntur Sukarnoputra, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Guruh Sukarnoputra, as well as Megawati’s husband, Taufik Kiemas. According to an unnamed source from the PDI cited by the Kompas daily, the party, without opposing the government, wanted to use the name of Sukarno to attract supporters. Initially, there was a good deal of confusion as to whether any members of the Sukarno family would actually agree to stand as candidates for the PDI, because none of the three nominees had formally agreed to do so before their names were submitted to the LPU. Eventually, however, Megawati and her husband, Taufik Kiemas, agreed to campaign for the PDI and were included in the final list of candidates approved by the government, which was announced by the LPU in January 1987. For the first time, a member of Sukarno’s immediate family stood as a candidate for Parliament for the PDI.

Just as in the 1982 election, the Sukarno family was split over whether its members should engage themselves in politics. The formal argument for taking a politically neutral stance was that Sukarno belonged to the whole nation and
not just to one group or party. For leading members of the family, however, the underlying reason seems to have been the impossibility of representing Sukarno’s teachings within the political format of the New Order. Rachmawati Sukarno admitted as much when she, ahead of the 1987 election, declared herself willing to join the PDI if the party were to pursue Sukarno’s teachings in a pure and consistent way.53 Meanwhile, Sukmawati – who, according to Angus McIntyre, was the most militant and outspoken member of the Sukarno family – in contrast to her stance in the 1982 election, now rejected to campaign for the PDI because she considered the party insufficiently radical, too unwilling to oppose the government and lacking the courage to discuss Sukarno’s teachings.54

The government’s approval of Megawati’s candidacy was not the only sign that the government approved of the PDI’s using Sukarno in its election campaign. At the end of October 1986, a few weeks after the PDI had presented its nominations of members of the Sukarno family for the legislature, President Suharto decided that Sukarno was posthumously to be declared a national hero together with former Vice-president Mohammad Hatta, who had died in 1980. Shortly afterwards, at a palace ceremony on 9 November, the president conferred the title of Pahlawan Proklamator, ‘Hero of the Proclamation [of independence]’, on the two former nationalist leaders. Although Suharto, just as in 1978, may have had personal and other reasons for his decision, the timing of the event, less than six months before the election, was scarcely a coincidence.55 By thus honouring his predecessor, Suharto could be seen indirectly to sanction the PDI’s use of Sukarno’s image in its election campaign. At the same time, as we have seen, the president also tried to control and co-opt the Sukarno symbol. The latter effort was illustrated by the president’s recognition of Sukarno only in tandem with Hatta, an association that the president had invoked already the year before when naming Jakarta’s new international airport Soekarno-Hatta. These two events led observers at the time to conclude that Suharto’s new strategy was to try to curb the power of Sukarno’s memory as a symbol of opposition to his own regime by associating the former president’s historical role with that of the less charismatic Hatta.56 In a broader sense, however, the strategy was a continuation of the strategy of objectification of Sukarno’s memory, which Suharto had initiated with the renovation of Sukarno’s tomb. Sukarno and Hatta were both turned into icons in the national historiography, representing the achieving of the nation’s independence and the origin of the Indonesian state.

The PDI’s election campaign, as already mentioned, was dominated by the party’s apparently successful exploitation of Sukarno’s memory. In several
locations around Java, the party’s rallies drew tens of thousands of mostly young people, and in general, Sukarno’s popularity was the most conspicuous feature of the election campaign. Supporters of the PDI wore T-shirts with the former president’s portrait and his picture was stuck on vehicles and carried as large posters at the party’s rallies. Megawati’s usually brief appearances at the party’s rallies, in which she evoked the memory of her father both through their visible likeness and through poignant slogans and rhetoric, were greeted by cheering crowds and chants of Hidup PDI (‘long live PDI’) and Hidup Bung Karno. At a large rally in Yogyakarta, she led the crowd singing a song of praise to her late father, entitled ‘Bung Karno belongs to whom?’ (Bung Karno, Siapa yang Punya?). She then stopped singing and asked the crowd ‘To whom does [Bung Karno] belong? He belongs to all of the Indonesian people. And they are the PDI’s voters’. In Yogyakarta, as well as in other places in Central Java, such as Banyumas and Purwokerto, observers estimated that the PDI’s rallies were attended by 100,000 people or more. On the final day of the election campaign, the PDI held a show of force in Jakarta, in which observers claimed that the largest crowd by far in the election campaign turned out on the streets to show their support for the party, reportedly turning Jakarta to a ‘sea of crimson’.

Although the PDI’s use of Sukarno’s memory was not the only factor explaining the party’s success in the election, the obvious response which the evocation of the former president’s memory aroused, especially among young urban people, surprised both the government and many observers. The party was criticised, however, in newspaper editorials as well as by members of the Sukarno family for exploiting the former president’s memory. Megawati’s sisters, Rachmawati and Sukmawati, both said that there was no election contestant which represented Sukarno’s teachings and ideas, and Rachmawati directly criticised the PDI’s exploitation of Sukarno’s charisma to attract masses. The party’s chairman, Soerjadi, meanwhile, both before and after the election, denied that the PDI had tried to exploit Sukarno’s memory or to initiate a Sukarno revival. According to Soerjadi, the PDI fielded Megawati as a candidate because she was ‘suitable’ (pantas) and not because she was Sukarno’s daughter. He did not, however, explain what qualities made her suitable. The party’s secretary general, Nico Daryanto, claimed that the display by PDI supporters of Sukarno’s photo was spontaneous, and he denied that the party had ever instructed its followers to carry the former president’s picture in the campaign.

In government circles the PDI’s successful campaign met with mixed responses. Ahead of the polling day, Golkar officials seemed worried that the
obvious surge in support for the PDI would come at the expense of Golkar, rather than the PPP. On the eve of the polling day, Golkar’s chairman, Sudharmono, even revised Golkar’s election target downward from its original 70 per cent to 60 per cent. In Kediri, East Java, the local election committee banned the use of Sukarno’s photo in the campaign, apparently because of worries that the PDI might damage Golkar’s election performance. Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, who campaigned for Golkar, directly attacked the PDI’s use of Sukarno’s picture. At a rally in Bandar Lampung in Sumatra in early April, he told the audience that throughout the election campaign he had observed that an election contestant carried a picture of someone who was not a founder of the New Order and not a leader of the New Order. ‘What is it called?’ he asked the audience, which shouted ‘Old Order’ in reply. ‘Now, you tell me’, he yelled, ‘who is the father of the New Order?’, and the crowd answered ‘Pak Harto [Suharto]’. ‘Who is the father of development?’, Alamsyah asked. ‘Pak Harto’, the crowd shouted. ‘Then, if we want to carry a picture, whose picture should it be?’ ‘Pak Harto’, the audience answered. ‘And if someone carries a picture of someone else then Pak Harto, what does it mean?’. ‘Old Order’. The PDI supporters who displayed Sukarno’s picture, however, were hardly motivated by feelings of nostalgia for the Old Order. With the PDI mainly attracting young people at its rallies, most of those who carried Sukarno’s picture were too young to remember the former president’s rule. Sukarno’s attraction probably lay more in the association which his memory evoked of the original nationalist project and its sense of shared purpose, not only for independence, but also, as we have seen, for a better future and social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people. The participatory, egalitarian and socialist nationalism which Sukarno represented stood in contrast to the politically exclusive, elitist and socially conservative nature of the New Order. Thus, for the young people who turned out at the PDI’s election rallies carrying Sukarno’s picture, the former president’s attraction lay both in the implied opposition to the New Order and President Suharto, and in the former president’s association with a vision of a better common future. The opposition, however, was generally not aired as direct criticism of the regime or the government, nor was it manifest in an articulate political alternative. With the notable exception of Kwik Kian Gie, the PDI, as we have seen, rarely confronted the government in its election campaign and direct criticism of government policies was largely avoided. Megawati’s appearances were usually short and she also refrained from criticising the government and indeed from making any more complex
political statements or analyses. She apparently held no long political speeches during the campaign.\textsuperscript{67} As a consequence, the opposition implied by the Sukarno symbol was generally diffuse and unfocused.

As the campaign neared its end, the PDI leaders obviously began to feel embarrassed by the extensive use of Sukarno’s picture among party supporters and the discontent with President Suharto and the New Order which this use implied. On the final day of the campaign, the party leaders began to defuse the oppositional potential of Sukarno’s image. In Surabaya, the PDI displayed two big pictures, one of Sukarno and one of President Suharto, and in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, the portraits of Sukarno, Hatta and Suharto were paraded together. In Manado, North Sulawesi, meanwhile, only the photo of Suharto was displayed, with the slogan \textit{Kami Cinta Soeharto} (‘we love Suharto’). In Jakarta, Soerjadi claimed that the PDI was a ‘child of the New Order’, and reiterated the party’s support for President Suharto.\textsuperscript{68}

In spite of the PDI’s boisterous rallies, the campaign was generally peaceful, and compared with earlier campaigns, there were fewer incidents of violence. The peaceful character of the 1987 campaign contrasted particularly with the 1982 campaign, which had left tens of people dead and hundreds wounded, largely in incidents involving supporters of the PPP and Golkar.\textsuperscript{69}

\section*{AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTIONS: SUKARNO AND SOCIAL DISCONTENT}

The polls were held on 23 April and the most significant outcome was a large shift in votes from the PPP to Golkar.\textsuperscript{70} The formerly Islamic party declined from the 27.8 per cent which it had collected in the 1982 election to 16.0 per cent, whereas Golkar increased from 64.3 per cent to 73.2 per cent, by far the organisation’s best result ever. The PDI increased by a relatively modest three points, from 7.9 per cent to 10.9 per cent. The results meant that Golkar increased its representation in Parliament by 53 seats to 299 (59.8 per cent), whereas the PPP declined by 33 seats to 61 (12.2 per cent) and the PDI increased by 16 seats to 40 (8.0 per cent).\textsuperscript{71}

Although there were complaints from the political parties, as well as Golkar, about irregularities in the election campaign and the voting procedure, these were relatively mild compared with earlier elections.\textsuperscript{72} None of the parties submitted a formal protest, but, according to Minister of Internal Affairs Supardjo Rustam, who chaired the General Elections Institute, LPU, the parties had only ‘requested attention’ to the problems of ‘obstacles’ during the election.\textsuperscript{73}
A statement issued by the PDI two weeks after the elections described the problems as 'administrative and operational weaknesses and violations' and expressed the party's thanks to the president for organising the general election 'safely, orderly, peacefully and smoothly'. The party also expressed its thanks to the 'military leadership and its whole organisation [for acting] as a catalyst in the development of Pancasila democracy and [for] wholeheartedly giving the election contestants the opportunity to give political education to the people through [their election] campaigns'.

The PDI increased its share of the votes in all but four provinces, those of Lampung, Yogyakarta, the Moluccas and Irian Jaya, but most significantly the party increased disproportionally in the country's urban areas. In Jakarta, the party jumped from 15.8 per cent in 1982 to 28.4 per cent, overtaking the PPP as the second-ranking party in the capital. The PDI also made substantial gains in the urban districts of West Java, such as Bandung, Bogor and several municipalities bordering on the capital, and more than doubled its share of the votes in the country's third largest city, Medan in North Sumatra. This pattern indicates that the party's electoral success was not so much due to a realignment of Sukarnoist Javanese abangan peasants, but probably more reflects the support from the youthful crowds that had carried Sukarno's picture in the party's election campaign. The support from urban youths, moreover, appears to have been larger than reflected in the election result because as several observers noted, the PDI crowds largely consisted of young people below the voting age of 17.

In spite of the fact that Golkar had made its best election ever and that the relatively small increase of the PDI had been balanced by a more substantial decline in the performance of the PPP, there were two principal reasons why many government and military officials objected to the PDI's successful use of the Sukarno symbol in its campaign. One was the obvious loss of face for President Suharto, which Alamsyah tried to remedy in his rally in Bandar Lampung, and which the PDI itself tried to redress on the last day of the campaign. The other reason, one which might potentially become a more serious political problem for the New Order, was the prospect of a revival of Sukarno's ideas, with their socialist and revolutionary potential, combined with a rise of class-based mass politics. Given political and ideological leadership, the probably widespread social discontent among the urban youths, predominantly men, who had attended the PDI's rallies might readily spill over into protests and violence directed at the regime. Such a development could even signal the start of an uprising against the regime. Although neither the PDI nor the urban
Youths posed any threat to the regime at the time, the developments in the Philippines a year earlier, where the ‘people power’ revolution had ousted President Ferdinand Marcos, probably urged caution on the regime about the rise of urban discontent. Incidentally, the development in the Philippines also began by the opposition rallying around a dead popular political leader and nationalist figure, Benigno Aquino.78

The PDI’s successful exploitation of Sukarno’s image consequently triggered a wide range of reactions from intellectuals as well as government representatives in the wake of the election. As we have seen, the government’s principal strategy in dealing with Sukarno’s legacy after 1978 was to turn the former president into an icon of the state, whose memory should evoke nationalist sentiments void of politics and ideology. To this end, the ban on Sukarno’s political writings was sustained and discussions about his political ideas were discouraged. Sukarno’s concept of Marhaenism was particularly condemned as being communist – Sukarno himself had once reportedly said that ‘Marhaenism was Marxism à la Indonesia’ – and not in compliance with Pancasila. State Secretary Moerdiono, in an interview with the news magazine Tempo shortly after the election, outlined the government’s view of the former president’s proper role in history. There were two sides to Sukarno’s popularity, he said. If Sukarno was honoured as the declarer of independence, this was to be considered a natural phenomenon in a ‘festival of democracy’ (pesta demokrasi) because it reflected respect for the national leader who had devoted himself since youth to the struggle for the country’s freedom. However, if the spontaneity of the young people were to be channelled to revive the teachings of Sukarno, this would have to be guarded against (diwaspadai). The teachings of Sukarno, Moerdiono said, included Nasakom and Marxism applied to Indonesia.79 Other officials were more blunt in their reactions to the PDI’s success in using Sukarno’s picture. House Speaker Amir Machmud warned people to shield themselves against any ‘extreme doctrine’ seeking to destabilise the New Order, and he described these doctrines as having originated from the outlawed Communist Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). In an apparent reference to the PDI, he furthermore said that ‘Old Order patterns and their sympathizers, or those opposing the state ideology Pancasila, should not infiltrate the New Order’.80 A similar warning came from the commander of Central Java’s Diponegoro Division, Major-General Syaiful Sulun, who claimed that Marhaenism had been forbidden by the MPR.81

The PDI’s use of Sukarno’s memory also brought about a discussion and revision of how the former president was represented in the official historio-
graphy, particularly the school curriculum. Some observers in Indonesia at the
time, including prominent historian Taufik Abdullah, believed that the
suppression of Sukarno’s historical role in the New Order’s historiography was
responsible for the rise of a plethora of myths, especially among young people,
about the former president. President Suharto also considered the national
historiography to be inadequate with regard to how his predecessor was
represented, and shortly after the election he ordered a revision of the history
texts for all levels of national education in order to teach the young generation
about the ‘real Sukarno’. William Liddle has interpreted the president’s
decision to order a history review as a desire on Suharto’s part to emphasise the
negative aspects of his predecessor’s rule. As we have seen, however, Suharto
and the government had since 1978 been consistent in honouring Sukarno in
order to turn him into a state icon. Two years after the 1987 election, in his
autobiography, Suharto again took care to give Sukarno due respect, calling
him an ‘extraordinary patriot’, a ‘freedom fighter’ and a hero worthy of
tribute. Although Suharto acknowledged certain historical mistakes on the
part of the former president, notably his failure to ban the PKI in the wake of
the 30 September 1965 coup attempt, he mainly attributed these shortcomings
to human weakness. Suharto’s attitude in his autobiography towards Sukarno
was one of mikul dhuwur mendhem jero, a Javanese saying which means to
respect one’s parents and forget about their mistakes and shortcomings. This
attitude was thus consistent with the president’s earlier promise to ‘carry
[Sukarno] high and bury him deep’, that is, to honour Sukarno’s role as a
nationalist and proclamation hero, but to discourage discussion of the former
president’s historical role and ideas. In line with this consistent strategy,
Suharto’s intention when ordering the history review in the wake of the 1987
election was probably to emphasise more clearly the image of Sukarno as a
nationalist symbol, while continuing to downplay the former president’s
mistakes and shortcomings, which, from Suharto’s point of view, included his
leftist political ideas and teachings.

The objectification of Sukarno’s memory was part of a larger venture on the
part of the New Order to project continuity with the original nationalist
movement and the war of independence. This venture included various efforts,
such as attributing a sacred quality to the 1945 Constitution, the labelling of the
New Order’s senior leaders as the ‘generation of ’45’, the aggrandisement of
Suharto’s role in the independence struggle and the development of the na-
tional hero cult. The conferral of the title ‘Hero of the Proclamation [of inde-
pendence]’ on Sukarno and Hatta served to integrate the two leaders
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

historiographically with a large group of ‘national heroes’ (pahlawan nasional) who at one time or another were seen to have played significant roles in the nation’s history and who were celebrated in various state rituals under the New Order. The purpose of this hero worship, as argued by Klaus Schreiner, was to link the regime with the heroism of the national struggle and to portray Indonesia’s history as a long anti-colonial struggle culminating in the New Order.89 In this context, and in addition to the aim of bolstering the PDI as a counterweight to the PPP, the government’s strategy of allowing the PDI – the compliant ‘child of the New Order’ – to parade Sukarno’s picture in its election campaign was meant to reinforce and lend credibility to the attempts to link the regime with the nationalist project. For the young supporters of the PDI, however, Sukarno symbolised an egalitarian and participatory nationalism with socialist overtones in contrast to the authoritarian and hierarchical New Order under President Suharto.

The PDI leaders, as we have seen, seem to have been taken aback by the response that its use of the Sukarno memory had aroused, and in the weeks immediately following the poll the party leadership awaited guidance from the government about how to proceed with Megawati’s election to Parliament. Soerjadi said that it was not certain whether she would actually take up her seat in the legislature, and that the matter would be decided at a national leadership meeting of the party in May. However, the matter does not appear to have been discussed at the meeting, but talking to journalists afterwards Soerjadi said that the government had no objection to Megawati’s taking up her seat in Parliament, a statement confirmed by Minister for Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam a few days later. After a few weeks of speculation as to whether or not Megawati herself would accept the seat, she eventually agreed and was sworn in as one of the 500 members of Parliament on 1 October 1987.90

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the 1987 election had been a spectacular success for the government. The campaign was the most peaceful and orderly in the history of the New Order and the compliant leaders of both the PDI and the PPP generally refrained from confronting the government. At least superficially, Islam seemed to have lost its relevance as a political force since the adoption in 1985 of Pancasila as the only basic principle for the political parties and Golkar. The emasculation of political Islam was illustrated by the decline of the PPP, which above all favoured Golkar, but also contributed to achieving the government-
desired aim of a more even representation between the political parties in Parliament. The government’s control, as noted by William Liddle, had never been greater, and he described the year 1987 as marking the ‘New Order at the Height of Its Power’.  

In spite of the PDI’s attempts to present a more bold and articulate political programme compared with earlier elections, the party’s campaign themes generally remained vague and insubstantial. In this respect, the PDI did not differ from the other two election contestants, because the general lack of substantial political discussion in the run-up to the election was, more than anything else, due to the political climate in general and the restrictions imposed by the government on the elections. Several important issues were banned from discussion and, apart from the general principles of *Pancasila*, the parties were not allowed to adhere to any ideology from which substantial political programs or policies might evolve. For all the hopes expressed by government and military officials that the PDI would develop to become a ‘partner’ of the government and an ‘asset in the national development’, the government apparently had no intention that the party would develop from a yes-man with its influence on national policy-making confined to a rubber-stamp legislature into a more independent political actor. This discrepancy between the official rhetoric about political pluralism and its practical implementation was demonstrated by Golkar’s and the government’s complete rejection of Kwik Kian Gie’s proposal that the party set up a shadow cabinet. Moreover, the issue highlighted a discrepancy between the ideals of *Pancasila* democracy as propounded by the government and political practice. Although Kwik justified and formulated his suggestion in terms of *Pancasila* democracy, emphasising concepts such as *musyawarah* and *gotong-royong* and steering clear of any implications of opposition, his proposal was rejected outright without any effort even to discuss or deliberate the proposal according to the ideals of *Pancasila* democracy. *Pancasila* democracy was instead evoked as a mantra for locating the proposal outside the limits of permissible political discussion, together with the unqualified and unexplained assertion that a shadow cabinet would disturb national stability. The paternalistic notions contained in the hegemonic concept of *Pancasila* democracy, moreover, were illustrated by Sudharmono’s rejection of Kwik’s proposal on the grounds that appointing the cabinet was the president’s prerogative. The argument was irrelevant with regard to Kwik’s concrete proposal, but instead implied that setting up a shadow cabinet was unethical because it amounted to a form of lèse-majesté – in Javanese *baléo*, rebellious behaviour – against the president.
The implications of *baléo* were relevant with regard to the PDI’s capitalisation on Sukarno’s image as well, because the enthusiasm displayed by the party’s supporters for the former president implied dissatisfaction with the current president and, in a more general sense, the prevailing social and political conditions. In allowing the PDI to use Sukarno’s image in the election campaign, the government had tried to boost the party’s performance, mainly to counter a perceived threat of political Islam. The image of Sukarno that was to be hailed and honoured was the image of the former president as he was represented in the official historiography, that is, the patriot and hero of the proclamation of independence with which the New Order could project continuity and which could serve to link the regime to the original nationalist project and struggle. As it was, however, the young supporters of the PDI were more attracted to the former president as a symbol of leftist, egalitarian and participatory politics, all in contrast to the hierarchical New Order and the aloof and elevated position of President Suharto. The PDI’s mobilisation of large masses of people in the election campaign, moreover, indicated that the party might emerge as a major spokesman for the apparently widespread popular resentment with the regime. For the government, allowing the PDI to exploit Sukarno’s memory thus proved to be a double-edged sword, as demonstrated by the sharply worded rejections of the former president’s political teachings and Suharto’s order to revise the history books with reference to the image presented of his predecessor.

**NOTES**

1 See Halawa (1993) for a political biography of Soerjadi.
2 *Kompas* (3 May 1986), *Jakarta Post* (3 May 1986) and *Tempo* (10 May 1986); see also Djadijono (1986: 453). The old board, elected at the 1981 PDI congress, originally comprised 17 members, but three of those had died in the course of the board’s five-year term in office and one, Isnaeni, had resigned; Lay (1987: 465 n. 766).
3 *Tempo* (10 May 1986) and *Jakarta Post* (20 May 1986).
4 van de Kok and Langenberg (1988: 164); see also van de Kok and Cribb (1987: 158–160).
6 *Prioritas* (10 January 1987).
7 For the election results, see Suryadinata (1989: 159–160).
8 For the dubious methods employed to ensure Golkar’s victory, see Irwan and Edriana (1995). See also van Dijk (1992) for a survey of the general elections under the New Order.
The expression appears to have been coined by President Suharto in a speech in 1981, after which it became widely used by civil servants; Pemberton (1986: 4).

Nico Schulte Nordholt (1980) was the first to describe the New Order elections as rituals; see also Pemberton (1986), Labrousse (1993) and Liddle (1996b) for similar interpretations.


Undang-undang Baru di Bidang Politik serta Peraturan-peraturan Pelaksanaannya: PP. No. 35/1985 - PP. No. 36/1985 (1985: 438). The law text refers to Pancasila as the ‘only principle’ (satu-satunya asas), but in the discussions around the law, the concept ‘one and only principle’ (asas tunggal) was commonly used. See Suryadinata (1989: 116–123) for the discussions surrounding the new legislation.

The 1986 PDI congress also adopted a political declaration which rejected the ‘ideologies of Marxism, Leninism, communism, liberalism and other concepts (isms) which are in conflict with Pancasila’, thus implying the rejection of Marhaenism; see Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 20).


Jakarta Post (28 March 1987).


Sukamto et al. (1991: 8–12).

van de Kok and Cribb (1987: 161) and Suara Pembaruan (29 April 1987).

Kompas (3 April 1987). Oil revenues declined from 1982 to 1986 due mainly to falling prices internationally. The prices fell particularly sharply in 1986, prompting the government to embark on a policy of deregulation and decreasing intervention in the economy; see Hill (1996: 16–17).

Another PDI campaigner and candidate for Parliament, B. N. Marbun, for example, made no mention of the seven-point program in his 3 April 1987 radio speech entitled ‘The struggle of the Indonesian Democratic Party to uphold Pancasila democracy in the economic field’, and the issues raised by Marbun were only partly the same as those raised by Kwik Kian Gie, including calls for a strengthening of consumer interests and a national social security system; Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1987: 35–42).
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

The current figure was 11.7 per cent; Jakarta Post (13 June 1987). The suggestion did not originate with the PDI, but had been adopted already in 1960 by the MPRS and had been reiterated by the 1966 MPRS; Nasution (1966: 197). In the 1982 discussions of the Broad Outlines of State Policy, GBHN, in the working committee of the MPR, the PDI had also presented the suggestion with reference to its adoption by the 1966 MPRS; see Djadijono (1985: 94–95).

E.g. Markus Wauran's radio speech in Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1987: 71–77). One concrete suggestion was for all education to be gathered under the authority of the department of education and culture, instead of being divided between this department and the department of religion.

E.g. Sutjipto Wirosadjono in Tempo (28 March 1987).

The GBHN were broad five-year development plans which the MPR established for each coming presidential term in office.


Tempo (2 May 1987). The majority of the respondents were enrolled in tertiary education and thus better educated than the average population. Allowing for reservations about the statistical uncertainty of the survey, it is still reasonable to suppose that political considerations would have been even less important among the electorate at large. The poll included 766 respondents.

Kompas (9 April 1987).


For the New Order's discourse on Pancasila democracy, see Uhlin (1999) and Antlöv (2000), and for the discourse on gotong-royong, see Bowen (1986).


Jawa Pos (14 April 1992).

For the circumstances surrounding Sukarno's burial, see May (1978: 242–245).


Labrousse (1994: 177) and McDonald (1980: 251). The latter sets Ali Moertopo's original announcement to a PDI congress in February 1978; as there was no PDI congress that year, Labrousse's information seems more reliable.


See Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook (1979: 201). For the protests, see further van der Kroef (1979), Grant (1979) and Anderson (1978). Against this background, Suharto may have hoped the renovation of Sukarno's tomb would divert some of the criticism against the plans for his own family mausoleum.


van de Kok et al. (1991: 86).

Brooks (1995: 70). For the controversies about Sukarno in the early 1980s, see Oey Hong Lee (1982).
Pancasila Democracy and Sukarno Revival in the 1987 Election

47 Van Dijk (1982: 25). This stance on behalf of the authorities was in contrast to earlier elections, particularly the 1971 election, when Sukarno's eldest son, Guntur Sukarnoputra, together with one of his sisters, Rachmawati Sukarno, had campaigned for the PNI. The military had then tried to restrict the PNI's use of the Sukarno symbol, and Guntur was confined to campaigning only in Jakarta. After the election he was harassed and interrogated by the military security organisation Kopkamtib, and he subsequently largely dissociated himself from politics; see May (1978: 263–264, 275). Guntur instead seems mainly to have devoted himself to business and became one of a number of members of prominent families who rose to become indigenous capitalists under the patronage of the president-director of the state-owned oil company Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, in the 1970s; Robison (1986: 355). The names of Sukarno and other members of the Sukarno family also figured in the PDI's 1977 election campaign, but apparently more spontaneously and without government sanctioning; see Sukamto et al. (1991: 14).
49 Suwondo et al. (1987: 64, 133, 136) and van Dijk (1982: 25); see also Pemberton (1986: 7).
51 Kompas (29 September and 2 October 1986).
52 Tempo (10 January 1987). Megawati herself did not at the time comment on her choice to campaign for the PDI, but it was rumoured that her husband, Taufik Kiemas, had convinced her to agree to be nominated for the PDI; Kompas (2 October 1986). Angus McIntyre (1997: 8) has suggested that Megawati's decision was underpinned by a 'certain amount of post-parental freedom', her children having grown up to be independent at the time.
53 Suara Pembaruan (15 April 1987).
54 McIntyre (1997: 9).
55 For the lively speculation around Suharto's motives at the time, see EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 1 (1987: 7).
57 Kompas (13 April 1987).
58 E.g. Jakarta Post (1 April 1987 and 2 April 1987). Megawati also campaigned in South Sumatra, where her husband, Taufik Kiemas, stood as candidate for the PDI, and Medan, where 70,000 people were reported to have attended the party's rally; see Kompas (7 April 1987) and Sukamto et al. (1991: 26 n. 26) respectively. Even though numbers may be inflated, the general impression was that the party's rallies that staged members of the Sukarno family were well-visited, especially in comparison with previous elections.
59 Jakarta Post (18 April 1987). Red was the colour of the PDI. The report claimed that over a million people were mobilised.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

60 EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 3 (1987: 6).
61 Tempo (4 October 1986) and Suara Pembaruan (14 April 1987).
62 Prioritas (4 April 1987); see also Kompas (17 January 1987).
63 Kompas (15 April 1987). PDI functionaries did, on at least one occasion, however, offer pictures of Sukarno to its followers, in Semarang, Central Java on 12 April; Kompas (13 April 1987).
64 Far Eastern Economic Review (7 May 1987) and Jakarta Post (6 April 1987).
65 Kompas (5 April 1987).
66 This opposition was essentially a manifestation of the two social processes identified by Benedict Anderson (1966), reprinted in Anderson (1990: 123–151), which he called ‘revolution, spontaneity, community’ on the one hand and ‘order, rule, hierarchy’ on the other; quoted by Goodfellow (1995: xi).
67 This impression is gathered from the study of newspaper reports from the campaign. Moreover, no speech by Megawati was included in the compilations of 1987 election campaign speeches published by the PDI’s central board; see Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1987) and Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993b).
69 The figures relating to campaign violence are highly uncertain, and any assessment of the level of violence must largely be based on the impression of observers. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (7 May 1987), only one death and two injuries were clearly linked to the 1987 election campaign. After the 1992 election campaign, however, a senior police officer said that the campaign in that year, which had left over 50 people dead, not including casualties from traffic accidents, was an improvement over the 1987 campaign; Jakarta Post (15 June 1992). For the 1982 campaign violence, see van Dijk (1982: 23–24).
70 The most important reason behind the PPP’s decline was the government-approved decision in 1984 by Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, the traditionalist NU, to leave the party. Many NU leaders subsequently encouraged the organisation’s members to vote for Golkar, and for this support NU teachers and schools were awarded with financial support from the government; see Liddle (1988: 184). Moreover, the PPP, as we have seen, had been formally deprived of its Islamic identity after the passing of the 1985 Law on the Political Parties and Golkar, and the party also suffered from internal strife in the year running up to the election.
71 See Baroto (1992: 249–253) for the election results and Jakarta Post (8 June 1987) for the division of seats in the Parliament. The total increase in the number of seats won by the three election contestants was due to the enlargement of the Parliament from 460 members to 500. Of the 40 extra seats, four were reserved for appointed representatives of the military, increasing its representation to 100 seats, whereas 36 new seats were contested in the election.
For example, after the 1977 election, the PDI had been particularly vocal in protested voting count irregularities; see Ward (1994: 32), and after the 1982 election, the daily Pelita, which was associated with the PPP, was banned after having published reports of a number of election-related incidents and alternative election figures for Jakarta; see Suryadinata (1982: 59).

jakarta Post (8 June 1987).


For the 1982 election results by province, see Suryadinata (1982: 77–78) and for the 1992 results, see Baroto (1992: 250).

Liddle (1988: 187) and Kompas (27 May 1987).


For the ‘people power’ revolution in the Philippines, see Thompson (1995). After the election, Soerjadi even felt inclined to deny the (faint) possibility that the PDI would come to lead a ‘people power’ revolution in Indonesia; Suara Karya (2 May 1987).

Tempo (2 May 1987). Nasakom (Nationalism, Agama, Communism, nationalism, religion and communism) was a doctrine formulated by Sukarno in 1961 to unite the main aliran of Indonesian society under his leadership; see Weatherbee (1966: 40–41.

Jakarta Post (8 May 1987).

van de Kok (1988: 167–168). To some extent, as noted by van de Kok and Langenberg (1988: 168), these attacks on the PDI from government and military officials reflected an ongoing struggle within the regime; see further the discussion in chapter 6.

Tempo (2 May 1987).

van de Kok and Langenberg (1988: 166).


There is a regrettable lack of systematic studies of the New Order’s historiography, and it is therefore uncertain what the results of the ordered history review were. In later New Order history text books, Sukarno’s role was still very much downplayed. For example, an upper secondary school book from 1991, astonishingly, does not mention Sukarno’s name at all in its fairly extensive treatment of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955, and he is all but invisible in the coverage of much of the rest of Indonesia’s modern history; Badrika and Sulaeman (1991: 114–120).
Cf. also Prasedyawati (1998) for a similar treatment of Sukarno. See also Leigh (1991: 28–31) for some observations about Sukarno’s representation in New Order history school texts.


92 See Mulder (1996: 79) for the implications of baléo in New Order political culture.
CHAPTER 6

Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92)

REGIME TENSIONS, OPENNESS AND MILITARY RAPPROCHEMENT

Just as after the 1982 election, observers concluded that the military covertly had supported the PDI in the 1987 election, including helping the party to organise its mass rallies in Jakarta. This strategy was believed to have been formulated by the armed forces commander-in-chief, General Leonardus Benjamin ‘Benny’ Moerdani.1 Benny Moerdani was himself a Catholic and had links to former activists in the Catholic Party, in part via the Jakarta think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS. The CSIS, influential in the 1970s and early 1980s in formulating government policies, had been founded by Moerdani’s mentor, Ali Moertopo, who died in 1984. The Moerdani family also appeared to have long-standing friendly relations with the Sukarno family as well as being acquainted with some of the new PDI leaders, including Soerjadi and secretary general Nico Daryanto;2 these connection probably made the general sympathetic to the PDI.

In the course of the 1980s, the PDI had also come to take a more positive attitude towards the military’s involvement in politics. The 1981 congress had done away with most of the PNI ‘hard-liners’, such as Usep Ranawidjaja, and other critical leaders who more or less openly opposed the military’s dual function. The congress had also adopted support for the dual function doctrine as one of the party’s four central political stances, and the 1986 congress had subsequently reiterated and reinforced this support. The absence of open opposition to the military’s dual function at the latter congress served, as Cornelis Lay observed shortly afterwards, to decrease suspicion on the part of the military for the PDI, thus opening a rapprochement between the party and the military.3

Before the 1987 election, in the beginning of September 1986, General Moerdani had addressed a meeting of PDI leaders, saying that ‘the people are putting new hopes on PDI to better carry their aspirations under Pancasila and...
the 1945 constitution’ and that he hoped that the party would be ‘more fresh, more dynamic, and of better quality’. This statement and the general’s presence at the meeting were seen by observers as an obvious signal of support for the PDI. Before the election, the military also reportedly let it be known that it would prefer a more balanced representation of the PDI and the PPP in Parliament. It is unclear, however, if the strategy of military support for the PDI in 1987 was adopted with or without the president’s approval. As we have seen, President Suharto had apparently endorsed the PDI’s use of Sukarno’s image ahead of the election, a main purpose of which had been to boost the party’s election performance in relation to the PPP. There were also, however, increasing signs of tension between the mainstream of the military led by Benny Moerdani on the one hand, and the president, bureaucracy and Golkar on the other hand, in the lead-up to the election. Against this background, some military leaders, including Benny Moerdani, apparently began looking to the PDI as an alternative political vehicle to strengthen their position.

The origins of the tensions between the president and the military can be traced back at least to the early 1980s, when the political influence of the military, which General Moerdani commanded from 1983, began to wane. At the Golkar congress that year, Suharto had strengthened his own personal influence over the organisation and engineered the election of his close protégé and State Secretary, Sudharmono, as the organisation’s general chairman. Sudharmono, although himself a retired army lawyer, was deeply unpopular among the mainstream of the military, partly because he was not seen as a ‘real’ soldier, having never held operational command, and partly because of his closeness to the president and an increasingly powerful nexus of civilian politico-bureaucrats who depended on the president’s patronage and whose political and economic interests largely conflicted with those of the military. Many senior officers, including Benny Moerdani, may also have felt uncomfortable with the president’s great personal influence in the military, stemming both from his ability to intervene in the military through reshuffles and rotations and from his control over sections of the officer corps through patronage networks. Moreover, as we shall see, a further source of resentment among sections of the military and in society at large from around the mid-1980s was the rapidly expanding business interests of the Suharto family.

After the 1987 election, the struggle between the military and the president, Sudharmono and the bureaucracy intensified. Speaking at a commemoration of the National Awakening Day on 21 May, General Moerdani indirectly challenged Suharto by saying that no power holder was exempt from social
control or criticism and that the ‘power delegated [should] be returned to the people if the power holder turns out to be deviating from the mandate entrusted [to] him by the people’. The general, probably deliberately ambiguous in his attitude to the concept of opposition, furthermore said that ‘[e]ssentially, the function of control is not an oppositional activity, although the oppositional activity itself contains the function of control in it’. Moerdani’s advocacy of greater popular accountability heralded the period of greater ‘openness’, or keterbukaan, which developed in Indonesia from the late 1980s and which lasted until mid-1994. Although scholars generally set the beginning of keterbukaan in 1989, some observers have noted that a more open political climate emerged already in the lead-up to the March 1988 MPR session, with lively debates on the vice-presidency and on key policy issues such as electoral reform and religious education. It seems that the main reason to set the beginning of keterbukaan in 1989 is that the concept itself then gained prominence in public discussions following an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review by retired General Soemitro calling for greater political openness. The underlying reason for the keterbukaan trend, however, was the same in 1987 and 1989, that is, the struggle between the dominating group in the military under Benny Moerdani and the president and his patronage network of mainly civilian politico-bureaucrats. As convincingly argued by Jacques Bertrand and others, keterbukaan was mainly a product of this struggle, in the context of which both sides tried to court the support of various groups and figures on the margins of power. Keterbukaan was never a formally endorsed policy, and its limits remained fluid throughout the whole period from 1987 to 1994, occasionally getting more leeway and occasionally backtracking. Repression and human rights abuses also persisted in spite of the generally more open political discussions throughout the period.

After General Moerdani’s call in May 1987 for greater popular accountability, Soerjadi was one of the first to respond, saying that the general’s statement opened ‘new horizons’ and that people who wanted to develop a sound democratic system in Indonesia had long awaited such a statement. ‘If everybody here had been aware of the importance of what Moerdani has said, our political development would be on the right path’, the PDI leader said. The rift within the regime and the ensuing more open political climate opened opportunities for the PDI to assert itself as a more independent and critical party. During the period of keterbukaan from 1987 to 1994, the PDI thus gradually came to style itself as a soft opposition – although the very term ‘opposition’ was carefully avoided because the concept of opposition was
anathema in the New Order’s political culture. The party did, however, begin to make more controversial political statements and propositions, confronting the government in ways which had been extremely rare in the party’s earlier history. Just as with keterbukaan in general, however, the PDI’s move towards opposition was no straight road, and the party remained divided between opportunism and compliance on the one hand and political assertiveness and reform aspirations on the other.

THE 1988 MPR SESSION

The 1,000 delegates of Indonesia’s highest legislative body, the MPR, were sworn in on 1 October 1987. The assembly consisted of all 500 members of Parliament and an additional 500 appointed representatives of the provincial governments, functional groups, the military, Golkar and the political parties. The members were grouped in five factions: the Golkar faction, the PPP faction, the PDI faction, the Armed Forces Faction and the Regional Representatives Faction. After being sworn in, the assembly started work in committees to prepare for the general session of the MPR, scheduled for March 1988. There were three main issues on the MPR’s agenda: to establish the Broad Outlines of State Policy, GBHN, for the period 1988–93, and to elect the president and vice-president for the same period.15

Much of the actual work for the MPR delegates in the lead-up to the assembly’s general session consisted of preparing the GBHN. President Suharto, however, in his speech at the inauguration of the new MPR on 1 October 1987, said that he saw no need for any fundamental change in the government’s development strategy, and that, by and large, the broad outlines for state policy that had been established by the 1983 MPR could be retained. The three dominating factions in the MPR, Golkar, the military and the regional representatives in principle took the position that the draft for the 1988–93 GBHN which had been submitted to the assembly by the president were already complete and should therefore be adopted without significant changes.16 The two political party factions, by contrast, came up with a number of propositions for alterations in the new GBHN. The PDI’s main proposal, presented at the end of October, was that a provision for an anti-corruption campaign be included in the new outlines. The proposal, presented by Kwik Kian Gie, who was a member of the MPR, was formulated in highly critical terms, with the government being the thinly concealed target for the criticism. In a plenary session of the MPR’s working committee on the GBHN, Kwik declared that ‘graft has corrupted the
nation’s mentality’ and he accused government officials as well as ordinary people of being imbued with corruption and lacking in morals. Corruption, he said, had become ‘part of [our] way of life, destroyed the morale and mentality of many citizens [ranging] from government officials to ordinary people, from adults to children’. Kwik also called for a halt to the settlement of court cases through bribery. The following month, Nico Daryanto, who chaired the PDI’s MPR faction, reiterated the party’s demand that an anti-corruption campaign be included in the GBHN, and he also called for the establishment of economic competition legislation in order to curb practices detrimental to the majority of the people. These detrimental practices, according to Nico, included monopolies granted by the government to private companies, monopolistic situations caused by unhealthy competition and the formation of cartels. These demands reflected dissatisfaction with the government’s lack of effort to combat corruption, and also with the increasingly blatant corruption and nepotism involving the president’s close family and associates. As mentioned, there was resentment in the military against the business activities of the first family, and the rapidly expanding business activities of Suharto’s children had also increasingly become a matter of public controversy.

The rise of Suharto’s children’s business empires and other large conglomerates – large groups of diverse companies related by ownership rather than by economic activity or expertise in any specific field of operation – owned by close associates of the president, especially from the mid-1980s, were all due to the government’s allocation of state contracts and licences to their companies. Many people found these newer forms of corruption more objectionable than earlier instances of corruption under the New Order, because the corruption which arose in the 1980s more exclusively favoured a small group of the president’s close family and associates, largely to the detriment of other businesses.

As Max Lane has observed, much of the public criticism against monopolies in general in the 1980s was implicitly directed at the Suharto family businesses, a circumstance which explains the political sensitivity of the issue. Although implicitly, the PDI’s calls for anti-corruption measures and economic competition legislation were thus largely directed at the patrimonial and nepotistic policies of the president. The PDI’s proposal for an anti-corruption campaign was rejected by the government, as well as by the dominating faction in the MPR, Golkar, on the unconvincing pretext that the existing laws dealing with corruption were already sufficient. There appears to have been some support for intensified anti-corruption measures among the military’s MPR delegates, but the faction also eventually rejected the proposal. Faced with
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

this resistance from the dominating factions in the MPR, the PDI chose not to push ahead with the proposal and dropped the demand for an anti-corruption campaign and anti-monopoly legislation. Speaking at a PDI gathering in February 1988, Soerjadi justified the party’s compliance in terms of Pancasila democracy and seemed even to take pride in the party’s accommodating strategy. He argued that if a question could not be resolved through deliberation (musyawarah) to reach a consensus (mufahat), and the problem stemmed from the PDI faction, the party would be prepared to let go of its proposal. ‘This is a promise, not just a slogan’, the PDI chairman said.23

Before the controversial suggestion for an anti-corruption campaign was dropped, however, it contributed to creating an open split in the party’s faction. At the end of November 1987, a group of 17 members of the PDI’s own MPR delegation rejected the proposal and regretted the confrontational terms in which the proposal was formulated. There were additional grievances from the group, which called itself the ‘Group of 17’ (Kelompok 17), including the allegedly authoritarian leadership of, and lack of open discussion in, the party’s MPR faction. The group was particularly upset by a suggestion by Nico Daryanto to scrap religious education from the school curriculum. The suggestion was presented to the working committee of the MPR in the name of the party’s faction, apparently without prior consultation with all faction members.24

As in earlier sessions of the MPR, both the PDI and the PPP proposed political reforms. Both parties’ factions demanded that the next general election, scheduled for 1992, be organised jointly by the government and the three election contestants, and that the polls be held on a holiday instead of a working day.25 The latter suggestion would have ended the prevalent practice of employees, especially civil servants, voting at their place of work, where, it was generally presumed, they were more vulnerable to pressure and intimidation. Another proposal propounded by both the PPP and the PDI was for the MPR to decree that the election be conducted honestly (jujur) and fairly (adil), a demand which the parties had raised on several occasions since the 1970s. As it was, the law on general elections, originally promulgated in 1969, only stated that the elections should be conducted ‘directly, publicly, freely and secretly’ (langsung, umum, bebas dan rahasia).26

All proposals for political and electoral reform were rejected, however, by the three dominant factions in the MPR, and in order not to breach the consensus, the PDI in January 1988 dropped all its proposals for political reform. The PPP, by contrast, persisted and forced a vote in the MPR commission preparing the general elections decree. The PDI voted against the PPP’s
proposal, and the latter party lost the vote by 280 to 28. The taking of a vote in an MPR commission was a significant departure from the normal practices under the New Order, and only once before, in 1978, had voting occurred in the assembly, then also initiated by the PPP.27

Whereas the preparation of the GBHN and the decree on general elections gave rise to some controversy, the re-election of President Suharto for a fifth term in office was a foregone conclusion. All major social and political organisations had already formally nominated or expressed their support for the incumbent president, and the PDI, as we have seen, had decided to nominate Suharto for another term already at the party’s congress in 1986, almost two years ahead of the presidential election. The MPR reportedly received at least 423 petitions from around the country, all calling for Suharto’s re-election. After the president’s accountability speech to the assembly on 1 March, the opening day of the general session of the MPR, all five factions formally asked Suharto if he was prepared to serve another term. On 10 March, Suharto was elected by acclamation, and the following day, 11 March, he was sworn into office in a televised ceremony and the assembly closed its general session.28 The date 11 March, symbolically significant, marked the anniversary of the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto in 1966.

In contrast to the presidential election, the vice-presidential election gave rise to much discussion and controversy. The issue was particularly significant because with Suharto’s advancing age – he turned 66 in 1987 – the question of presidential succession began increasingly to dominate Indonesian politics.29 In this context, the position of vice-president was strategic because, according to the constitution, the vice-president would automatically replace the president should the latter die, resign or be incapable of performing his duties.30 Suharto strongly favoured the Golkar chairman Sudharmono as his second-in-command, but the president carefully tried to avoid giving the impression that he was dictating to the MPR, which according to the constitution was the country’s highest political institution and embodied the people’s sovereignty. Instead, Suharto set up five criteria which the candidate for vice-president should fulfil, although he did not explain what constitutional authority he had to do so.31 According to Suharto, in his autobiography which was published in 1989:

Before the [1988 MPR] session began, the representatives of the factions came to me, asking me about [the vice-presidential nominations].

In these discussions, they asked me whom I thought should be the vice-president and whom I regarded as appropriate for becoming vice-president.
To all of those who came to me to ask about this question, I set forward my same opinions. I explained to all of them that the authority to elect and install the vice-president lies with the MPR. I do not have the right to elect or install [the vice-president]. I did not mention any name in answer to those questions. I brought up [a number of] criteria for becoming vice-president. I proposed those criteria. The vice-presidential nominee has to fulfil five criteria, that is: to have a mental and ideological commitment to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, to have personal integrity, to be capable, to have proven his or her achievements in work, and to be acceptable by all layers of society, as expressed in [their] support for the socio-political force which is big and dominant.32

The reference to the 'big and dominant' socio-political force undoubtedly meant Golkar, and the president's criteria thus strongly indicated his preference for its chairman Sudharmono. As we have seen, however, the Golkar leader was intensively disliked by the dominant faction of the military, and it seems that Benny Moerdani and Sudharmono also disliked each other personally. Moreover, as Max Lane has observed, in contrast to earlier vice-presidents under Suharto, Sudharmono belonged to the president’s ‘inner clique of cronies and confidants’,33 and his election would thus reinforce the president’s dominance of the political scene and reconfirm, symbolically, the military’s sub-ordination under the president and the weakening of its capacity for playing an independent political role in accordance with the dual function doctrine.

In order to thwart Sudharmono’s chances of becoming vice-president, the military, apparently on Moerdani’s initiative, staged a smear campaign against Sudharmono, trying to implicate him as well as a number of his associates as communists. This campaign gave rise to the terms bersih diri and bersih lingkungan, that is, ‘being personally clean’ and ‘having a clean environment’, meaning that civil servants and public figures in general should come from a background totally free from influence of, and association with, the outlawed Communist Party. The bersih diri and bersih lingkungan became sweeping and powerful tools for the authorities, particularly the military intelligence organisation Kopkamtib, which General Moerdani commanded, to intimidate political opponents and dissidents and purge the state apparatus as well as social and political organisations of unwanted elements.34 The president apparently felt uneasy with Moerdani’s and the military’s intentions ahead of the MPR session, and in February 1988, only a few weeks before the opening of the general session, the president abruptly dismissed Moerdani from his position as
commander-in-chief of the military, although he was allowed to retain his powerful position as commander of Kopkamtib. Moerdani was replaced by General Try Sutrisno, a former adjutant to Suharto who was seen as more loyal to the president and who had less of an independent power base in the military. Moerdani was later included in the president’s cabinet as defence and security minister, a less powerful position than that of commander-in-chief.

In their efforts to thwart Sudharmono’s election, the military also apparently encouraged the political parties not to nominate the Golkar chairman, in spite of the president’s clear indications that he wanted to see him elected. The PPP, in an unprecedented development, even nominated its chairman, Djaelani Naro, for the vice-presidency, apparently at the military’s behest. Naro, as we have seen, had been a close associate of Ali Moertopo and had longstanding connections with the military intelligence community. He was unpopular within the PPP, however, and he was widely regarded as an unprincipled opportunist.35 Naro’s chances of being elected, moreover, were slight, given Sudharmono’s sure support from Golkar and most of the MPR’s government appointed regional and functional group representatives. The intention of Naro’s nomination was instead to force the MPR for the first time to take a vote on the vice-presidency. Although Sudharmono would have been certain to win the vote, such a demonstration of disunity would have been a snub not only to Sudharmono but also to Suharto. The president, before the MPR session, also let it be known that the ‘decision would be flawed’ if it were not taken through consensus. In his autobiography, Suharto further laid out his view on the issue of voting versus consensus:

If there are two candidates for vice-president, it means that there is a difference [of opinion]. This difference [in relation to] the candidates should be corrected. Through deliberation [musyawarah], the difference must be phased out. After putting forward [their] arguments in deliberation, the side which gets less support must be willing to acquiesce […].

Apparently they [the PPP faction in the MPR] still think in terms of Western democracy, which means [that they] still want to count the votes although it is estimated that they will lose. In the concept of Western democracy, this is not wrong, but in the world of Pancasila Democracy, this means [that the decision is] imperfect [kurang sempurna]. Because Pancasila Democracy requires that deliberation is performed [in order to reach a] consensus.36

In line with the president’s view of the ideal decision making process, Sudharmono also said, shortly before the MPR opened in October 1987, that
Golkar would do its utmost to uphold the principle of deliberation to reach a consensus in the assembly, and that Golkar, as far as possible, would try to prevent the decisions from being taken by majority vote. This declaration and the president’s stance on voting were peculiar because voting was prescribed in the constitution as the means of decision-making in the MPR, a fact which curiously was largely absent from the discussions about voting in the lead-up to the general session of the MPR. Few of those advocating voting in the MPR appear to have had the courage to challenge the president or the hegemonic political culture with its aversion to voting, and in general few voices outside the PPP advocated voting at all. Leading PDI representatives, including Kwik Kian Gie and Nico Daryanto, took the view that voting was indeed permitted according to Pancasila democracy, but that it should only be used as a last resort, should the attempts to reach a consensus fail.

As we have seen, in practice the party followed the president’s interpretation of Pancasila democracy, according to which voting should be avoided at all costs and it was the duty of the party which received less support in the deliberation to yield to the stronger party. Such compliance seems to have been more a result of pressure applied on the party than any deeper commitment to the ideals of consensual decision-making. In an interview with the author, Nico Daryanto said:

I always say that you can musyawarah your idea; you can discuss your idea. But you can not mufakat your idea; you can not agree your idea [sic]. If you say that it is black and they say it is white, you will never change your idea that it is black. But finally, if [in] one group consisting of nine or ten people, you are the only one saying it is black, then finally you have to say, yes, maybe I am colour blind. So I will follow [the majority]. But I still say it is black.

It was unclear, moreover, what mechanism there was for determining the relative strength of different opinions or parties in the deliberation process. This difference of opinion with regard to the proper role of voting in Pancasila democracy may seem like a fine point of distinction, but the two views represented fundamentally diverging concepts about the legitimate forms for decision-making. The president’s view represented an authoritarian – or ‘orthodox’ in the terminology of Michael Morfit – interpretation of Pancasila democracy through which those in power essentially dictated the consensus and dissenting voices were expected to yield and endorse decisions even against their political convictions and aspirations. The view of the political parties, by contrast, seemed to recognise that there might exist differences of opinion.
Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92)

which could not be solved through deliberation and that, in the last resort, voting was a legitimate mechanism to reach a decision based on the will of the majority.41

The PDI appeared to be split on whether or not the party should nominate a candidate other than Sudharmono. Soerjadi took a generally accommodative stance and declared the party’s readiness to comply in order for consensus to prevail. He also argued that there should only be one candidate for vice-president, although he put forward a seemingly naive and irrelevant line of argumentation to support this principle: ‘If there are several vice-presidential candidates but only one person who will become vice-president, the other candidates who failed to be elected as vice-president will maybe feel ill at ease. This may have negative social effects for those involved,’ he said in October 1987.42

The PDI delayed announcing its candidate, citing procedural reasons, and when the general session opened on 1 March 1988, the party’s faction had still not announced its vice-presidential candidate. All other factions had by this time announced their decisions. Golkar and the regional representatives faction nominated Sudharmono, the PPP nominated Naro, whereas the military’s MPR faction in February announced that it ‘affirmed’ (menguatkan) the nomination of Sudharmono.43 The fact that the military did not formally nominate Sudharmono indicated that they only accepted him grudgingly.

Reform-oriented elements in the PDI as well as commentators outside the party seem to have hoped that the PDI would nominate a candidate other than Sudharmono. Alternative candidates reportedly discussed included House Speaker Khairis Suhud, the commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, Benny Moerdani, and the outgoing vice-president, Umar Wirahadikusumah.44 On 2 March, a delegation of PDI legislators led by Soerjadi met the president and presented the names of five possible candidates: Umar Wirahadikusumah, Khairis Suhud, Try Sutrisno, Sudharmono and the minister of internal affairs, Supardjo Rustam. The party’s secretary general Nico Daryanto, in addition proposed Soerjadi as a possible candidate to the president. At the meeting, however, Suharto explained that since the largest MPR faction, Golkar, had already nominated Sudharmono, and that since the PDI was a small party, it had better accept Sudharmono’s nomination as well. A few hours after the meeting with the president, Soerjadi announced that the PDI’s MPR faction, like the military, ‘affirmed’ Sudharmono’s candidacy. The decision was widely seen as an anti-climax among those who had hoped that the party would nominate an alternative candidate.45 Announcing the party’s affirmation,
rather than nomination, of Sudharmono was probably meant as a token demonstration of the party’s independence and assertiveness, but the effect appears to have been the opposite. The party stood out as weak and compliant, particularly in comparison with the PPP. The PDI’s dithering on the vice-presidential nomination ahead of the general session of the MPR was widely seen as being driven by opportunism; that is, the party apparently waited for the military’s nomination before making its own decision. The party’s mimicking of the military’s announcement that it ‘affirmed’ rather than nominated Sudharmono only strengthened this impression.

In the end, Naro also withdrew his candidacy after a personal consultation with Suharto. In this discussion, the president reportedly told Naro that he could not guarantee the PPP leader’s security should he persist with his candidacy.46 The disappointment within the military was demonstrated on 10 March, when a senior member of the military’s MPR faction, Brigadier General Ibrahim Saleh, interrupted the MPR session apparently to protest against the vice-presidential election. He was led away by other members of the military’s MPR faction, however, before he got very far.47 The following day, Sudharmono was duly elected vice-president by acclamation.

Sudharmono’s unanimous election by the MPR, more than anything else, demonstrated the president’s complete domination of the mechanisms of the political system. It was clear that the consensus had been forced on the assembly by the president in the face of substantial opposition, primarily from the military, but also from sections of the political parties. The president’s authoritarian view of Pancasila democracy had thus prevailed, and all dissenting voices had been silenced or coerced to yield to the will of the president. Reform-oriented commentators, however, hailed the PPP and Naro for their courage in standing up for their aspirations, both in the vice-presidential election and in forcing votes in the MPR commissions. In comparison with the PPP, the PDI stood out as weak and compliant ahead of and during the March 1988 general session of the MPR, and the party was criticised for being inconsistent and for not standing up for its policies.48

POLICY MAKING AND THE TURN TO OPPOSITION
The PDI’s relative success in the 1987 election meant that the party’s delegation in Parliament was enlarged from 24 to 40 members, when the assembly was sworn in on 1 October. Most of the new members were relatively inexperienced, a circumstance largely due to the efforts to rejuvenate the party’s parliamentary
As we have seen, the appointment of Soerjadi and the new central board in May 1986 meant that the generation of older PDI leaders, many of whom had been active in the party since its founding in 1973, was replaced by mostly younger leaders. In order to consolidate their leadership and influence in Parliament, the central board, in September 1986, issued a regulation which stipulated that a PDI legislator could only sit for a maximum of two terms in Parliament, thus excluding a majority of the incumbent legislators, most of whom belonged to the older generation. Although the decision was not fully implemented, most of the new PDI legislators were newcomers, and the delegation was generally perceived to be less vocal and active than its predecessor. Admitting the inexperience of most of the party’s legislators, the vice-chairman of party’s faction in Parliament, Ipik Asmasoebrata, said that it was better for the PDI legislators first to keep quiet for a year in order to deepen their understanding of the problems discussed in the assembly. Along the same lines, another legislator, B. N. Marbun, said that it was better (for the PDI representatives) to be silent than to speak without forethought.

The lack of experienced politicians in the party thus hampered the party’s capacity for policy making, and was also a major reason why the shadow cabinet, promised by Kwik Kian Gie to be set up after the 1987 election, did not materialise. In an interview shortly before the 1992 election, Kwik admitted that the scheme had failed in 1987–88 because there were not enough competent people in the PDI to act as shadow ministers. Because of this limitation and the resistance from the party leadership, it appears that Kwik would have dropped the idea of forming a shadow cabinet altogether had he not been approached repeatedly by the American ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, who, according to Kwik, was very positive to the idea. According to Kwik, the ambassador pressed him on three different occasions to reveal the names of the shadow cabinet, causing considerable embarrassment for the economist as he did not have enough suitable candidates. In August 1988, however, Kwik took the initiative together with seven other PDI figures to form the Foundation for Research on Indonesian Democracy, YPDI (Yayasan Pengkajian Demokrasi Indonesia), an organisation formally independent of the PDI, which was meant to act as an embryonic shadow cabinet. Soerjadi and other leading PDI members, however, distanced themselves from the YPDI, saying that it did not represent the opinions of the party. The foundation was dissolved the following year, 1989, on the insistence of the director-general of socio-political affairs, Hari Soegiman, because the organisation had been set up outside the PDI.
The party leadership also realised the need for the PDI to strengthen its capacity for policy making. In 1990, the party decided to revive the largely dormant Body for Research and Development, Litbang (short for Balitbang, Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan), which had been founded in 1984 by then party chief Soenawar Sukowati as part of his effort to transform the PDI into a cadre party. For Soerjadi, the purpose of reviving Litbang was that it should act as the party’s think tank and attract intellectuals to the party.\(^{54}\) The leadership of Litbang was entrusted to Kwik Kian Gie, one of the party’s leading sources of policy thinking, and certainly, as we have seen, one of its most outspoken leaders.

In order to strengthen Litbang’s capacity, the body in late November 1990 advertised in five national and five regional newspapers for intellectuals to join the PDI and register with Litbang. The advertisement, written over with the PDI’s party symbol of the horned *banteng* (wild ox) head, urged the ‘intellectual community to join us’. The advertisement argued that intellectual concepts were need in order for a responsible democracy to function and listed a number of things that could and could not be bought for money, such as a computer but not intelligence, medicine but not health and sex but not love. In bold letters, the advertisement then stated ‘What can not be bought for money is: The wish to JOIN the PDI’.\(^{55}\) Several government officials questioned the advertisement, arguing that it resembled an election campaign activity, which was banned outside the official election campaign periods. These reactions gave the advertisement considerable media attention, thus probably enhancing its effectiveness.\(^{56}\) In January 1991, 210 intellectuals, mostly men from the Jakarta area, signed up as members of Litbang, substantially expanding the body’s registered members to 255. The new members included doctors, industrialists, lawyers, civil servants and a retired senior army officer.\(^{57}\)

The revival and strengthening of Litbang boosted the PDI’s capacity for policy making at a time when the party was already moving to become more critical of the government and less accommodative. On average, the newly recruited intellectuals and professionals appeared to be more critical than the party’s old guard of politicians, probably reflecting a more broadly felt discontent with the New Order in society. The recruited Litbang members were not professional politicians and did not depend on politics for their income and social position, and could therefore be expected to dare to be more critical of the government. One of those recruited to the party in 1991, Laksamana Sukardi, called these new PDI cadres the ‘new breed’ of politicians, in contrast to the older generation of generally accommodative politicians who he claimed
were nurtured by the government for their compliance. As we shall see, many of these new recruits were to become vocal proponents for political reform and lead the party’s move towards opposition – although the very word ‘opposition’, anathema in the political culture of the New Order, was carefully avoided. In an interview in 1997, Nico Daryanto summed up this attitude when he said: ‘If you say there is no opposition, OK, there is no opposition. But we still oppose you’.59

As mentioned above, however, the PDI’s development towards a ‘soft opposition’ was not a straight development. Critical statements and proposals had been voiced already in the lead-up to the 1988 MPR session, but as the general session approached, the party dropped its confrontational proposals in order not to breach the enforced consensus in the MPR. Soerjadi’s speech at the party’s 15th anniversary, on 10 January 1988, had been virtually free of even mild criticism of the government and instead emphasised the party’s commitment to the family principle and to making the MPR session a success.60 The theme for the anniversary was ‘In the spirit of the family principle, we place unity and integrity on a firm footing in order to make the 1988 general session of the MPR a success’.

In an indirect and relatively mild indication of a bolder stance, however, the PDI chairman also expressed the party’s commitment to fight for the wong cilik (little people).61 As we have seen, poverty reduction and greater social and economic justice were central themes in the party’s election campaign the year before, but the Javanese term wong cilik appears to have been all but absent in campaign speeches and statements.62 The party had then rather styled itself as a party for the rakyat kecil (Indonesian for ‘little people’) or the orang miskin (poor people).63 Although both of these terms had a class dimension, they sat relatively comfortably with the family principle and did not in themselves – and certainly not in the way the PDI employed them – imply a class struggle or opposition to those who were better off. The term wong cilik, by contrast, inherently implied a contrast to the wong gedhe, that is, the ‘big people’, whether these consisted of the traditional Javanese aristocracy or the power-holders of the New Order. Although certainly less offensive than the term Marhaen, which was directly associated with Sukarno’s leftist teachings, the PDI’s vow to fight for the wong cilik implicitly suggested the spectre of mass politics associated with Guided Democracy and the outlawed Communist Party. The term wong cilik carried connotations of supposedly traditional Javanese ethics, according to which the wong gedhe were expected to show compassion and decency towards the ‘little people’. The PDI’s use of the term wong cilik thus implied criticism against the rising social and economic disparity and
the apparent lack of concern for the plight of the poor and the weak on the part of the government and the big businesses associated with the regime.

In his 1989 anniversary speech, Soerjadi avoided the term wong cilik, but instead expressed the PDI’s commitment to the rakyat kecil and the lapisan masyarakat kecil (layer of small [people] in society). He also took a more critical stance than in earlier speeches, implicitly criticising the authorities for not upholding the ‘noble values of social justice’ in instances such as when:

pedicab drivers are dragged from their work; or when, for the beautification of the city, street vendors are chased away [and forced] head over heels to save their merchandise from operations to safe-guard the city; or when the houses of poor inhabitants are bulldozed with insufficient compensation in order to erect luxurious buildings, and so on.

Soerjadi also complained of fundamental deficiencies in the country’s – in other words, the government’s – economic policies:

[T]he economy, it is agreed, is the main priority of [our] development. But precisely here, I see that there are a number of structural and constitutional weaknesses. You have all of course read article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. In accordance with article 33, the cooperative sector should be the second [most important] sector in the national economy, after the state-controlled sector. But what we see is that this very cooperative sector is a very weak link in the national economic chain, still left far behind the private sector. The state of the cooperatives today seems to be [to act as] a complementary showcase to the national economic wheel. [...] The development of the New Order began from deep consideration and commitment to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution purely and consequently. The Indonesian Democratic Party, as a child of the New Order, feels called upon once again to refresh that commitment.

In his anniversary speech the following year, Soerjadi once again raised the issue of cooperatives, and he also called for legislation to restrict the increasing domination of conglomerates in the economy, as well as for anti-monopoly legislation. These issues had become the subject of widespread popular resentment in the preceding years, focusing on the president’s economic favouritism towards his close family and associates.

In general, many of the PDI’s critical positions from the late 1980s and in the years leading up to the 1992 election concerned economic policies, which to some extent reflected the party’s relative competence in those areas. In early
Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92)

1991, a meeting of provincial party leaders adopted a political declaration, which also was dominated by economic policy issues. The declaration criticised the existence of conglomerates and private monopolies and reiterated the demand that cooperatives and small-scale businesses be given greater priority and support. The manifesto also explicitly called for an immediate change in the government’s policy which, according to the document, ‘had already resulted in the concentration of economic power in the hands of a small layer of society, such as conglomerates’. The party also wanted to see the adoption of a fully progressive tax system, with a maximum tax rate of 70 per cent, as well as revisions in a number of laws in the economic fields and the issuing of new laws regulating, among other things, monopolies, small businesses and consumer interests. The declaration was less concerned with, and less specific about, policies in the non-economic fields; a notable exception was the call for the leadership of the state-sponsored All-Indonesia Workers’ Union, SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia), to be democratically elected by the workers themselves in order that the organisation not be used for political or economic interests by other groups.

Kwik Kian Gie continued to stand out as one of the party’s most vocal representatives and to criticise the prevalence of corruption and unfair business practices. In August 1991, he presented a Litbang report about corruption, saying that there was an alarming mental and moral erosion ‘in almost all of the nation’s elite circles including business leaders, professionals and bureaucrats’, causing social and economic discrepancies. He also lamented the collusion between power holders and business leaders, which he took as proof of the lack of good moral standards. Although a reform-oriented deputy secretary of Golkar’s faction in the Parliament, Marzuki Darusman, supported Kwik’s claims, his statement invited a sharp rejection from State Secretary Moerdiono. “Government officials are amoral.” That’s too much’, an obviously irritated Moerdiono said. Kwik’s assessment was also rejected by Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini, who denounced Kwik’s argument as too generalised. Although the attack was not exclusively directed towards the government or the bureaucracy, government officials seem primarily – and by implication justifiably – to have interpreted it this way.

INTERNAL DISPUTES

As we have seen, the controversial stances taken by the PDI in the lead-up to the March 1988 MPR session, particularly on corruption and religious education,
were resented by several of the party’s legislators in the assembly. In December 1987, the group of legislators who called themselves the ‘Group of 17’ sent several letters of complaint about these and other issues to the party’s central board. The group also demanded that the party’s secretary general, Nico Daryanto, resign because of his call for the scrapping of religious education in the school curriculum. It seems that by bringing the issue to public attention, Nico’s foes hoped that the issue would weaken the secretary general’s position, much as former party leader Soenawar Sukowati’s position had been weakened in the mid-1980s by the debate over his statement about Indonesia being a secular state.

At the end of March 1988, the split within the party was formalised when eight leading members of the Group of 17, at a PDI leadership meeting in Cisarua, West Java, announced a reshuffled central board, chaired by the chairman of the PDI’s West Java chapter, Dudy Singadilaga, and including the chairmen of four other PDI chapters, those of East Java, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and Aceh. As the reasons for the reshuffle, the group cited Nico Daryanto’s call to end religious education in public schools and other political declarations in connection with the MPR session which, according to the group, had ‘not been beneficial for the struggle of the PDI’. In addition, the group resented the allegedly authoritarian leadership of the party’s central board and a number of alleged breaches of the party’s statutes on the part of the central board. The members of the reshuffle group were mostly elder PDI politicians, mainly from the former PNI, and, incidentally, two of them were parliamentarians who would have been affected by the central board’s decision in September 1986 that PDI legislators could only serve two terms in Parliament, had that decision been fully implemented.

At the party’s leadership meeting in Cisarua, the declaration of the eight dissidents was reportedly met with laughter and ridicule, and the assembled leaders, who claimed to represent 23 of the party’s 27 chapters, instructed the central board under Soerjadi to expel the members of the reshuffled board from party membership as well as to recall from Parliament those signatories who were assembly members. The decision to expel the eight PDI leaders who had signed the declaration of the reshuffled board was taken immediately and was signed by Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto, although no decision was taken to recall the seven members of the reshuffle group who were PDI legislators. The implementation of such a decision would have required the ratification of the president, and apparently the PDI leaders were uncertain whether the president would support them.
After the PDI meeting, several leading government officials urged the party leadership to reconsider its decision to expel the eight members and to solve the party’s internal dispute through *musyawarah*. In spite of these concerned reactions, the rebels did not have the support of the government for their cause, and both Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini and Vice-president Sudharmono reportedly refused to meet the group’s representatives. An accusation that Nico Daryanto’s family background showed signs of PKI influence and a call for the government to investigate the secretary general also went unheeded.

At the end of July 1988, the party’s highest organ in between congresses, the Party’s Consultative Assembly, MPP (Majelis Permusyawaratan Partai), met and ratified the decision to expel the reshuffle group. The assembly also mandated the central board to recall the seven rebellious legislators from their parliamentary positions, as well as to implement the central board’s decision from 1986 that a PDI legislator could only serve two terms in Parliament by recalling those legislators who were affected by the decision. The MPP delegates were addressed by the defence and security minister and commander-in-chief of Kopkamtib, General Moerdani, who rejected the allegations that any of the PDI leaders had a communist background, and implied that such accusations stemmed from people who had vested interests in making the party look suspicious. At the MPP session, the general urged the party to take firm actions against any elements that tried to harm the party’s unity, and said that Kopkamtib appreciated the PDI leaders’ efforts to maintain unity in the party.

Moerdani’s rejection of the allegations that the PDI leaders had communist associations was significant because, as we have seen, the renewed anti-communist campaign had been initiated by Moerdani himself earlier the same year, and as the head of Kopkamtib he was also responsible for its implementation. Further demonstrating the government’s support for Soerjadi, Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini also addressed the delegates and said that the government only recognised the central board under Soerjadi.

Strengthened by this firm support from the government and from the MPP delegates, the party’s central board, in mid-August, issued the request for 11 members, including all seven members of the reshuffle group, to be recalled from Parliament, and also for an additional four members from the party’s MPR faction to be recalled. One of the leaders of the dissident group, former East Java chairman Marsoesi, reacted by accusing Soerjadi of being involved in an anti-Suharto conspiracy, and by accusing both Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto of having been members of a communist youth organisation in the 1960s. He also charged that the legislators were recalled because they had supported
Sudharmono’s election as vice-president earlier in the year. Marsoesi vowed to send a letter to the president with his complaints. If he did so, however, he failed to win the president’s support, and in December 1988, after the president had granted his approval, all 11 members of Parliament were replaced. The four members of the MPR were also recalled, but two of those were transferred to Parliament.

The expelled group of dissidents, however, continued to attack Soerjadi and the party leadership and to accuse them of being communist sympathisers. In 1988, a retired army intelligence officer, Soegiarso Soerojo, had published a highly controversial book entitled *Siapa Menabur Angin akan Menuai Badai: G-30-S dan Peran Bung Karno* (Whoever sows the wind will reap the hurricane: G-30-S and the role of Sukarno), which argued that Sukarno had been a Marxist and even implied that the former president had masterminded the 30 September 1965 coup attempt. Soegiarso reportedly said that he had been inspired to finish the book when he saw the PDI’s spectacular mass rally in Jakarta on the final day of the 1987 election campaign. The rally, in which the PDI masses had turned Jakarta red with the party’s colour, reminded the author of the outlawed Communist Party. The implied associations between the PDI and the Communist Party prompted Soerjadi to denounce any similarities, even symbolic, between the two parties. At the PDI’s 16th anniversary in January 1989, he said:

> The PDI’s symbol completely originates from the sacred Garuda Pancasila [the state coat of arms symbolising the five principles of *Pancasila*], the colours of the PDI also completely originate from the Garuda Pancasila which we hold in high esteem. In truth, the red colour and the black of the PDI are not derived from Russia or China, the red and black of the PDI do not originate from England or America; because indeed, the red and black of the PDI are taken only from the soil and culture of Indonesia itself, the red and black of the PDI have been dug up from the colours of the Garuda Pancasila.

This denouncement was turned around by Soerjadi’s foes, who claimed that his statement had communist connotations, and that Soerjadi’s alleged claim that the ‘red of the PDI was the red of Pancasila’ ran counter to the unitary spirit of *Pancasila*. In March 1989, at least nine separate delegations claiming to represent the aspirations of various provincial PDI chapters visited the party’s central headquarters in Jakarta, demanding the resignation of Soerjadi and the holding of a party congress to restore the unity of the party. The protesters also
denounced Soerjadi’s use of the concept *wong cilik*, because of its alleged connotations of class struggle and communist ideology. Although Marsoesi, who emerged as the primary spokesman for the Group of 17, claimed that his group had nothing to do with these actions, which he called spontaneous, he admitted that their aspirations were in line with those of the Group of 17. At least one of the delegations, that from East Java, spent the night in Marsoesi’s Jakarta residence, indicating that the former East Java chairman was involved in the new protests against the party leadership. In early April, the protests continued, and the Group of 17 apparently took the initiative to form a National Committee for Saving the PDI (Panitia Nasional Penyelamat PDI), which demanded that an extraordinary party congress be held as soon as possible. The main complaint against the party leaders appeared to be over their allegedly authoritarian leadership. ‘Our party is regarded as a company, and they [Soerjadi and his associates] are the directors’, Dudy Singadilaga said at a meeting of the new committee. Another of the ousted PDI members, Jusuf Merukh, urged the committee’s members to seek the support of their respective local authorities in order for the anti-Soerjadi movement to gain momentum.91

The next major action of the Group of 17 came in December 1989, when around 100 people who claimed to be PDI cadres led by Dudy Singadilaga entered the PDI’s central headquarters in Jakarta and occupied the building for seven hours, before the police, on Soerjadi’s demand, ousted them. During this time, Dudy issued two decisions on the party’s formal letterhead, which claimed to nullify the decision to expel the eight rebels, including himself, and to establish a committee to organise an extraordinary congress. Dudy said that he was sure that the government would support the move to organise the congress, and in the wake of the action there were indeed indications that the government’s support for Soerjadi now was less solid than a year earlier. Although Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini denounced the seizure of the building as unconstitutional, he urged the party leadership to hold a dialogue with some of the occupiers, and he said that he would support the holding of an extraordinary congress if it was in accordance with the party’s statutes.92 These statutes ruled that an extraordinary congress could be called at the request of the central board or of at least half of the party’s local branches.93 Since the Group of 17 had no support within the party’s central board, they seem to have concentrated their efforts on gathering enough support from the local branches for bringing about an extraordinary congress.

In the wake of the occupation of the party’s headquarters in December, other government officials also urged the party to settle its disputes through
deliberation, reinforcing the impression that the government’s support for Soerjadi was waning. There were even rumours that the dispute in the party was fuelled by elements outside the party, forcing Defence and Security Minister Benny Moerdani in early 1991 to deny that the government had anything to do with the dispute.\(^94\)

The Group of 17 failed, however, to gather enough support among the party’s branches to launch a formal request for an extraordinary congress. In early June 1991, the group consequently changed its tactics, now arguing instead that it was necessary to hold a congress to elect a new leadership, because the term in office for the incumbent board had allegedly expired on 2 May 1991. The claim was rejected by Soerjadi, who said that the current board held office until the next congress, which, according to a decision apparently taken at the 1986 congress, would be held only in April 1993, after the 1992 general elections and the March 1993 MPR session.\(^95\) The decision was motivated by the need to change the congress cycle in order for the elected party leaders to get more time to prepare for the elections. The issue gave rise to much confusion about what actually had been decided at the congress and whether the central board’s term in office extended up until the time for the next congress or had already expired because the board had allegedly only been appointed for five years, regardless of when the next congress was to be held. Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini appeared to support the immediate holding of a congress, and he said that his predecessor, Supardjo Rustam, in 1986 had only appointed Soerjadi’s central board for the period 1986–91. In early June 1991, however, he also said that a congress needed to be held that same month, because with the 1992 general election approaching, the government would not grant permission for any socio-political organisation to hold a congress between July 1991 and the elections. This restriction raised the stakes in the conflict, and on 13 June, several hundred supporters of the Group of 17 demonstrated at the Parliament and demanded that the government rescind the legality of Soerjadi’s central board and that a party congress be held immediately. The scramble for the party leadership then further intensified when the former PDI chairman Isnaeni, accompanied by three other senior party leaders, all of whom were members of the party’s largely ceremonial Central Advisory Council, Deperpu (Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat), met Rudini and demanded that the party’s central board be enlarged to include the members of Deperpu.\(^96\) This intensification of the conflict over party leadership was related to the upcoming election, or more specifically, to the upcoming nomination of candidates for Parliament, which was the prerogative of the
central board. Marsoesi admitted as much when he said that he was worried that if the congress were to be held in 1993, Soerjadi’s people would dominate the party’s candidates for Parliament. If, by contrast, the congress were to be held in 1991, the Group of 17 could be rehabilitated and they could take control over the central board. ‘Of course, Soerjadi’s people will not be discarded, but their positions will be quite subordinated’, he said.97

Soerjadi’s adversaries continued to contest the party leadership even after the government’s deadline for holding a congress had passed, apparently trying to cause enough upheaval to provoke government intervention and the appointment of a new party leadership. In mid-July, two supporters of the Group of 17, Eddy Sukirman and Agung Iman Sumanto, claimed that they had been kidnapped and beaten by Soerjadi’s supporters, allegedly on the orders of Soerjadi and the chairman of the party’s Jakarta chapter, Alex Asmasoebrata. Marsoesi said the action resembled the methods of the PKI and hoped that the incident would prompt the government to intervene in the party dispute. Soerjadi, however, claimed that the Group of 17 had masterminded the issue. Then at the end of August 1991, a number of senior PDI politicians set up a rival central board chaired by Achmad Subagyo, a member of the original Group of 17 and one of the legislators who had been recalled three years earlier. Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini immediately denounced the board as illegal, and in December he firmly rejected its call to hold an extraordinary congress, despite the rival board’s unsubstantiated claim that it had gathered the support of 200 out of the party’s approximately 300 district branches.98 By this time the PDI leadership under Soerjadi had already submitted their list of candidates for Parliament to the General Elections Institute, LPU, and the internal dispute in the PDI subsided for the time being, only to emerge again after the 1992 election.

The conflict between the central board under Soerjadi and the Group of 17 was all but void of any substantial political or ideological differences. During the four years between the end of 1987 and 1991, the Group of 17 brought up several allegations against Soerjadi and the other PDI leaders, accusing them of fuelling anti-religious sentiments, of being communist sympathisers, of conspiring to topple Suharto and of being anti-Pancasila. Most of these accusations lacked substance, and the Soerjadi group generally did not even find it worthwhile to counter or try to disprove the allegations. The thrust of the allegations indicated that the main strategy of the Group of 17 was to try to gain the sympathy and backing of the government and military authorities in its struggle against Soerjadi. The dissidents apparently had less support in the
party than Soerjadi and the central board, and government intervention thus appeared to be their main chance of regaining their positions and influence in the party. The government did not support the renegade group, but neither did the government, except during the first months of the conflict in 1988 and at the end of 1991, unambiguously denounce their demands and activities. Although there is little evidence of direct government or military involvement in the party’s conflict, the fact that the dissident group was allowed to continue to hold meetings, demonstrations and other activities, at times gaining much publicity, showed that the authorities had some interest in keeping at least a small-scale conflict alive in the party. The government’s main reason for allowing the conflict to go on was probably to intimidate Soerjadi and the other PDI leaders by continually reminding them that the government at any time could shift its support to their opponents and have them deposed from the party leadership, should they become too confrontational or otherwise transgress the limits of acceptable political behaviour.

The allegation that Soerjadi’s and Nico Daryanto’s leadership was authoritarian seems to have been the most substantial allegation against the party leaders, one which continued to be a main complaint throughout the four years. As we have seen, Soerjadi consistently refused to discuss or seek a compromise with the dissidents, in spite of many exhortations by leading government and military officials to deliberate and seek a consensus to end the bickering. The Group of 17 had also from the outset taken a confrontational stance towards the party leadership, and their announcement of a reshuffled central board in the end of March 1988 was a clear breach of party statutes. Such behaviour would justify firm disciplinary action in most organisations, and Soerjadi appeared to have the support of the majority of the party’s leaders and cadres. Nevertheless, those who were expelled or demoted within the party naturally felt that they had been mistreated. As mentioned, most of the members of the Group of 17 were elder politicians who had been active in the PDI since its foundation in 1973 and even in the PNI before that, and they felt they were being discarded with no regard or respect for the work and commitment which they had put into the party over the years. As in most earlier disputes in the party, the main reasons for the drawn-out conflict between Soerjadi and the Group of 17 were personal interests and animosities coupled to the struggle for influence in the party. Because there were no fundamental ideological or political differences between the two camps, the struggle over party leadership appears, more than anything else, to have been related to a scramble for positions, especially in Parliament. The attraction of these posi-
tions lay in their material rewards and relatively high status, rather than in any illusion that they gave real influence in national politics.

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS AHEAD OF THE 1992 ELECTION

The Parliament was widely and generally correctly perceived to be a rubber stamp for the government throughout the New Order, especially after Golkar’s and the government’s success in the 1971 election. The mostly uncritical and compliant assembly never initiated legislation, and its views and deliberations rarely influenced government policy. Cynics alleged that its members adhered to the principle of ‘5 D’, that is, datang, duduk, diam, dengar, duit, which means ‘come, sit, be quiet, listen, [take the] money’.99

In the context of keterbukaan, however, there were some signs that the government wanted the Parliament to play a more active role. In October 1991, Suharto said that Parliament was not forbidden to be vocal or to criticise the government. What was forbidden, according to the president, was to try to change the system or to replace Pancasila with another ideology. ‘So, it is OK to criticise, it is not forbidden. It is even their [the members of Parliament] task to perform [the function of] control. Point out what is wrong, if indeed it is known to be wrong. If it is not yet known, ask why it is like this’, Suharto said.100 In February 1992, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Sudomo also lashed out at the Parliament for not using its authority to control the government. He especially cited the Parliament’s failure to investigate the Dili massacre in November 1991 in which troops shot dead probably between 100 and 200 demonstrators in the East Timorese capital. Sudomo also criticised the legislators for their lack of initiative and expertise, lamenting that the government needed to get more input from the Parliament.101 One of the PDI’s legislators, Budi Hardjono, responded to Sudomo’s criticism by saying that the government seemed to fear that a stronger and more independent Parliament might undermine its power. He also said that the Parliament had frequently asked the government to provide funds for the House to employ permanent staff of expertise in different areas, but that the government had never agreed to those requests.102 As Harold Crouch has observed, during the keterbukaan trend, Parliament in general came to play a more active role, with Golkar and military representatives being especially prominent in raising issues critical of the government.103
As the 1992 general election approached, the PDI also began to appear more vocal in Parliament. The party’s greater assertiveness in the legislature was demonstrated in January 1992 in connection with the discussions of the state budget for the fiscal year 1992–93. One of PDI’s legislators and a member of the parliamentary budget commission, Aberson Marle Sihaloho, quoted senior economist Professor Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, who, according to Aberson, had estimated that leakages in the current budget for the fiscal year 1991–92 amounted to 30 per cent. Aberson complained that the government did not release detailed figures for the individual budget posts, which made it difficult for the Parliament to control and supervise the government’s budget implementation. He said that he had asked the government to give detailed budget figures, but that the executive had responded that it was not capable of breaking down the budget in more detail. Aberson concluded that the government feigned incapacity in order to be able to move funds between different sectors or sub-sectors. The budget did not even contain figures for the projected spending by individual departments. At the end of February, Parliament unanimously passed the bill, but the PDI protested against the lack of discussion between the government and Parliament in preparing the bill. The party faction’s statement said that, according to the constitution, Parliament should be invested with more power and authority than the government in the budget formulation process, but that this provision had not been effectively implemented under the New Order. The faction also called for the establishment of an independent audit agency to monitor state finances. The existing Finance and Development Audit Agency, BPKP (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan), the statement said, did not fulfil the requirement of the constitution because, being a government body, the BPKP could not conduct independent audits.

In January 1992, four months ahead of the general election, Kwik intensified his crusade against corruption by presenting an 18-page draft for a new economic competition law. Already two months earlier, in November 1991, he had reiterated the call for more detailed regulation of monopoly rights. Specifically, Kwik said that it was contrary to the public interest if monopolies were granted by the government to private businesses or organisations without basis in the law. The call for monopoly rights to be established by law, thus requiring the approval of the Parliament rather than by presidential decree, was a direct attack on the cronyism and nepotism surrounding the president. In the end of January 1992, Kwik presented the draft legislation, which included anti-monopoly and anti-trust provisions based on Dutch and American models.
The drafting by a political party of a proposed law was unusual in the political history of the New Order, under which the Parliament had never used its constitutional right to initiate legislation. According to Kwik, the draft was also an answer to calls for improvements in the quality of party politics and for the parties to compete with concrete political programs.\textsuperscript{108}

The political sensitivity of the issue forced Litbang to cancel its scheduled press conference at the Hotel Sahid Jaya Jakarta, since permission to hold the meeting was withheld by the Central Jakarta Police District. Eventually, after the matter had passed through the National Police Headquarters, the director-general of social and political affairs and the chief of the nominally civilian intelligence body Bakin, permission was granted, and on 18 February the press conference could go ahead. In the media reporting, however, the contents of the draft bill was largely overshadowed by the troubles of getting permission for the press meeting, and Kwik later expressed his disappointment with the media coverage about the proposal.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, Kwik was pessimistic about the prospects for the bill in Parliament. In order even to have the bill discussed in the legislature, the PDI would need the support of at least one more faction in Parliament. Representatives of all the other three factions declared that they were unlikely to support such a move. Golkar’s Secretary General Rachmat Witoelar suspected that the PDI’s drafting of the law proposal was just a ‘political move’ (\textit{move politik}). ‘If it is a political move, we will balance it off in order that the draft legislation does not reach its target’, he said.\textsuperscript{110} On the same line, the chairman of Golkar’s parliamentary faction, Jacob Tobing, said that his faction would not support the bill because doing so would only benefit the PDI. The military’s parliamentary faction was not prepared to support the draft legislation either, citing the heavy workload of the legislature during its last eight months in office as the reason.\textsuperscript{111} The PPP leader, Ismail Hasan Metareum, who had replaced former chairman Naro at the party’s congress in 1989, said that his party would take a look at the draft before deciding whether or not to support it. ‘We can not support it just like that. That is buying a pig in a poke, is it not’, he said. The PPP chairman also mentioned that the PDI had failed to support a draft prepared by the PPP 13 years earlier about the administrative structure of the newly established province of East Timor, thereby indicating that his party would be unlikely to support the PDI’s new draft.\textsuperscript{112}

The PDI’s failure to get the support of any other faction meant that the bill was never presented to the Parliament for consideration. For all the rhetoric about \textit{musyawarah}, \textit{gotong-royong} and the family principle, tactical political reasons seem to have been the overriding concern of the other factions. Golkar
openly declared that it rejected deliberation of the proposal because doing so might benefit the PDI. Although the PPP did not say so openly, the party’s underlying reasons to reject the proposal were probably similar to those of Golkar, that is, fears that a discussion about the draft might benefit the PDI. This consideration was all the more central with the general election only a few months away. In this context, commitment to the ideals of *Pancasila* democracy, with its emphasis on deliberation, appeared to be rather shallow and real political considerations instead took precedence.

**CONCLUSIONS**

A central element in the New Order’s political culture was the adherence to *Pancasila* democracy, which prescribed that decisions primarily be taken through *musyawarah* in order to reach a *mufakat*. The political developments in relation to the PDI between 1987 and 1992, however, demonstrate that the commitment in practice to this form for decision-making was a far cry from the rhetorical commitment. Whether we look at the internal conflicts in the party or the party’s interaction with external actors, there is little sign in the developments reviewed here that any effective deliberation ever took place. In the MPR, the Parliament and the PDI itself, those who were in power, generally by virtue of their institutional position or proximity to outside powers, such as the president, the government or the military, made little effort to participate in any deliberation to reach a consensus and, more often than not, ignored or rejected outright the calls of other forces for deliberation. In accordance with the prevailing authoritarian interpretation of *Pancasila* democracy, those other forces were expected to yield to those with more influence and resign themselves to a consensus dictated by those in power. To the extent that the weaker side did not comply, they were met with suspicion, exclusion, rejection, expulsion or coercion until they complied. In this uncompromising political climate, opportunism and the assertion of self and group interests were the main characteristic features, although they were cloaked in a rhetoric of high ideas of national unity and integrity, *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, the family principle and *gotong-royong*, all embodied in the concept of *Pancasila* democracy. This rhetoric served, albeit unconvincingly, to transmute compliance and accommodation into political virtues, and the sacrifice of political aspirations and principles into something of a *noblesse oblige*.

In this political culture, there was little point in conducting any substantial discussions of concrete political problems or policies. In general, such issues
appear to have been second in importance to the achieving or preservation of institutional power that gave access to the allocation of lucrative and status-filled positions. Access to those positions depended much more on personal connections and the support of influential patrons than on political competence or voter legitimacy. As a consequence, political discussions were often lacking in substance and detailed arguments and, with a few notable exceptions, politicians rarely seemed to possess either knowledge, intellectual capability, personal integrity or commitment to their ideas and ideals.

During the period, the PDI made some effort to challenge the predominant political culture, an effort which, at least in the short term, seems primarily to have been aimed at increasing the party’s popularity ahead of the 1992 election. As part of a conscious strategy to assert its autonomy, the PDI – particularly as represented by Litbang – began to develop a more independent political platform with policy suggestions, particularly concerning economic policies, different from those of the government. As we have seen, the PDI had a relatively high level of knowledge and expertise in those areas, particularly through Kwik Kian Gie. Moreover, at least superficially, economic policies appeared to be less controversial than many other issues, such as political and social problems, and the regime apparently allowed somewhat more leeway for criticism of the government’s economic policies compared with other, more sensitive areas. The PDI skilfully exploited this opportunity to criticise the prevailing conditions as well as government policies, often focusing on inadequacies in the government’s implementation of the constitution or on the government’s failure to look after the economic interests of the nation and the majority of the population. Such criticism thus allowed the PDI to challenge the hegemonic political culture through criticising those in power from their own premises, accusing them, both implicitly and explicitly, of disregarding the highly regarded principles that they claimed to uphold.

The PDI’s attempts to challenge the regime during the years between the 1987 and 1992 elections, however, met with little concrete success. The party’s proposals, as well as its efforts to improve its capacity for policy making, were generally met with suspicion, disregard or outright rejection, as demonstrated by leading Golkar and government officials’ reactions to the suggestion of forming a shadow cabinet, the formation of the YPDI, Litbang’s advertising campaign and the fate of the draft economic competition legislation. The policy and legislation suggestions of the PDI largely aimed at increasing transparency and putting increased checks on the government in its handling of state finances. Such measures, however, would have been detrimental to the
political and economic interests of those in power and to the president's patronage networks, which were an important source of his power. Because of these obvious implications, there was no interest from the government, or from most politicians who directly or indirectly depended on the support of the government for their political survival, in even discussing the PDI's proposals.

NOTES


2 In 1964, Sukarno reportedly tried to have Benny Moerdani, then a major, marry one of his daughters, presumably Megawati; see Pour (1993: 201) and McIntyre (1997: 4–5). In January 1993, Benny Moerdani also attended a private reception for Guruh's 40th birthday; see Kompas (14 January 1993). Nico Daryanto said that he knew Benny Moerdani long before he became the PDI secretary general, although he claimed that they had no special relationship apart from attending the same church in South Jakarta; see Tiara (29 August 1993).


4 Jakarta Post (8 September 1986).

5 E.g. Tempo (13 September 1986) and Suryadinata (1989: 131).


8 On the military's dislike of Sudharmono, see Vatikiotis (1993: 84–85), and on the conflict between the military and the politico-bureaucrats, see Robison (1986) and (1993).

9 Jakarta Post (22 May 1987).

10 Hein (1989); see also Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1989 Yearbook (1989: 132) on the greater openness in the lead-up to the 1988 MPR session. The case for believing that keterbukaan began in 1989 is argued, for example, by Lane (1991) and Bertrand (1996: 325).

11 The article was entitled 'Aspiring to Normal Politics' and published in the Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April 1989). Shortly after its publication, Soemitro's call was reinforced by the outgoing United States ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, and was subsequently boosted by the public support of several leading military figures. Keterbukaan was eventually, in August 1990, endorsed by President Suharto, although the president remained ambiguous about its implications; see Bertrand (1996: 326) and Lane (1991: passim). In a later interview with Time (8 April 1991), the president indicated that he resented Wolfowitz's advocacy of more openness, saying that after his call in May 1989, the 'issue has become a political issue that has been intensified and aggravated.'
Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92)

12 Bertrand (1996), Vatikiotis (1993) and Lane (1991) have made similar analyses.
13 See Romano (1996) and Hanazaki (1998) for the keterbukaan trend. The period of openness ended in mid-1994, when the government banned the country’s leading news weekly Tempo and two other publications and subsequently restricted the scope of permissible political discussion. By this time, Suharto had already begun firmly to reassert his grip on the military, and the struggle between the president and the Moerdani group in the military, which had been the raison d’être for the more open political climate from 1987, was no longer relevant; see The Editors (1995: 104–105) for the changes in the military.

14 Jakarta Post (23 May 1987).
15 Jakarta Post (2 October 1987 and 27 October 1987).
16 Jakarta Post (27 October 1987).
17 Kompas (19 November 1987) and Jakarta Post (19 November 1987).
19 For the proceedings of the 1988 MPR, see Keppres 15/1984, GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) dan Ketetapan MPR 1988 (1988).
21 Lane (1991: 26). See also MacIntyre (1990) about the political implications of the rise of conglomerates.
23 Kompas (19 February 1988).
24 Pelita (25 November 1987) and Sukamto et al. (1991: 58–59). Nico’s proposal appears to have been a reaction to the PPP’s controversial proposal that religious education be made compulsory at all levels, from kindergarten to university; see EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 2 (1988: 6).
25 Suara Pembaruan (9 January 1988) and Jakarta Post (2 December 1987 and 22 January 1988).
26 5 Undang-undang Baru di Bidang Politik serta Peraturan-peraturan Pelaksana-annya: PP. No. 35/1985 - PP. No. 36/1985 (1985: 36). The demand that the elections be conducted honestly and fairly was also inscribed in the PDI’s party program adopted at the 1986 congress; see Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 36).
27 Jakarta Post (22 January 1988 and 9 March 1988) and EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 2 (1988: 5–6). The PPP also forced a vote in the commission preparing the GBHN about its proposal to strengthen religious education and the separation of Javanese mysticism, Kejawen, from the ministry of religion. The party lost this vote as well, by 288 to 30. In 1978, the voting had also concerned the position of Kejawen; see Haris (1991: 46).
28 Jakarta Post (11 March 1988).
29 E.g. Mackie (1989: 13–14) and EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 2 (1988: 7); see further the discussion in chapter 7 below.
30 Article eight, 1945 Constitution.
31 The main justification for the president’s influence over the selection of the vice-
president seemed to be a 1973 MPR decree, which ruled that the vice-president
must be able to cooperate with the president; see further the discussion below in
chapter 8.
33 Lane (1991: 11).
34 See Goodfellow (1995: 23–25) about the campaign against Sudharmono and his
associates. The terms were not completely new, however, as they were used in
connection with an internal strife in the PPP before the 1987 election; see Tempo
(10 January 1987).
Naro’s background and reputation.
37 Angkatan Bersenjata (1 October 1987).
38 E.g. Suara Pembaruan (8 March 1988) and Antara (9 March 1988). A similar
position has been advocated by the Islamic scholar Nurcholish Madjid (1995: 197).
39 Interview by the author, Jakarta (14 March 1997).
40 Morfit (1986).
41 Ramage (1995: 178–180) cites both Soerjadi and Kwik Kian Gie as committed
proponents of consensual decision-making, but he fails to problematise the proper
role of voting in the system, or any other mechanisms for resolving more
fundamental differences in the context of Pancasila democracy. The PDI’s
commitment to the process of musyawarah in order to reach a mufakat, as
interpreted by Ramage, appears mainly to relate to situations in which there are no
fundamental lines of division or conflict. As Nico Daryanto’s views, cited above,
instead indicate, acceptance of the musyawarah/mufakat model was more related
to the constellations of power – backed by coercion – than by any cultural
disposition for consensual decision-making.
42 Kompas (24 October 1987).
43 Suara Pembaruan (3 March 1988).
44 Kwik Kian Gie, for example, mentioned these as leaders who all fulfilled the criteria
for becoming vice-president; Jakarta Post (10 March 1988).
45 Suara Pembaruan (3 March 1988) and Tempo (12 March 1988). See also the
editorial in Jakarta Post (28 March 1988) for the disappointment with the PDI’s
performance in the MPR.
46 Lane (1991: 12 n. 18).
47 EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 2 (1988: 7–8). See also Jakarta Post (8 March
1993) about Saleh’s interruption.
Of the party’s legislators, only eight were retained from the 1982–87 delegation; see Sukamto et al. (1991: 82–83) for lists of the members of the two delegations.

In spite of the September 1986 decision, several legislators who had already served two terms were nominated as candidates for Parliament for the PDI in 1987, apparently as vote-getters. Three of these were elected but refused to withdraw from their parliamentary positions, and after government mediation the three were allowed to take up their parliamentary seats on 1 October 1987; see Kompas (12 September 1986 and 22 August 1987).

Pelita (25 February 1988).

Jawa Pos (14 April 1992) and Jakarta Post (19 August 1988).


For the advertisement, see e.g. Merdeka (29 November 1990). The other four Jakarta newspapers were Kompas, Suara Pembaruan, Jayakarta and Media Indonesia, and the regional newspapers were Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung), Kedaulatan Rakyat (Yogyakarta), Suara Merdeka (Semarang), Jawa Pos (Surabaya) and Waspada (Medan); see Tempo (23 December 1990) for a report about the advertising campaign.

See e.g. Pelita (1 December 1990 and 4 December 1990), Suara Pembaruan (3 December and 5 December 1990), Suara Karya (5 December and 6 December 1990) and Angkatan Bersenjata (5 December 1990) for some official reactions to Litbang’s advertisements.

Tempo (26 January 1991).

Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).

Interview by the author, Jakarta (14 March 1997).


This impression is gathered from press reports and the campaign speeches collected in Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993b). Moreover, neither Sukamto et al. (1991) nor Ward (1994) mention the term in connection with the party’s 1987 election campaign. Halawa (1993: 44) first refers to Soerjadi’s use of the term in 1988. Brooks (1995: 76) mentions the term in connection with the PDI’s 1987 election campaign, but she seems to employ the term analytically to summarise the party’s campaign themes, and she does not claim that the party used the explicit term in the campaign.

Sukamto et al. (1991: 10).


Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

67 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993b: 115–116). The first paragraph of article 33 of the constitution reads 'The economy shall be organised as a common venture based on the family principle'.


69 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1991: 71). The passage seems to have been adapted from a critical statement of the 1988 Broad Outlines of State Policy, which stated that there existed a 'small layer of society with a very strong economic position and which controls most of the national economic life'; Keppres 15/1984, GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) dan Ketetapan MPR 1988 (1988: 91). The Broad Outlines, however, did not specifically mention the conglomerates in the context.

70 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1991: 68 and 70–71). The current tax system consisted of three progressive levels, with a maximum level of 35 per cent.

71 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1991: 70). Rather than channelling the bottom-up aspirations and interests of workers, the SPSI was a hierarchical and centralised organisation under government control and devised to control the industrial workforce; see MacIntyre (1994b: 9) and Hadiz (1997: passim).

72 Jakarta Post (7 August 1991).
73 Jakarta Post (9 August 1991).
75 Sukamto et al. (1991: 60–61).
79 Tempo (16 April 1988 and 18 June 1988).
80 According to the party's in-house rules, the MPP consisted of the members of the central board, the chairmen of the party's provincial chapters, up to five elected representatives of each province, special delegates appointed by the central board and the leaders of the party's delegations in the country's highest assemblies; Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 178). In 1988, the MPP reportedly comprised around 200 members; Jakarta Post (22 July 1988).
82 Jakarta Post (27 July 1988).
83 Tempo (6 August 1988).
84 Jakarta Post (16 August 1988).
85 Kompas (6 December 1988) and Jakarta Post (15 December 1988).
Openness and the Turn to Opposition (1987–92)


87 Tempo (11 March 1989).

88 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993b: 120–121). According to Tempo (11 March 1989), however, Soerjadi said that the black of the PDI is not derived from (the Iranian leader) Khomeini or the Middle East. It is uncertain whether Tempo misquoted the chairman, or if the manuscript for the speech was corrected when published by the PDI’s central board in 1993. The ensuing controversy, however, did not concern the party colours’ relation to Islam or the West, but rather their relation to communism and Pancasila.

89 Tempo (11 March 1989).

90 Tempo (11 March 1989 and 8 April 1989).

91 Tempo (8 April 1989).

92 Tempo (23 December 1989) and Suara Pembaruan (29 December 1989).


95 See Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 75) for the decision. Soerjadi’s foes, however, alleged that the decision had been forged; see Tempo (15 June 1991).


97 Tempo (15 June 1991).


99 A sixth ‘D’, daftar (register), or dengkur (snore), was sometimes added to the five cited above. See also Azhar (1997: 109–122) on the weakness of the Parliament.

100 Kompas (8 October 1991).

101 Jakarta Post (13 February 1992). In 1989, Sudomo, by contrast, implied that the government was generally uninterested in the input from the legislature. ‘The House may question government policies and give alternative proposals, but the government doesn’t have to accept them because it has its own considerations’, he said, as quoted by the Jakarta Post (16 May 1989). For the Dili massacre, see Feith (1992).

102 Jakarta Post (14 February 1992).


104 Tempo (11 January 1992). The government-appointed head of the Finance and Development Audit Agency, BPKP, Gandhi, by contrast, estimated budget leakages at less than 1 per cent.


106 Jakarta Post (28 February 1992). The press report refers to article 22 of the constitution as the relevant passage, but it should in fact be article 23. The first paragraph of the latter article, however, only required the state budget to be
decided by law (that is, passed by Parliament) and did not explicitly give more authority to the Parliament compared with the government in budgetary affairs. The article also provided for the establishment of an auditing body, the Financial Auditing Agency, BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), which was to report to the Parliament.

110 Tempo (8 February 1992).
111 Jakarta Post (19 February 1992) and Tempo (8 February 1992).
112 Tempo (8 February 1992).
MILITARY RAPPROCHEMENT

In accordance with the doctrine of the dual function, the military, as a nationally unifying force, was supposed to be politically neutral and to stand above electoral and party politics. Military personnel were consequently not allowed to vote in the general elections, and the military’s task in the ‘festival of democracy’ was instead to act as catalyst and facilitator for the three election contestants, and to maintain order and security. The proclaimed political neutrality of the armed forces was, however, somewhat ambiguous because of the historical and personal links between Golkar and the military. In earlier New Order elections, the military had overtly supported Golkar in the election campaigns, but in the 1987 election, the military’s support for Golkar had been less conspicuous and the principle of political neutrality had been relatively better upheld than in earlier elections. This strategy, which was linked to General Moerdani and the rift between the Golkar leadership and the military, was continued in 1992, and after the election the military was widely praised for its neutral behaviour.¹

As in the 1982 and 1987 elections, however, there were reports that sections of the military covertly supported the PDI, and there were strong sympathies for the party among retired officers, who were allowed to vote and to take part in electoral politics. In May 1991, Nico Daryanto claimed that hundreds of retired officers from the province of West Java alone had already joined the PDI.² In the same month, a group of PDI leaders, including Soerjadi, Nico Daryanto, Megawati, Taufik Kiemas and Guruh Sukarnoputra, who had joined the PDI earlier in the year, met a group of 30 to 40 retired senior military officers for a ‘courtesy’ event. One of the officers, retired Navy Colonel Bambang Widjanarko, had served as a personal adjutant to former President Sukarno, and several other retired officers who supported the PDI also had links to, or
appeared to feel affection for, the former president. The event, widely reported in the press, lasted for five hours and included a dialogue session during which several of the retired officers expressed their support for the PDI.³

In recruiting retired military officers, the party apparently had the support of Defence and Security Minister Benny Moerdani, who said shortly before the meeting that retired military officers were free to join political parties.⁴ In spite of Moerdani’s apparent attempt to forestall a controversy over the issue, the meeting between the PDI leaders and the group of retired officers sparked reactions from several government and military officials, displaying differing views on whether or not it was appropriate for retired military personnel to join a political party. Retired military officers were required to join the Retired Armed Forces Officers’ Union, Pepabri (Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), an organisation affiliated with Golkar, and they were often expected to support Golkar, financially or otherwise, in the organisation’s election efforts. A leading functionary of Pepabri, retired Brigadier General H. Soetjipto Hadiwasito said in the wake of the meeting that those retired officers who decided to join a political party had already abandoned their seven-fold soldier’s oath (Saptamarga) – the most important oath of which was the commitment to uphold Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution – which is the soul of every member of the military. This statement was denounced by Soerjadi, who objected to the implication that the PDI was anti-Pancasila.⁵ The commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, also indirectly condemned retired officers who joined a political party by saying that the retired officers should know their place, so that the military would remain unified. According to the general, ‘[a]nyone who [retires] from the military knows that his place is in Pepabri. So the problem is not [whether joining a political party is] legal or not legal, but it concerns morals and ethics’.⁶ By contrast, Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini – also a retired general – seemed to take a similar stance to Benny Moerdani, and said shortly after the PDI meeting that retired military officers were free to become members of a political party or Golkar as they chose.⁷

The open support of retired officers for the PDI and the more covert sympathy which the party seemed to enjoy in sections of the active ranks of the military reflected a strong dissatisfaction in the military with Golkar and, more specifically, with President Suharto in the years leading up to the 1992 election. As we have seen, the background to the split between the military and the president was that the influence of the military, since the early 1980s, had begun to wane in favour of cliques of civilian and military politico-bureaucrats bound
together by the president’s patrimonial network of clients in the bureaucracy and private businesses. The expansion of Suharto’s patrimonial network and its reproduction at lower levels in the system was intimately linked to the prevalence of corruption and nepotism, especially in government circles, which also was a source of strong resentment in the military. Many officers appear to have felt strongly that it was time for the ageing Suharto – who turned 70 in 1991 – to step down after the end of his term in 1993. The expectation that the president would step down had also been fuelled by Suharto’s own indication, in his autobiography, published in 1989, that he would not seek re-election beyond 1993.8 As a consequence, Indonesia’s political life became increasingly dominated by the impending presidential succession, which led several analysts to describe Indonesian politics during Suharto’s last decade in power as politics ‘in waiting’.9 With Suharto’s advancing age, a presidential succession inevitably loomed nearer, and in this context, political actors engaged themselves in a double game, trying to achieve short-term goals and benefits while simultaneously positioning themselves for the presidential succession. Open discussion of the succession, meanwhile, was largely suppressed because it was seen as unethical or, more accurately, as an affront to President Suharto, to discuss his departure from the presidential office.10

As the 1992 election approached, it became increasingly clear that Suharto, in spite of the indication in his autobiography that he might retire in 1993, was determined to seek another term in office. In order to achieve this objective, and in order to counter the challenges from the military, the president began to court the country’s Muslims in an attempt to broaden his constituencies. In 1990, the president decided to sponsor the newly formed Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin se-Indonesia), and in accordance with the president’s wishes, his long-standing protégé, Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie, was elected chairman. The president’s sponsoring of ICMI meant that Islam, particularly its modernist streams, gained a much improved standing in national politics, although leading ICMI activists generally understood that Suharto’s sponsoring of the organisation was driven by political motives rather than any newly found piety on the part of the president, who was well known as a follower of Javanese mysticism.11

Among members of the mainstream of the military, ICMI, and modernist Islam in general, were regarded with much suspicion. Habibie, moreover, was possibly even more resented than Sudharmono, largely because of the civilian minister’s influence over military equipment procurements, through which he
was seen as promoting the purchase of expensive technology not particularly suited to the needs of the military. The founding of ICMI and the rising prominence of Habibie – including speculation that Suharto might want to see him elected as vice-president for the period 1993–98 – thus served to alienate the mainstream of the military further from the president and strengthened the notion that it was time for him to step down. In this context, many retired officers apparently came to regard the PDI as a more appropriate vehicle for channelling their political aspirations than Pepabri and Golkar, both of which were certain to support Suharto’s re-election and, if the president so indicated, the election of Habibie as vice-president. At the meeting in May 1991 with Soerjadi, Megawati and Guruh, one of the officers indicated that the upcoming presidential and vice-presidential elections were central considerations when he reminded the PDI leaders about the party’s disappointing performance in the 1988 MPR session. ‘What was it that went wrong so that the PDI did not dare to propose its own candidate? Come on, have some guts. We hope that it will not happen again in the next election’, an unidentified retired officer was quoted by the Suara Pembaruan daily as saying.12

THE SORTING OUT OF CANDIDATES

In spite of the drawn-out conflict between the party’s central board and the Group of 17, the PDI’s prospects for the June 1992 election looked relatively good. Internal fractionalism had failed to bring about a split in the central board, and around half a year before the election, at the end of 1991, the conflict had largely subsided. The party’s regional chapters and local branches were relatively coherent and no major disruptions in the party’s internal consolidation seemed to threaten its election performance. This consolidation was largely a result of the stern tactics employed by the party leadership in facing the Group of 17 and their supporters. The party, moreover, looked set to repeat its 1987 success and capitalise on Sukarno’s charisma, and in 1992 the party managed to field two of the former president’s children as candidates, Megawati and her younger brother Guruh Sukarnoputra. The PDI had also taken steps to improve its quality and capacity for making policy suggestions and programs, and in the years leading up to the 1992 election, the party had on several occasions attracted attention through its frank criticism of the government’s economic policies and of the prevalence of corruption and rent-seeking, not least in the bureaucracy. According to Soerjadi, the party targeted five main groups in its campaign: the poor, women, youth, intellectuals and elder people.13
Overall, the format of the June 1992 election was the same as those of earlier elections under the New Order, with Golkar certain to win the vast majority of the votes. In spite of the general climate of openness, a new measure was introduced ahead of the 1992 election which seemed contradictory to the government's more open attitude towards criticism and policy input from the Parliament. This new measure was the so-called *special investigation*, Litsus (*Penelitian Khusus*), which all prospective candidates for the national and regional parliaments were required to go through before their nominations were submitted to the General Elections Institute, LPU, in September 1991. The Litsus procedure had been established by presidential decree in 1990 and consisted of a written test and oral questioning to assess the prospective candidates' political views and, above all, possible influence from communist ideology, denoted by the term *keterpengaruhan*, meaning 'state of being influenced'. The commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, defined *keterpengaruhan* as 'acting, speaking, writing or showing an attitude in a way which resembles or assists PKI strategy'. In contrast to the earlier concepts of *bersih diri* and *bersih lingkungan*, the narrow direct connection between the events of 1965 and political crime had been broken, and *keterpengaruhan* provided the authorities with – in the words of Robert Cribb – a 'Sword of Damocles', which could be used to implicate just about anybody as being communist and thus subversive, with no substantial evidence needed.

The Litsus investigation was carried out by the Coordinating Agency for National Stability, Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional), the military intelligence body which in 1988 had replaced Kopkamtib. Bakorstanas was a substantially weaker and less independent organisation than Kopkamtib had been. Kopkamtib had been the centre for the anti-communist campaigns aimed at Sudharmono and his supporters around the 1988 MPR session, and was the main source of power for Benny Moerdani in the military after his departure as the armed forces commander-in-chief in February 1988. Although there were other reasons for the restructuring as well, the replacement of Kopkamtib with Bakorstanas served to weaken Moerdani's influence and strengthen the president's personal control over the military. The reorganisation was thus part of the president's efforts to re-establish supreme control over the military, in the context of which he increased his direct involvement in the organisation and implementation of military intelligence operations, including the anti-communist campaigns and the selection of parliamentary candidates.
To undergo the Litsus investigation, the prospective parliamentary candidates had to come to the premises of their respective regional military authorities, where they had to answer a questionnaire which, as observed by Cees van Dijk, 'bore a strong resemblance to a psychological test designed to find out what people really thought about a number of sensitive political issues'. Although the questions were primarily designed to detect communist inclinations, some questions also aimed to detect involvement in or sympathies for other movements considered to be anti-Pancasila, such as extremist Islam and regional separatist organisations, and to assess the prospective candidates' views on sensitive matters such as interethnic and interreligious relations. Some of the questions were more or less straightforward, such as how one had reacted upon hearing the news of the 30 September coup in 1965, and whether any friends or relatives had been involved. Other questions were more complex. One question, for example, read: 'We need much electric power; therefore we need to build a big electric power station. But the special work force needed to build it were indeed involved with the PKI. What is your opinion?'

Government and military officials asserted that Litsus was conducted at the request of the political parties and Golkar, and that the military thus only helped the three election contestants to select high-quality candidates. There was no concrete mention of any such explicit request from any of the three organisations, however, and Golkar appeared especially reluctant to submit its prospective candidates to the investigation. The candidates of the PPP and the PDI finished their Litsus tests in early September, but Golkar delayed the process, forcing a week's postponement of the deadline for submitting the lists of candidates to the General Election Institute. In contrast to Golkar, the PDI took a cooperative and accommodative stance on the Litsus issue, and Soerjadi said that he had not minded going through the examination. The issue was sensitive, however, especially concerning whether the incumbent legislators had to go through the Litsus investigation, because the investigation of legislators implied that the mainly popularly elected Parliament was subordinated to the military.

In spite of Soerjadi's carefree attitude towards Litsus, many of the party's candidates, especially for the regional parliaments, were rejected in the process. The party managed to reverse the rejections of some of the candidates shortly after the Litsus investigation, but it appears that several of them instead were moved to unelectable positions. The PDI, as well as the PPP and Golkar, were also apparently pressured to move more outspoken candidates for Parliament to unelectable places, even though they had passed the Litsus test. In the case of the PDI, such pressure resulted in incumbent legislators Aberson Marle
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

Sihaloho and Budi Hardjono, both of whom, as we have seen, had made critical statements of the government shortly before the election, being moved to less favourable positions on the party’s lists of candidates.21

The nomination of Kwik Kian Gie, who was meant to head the PDI’s Jakarta list was rejected on the grounds that he had failed to register as a voter in time. Kwik and the PDI made efforts to submit the necessary qualifications, and Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini vowed to seek the president’s approval for granting exemption for Kwik. In the middle of September, however, the minister announced that all doors were closed to Kwik,22 apparently because the president had refused to grant the exemption. Kwik himself seemed to acquiesce and thanked Rudini for his efforts:

As we have been able to follow in the mass media, the government and the General Elections Institute with Mr. Rudini as its chairman have already tried very hard to provide an opportunity for me and other citizens who, due to negligence, inattention or mistake, have failed to register themselves in time, so that [we] could still be proposed as voters. However, as also explained by [the director-general of social and political affairs] Mr Harisoegiman, [sic] the technical implications were too complicated. To both of them, I express my deepest gratitude and apologise because [I have] already caused enough trouble.23

The controversy continued in early 1992 over whether or not Kwik would even be allowed to campaign for the PDI, with government officials giving contradictory messages and some officials reportedly pressing the economist to refrain from campaigning. At the end of April, however, it was announced that Kwik would be allowed to campaign.24

In the introduction of the Litsus procedure, as well as in the rejection of Kwik’s candidacy, the president’s covert involvement was discernible. Whereas the president paid lip service to keterbukaan and acknowledged that Parliament had a legitimate task in controlling the executive, in practice the president’s control over the legislature increased, as he now took a more direct role, compared with earlier elections, in sorting out critical or otherwise unwanted candidates. Through various methods – Litsus, the raising of procedural difficulties and the application of pressure on the election contestants – vocal prospective candidates for Parliament were deprived of their right to stand for election. The overhanging threat of being implicated as communist or in other ways subversive functioned to coerce those who were rejected into accepting their fate.

For those candidates who passed the Litsus investigation, Bakorstanas issued a recommendation to the police authorities, who subsequently issued a
'certificate of non-involvement' to the nominees. This letter was then submitted to the General Elections Institute, LPU, headed by the minister of internal affairs, which then performed the so-called screening (skrining) of the candidates, considering their formal qualifications and, once again, political sympathies and ideological commitment. This process, although enigmatic, appears to have been similar to those of earlier elections under the New Order. One of the objectives of the screening process was to ensure that the prospective candidates fulfilled a number of formal criteria, which were regulated in General Elections Law. These included belief in one God, being able to speak and read Indonesian in Roman script, having at least upper primary schooling, and being committed to *Pancasila*, the proclamation of independence, the 1945 Constitution and the national Revolution of independence.25 In December 1991, the LPU announced the temporary list of candidates. Of the 2,400 names submitted by Golkar and the political parties, 117 candidates, mostly from the PPP, were rejected on the grounds that they allegedly did not fulfil one or several of the conditions. In January 1992, the temporary lists of candidates were posted in all villages and urban neighbourhoods around the country for one month, during which anyone could submit objections to the proposed candidates, citing their reasons for those objections.26 The objections could concern just about anything, including allegations of communist involvement or other anti-*Pancasila* sympathies, as well as personal conduct such as infidelity or non-marital cohabitation. In earlier instances, according to Pierre Labrousse, the result had often been that the candidates thus accused quietly withdrew their candidacies, for example citing health reasons or other personal circumstances.27 Whereas the PPP had suffered most heavily in the screening process, the PDI’s candidates were the subject of the majority of the 539 complaints which the General Elections Institute received,28 possibly because of the internal conflict in the party in the preceding years. Only three of those complaints, however, led to the rejection of the candidates concerned, though all of those belonged to the PDI. In early April 1992, around a month before the start of the election campaign, the final lists of candidates for the elections were announced by the General Elections Institute.29

**REREVIVING SUKARNO**

The fears, or in some quarters hopes, that the PDI would revive Sukarno’s leftist teachings and policies had not been realised after the PDI’s successful use of the
former president’s image in the 1987 election. Megawati’s membership in Parliament had little significance, as she was often absent and rarely took part in debates or deliberations. One of her more hostile biographers, Ahmad Bahar, even described her as a ‘woman who was weak, meek and plain’ (wanita yang lemah, lembut dan polos). Regardless of whether this description is apt or not, Megawati was little seen or heard in the media or public discussions during the parliamentary term 1987–92. Although she was a member of Litbang, she does not appear to have been an active policy thinker, nor did she belong to the inner circle of the party leadership. The PDI, moreover, was not particularly prominent in the heated controversies about Sukarno’s teachings and historical significance which flared up in the years between the two elections. These debates had largely been fuelled by the publication in 1988 of the controversial book by Soegiarso Soerojo about Sukarno’s ideological inclinations and his alleged involvement in the 30 September 1965 coup attempt. The PDI’s main involvement in these controversies occurred when Soerjadi, as we have seen, saw himself called upon to reject Sugiarso’s association between the PDI and the outlawed Communist Party. Another rare instance when Soerjadi commented on Sukarno’s legacy was in September 1990, after Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had commented unfavourably on Sukarno’s domestic political failures and confrontational foreign policy. Quoting President Suharto’s stance of mikul dhuwur mendhem jero, that is, to respect one’s elders and forget about their mistakes and shortcomings, the PDI leader said: ‘If Lee Kuan Yew really wants to be friends with Indonesia, he should learn about Indonesian culture.’ Apart from these instances, the PDI generally kept a low profile in the heated Sukarno controversies between the 1987 and 1992 elections.

Early in 1991, however, the PDI’s association with the late president was revived as Sukarno’s youngest son, well-know choreographer and song writer Guruh Sukarnoputra, joined the PDI. Guruh had been invited to stand as a candidate and campaign for the party already in the 1987 election, but had declined, apparently because he felt that the PDI then was too accommodative and did not represent his father’s teachings. In January 1991, however, Guruh declared before a gathering of PDI leaders in Bali that he might enter politics. He also said that he had inherited the political beliefs of his father, thereby indicating that he had no intention of toning down his leftist political beliefs. A leader of the party, Sukowaluyo, said that the party’s executive board was keen to sign Guruh on as a member and that he would get a special position as a vote-getter if he joined the party. The PDI’s secretary general, Nico Daryanto, said
that the reason for fielding Guruh and Megawati was not their being Sukarno's children, but because they had capacities, including the capacity to communicate with the masses.35

The PDI's more critical stance in the lead-up to the 1992 election was probably a central factor behind Guruh's decision to join the PDI. Already well before the start of the official election campaign he stood out for his critical and populist statements, many of which echoed the more critical leftist positions taken by the PDI in the preceding years. Guruh was often more blunt and direct than the party leaders in his criticism of the government and its policies. For example, vowing to fight against poverty, Guruh contrasted the wealth of the rich with the destitution of the poor and directly criticised the government for issuing regulations that forced the poor out of their jobs, such as the becak (pedicab) drivers in Jakarta, or from their land as had happened to villagers in Buleleng, Bali.36 He furthermore commented on the rise of new business giants – presumably the conglomerates – with lifeless souls, whom he called the new breed of feudal lords, and he criticised the government's implementation of article 33 of the constitution, which states that the Indonesian economy should be founded on the family principle. Speaking in Bali in October 1991, Guruh declared his resolve to treat the country's 'sick' democracy.37

The PDI's recruitment of Guruh indicated that the party's strategy ahead of the 1992 election was to copy its successful exploitation of the symbolism of Sukarno in 1987 in order to attract voters. However, whereas this strategy had had the blessing of the government in 1987, the authorities did not approve of the PDI's use of Sukarno's image ahead of the 1992 election. The campaign rules, regulated by presidential decree, prohibited the display of pictures and slogans reflecting individual persons and works.38 This regulation was directly aimed at the PDI and served to preclude the massive display of pictures of Sukarno which had dominated the party's 1987 election campaign. The PDI protested against the regulation, and Soerjadi even called it 'ridiculous', but these protests did nothing to change the president's mind. The PDI leader also rhetorically pointed out that it was funny that people were allowed to love Michael Jackson or Khomeini, but not Sukarno.39

On the whole, the ban on pictures seems to have been implemented strictly, and the posters of Sukarno which had decorated PDI rallies in 1987 were generally absent in the 1992 election campaign. It is uncertain, however, if the prohibition had the intended effect of dissociating the PDI from Sukarno's symbolism. Although Sukarno's picture was absent, as Karen Brooks has pointed out, 'his image was readily found in the faces of his children',40 that is,
of Guruh and Megawati. The ban also served to reinforce the impression of Sukarno as a symbol of opposition to the government.

The official election campaign period lasted from 10 to 30 May 1992. Both Guruh and Megawati were nominated as candidates for Parliament by the PDI, with Guruh heading the party's list in the country's most populous province, East Java. The two siblings campaigned hard for the PDI in various places around the country, but due to government regulations that aimed to limit the size of the campaign meetings, the rallies appeared in general to have been attended by fewer people than in the previous election. The press, meanwhile, gave limited coverage to the campaign activities of Guruh and Megawati, possibly as a result of pressure from government or military authorities. Some newspapers, such as Kompas, often left out Guruh's more controversial statements and attacks on the government. Although the PDI in general took a much more confrontational attitude in the 1992 election campaign compared with the party's relative compliance in earlier elections, Guruh especially stood out as one of the most outspoken critics of the government from any party or Golkar. He mainly expressed discontent with the economic, social and political situation, as well as with particular government policies, but presented few remedies or policy alternatives. He continued to focus his criticism on the social and economic gap, the corruption and the lack of democracy, all of which were central themes in the party's campaign material. Being comparatively young at 39, and leader of the popular youth music and dance group Swara Maharddhika, he was well-placed to appeal to the young generation.

Guruh, in an unexpected development, challenged President Suharto directly, when he, according to Melbourne's Sunday Age, declared his willingness to replace the president before a rally in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, in the middle of May. If Guruh indeed did offer himself as a presidential candidate, few, if any, Indonesian newspapers reported the controversial declaration. In the following week, however, the Jakarta Post reported that PDI campaigner and film star Sophan Sophiaan had asked 30,000 PDI supporters who attended a campaign rally in the capital if they wanted the PDI to nominate Guruh for president, and that the crowd had shouted in agreement.

On 2 June, one week before the polling day, Guruh appeared on national television to deliver a campaign speech. He started by saying that he had had to submit his speech to the official election committee for approval before he was allowed to read it on television. He then explored the theme of the country's democracy being sick, saying that 'we – especially the small people [rakyat kecil] – feel a lack of freedom, fear, direct and indirect threats, worry,
uncertainty, compulsion, coercion, and so on. The clearest example is the elections. The elections as an instrument of democracy are still not yet felt to be completely free, secret, honest and fair. Appealing to the youth, Guruh said that the ‘rights and freedom of the young generation [...] are felt to have been raped [diperkosa] on the pretext of “for stability” and “freedom under responsibility”’.48

Guruh’s radical criticism of the government and social, economic and political injustice followed on a general broadening of the political agenda in the first years of the 1990s. Several high-profile cases of land disputes, workers conflicts and human rights violations led to an increasing general awareness of the discontent and restlessness among the country’s less privileged masses.49 The issues and criticism that Guruh brought to the fore in the election campaign were thus largely those which had gained prominence during the preceding years and which began to emerge as the focus of opposition against President Suharto and the New Order. With Sukarno’s popular reputation for concern with the plight of the common man, Guruh was well-placed to articulate this opposition. In doing so, he also reinforced the image of Sukarno as a symbol of opposition against the New Order, as did the PDI’s generally critical stance in the election. The government’s ban on carrying the former president’s picture further enhanced this symbolism. In 1987, when supporters of the PDI, with the government’s tacit approval, had displayed Sukarno’s picture at the party’s rallies, the opposition had been more implicit and less focused. In 1992, by contrast, Sukarno stood out more as a controversial symbol of opposition to the New Order and to the unsatisfactory and unjust social, economic and political conditions experienced by many people.

THE PDI CAMPAIGN

In the 1992 election campaign, the PDI continued on the more confrontational path which the party slowly had begun to tread in the years leading up to the election, and although Guruh was one of the party’s most outspoken campaigners, the PDI in general stood out as an aggressive opposition to the government and not least President Suharto. The contrast with the 1987 election was particularly evident in three central issues: the party’s advocacy of a shadow cabinet, its criticism government policies and its support for a limit to the number of terms a president could serve.

About a month before the start of the election campaign, in April 1992, the PDI chairman Soerjadi revived Kwik Kian Gie’s suggestion from 1987 that the
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

...party set up a shadow cabinet, apparently to Kwik’s surprise. Official reactions were mixed, but, as in 1987, generally suspicious. Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini said that it was the right of the socio-political organisations to form shadow cabinets, but that it would be better to wait until the new Parliament had convened in October. Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Sudomo said that the move to set up a shadow cabinet was only political engineering by the PDI ahead of the election and that it was unnecessary and might confuse people. When Soerjadi then said that the party had decided to form a shadow cabinet as a contingency measure should a party member be named for a cabinet post by the president, Rudini reacted more strongly, saying that the PDI had no right to make concrete proposals as to future cabinet members. Soerjadi remained defiant and, referring to the family principle, said that it was the right of the political parties to sit in the cabinet, and that it was only natural that the PDI prepared itself for taking up positions in the cabinet. This controversial stance on the part of the PDI chair was probably linked to the support which the idea apparently enjoyed among sections in the military. In August 1991, for example, the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas, said at a political seminar in Jakarta that since Pancasila now was the only basic principle of the political parties, it was time that they be included in the cabinet.50

To some extent the party’s oppositional stance was conditioned by the political climate of openness, keterbukaan, with the government signalling ahead of the election that a more open political discussion would be tolerated. Shortly after the campaign started, Rudini explicitly said that campaigners were free to criticise the government and other election contestants, although he also said it was not allowed to discredit them.51 Several of the PDI campaigners consequently made statements that were directly critical of the government and its policies, as well as of the bureaucracy. There were two main areas of criticism in the PDI campaign. One concerned the lack of political freedom under the New Order and focused particularly on the restrictions on freedom of expression, irregularities in the election system, and criticism of the floating mass doctrine, under which the political parties were banned from establishing local branches in rural areas.52 The other area of criticism concerned economic and social issues, particularly the increasing social and economic inequalities, the frequent evictions of poor farmers and residents to make way for big commercial projects such as golf courses, and practices of unfair economic competition. Much of the latter criticism focused on private monopolies and nepotistic practices, the implicit but obvious main target – as in earlier...
instances – being President Suharto and the business activities of his close family and crony businessmen.53

According to observers, the PDI came closest of the three election contestant to having an articulated political platform for its campaign.54 The development of Litbang with its ‘new breed’ of politicians, led by the untiring efforts of Kwik Kian Gie, was probably a crucial factor behind this improvement. Commitment to and understanding of the party’s programme, however, appears to have varied between the party’s different campaigners. Hari Wiryawan, in his study of the foreign policy programs of Golkar and the political parties in the 1992 election, found that lack of coordination concerning foreign policy concepts was common to all three election contestants in the 1992 election.55 As regards the PDI, this observation applied to other policy areas as well. To a large extent, campaigners seem to have been more or less free to choose what they would like to talk about and sometimes appeared to express in the name of the party ideas and proposals that had not been formally adopted. Secretary General Nico Daryanto, for example, at the end of May told a youthful crowd in Jakarta that the PDI would provide bank loans for unemployed high school graduates, a promise that apparently was not expressed by any other of the party’s spokesmen and not included in the PDI’s election manifesto.56

The general impression was that the PDI’s election campaign, as well as the campaign in general, still was lacking in substance and quality. Kwik Kian Gie, in contrast to his stance in the 1987 election when similar criticism had been raised by observers, now agreed with the need for improvements in the quality of politicians, and he was obviously irritated with the generally low quality of the country’s political life. In a debate article in the Kompas daily, half-way into the campaign period, he wrote: ‘We can not deny that the political arena is the most remunerative arena for those who really have neither qualities nor integrity, but who nevertheless can become famous and achieve honoured positions, such as becoming members of the DPR or the DPRD [regional parliament], DPA [Supreme Advisory Council], and so on’.57 Kwik, moreover, lamented the inclination of politicians in general only to make normative statements, expressing ‘what is all well and felt to be good for everybody’. Examples of such statements, according to Kwik, were ‘We must be just’ or ‘Pancasila must implemented purely and consistently’. The politicians who made such statements, Kwik said, generally lacked concrete ideas about how to implement their suggestions, so that if asked about ways to achieve their goals or promises, the answer would be in diffuse terms such as ‘the way is in such a
manner so that...’ (‘caranya adalah sedemikian rupa, sehingga...’). In another article, Kwik urged the press to persist in asking the politicians for more in-depth statements, giving as an example, among others, the PDI’s long-standing suggestion that 25 per cent of the state budget be allocated to education. The suggestion, Kwik said, would have to be explained in terms of how the allocation should be divided between different sectors, which other budget items would have to be decreased and so on.

Minister of Home Affairs Rudini, with apparent sincerity, also lamented the failure on the part of the three election contestants to conduct a quality campaign and the lack of substantial discussions among them. According to the minister, he had tried since 1989, unsuccessfully, to change the style of the election campaign in order for Golkar and the parties to conduct their campaigns primarily through the media instead of mass rallies. In contrast to earlier elections, the 1992 campaign rules banned motorcade parades, which had been prominent in the 1987 campaign and at times caused severe traffic jams and accidents. Although there was no explicit ban on outdoor rallies, these were to be avoided in favour of smaller indoor rallies and greater use of the state television and radio for the three election contestants to get their message through to the voters.

Rudini appeared to be despondent about the effect which the rules and his efforts had had on the quality of the campaign. As it was, he said, people were only invited to the campaign to make noise or even to be incited to become fanatical over a party symbol. ‘The one who speaks, he speaks, the one who eats bakso [meatball soup], he eats bakso’, Rudini said. ‘Is that good political education?’ By mentioning bakso, the minister probably meant to refer to the circumstance that many campaign goers showed up at the rallies – particularly those of Golkar – because they were given free food or other forms of material compensation, and not to listen to the political messages delivered.

Kwik Kian Gie, in another debate article at the end of May, even compared the election campaign to a wild drinking party at a Dutch student sociëteit. According to Kwik, the problem for the election campaigners was simultaneously to try to address the unruly crowd at a rally and the journalists covering the event. If the speaker tried to address the journalists and explain a political programme, he would be shouted at by the crowd and requested to stop in favour of dangdut music. If the speaker on the other hand tried to address the crowd, the result was no less disconcerting:

\[1\] If the speech is directed towards the crowd, it will have to consist of nothing but yells, slogans [and] agitational rhetoric, or, if it is necessary
to [try to] sell ideas, the style and manner will be like selling soy sauce, dancing [around the stage] at intervals, so that the campaigners, who actually are very elite and rich, in the campaign once every five years shall be regarded by the people as equally poor.62

Kwik’s solution to improve the quality of the elections was to separate the elements of festival (pesta) and politics in the election campaign. The popular festival, he said, could instead be held in a non-political context, such as the national day celebration, and the election campaign would consist of political speeches, discussions, debates and dialogues in enclosed premises and covered by the press and electronic media.63

Kwik Kian Gie also strongly supported the idea of holding debates between the three election contestants, an idea forwarded by Minister Rudini already in January 1992. If realised, it would have been the first organised debate under the New Order between the election contestants.64 The attempt to bring about a debate on national television, however, failed, apparently due to resistance from the Ministry of Information under Harmoko, a Suharto loyalist and ally of Golkar chairman Sudharmono.65 When the TV debate did not materialise, Kwik Kian Gie instead took part in a debate before print media journalists and other invited guests in a closed location in Tanah Abang, Jakarta, on 3 June. The PPP was represented by the party’s deputy secretary general, Jusuf Syakir. However, the Golkar representative, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, a Golkar functionary who previously had agreed to represent his organisation in a televised debate, was instructed by Golkar’s central board not to attend. In a press statement, Sarwono said that the central board considered that it was better for the meeting to be a campaign dialogue exclusively for the PDI, and that it was better not to invite representatives of the other election contestants, because it could give rise to misunderstandings.66 The fact that Sarwono issued the press statement in his own name, quoting the central board’s instructions to explain his absence, indicated that there was a split within Golkar over whether or not the organisation should participate in debates, and, more broadly, over whether the regime should engage itself in public discussions in order to counter the rising tide of criticism against the government and its policies. This split was visible not only within Golkar, but also, as we have seen, in the regime in general and was, in a general sense, the major reason behind the keterbukaan trend. Golkar, especially its central board led by the vice-president and close Suharto loyalist Sudharmono, was a major centre of power for the president’s politico-bureaucratic constituencies. Although these groups had an institutional base in Golkar, their influence was largely dependent on the support and
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

patronage of the president. If an open debate were to be organised, Golkar, as the government's representative in the election, would probably be forced into a defensive position, having to ward off criticism from the political parties regarding government policies of economic distribution, corruption, repressive political regulations and obscure electoral practices. In spite of the lip-service paid to the goal of a programme-oriented election campaign, Golkar, with its comparatively large resources and easy access to government facilities, was better served by boisterous rallies than by complex discussions about political, social and economic issues. This resistance from Golkar and sections of the bureaucracy was the main direct reason why the efforts of both political party representatives, such as Kwik Kian Gie, and government officials, particularly Minister of Home Affairs Rudini, failed to bring about a more programme-oriented campaign.

CONFRONTING PRESIDENT SUHARTO

Probably the most controversial of the PDI's suggestions in the 1992 election was a proposal to limit to two the number of presidential terms one person could serve. The proposal obviously had international precedents, particularly in the United States and the neighbouring Philippines, and had, moreover, been vented several times before in Indonesia. The proposal had been discussed in the MPR, as well as by academics, in the 1970s. In 1990, the idea gained renewed prominence when a group of academics from the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta called for a limitation of two presidential terms, starting in 1993.67

The proposal to limit the number of presidential terms does not appear to have been part of the PDI's formal election programme. In November 1991, Kwik Kian Gie had expressed his support for the suggestion, but he did not claim that it was the official stance of the PDI. In the 1992 election campaign, however, Soerjadi turned the proposal of a limitation of the presidential terms into a major theme for the party. Addressing a rally in Jakarta on 12 May 1992, Soerjadi said that Indonesia's 1945 Constitution stipulates that a president can hold office for one five-year term and stand for re-election for another term. This regulation, Soerjadi concluded, meant that 'basically, a president can only hold the post for a maximum of 10 years'.68 The challenge prompted immediate reactions from leading Golkar campaigners as well as, unusually, from the president himself. According to the president, as quoted by the secretary general of Kosgoro (Kesatuan Organisasi Serba Guna Gotong-Royong), one of
Golkar’s constituting organisations, Agung Laksono, it was clear according to the constitution that the president could be re-elected, and that it was up to the MPR if it wanted the president to serve two or three periods. The president also said that those who wanted to limit the number of terms were trying to ‘emasculate’ (mengebiri) the constitution.69

Soerjadi, however, remained defiant, and two days after the president’s denunciation of his proposal, Soerjadi reiterated his claim that the constitution meant to limit the number of presidential terms to two. He also said that it was ‘one of the people’s rights’ to propose presidential terms of office. Moreover, Soerjadi wanted the MPR to elect the next president by open voting as prescribed by the constitution, rather than by acclamation, as had been the case up till then.70 The PDI leader thus signalled that the party had abandoned its accommodative stance in 1988, when he himself had emphasised the virtues of consensus in the MPR and declared the party’s readiness to let go of its proposals in order to avoid voting.71

Soerjadi tried to soften his confrontation with the president somewhat by saying that the country’s two first presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, both were ‘extraordinary men’ (orang hebat), thereby implying that their long tenures of office could be justified. The PDI chairman also said that his proposal was more aimed to the future, after Suharto, and that the limitation should start only with the upcoming term of office, 1993–98.72

These attempts at appeasement seem to have won the PDI chairman little sympathy from the president. Soerjadi’s proposal transgressed the limits of permissible public discussion under the New Order, even under keterbukaan, because the suggestion not only suggested that a further term for Suharto was undesirable, but directly challenged Suharto’s claim to constitutional legitimacy. The transgression consisted less of the proposal in itself, which, as we have seen, had previously been advocated by politicians and intellectuals. The breach lay more in Soerjadi’s claim that the constitution stipulated a limitation of the number of presidential terms to two. The obvious conclusion of Soerjadi’s argument was that President Suharto, who was serving his fifth term as president, held office in violation of the constitution. This implication prompted the president to take the unusual step of responding to a proposal brought forward in the election campaign.

Soerjadi’s interpretation of the constitution was doubtful, at best. The relevant article, article seven, read: ‘The president and vice-president hold office for five years, and can thereafter be re-elected.’73 Although the president was correct in saying that there was no stipulation in the constitution that
limited the number of presidential terms, he seemed to be overreacting by accusing those who proposed such a limitation – that is, Soerjadi – of trying to 'emasculate' the constitution. Moreover, the president, as well as most observers, overlooked the fact that the MPR, theoretically and according to the constitution, was invested with the power to amend the same constitution. More than anything else, Suharto’s reaction demonstrates the sacrosanct quality that the president ascribed to the 1945 Constitution, which allowed him both to project an illusion of democratic and constitutional legitimacy and to draw legitimacy from the symbolic identification of the constitution with the nationalist Revolution of 1945–49.74 By accusing Soerjadi of trying to emasculate the constitution, Suharto thus implied that Soerjadi and the PDI were unpatriotic.

**ELECTION RESULTS AND PROTESTS**

The poll on 9 June 1992 gave the PDI its best election result ever, with 14.9 per cent of the votes nationwide, an increase by four points from the 10.9 per cent which the party had reached in 1987. The PPP also increased somewhat, from 16.0 per cent to 17.0 per cent, whereas Golkar dropped by more than five points from 73.2 per cent to 68.1 per cent.75 Although Golkar’s result still meant that the organisation commanded a comfortable majority of the votes, the decline signalled discontent with the government, especially because the Golkar votes appeared to have been transferred to the PDI, which, as we have seen, had stood out as a vocal critic of the government and its policies before and during the election campaign – more so than the PPP. The PDI’s ability to attract protest votes was probably the most important factor in its electoral success. Kwik Kian Gie, in an academic paper analysing the voter shift in the election, argued that the PDI’s increase was not because of the party’s election strategy or campaign, but a necessary outcome of history, which he termed ‘historical fate’. His argument, although not completely clear, appeared to be that the tide of rising discontent with the regime in the last ten years was inevitable and the protest votes transferred to the PDI comprised a ‘ball which, like it or not, has been thrown into the hands of the PDI.’76 Kwik even argued that the party would have improved its election result even if it had not campaigned at all. The party’s campaign, however, had largely been geared towards attracting the protest votes. The focus on criticism of government policies and social and economic injustices, the party’s confrontational statements and suggestions and the populist appeal of Sukarno’s symbol reinforced by Guruh’s election campaigning, all helped the party to attract protest voters.
There were two other factors which probably contributed to the PDI’s increase as well, although it is difficult to assess their relative importance. One factor was the party’s greater credibility compared with earlier elections. Although there had been drawn-out internal conflicts in the in the years 1988–91, these disputes had been less damaging than earlier major conflicts in the party’s history, largely because the main conflict ahead of the 1992 election, the one between Soerjadi and the Group of 17, had failed to splinter the party’s central board, all members of which remained loyal to Soerjadi. Soerjadi also, in a later interview, claimed that the party had never been more coherent than it was under his leadership in the early years of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{77} The government and the military also appeared to support Soerjadi, and in spite of indications that sections of the government or the military tacitly supported, or at least tolerated, the dissidents within the party, the activities of the latter did not cause any acute crisis in the party. The party’s revival of Litbang and efforts to attract intellectual capacity to the party also served to strengthen its credibility among the politically more aware and educated voters.

Another major factor favouring the PDI was the successful effort to strengthen the party’s grass-roots organisation at the village and sub-district (\textit{kecamatan}) levels. As discussed above, in chapter 3, the floating mass principle envisaged that there should be no permanent representation of the political parties or Golkar at the local level, especially in the rural areas. This restriction in effect favoured Golkar, because the organisation, in practice, had permanent representation at these levels through the bureaucracy. Due to resistance from the political parties, particularly the PPP, however, the floating mass doctrine had never been passed into law, and the 1975 Law on the Political Parties and Golkar, as well as its 1985 successor, was in this respect a compromise which gave the parties (and Golkar) the right to establish a limited representation at the village and subdistrict levels. The district (\textit{daerah tingkat II}) branches of the parties and Golkar were thus each allowed to appoint one commissioner (\textit{komisaris}) in each sub-district and village in the district to act as an executive of the district board. Each commissioner, moreover, was allowed to have up to four or five aides.\textsuperscript{78} Whereas the PDI ahead of the 1987 election had hardly had any commissioners at all, particularly at the village level, by June 1991 the party had reportedly filled nearly all of its sub-district commissioner positions and half of its village commissioner positions. In the party’s strongholds in Java and Bali, the figures were even higher, with party representatives claiming that the party had representation in all or nearly all sub-districts and in up to 90 per cent of the villages.\textsuperscript{79}
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

In the election, the PDI increased its share of the votes or held steady in all of the country’s 27 provinces except the greater Jakarta district, and its number of seats in Parliament rose from 40 to 56. The party more than doubled its share of the votes in seven of the outer island provinces, but because most of these provinces had relatively small populations and the PDI’s result in most of them still was below its national average, these gains did not generate more than two of the additional seats in Parliament, one each from West Sumatra and East Timor. In terms of parliamentary seats, the party’s spectacular gains in the populous provinces of East and Central Java were the most important, generating nine of the 16 new seats. The party also made large gains in several of its other former strongholds, such as North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Yogyakarta, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and Bali.

The PDI, however, declined drastically in Jakarta; from the 28.4 per cent the party had collected in 1987 to 21.8 per cent. Both the PPP and Golkar instead increased, and the PDI lost its second place to the PPP. This result was surprising, because the PDI, as we have seen, had been very successful in Jakarta in the previous election, and the social and economic discontent which generated protest votes for the party was generally expected to be higher in urban areas. The outcome was even more surprising against the background of the massive show of force that the party had held in the capital on the last day of the election, when reportedly millions of PDI supporters – far more than in 1987 according to newspaper reports – had turned out to make Jakarta ‘totally red’ (merah total). Several explanations were suggested by analysts for this apparent contradiction, including that many of those who attended the PDI’s rally were below the voting age of 17, that many of the campaign goers voted in their home villages rather than in the capital and that the ‘vulgar’ showing of mass support and the party’s sometimes brutal campaign in the capital alienated many moderately inclined voters. The leaders of the PDI’s Jakarta chapter, however, were convinced that the vote in Jakarta had been rigged, and the chairman of the capital chapter, Alex Asmasoebrata, threatened not to sign the official election report if no action was taken against those responsible for the alleged irregularities. The main complaint in Jakarta concerned alleged instances of double or multiple voting by civil servants for Golkar.

Just as in earlier elections, both the PPP and the PDI compiled reports with numerous complaints over alleged irregularities, which they submitted to the General Elections Institute. Whereas the PPP took an accommodative stance and called the election a ‘success’ and ‘relatively well run’, the PDI confronted the government head-on over the irregularities. A meeting of the party’s
provincial leaders in Jakarta in mid-June, one week after the poll, decided to assign to the central board the task of delivering a number of complaints concerning the election to the president, who had been mandated by the MPR to organise the event. The meeting’s decision said that there had occurred ‘fraud, manipulation, terror, intimidation and other criminal acts which had very much damaged the Pancasila democratic process,’ and that these acts generally had been perpetrated by elements of the bureaucracy, especially in its lower echelons. The meeting also accused elements from the military of having performed acts that had damaged the PDI, although the wording was much less confrontational towards the military, emphasising its generally positive contributions to the election. The assembled party leaders, moreover, demanded that legal action be taken over all violations and demanded that the election laws be changed so that the political parties be allowed to take part in the organisation of future elections. The most confrontational statement was a direct accusation against President Suharto for not having carried out his duties properly:

> Based on the reports from the provinces about the implementation of the 1992 general election, the leadership meeting is of the opinion that the mandate to improve the quality of the 1992 general election in accordance with the MPR’s decision no. III/1988 and the 1988 GBHN, as well as the President’s Mandate of 16 August 1991, apparently has not been satisfactorily fulfilled as had been hoped.

Although these confrontational accusations were not published in the media at the time, the complaints of the party meeting appear immediately to have reached the government. On the day after the closing of the meeting, 16 June, Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Sudomo lashed out at ‘certain elements’ (pihak tertentu) which tried deliberately to ruin the general election through groundless accusations of violations and fraud with the aim of discrediting the organiser(s) of the election. He also threatened that anyone trying to undermine the general elections could be sentenced to prison for up to five years. If there were complaints, the minister said, these should be handled by the official Committee of the Supervision of General Election Implementation, Panwaslak (Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilu). This body, however, was highly inefficient and dominated by the civil servants and Golkar functionaries who largely were the very perpetrators of the election violations.

Soerjadi, unconvincingly, said that he did not believe that Sudomo had meant the PDI by his reference to ‘certain elements’. The PDI leader also said that if the party’s attempt to settle the problem election violations was crime, it
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

was up to the court to decide. The party claimed to have evidence of numerous election violations across the country, including the reports of threats and intimidation of voters ahead of the election – which, incidentally, Sudomo also acknowledged but wrote off as a ‘commonplace’ and a ‘part of politics’ – and photo documentation of civil servants voting at several polling stations.88

Meanwhile, Director General of Social and Political Affairs Hari Soegiman said that Soerjadi, by confronting the government, failed to give good political education to the people, especially because the level of political understanding varied in society. Soerjadi and his group, according to the director-general, instead taught and pushed society towards the concept of opposition, and he said that the PDI leader should know the meaning of Pancasila and its core values of musyawarah to reach a mufakat without knowing any opposition.89 As the weekly Tempo implied Sudomo’s hard line demonstrated little willingness on the part of the government to musyawarah the issue of election manipulation.90 Just as in other political arenas, including, as we have seen, the MPR, Parliament and the PDI itself, the ideals of Pancasila democracy were evoked mainly in order to pressure the weaker side into compliance and accommodation.

The PDI eventually complied and signed the election results at the end of June, first at the regional levels and then at the national level. The party’s Jakarta chairman, Alex Asmasoebrata, at first refused to sign the election report for the capital and walked out from the plenary meeting of the provincial elections committee with tears in his eyes. However, after private consultations with the commander-in-chief of the Jakarta military district, Major-General Kentot Harsono, in an adjacent room the PDI chairman agreed to sign the report, which the general personally fetched for him from the meeting room. ‘If it were not for him [Harsono], I would not have signed the documents’, Alex told reporters afterwards.91 Three days later, after all the party’s 27 chapters had signed their respective provincial election reports, Soerjadi signed the national election report, trying to tone down the party’s confrontational stand over the election irregularities.92

CONCLUSIONS

In the 1992 election, the PDI stood out as a confrontational and largely populist opposition party. The party focused its campaign on critical issues, such as the country’s ‘sick’ democracy, the prevalence of corruption, nepotism and monopolistic practices, and economic and social injustice. The party openly con-
fronted the president over the suggestion to limit the number of presidential terms and his interpretation of the constitution. All of these themes tapped into pent-up discontent among large groups in society and the party could thus attract a substantial number of protest votes. The result was the party emerged as the most vocal proponent of political reform within the formal political system of the New Order. As in earlier elections, however, the party presented few remedies and concrete policy suggestions to correct the problems. The party's use of Sukarno's image, against this background, took on a more manifestly oppositional quality compared with the 1987 election.

In adopting its oppositional stance in the election, the PDI appears to have been encouraged by the support which the party seemed to enjoy from segments of the military. Several of the party's controversial campaign themes and suggestions also had the expressed or tacit support of sections of the military, such as the PDI's attacks on corruption and monopolies linked to the president, the demand that the political party representatives be included in the cabinet and the implicit attacks on President Suharto's long term in office. All of these themes were also directly or indirectly attacks on the personalised power of the president, which, as we have seen, was a major source of resentment among the military. Even though the PDI appeared more critical and independent in the 1992 election than at any earlier time in its history, this new assertiveness also depended on the party's rapprochement with more powerful elements in the military.

With the PDI leading the initiative to attack the government in the election campaign, Golkar appeared to be defensive and avoided engaging in discussions or debates with the PDI. Much of the PDI's criticism against the government and government policies was well-founded and tapped into widely felt discontent in society. Public discussions about these issues were unlikely to favour Golkar or the government more broadly, and Golkar was consequently better served by the pesta style of campaign, with little discussion of concrete problems and political issues. The government responded to the increasing criticism mainly by exclusionary and authoritarian strategies, refusing to engage in any meaningful discussion about the problems. These tendencies were visible ahead of the election, when vocal candidates were sidelined, as well as during the campaign in the sharp rejection of the suggestion to limit the number of presidential terms and the obstruction of a televised debate, and, finally, after the polls, in the harsh language and thinly veiled threats against the PDI for its protests over election irregularities. In none of these instances were there any efforts to deliberate or engage in substantial discussions about the
issues with groups outside the immediate circles of power. The reluctance to engage in discussion with even moderately reformist forces such as the PDI was largely due to the complacency of many of the New Order's leaders who, in the view of the apparent stability and control of the regime, felt little need to respond to the criticism raised by the PDI. The reluctance or refusal to engage in a debate with the PDI, however, also implied that much of the criticism might be justified and that those who defended the regime suffered from a tacit lack of confidence. This lack of confidence was above all related to the increasingly obvious moral corruption of President Suharto and the New Order, which made it difficult to argue convincingly for the legitimacy of the regime.

NOTES


2 Merdeka (13 May 1991). According to Soerjadi, quoted by Halawa (1993: 51–52), the decision to try to recruit retired military officers had been taken at the party's leadership meeting in Denpasar, in January 1991. Apparently, a retired brigadier general, Josef Mathius Mailoa, who had joined the PDI already in 1982, was instrumental in the efforts to recruit senior officers; see Kompas (14 May 1991) and Tempo (25 May 1991).

3 Suara Pembaruan (14 May 1991). Another retired officer, Colonel (ret.) Mangil, was nominated by the PDI as a candidate for Parliament together with Bambang Widjanarko, and both were described by the Jakarta Post (14 September 1991) as 'former aide de camps' of Sukarno. Josef Mailoa, who apparently helped recruit many of the retired officers to the PDI, also appeared in a photo in Tempo (25 May 1991) with a picture of Sukarno in the background.

4 Jakarta Post (5 May 1991). Tempo (25 May 1991) also hinted at Moerdani's involvement by publishing a photo of Soerjadi and Moerdani walking side by side as part of an article about retired officers joining the PDI. The photo had no apparent relation to the text of the article, which did not mention Moerdani.


6 Pelita (17 May 1991).

7 Kompas (14 May 1991).


9 Robert Cribb (1990b: 24) seems to have been the first to use the term to describe Jakarta's political life in 1989–90. Crouch (1992: 61–62), Schwarz (1994) and Eklöf (1997: 1195) subsequently also employed the description.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

10 See for example Golkar chair Harmoko’s statement in *Merdeka* (26 March 1994).
14 Cited in Cribb (1990b: 36).
15 Cribb (1990b: 36); see also Goodfellow (1995: 26–27) about the implications of *keterpengaruhan*.
20 *Kompas* (2 September 1991 and 10 September 1991), *Jakarta Post* (5 September 1991 and 9 September 1991) and *Suara Pembaruan* (12 September 1991). See *Tempo* (14 September 1991) about the sensitivity of the issue. There was some confusion even among senior government officials as to what the exact procedures were. Rudini, when asked by a journalist about the Litsus investigation, confessed that he knew nothing about it and referred to the commander-in-chief of the military; *Kompas* (2 September 1991). After Soerjadi had been investigated, moreover, Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Sudomo said that he should not have been investigated; *Jakarta Post* (5 September 1991).
21 *Media Indonesia* (10 September and 13 September 1991) and *Tempo* (14 September 1991). The New Order used a proportional election system in which voters cast their votes for lists of candidates for each election contestant and province. After the general election ten of the PDI’s elected legislators voluntarily gave up their seats in the national Parliament, thus allowing for the same number of candidates who had not been elected to take their seats; *Suara Karya* (11 July 1992). Although the background is unclear, some of the voluntary resignations may have been part of a secret or tacit agreement in the party in order to get some of the outspoken legislators into Parliament. Both Aberson and Budi Hardjono did become legislators for the period 1992–97.
29 *Jakarta Post* (9 April 1992). Of the three PDI candidates who were rejected, two were reportedly found to have falsified their university diplomas and one, a civil servant, had not been given permission to be nominated by his superiors.
A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

30 Bahar (1996: 32); see also Taju and Dewanto (1997: 212) for a similar assessment.
31 Soegiarso (1988); see further the discussion in chapter 6 above.
32 Kompas (5 September 1990).
33 For the controversies, see Brooks (1995: 77–84).
34 Before the 1987 election, Guruh officially subscribed to the Sukarno family’s stance, as expressed by his sister Rachmawati, that Sukarno was the asset of the whole nation and that the family should stand above all political groups. He also, however, expressed his commitment to Sukarno’s ideas of anti-neocolonialism, anti-capitalism and the ‘Marhaen spirit’, ideas that were far more radical than the those of the PDI at the time. In spite of Guruh’s declared political neutrality in the 1987 election, his youth music and dance group, Swara Maharddhika (‘the voice of freedom’), had performed at a PDI cadre meeting before the election and at the party’s final campaign rally in Jakarta, although the musicians claimed that they participated only as individuals; see Tempo (8 November 1986, 17 January 1987 and 16 May 1987).
35 Jakarta Post (11 January 1991) and Kompas (30 March 1991). The argument seems tautological, however, as the masses mainly turned out to see and listen to Megawati and Guruh because of their family name.
36 Jakarta Post (5 March 1991). For the land disputes in the early 1990s, see Lucas (1997).
37 Jakarta Post (15 March 1991) and Magenda (1992: 121). This theme was also explored by other PDI representatives in the election campaign.
38 Jakarta Post (13 January 1992). The rules had been presented in the media already in May 1991; see Jakarta Post (29 May 1991).
42 For example, cf. the coverage of Guruh’s speech in Kuningan, Jakarta, on 21 May in Kompas (22 May 1992) and Jakarta Post (22 May 1992). Leading figures of the PDI, including Guruh and Kwik Kian Gie, also criticised the media’s coverage of the party; see Jakarta Post (3 June 1992 and 4 June 1992).
43 For examples of Guruh’s campaign statements, see Jakarta Post (12 May and 22 May 1992) and Kompas (29 May 1992 and 30 May 1992).
44 Sunday Age (24 May 1992).
45 The author has not been able to find any press reports on Guruh’s reported willingness to be nominated, and neither does the survey of the PDI’s campaign in Sudibjo (1995: 217–224) mention Guruh’s alleged statement.
46 Jakarta Post (25 May 1992); see also McIntyre (1997: 10).
47 See Tim SPES Jakarta (1992: 112–118) for the speech and Jakarta Post (3 June 1992) and Kompas (3 June 1992) for press reports of the speech.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

49 Lane (1992: 6); see also EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 3 (1990: 7).


55 Wiryawan (1993: 100).

56 *Jakarta Post* (25 May 1992); for the party’s election manifesto, see *Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (1991: 61–73). In general, the lack of party discipline and coherence was, according to Soerjadi, one of the most serious problems for the PDI; interview by author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).


60 *Kompas* (2 June 1992) and *Jakarta Post* (13 January 1992).

61 *Kompas* (2 June 1992); italics added. See also *Jakarta Post* (15 May 1992).


63 *Kompas* (30 May 1992).


65 Kwik Kian Gie, in his article in *Kompas* (30 May 1992), indicated that he suspected the ministry of information of blocking the TV debate. Rudini also implied as much when he said on 1 June that because the three election contestants had only declared themselves ready to take part in a debate two weeks before the start of the election campaign, the ministry of information was not ready to organise it; *Kompas* (2 June 1992).


67 *Jakarta Post* (15 October 1990). According to a leading PDI functionary, Sabam Sirait, all factions of the 1973 MPR session had favoured a limitation of the number of presidential terms, especially in view of Sukarno’s long presidency, but they felt that it was not yet the time, as the New Order still had its ‘honeymoon’; *Tim Penulis* (1997). According to *Tempo* (23 May 1992), the suggestion had also surfaced at a seminar at the University of Indonesia in 1977, but was subsequently ‘sunk’ *(tenggelam)*.

A Populist Opposition? The PDI in the 1992 Election

69 Media Indonesia (19 May 1992).
70 Jakarta Post (21 May 1992).
71 In an interview with Tempo (28 December 1991), Soerjadi explained the PDI's accommodative stance in the 1988 MPR session by citing that the party had not been ready to 'play politics' because it only had 61 representatives in the MPR, 17 of whom rejected Soerjadi's leadership.
72 Tempo (23 May 1992).
73 In 1999, the MPR amended this article so that the president and vice-president could only be re-elected to the same office once; see TAP MPR '99: Hasil Sidang Umum MPR RI Tahun 1999 (1999: 118).
75 See Baroto (1992: 250) for the results.
76 Kwik Kian Gie (1995: 81). Kwik used the English term 'historical fate', which he translated as nasib sejarah.
77 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
80 See Baroto (1992: 250 for the election results). The other five outer island provinces in which the PDI rose sharply were Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and Irian Jaya.
81 Kompas (1 June 1992) estimated that two million people attended the PDI's last campaign rally in the capital, whereas the Jakarta Post (1 June 1992) estimated the number at 1.5 million. The generally reliable EIU Country Report Indonesia, no. 2 (1992: 12) estimated that the rally attracted up to three million supporters. Press reports on the party's final rally in 1987 typically ranged from 500,000 to one million; see Ward (1994: 67). The PDI was also nicknamed partai metal by its supporters, metal apparently being an acronym for merah total. Metal, however, could also be interpreted as a reference to heavy metal music and subculture, which were popular among sections of Indonesia's youth and associated with youth protest and social discontent.
83 Jakarta Post (15 June 1992).
86 Kompas (17 June 1992). A delegation of PDI leaders under Soerjadi also met Rudini on the closing day of the leadership meeting, 15 June, and delivered a list of complaints; see Jakarta Post (16 June 1992). Rudini does not appear to have been informed about the decision of the leadership meeting, because on the following day, Soerjadi said his mandate to deliver the decision of the meeting to a 'second
party’ (pihak kedua), that is, the president, had yet to be carried out; Kompas (17 June 1992). The government thus probably gained instant knowledge about the controversial decision through intelligence sources in the party. According to Tempo (27 June 1992), Sudomo was possibly upset by a radiogram from the party's headquarters, dated 10 June and issued in the name of Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto, to the party's provincial chapters, allegedly instructing the latter to boycott the signing of the election results. The party leaders denied that such an instruction had been issued.


90 Tempo (27 June 1992).

91 Bisnis Indonesia (27 June 1992) and Jakarta Post (27 June 1992).

92 Kompas (30 June 1992).
CHAPTER 8

Challenging the New Order: 
The 1993 MPR Session

FIGHTING FOR REFORM

After the PDI’s vigorous election campaign and challenging stance towards the government and the president, there were great expectations that the party would continue to press for its demands in the 1993 MPR session. As we have seen, the party had emerged as a major critic of the regime during the election campaign and after the election. Since this criticism clearly implied dissatisfaction with the president, critical groups within the party as well as outside apparently hoped that the PDI would nominate a presidential candidate other than Suharto for the presidential term 1993–98. In addition, there were hopes that the PDI would continue to press for its demands for political reform, including a revision of the election laws and a limitation on the presidential term.

In a gesture apparently meant to demonstrate the government’s more open attitude towards policy input from the MPR, Golkar and the political parties were given the president’s draft for the Broad Outlines of State Policy, GBHN, already in June 1992, well ahead of the opening of the MPR on 1 October. On earlier occasions, including, as we have seen, the 1987–88 session, the president had delivered his draft in connection with the opening of the assembly and any suggestions by the political parties for significant changes to the draft had been consistently resisted by the Golkar, military and regional representatives factions. Apart from signalling a more open attitude of the government to the views and suggestions of the three socio-political organisations, the new move was probably intended to diffuse the impression that the president dictated to the MPR. A member of the presidially appointed Supreme Advisory Council, DPA [Dewan Pertimbangan Agung], Harry Tjan Silalahi, however, also said that handing out the GBHN draft was a ‘gesture’, and he also, realistically, said that ‘we know that [the GBHN] will not be changed much’. 
The political parties and Golkar immediately started work on drafting their respective proposals for the outlines to be discussed in the MPR. Kwik Kian Gie reiterated the party’s demand from 1987 to have anti-corruption measures included in the GBHN, and he also called for measures to improve economic competition legislation in order to achieve greater economic democracy. The PPP also worked out its GBHN draft, but three weeks before the opening of the MPR session, the party agreed with Golkar to use the president’s draft as reference for the discussions in the MPR.3

As in the 1992 election campaign, the PPP took a much more accommodative stance in advance of the MPR session compared with the PDI, which looked ready to transform its election promises to reform proposals to the MPR. The military, however, discouraged the PDI from trying to effect any significant changes in the political system. A few days before the opening of the MPR session, the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant General Harsudiono Hartas, delivered a message from the commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, to the party’s MPR delegation-in-waiting. Hartas urged the delegates to be sensitive to the aspirations of the people, but to be selective in taking in those aspirations and not to be in a hurry to advocate all aspirations which emerged in society. ‘We need to be meticulous and careful when we decide which aspirations really are the wishes of the people and which are only the interests of certain groups’, the general said. He also said that the military agreed with efforts aiming at renewal, although within limitations: ‘But such renewal does not mean that [we] have to sacrifice the established system which objectively has been proven to support stability and continuous development’, the general told the PDI delegates.4

As the MPR opened on 1 October 1992, however, the PDI vowed to continue to struggle for far-reaching political reform. Some of the suggested reforms were similar to those proposed by the PPP and echoed earlier, long-standing demands. These included the demand that the elections be organised jointly by the government and the three election contestants, that the polls be held on a non-working day, that the words ‘honestly’ and ‘fairly’ be included to prescribe how the elections should be conducted and organised, and that the political parties be allowed to establish branches at the village level. In addition, and more controversially, the PDI continued to advocate a limitation of the number of presidential terms, which, as we have seen, had been a major campaign theme for the party in the general election. Moreover, Soerjadi said that the party had already prepared a draft for amending a 1973 MPR decree that regulated the election of the president and vice-president, and that the
party would push for other legislation which regulated the powers of the presidential institution. As it was, the only formal regulation of the presidency were 12 brief articles of the constitution, which mostly conferred powers of the executive and put few constraints on its authority.

The PDI, however, made no suggestion to amend the constitution, which, in the New Order’s political culture, would have implied unpatriotic and even subversive aspirations. The party instead based its arguments for political reform on the constitution, thereby appropriating – in the sense of James Scott (1985) – the ideological platform of the New Order and using it to criticise the regime. MPR legislator Sabam Sirait, who emerged as a major spokesman for the political reform efforts, thus claimed that the party only wanted to ‘purify the implementation of the 1945 Constitution’. This strategy, as we have seen, echoed the strategies adopted earlier by the party, for example in its criticism of the government’s economic policies before the 1992 election and in the argument in the election campaign over a limitation of the presidential term.

As the MPR’s working committee started its meetings to prepare for the assembly’s general session, scheduled for March 1993, one of the party’s central reform proposals was to change the 1973 MPR decree, which, among other things, stated that if there were only one presidential candidate proposed by all factions of the MPR, he (or she) was to be immediately sworn in by the general session. The PDI proposed that the paragraph be replaced with the formulation: ‘The President is elected by the [MPR] through majority vote’, a wording which closely followed article six of the constitution. The faction also wanted to scrap another regulation of the 1973 decree, which required the vice-president to sign a statement pledging to cooperate with the president. This regulation was the main legal basis for the president’s influence over the vice-presidential election. According to the PDI, however, the requirement could imply that the vice-president was elected by the president, rather than, as stipulated by the constitution, by the MPR.

All significant proposals for political reform by the PPP and PDI, however, were rejected by the three dominant pro-regime factions in the MPR, that is, the Golkar, military and regional representatives factions, which collectively were called *Trifraksi* (‘three factions’). The meetings of the commissions of the MPR’s working committee were largely conducted behind closed doors, and it is therefore difficult to follow in detail the arguments advanced in the debates. Both the PPP and the PDI proposed that all MPR meetings should be open to the press, but apparently the press was excluded from sessions in which controversial issues were discussed. The statements delivered in the media by
leading Golkar and military representatives concerning the reform proposals of
the political parties, meanwhile, were largely void of substance and mostly
argued that there were no reasons to change the present system and regulations
because they were already sufficient and working well. Golkar’s faction chair-
man Usman Hasan, for example, said that Golkar saw no urgency to make any
significant changes to the general election, presidential election and the
legislative body systems. ‘We’d rather keep the current systems the way they are’,
he was quoted saying by the *Jakarta Post*. Hasan also saw no need to change
the in-house rules of the Parliament, because it ‘saw no reason’ to do so, and the
general elections, according to Hasan, were ‘sufficient’ to suit the present
conditions. A spokesman for the military faction, Sembiring Meliala, said:
‘We reject the proposals not because they are made by minority parties but
because we consider the existing system is already adequate’. Another Golkar
faction spokesman, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, argued that it was impossible
to involve the election contestants in the organisation of the elections because
the constitution and *Pancasila* allegedly designated the president as solely
responsible for overseeing the election process. This argument, however, was
peculiar because neither the constitution nor *Pancasila* even mentioned elections.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, many politicians who defended
the regime felt little need to respond to the criticism of the political parties
because of the political weakness of the parties vis-à-vis the government. At the
same time, however, the arguments – or, rather, lack of arguments – which the
dominating factions of the MPR used to counter the PDI’s reform proposals
also, once again, indicated a lack of confidence on the part of the pro-regime
legislators. This lack of confidence was probably, more than anything else, due
to a tacit awareness that the regime lacked popular legitimacy and that it was
morally corrupt. Under these circumstances, to engage in a substantial debate
with the PDI over the suggestions for political reform was seen as not only
unnecessary, but also likely to put the pro-regime factions in a defensive and
possibly embarrassing position.

Likewise, the three dominant factions said that the decisions of the 1973
MPR decree were still relevant and that there consequently was no urge to
change the decree. The suggestion to allow the parties to establish village
branches was rejected on the grounds that doing so might fan political conflicts
and threaten national stability, and the three factions, again, argued that the
present system was good enough. The PDI’s suggestion that the president be
elected by majority vote, as prescribed by the constitution, was rejected by the
three dominant factions as well as the PPP, all of which said that they had
different interpretations of the constitution. A spokesman for the military faction, Achmad Rustandi, moreover, said that it was not necessary to vote for a single candidate and even implied that doing so might threaten national integrity. Voting, he appeared to think, was suitable in village democracy, but not in the country’s highest legislative assembly. ‘It [the presidential election] is not like electing a village headman in the villages’, he said. In making this obvious point, he also expressed a rather disparaging elitist sentiment towards Indonesian village democracy.

THE PDI AND THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

As the MPR carried on with its work in committees, the PDI delayed naming its presidential candidate. Both Golkar and the military formally decided to nominate Suharto for president in October, and the PPP had done so already before the 1992 general election. The PDI’s refusal to name a candidate in the election campaign, combined with the party’s confrontational stance towards the president, had given rise to widespread speculation that the party would nominate a candidate other than Suharto. A remarkable statement in the election campaign by Nico Daryanto had further fuelled such speculations, although he did not claim to speak on behalf of the party. Nico said that he did not yet have a candidate for president and mentioned three possible candidates: Benny Moerdani, Rudini and Try Sutrisno – thus omitting Suharto. The minister of internal affairs, Rudini, moreover, had been proposed by a deputy chairman of the PDI’s central board, Yahya Nasution, in mid-1991, although Soerjadi had made it clear at the time that Yahya did not speak for the party. Compared with other senior government officials, Rudini was regarded as having relatively good democratic credentials, and he had been named ‘man of the year’ by the weekly news magazine Editor in 1990.

As we have seen, Guruh Sukarnoputra was reported to have declared himself willing to be nominated as the PDI’s presidential candidate in the election campaign, and prominent PDI campaigner and candidate for Parliament, Sophan Sophiaan, had supported the move too. Kwik Kian Gie, however, tried to tone down Guruh’s candidacy by arguing that Guruh did not fulfil the formal requirements of the constitution for becoming president. According to Kwik, Guruh was only 38 years old, whereas the constitution allegedly demanded that the president be at least 40 years old. Guruh was in fact 39 and turned 40 on 13 January 1993, two months before the presidential election. Moreover, the constitution did not say anything about a required
minimum age for the president. The requirement that the president be at least 40 years of age was stated in the 1973 MPR decree discussed above, and thus did not have the same impeccable status as the constitution. That decree was also, as we have seen, a major target for the PDI’s efforts in the MPR to reform the political system. Although Kwik may have been mistaken about Guruh’s age, it is highly unlikely that he was mistaken about the provisions of the constitution. Kwik thus apparently tried to tone down Guruh’s candidacy, probably because he felt that it would have been futile to campaign for Guruh, or because he had reservations about Guruh’s capability.

As the MPR session opened in October 1992, the PDI seemed split over the question of the presidential nomination. Apparently, the original intention had been for the party to name its presidential candidate at a leadership meeting soon after the election; both Kwik Kian Gie and Nico Daryanto had expressed that intention shortly before the polling day in June.20 As we have seen, a leadership meeting was held in mid-June, but it does not appear to have discussed the question of the presidential nomination. According to Soerjadi, the meeting had instead decided that the candidates were to be nominated at a special leadership meeting in January or February 1993.21

The party’s central leadership under Soerjadi seemed unwilling to confront the president directly by nominating an alternative candidate, whereas Guruh and other more radical party representatives wanted to go ahead and openly challenge Suharto in the presidential election in March 1993. Rumours of the split within the party were reported already in mid-October 1992, although they were denied by leading party representatives.22 The party leaders instead argued that they were only following due democratic procedures in the party, although Soerjadi’s understanding of party democracy seemed elitist and provided little room for broader popular aspirations:

The presidential institution is a high ranking institution which must be respected; we hold it in high esteem and we must maintain its authority. Therefore, when [we] discuss, or even make a decision on, the [presidential] nomination, it has to be in a respected place, not in a coffee stall or in a road-side chat. The PDI wants the decision on this powerful institution to be taken by various responsible parties [pihak] in an authoritative and dignified forum. The PDI has already decided that the forum which is dignified enough is a Special Leadership Meeting. The second ‘D’ in the PDI is democracy.23

The delay in nominating Suharto was an obvious break with tradition under the New Order, where social and political organisations often declared their
support for Suharto’s re-election one or two years in advance. For example, in 1986, the PDI’s congress nominated Suharto for the period 1988–93, almost two years before the presidential election. In all previous presidential elections, Suharto had been the only candidate, and he had always been elected by acclamation. Now the PDI vigorously advocated that the president be elected by voting rather than acclamation, and it looked probable, or at least conceivable, that the party would decide to nominate an alternative candidate. Even though Suharto was certain to win a vast majority of the votes in a presidential election in the MPR, not getting the unanimous support of the assembly would indicate that the president’s authority had begun to decline, as well as mean a serious loss of face.

A vote for president would have further implications. The 1973 MPR decree ruled that the vote be taken secretly, and provided that the secrecy of the ballot be upheld, there was a large possibility that some delegates from other factions than the PDI, particularly the PPP and the military, would vote for the PDI’s candidate, or would cast blank votes. Even though such dissent was not likely to be so extensive as to threaten Suharto’s re-election, such an outcome would have demonstrated that discontent with the president was not limited to the PDI and marginal groups of students and activists, but was also significant among the more mainstream political elite. A poll conducted by the University of Indonesia and Tempo among 115 MPR legislators pointed in the same direction. More than half of the respondents, 53 per cent, agreed with the idea of a presidential term limit, thus indicating dissatisfaction with Suharto’s long term in office.24

The PDI’s hesitation to nominate Suharto before the 1993 MPR session, combined with the party’s critical attitude in the preceding election, implied dissatisfaction with Suharto’s leadership and raised the possibility that the party would nominate a candidate other than the incumbent. The president himself commented indirectly on the party’s stance in October, when he said that he knew there were ‘elements’ (pihak) who did not want to see him re-elected. The president’s statement, deliberately vague and open to different interpretations, gave rise to much speculation about what the president had meant. Although the president, as some political observers noticed, was only stating the obvious, his observation was widely interpreted as having been directed at the PDI, and as such meant to pressure the party into nominating him.25 There was an implicit ethical dimension to the president’s comment, because since all the other MPR factions had already nominated him, the PDI – the smallest faction – was expected to fall in line in order for consensus to prevail. As we have seen, the government, and not least Suharto himself, strongly
advocated that important decisions such as the presidential and vice-presidential elections be taken through mufakat rather than by voting. For the PDI not to comply with the dominating forces in the MPR, would have implied unethical, irresponsible and unpatriotic behaviour. Soerjadi, however, argued that the president’s statement only demonstrated that Suharto was a democrat, and the PDI chief said ingenuously that he did not believe that the president had his party, or any groups within the party, in mind.

The PDI leaders, meanwhile, tried to have its cadres close ranks and ordered party representatives to refrain from publicly discussing the presidential nomination before the special leadership meeting. In early November, however, the PDI’s deputy treasurer, Markus Wauran, said that the party would nominate Suharto, and around the same time one of the party’s largest chapters, Central Java, declared its support for Suharto. Shortly afterwards, the chairman of the PDI’s Yogyakarta chapter, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, said on television that he supported Suharto. These public expressions of support for Suharto by leading PDI figures invited strong reactions from the party chairman as well as from individual legislators who were disappointed with the premature announcements of support for Suharto. Even though the party maintained its official stance that the presidential candidate would only be decided at the special leadership meeting, the declarations of support for Suharto in November led Tempo, and other observers, to conclude that the PDI would indeed decide to nominate Suharto.

As the internal split in the party over the presidential nomination exacerbated in November, the party came under mounting pressure from different outside parties to name its candidate. In the middle of November, Minister of Home Affairs Rudini urged the party to announce its candidate soon in order to quell unrest within the party. Coordinating Minister of Political Affairs and Security Sudomo, well-known for making provocative statements, said that the party experienced difficulties in living up to its election promises and urged the party to nominate an alternative candidate lest the party wanted to face accusations by its supporters for breaking its promises. Speculation that the military was pressuring the party to nominate Suharto, however, led the commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, publicly to refute such allegations. On the other side of the political spectrum, young PDI activists and oppositional student groups outside the party expressed their hopes that the party would decide to nominate anyone but Suharto.

As the special leadership meeting approached, now scheduled for 11–13 January 1993, Guruh Sukarnoputra again announced his readiness to be
nominated for president. At the end of December 1992, Guruh claimed that he had sent letters to Soerjadi and to the chairs of all the party’s provincial chapters and district branches around the country, declaring his willingness to stand as a presidential candidate. Although Guruh thus lobbied for support within the PDI, he did not campaign very actively outside the party, and he did not present any political programme to attract public support. For example, when asked in an interview about his views on unemployment and urbanisation, he said that those things were related to government policies. ‘These are not yet my business’, he said. Guruh instead argued that his attempt to be nominated was a matter of principle, thus indicating that he did not hold high hopes of actually being elected. His nomination attempt was instead meant to challenge Suharto’s single candidacy, and Guruh said that the MPR’s repeated re-election of Suharto could be interpreted as an endorsement of a ’presidency for life’, an idea which he said was repugnant to the people. He also hoped for the support of the military as a ’moral force’, and declared that he was willing to rule together with the armed forces.

The split within the party over the presidential nomination became more apparent ahead of the leadership meeting. Although Soerjadi tried to stifle public displays of discord within the party, the party’s central board was split in two groups, with one group around Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto wanting to nominate Suharto, and the other group, of whom PDI legislator Sophan Sophiaan was the most vocal and active, wanting to nominate another candidate. Guruh was not the first choice of candidate for the group around Sophan, but rather Soerjadi, who was seen as more credible and having more political experience. Illustrating the conspiratorial inclinations of New Order political culture, however, some of those supporting Soerjadi’s candidacy reportedly did so in order to put the chairman in a difficult position by forcing him to challenge Suharto. The PDI leader himself, meanwhile, explicitly said already in December 1992 that he was not prepared to be nominated. He later explained his refusal in cultural terms: ‘I am a Javanese. For the sake of Allah, I never said that I wanted to be nominated’, *Tempo* quoted him as saying. Soerjadi’s adherence to supposedly traditional Javanese values, according to which it was regarded as unethical openly to strive for power, were probably conditioned by the circumstances. Ahead of the 1986 party congress, by contrast, Soerjadi had no problem openly declaring that he wanted to become the party chair, and, as we shall see, he subsequently had no problem with openly declaring his ambition to be re-elected to the post ahead of the party’s July 1993 congress.
Apparently in order to forestall the possibility of the PDI nominating an alternative candidate, President Suharto now intervened more directly, deploying coercive means to pressure the PDI leaders. On 5 January 1993, the attorney-general’s office announced that the president had approved the questioning of Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto as witnesses in connection with the alleged kidnapping of two supporters of the Group of 17 in July 1991. Presidential approval was required because the two PDI leaders were members of the MPR. Even though the parties involved denied that there were any political implications in the case, the timing of the attorney-general’s announcement, only a week before the PDI’s special leadership meeting, suggested that the proceedings were used to put pressure on Soerjadi and Daryanto in order for the PDI to fall in line and nominate Suharto. The group of PDI legislators around Sophan Sophiaan issued a statement regretting the questioning of the two party leaders, calling it engineering for certain political reasons.

Soerjadi’s unwillingness, however, did not stop Sophan and those opposing Suharto’s nomination from campaigning for Soerjadi ahead the leadership meeting. Sophan tried to collect signatures from the party’s representatives in the MPR, but only managed to gather the signatures of 19 out of the 85 delegates. The lobbying efforts among the chapter leaders, by contrast, were more successful, especially among the chapters from outside Java. When the delegates arrived in Bogor on the eve of the leadership meeting, around 20 of the party’s 27 provincial boards were reportedly prepared to nominate Soerjadi. Before the meeting started, however, Soerjadi gathered the provincial leaders at a restaurant to explain to them that he was not prepared to be a candidate. The reason he gave was for the interests of the party, which apparently included his own re-election as party leader at the upcoming congress.

The special leadership meeting with representatives of all the party’s 27 chapters opened on 11 January outside Jakarta in Kopo, Bogor, under tight security and with hundreds of students demonstrating outside the venue, demanding that the party nominate a candidate other than Suharto. Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini opened the conference, telling the delegates that the government did not dictate to the PDI in its choice of presidential candidate and that the party had its full freedom to make its own decision. He also said, however: ‘There will always be those who like and dislike, are satisfied and dissatisfied with, whatever decision is taken. Therefore, the leaders always have to make a decision which carries with it the smallest possible risk for negative impact on the life of the nation and the state’. The message given by the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas, was similar but more blunt:
If, in the process of running the state during the last 25 years, there were parties who made efforts to stimulate attitudes which were antithetical to the momentum of development, the military, as a component of the national struggle, certainly would not take any risk whatsoever which might imperil the course of the national life and national development. [...] Change [is not] the objective of the national struggle, because the objective of the national struggle is already clearly formulated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Change, in this context, means change in the direction of better conditions, not change just for the sake of change.38

Hartas’s reference to the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the constitution referred to Pancasila as the basis for the country’s political life. Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were thus evoked mainly as exclusionary tools to locate any suggestions for political reform outside the permissible boundaries of the New Order’s political culture.

In addition to the pressure brought on the candidates from these official messages, Soerjadi was also, according to Adam Schwarz, pressured by military officials, who met the PDI leader privately several times during the conference.39 According to Laksamana Sukardi, at the time a member of Litbang, Benny Moerdani even summoned Soerjadi before the leadership meeting and directly instructed him to have the party nominate Suharto for president and Try Sutrisno for vice-president.40

On 13 January 1993, Soerjadi announced to the press that the PDI had decided to nominate Suharto for president and the commander-in-chief of the military, General Try Sutrisno, for vice-president. Only one of the party’s 27 chapters, South Kalimantan, persisted and suggested three other candidates: Soerjadi, Rudini and Guruh. This breach of consensus was apparently not mentioned by Soerjadi when he announced the result of the leadership meeting, and it seems overall to have been downplayed in the daily news media.41

The PDI leaders, largely in vain, tried to draw attention to the ostensibly democratic procedure that had preceded the decision. According to Soerjadi, the nomination had been carried out without pressure or intimidation. ‘We have all tried to carry out [the nomination] as democratically as possible, starting from the district level, via the regional level and up to the provincial level, culminating in this leadership meeting’, he said.42 The media and most analysts, however, concluded that the PDI leaders, particularly Soerjadi, had bowed to pressure from the regime.43
Overall, there was widespread disappointment among the party’s supporters and functionaries as a result of the meeting’s decision to nominate Suharto. Guruh accused Soerjadi and other party leaders of having vested interests in Suharto’s nomination, whereas Sophan Sophiaan expressed his deep disappointment in the decision and fitted a black ribbon on his sleeve to symbolise the demise of democracy in the party. One of the party’s legislators, S. G. B. Tampubolon, said that he and several of his colleagues felt completely broken and had no enthusiasm left for their work. Outside the PDI, meanwhile, the party was widely ridiculed by students and activists for its complaisance and for its failure to deliver on what were perceived to have been its election promises.

An editorial in the Republika daily called the PDI’s decision an ‘anti-climax’, and political scientist Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin named it the ‘biggest political joke after the 1992 election’.

Even though the PDI fell in line and nominated Suharto, its decision to nominate Try Sutrisno for the vice-presidency was somewhat unexpected. As we have seen, the choice of vice-president had previously been Suharto’s prerogative. Although the PDI had announced beforehand that the agenda of the leadership meeting included the party’s nominations of its candidates for both president and vice-president, the latter issue had been overshadowed by speculation that the party would nominate a presidential candidate other than Suharto. The general expectation seems to have been that the meeting would propose a number of vice-presidential candidates for the president to consider, as the party had done in 1988.

The nomination of Try as vice-president had first been suggested by Nico Daryanto in April 1992. The secretary general then argued that Try’s nomination was a necessary consequence of the party’s four political stances adopted by the 1986 congress, the second of which was support for the military’s dual function. Therefore, Nico argued, the party had to nominate a vice-president from the military. In January 1993, the decision to nominate Try seems to some extent to have been intended to save the face of the PDI leaders in the wake of their failure to live up to the expectations on its presidential nomination. Nico Daryanto admitted as much in an interview with the author, when he said that the vice-presidential nomination was an indirect way for the PDI to challenge the power of President Suharto, since it would have been too risky and in addition useless to challenge the president directly. According to Nico, the PDI’s promotion of Try made Suharto very angry, because the president had his mind set on another candidate. This other candidate, as we have seen, seemed to be Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie.
The PDI was the first MPR faction to decide to nominate a vice-presidential candidate for the period 1993, but a month later the military faction also decided to nominate Try, and two days later the PPP followed suit. Suharto was thus left with little choice but to accept the commander-in-chief as vice-president, lest he wanted to force a vote in the MPR, which, as we have seen, he had strongly argued against five years earlier when Sudharmono had been elected. Although Suharto apparently did not have any problems cooperating with Try, according to Adam Schwarz, the president later made it clear privately to government officials that he was unhappy with the military because of its stance on the vice-presidential election. The PDI, moreover, gained little credit for Try’s nomination, and observers were inclined to see the hand of the military behind Try’s election. According to William Liddle, the military had already decided to nominate Try by the end of 1992, and it seems likely that the PDI’s decision in January was influenced by the stance of the military. In any event, Nico Daryanto had from the outset based the nomination on reference to the party’s support for the military’s dual function. The PDI’s nomination of Try, therefore, should not be seen so much as a sign of the party’s independence as of its rapprochement to, or even dependence on, the military.

ACCOMMODATION AND INTERRUPTION

Disappointment with the PDI’s performance in the MPR was exacerbated one week after the leadership meeting had ended, when the party dropped all its demands for political reform except one, the demand for electoral reform. A day earlier, the PPP had likewise decided to drop all its reform proposals, on the vaguely formulated condition that its proposals be used as input for drafting legislation with lower status in the future. The PPP chairman, Ismail Hasan Metareum, had reportedly also been called for consultations with the president the night before the decision.

Due to the compact resistance from the three dominating factions in the MPR, the PDI achieved precious little in its efforts to initiate political reform. The most significant concession from the other factions — described as a ‘surprise’ by the Jakarta Post — was the acceptance by the other factions of a PDI suggestion to change the wording of the oath taken by the MPR members from ‘The new MPR members are sworn in...’ to ‘The new MPR members take an oath...’ The motivation for the change was that the words ‘sworn in’ gave the impression that the MPR was accountable to a higher institution, which was not the case because the assembly was the country’s highest political institution according to the constitution.
The Broad Outlines of State Policy, GBHN, which the working committee eventually adopted in mid-January 1993, closely followed the draft that the military’s MPR faction had submitted in the beginning of November. It is unclear why the draft provided by the president in June was abandoned in favour of that proposed by the military, but there seemed to be little fundamental change in the two drafts, and both Golkar and the regional representatives factions immediately declared their support for the new draft. The PDI and the PPP, however, protested against the new draft because they felt it overemphasised the successes of the first 25-year development plan, which ended in 1993. The parties also wanted to have the failures of the first 25-year plan listed in the GBHN. According to Aberson Marle Sihaloho of the PDI, these included disparities in economic distribution, the prevalence of unfair business practices, insufficient management of non-renewable natural resources and the government’s dependency on foreign borrowing. The parties, however, gained little sympathy from the Trifraksi for their views, and although 340 out of 524 paragraphs of the GBHN draft were altered in the final version, most of those changes – the result of three months of deliberations – were editorial. Tempo, for example, reported that PPP legislator Muhammad Buang had managed to bring about the replacement in one paragraph of the GBHN of the word kokoh (firm) with the word kukuh, which was merely an alternative spelling of kokoh. Moreover, according to Tempo, Buang’s suggestion had first been rejected.

There was considerable fear on the part of the authorities before the MPR general session that some of its members would disturb the event by trying to vent dissenting political aspirations. Although not stated outright by officials, the main threat seemed to come from the PDI, because, as we have seen, there was strong disappointment among some of the party’s legislators over the decision to nominate Suharto. The party had also vowed to fight until the end for its proposal for electoral reform, and appeared prepared to take the question to a vote in the MPR. Defence and Security Minister Benny Moerdani thus said in early February that, whereas he saw no threats of disturbances to the session from the outside, possible threats from the assembly itself should be guarded against. A deputy speaker of the MPR, Achmad Amaruddin, warned that individual members would not be allowed to air their opinions or interrupt the session to raise objections, and must only speak on behalf of their factions. Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini urged the factions to restrain their members so that they would behave in a disciplined way and in accordance with the assembly’s in-house rules.
opened, the MPR’s secretary general, Soelaksono, announced that his office had prepared a unit of ‘big-bodied [and] well mannered’ security personnel which could be deployed at the orders of the meeting chairman to remove by force any member of the assembly who did not adhere to the MPR’s in-house rules, including those about interruption.57 In justifying this move, Soelaksono referred to the disruption of the 1988 MPR session, when a disgruntled military officer, Brigadier General Ibrahim Saleh, had interrupted a session of the MPR’s working committee in order to express his complaints about the vice-presidential election.58

As the general session of the MPR opened on 1 March 1993, the PDI continued to advocate changes to the election system. Sabam Sirait was the party’s most prominent advocate of election reform, and he was reported to be the ‘brain’ behind the party’s suggestions. As we have seen, the suggestions largely consisted of long-standing demands of both the PPP and the PDI, such as that the elections be organised jointly by the government and the three election contestants, that the poll be held on a non-working day and that the words ‘honestly’ and ‘fairly’ be added to the 1988 MPR decree on general elections. In addition, Sabam wanted to replace the symbols of the three election contestants on the voting cards with the names of the election contestants, and for the regional representatives in the MPR to be chosen by the regional parliaments in accordance with the proportional representation of the parties and Golkar in those assemblies.59 The other factions, however, rejected any further discussion of the proposal, and even the PPP took a hostile stance, although its earlier proposals had been largely similar to the PDI’s proposal. According to the PPP, a consensus had already been reached on the issue in the deliberations in the working committee. ‘Any consensus reached in the preliminary debates has moral [sic] binding force, meaning that settled issues should not be raised again in the upcoming debates’, faction spokesman Zein Badjeber said.60 This stance won the party praise from the secretary of the Golkar faction, Akbar Tandjung, who said that the statement reflected the PPP’s ‘maturity in playing politics’. Sabam Sirait, however, claimed that no consensus had been reached in the working committee, and that all factions had agreed to continue the discussions at the general session.61

On 5 March, the MPR held a plenary meeting to decide the composition and agenda of the three commissions that would finalise the proposals for the assembly. Commission B was entrusted with discussing matters not pertaining to the Broad Outlines of State Policy, and according to the PDI, these included its proposal for election reform. However, when the house speaker and Golkar
chairman, Wahono, at the plenary meeting, announced the agenda for the commission, the PDI’s proposal was not included. Sabam Sirait immediately sent a note to Wahono via courier objecting to the exclusion, but apparently the speaker did not read the note. Consequently, when Wahono banged the gavel to finalise the assembly’s decision on the composition and agenda of the commissions, Sabam Sirait interrupted the session and walked up to the podium. He was soon joined by Nico Daryanto and another leading PDI legislator, Sukowaluyo. Some of the other delegates urged the three PDI representatives to sit down, and some called for the security guards. Wahono, however, allowed Nico Daryanto to address the assembly, whereas Sabam and Sukowaluyo went back to their seats. Nico, who was booed from the floor as he spoke, said that the PDI did not wish to create difficulties or to give a bad impression, but explained that he expected that discussions about those matters on which consensus had not been reached ahead of the general session to continue in the MPR’s commissions. After his short speech, Nico went back to his seat. A few minutes later, Akbar Tandjung strode up to the podium and demanded that he also be allowed to address the assembly in order to lay out Golkar’s opinions on the matter. The request was rejected by Wahono, reportedly on the basis that the clarification given by the PDI was already sufficient. Wahono’s rejection of his request annoyed Akbar Tandjung, who publicly questioned the decision, thus displaying a rare open rift in Golkar.62 Wahono apparently had some sympathies for Sabam’s plight, and after the session, he reportedly pulled the PDI legislator over and said: ‘You are not angry with me, are you? I am just doing my duty [and] you are also doing your duty’.63

At the meeting of Commission B on the following day, the PDI’s proposal was still not on the agenda as it was read out by the commission’s chairman, Oetojo Oesman. Several PDI members of the commission angrily protested against the exclusion from discussion of their party’s proposal, and during a one-hour adjournment, one PDI legislator, B. N. Marbun, even tore up a copy of the commission’s schedule in the face of Akbar Tandjung. The meeting continued on the following day with 30 minutes’ ‘lobbying’ (lobi) during which Akbar Tandjung, Oetojo Oesman and Sabam Sirait participated. The last part of the lobbying was closed to the press. Sabam Sirait, who up until then had seemed to be in good spirits, left the meeting in tears. ‘I am just a human being. That is all I can say [...] Democracy is still far away, we have to keep on fighting’ he told journalists as he headed towards PDI’s offices in the parliamentary complex.64

In a later interview, Sabam said that Akbar Tandjung had promised him that Golkar would support the efforts to change the 1988 MPR decree on the
Challenging the New Order: The 1993 MPR Session

general elections. ‘I was already at ease. I was sure, because Akbar represented his faction. But it did not happen. God knows why, I do not know and Akbar did not explain,’ Sabam said.65 Akbar Tandjung, however, said after the lobbying that the meeting had been conducted in the spirit of masyawarah in order to reach a mufakat. He also that there had been no bargaining what-so-ever. ‘There were suggestions [to bargain], but we did not want to,’ he said.66

After the lobbying meeting, the commission finally discussed the PDI’s suggestion to change the MPR decree on general elections, reportedly after the military had taken the PDI’s side and agreed to put a discussion on the agenda.67 As expected, the other four factions continued to reject any changes to the decree. The PDI’s representative, Budi Hardjono, however, expressed his thanks to the commission for agreeing to discuss the proposal, and after hearing the rejections of the other factions, he declared that the PDI was ready to acquiesce in the views of the majority in the assembly. Soerjadi, meanwhile, said that the result achieved in the commission was the best way to settle the matter, not only for the PDI, but also for ‘togetherness, democracy and the nation’.68 The PDI’s decision to drop its demand for reform won praise from the other MPR factions, and a military representative, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, claimed that ‘[t]he absence of voting shows the maturity of democracy in our country’.69 Some PDI legislators, including Guruh Sukarnoputra and Aberson Marle Sihaloho, however, were disappointed that the party had not persisted in demanding a vote on the issue. Aberson said that if the PDI had been defeated in a vote, the party could have told its voters afterwards that the proposal had failed because a large proportion of those who opposed it were appointed by the government and not popularly elected.70

After the PDI had abandoned its suggestion for electoral reform, the rest of the MPR session followed the prepared script. The assembly duly adopted the Broad Outlines of State Policy and elected Suharto by acclamation for a sixth term as president. The only novelty in the 1993 presidential election compared with earlier instances was that the Trifraksi legislators stood up when they shouted in agreement to Suharto’s re-election. Try Sutrisno was also undramatically elected as vice-president, and the general MPR session closed on 11 March 1993.71

CONCLUSIONS

The government’s unprecedented gesture in giving its draft of the GBHN to the MPR factions several months before the session proved to be a very token
concession to the calls for openness and to the demands from the political parties for more influence. The PDI, however, tried to push ahead with a number of crucial political reform proposals, including the limitation of the presidential term and changes in the election laws. In doing so, the PDI appropriated the ideological platform of the regime, particularly in the references to the constitution to motivate the party’s proposals. The party could thus effectively criticise the government and the regime from a position within the system and contest the hegemonic political culture of the New Order. At the same time, the PDI continued to stand out as the most vocal proponent for change within the framework of the regime.

The input from the PDI, which was adopted after three months of deliberations in the MPR’s working committees, however, concerned little more than semantics, and all proposals for any significant reforms or policies were consistently rejected by the three dominating pro-government factions in the MPR. The rejections by the Trifraksi were generally not explained with reference to any ideological or policy arguments. Instead, the proposals were simply dismissed out of hand as ‘unnecessary’, which again reflected the lack of substantial political discussion in New Order political culture. The legislators of the three factions were there to perform their tasks, on behalf of the president, of safeguarding the political system from any attempts at reform and to see that the government’s policy suggestions were endorsed and the president unanimously re-elected. In doing so, they stood little to gain from engaging in a serious debate with the political parties over the issue of political reform. The refusal of the pro-government factions to engage in discussion with the PDI over its reform proposals, however, also indicated a lack of confidence on behalf of the pro-regime factions, which probably was based in the tacit realisation that the regime was morally corrupt and lacked popular legitimacy. The outcome of the 1993 MPR session was that the Trifraksi made little positive contribution to the discussions.

Within the PDI, there were differences of opinion about the lengths to which the party should go in fighting for its reform ideas. Some of the more radical legislators urged a more confrontational stance, but the party leaders eventually backed down from the party’s challenging stance, in what they claimed to be the interests of the party. As the general MPR session drew near and the PDI persisted in its confrontational stance, the regime increasingly resorted to a combined strategy of manipulation of the political process and coercive practices, including personal threats and judicial harassment and even the deployments of security guards against the representatives of the people’s
sovereignty. *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution were used as tools of exclusion to locate the PDI’s drive for reform outside the permissible boundaries of New Order political culture, thereby implying that the PDI was unpatriotic and acting unethically if the party did not comply with the dominant forces in the MPR. In the end, the PDI did comply and refrained from forcing a vote in the MPR. This stance, however, was resented by several of the more radical politicians – many of whom belonged to the ‘new breed’ of politicians recruited under Soerjadi – and by reform-oriented groups outside the party. Much of this resentment focused on Soerjadi personally, who was accused of being opportunist.

The MPR, which embodied the people’s sovereignty under the constitution, was in many respects an assembly of elites with little contact with or concern for broader political aspirations. Soerjadi, for example, did not even think it appropriate that the *wong cilik* in the coffee stalls or on the roadside discuss such an important issue as the presidential election. Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas also indicated the prevalence of such elitist sentiments when he urged the PDI legislators to be selective and meticulous in taking in popular aspirations. However, his warning against the party’s expressing the aspirations of certain groups rather than the whole people pointed to a central problem within the prevailing political culture, namely, the reluctance to recognise that there were legitimate differences in aspirations between different segments of the ‘people’ and that an adequate political system must be able to provide functioning arenas and forms for political interaction between these different aspirations.

**NOTES**

1 *Media Indonesia* (8 July 1992). The draft had been prepared by the National Defence and Security Council, Wanhankamnas (Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional).
6 The articles were articles 4–15 of the constitution. Article four stated that the president exercises governmental power according to the constitution, and article five said that the president has the power to institute legislation with the ratification of Parliament. Otherwise, the only unambiguous limitation on the president's
powers was contained in article 11, which stated that the president needs the ratification of Parliament to declare war and to make peace agreements and contracts with other countries.

7 Suara Pembaruan (17 November 1992).
8 Suara Merdeka (17 November 1992) and Jakarta Post (17 November 1992).
9 E.g. Media Indonesia (11 March 1993). The term was a Sanskrit hybrid, which, intentionally or not, aptly brought associations to the concept of triwangsa (literally the 'three peoples'), that is, the three upper Hindu castes.

10 E.g. Jakarta Post (3 November 1992).
11 Jakarta Post (20 October 1992).
12 Jakarta Post (20 October 1992).
16 Suara Pembaruan (17 November 1992).
18 Tempo (22 June 1991).
21 Kompas (17 October 1992). This decision, however, was not included in the proceedings of the meeting published by the PDI’s central board; see Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 308–309).
22 Merdeka (17 and 19 October 1992).
23 Kompas (23 November 1992).
24 Jakarta Post (4 March 1993). There was considerable support for a limitation even among Golkar legislators, 36 per cent of whom were positive to the idea. The samples for the military (six respondents) and the regional representatives (three respondents) were too small to have any statistical value.
25 Jakarta Post (22 October 1992).
26 Media Indonesia (22 October 1992).
29 Merdeka (31 December 1992). Soerjadi, however, said several days after Guruh's declaration that he had not heard anything about his campaign to be nominated and that he would demand a clarification from Guruh. Shortly before the leadership meeting of 11–13 January, Soerjadi admitted that he had received Guruh's letter, but said that it was only a photocopy and that he did not know what Guruh meant by it; Media Indonesia (4 January 1992) and Republika (11 January 1992).
Challenging the New Order: The 1993 MPR Session

30 Media Indonesia (10 January 1993).
31 Jakarta Post (7 January 1993). The concept of president-for-life, coincidentally, was above all associated with Guruh's father, Sukarno, who had been awarded that title by the MPRS in 1963. In 1966, however, the MPRS, which by then had been purged of pro-Sukarno elements, revoked the 1963 decision; see Nasution (1966: 125–127).
32 Media Indonesia (10 January 1993).
33 Editor (23 January 1993) and Tempo (23 January 1993).
34 Tempo (9 January 1993) and Jakarta Post (9 January 1993). The letter was said to have been signed by the president already on 8 December 1992, but had apparently not led to any further steps until the following month.
35 Media Indonesia (11 January 1993).
36 Editor (23 January 1993) and Tempo (23 January 1993 and 10 July 1993). For Soerjadi's campaign to be re-elected to the party chair, see the following chapter.
37 Kompas (12 January 1993).
38 Kompas (12 January 1993).
40 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997). Soerjadi himself denied that there was any outside pressure around the meeting; interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
41 Suara Pembaruan (13 January 1993) and Editor (23 January 1993). Kompas (14 January 1993) and Angkatan Bersenjata (14 January 1993) did not mention South Kalimantan's dissenting vote. According to Soerjadi, as quoted by the Suara Pembaruan (13 January 1993) daily, all chapters separately nominated Suharto.
42 Suara Pembaruan (13 January 1993).
43 See e.g. the editorial in Merdeka (14 January 1993) and Arbi Sanit's analysis in the Jakarta Post (14 January 1993).
44 Republika (16 January 1993) and Jakarta Post (15 January 1993 and 16 January 1993).
45 Republika (14 January 1993) and Antara (14 January 1993).
47 Interview with Nico Daryanto, Jakarta (14 March 1997). Nico seemed very satisfied with having upset the president, and especially emphasised that he personally had started the promotion of Try Sutrisno.
50 E.g. Schwarz (1994: 285–286), Liddle (1993: 32) and MacIntyre (1994a: 111–112). Schwarz mistakenly says that the military first declared its nomination of Try and that the other assembly factions followed suit, thus ignoring the PDI's nomination of Try one month ahead of the military. Liddle (1993: 32) also ignores the circumstance that the PDI nominated Try ahead of the military. The lack of attention to the PDI on the part of these authors once again demonstrates the
strength of the state-centred paradigm in studies of late New Order politics, in
which the processes in the political parties were largely regarded as irrelevant.

51 Liddle (1993: 32).
54 Jakarta Post (4 November 1992 and 5 November 1992). As it was, the GBHN
adopted by the MPR only recognised that, although the first 25-year plan had
already yielded very positive results, there were still problems which had not been
completely overcome, and that, consequently, efforts to overcome these problems
would have to be continued through the next 25-year plan; see Ketetapan-ketetapan
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 1993 (1993: 115). Significantly,
a critical passage about economic disparity in the 1988 GBHN was scrapped in the
1993 GBHN, in spite of strong evidence that such disparity actually had increased
in the years between 1988 and 1993. The 1988 GBHN passage said that ‘there is a
small social stratum with a very strong economic position which dominates the
greater part of the national economy, while on the other hand the majority of
society finds itself in a weak economic condition’; Keppres 15/1984, GBHN dan
55 Tempo (30 January 1993).
56 Angkatan Bersenjata (4 February 1993), Jakarta Post (3 February 1993) and Kompas
(8 February 1993).
57 Kompas (26 February 1993).
59 Media Indonesia (3 March 1993).
60 Jakarta Post (4 March 1993).
61 Jakarta Post (4 March 1993).
62 Pelita (6 March 1993) and Media Indonesia (6 March 1993). According to Tempo
(13 March 1993), Akbar Tandjung was even restrained by the security personnel in
order to obstruct him from approaching the podium when the PDI representatives
were there.
64 Kompas (8 March 1993).
66 Kompas (8 March 1993).
67 Jakarta Post (9 March 1993).
68 Kompas (8 March 1993).
69 Jakarta Post (9 March 1993).
70 Media Indonesia (8 March 1993) and Jakarta Post (9 March 1993).
71 Media Indonesia (11 March 1993). See Ketetapan-ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat Republik Indonesia 1993 (1993) for the decisions of the 1993 MPR session.
CHAPTER 9

The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

‘ASAL BUKAN SOERJADI’

According to a decision taken at the PDI’s congress in 1986, the party’s fourth congress was to be held in April 1993, after the general session of the MPR. On 13 March, however, the party’s central board announced that it had decided to postpone the congress until July in order to fit the schedule of the president, who, in keeping with the common practice under the New Order, was invited to open the congress.

The decision also gave Soerjadi more time to campaign for re-election from his platform as party leader. Soerjadi had declared already in February that he wanted to be re-elected in order to be able to continue his programme for consolidating and strengthening the party. The party chair, moreover, had begun his lobbying efforts among the provincial leaders at least a month earlier, in connection with the party’s special leadership meeting in Bogor. As mentioned above, Soerjadi had gathered the provincial leaders at a restaurant on the eve of the opening of the meeting to dissuade them from nominating him as the party’s presidential candidate. According to the weekly Tempo, Soerjadi then said that nominating him for president was not in accordance with his plans to lead the PDI for another period, and that pressing ahead with such a manoeuvre would be likely to invite resentment from ‘another force’ (kekuatan lain). His mention of ‘another force’ was almost certainly meant to refer to Suharto, who, as we have seen, ahead of the leadership meeting had pressured the PDI and its leaders to nominate him for another term in office.

As Soerjadi and the PDI eventually had complied and nominated Suharto, as well as later dropping all its demands for political reform without forcing a vote in the MPR, the PDI leader apparently believed that he could count on the government’s support for his re-election. The president’s agreement to open the congress was seen as an endorsement of Soerjadi’s leadership, and high-ranking government and military officials repeatedly declared that the govern-
ment would not interfere in the party’s leadership election. After the closing of the MPR session, moreover, neither Soerjadi or Nico Daryanto were summoned again by the police in connection with the alleged kidnapping and beating of two supporters of the Group of 17 in July 1991. The investigation instead seemed to have stalled. The trial had originally been scheduled for the end of February, but by mid-April, the South Jakarta District Court had reportedly not yet received the results of the police investigation.

Soerjadi continued his lobbying efforts in the party in order to ensure his re-election meanwhile. In April, the PDI leader quietly invited all provincial leaders to a meeting at his house in Jakarta in order to shore up support for his re-election bid. Of the party’s 27 provinces, only three failed to send their leaders, those of Jakarta, East Timor and Central Kalimantan. Although Soerjadi thus apparently could count on the support of the majority of the provincial boards, his support among the party’s district branches – whose representatives would make up the vast majority of the congress delegates – was less certain. The district delegates, however, were required to obtain a mandate from their respective provincial chapters in order to attend the congress, and in several provinces the district branches were pressured to give their mandate to the provincial board to represent them in the leadership election. As the congress opened, Soerjadi had reportedly collected written statements of support from 259 of the party’s 303 district branches. Through these methods, he appeared to have secured his smooth re-election at the congress.

Soerjadi’s leadership, however, was challenged by several alternative candidates for the party’s top post. The fiercest contender was Aberson Marle Sihaloho, who, as we have seen, was a vocal PDI legislator and who had been one of the hard-liners in advocating political reforms in the MPR. Shortly after the assembly closed, Aberson said that Soerjadi had serious ‘political defects’ and criticised the party chair for having committed various political blunders, of which he specifically mentioned Soerjadi’s endorsement of Suharto’s candidacy in contradiction to the party’s election promises. Aberson also accused Soerjadi of employing undemocratic methods in his efforts to gather support in the party and of using party funds to finance his campaign, as well as of obstructing Aberson’s own campaign to be elected. Soerjadi, by contrast, urged his competitor to present concrete programs for the coming five years instead of trying to discredit him.

In addition to Soerjadi and Aberson, there were four serious contenders for the top post: the outspoken legislator Budi Hardjono, two deputy chairmen of the central board, Tarto Sudiro and Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, and a deputy
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

chairman of the party’s Jakarta chapter, Ismunandar. The Sukarno family, among which, as we have seen, there was dissatisfaction with Soerjadi’s leadership because of the party’s compliance at the MPR session, reportedly supported Tarto Sudiro.10

Apart from these contenders for the party’s top post, Soerjadi also had to deal with the Group of 17 and their sympathisers, who began to increase their activities in the run-up to the congress, now scheduled to take place in Medan, North Sumatra, on 21–25 July. Although the government still firmly declared that it supported Soerjadi’s leadership, the position of the dissidents was strengthened when Achmad Subagyo, one of the legislators who had been recalled in 1988 and who subsequently, in 1991, had set up a rival central board, was appointed by the president to be a member of the Supreme Advisory Council, DPA, a couple of months before the congress.11 Although the DPA was a largely ceremonial body with no practical political influence, the representation of the political parties in the council had some symbolic significance, because of the DPA’s proximity to the president. The appointment of a major adversary to Soerjadi was thus widely regarded as a snub to the PDI chairman. The Group of 17 and their supporters now began to feel that they were fighting a winning battle, and Achmad Subagyo’s rival board set up a congress committee to organise their own congress, also in Medan. Meanwhile, one of the original leaders of the Group of 17, Marsoesi, threatened to bring 2,000 of his supporters to Medan and have them force their way into the congress organised by Soerjadi’s central board.12

The original stance of the central board had been that the expelled members of the Group of 17 would be given the chance to defend themselves at the congress, but two weeks before the opening of the congress, Soerjadi suddenly said that it would be up to the congress to decide if there were to be any reconciliation with the dissident group. He also threatened to use security forces to bar their entry to the congress venue.13 The PDI chairman gave no reasons for this sudden change in his stance. An obvious reason was the confrontational attitude of the dissidents, who threatened to take over or ruin the congress. Another reason was probably that Soerjadi by now had begun to sense that the government was undermining his efforts to be re-elected, as rumours in political circles had it that the government wished to ‘dethrone’ Soerjadi.14 The media summerised the operation by the abbreviation ABS, which in this context was interpreted as Asal Bukan Soerjadi, that is, ‘anyone but Soerjadi’.15 The conventional meaning of ABS, however, was Asal Bapak Senang, that is, ‘keep the boss happy’, which expressed a supposedly traditional
Javanese attitude of deference to authority. The broader, implicit, meaning of ABS in the context seemed to be that Soerjadi was to be ousted in order to placate the president.

The authorities’ main strategy to thwart Soerjadi’s chances of re-election was to implicate him in the kidnapping case. After the police investigation, as mentioned, seemed to have stalled for five months, the trial suddenly opened in the beginning of July, only a few weeks before the PDI congress, in the South Jakarta District Court. The accused in the trial was the chairman of the PDI’s Jakarta chapter, Alex Asmasoebrata, a former associate of Soerjadi, who now emerged as a major opponent of the PDI leader. In mid-July, a witness claimed before the court that Soerjadi had tried to bribe him and six other witnesses not to mention Soerjadi’s name in the trial, and that the PDI leader, moreover, had ordered the killing of the kidnapped activists in July 1991. Soerjadi was subsequently summoned to witness in the trial, but he failed to fulfil two summons and instead sent a letter to the panel of judges, requesting that the hearing be postponed until after the party congress. In spite of loud protests from Alex Asmasoebrata, the court agreed to Soerjadi’s request, and the hearing was postponed until 2 August, one week after the scheduled closing of the congress.

Regional military officials, meanwhile, held briefings with the PDI’s congress delegates from their respective provinces before they departed for Medan. Their messages to the delegates in the various provinces was overall similar, and, as the Jakarta Post noted, ‘sounded as if they were being orchestrated’. The recurrent message from the officers to the PDI delegates was not to elect a party leader who had a ‘legal defect’ (cacat hukum). After meeting the president two days before the opening of the congress, the commander-in-chief of the military, General Feisal Tandjung, said that there was no candidate preferred by the government or the military for the PDI chair, and that all would be up to the congress floor. However, he said the party leader should not be someone with a ‘legal defect’. As if the message was not clear enough, the general elaborated:

For example, [let’s say that] unexpectedly, someone [is elected] who is implicated to be involved in the charge of a kidnapping case which now is on trial at the South Jakarta District Court. For example, if he is elected by the congress, and it then happens and transpires that he has a legal defect, is there going to be another congress? That is just a waste of funds. Better to elect someone who is better.
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

THE 1993 MEDAN CONGRESS

The five-day congress, held at the Pangkalan Masyhur haj dormitory in Medan, was opened by President Suharto on the morning of 21 July 1993. His welcome address was followed by messages from Soerjadi, General Feisal Tandjung and Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. Momet. Some 15 minutes after Yogie finished his speech, hundreds of supporters of Achmad Subagyo’s rival central board crashed the gates of the congress venue with a hardtop jeep and an old Toyota van, and subsequently stormed the main hall where the congress had just started its plenary session. Deputy party chair Fatimah Achmad, who led the session, managed to adjourn it before she was hit in the head by a plastic bottle and forced to leave the podium. The demonstrators reportedly shouted slogans deriding Soerjadi, called for the liquidation of the party chairman and sang patriotic songs as they marched into the meeting hall. One of the members of the rival central board and a former PDI functionary who had been demoted at Soerjadi’s behest, Jacob Nuwa Wea, took the microphone and announced the take-over of the congress. He then asked Alex Asmasoebrata, who now supported the rival board, to lead the congress.

The action of the dissidents would not have succeeded without the tacit approval of the security forces that guarded the congress venue. Before the congress, it had been reported that 1,000 police and military personnel – about as many as the number of congress delegates – would be deployed to keep security tight. After the incident, the North Sumatra chief of police, Brigadier General Soebandy, said that the Medan police district had only deployed 30 police officers at the time. ‘With that number of personnel we hoped to be able to convey the impression that the congress went smoothly and not under exaggerated security’, he said, adding that the action of the dissidents was unanticipated. These explanations seemed incredible, because, as we have seen, the dissidents had openly announced ahead of the congress that they intended to force their way into the event.

The intruders occupied the congress hall for five hours, during which time they argued their case to those delegates who were still present. The apparent intention of the occupiers was to continue to lead the congress until its close, and they would probably have continued their action had not Nico Daryanto persuaded Defence and Security Minister Edi Sudradjat, who was scheduled to address the congress delegates the same evening, to order the security forces to clear the rival group from the congress hall. The demonstrators subsequently left the congress venue voluntarily after an appeal by the Medan chief of police,
Lieutenant-Colonel Chairuddin Ismail, who backed up his appeal by a company of riot police. At 10.30 p.m., the congress resumed to hear the defence and security minister’s address, two and a half hours behind schedule.29

On the second day of the congress security appears to have been reinforced, and the supporters of the Group of 17 were obstructed from entering the congress hall by riot police and police dog units. Soerjadi and the congress organisers could thus continue the congress, and they took the opportunity to push swiftly through with Soerjadi’s re-election, even though the leadership election was not scheduled until the last day of the congress. After hearing the chairman’s accountability report for the preceding term in office and the mainly positive reactions of all of the party’s 27 regional branches, the chair of the session, Deputy Secretary General of the central board Dimmy Haryanto, asked the delegates if they could elect Soerjadi to the party chair for the period 1993–98. The delegates answered affirmatively, by acclamation and – apparently inspired by the presidential election a few months earlier – by standing up. The session also mandated Soerjadi to form the committee that would propose the line-up of the central board for the upcoming period. After the session, Dimmy Haryanto explained that the election of party chairman had been brought forward at the request of the congress delegates. ‘This is Pancasila democracy which is cultivated by the PDI’, he said, apparently without irony.30 Soerjadi’s opponents for the post of chairman were less enthusiastic about the democratic character of the election procedure. Aberson Marle Sihaloho, who, apparently at Soerjadi’s behest, had been designated as a committee man (panitia) with no right of speech at the congress, said that, although the election was formally binding, it was undemocratic and manipulative. Tarto Sudiro said that the election violated the party’s statutes as well as the congress schedule.31

In spite of the democratically dubious circumstances surrounding Soerjadi’s re-election, an editorial in the Jakarta Post actually hailed the decision as a sign that Indonesian democracy had ‘developed and matured’.32 The editorial wanted to see the affair in a positive light, arguing that the decision was an unprecedented instance of civil disobedience, because the congress delegates had defied the clear signal from General Feisal Tandjung not to re-elect Soerjadi. On the same note, political scientist Amir Santoso suggested that the decision might have been motivated by a wish on the part of the congress delegates to assert the party’s independence of the government.33 Even though such considerations may have been on the minds of some of the congress delegates when they re-elected Soerjadi, the forms under which the decision was taken, as well as Soerjadi’s campaign to be elected ahead of the congress, demonstrated little
commitment to democratic procedures. Only one day earlier, after the congress' opening ceremony, Soerjadi had advocated voting as the best procedure for electing the party chairman. In view of the party's fierce championing of voting for the president and vice-president in the MPR, less than half a year earlier, regardless of whether there was one candidate or several, any other position would have been difficult to defend. No preparations to hold a vote were made, however, before the congress met because, Soerjadi said, it was all up to the congress. After he was elected Soerjadi offered no regrets over the fact that the decision had been taken by acclamation and not put to a vote. 'I am moved by this decision', he instead told reporters.

The government appears to have been taken aback by the disobedience of the congress and by the swift manoeuvring of Soerjadi and his supporters. Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. said that since the decision to re-elect Soerjadi had been taken ahead of schedule and not in accordance with the congress rules, it was not yet valid. Likewise, the military chief of information, Brigadier General Syarwan Hamid, questioned whether the decision adhered to the party's statutes and the congress rules.

Indirectly, the government's response came on the following morning, 23 July, when security around the congress apparently was relaxed, thus allowing the supporters of the Group of 17 again to crash the gates of the congress venue with a jeep and enter the congress hall. The rebels ordered the congress delegates to stay in their seats and tried forcibly to prevent them from leaving the room. Achmad Subagyo now claimed that his supporters did not want to take over the congress, but only to participate. Jacob Nuwa Wea, meanwhile, said: 'Do not be afraid. We act for the unity and integrity of the PDI in order to save the PDI from the leadership of Soerjadi, who [has] a legal defect'. He also urged the congress delegates to declare the congress invalid and entrust its continuation to the ministry of internal affairs.

Security forces took the initiative to divide the congress venue into two zones, with Soerjadi's side controlling the side rooms of the Pangkalan Masyhur haj dormitory, and the Group of 17 occupiers controlling the main hall. Alex Asmasoebrata and his brother, Ferry Asmasoebrata, tried to cross the demarcation line, but were immediately attacked and beaten by pro-Soerjadi congress security guards until they were rescued, Alex with a bleeding wound in his head, by the military security personnel. 'This is Medan, buddy', one of the young pro-Soerjadi thugs reportedly said, referring to the city's reputation as a rough place. In all, five supporters of the Group of 17 were beaten and treated in hospital as a result of clashes during the day.
The deadlock continued during the remaining two congress days. The congress procedures continued in three working commissions, but the occupation of the main hall by the Group of 17 obstructed the congress organisers from holding any plenary sessions, and consequently the suggestions and proceedings of the commissions could not be ratified by the congress. Soerjadi and his supporters hoped that the congress hall would be cleared by the security forces for the closing ceremony, scheduled for 25 July, which was to be presided over by Vice-president Try Sutrisno. If only a short plenary session could be held, they would be able to push through the results of the commissions, and the congress could be formally closed. The vice-president, however, cancelled his participation with no official explanation given, and the occupation of the congress hall continued until the deadline for the closing of the congress passed on the evening of 25 July. In lieu of a closing plenary session, the party’s central board apparently collected statements from the branch delegates, in which they pledged allegiance to Soerjadi’s leadership and the results of the deliberations in the congress commissions.41

Shortly after the congress, the government said that it ‘agreed if the congress was declared to have failed’, and that Soerjadi’s re-election was invalid. After meeting representatives of the various sides in the conflict, Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. instead urged the party to set up a ‘caretaker’ board – an institution not mentioned in the party’s statutes – comprising all factions in the party, including the Group of 17 and the rival board of Achmad Subagyo.42

The minister claimed that the government’s intervention in the party’s affairs had been requested by the members of the PDI, and that the government would only ‘guide from behind’ (tut wuri handayani). This Javanese expression, introduced in the New Order political discourse by army leaders in the mid-1970s, refers, in the words of Harold Crouch, to the ‘guidance given by a parent to a child learning to walk, where the parent does not actually support the child but is always ready to save him from falling’.43 The same paternalistic attitude towards the party was also evident in the comments by Minister of Defence and Security Edi Sudradjat, who said that the problem was that the neither the party’s members nor its chairman were ‘grown-up’ (dewasa). When asked about the possibility of the government being asked to intervene, if there should be another congress, he said: ‘Yes, I wouldn’t be surprised. When will they grow up?’44

In spite of the obvious failure on the part of the security forces in maintaining security around the congress, Edi Sudradjat said that they had handled the chaotic situation well, and he even claimed, unbelievably, that security had
been optimal. The minister appeared to think that the clashes between members of the party were not the concern of the government’s security apparatus. ‘They are fellow [party] members who tussle. So, we respect that’, he said, reportedly with a smile.\(^45\) This hands-off policy and the ensuing chaos at the congress also provided the government with the necessary pretext to intervene and annul Soerjadi’s re-election. Now, the problem for Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M., who was entrusted with the task of dealing with the situation in the party, was to make the government’s interference look like a benevolent act of paternal aid and guidance, and not as an unwarranted authoritarian intervention.

**TOWARDS THE SURABAYA EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS**

A major problem for the minister of internal affairs was that Soerjadi still appeared to enjoy broad support among the party’s provincial chapters and district branches and that he refused to withdraw voluntarily on the grounds that his re-election at the congress allegedly was valid. In early August, newspapers reported that Yogie explicitly had urged Soerjadi to resign from the party chair, but the following day, after a meeting with the president, the minister denied having made such a statement. He instead threatened that the president had the right to halt the activities of the central board, and said that the PDI leadership now was in a vacuum. This statement inspired a cartoon in the *Media Indonesia* daily, which tellingly portrayed the minister with a vacuum cleaner, sucking the struggling Soerjadi into the nozzle. Yogie, who appeared to be inexperienced in handling political party affairs, seemed distressed by the public attention which the case attracted, and on 8 August he even ordered the public to stop talking about the problems in the PDI, complaining that there had been too many comments about the crisis in the newspapers.\(^46\)

In mid-August, there were reports that the government had appointed a caretaker board, which once again forced Yogie to deny the press reports.\(^47\) The government carefully wanted to avoid conveying the impression that it dictated to the party, and, eventually, the composition of the caretaker board was instead decided by a meeting of representatives of the party’s 27 provincial chapters in Surabaya at the end of August. The representatives were hastily flown in from around the country to the East Java capital, where they met the minister of internal affairs at an airport hotel. The representatives then immediately started work on composing the caretaker board. The meeting had no formal status according to the party’s statutes, and the participants had reportedly been selected by the government on the recommendations of the provincial direc-

201
The resulting caretaker board was chaired by the party’s little-known East Java chairman, Latief Pudjosakti, and was dominated by Soerjadi’s foes, including supporters of the Group of 17 and the rival central board. Kwik Kian Gie, who had abandoned his support for Soerjadi at the height of the Medan congress, was made a deputy chairman, and three of Soerjadi’s competitors for the party chair ahead of the Medan congress were included in the line-up: Ismunandar, who held the post as secretary general, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno and Budi Hardjono. When hearing the report of the new leadership line-up, Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie said that he felt ‘extreme pleasure’ because the caretaker board had finally been set up. ‘When I go back from Surabaya, I will not feel embarrassed meeting Mr. President Suharto anymore. Sir, this is a present for you, sir…’ he said upon receiving the composition of the caretaker board.

With the announcement of the caretaker board, Soerjadi apparently realised that he had lost the struggle to cling to the party chair, and he said that he accepted the new leadership, although it had been formed under unusual circumstances. On 31 August 1993, the caretaker board moved into the party’s central headquarters in Jakarta, symbolically removing Soerjadi’s picture from the wall of the main office. The main task of the caretakers was to organise an extraordinary congress which would elect a new leadership and review some of the decisions taken by the central board under Soerjadi, particularly the 1988 decision to expel the Group of 17 dissidents. The government explicitly favoured the rehabilitation of the Group of 17 and the supporters of Achmad Subagyo’s rival central board, and they were invited to be involved in all party activities, including the organisation of the extraordinary congress. The congress was scheduled for the beginning of December 1993 in Surabaya, which, as we have seen, was a stronghold of the Group of 17 and the power base of its most vocal spokesman, Marsoesii. In order to strengthen further the position of the dissidents, a ‘reconciliation’ campaign was conducted ahead of the congress. In the context of this campaign, the party’s provincial chapters and district branches were instructed to hold conferences to select their congress delegates, and they were pressured to include at least one supporter of the Group of 17 in their respective delegations.

As for the question of who would become party chair for the period 1993–98, the government was widely reported tacitly to support Budi Hardjono. Budi, as we have seen, was an outspoken legislator and had been one of the front figures in the party’s push for political reforms in the 1993 MPR session. He thus had some credibility as a critical and relatively independent politician,
who did not look set to become just a government stooge as party leader. At the same time, however, he did not belong to the radical camp in the party, and, as we have seen, he had defended the party’s decision to comply with the majority in the MPR and not to force a vote over its demands for political reform. Also speaking in Budi’s favour was that he seemed to be acceptable to a majority of the rank-and-file of the party.52

Only two weeks after the caretaker board had started its work, however, its efforts to ensure a smooth leadership election at the extraordinary congress were threatened by a call for Megawati Sukarnoputri to stand as candidate for the party chair. On 12 September, a delegation of around 100 PDI functionaries, claiming to represent 70 of the party’s 304 branches, called on Megawati at her home in Jakarta to ask her to agree to be nominated at the upcoming extraordinary congress.53 Reportedly, the delegates were largely supporters of Soerjadi who, in the face of government rejection of their former leader, had transferred their support to Megawati, and although Soerjadi did not openly throw his support behind Megawati, observers tended to see Soerjadi’s hand behind Megawati’s nomination.54

Megawati did not immediately accept the nomination, but two weeks later, at the end of September, she held a press conference in her garden, an initiative which seemed to signal her readiness to be nominated. She then indirectly urged the government to withdraw from the internal affairs to the PDI:

We have to consider the involvement of the government, as the patron of politics [pembina politik], as a positive thing. However, the government also has to explain why it interferes. The government must know when to stop and not get too mixed up in matters which should be solved by the PDI itself.55

When asked about whether she had already sought the ‘blessing’ (restu) of the government for her candidacy, she said:

If you mean blessing within quotation marks, that is, feigned blessing. There is no way I would take such a position. What about blessing in earnest? That is also a problem. Because, I am going ask you back, does our political culture forever have to prescribe such a thing? [...] Because, if what we want is party independence, the culture of blessing is not something which is suitable.56

Should I just do what everyone does, give up my principles and beg for the government’s support for my bid? [...] I don’t think so.57
Although government officials claimed that they had no preferences for the party’s leadership, the government was clearly averse to the prospect of Megawati taking up the PDI chair, and in the month leading up to the congress there came reports from several party branches around the country of pressure being applied by local civilian and military authorities in order for the congress delegates to support Budi Hardjono. Nineteen party branches in South Sulawesi said that they had been banned from sending delegates who supported Megawati to the congress, and the party’s Minahasa (N. Sulawesi) branch had reportedly been forced to abandon its support for Megawati in favour of Budi Hardjono. Likewise, in a letter to Megawati, which was circulated among the mass media, the party’s Solo branch complained about pressure from the Central Java chapter as well as the provincial directorate of social and political affairs in order for the branch to withdraw its support for Megawati. A deputy chairman of the PDI’s Aceh chapter, Nazaruddin Abdullah, threatened to sue the caretaker board because they allegedly had barred him from participating in the congress because he was a Megawati supporter. A congress delegate from East Timor alleged that the provincial director of social and political affairs had forced him and his fellow delegates to sign a statement that they would not choose a woman as the new PDI leader.

Against this background, Budi Hardjono was optimistic about his chances of getting elected at the congress, in spite of the obviously broader support enjoyed by Megawati among the rank-and-file of the party. Budi openly claimed that he had the support both from above and below. Megawati, however, stepped up her efforts to be elected as the congress approached. Less than two weeks before the opening of the congress, she launched a small booklet, in which she, for the first time, unambiguously declared that she was prepared to step forward as party leader. The booklet, entitled *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan* (‘I have already unfurled the flag’) was intended as a political manifesto, in which Megawati presented her political ideas. As we have seen, Megawati was not very active in Parliament during the six years she had been a legislator, and when the PDI pressed for political reforms in the 1993 MPR session, she had been little heard of. To some extent, the booklet seems to have been intended to diffuse criticism that she did not understand complex issues of policy making. She devoted one chapter each to seven central political, social and economic areas: the interests of the many people (kepentingan rakyat banyak); democracy; national unity and integrity; human rights; the dual function of the military; social disparity; and national development. In her brief comments on each of these areas, she mainly drew attention to prevailing unsatisfactory conditions,
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

thus implicitly, but at times strongly, criticising the government. Megawati’s
criticism largely raised the same issues which the party had raised in the previous
election campaign, especially the commitment to the small people. Megawati,
however, avoided the term *wong cilik*, which, as we have seen, carried leftist
connotations and was particularly associated with Soerjadi. She instead spoke
of the *rakyat banyak*, that is, the ‘many people’ and called for greater social and
economic equality. Although the term *rakyat* (people) was part of the New
Order political culture, the term was above all associated with Sukarno, who
had claimed to speak on behalf of the people and styled himself as the ‘extension
of the tongue of the people’ (*penyambung lidah rakyat*).61 By using the term
*rakyat banyak*, Megawati could thus raise associations to Sukarno and the
popular image of the former president as a leader who was close to the people.

As with the party’s election campaign themes, the booklet contained few
concrete political programs and policies. Frans Seda, a former senior politician
of the Catholic Party who wrote a preface to the book, seems to have anticipated
the criticism that the contents of the book were too general and lacking in
concrete programs. Most important, Seda wrote, was for a politician to have a
deep concern for the life and livelihood of society, the nation and country.
Programs and concepts, he assured his readers, would follow as the consequence
of a concerned attitude.62 The weekly *Tempo*, however, was unimpressed with
Megawati’s booklet, and, in an apparent reference to her effective election
campaign speeches, the reviewer said that the booklet failed to arouse the spark
of the reader in the way that public speeches could do with the audience. The
magazine lamented that the booklet only described various problems in
Indonesia without analysing them in any detail or providing solutions for the
future.63

In several ways, Megawati also used the booklet to strengthen her associa-
tion with her father. The title of the book, *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan*, seems
to have been a deliberate attempt to create an association with Sukarno’s most
well-known collection of political writings, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi* (‘Under
the flag of the Revolution’).64 The booklet then started with a quote in German:
‘Mann kann das Leib töten, aber nicht den Geist’, which also was translated into
Indonesian.65 The use of a foreign European language was in itself reminiscent
of Sukarno’s rhetorical style, in which he frequently mixed expressions from
Dutch, German, English and other European languages. The obvious message
of the quote was that Sukarno’s spirit was still alive.

In her preface, Megawati explained her decision to be nominated for the
PDI chair by claiming that her becoming chairwoman was a sincere wish
spreading from Sabang to Merauke, thus alluding to the slogan coined by Sukarno to represent the geographical scope and unity of Indonesia. She also used the English expression 'national and character building', which had been one of Sukarno's favourite expressions. The booklet included several photographs, among them a family photo of Sukarno, his second wife and Megawati's mother, Fatmawati, and their five children, including Megawati herself. There was also a photograph of Megawati and the sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono IX, with the text:

The close friends of Bung Karno, such as Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, took care to involve me so that I should better understand political events and history. In 1984, the sultan [...] invited me to Bangka Island, where Bung Karno was thrown in prison by the Dutch colonial government. "Whoever was friend and foe then, even the foreign community still acknowledges Bung Karno as the leader of the Indonesian people," the sultan whispered to me then.

Megawati, probably consciously underestimating her readers, also took care to explain the meaning of the title Bung as a term 'used by the wider public for the real leaders of the people'. Suharto, incidentally, had never been referred to as Bung, but was instead called Pak Harto. Pak, short for Bapak (father), carried paternalistic and hierarchical connotations in contrast to the more egalitarian Bung. The use of the latter term had declined drastically under the New Order, in contrast to its popularity during the first two decades of Indonesian independence.

Surabaya, where the extraordinary congress was to be held, was just over 100 kilometres from Blitar where Sukarno was buried. Realising the symbolic significance which Sukarno’s memory held for Megawati’s supporters, the chairman of the caretaker board, Latief Pudjosakti, called on the party’s members not to undertake ‘political pilgrimages’ (ziarah politik) to Sukarno’s grave before the congress. His call met with fierce protests from Megawati’s supporters in the party and even from government circles, such as when the chairman of the DPA and former coordinating minister of politics and security, Sudomo, said that anyone, including PDI members, was allowed to go on pilgrimage to Sukarno’s grave. Megawati herself, in an interview before the congress, said that she would make the pilgrimage to her father’s grave, as well as to the grave of her mother, to ask for their blessing and to obtain ‘inner spiritual strength’ (kekuatan lahir bathin) from her parents. She declined, however, to comment on the proposition that her pilgrimage might be
regarded as a political venture. On 27 November, Megawati visited Sukarno’s grave, but the visit had a low-key and private character, with Megawati being accompanied only by her husband and a small group of close supporters in the party. The journalists who followed her to Blitar were not allowed into the mausoleum with Megawati and were prevented from taking photographs of her praying at her father’s grave. The low-key character of the visit thus served to diffuse criticism that Megawati tried to exploit her relationship with Sukarno, and the accusations that Megawati tried to politicise her pilgrimage to her father’s grave probably reflected more on her adversaries who had raised the issue in the first place.

THE SURABAYA EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS

In contrast to the party’s congress in Medan in July, the Surabaya assembly attracted considerable international attention, and around 40 foreign correspondents were reportedly registered to cover the event, whereas the Medan congress had only attracted three foreign journalists. The government was also aware of the international spotlight on the party’s extraordinary congress. ‘The whole world is watching us now’, Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Soesilo Soedarman said shortly before the congress opened. Megawati, moreover, was personally acquainted with the United States President Bill Clinton, and this may have cautioned the government further not to be too conspicuous in its campaign to thwart her bid for the party chair. Senior government and military officials also repeatedly declared prior to the congress that they would not interfere with the proceedings and claimed that they had no preferred candidate for the leadership position.

The congress’ first plenary session on 2 December 1993 was scheduled to ratify the congress schedule and to review the central board’s decision from 1988 to expel eight members of the Group of 17. The session was led by Edwin Sukowati, son of the late party chairman Soenawar Sukowati and a staunch supporter of the Group of 17. According to the Kompas daily, the congress schedule was hastily pushed through, as Edwin, without looking at the delegates, asked if the proposed schedule could be approved. Upon hearing calls of approval from the floor, he then immediately struck the gavel without looking up at the delegates, several of whom had stood up and raised their hands in objection. The delegates had difficulties in making themselves heard because the microphones that had been prepared for the session were not distributed by the security guards, who were under the control of Jacob Nuwa Wea.
The decision to annul the expulsion of the Group of 17 was then likewise hammered through, which prompted several delegates to run up to the podium to protest against the decision and against the session chair’s method of hammering the gavel before the delegates had had a chance to express their opinions. Edwin Sukowati afterwards claimed that he had looked up and that it seemed like the majority agreed. ‘So I banged [the gavel]’, he said. The fact that some parties did not agree was only natural, according to Edwin.80

The second session, which started on the evening of the first congress day, was scheduled to ratify the congress regulations. The most controversial issue concerned whether the leadership should be elected through a direct floor vote or through a so-called formatur system, that is, the appointment of a committee entrusted with the task of composing the new leadership line-up. The former alternative – in which a plenary session would elect, by majority vote, the members of the central board or at least the most strategic positions such as general chair, secretary general and treasurer – was almost certain to get Megawati elected to the party chair. The second alternative, the formatur system, had often been used in the party’s history and was seen as more susceptible to manipulation and to the exercise of pressure on the members of the formatur committee. The system was consequently believed to be unfavourable to Megawati’s chances of being elected. The formatur system was favoured by the congress organisers and the supporters of the reinstated Group of 17 and the rival central board, as well as, apparently, by the government. In his opening message to the congress on the morning of 2 December, Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. had urged the delegates to deliberate rather than vote for the new party leadership, a message widely interpreted as an instruction to adopt the formatur system. The minister’s message was reportedly met by booing from the congress delegates.81

At the second plenary session, the congress organisers’ proposal to adopt the formatur system met with loud protests and shouts of ‘do not agree’ from the floor. Eventually, in spite of the protests of the majority of the congress delegates who wanted immediately to adopt the direct voting system, the second plenary session was adjourned until the following day by the congress security coordinator, Abdulgani Abdullah. On the second day, the recommencing of the session was postponed four times during the day, apparently with no reason given, until the session eventually was postponed until the following morning. During this time, the caretaker board tried to lobby the delegates to accept the formatur system, but their efforts seem to have met with little success. Moreover, several congress participants were now identified as
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

chiefs of provincial directorates of social and political affairs, who apparently attended the congress in order to pressure the congress delegates to toe the line and elect Budi Hardjono.82

As the plenary session was repeatedly postponed on the second congress day, some of the congress delegates began to suspect that the caretaker board was trying to delay the proceedings in order that the congress should fail, thus warranting a government intervention to appoint a new central board. On the third congress day, however, the sessions continued after Budi Hardjono and Megawati met in private and reportedly agreed to put their differences aside to allow the congress to proceed. The media, which had been allowed to cover the opening ceremony and the plenary sessions on the first day, was now excluded from the sessions.83 Although the congress committee gave no reason for this decision, they were obviously unhappy with the unfavourable reports in the newspapers from the sessions of the first day.

The fourth plenary session, which started on the morning of 4 December and continued until the afternoon, heard the ‘general viewpoints’ (pemandangan umum) of each of the 303 branch delegations. This opportunity was used by Megawati’s supporters to express their support for her candidacy, and one after another the delegations declared that they wanted to see Megawati as party chair for the period 1993–98 and called for a direct vote to elect the party leader. At this point in Jakarta, President Suharto, who presumably was well informed about the developments in Surabaya, and with his characteristic political flair, apparently saw where the wind was blowing, summoned Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. at a moment’s notice for a briefing on the proceedings of the congress. Immediately after the meeting, Yogie said that the PDI was free to elect its own leader, and he announced that the government had no objection if Megawati were elected or if voting were adopted to elect the new party leadership. Although the statement’s content did not differ from earlier statements by senior government officials, and although Yogie denied that Megawati’s candidacy had been specifically discussed during his meeting with the president, the message was widely interpreted as a green light for Megawati from the presidential palace. Yogie’s declaration, which came as the general opinions session was still in progress, further strengthened the supporters of Megawati. In all, 256, or 84 per cent, of the delegations declared their support for Megawati and for the direct voting system to elect the party leader. In the afternoon, before the session closed, the delegates, now reportedly hysterical with joy, resoundingly sang *Megawati Siapa yang Punya?* (‘Megawati belongs to whom?’), a remake of *Bung Karno Siapa yang Punya?*, a well-known song that
paid tribute to Megawati’s father.\textsuperscript{84} This strong show of support for Megawati in the face of the government’s campaign to thwart her election bid apparently had a unifying effect on the majority of the party’s delegates, who may previously have supported competing factions in the party. Budi Hardjono, meanwhile, seemed to have little support outside the congress organising committee and the minority of the congress delegates who supported the Group of 17 and Achmad Subagyo’s rival board.

Although Megawati and her supporters claimed after the session that the declarations of support for her were issued without pressure, the tide of support for Megawati at the congress was to some extent engineered. Soerjadi, in a later interview with the author, claimed that he had urged those delegates who had supported him in Medan now to support Megawati’s election bid.\textsuperscript{85} On the eve of the congress’ opening day, moreover, some of Megawati’s close supporters, including Aberson Marle Sihaloho and the East Java treasurer Sutjipto reportedly gathered around 200 representatives of the party’s district branches at a Surabaya hotel to discuss the strategy of bringing about Megawati’s election. One of the issues raised at the meeting appears to have been the system for electing the party chair, which partly explains the fierce resistance of the district delegates to the attempt of the congress organisers to push through the \textit{formatur} system on the first day of the congress.\textsuperscript{86} After the general opinions session on 4 December, Aberson, now described by \textit{Kompas} as a ‘member of the team for Megawati’s victory’, said there was nothing to worry about as regards the Commission for Organisation, which was entrusted with the task of preparing the new leadership line-up. ‘You see for yourself the large portion [of the delegates] who declare their support for Mega and the voting system. This is already legitimacy enough,’ he said.\textsuperscript{87}

On the following day, however, the congress again became deadlocked as the Group of 17 and the rival central board – which now formally joined forces, calling themselves the Unity and Integrity Group, (\textit{Kelompok Persatuan dan Kesatuan}) – together with the caretaker board continued to resist the calls from the floor for the party chair to be elected by direct vote.\textsuperscript{88} Because Megawati’s foes by now probably realised that they could not obstruct her from becoming party chair, their main aim shifted to manoeuvring to get as many positions as possible on the new central board. To this end, they continued to push for the \textit{formatur} system, which was likely to give them a greater say in the formation of the leadership line-up. After they again failed to force through the \textit{formatur} system on the fourth day of the congress, most leading members of the caretaker board, including those who were to chair the sessions on the fifth and
last day of the congress, disappeared from the congress venue, reportedly for consultations with government officials, including the minister of internal affairs who now had arrived in Surabaya. The members of the Unity and Integrity Group reportedly also took part in consultations with government officials, apparently with the aim of persuading the government to appoint a new central board with a strong representation for the caretaker board and the Unity and Integrity Group.89

On the last day of the congress, the delegates waited from nine o’clock in the morning for the final plenary session to start, but as the session chairs were nowhere to be found, the day went by with no sessions being held. As the government’s deadline for closing the congress at midnight approached, Megawati, in front of the media and the congress delegates, held a short speech in which she declared that she had been de facto, although not de jure, elected to the party chair, and she urged her supporters to stay calm in order to allow the issue to be solved in accordance with the party’s statutes. Minutes later, security forces entered the congress hall to break up the failed congress.90

Compared with the government’s handling of the Medan congress less than five months earlier, the methods deployed for the Surabaya extraordinary congress appeared to follow more closely the modus operandi for interfering in the political parties associated with the late Ali Moertopo in the 1970s and early 1980s. These methods, as we have seen, included pressure applied on the congress delegates by regional authorities, the placing of government agents as congress participants, the mobilisation of sympathetic forces in the party and the manipulation of congress procedures.91 In contrast to earlier operations, however, the efforts to engineer the election of Budi Hardjono and thwart Megawati’s election seem mostly to have been conducted by less efficient civilian authorities, particularly the provincial directorate generals for social and political affairs led by the ministry for internal affairs. Although there were some reports of military involvement in the attempts to pressure delegates to support Budi Hardjono before the congress, military involvement in the congress appeared overall to be relatively low-key. Suharto probably did not fully trust the military, especially the intelligence organisations which continued to be strongly influenced by Benny Moerdani,92 to handle the PDI’s extraordinary congress. As we have seen, there had been rapprochement between the PDI and the military at least since the 1986 congress, and there had been indications of growing dissatisfaction among sections of the military with Suharto and Golkar already ahead of the 1992 election. These long-standing tensions had been further exacerbated at the Golkar congress in October 1993,
which had elected the civilian Minister of Information Harmoko, a close supporter of Habibie and a Suharto loyalist, to the position of general chairman. This outcome was obviously unpopular among the Moerdani faction in the military, and in the wake of the Golkar congress, one senior officer, Major-General Sembiring Meliala, even threatened that the military might shift its support from Golkar to the PDI, in which case, he said, the party would certainly win the 1997 election.93

The main responsibility for the operation to have Budi Hardjono elected appears instead to have been entrusted to Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M., who had long since retired from the military and who was not seen as being under the influence of Benny Moerdani. The lesser capability of the civil service in these matters, paired with Yogie’s obvious inexperience in handling the political parties, probably partially explain why the operation failed under such embarrassing circumstances for the government. In addition, Megawati and her supporters, as we have seen, also fiercely resisted the attempts by the government and the congress organisers to manipulate the outcome. To some extent, Megawati’s success was due to her astuteness and that of her supporters in countering the coercive and manipulative tactics of the government and the congress organisers.

MANOEUVRINGS FOR PARTY LEADERSHIP

After the extraordinary congress was discontinued at midnight on 6 December 1993, the government immediately issued a statement that it would assist the party in setting up its new leadership and announced that in doing so, the government would take into account the different aspirations that had emerged during the Surabaya congress. The statement specifically said that consultations would be held with the three main camps in the conflict: the caretaker board, Megawati and the Unity and Integrity Group.94 It was not immediately clear from the statement, however, whether the government intended to support Megawati. Several leading commentators, including former Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini and House Speaker Wahono, urged the government not to meddle further with Megawati’s ascendancy to the party chair. Minister Yogie also came under fire in the media and during a questioning in Parliament for his allegedly clumsy handling of the affair, and President Suharto was rumoured to be angry with the minister for his failure.95 Gerry van Klinken has even suggested that the press was given a free hand to flog the minister in the wake of the congress,96 thus publicly indicating the president’s displeasure with his minister.
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

A week after the congress, Yogie consulted with chairmen of the party’s 27 provincial boards, all of whom now appeared to support Megawati. The consultation resulted in a decision to call a formal meeting of the provincial leaders, a so-called Party National Deliberation, Munas (Musyawarah Nasional [Partai]), to be held in Jakarta on 16 December. The meeting would elect the party chair, set up a formatur committee to compose the party’s central board and ratify the other results of the Surabaya extraordinary congress. This procedure had some support in the party’s statutes, according to which a Munas conference, under extraordinary circumstances, could replace a congress with the same authority. After meeting the provincial leaders, Yogie also consulted with Megawati, and newspapers carried pictures of the two smiling broadly and cordially afterwards. The minister then said that the government saw the possibility that Megawati would become PDI chair for the period 1993–98, an announcement widely interpreted as a ‘blessing’ for Megawati from the government.

Even though the government had resigned itself to the prospect of Megawati becoming PDI chair, it obviously intended for her central board to include a strong representation of the more compliant caretaker board and the Unity and Integrity Group. As promised in the government’s statement after the congress, the minister of internal affairs also consulted with both these groups, and, indicating the government’s support for the Unity and Integrity Group, Yogie called the former dissidents ‘potential leaders’ (tokoh potensial). After consulting the minister on 14 December, the group was upbeat about its chances to be well represented in the leadership line-up, and Marsoesi said that they aimed for 40–45 per cent of the positions on the central board. ‘Please don’t consider this as demanding a portion. This is only to fulfil the interests of our friends’, Marsoesi said.

Although Megawati, as we have seen, had rejected the culture of seeking the blessing of the government ahead of the congress, she now embarked on what was dubbed in the media a ‘political safari’ (safari politik). The day after she met Yogie, Megawati consulted for three hours with the Jakarta military commander, Major-general Hendropriyono, who said that the military had no problem with Megawati becoming the PDI chair, and vowed to secure the upcoming Munas meeting. He also rejected any suggestions that President Suharto was opposed to Megawati’s leading the PDI. ‘That is slander, that Pak Harto does not agree with Mega’, he said. On the following day, Megawati visited Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, also known as Tutut. The two presidential daughters claimed that they did not discuss
political matters and Megawati said that her visit was only a courtesy call that had been planned for a long time. The visit, however, was seen as a tacit approval by the president for Megawati.

In addition to Hendropriyono, Megawati also met several other top military officials, including the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Hariyoto, the chief of Bakin, Lieutenant-General Sudibyo, and the director of section A (internal affairs) of the Strategic Intelligence Agency, BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis), Brigadier General Agum Gumelar. All these officers were believed to be more or less close to Benny Moerdani and seem to have resented the election of Harmoko to the position of Golkar chair less than two months earlier.

In the face of Megawati’s vigorous campaign for support from the authorities, the caretaker board and the Unity and Integrity Group now apparently feared that they would be swept away and awarded no positions on the central board at the Munas conference. On 15 December, Yogie announced that the conference, originally scheduled for the following day, would be postponed for a week, allegedly because the caretaker board needed more time to organise the meeting. The caretaker board used the extra time to try to alter the composition of the Munas delegates, and declared that all participants would need to be screened beforehand by the caretaker board. They also proposed to include an extra 20 delegates to represent the Unity and Integrity Group, and announced that the meeting would be held outside Jakarta in Kopo, Bogor, instead of, as previously announced, in Jakarta.

At this point, the military, led by Brigadier General Agum Gumelar, intervened directly and, apparently bypassing the ministry of internal affairs, held consultations with the different factions of the party. The result of these meetings was that the Munas conference went ahead at a Jakarta hotel on 22–23 December, with no extra delegates added and no screening procedures conducted. Marsoesie and his supporters, who were already in place in Kopo, were not invited, and the role of the caretaker board was reduced to opening the meeting. As the meeting started, however, Latief Pudjosakti immediately adjourned the session because the conference room allegedly needed to be cleaned. He then disappeared for two hours and had to be fetched back to the meeting room by a military officer for the session to continue. As the meeting started again, Latief was finally relieved of his duties and the caretaker board was declared defunct. Later the same evening, Megawati was unanimously elected general chair for the period 1993–98 and was also entrusted with leading the formatur committee which would compose the new central board.
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

The outcome of the deliberations in the formatur committee, in which an unnamed senior military official, probably Agum Gumelar or Hendropriyono, reportedly was closely involved, was a compromise. The board included representatives of all major factions in the party, but was overall favourable to Megawati. The former caretaker board was represented by two deputy chairmen, Ismunandar and Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, whereas the Unity and Integrity Group also got two representatives, Gerry Mbatemooy and Edwin Sukowati. Kwik Kian Gie, who had resigned from the caretaker board on the last day of the extraordinary congress because he said he was ashamed to be associated with it, was also included in the new line-up, as were some supporters of Soerjadi, of whom Fatimah Achmad, who also chaired the party’s faction in Parliament, was the best known. The two most strategic positions apart from that of general chair, those of secretary general and treasurer, went to two relatively unknown supporters of Megawati, Alexander Litaay, a Christian from Ambon, the Moluccas, and Laksamana Sukardi, a former banker and member of Litbang. Several of the other members of the 29-member board were less well known provincial representatives who were considered to be more or less neutral in the party’s leadership conflicts.¹⁰⁸

According to Tempo, the military helped Megawati to have a relatively free hand in composing the central board, and none of her major opponents, such as Latief Pudjosakti and Budi Hardjono, nor long-standing ‘troublemakers’, such as Marsoesi, Jusuf Merukh and Achmad Subagyo, were included in the new leadership line-up.¹⁰⁹ Most of the new board members, however, were not close Megawati supporters, and according to Laksamana Sukardi, the compromise meant that Megawati was forced to accept a large number of government-loyal members in her central board.¹¹⁰ As we shall see, its composition hampered Megawati’s attempt to consolidate the party, and her foes in the central board eventually triggered her demise as party leader in 1996.

CONCLUSIONS

The PDI, as we have seen, was constructed as an essentially state corporatist institution, with little actual prospect of independence from the government. The party’s relative success in the 1992 election, however, strengthened the aspirations for greater party independence, and these aspirations were manifested in the party’s allegations of election rigging and its push for political reforms in the lead-up to the 1993 MPR session. The failure of the party to stand up for its demands gave rise to widespread disappointment and even
resignation among the party’s rank-and-file. Against this background, there seems to have been a pent-up desire to reassert the party’s independence towards the government, which in 1993 manifested itself in the demand that the PDI be allowed to elect its leaders without government interference. This demand was visible already in the defiance of the July 1993 Medan congress which re-elected Soerjadi in spite of the clear signals from the government and the military that he was unacceptable. The nomination of Megawati for party chair and the rising tide of support for her in the lead-up to the Surabaya extraordinary congress in December were also largely motivated by the desire for party independence, an aspiration that Megawati explicitly articulated. As the government, unsuccessfully, tried to thwart Megawati’s election to the party chair in Surabaya, she emerged as a powerful symbol of party independence vis-à-vis the government.

In spite of the strong aspirations for party independence, few of the leading PDI figures in the 1993 events showed much commitment to this ideal in practice as they manoeuvred for positions and influence in the party. The commitment in practice to the ideal of party independence varied between different leaders and factions, with the Soerjadi and Megawati camps generally favouring less government intervention, and their adversaries in the caretaker board, the Group of 17 and the rival central board more frequently calling for government intervention in the party. To a large extent, the difference in attitude towards government intervention reflected opportunism; the government was called upon by those who believed that they were favoured by an intervention, whereas those who believed that the government would be averse to their interests rejected an intervention. Even Megawati, after the Surabaya congress, lobbied hard among the military in order to strengthen her influence over the party leadership line-up.

The events surrounding the PDI’s two congresses in 1993 demonstrated a troubling lack of ethics among several of the central actors. Apart from the recurring opportunist calls for government intervention, there were several crude attempts to manipulate the party’s statutes and the congress procedures, and the even the outright deployment of violence was not shunned in the jockeying for influence and positions in the party. The acts and ethics of a limited number of individuals can not be taken to represent a broader political culture, but the conspicuous and unashamed deployment of unethical methods indicates that there was little concern for the broader opinions of the party’s rank-and-file or for those of society at large. Direct or indirect backing from the government or the military seemed to justify just about any kind of
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

method to gain positions and influence in the party, regardless of the ethical implications. Such powerful support from outside the party seemed to relieve those concerned of any accountability within the party, and, consequently, they appeared to feel that they had a free hand to deploy overtly any unethical method to achieve their goals.

NOTES

1 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 75). The legality of the decision, as we have seen in chapter 6, was contested by Soerjadi’s adversaries.

2 Kompas (16 March 1993). Although the decision had little basis in the party’s statutes, it appears to have met with little resistance in the party, with the exception of the supporters of the Group of 17; see Jakarta Post (16 March 1993).

3 Jakarta Post (26 February 1993); see also Halawa (1993: 108–109).

4 Tempo (10 July 1993).


6 This delay was protested against by a group of supporters of the Group of 17 to the military’s parliamentary faction in April; see Jakarta Post (21 April 1993). Both Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto had been summoned by the police in February for questioning as witnesses in the case; see Kompas (12 February 1993 and 16 February 1993). Tempo (20 February 1993) also reported that the trial would go ahead in the following week, which apparently it did not.

7 Jakarta Post (21 April 1993).

8 Tempo (5 June 1993 and 31 July 1993), Republika (30 March 1993) and Merdeka (3 April 1993).

9 DeTIK (12 May 1993) and Jakarta Post (17 March 1993 and 1 May 1993).

10 Interview by the author with Soerjadi, Jakarta (7 October 1997).

11 Editor (19 June 1993).

12 Tempo (5 June 1993).

13 Jakarta Post (5 July 1993).

14 See e.g. the editorial in Jakarta Post (21 July 1993). Soerjadi also said that he had heard rumours before the congress that the government did not want to see him re-elected, although he claimed that he never understood, or tried to find out, why; interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).


16 See Antlöv (1994: 86–87) for some observations on the ABS attitude.

17 Jakarta Post (14 July 1993).

18 Kompas (18 July 1993). Soerjadi subsequently answered the summons and testified in the trial. Alex was acquitted in early November, and, based on the testimony of the witnesses, the judge urged that Soerjadi be accused instead; see Tempo (13
November 1993). No formal charges were raised against Soerjadi, however. Soerjadi had by then given up his ambition to lead the PDI, and it appears that, as a consequence, he was spared further harassment over his alleged involvement in the kidnapping case.

21 *Kompas* (29 July 1993). Feisal Tandjung, widely seen as a palace loyalist, had replaced Try Sutrisno as the commander-in-chief shortly before Try’s election as vice-president in March 1993.
22 *Kompas* (29 July 1993).
23 *Kompas* (22 July 1993). Yogie had replaced Rudini as minister of internal affairs in the new cabinet appointed by the president after his re-election in March 1993.
24 *Tempo* (31 July 1993). *Tempo* says that Fatimah was hit by a bottle of mineral water, usually made of plastic in Indonesia. She, moreover, did not seem to have suffered any serious injuries. *Tempo* claims that there were 300 demonstrators, whereas *Kompas* (22 July 1993) claims that there were 400. *Jakarta Post* (22 July 1993) made a more moderate estimate of 50 people.
25 *Jakarta Post* (22 July 1993).
26 *Jakarta Post* (20 July 1993).
27 *Suara Karya* (23 July 1993).
28 *Tempo* (31 July 1993). Edi had replaced Benny Moerdani as defence and security minister in the 1993–98 cabinet line-up, appointed in March 1993. The police were organisationally a part of the armed forces under the New Order, and police officers consequently held military ranks.
29 *Tempo* (31 July 1993).
30 *Suara Karya* (23 July 1993).
31 *Suara Pembaruan* (22 July 1993) and *Suara Karya* (23 July 1993).
34 *Angkatan Bersenjata* (22 July 1993).
35 *Angkatan Bersenjata* (22 July 1993).
36 *Jakarta Post* (23 July 1993).
38 *Kompas* (24 July 1993).
40 *Tempo* (31 July 1993).
41 *Tempo* (31 July 1993) and *Jakarta Post* (26 July 1993). Nico Daryanto denied that the central board had asked the branches for the statements of loyalty.
42 *Kompas* (1 August 1993).
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

44 Republika (27 July 1993).
45 Republika (27 July 1993).
46 Tempo (14 August 1993), Republika (4 August 1993), Media Indonesia (6 August 1993) and Jakarta Post (5 August 1993 and 9 August 1993).
47 Kompas (12 August 1993) and Jakarta Post (14 August 1993)
48 Merdeka (25 August 1993) and Jakarta Post (27 August 1993).
49 Merdeka (28 August 1993).
50 Jakarta Post (31 August 1993, 1 September 1993, 10 September 1993 and 13 September 1993) and Republika (7 September 1993).
51 Jakarta Post (9 October 1993).
52 For example, in October, Budi claimed that he had the support of 60 per cent of the party’s district branches; Kompas (12 October 1993).
53 Kompas (13 September 1993).
54 E.g. van Klinken (1994: 3) and van Dijk (1997: 400). Soerjadi, although he indicated support for Megawati in September (e.g. Kompas (16 September 1993)), did not explicitly say that he wanted to see her elected to the party chair; e.g. Republika (2 December 1993). In an interview with the author (Jakarta, 7 October 1998), however, Soerjadi claimed that he had supported Megawati, urging those who had supported his own re-election to the party chair in Medan in July 1993 instead to support Megawati in Surabaya.
55 Kompas (29 September 1993).
56 Kompas (29 September 1993).
57 Jakarta Post (29 September 1993).
58 Jakarta Post (5 November 1993, 24 November 1993 and 2 December 1993) and Suara Karya (20 November 1993). See further Haribuan (1996: 5–6) for similar reports from the party’s district branches.
59 Republika (23 November 1993).
60 Soekarnoputri (1993: 15).
61 Daniel Ziv (2002: 88), drawing on the work of James Siegel (1998: 11–29), has argued that “[t]hroughout the long years of the New Order regime […] Suharto was careful not to invoke the rakyat, relying instead on “development” and “order” as the watchwords of his rule…” This assertion probably overstates the alleged evasion of the term rakyat during the New Order. Suharto, for example, used the term in his autobiography; e.g. Soeharto (1989: 411). The concept, however, was much less prominent than it had been under Guided Democracy, and the New Order seems mainly to have linked the term rakyat to its claims to have raised the standard of living for the majority of the people.
63 Tempo (27 November 1993). Jakarta Post (24 December 1993) even alleged that Megawati’s views as expressed in Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan differed little from those of the government.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

64 Soekarno (1963).

65 Soekarnoputri (1993: 5); capital letters in original. The background of the quote is somewhat obscure (at least to the present author). Its origin is the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 10, verse 28, but it is uncertain who coined the expression in German.

66 Soekarnoputri (1993: 13). Sabang is the town in Indonesia furthest to the north-west, on Pulau We in Aceh, and Merauke is the town furthest to the south-east, in the province of West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya). The slogan was particularly significant in Sukarno’s struggle in the 1960s to incorporate Dutch West New Guinea into Indonesia.


70 Soekarnoputri (1993: 26). Megawati’s posing with the sultan was probably also meant to associate her with the most prestigious centre of royal power in Indonesia, a tactic also employed by Suharto; see Leigh (1991: 30).

71 See Anderson (1966) for the shift to more hierarchical language during the New Order, and idem (1990: 141) for the changing meaning of the word Burg. The former Jakarta governor, Ali Sadikin, even claimed that it was illegal in 1965 to call someone Bapak, and that the rise to prominence of the title under the New Order signalled ‘Javanese feudalism’; see Asianweek (26 June 1994).

72 Kompas (6 November 1993) and Suara Karya (8 November 1993 and 11 November 1993).

73 Media Indonesia (21 November 1993).

74 Republika (29 November 1993).

75 Suara Pembaruan (1 December 1993).

76 Jakarta Post (1 December 1993).

77 Megawati reportedly had known Bill Clinton for several years and had visited him both when he was the governor of Arkansas and during the United States presidential campaign in 1992; see Merdeka (29 October 1992).

78 E.g., Kompas (25 November 1993 and 29 November 1993), Suara Karya (1 December 1993) and Jakarta Post (1 December 1993).

79 Kompas (3 December 1993).

80 Kompas (3 December 1993).

81 Kompas (3 December 1993).

82 Kompas (3 December 1993), Bisnis Indonesia (4 December 1993) and Merdeka (4 December 1993). The government claimed that the officials were only there to witness the proceedings; Jakarta Post (6 December 1993).

83 Bisnis Indonesia (4 December 1993) and Kompas (4 December 1993 and 5 December 1993). According an unnamed source close to Megawati, Budi Hardjono was promised a post as deputy chair in the central board should Megawati be
The Democratic Party and Party Democracy

elected to the general chair. This scenario, however, whether or not agreed upon, was not realised in the final line-up, which did not include Budi Hardjono.

84 Kompas (5 December 1993), Jakarta Post (6 December 1993) and Tempo (11 December 1993).
85 Interview, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
87 Kompas (5 December 1993).
88 Kompas (6 December 1993).
89 Jakarta Post (8 December 1993) and Haribuan (1996: 11).
90 Kompas (7 December 1993).
92 See The Editors (1993: 124) and The Editors (1994: 84–85) about Benny Moerdani’s influence in the military intelligence organisation and the president’s campaign to end this influence.
94 Media Indonesia (8 December 1993) and Jakarta Post (8 December 1993). The statement, with the exact same wording, was issued separately both by Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Soesilo Soedarman and Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M.
95 Bisnis Indonesia (9 December 1993), Suara Karya (10 December 1993), Media Indonesia (9 December 1993) and Haribuan (1996: 14).
97 Republika (14 December 1993).
98 The statutes said that ‘If, in the course of 1 (one) year after the passing of the time at which a congress should have been organised, but because the situation and conditions do not allow the organisation of a congress, a National Deliberation of the Party shall be held in lieu of a congress’; Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1993a: 159).
99 Republika (14 December 1993) and Kompas (14 December 1993).
100 Republika (14 December 1993).
101 Jakarta Post (15 December 1993).
102 E.g. Tempo (25 December 1993).
103 Media Indonesia (15 December 1993).
104 Kompas (16 December 1993).
105 Bisnis Indonesia (17 December 1993) and Republika (17 December 1993). See The Editors (1994: 84–85) for the political associations of the officers. Hariyoto was believed to be the ‘President’s man’, until he resisted Harmoko’s election at the 1993 Golkar congress.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

107 *Tempo* (1 January 1994).


109 *Tempo* (1 January 1994). See also *Jakarta Post* (27 December 1993) for some reactions to the line-up and the process of its composition.

110 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
CHAPTER 10

The PDI under Megawati

MEGAWATI, SUKARNO AND ‘ARUS BAWAH’

In her bid to be elected to the PDI chair, Megawati, as we have seen, had skilfully used the association with her father, but also taken care not to exploit it too far or too conspicuously. In various indirect ways, such as in the rhetoric of her booklet or through her low-key pilgrimage to her father’s grave, she managed to raise the associations with her father while avoiding accusations that she exploited her relationship with him. Publicly, Megawati even seemed to distance herself from her father, no doubt convinced that such a stance would do nothing to reduce her association with him in the eyes of her supporters and the wider public. For example, shortly after she was formally elected to the PDI chair in late December 1993, she said: ‘Praise Allah I am a daughter of Bung Karno. But is that a sin? [...] It is not my fault that I am one his daughters. [...] I see myself as Megawati, with all my strengths and weaknesses. I do not have to be compared with Bung Karno. He was a personage in his own time’.

Megawati was also, both before and after she was elected as PDI leader, careful to refute allegations that her ascendancy to the party chair would initiate a revival of ‘Sukarnoism’, a loosely defined term generally used to represent Sukarno’s leftist ideas, including Marhaenism and a strident brand of nationalism. Although Megawati claimed that Sukarno was her ‘political tutor’, she said that his political ideas should be seen in the light of his having formulated Pancasila. ‘If we want to be honest and look at history with an open heart, on 1 June 1945, Bung Karno said that our philosophy is Pancasila. So, if we talk about Pancasila everyday, those who refer to it should also remember a person whose name was Bung Karno’, she said. Megawati’s political ideas in Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan were, as we have seen, generally uncontroversial and within the limits of permissible political discussion, and she claimed that her efforts to meet senior government and military officials ahead of her election to the party chair was meant to counter the allegations that she would bring about a revival of Sukarnoism.

In spite of these reassurances, the government was apparently worried that Megawati might become a rallying symbol for social and political discontent.
and opposition. Only four days after Megawati declared herself *de facto* elected to the PDI chair in Surabaya, a number of leading Golkar functionaries visited Sukarno’s grave in Blitar, apparently in an attempt to diffuse the association between the PDI and Megawati on the one hand and Sukarno on the other. President Suharto’s eldest daughter and Golkar deputy chair Tutut and Golkar’s general chairman Harmoko as well as several other leading Golkar officials participated in the highly publicised visit. A so-called cadre meeting of a reported 5,000 Golkar supporters was also held nearby after the officials’ visit to Sukarno’s mausoleum. Although Harmoko, unconvincingly, said that the venture was not a political pilgrimage, the chairman of Golkar’s East Java chapter, Hasril Harun, who also took part in the event, was more frank and said that the purpose of visiting Sukarno’s grave was to demonstrate that Bung Karno was the property of the whole nation and not only of the PDI. Tutut, meanwhile, said that although Megawati was the daughter of Sukarno, she herself also had the right to put flowers (*nyekar*) on Sukarno’s grave, because he was the father of the nation. She also said that the national culture teaches the good citizen to honour the deeds of the nation’s heroes and to uphold the attitude of honouring one’s elders and forgetting about their mistakes (*mikut dhuwur mendhem jero*), thus reiterating her own father’s words in his autobiography about his predecessor.5

Megawati was no doubt aware that her popularity mainly rested on her family name, and her pronounced attempts to distance herself from her father probably aimed at improving her much-questioned credentials as a politician and party leader in her own right. Such attempts were probably more aimed at the political elite and observers then at her supporters among the general public and probably reflected her own desire not to be explained away as just a symbol of her father. There were several contemporary precedents of women political leaders in South and Southeast Asia who initially owed their political careers to their status as either daughter or widow of a founding father or an otherwise prominent political male leader of their respective nations, but who in time had become political figures in their own right. The most well-known were Indira Gandhi in India, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma and Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, but there were a number of others as well.6

Due to the regrettable lack of studies of gender and politics in Southeast Asia, however, the historical and cultural background to this recurring emergence of women political leaders in the region is little understood.7 Historically, Anthony Reid has argued that the emergence of female political leaders in maritime Southeast Asia between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries was
related to involvement of their respective states in the expanding commerce in
the region. Female rulers seem to have been favoured by commercially oriented
aristocracies in order to limit the despotic powers of kings and to guarantee a
safe environment for international commerce. Although the link between
commerce and female leaders is less evident in the post-colonial era, the
emergence of women political leaders can probably to some extent similarly be
explained by their symbolising ‘softer’ values, especially in contrast to male-
dominated regimes associated with violence, repression and militarism, such as
Indonesia’s New Order or Burma’s military rule.

In the case of Megawati, her association with ‘softer’ female-gendered
values was evident before she was elected to the PDI chair. The Islamic scholar
and leader of the traditionalist Islamic organisation NU, Abdurrahman Wahid,
for example, said he believed that Megawati’s supporters hoped she would
restore the wholeness (keutuhan) of the party and that she represented a search
for togetherness (kebersamaan). Although Wahid did not say so, her being a
woman probably reinforced such ascribed qualities of Megawati in the eyes of her
supporters. Furthermore, as the Jakarta Post observed in an editorial, Megawati
was immediately acceptable in various PDI factions because she had not
previously been involved in the party’s internal conflicts. There thus seems to
have been great expectations in the PDI that Megawati would unite the party
and forge internal cohesion after the various conflicts and factionalism which
almost incessantly had beset the party since its founding in 1973, and which
had been aggravated by the leadership conflicts in 1993.

In addition to the hopes that Megawati would be able to restore the unity
of the party, her election also represented the hope for a more democratic and
participatory political culture. Megawati and her supporters claimed that her
election was unique, because it allegedly marked the first time during the New
Order that a party leader was elected ‘from below’ in defiance of the govern-
ment’s obvious wishes. The assertion was disputable, however, because, as we
have seen, Soerjadi had also been elected in the face of government resistance
at the July 1993 congress in Medan, and in 1968, Parmusi had also elected a
leader, Muhammad Roem, in defiance of the government’s wishes. In both
these instances, however, the elected leaders had been rejected by the govern-
ment, whereas in Megawati’s case the government had acknowledged her
election, albeit grudgingly. Thus, in spite of the fact that Megawati’s accession
to the party chair also to some extent depended on political manoeuvrings and
her support from influential sections of the military, Megawati’s election came
to symbolise hope that broader, bottom-up political aspirations would at last
begin to have a significant influence on the political process. This new hope was manifest by the emergence of a new term, which entered the media and public discussions in the lead-up to the Surabaya congress. The term was *arus bawah*, literally meaning ‘undercurrent’, but a more accurate translation in this context would be ‘aspiration(s) from below’. Although the term *arus bawah* first appeared in connection with Megawati’s rise to the PDI chair, it quickly came to be used in relation to a range of other issues in which public opinion was seen to have influenced government policies or voiced as protests of different kinds.

Government officials close to President Suharto were obviously irritated with the new discourse on *arus bawah*. In early January, former Golkar Chairman Sudharmono cautioned the public against talking about *arus bawah*, because, he suggested, it might be a sign of political engineering (*rekayasa*). Megawati’s election, he said, exemplified that *arus bawah* could be manipulated, because there had been no support for her at the PDI’s congress in Medan in July 1993, while a few months later there was a chorus of support for her. This shift in support, according to Sudharmono, demonstrated that someone had brought about Megawati’s election, that is, engineered it. State secretary Moerdiono, meanwhile, said: ‘We have to be really careful in our understanding of this “arus bawah”. All political processes are a kind of engineering. [...] If the political process is not yet executed with perfection, that which is called “arus bawah” can be manipulated’. He also acknowledged that the government’s democratic credentials were in doubt, saying that ‘at this moment there is a tendency [to view] everything that comes from the government as not good and not democratic’.

Megawati’s rise to the PDI chair and the new attention paid to the concept of *arus bawah* had put the government in a difficult situation. The evidently strong support which Megawati enjoyed within the PDI as well as outside the party made it difficult for the government to ignore her. The democratic credentials of the regime had already been damaged by its blatant interference with the party’s leadership elections in Medan and Surabaya. Although government allegations that *arus bawah* in general and Megawati’s election in particular had been engineered to some extent were well founded, her election seemed to signal a broadening of political participation and influence. Through the association with her father and the inclusive and participant nationalism and concern for the plight of the small man which he represented, Megawati was a credible symbol for the emergence of *arus bawah*. Her emergence was timely and she came to symbolise much of the social discontent and dis-
The PDI under Megawati

satisfaction with the New Order that had become evident since the beginning of the 1990s and which was captured in the concept of *arus bawah*. In spite of Megawati’s uncontroversial political programme and generally docile appearance, her election in defiance of the government seemed to herald a new and strengthened voice for the *arus bawah* in Indonesian politics.

PARTY REINVIGURATION AND GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT

In January 1994, Megawati and the new PDI leadership started work with a vigour not seen in the party since the 1992 election. Megawati apparently did not want to lose the momentum gained from the tide of support leading up to her election to the party chair, and in the first months of the new year she made a series of statements critical of the government and the political system. In her first major speech as party leader, held on the PDI’s 21st anniversary on 10 January 1994, she attacked the ‘single majority’ system, a term she used to refer to Golkar’s dominance of the political system and its absolute electoral majority. The concept and spirit of ‘single majority’ which had developed lately, Megawati said, could plunge Indonesia into a political culture of the ‘dictatorship of the majority and the tyranny of the minority’, which was opposed to *Pancasila* democracy and its core values of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*. Megawati also rhetorically asked whether the concept of single majority was in line with the spirit of togetherness, the family principle and openness with responsibility, as prescribed in the 1993 Broad Outlines of State Policy.

At the end of January, Megawati embarked on a regional tour, visiting a large number of the party’s provincial chapters and local branches in Java and Eastern Indonesia. In several of the places she visited, she was reportedly greeted by thousands of supporters causing her meetings to take on an air of election campaign rallies. In her speeches, Megawati repeatedly called on the government to give equal treatment to the political parties and Golkar, and she urged her supporters immediately to start approaching the bureaucracy and ‘seduce’ civil servants into voting for the PDI in the next general election, which was scheduled for 1997. She also lashed out at the doctrine of monoloyalty, saying that civil servants belonged to the whole republic and not exclusively to one group. In another bid to make inroads into the bureaucracy, she took care to meet governors and other leading officials in the regions. As political scientist Afan Gaffar observed, these meetings were a new phenomenon because local bureaucrats had in the past avoided, or even been prohibited
from, meeting political party leaders out of fear that such meeting might implicitly endorse Golkar’s election opponents. Especially in the country’s remote and lesser developed areas, the support from the bureaucracy was crucial for Golkar’s electoral success, and Megawati’s strategy apparently aimed at undermining this advantage of Golkar and at instead improving the PDI’s access to the civil service in anticipation of the next election.

During her regional tour, Megawati courted local and regional military commanders. She was generally careful to talk about the armed forces in favourable terms, saying, for example, that ‘co-operation with the armed forces is deeply rooted as PDI policy’. She urged provincial and district leaders to work together with the local military authorities and said that they should regard the military as their partners. Megawati was probably well aware that the government might try to depose her by deploying the military to put pressure on the party’s provincial chapters and district branches, and her strategy of courting the military seems to have been aimed at consolidating her leadership over the PDI. Joseph Mailoa, a retired brigadier general and supporter of Megawati, admitted as much when he said that the party’s strategy of seeking support from the military was like ‘us asking them [...] to cover our rear while we move forward to the front line’.

The PDI thus immediately emerged as a reinvigorated and more critical party under Megawati’s leadership. In addition to the criticism raised about Golkar’s unfair election advantages, Megawati and the PDI’s parliamentary faction also sharply criticised the government’s support for a controversial mega-tourist project close to the Tanah Lot temple in Bali, which had stirred up religious sentiments because of its location close to the holy Hindu temple. The project also involved the forced sale of land, for which local residents seem to have received compensation far below market value. Moreover, the party’s parliamentary faction, together with the PPP, criticised Minister of Information and Golkar chair Harmoko for allegedly using state funds covertly to campaign for Golkar. Megawati, during her regional tour, also accused the state television, TVRI (Televisi Republik Indonesia), of deliberately boycotting her, saying that Golkar and the political parties should be treated equally by the state-run media.

Taken separately, the criticism vented by Megawati and the PDI over these issues did not mark any departure from the party’s stances in previous years, in the course of which, as we have seen, the party had become more critical and begun to style itself as a soft opposition. Criticism of the election system, including the monoloyalty doctrine and other arrangements favouring Golkar, as
well as criticism over forced land acquisitions, had, for example, been major themes in the party’s 1992 election campaign. Megawati avoided the more controversial issues raised by the party in the election campaign and afterwards, such as the suggestion to limit the number of presidential terms and the question of whether there should be more than one presidential candidate. Whereas the substance of the PDI’s under Megawati criticism did not differ from earlier stances of the party, her diligence in criticising the government and the prevailing political system marked a departure from earlier practices between elections. Megawati appeared already from the outset to have her focus set on the 1997 election. If she were to succeed in building and consolidating the party’s support in the military and the civil service, the PDI under her leadership seemed to have good prospects for the election and could be expected to improve substantially its result over the 1992 outcome. Such an increase was very likely to come at the expense of Golkar.

The PDI’s reinvigoration in the first months of 1994 came among a number of other signals in 1993 that the president’s control had begun to slip. The term arus bawah, as mentioned above, had gained widespread currency from the end of 1993, and was used to denote an apparently increasing political activity among students, workers and Muslim activists over a variety of social and political grievances. Apart from Megawati’s election, the most prominent sign of the rise of arus bawah concerned the state-sponsored lottery known as the Philanthropic Donation with Prizes, SDSB (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah), which the government, in late November 1993, closed after a wave of protests. Other signs that the president’s control over the political system was less firm than in previous years were the election of Try Sutrisno as vice-president in March 1993, and the resistance from and open dissatisfaction with Harmoko’s election as Golkar chair in October among sections of the military.26

A common denominator in these issues was the open or covert involvement of sections of the military, allegedly under the influence of former Defence and Security Minister Benny Moerdani, who still seemed to exercise considerable influence in the military through his personal links with senior military officers.27 For the president, the key to re-establishing his supreme control over the political system lay in reasserting his control over the military, and to this effect he initiated a campaign which observers called ‘de-bennyisation’, which aimed at minimising the influence of his former protege in the military.28 In the context of this campaign, the president in January 1994 ordered the liquidation of the military intelligence body BAIS, which, as we have seen, had been instrumental in achieving Megawati’s election to the PDI chair a few weeks
earlier. The director of its internal affairs section, Brigadier General Agum Gumelar, who also had served in the powerful capacity as commander of the Special Forces Command, Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus), was demoted to the post of chief of staff of the North Sumatra military command, stationed in Medan far from the capital and with little political influence. The commander of the Jakarta military district, Major-General Hendropriyono, who also had supported Megawati’s election, was transferred prematurely from his posting in the capital and given a newly created, politically powerless position as commander of the army educational and training command. Another officer who seems to have supported Megawati, Lieutenant-General Hariyoto, was sacked from his influential post as military chief of social and political affairs, and subsequently retired. For the most part, these officers were replaced by palace loyalists, several of whom were relatives of or former adjutants to President Suharto.

As Suharto worked systematically to re-establish his control over the military, the government also signalled in mid-1994 that the political climate of openness, keterbukaan, now had come to an end. In June, the government banned three weekly publications, among them Indonesia’s largest and most respected news magazine, Tempo. The bannings were followed by crackdowns by the security forces on protesters and labour activists and by the imposition of heavy jail sentences for a group of students convicted for defaming the president at a demonstration at the end of 1993. These measures thus signalled that the government’s tolerance for criticism and openness had reached its limit, and that repressive measures would be deployed to ensure that no fundamental challenges to the political system or the president’s authority emerged.

As for the challenge that had begun to emerge from the PDI under Megawati, the government’s strategy from the second half of 1994 was to destabilise her leadership in a variety of ways, including the sponsoring of forces within the party who were hostile to her leadership, to withhold permits for her to hold party meetings to consolidate her leadership and to implicate her supporters as communist sympathisers. The efforts first started in connection with a leadership rift in the PDI’s East Java chapter. East Java, as we have seen, was an important electoral province, both for Golkar and the PDI, as well as a stronghold of Megawati’s adversaries in the party including the East Java chairman Latief Pudjosakti and the reinstated members of the Group of 17. The provincial government, and especially Governor Basofi Sudirman, a former Jakarta Golkar chairman and staunch supporter of the organisation, cont-
The PDI under Megawati

In July 1994, the PDI’s East Java chapter held a conference to elect a new leadership line-up. There were two contenders for the provincial chair: the incumbent Latief Pudjosakti and Sutjipto, who had the support of Megawati. Sutjipto was first elected by a narrow vote among the district delegates, but the result was rejected because of alleged irregularities in the voting procedure, and the task of electing a new chairman was entrusted to a formatur committee chaired by Megawati. The majority of the formators, however, supported Latief, and the committee failed to reach a consensus. Megawati, as chair of the committee, then declared that the task to appoint the chair would be entrusted to the party’s central board, which on 12 August appointed Sutjipto. On the same day, Latief’s supporters in the formatur committee declared that they had elected Latief as the chapter chair, and they immediately reported this result to the provincial authorities.

The provincial government endorsed the leadership of Latief, which it demonstrated by inviting him, but not Sutjipto, to the official Independence Day ceremonies on 17 August 1994. The provincial authorities subsequently denied Megawati permission to install Sutjipto as chapter chair because of the leadership conflict, which Governor Basofi said would have to be solved first. Meanwhile, there were reports from the East Java district branches that they were pressured by the provincial directorates of social and political affairs to sign statements in favour of Latief, and at the end of October, Governor Basofi gathered the representatives of the district branches for a briefing at his office, presumably to pressure them into supporting Latief.

A month later, at the end of November, a deputy chairman of the central board and former supporter of the Group of 17, Gerry Mbateomooy, installed Latief in an unauthorised ceremony at the PDI’s Surabaya headquarters. Megawati and the party’s central board responded by suspending Latief’s party membership and sacking Gerry from the central board in the beginning of December. This decision led the dissidents to bring their supporters to Jakarta to demand the resignation of Megawati for her allegedly dictatorial and unconstitutional leadership.

The conflict in the party’s East Java chapter had thus spread to the national level by the end of 1994. From around the same time, Megawati’s leadership came under increasing pressure as accusations that the PDI was infiltrated by activists with past communist links. By implication, these accusations were also directed at Megawati herself, through her family relations. The background to
the allegations was the publication by the State Secretariat in October 1994 of a long overdue ‘white book’ on the 1965 coup events. The seventh chapter of the book was dedicated to Sukarno’s stance towards the 30 September Movement and the Communist Party. The book did not explicitly say that Sukarno was involved in the coup attempt, but argued that the president had tended to defend the Communist Party in the wake of 30 September and that he had failed to take legal or other actions against the alleged leaders of the coup attempt, including the top leaders of the Communist Party.

Megawati’s sister, Sukmawati, said that she was offended by the allegations because she felt that they tarnished the image of her family. She also believed that they would affect public opinion of the PDI. Megawati, meanwhile, shortly after the book was published, declined to comment on it, claiming that she had not read it and did not even know that it had been published. She regretted, however, that the controversies about Sukarno surfaced time after time and called on the nation to show respect and consistency in regard to her father’s memory. In February 1995 she said that those who made negative assessments about Sukarno should feel ashamed (malu), because they were not consistent. Furthermore, by rhetorically asking who had conferred the honour of ‘Hero of the Proclamation [of independence]’ on her father, she implied that the target of her criticism was President Suharto.

It is unclear why the white book was published at the particular time; rumours had been circulating for several years that it was about to be published. In early 1994, however, shortly after Megawati’s election to the PDI chair, the commander-in-chief of the military, General Feisal Tandjung, said that the book was about to be published later the same year. This timing and the book’s negative assessment of Sukarno’s role – which diverted from Suharto’s and the government’s official stance of mikul dhuwur mendhem jero – indicate that its publication at least in part was politically motivated and aimed at denigrating Megawati through suggesting that she had a background of communist associations and thus did not have a ‘clean environment’ (bersih lingkungan).

Shortly after the publication of the white book, the PDI became the direct target for a bersih lingkungan campaign, initiated by the military leadership, which now appeared to be more firmly under Suharto’s control. The campaign aimed at associating the party as well as Megawati herself with the outlawed Communist Party. In early December, the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General R. Hartono, said that the chairman of the PDI’s West Java chapter, Djadjang Kurniadi, a close Megawati supporter, did not have a ‘clean environment’. A few weeks later, the accusations against Djadjang
The PDI under Megawati

were specified, as he was accused by the West Java regional branch of the military intelligence agency, Bakorstanasda (Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional Daerah), of having issued a statement in 1965 in support of the so-called Revolutionary Council which had claimed responsibility for the 30 September coup attempt. Djadjang, however, was not summoned by Bakorstanasda to defend himself, indicating that the highly publicised accusations and allegations lacked substance. When Djadjang held a press conference in Bandung, refuting the allegations, the regional newspapers were reportedly advised by the Bakorstanasda not to report the event. The press conference, however, was covered by several Jakarta newspapers. Djadjang was eventually forced to declare himself non-active in the PDI pending the investigation.

In early 1995, the bersih lingkungan campaign was stepped up as Jusuf Merukh, a former leader of the Group of 17 and a reputed troublemaker in the PDI, declared that between 300 and 400 PDI functionaries, including Megawati’s husband Taufik Kiemas, had past communist links. Shortly afterwards, his claim was boosted by General Feisal Tandjung, who said that the military took the allegations seriously and confirmed that many leaders of the PDI’s provincial chapters and district branches had past communist links. Minister of Home Affairs Yogie S. M., meanwhile, said that the commander-in-chief must have good evidence to support his belief, and that he therefore shared the general’s view. In mid-January, a group of demonstrators calling themselves the PDI Young Generation (Generasi Muda PDI) demonstrated at the PDI headquarters and the Parliament building in Jakarta, demanding that the PDI be ‘cleansed’ (dibersihkan) of communist elements.

The full list of those PDI cadres who allegedly had links with the PKI appears never to have been published, and the bersih lingkungan campaign was toned down by the authorities after January 1995. The attempt to associate Megawati and the PDI with the PKI appears to have been largely unsuccessful. In the absence of any real threat from communism for over two decades, the government’s and the military’s ideology of anti-communism had come to be regarded with increasing criticism or even cynicism by many Indonesians, at least those who were more politically aware. For example, according to Rob Goodfellow, the very term ‘PKI’ had taken on a meaning of jocular abuse, and by the early 1990s it had become fashionable in Jakarta to use the word in the sense of ‘stupid’ or an ‘idiot’. The Jakarta Post, in an editorial on 10 January 1995 entitled ‘Clear and present danger?’ questioned the likelihood of the allegations that there were hundreds of PDI activists with past communist links in the PDI, since government and military authorities had already screened all
party candidates for suspected communist links ahead of the general elections. It may be that the military decided to cancel the bersih lingkungan campaign against the PDI because the issue started to reflect badly on the competence of military agencies, especially the security agency Bakorstanas, in conducting the screening process. Another reason may have been that calls started to be made for investigations of possible communist infiltration of other political organisations, including Golkar.

The communist allegations, however, provided Megawati’s adversaries in the party with a pretext for setting up a rival central board, allegedly to ‘save the party [from communist infiltration] and relieve Megawati of her burden.’ The rival board, which was announced in the end of December 1994, contained several well-known PDI figures who previously had been involved in the attempts to destabilise Soerjadi’s leadership, such as Jusuf Merukh, who was named party chairman, Gerry Mbatemooy, who seemed to be leading the initiative, Edwin Sukowati and Latief Pudjosakti. Some of the people named as board members, however, appeared not to have been contacted beforehand, such as the former chairman of the PDI’s Jakarta chapter, Alex Asmasoebarta.

Even though the government claimed that it only recognised the central board led by Megawati, the party rebels were allowed to hold a three-day meeting attended by 200 supporters in Ciawi, Bogor in the middle of January 1995. The meeting lacked an official permit – required for any meeting with more than five participants – but Jusuf Merukh said that he had obtained a verbal permit from the authorities. As the meeting ended on 19 January, Jusuf claimed that the secretary general of Megawati’s central board, Alexander Litaay, had defected to the rival board. The secretary general, however, had mysteriously disappeared the same morning, and the claim could not be confirmed. Alex Litaay reappeared again four days later, and after a seven-hour meeting with Megawati he announced his continuing loyalty to her leadership and claimed that he had been abducted by the party rebels and forced to sign a statement that he supported the rival central board. Jusuf Merukh, however, claimed that Alex had come to join their camp voluntarily. The circumstances around the disappearance were never fully explained, but it seems that the rebels tried to win over Alex by a combined strategy of coercion and bribery.

Jusuf Merukh planned to organise an extraordinary party congress in April 1995, and he even claimed that he had received funds from the authorities for the event, a claim denied by Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. According to one version, Jusuf Merukh was sponsored by the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General R. Hartono, who allegedly also engineered
The PDI under Megawati

support for the party rebels among the regional military authorities.\textsuperscript{51} Although these allegations remain unconfirmed, they are strengthened by the circumstance that the rival board seems to have lost its backing in the military after Hartono in February 1995 was replaced as military chief of social and political affairs by Major-General Mochammad Mar’uf, who was regarded as close to Benny Moerdani.\textsuperscript{52} Shortly after his inauguration, Mar’uf firmly stated that the military did not recognise the rival central board and would not allow the group to hold any more meetings in the future. Defence and Security Minister Edi Sudradjat, another Moerdani supporter, also denounced the rival central board in the middle of February, saying that it was not in accordance with Pancasila democracy.\textsuperscript{53} After February 1995, the activities of Jusuf Merukh received markedly less media attention, and the extraordinary congress planned for April the same year did not materialise. Throughout the rest of the year, Jusuf Merukh and the rival central board were thus little heard of in the media, with the exception of an incident in the beginning of June, when Jusuf attempted to inaugurate a rival provincial board in Medan, but failed to do so because he was chased away by hundreds of Megawati supporters and eventually forced to flee out the back door of a hotel and fly back to Jakarta.\textsuperscript{54}

The leadership rift in East Java, the communist allegations and the challenge of the rival central board seem to have combined virtually to paralyse the party from the latter half of 1994 and throughout 1995. The press reports about the party were heavily dominated by its internal problems and there were few news about the party’s political views or policies. There were two exceptions in October 1994, however. First, in an unprecedented move, the PDI assembled its MPR faction to discuss the party’s policies for the 1998 session. The meeting marked the first time in which any of the MPR’s five factions had assembled their delegation in between the assembly’s quinquennial sessions. The second instance was when the PDI’s parliamentary faction a few days later met a delegation of the Petition of 50 (Petisi 50), a group of dissidents, many of whom previously had been prominent in the early days of the New Order, but who subsequently had become critical of the corruption and lack of democracy under Suharto.\textsuperscript{55} After these two instances, until early 1996, the PDI was almost exclusively in the public spotlight because of the internal conflicts and the bersih lingkungan campaign.

Megawati continued in meetings, speeches and interviews to criticise the existing political arrangements, particularly certain aspects of the election system, such as the floating mass doctrine and the shortcomings in the election implementation.\textsuperscript{56} Although she largely refrained from criticising the president, she also largely refrained from hailing his achievements or expressing the
party’s support for the president. In her party anniversary speech in January 1995, for example, Megawati only mentioned Suharto’s name once, when she gave him credit for organising the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, which had been held in Jakarta at the end 1994. Megawati thus praised the president for an achievement in the foreign policy area, but she omitted any references to his achievements in domestic policy areas, a circumstance which implied dissatisfaction with his leadership in those areas. In her speech, Megawati also mentioned the party’s commitment to its four political stances, but did not explicitly express the party’s support for the president. She instead elaborated the party’s commitment to the second of the stances, support for the dual function of the military, urging the armed forces to uphold their commitment to the people and the nation and not to be influenced by the ‘subjective interests of cliques, groups or individuals,’ probably a subtle reference to the president’s efforts to assert his personal control over the military.

In June 1995, the continuing conflict between Megawati and the East Java authorities again came to the fore, now over the commemoration of Sukarno’s death on 21 June 1970. The commemoration was traditionally held in Blitar, East Java, where Sukarno was buried, and had in previous years been organised by the Sukarno family. Ahead of the 1995 celebration, however, the regional authorities in East Java announced that they would take over the organisation of the celebrations, apparently out of fear that the event would turn into a manifestation of political support for Megawati and the PDI. Taking a hard line, the Commander of East Java’s Briwijaya Division, Major-General Imam Oetomo said that there would be no speeches or political discussions allowed at the anniversary, only prayers (tahlilan). When asked if members of the Sukarno family, such as Megawati, would be allowed to hold welcome addresses, he said that the only ones with the right to hold addresses were representatives of the provincial government. On the same day, however, the government-appointed organising committee announced that, in addition to government officials, several leading non-government figures were scheduled to speak at the event, including Megawati’s sister Rachmawati and the NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid. The split in government ranks was then further highlighted when the East Java Governor, Basofi Sudirman, said that speeches would be allowed, but that no politicking would be tolerated. Minister of Home Affairs Yogie S. M. then surprisingly said that the organisation of the commemoration should be left to the Sukarno family, and that he did not know for sure why the regional government had taken over the organisation.
As it was, the commemoration, which took place on the night of 21 June, was attended by thousands of people. The Sukarno family was represented by Megawati’s sisters Rachmawati and Sukmawati, both of whom held speeches, and by Sukarno’s youngest wife, Ratna Sari Dewi Sukarno. Megawati herself was conspicuously absent, as were her brothers Guntur and Guruh. Abdurrahman Wahid, who had close ties with Megawati, did not show up either, even though he had been scheduled to speak.60 Just as the preparations ahead of the anniversary had highlighted splits in government circles, the event itself highlighted the long-standing split in the Sukarno family regarding the PDI’s exploitation of Sukarno. Whereas Sukmawati said that she had no objection to the government organising the commemoration, Megawati worried publicly that the government’s involvement would cause the spontaneity of the event to be lost in favour of protocol.61

In spite of the authorities’ overt attempt to control the event, it seems that the spontaneity of the participants was largely intact. The crowd, which had come to celebrate Sukarno, showed its defiance by heckling official speakers, chanting ‘Long live Sukarno’ and disregarding an official ban on wearing the red shirts associated with the PDI.62 The discussions about the organisation of the event and the widely publicised display of disunity in government circles, moreover, helped to draw public attention to the event and to highlight its political implications. Ironically, the government’s attempt to prevent Megawati from using the event politically contributed to its politicisation and reflected badly on the regional authorities for trying to control the spontaneous expressions of popular affection for Sukarno. Megawati’s calm and disinterested attitude, meanwhile, strengthened the impression that the government was overreacting to the supposed political threat which Sukarno’s symbolism represented.

The government’s attempts to destabilise Megawati’s leadership, such as the sponsoring of rival groups within the PDI and the bersih lingkungan campaign, as well as the authorities taking control of the commemoration of Sukarno’s death, all served to increase Megawati’s popular esteem and affection. Throughout much of the turmoil, she herself seemed to stand above the commotion through her stillness and silence, thus becoming a mute symbol for decency in contrast to the manipulations and abuses of power by the regime.63 In early 1996, political scientist Aribowo said that her ‘respectful, calm and seemingly docile style’ had made for an effective leadership of the PDI, and that the PDI under leadership might fare well in the upcoming 1997 election.64 Megawati herself, when asked if people considered her too nrimo, an originally Javanese
word meaning to take an ‘attitude of accepting something the way it is’, said that she was happy if people considered her *nrimo*. ‘To be patient in this republic is indeed something which is difficult’, she also said. Megawati’s symbolising virtues, such as calm, patience and decency, had come about as a consequence of her stance in dealing with persistent harassment and manipulations by military and government authorities, and were thus separate from the qualities which people identified in her due to her association with Sukarno. Although her popularity still largely rested with her name, she could no longer be explained away as just a symbol of her father.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Megawati’s rise to the PDI chair was one of a number of indications in 1993 that Suharto’s predominant position and supreme control over the political system had started to slip. The new term *arus bawah*, which emerged in connection with Megawati’s election, expressed the hope for a more participatory political culture and a more responsive regime. The emergence of *arus bawah* in general, as well as Megawati’s election to the PDI chair, depended on the support of sections of the military, who were opposed to the autocratic and patrimonial rule of the president, but who were not necessarily committed to ideas of democracy or broader political participation. President Suharto, meanwhile, realised that a potentially serious challenge to his leadership had begun to emerge, and intensified his efforts to reassert control over the military and cracked down on oppositional and dissenting voices.

In this context, Megawati’s rise to political prominence as PDI chair at the end of 1993 was a potential threat to the political status quo, most directly in relation to Golkar’s performance in the upcoming 1997 general election, but also, by extension, to Suharto’s supreme control over the political system, particularly the 1998 MPR session and the presidential and vice-presidential elections. During Megawati’s first months as party leader in early 1994, the PDI displayed a new vigour, which, if it could be sustained, was likely to lead the party to a significantly stronger result in the 1997 election. Megawati’s popularity, high moral standing and female qualities made it difficult for the government to confront her, especially in the wake of the failed attempts to thwart her election to the PDI chair, which had damaged the regime’s already shaky democratic credentials. Megawati was careful not to open herself to criticism, and she consequently did not overtly exploit her relationship with her father, nor did she openly advocate any of Sukarno’s leftist political ideas or
The PDI under Megawati

strident nationalism. Although Megawati, in the first months of her leadership of the PDI, often took a critical stance towards the government and the political system, she was careful not to transgress the limits of permissible political discussion and opinion. Government officials, meanwhile, seemed reluctant to counter her criticism, probably because doing so was likely to put them in a defensive position and expose the inconsistencies between the government’s rhetoric and the prevailing conditions, concerning, for example, the election system. Throughout 1994 and 1995, Megawati continued to focus her criticism on inconsistencies and shortcomings in the election system. She also gave little credit to President Suharto for his achievements and policies, thereby implying dissatisfaction with his leadership.

Instead of openly countering the challenge from Megawati and the PDI, the government instead deployed its long-standing modus operandi of covertly trying to destabilise her leadership. These efforts included the sponsoring of breakaway factions in the party, obstructing her internal consolidation efforts and initiating a bersih lingkungan campaign to intimidate Megawati and her supporters. The campaign, by implication, also targeted Megawati herself through the accusations against her husband and the allegations that Sukarno had been a communist sympathiser. These campaigns obviously hampered Megawati’s efforts to lead the party effectively, and by the end of 1994 the vigour the PDI had displayed during Megawati’s first months as party leader earlier in the year seemed all but to have evaporated. At the same time, however, Megawati’s calm and respectful attitude in the face of the harassment from the government and her political adversaries in the party boosted her moral standing among her supporters and the wider public. As a consequence, as Megawati entered her third year as party leader at the end of 1995, she had come a long way from being seen as just a symbol of her father’s legacy, and had instead acquired a reputation for morality, honesty, righteousness and decency, as a result of her calm and patience in facing the crude attempts to destabilise her leadership and depose her from the PDI chair.

NOTES

1  Jakarta Post (24 December 1993); italics in original.
2  See Mochtar Pabottingi in Jakarta Post (24 December 1993). The term Sukarnoism seems to have originated with the formation in 1964 of the ‘Body for the support of Sukarnoism’, BPS (Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme), an organisation associated with Adam Malik and the Murba party, created to counter the rising influence of the PKI at the time; see Crouch (1993: 65–66).
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

3 Tempo (4 December 1993).
4 Jakarta Post (17 December 1993).
5 Kompas (11 December 1993).
6 These included Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh and Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka.
7 See Blackburn (1991) and Philpott (2000: 73) about the lack of studies linking gender and politics. Manderson (1991: 50), moreover, has observed: ‘[S]tudies of women and politics are not concerned with [the process of the social and cultural construction of gender], or with gendered realities, or with linking cultural notions of maleness and femaleness to power or political activity, although they could be concerned with any of these issues’. See also Errington (1990: 3) for a similar assessment. A notable exception is the study by Mina Roces (1998) about gender and politics in the Philippines. See further McIntyre (1997: 1) for some notes on the emergence of female leaders in post-colonial South and Southeast Asia, and Onghokham’s article in Kompas (26 December 1993) about the historical background of female political leadership in Asia.
8 Reid (1988: 170–172) and Reid (1979: 408–412). The main instances of female rule were Patani, which was ruled by four consecutive queens between 1584 and 1688, and Aceh, which likewise had four consecutive female rulers between 1641 and 1699.
9 See Anderson (1996a) and McIntyre (1997: 2) for similar lines of argument. Naisbitt (1996: 217–218) also notes the focus of some women leaders in South Asia on ‘soft’ issues such as peace, education and social welfare. McIntyre (2000: 110) also discusses Megawati’s style in terms of a softer ‘maternalism’. In the Philippines, Roces (1998: 3) has argued for a link between power and female beauty and morality, as well as, under particular circumstances, militancy.
10 Kompas (16 September 1993).
12 Megawati, for example, implied as much in an interview in Kompas (14 January 1996).
13 It is unclear who coined the term and precisely when. According to Bachtiar Sitanggang in Suara Pembarusan (8 February 1994), the term appeared as the PDI’s extraordinary congress in December 1993 approached. State-secretary Moerdiono, in early January 1994, also said that he had seen a new political word, aras bawah, becoming fashionable.
14 Another important issue which occurred around the same time and which was taken as evidence of the rising influence of aras bawah was the government’s decision to close the state lottery, SDSB, after protests from Muslim groups; see further below. An editorial in Media Indonesia (4 January 1994) identified the closing of the SDSB and Megawati’s election as examples of the new prominence of aras bawah, together with the withdrawal of a candidacy for the post of governor in Central Kalimantan after pressure from the regional parliament. Suyanto et al.
The PDI under Megawati

(1995), meanwhile, uses arus bawah to denote a range of protest movements, involving land conflicts, workers and students, and this use appears to have been the one which gained currency in Indonesia.

15 Merdeka (6 January 1994).
16 Tempo (8 January 1994).
17 Kompas (12 January 1994).
18 Kompas (11 January 1994). Megawati used the English term ‘single majority’.

Megawati started her tour in Bandung, West Java, and in February 1994 she also visited Yogyakarta, Central Java, East Kalimantan, the Moluccas, South Sulawesi, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and East Timor; see Jakarta Post (1 February 1994), Suara Karya (8 February 1994), Jakarta Post (9 February 1994 and 11 February 1994), Kompas (15 February 1994), Jakarta Post (19 February 1994 and 22 February 1994), Media Indonesia (23 February 1994), Kompas (26 February 1994) and Suara Karya (28 February 1994) respectively. She does not appear to have visited any Sumatran provinces, nor East Java, which, as we have seen, was a stronghold of her opponents in the party.

20 Tempo (19 February 1994) and Jakarta Post (1 February 1994 and 19 February 1994).
21 Jakarta Post (8 March 1994).
22 Jakarta Post (26 February 1994).
23 Jakarta Post (26 February 1994). Megawati also, conspicuously, attended military ceremonies, such as the anniversary of the Jakarta military command in the end of December, at which she appeared in a press photo smiling broadly and standing close to Major-General Hendropriyono; see Jakarta Post (27 December 1993). She was also invited at least twice during her first months as party leader to speak at the Army Staff and Command College, Seskoad (Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat) in Bandung; see Kompas (2 March 1993) and Merdeka (30 April 1993).
24 Jakarta Post (20 January 1994, 22 February 1994 and 2 March 1994). At a parliamentary hearing in September 1994, Harmoko was again pressed over TVRI’s extensive coverage of Golkar activities, and he then indirectly admitted that Golkar paid the reporters to cover the organisation’s activities and urged the political parties to do the same if they could afford it; Jakarta Post (22 September 1994).
25 Jakarta Post (11 February 1994). The impression from the collected media material about Megawati’s regional tour is also that her activities and critical statements were toned down in the print media, with the exception of the Jakarta Post, which generally was allowed greater leeway in reporting on controversial issues.
27 Military involvement was apparent as seen in the election of both Try Sutrisno and Megawati. The demonstrations against the SDSB, which even occurred in front of the presidential palace, were obviously tolerated by the security forces and used by
the military to put pressure on Suharto; see Kingsbury (1998: 222). The actual influence of Benny Moerdani in the struggle is disputable, however. The president appears to have regarded the conflict in personal terms, whereas leading military officers seem to have seen the division in the military more in terms of palace loyalists versus those officers who had their primary commitment to the nation and the military as an institution (‘Sapta Margaists’); see The Editors (1994: 84).

28 According to Said (1998: 544), Suharto initiated the campaign already in 1988. It seems to have intensified in the wake of the 1992 election, however, leading to a more volatile situation in the military in the following years; see The Editors (1994: 84).

29 See The Editors (1994: 84–85) and The Editors (1995: 104–105) for the reshuffles. Although the involvement of these officers in Megawati’s election was conspicuous, there were other reasons for the reshuffles as well. For example, Hariyoto, as mentioned above, had resisted Harmoko’s election to the Golkar chair.


34 Hariibuan (1996: 40) and Jakarta Post (26 October 1994).


36 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (1994). The release of the book, probably coincidentally, followed closely on the publication of another book in September by one of Sukarno’s former close associates, Manai Sophiaan (1994), entitled Kehormatan Bagi Yang Berhak: Bung Karno Tidak Terlibat G-30-S (‘Respect for those who deserve it: Bung Karno was not involved in G-30-S’). As the title shows, Manai Sophiaan tried to disprove all allegations that Sukarno had been involved in the 30 September 1965 coup attempt. The book, together with Manai’s statements in the media, reignited the controversy over Sukarno’s legacy as well as the origins of the New Order; see Brooks (1995: 89–93). Manai, a leading PNI politician in the 1950s and 1960s, was the father of PDI legislator Sophan Sophiaan.


38 Jakarta Post (6 October 1994) and Kompas (12 October 1994 and 27 February 1995).


40 Kompas (5 December 1994).

41 Suara Karya (27 December 1994).


43 EIU Country Report Indonesia, 1st quarter (1995: 8), Jakarta Post (6 January 1995 and 7 January 1995) and Hariibuan (1996: 24). According to van Dijk (1997: 406), Taufik Kiemas’ name was also included in the list of the 300 PDI functionaries with suspected Communist links.
The PDI under Megawati

45 Jakarta Post (10 January 1995).
46 See e.g. Jakarta Post (6 January 1995 and 10 January 1995), Kompas (8 January 1995 and 10 January 1995) and van Dijk (1997: 406). The calls for Golkar to be investigated brought associations to the origins of the bersih lingkungan campaigns, which, as we have seen, had first been staged in connection with the military’s attempts to thwart Sudharmono’s election as vice-president in 1988.
47 Jakarta Post (2 January 1995).
48 Jakarta Post (2 January 1995).
49 Jakarta Post (20 January 1995).
50 See Jakarta Post (23 January 1995), Gatra (28 January 1995) and Suara Independen (31 February 1995) for the different versions surrounding Alex’s disappearance. According to one of Megawati’s close aides, Laksamana Sukardi, Alex was offered a presumably lucrative mining concession and other material compensation for his defection; interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997). Megawati herself was very reluctant to comment on the alleged defection of her secretary general after he reappeared, e.g. Tiras (16 February 1995). If Alex indeed was abducted, it remained unexplained, as the Jakarta Post (27 January 1995) implied in an editorial by asking, why nobody in the party filed a police complaint.
51 Jakarta Post (16 January 1995) and Haribuan (1996: 21). Hartono is described by the latter as army chief of staff, a position he only acquired in February 1995; see The Editors (1995: 118).
52 According to The Editors (1995: 105 n. 4), it was unclear why the politically important position as chief of social and political affairs was given to Mar’uf, who had close ties to Benny Moerdani. Mar’uf – as well as Hartono – was rumoured to be close to Suharto’s eldest daughter Tutut.
53 Kompas (16 February 1995 and 17 February 1995). The rift in senior government and military circles was visible also in connection with a leadership rift in the NU, when Hartono led an unsuccessful attempt to depose Abdurrahman Wahid of the NU chair at the organisation’s congress in December 1994; see Fealy (1996) and Ramage (1996: 158).
54 Kompas (2 June 1995).
59 Kompas (17 June 1995 and 19 June 1995) and Jakarta Post (19 June 1995).
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

61 Gatra (1 July 1995) and Kompas (17 June 1995).
64 Jakarta Post (10 January 1996). Political scientist Amir Santoso took a pro-government stance regarding Megawati's leadership, and accused her of being 'stubborn' and 'rigid' in her dealing with the government.
65 Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (1996: s.v. 'nrima'). The word is alternatively spelt nrimo, nrima or nerimo.
66 Kompas (14 January 1995).
CHAPTER 11

The Deposing of Megawati

BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND COMPLIANCE

As we have seen, Indonesian politics during most of the 1990s was a waiting game, with the impending presidential succession increasingly dominating the country’s political life. After Suharto, in spite of widespread expectations that he might step down in 1993, had been elected president for the term 1993–98, the expectation was that this term – by the end of which the president would be 76 years old – would in any case be his last.1 This expectation again seemed to come to nought in the second half of 1995, when the president began to indicate that he was prepared to serve a seventh term as president. From September 1995, a wave of endorsements for Suharto to seek another term as president began to be heard from Muslim leaders, as well as Golkar functionaries and cabinet ministers,2 making Suharto’s re-election in 1998 again look like a foregone conclusion.

As PDI leader, Megawati was consistently reluctant to discuss the presidential succession, saying only that it was up to the people to choose the president.3 In the last months of 1995, however, just as the calls for Suharto’s re-election were gathering pace, sections within the PDI began to call for the party to nominate Megawati as its candidate in the 1998 presidential election. These calls started with a questionnaire campaign, initiated by legislator and staunch Megawati supporter Aberson Marle Sihaloho, in which the party’s district branches were asked about their opinions concerning three suggestions: that the party nominate Megawati as its presidential candidate for the 1998 presidential election, that the president and vice-president be elected by majority vote by the MPR and that the candidates for president and vice-president campaign in the 1997 general election with their respective political programs.4 Aberson’s strategy appears to have been to collect a sufficiently large number of signatures from the party’s district branches in order to pressure the party’s central board into nominating Megawati.5
Megawati, however, continued to take an evasive stance concerning the presidential election and refused to answer the question of whether she would agree to be nominated. When asked about the matter in an interview in the middle of January 1996, she said:

To say that I will engineer change, that is, not quite correct. Because, change is going to happen in a natural way. [...] This is what I have said before: everything is going to happen in a natural way. The succession, whenever it will happen, will happen. Why do we dramatise every event. I once was the president’s child. My father was the first president of this republic. For me it was nothing strange when Pak Harto became president.6

It is hard to believe that Megawati was sincere when she said that she had found nothing strange as Suharto took over power from her father. The circumstances around the presidential transition, in the wake of the army-sponsored massacre of hundreds of thousands of alleged communist sympathisers, were by no accounts normal, and several members of the Sukarno family, including Megawati’s sisters, Rachmawati and Sukmawati, had openly expressed their resentment over the way their father was treated in the final years of his life.7 Megawati’s evasiveness over the succession issue was probably more driven by pragmatic political concerns, not least for the sake of party unity. As we have seen, the question of whether the party should nominate another candidate than Suharto in the 1993 presidential election had led to an open rift in the party in the lead-up to the 1993 MPR session.

At the end of January 1996, Megawati’s evasive stance became more difficult to maintain, as Aberson, together with two other PDI legislators, Marwan Adam and S. G. B. Tampubolon, publicly announced their support for Megawati’s nomination. Their declaration met very mixed reactions, both within the party and among officials and commentators outside the party. Several political observers hailed the move as a positive development, whereas government and military officials were generally suspicious and questioned the procedures through which the proposal was put forward.8 One of the strongest negative reactions to the suggestion came from within the ranks of the PDI. Legislator Budi Hardjono immediately reacted to the proposal, saying:

They [Megawati’s supporters] have first to convene a congress and drop the party’s pledge of support for the New Order government under President Soeharto. [...] Those who insist on nominating Megawati
The Deposing of Megawati

without bothering to consider the party's political stand do not deserve PDI membership.9

As Budi Hardjono implied, the PDI had in its four political stances decided to 'give full support and firmly declare itself united with the national leadership under the leadership of President Soeharto.' The four political stances, as we have seen, had first been adopted at the party’s 1981 congress and then been reiterated at the 1986 congress. The 1993 Munas conference, which elected Megawati to the party chair, had also repeated the party’s commitment to the four stances.10 Formally, the congress and Munas decisions left the party’s central board with little room for proposing any other candidate than Suharto, as long as he was willing to be nominated, which clearly seemed to be the case in early 1996.

Megawati, however, continued to decline to say whether or not she was prepared to be nominated. Shortly after the three legislators’ declaration of support for her nomination, she said:

I do not yet think about the nomination. [...] My priority is to prepare the PDI for the general election that is going to take place. Even if I want to nominate myself, that will be after the 1997 general election, after seeing whether the situation is favourable or not.11

Against the background of the party’s support for Suharto’s national leadership, however, even this seemingly diplomatic stance amounted to an indirect challenge to Suharto, because Megawati did not explicitly reject the possibility that she might run for president in 1998. In coupling her decision to the PDI’s election performance, Megawati even indicated that she would consider challenging Suharto if the PDI were to do well in the election. As we have seen, during her two years as party leader, Megawati had also implicitly expressed dissatisfaction with Suharto’s leadership, both through her criticism of the political system, particularly the election system, and through her failure to praise the president for his achievements. During this time, Megawati had also earned a reputation for being headstrong and unafraid of confronting the government, especially in connection with her stand-off in the still unresolved leadership dispute in the party’s East Java chapter. She thus looked less likely than her predecessor, Soerjadi, to bow to pressure to withdraw her nomination bid, should she decide to make one ahead of the 1998 general MPR session. Taken together, these circumstances thus indicated that Megawati would be very likely to challenge Suharto in the 1998 presidential election. Just as in 1993,
such a move could be expected to meet with resistance within the party, not so much out of loyalty or admiration for Suharto as out of fear that an open confrontation with president would be not only futile, but also likely to damage the party’s interests and thus also the political fortunes of its representatives.

The conflict in East Java, which had been deadlocked since the end of 1994, meanwhile intensified. On 22 January 1996, the East Java Governor, Basofi Sudirman, announced the composition of the provincial election committee, which excluded the PDI on the grounds that the leadership conflict in the party’s provincial chapter had not been solved. This move by the East Java authorities caused considerable controversy among politicians and commentators. One of the most critical reactions came from Aberson Marle Sihaloho, who urged the party’s central board to sue President Suharto, Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. and Basofi Sudirman for failing to respect the party’s internal rules on the pretext that the government, as prescribed by a 1984 law, was the ‘patron of politics’ (pembina politik). Aberson said that all three should be sued, since it was not clear who bore responsibility for the government’s stance. He also said that the notion of the government being the political patron of the political parties was legally questionable.12

In the middle of February, President Suharto spoke out about the PDI’s leadership conflict in East Java. After a meeting with Suharto, Governor Basofi quoted the president as saying that all sides should ‘open [their] eyes and hearts’ to the problems that still existed in the party’s East Java branch, and urged them not to claim that the problems had already been solved. Basofi also said that Suharto fully supported the steps he had taken in the conflict. Megawati did not comment directly on the president’s statement, but she did not appear to be prepared to change her stance in the conflict. Aberson, meanwhile, flatly rejected Suharto’s comment and said that government officials, such as Basofi and Yogie, should stop poking their noses into the party’s internal affairs. Budi Hardjono, however, just as with the question over the presidential nomination, expressed the opposite view and criticised the PDI leadership for their allegedly ‘childish’ attitude, obviously referring to Megawati’s refusal to negotiate a solution to the conflict. He also said that the side which was losing on the conflict was the government, all the way from Governor Basofi to the central government.13

In addition to the obvious split in party ranks over the presidential nomination and the East Java conflict, signs of friction also emerged in the work of the party’s parliamentary delegation. The delegation was dominated by the supporters of Soerjadi, who had been allowed to retain his position as
The Deposing of Megawati

deputy house speaker, a position normally held by the party chair. The faction chair, moreover, was Fatimah Achmad, who was a close supporter of Soerjadi, as was the faction’s secretary general, Markus Wauran. The delegation, however, also included several outspoken legislators who already in 1993 had advocated a more radical stance in the attempts to push for political reform, and who had wanted to challenge Suharto in the 1993 presidential election. Several of these more radical legislators, including Aberson, Sophan Sophian and Sabam Sirait, had emerged as staunch supporters of Megawati as she rose to the party chair at the end of 1993. Aberson, as we have seen, especially stood out for his frank criticism of government policies and prevailing political arrangement. In addition to his advocacy of Megawati’s nomination and his rejection of the government’s interference in the East Java conflict, Aberson also openly rejected the dual function of the military, which upset the military’s faction in Parliament. Its chair, Suparman Achmad, even said that retaining Aberson in the assembly could ‘undermine’ the PDI and its parliamentary faction.14

Before 1996, the tensions in the party’s parliamentary faction do not appear to have caused any serious open conflicts. According to Soerjadi, there were few internal problems in the parliamentary faction during Megawati’s leadership because several of her close and more radical supporters, such as her brother Guruh, her husband Taufik Kiemas and Sophan Sophiaan, rarely attended the parliamentary sessions.15 As we have seen, Megawati herself had shown little activity in Parliament during her first term in office between 1987 and 1992, and as the PDI leader from 1993 she continued to take little interest in the legislature’s activities. Although she was a member of Parliament, she rarely attended the meetings of the legislature and she seemed to take little interest in the affairs of the party’s house delegation.16

In the first months of 1996, however, two events in the legislature aggravated the split among the party’s legislators. The first of these occurred in February 1996, when Aberson Marle Sihaloho, who was a member of the parliamentary budget commission, together with a group of fellow PDI legislators demanded that the faction reject the government’s budget proposal for the fiscal year 1996–97. The reasons for a rejection, according to the group, were that projected tax rates and revenues were too low, that the budget contained insufficient anti-corruption measures and that the salaries of civil servants needed to be raised as part of the efforts to combat corruption in the bureaucracy. The group also wanted to strengthen Parliament’s influence over the allocation of fiscal funds, a demand which, as we have seen, Aberson had also propounded in the budget deliberations in the preceding years. The leadership
of the PDI faction, however, claimed that Megawati, who was abroad at the time and thus not present to settle the dispute, had instructed the faction to accept the budget proposal. Aberson was outraged by this claim, and he blasted the other camp for its compliance with the government’s proposal. The budget was eventually passed without reservations from the PDI, but the faction’s secretary general, Markus Wauran, later said that the party considered expelling Aberson for his threat to reject the budget proposition.\(^ {17}\)

The other event which highlighted the internal differences within the PDI faction was a controversial boycott by five legislators, including Megawati’s husband Taufik Kiemas, of a routine meeting of a parliamentary commission with Minister of Information Harmoko in March 1996. Instead of attending the meeting, the five representatives stayed in the party faction’s premises of the House. One of the legislators, Sophan Sophiaan, said that he had stayed away from the meeting because he knew that Harmoko would ‘sing the same old tune’ and that he feared that the meeting would waste his time.\(^ {18}\) According to Sophan, there had never been any positive results from the meetings with Harmoko, for example regarding the attempts by the PDI to discuss issues such as film, censorship and press bannings. Another of the legislators, Sabam Sirait, said that he would rather take his children to school than listening to empty talk.\(^ {19}\) The use by Sabam of the term ‘empty talk’ (\textit{omong kosong}) was probably meant as an allusion to the widespread mock interpretation of the minister’s name Harmoko as meaning \textit{hari-hari omong kosong}, that is, ‘talking nonsense every day’.

Just as with the attempt to have the budget proposal rejected, however, the leadership of the parliamentary faction took a more pro-government stance. The faction chair, Fatimah Achmad, said that the boycott had not been officially orchestrated, and Soerjadi said that for the legislators not to attend the commission working meetings was irresponsible and demonstrated a disrespectful attitude towards Parliament. Moreover, he said, those parliamentarians who did not want to follow the party’s policies and preferred to act on their own had better resign.\(^ {20}\)

These controversies and the disagreement around the presidential nomination seemed to demonstrate a significant rift in the party’s ranks – besides the split involving Jusuf Merukh’s rival central board – over the extent to which the party should confront the government. The rift was largely a continuation of the friction which had been apparent already around the 1993 MPR session, but was aggravated as the political temperature rose ahead of the 1997 election. Whereas the more compliant side led by Soerjadi eventually had gained the
The Deposing of Megawati

upper hand in 1993, now, a year before the 1997 general election, it looked as if the ‘radicals’ – with Megawati’s tacit approval – would be allowed greater leeway to challenge the government and the president and to press ahead with the demands for political reform.

The open controversies in the party also indicated that there was a lack of cohesion and leadership. Megawati appeared to have little influence over the political statements and actions of her supporters in Parliament, and the radical positions taken by several of them, particularly by Aberson, were strongly resented by the more acquiescent members of the party’s parliamentary faction, led by Soerjadi and Fatimah Achmad. In general, during her party leadership, Megawati appears largely to have let the PDI’s parliamentary faction mind its own business. Her relationship with her predecessor and deputy house speaker Soerjadi, moreover, seemed to be cool. Soerjadi later claimed that Megawati did not like him and that she never contacted him during her term as party leader. According to former secretary general Nico Daryanto, she did not try to accommodate Soerjadi and did not even talk to him. From Megawati’s perspective, however, allowing Soerjadi to retain his position as deputy house speaker appears to have been meant to accommodate him, even though their relationship otherwise seems to have been distant and perhaps even distrustful.

STAGING MEGAWATI’S REMOVAL

Shortly after the discussions about Megawati’s possible nomination for president and the open controversies in the PDI’s parliamentary faction, the government and the military initiated an operation that in June 1996 resulted in Megawati’s ousting from the PDI chair. According to Megawati, the plans for the operation were drawn up at a military leadership meeting in Jakarta at the end of March, and the timing for the operation seems to have led several of her supporters, as well as political observers, to conclude that she was ousted in order to prevent her from challenging Suharto in the 1998 presidential election. Some observers, including myself, have furthermore suggested that the decision to oust Megawati was related to a concern on behalf of the president that for him not to get the unanimous support of the MPR for his re-election would mean a loss of spiritual power and potency, wahu, in Javanese. This concern may have been especially deeply felt by Suharto because the threat to his wahu came from the daughter of the man he himself had toppled 30 years before. The possibility thus emerged that Suharto’s rule
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

would be bracket-ed between two Sukarnos, which in historical perspective would make Suharto look like an illegitimate usurper.27

Against the background of Suharto’s well-documented mystical beliefs and ventures, especially at the beginning of his presidency,28 this interpretation seems plausible, but remains unconfirmed and largely hypothetical. Suharto, as we have seen, was firmly committed to the idea that decisions should be taken through consensus rather than through majority vote, and against the background of his having been elected through acclamation on all previous occasions, the prospect of his not getting the MPR’s unanimous support in 1998 would mean a serious loss of face and indicate that his paramount authority was beginning to unravel, whether from a more mundane secular view of politics or from the perspective of supposedly traditional Javanese notions of power. Moreover, just as in 1993, a secret ballot in the MPR might also lead to a larger than expected vote against Suharto, an outcome that would not only signal dissatisfaction with the president’s rule, but also cast doubt on the legitimacy of previous elections of Suharto by acclamation and, by implication, on the New Order’s Pancasila democracy in general. President Suharto, regardless of his possible mystical inclinations and considerations, was probably well aware of these implications of his being elected by majority vote rather than by acclamation.

Aside from the likely possibility of Megawati challenging Suharto in the presidential election, her popularity could also be expected to benefit the PDI in the 1997 election. The party might even threaten Golkar’s absolute majority, particularly in some of the most strategic and populous provinces, such as Jakarta, Central Java and East Java. All of these provinces were traditional PDI, and to some extent PPP, strongholds where Golkar enjoyed significantly less voter support than its national average.29 As we have seen, the attempts to destabilise Megawati’s leadership had begun in one of these provinces, East Java, where Golkar had suffered heavy losses, mainly to the PDI, in the 1992 election. The organisation had declined by more than 12 points, from 71.2 per cent in 1987 to 58.8 per cent in the provincial vote. Golkar, staunchly supported by the East Java Governor Basofi Sudirman and led by Suharto’s daughter Tutut, who was Golkar’s election coordinator for East Java, apparently meant to recover this loss in 1997 election, an aim which looked difficult to achieve if the organisation were to compete with the popularity of the PDI under Megawati. The threat from the PDI was particularly worrisome from Golkar’s point of view because there were signs that an alliance had begun to emerge between the PDI and the 30-million strong traditionalist Muslim organisation
NU, which had its heartland in East Java. The NU had been a member of the
PPP when the party was founded in 1973, but it had withdrawn in 1984 so that
it no longer had any formal obligation to the PPP. In the 1950s, moreover, when
the NU had been an independent political party, it had had a reputation for
promiscuously shifting its support between different party coalitions in its own
interests. Against this background there was thus a distinct possibility that the
NU might provide some backing to the PDI in the 1997 election. The NU leader
Abdurrahman Wahid, a personal friend of Megawati, had in fact suggested
already in mid-1994 that NU voters who were disillusioned with the PPP and
Golkar might support the PDI. In September the same year, a prominent NU
leader in Madura declared that he wished to join the PDI. An election alliance,
even if informal, between the NU and the PDI had the potential to bring about
substantial shifts in voting patterns, affecting not only in East Java but the
national political map as well.

From the government’s and President Suharto’s point of view, the PDI
under Megawati thus seemed likely to disturb both Golkar’s smooth election
victory and the subsequent presidential election. The decision to have her ousted
from the PDI chair was probably motivated by both of these interrelated
concerns on the part of the government, more than any notion that she was a
threat because of her critical or oppositional opinions. The perceived threat,
from the government’s point of view, rather stemmed from her popularity
combined with her demonstrated firmness in upholding her views and
principles. In contrast to Soerjadi – who, as we have seen, could be at least as
critical in his statements as Megawati – and the majority of New Order
politicians, she seemed unlikely to compromise her and the party’s political
convictions because of government pressure.

In order to oust Megawati, the government once again deployed its long-
standing methods of mobilising sympathetic forces in the party and pressuring
the district branches into supporting her ouster. Jusuf Merukh, who, as we have
seen, had challenged Megawati since the end of 1994, seemed to be a spent
force. He had apparently failed to gain much support in his efforts to set up
rival provincial boards around the country, and he had a tarnished reputation
as a long-standing troublemaker in the party even long before Megawati’s rise
to the party chair. His last effort to oust Megawati seems to have been an
abortive attempt to organise an extraordinary congress in Jakarta at the end of
April 1996. The meeting, however, was broken up by the police because it
lacked an official permit. The supporters of Jusuf Merukh were also attacked by
a group of Megawati supporters, who reportedly found that 19 of Jusuf
Merukh’s supporters carried Golkar membership cards, which strengthened suspicions that Jusuf Merukh’s group was sponsored by sections in the government or the military.31

With Jusuf Merukh being unacceptable to the mainstream of the party’s rank-and-file, the only significant sympathetic force which could be mobilised to oust Megawati was the Soerjadi camp, within which there apparently was discontent with Megawati’s leadership. As we have seen, there were signs of friction in the party concerning the suggestion to nominate Megawati for president, as well as over the critical attitude taken by some of her supporters in Parliament. There appeared to be dissatisfaction among some members of the party’s central board, who felt excluded from influence by Megawati’s allegedly high-handed leadership, particularly in connection with conflict in East Java.32 These grievances provided the government with an opportunity to intervene in the party by lending its support to those who were dissatisfied with Megawati and thereby having her removed as party leader.

The government’s first choice to replace Megawati was rumoured to be Fatimah Achmad, an experienced politician and a close Soerjadi supporter.33 She was also reported to be close to the military.34 Fatimah, however, reportedly rejected the offer to become party chair, which left the government with no other viable and willing candidate but Soerjadi.35 Demonstrating the government’s alarm over Megawati’s challenge, the authorities thus launched the operation to reinstate Soerjadi, in spite of the fact that he was deeply unpopular in government circles because of his controversial stance in the previous general election and MPR session.

In the eyes of the general public, Soerjadi’s willingness to cooperate with the authorities to oust Megawati in 1996 turned him into a government stooge and, as we shall see, completely ruined his political reputation and career. Megawati’s supporters tended to see him as bereft of principles and morality and driven only by personal ambition and opportunism.36 From Soerjadi’s point of view, however, his replacing Megawati seemed to have nothing to do with ethics but only with political realities. According to Soerjadi, no political party under the New Order was free from government interference and, he said in an interview with the author, ‘no one and no organisation can survive without support from the government.’37 This belief seemed to be well-founded in the political history of the New Order as well as in Soerjadi’s own long experience as a party politician. As we have seen, he had been appointed to the party chair by the government in the first place in 1986, whereas in 1993 he had been deposed by the government. As Megawati’s adversaries pointed
out, her own ascendancy to the party chair in 1993 also involved her getting the support of government and military officials. Soerjadi, meanwhile, lamented the opportunism and tendency in the party to seek government support. ‘Everybody goes to the government, even me,’ he said. If, by contrast, the party is coherent, Soerjadi said, it is very difficult for the government to interfere and create conflict in the party. Soerjadi, however, did not appear to see any ethical implications of his own participation in government-engineered operation to oust Megawati. Party coherence – and party interests in general – instead seemed to be synonymous with his own leading of the party.

From the end of April 1996, the party’s central board under Megawati began to receive letters of complaint from several district branches about external intervention. The letters told similar stories from different parts of the country: the district branch leaders were briefed by the local authorities and advised to accept the holding of a party congress. They were given little information but that everything was already organised and that they should just wait and see. Although the purpose of the congress was not explicitly stated, the obvious reason seemed to be to depose Megawati. In addition to the district branches, leaders of the party’s provincial chapters as well as some members of the central board were also approached by military authorities.

The party’s central board countered the campaign by publicly charging the authorities with trying to depose Megawati, thus trying to expose the conspiracy. Deputy chair and head of Litbang, Kwik Kian Gie, charged that some elements of the armed forces wanted to see Megawati resign, although in a ‘legal manner’. On 10 May, the central board sent a letter to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Feisal Tandjung, to complain about the pressure applied on the party’s district branches. Litbang also sent questionnaires to the district branches inquiring about the demand for a congress and asking whether the authorities had contacted them about the matter. At the end of May, Megawati urged all PDI members and cadres to guard against the efforts of internal as well as external elements to organise a congress or extraordinary congress:

Their purpose can already be clearly read. In the long run, [it is to] destroy the unity and integrity, as well as the potential and independence of the PDI as a Basic Capital for Development. [In] the short run, [it is to] destroy the strength of the PDI’s consolidation so that [the party] once again will become a chicken flea party [partai gurem], in order that they can act unimpeded without effective control against the tendency
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

and possibilities of negative practices in the life of society, the nation and the state.  

The campaign to unseat Megawati continued in spite of the protests of Megawati and her supporters. On 3 June, a delegation of around 40 PDI cadres, led by the secretary general of the PDI’s North Sumatra chapter, Buttu Hutapea, visited the ministry of internal affairs and delivered statements which they claimed represented 215 of the party’s 305 local branches, all demanding that a congress be held. This procedure was peculiar because the demand should have been delivered to the party’s central board, which, according to the party’s statutes, should organise an extraordinary congress if requested by more than half of the district branches. The proponents of the congress claimed that the assembly was not to be an extraordinary congress, but a regular congress, and there followed a great deal of confused discussions about the legality and justifications for arranging a congress in 1996. The party’s statutes prescribed that a congress be held once every five years, which should have meant in 1998, five years after the 1993 congress in Medan. The main argument for holding a congress in 1996 appeared to be the dubious claim that, according to the party’s statutes, the decisions of the Munas conference in December 1993 needed to be ratified by a congress.  

On the following day, 4 June, Fatimah Achmad, supported by a majority of the members of the central board, the so called ‘group of 16’ (kelompok 16), took the initiative to form a committee to organise the congress. The congress organisers were immediately received by the second-in-command of Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M., the director-general of social and political affairs, Soetojo N. K., as well as by the military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid. Other high-ranking government and military officials, including General Feisal Tandjung, Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Soesilo Soedarman and Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M., also immediately declared their support for the congress. The congress committee worked with unusual speed, and the government facilitated its task by immediately pledging the funds to hold the congress. Just over a week after the demand for a congress had been presented to the ministry, Fatimah Achmad, who chaired the congress committee, announced that the congress would take place in Medan on 20–24 June. The only agenda was to ratify the 15 decisions of the 1993 Munas conference, which, as we have seen, included the election of the party’s chair and central board. Fatimah, implausibly, said that the congress was not meant to topple Megawati, but to allow her to defend her leadership.
The party chair, however, was not invited to the congress, on the grounds that she rejected it.  

On 12 June, Megawati made an unprecedented outburst against the government. In a statement read to a group of foreign correspondents, Megawati said that she would sue the government for endorsing the plans to organise the congress. She also said that it was beyond doubt that individuals in the military had played an active role in encouraging party members to request a congress. Apparently disappointed with the military’s withdrawal of support for her, the statement said: ‘A military that changes its position erratically is a very worrisome and alarming development that all Indonesians should be deeply concerned about’.  

Megawati said that the PDI ‘could bring tens of millions of people into the streets of every major city and town in the country’, closing thousands of factories, offices and schools nation-wide and bringing normal activities to a halt. At the press conference, Megawati was accompanied by the NU leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. Ostensibly, he was there only as Megawati’s friend, but his presence served as a reminder of the possibility of an alliance between the NU and the PDI, thereby putting extra force behind the threat that the PDI could bring out millions of people onto the streets. Between the two of them, Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid could command the loyalty of a substantial part of the population, especially in politically sensitive and important Java. Megawati’s threat was probably meant as a warning to the government and Suharto that a ‘people power’ revolution, such as had occurred in the Philippines in 1986, might occur in Indonesia as well. Megawati, however, said that the PDI had decided to refrain from radical action for the moment in order to prevent bloodshed and preserve public order.  

Later the same day, Megawati chaired a meeting of the party’s central board. Apart from Megawati herself, those who attended the meeting were the ten board members still loyal to her and who rejected the congress. These included several key members, such as secretary general Alexander Litaay, treasurer Laksamana Sukardi and deputy chairs Kwik Kian Gie and Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno. At the meeting, the 16 dissidents, as well as the leaders of the party’s provincial and district boards who supported the congress, were given a deadline until 15 June to come back to the organisation, or face expulsion.  

Kwik Kian Gie, meanwhile, said that he had analysed the supposedly 215 demands for a congress submitted to the ministry of internal affairs, and claimed that there were only 141 of them, many of which allegedly were forged or otherwise invalid. He invited the government to investigate the statements.
together with the party’s central board, but although Yogie S. M., when asked by journalists, agreed to the request, nothing came of it.\textsuperscript{51} Government officials consistently ignored the protests of the Megawati side, and military and government officials even held briefings with media representatives, advising them to report favourably about the congress and not to use Megawati’s last name, Sukarnoputri, but rather refer to her as Megawati Taufik Kiemas after her husband.\textsuperscript{52} This obviously biased stance of the government drew criticism from several observers and NGO activists, as well as from Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights, Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia).\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{THE MEDAN CONGRESS AND POLITICAL ETHICS}

On 20 June 1996, the party’s congress was opened in the Pangkalan Mansyur haj dormitory in Medan, the same venue where the PDI’s chaotic fourth congress had been held three years earlier. Around 700 party delegates attended, but Megawati and her supporters were not present, as they did not recognise the legality of the assembly. Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. opened the congress and, just as he had done in his opening speech at the Surabaya extraordinary congress in 1993, he urged the delegates to \textit{musyawarah} to reach a \textit{mufakat} to solve the party’s problems. In contrast to 1993 when this message had been greeted by booing from the audience, it was now reportedly greeted with loud applause from the floor. The commander-in-chief of the military, General Feisal Tandjung, also addressed the delegates, saying that the armed forces supported the effort to ‘conserve the image, integrity and cohesion of the party against the polarization away from Pancasila democracy’. Several other high-ranking military officials also attended the congress.\textsuperscript{54}

After the opening ceremony, the delegates listened to an accountability report over the central board’s performance during its two and half years in office. The report was delivered by a deputy chairman of the central board and a member of the group of 16, Soebagyo. The report was not meant to defend the central board, but read more like a list of Megawati’s alleged shortcomings during her two and a half years as party leader. Among these was her stubborn adherence to the decision to appoint Sutjipto as chair of the East Java chapter, which allegedly had obstructed the resolution of the conflict. Soebagyo, moreover, complained that the East Java question, in spite of the demands of several board members, almost never had been discussed in the central board, but instead only discussed among some party functionaries. He also lamented
Megawati’s failure to set up two assemblies prescribed by the party’s statutes, the Central Advisory Council, Deperpu, and the Party’s Deliberative Assembly, MPP. Regarding the party’s political commitment, the report said that the PDI’s four political stances had become ‘contaminated’ (terkontaminasi) and ‘besmirched’ (tercemar) by the manipulations and insults of some PDI cadres. Soebagyo especially mentioned Aberson Marle Sihaloho’s criticism of the dual function of the military, the attempt to reject the state budget in Parliament and the boycott of the commission meeting with Harmoko. The promotion of such views and actions, according to the report, had already caused the PDI to acquire a confrontational attitude and become positioned as an opposition party.55

Soerjadi was already on the first day of the congress proposed as candidate for the party chair by a majority of the representatives of the provincial chapters.56 In contrast to three years earlier, he now obviously enjoyed the support of the government and the military. General Feisal Tandjung, when asked about his statement ahead of the 1993 congress, in which he had implied that Soerjadi had a ‘legal defect’, only said: ‘That was then. That is over’.57 On the second day of the congress, 21 June, the delegates, without questioning the election system, unanimously elected Soerjadi to chair the formatur committee which was to select the new line-up for the party’s central board. This election, which, coincidentally or not, took place on the 26th anniversary of Sukarno’s death, was widely seen as a de facto election of Soerjadi to the party chair.58

Soerjadi and several of the congress delegates seem to have hoped that they would be able to accommodate Megawati in the new leadership constellation. She was proposed as chair of the MPP, a largely ceremonial position from which she would have wielded little influence over party affairs. Soerjadi claimed that he tried in vain to contact Megawati to ask her about whether she was willing to be a member of the MPP.59 Fatimah Achmad, meanwhile, said that she would be happy if Megawati would serve in the new leadership line-up, and that she would go and ask her personally:

That’s how it should be. There are times when you go up, and times you go down. As a good cadre, I’m sure Mbak Mega (sister Megawati) will not object to serving in any capacity in the party. [...] Of course we need to accommodate her, although it would have to be outside the executive board.60

On the third day of the congress, a new central board, chaired by Soerjadi, was undramatically elected by acclamation. Neither Megawati nor any of her close
supporters were among the 33 members of the new board, and Jusuf Merukh’s group was not accommodated either. As expected, the new board was dominated by Soerjadi’s supporters, such as Fatimah Achmad, Markus Wauran and Dimmy Haryanto. Another well-known face was Budi Hardjono, who became a deputy chair, but otherwise the board was largely made up of relatively unknown provincial party leaders. Nico Daryanto, who had kept a low profile throughout the affair, was not a member of the new board.

The congress closed the same day, two days ahead of schedule. Minister Yogie afterwards congratulated Soerjadi and firmly declared that the government now only recognised the central board under Soerjadi’s leadership. He also, however, urged Soerjadi to deliberate with Megawati’s camp, in order that the party be united. The military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid, firmly expressed the military’s support for Soerjadi, saying that the military was prepared to ensure the full implementation of the congress’s decisions. Soerjadi, meanwhile, in his initiation speech, thanked the government and the military for the help in arranging the congress, and he vowed to approach Megawati’s group in order to end the conflict in the party.

Against the background of the long history of government intervention to install or depose PDI leaders, there were two obvious options for Megawati in the wake of the Medan congress. One was to take up the offer of deliberation and reconciliation from the Soerjadi side, which would have meant that Megawati and some of her less controversial supporters probably could have been accommodated in the party, but in positions where they would have wielded no significant influence. The other option, which, for example, had been taken by several critical figures before and after the party’s 1981 congress, was to opt out of politics altogether, either out of resignation or as a silent protest against the circumscribed political climate. Megawati and her close supporters, however, chose a third option: To reject the legality of the Medan congress and continue to assert that Megawati was the legitimate party chair. Although, as we have seen, the existence of rival leaderships had been common in the party’s history, there was a major difference between former dissidents, such as the Group of 17 and the rival boards of Achmad Subagyo and Jusuf Merukh on the one hand, and Megawati and her supporters on the other. Whereas the former had tried to strengthen their positions by courting government and military authorities and officials, Megawati’s strategy – unprecedented in the party’s history – was to confront the government directly over its involvement in the campaign to have her ousted and to appeal to public
opinion by exposing the coercive and manipulative tactics employed by the authorities and the Soerjadi camp. A press statement issued by the PDI under Megawati’s leadership on 21 June said that:

Intense coercion and intimidation including threats and large bribes were used to recruit the vast majority of the PDI members who allegedly support Mrs Megawati’s ouster. [...] Several high-ranking government officials and some anti-democratic members of the military command have actively participated in all aspects of the planning and execution of the campaign to unseat Megawati. [...] This represents unlawful and unconstitutional interference in the democratic process.65

 Shortly after the congress, Megawati, aided by a team of lawyers called the Team of Defenders of Indonesian Democracy, TPDI (Tim Pembela Demokrasi Indonesia), launched a suit in the Jakarta central district court to have the congress declared illegal, and they charged both the Soerjadi camp and three leading officials, Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M., General Feisal Tandjung and the national chief of police, Lieutenant-General Dibyo Widodo, with supporting the congress. The first court hearing was cancelled, allegedly because the judge had a toothache. The case was subsequently adjourned in several stages until it eventually was declared by the court to be outside its jurisdiction. Megawati’s supporters in at least 92 district branches also launched civil claims in their respective regional state courts to prove that the branch delegates who had attended the Medan congress were not legitimate branch representatives.66 Because of the political dependence of the courts, Megawati’s side probably had few hopes of verdicts in their favour. The courts, nevertheless, provided an arena for Megawati and her supporters to advocate their position, and the extensive media coverage of the legal proceedings helped to keep them in the political spotlight, as well as to strengthen Megawati’s reputation for justice and righteousness. The obviously biased stance of most of the courts, moreover, contributed to casting doubt on the legal system and the New Order’s already dubious reputation for justice and morality.

The 1996 Medan congress followed the same script that the regime had used on numerous occasions to install or demote the leaders of political parties as well as several other major social and religious organisations. In comparison with earlier instances, however, the deposing of Megawati reflected much more negatively on the regime and its political legitimacy in the eyes of large sections of the population. In a general sense, this difference was probably due to the increasing levels of education and political awareness among the population at
large, combined with the government’s declining control over the flow of information in the years preceding Megawati’s ouster. The latter circumstance was largely due to a surge in illegal and quasi-legal print media, as well as the emergence of electronic media, including the Internet. Moreover, Megawati’s uncompromising refusal to accept the government’s Machiavellian intervention in the party, together with her highly published advocacy of justice and the rule of law, combined to introduce a strong ethical element in the PDI leadership conflict. As we have seen, during her first two years Megawati had already as party leaders acquired a reputation for justice, righteousness and decency. In the course of her struggle against the regime in the wake of the Medan congress, this reputation was greatly enhanced and Megawati emerged as a popular symbol of opposition to the manipulative and strong-armed tactics of the regime. In the process, she attracted an alliance of oppositional forces, many of which hoped that Megawati would become a gathering force for the start of a broadly based political reform movement, or even a popular uprising against the regime. As we shall see, Megawati and her close aides were reluctant to become associated with such overtly oppositional forces and radical actions which were certain to invite a harsh response from the regime and provide the authorities with a pretext for cracking down on the dissenting groups.

SYMBOL OF OPPOSITION AND THE 27 JULY 1996 RIOTS

Already in the lead-up to the Medan congress, supporters of Megawati had begun to express their support for the PDI leader in a series of demonstrations and other radical actions around the country. In several places, including Solo, Central Java and Bali, young Megawati supporters signed statements with their own blood, promising to defend Megawati. In East Java, where the situation in the party’s chapter was already polarised because of the drawn-out leadership conflict, reportedly thousands of Megawati supporters planned to undertake a ‘long march’ from Surabaya to Jakarta to protest against the congress at the Ministry for Internal Affairs. The plan was cancelled, however, due to opposition from the PDI’s East Java chapter under Megawati’s supporter Sutjipto because of fears that the demonstration might be used by outside forces to create upheaval which would damage Megawati’s cause.

Such fears were instead realised on the opening day of the congress, 20 June, when thousands of Megawati supporters demonstrated in Jakarta against the congress and against the government’s support for it. Outside Gambir railway station in Central Jakarta, riot police and soldiers blocked the way of the
demonstrators, and a number of unidentified people in black started hurling stones at the troops, who answered by attacking the demonstrators with batons and rattan sticks. The PDI central board under Megawati claimed that one demonstrator was killed and 70 were injured. Megawati charged that the government had planted agents provocateurs among the crowd, and that these had started the stone throwing which then led to the rioting and the clash with security forces.69

After the clash, which became known as the Gambir incident, an agreement was reached between the Jakarta military commander, Major-General Sutiyoso, and Megawati’s camp to avoid further incidents. According to one of Megawati’s aides, their side promised not to hold any more street demonstrations, but was permitted to hold activities in the compound of the party’s headquarters in Jalan Diponegoro, Central Jakarta. Because Megawati continued to claim that she was the legitimate PDI chair even after Soerjadi’s election at the Medan congress, her supporters refused to leave the party headquarters. In anticipation of an expected attack by the military to oust them, a 24-hour watch was organised.70

On 26 June, support for Megawati gathered strength as the representatives of 30 NGOs announced the formation of an umbrella organisation called the Indonesian People’s Assembly, MARI (Majelis Rakyat Indonesia). According to one of the founders, labour activist Muchtar Pakpahan, MARI was formed in response to the government’s interference in the PDI. The new organisation presented a set of demands, including political legislative reform and the ‘sacking and bringing to trial of traitors and those who cause divisions among the people’.71 MARI represented a wide spectrum of NGOs, mostly on the political left, and all drawn from groups critical of the government. Among the leading figures were, apart from Muchtar Pakpahan, human rights activist Johannes Cornelis ‘Poncke’ Princen, Megawati’s politically radical sister Sukmawati and Budiman Soedjatmiko, the leader of a small unrecognised leftist party, the Democratic People’s Party, PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik). Most of the activists and organisations which formed MARI were much more radical in their criticism of the government and their demands for political reform than Megawati and most of her close supporters in the PDI, and for some of them, such as the PRD, associating themselves with Megawati appeared to be a strategy for getting access to her mass support.72

At the PDI’s headquarters in Jalan Diponegoro, Central Jakarta, meanwhile, a free-speech forum was erected in front of the central office building, which, after a cautious start, gradually became more bold and critical of the
government and of the prevailing social and political conditions. It was a unique occurrence because, as the Jakarta Post remarked in an editorial, it was the first free-speech forum in Indonesia outside a university campus in a long time.73 Speakers from the PDI as well as the NGOs in MARI and other activists spoke at the forum,73 criticising the government, corruption and lack of democracy. Hundreds of students, pro-democracy activists and Megawati supporters gathered each day to listen to the speeches and to sing political songs.74

Megawati’s deposing had thus brought about an emerging broad coalition of pro-democracy forces which seemed intent on challenging the regime and its hold on power. The government seems to have realised this danger and began to signal that action would be taken against the activists. On 22 July, General Feisal Tandjung branded the free-speech forum as unconstitutional, saying that the speakers planned to overthrow the government. He also said that the speeches did not reflect Indonesian values and that the jargon of the speakers was similar to that used by the outlawed Communist Party, PKI. Two days later, the Jakarta chief of police formally banned the free-speech forum. On the same day, President Suharto received Soerjadi in the presidential palace, thus officially endorsing the new party leadership. After the meeting, Soerjadi quoted the president as warning against the ‘bald devils’ (setan gundul) who allegedly were creating problems in the PDI. Suharto, as quoted by Soerjadi, accused the NGOs in MARI of being outside the New Order and of using the PDI for their own purposes. The president also compared their strategy to that of the PKI in connection with the party’s alleged revolt in 1965.75

The operation to oust Megawati’s supporters from the PDI headquarters and to put an end to the free-speech forum was launched shortly afterwards, on 27 July 1996.76 Shortly after dawn, a number of yellow trucks pulled up in front of the party headquarters and unloaded hundreds of young men with headbands and red t-shirts reading ‘Supporters of the Fourth Medan Congress’ (Pendukung Kongres IV Medan).77 Many of the men were well-built and had short crewcut hair, leading some observers to suspect that they were in fact soldiers out of uniform.78 Several of the men were armed with long wooden sticks. They started to throw stones and other objects unloaded from their trucks at Megawati’s supporters inside the building, who returned the assault in the same way as best they could. The stone throwing was accompanied by verbal insults between the two groups. Shortly afterwards, some 500–1,000 anti-riot police, backed up by armoured vehicles, arrived on the scene. They did not attempt to stop the attack and the stone throwing, but instead split into two groups sealing off Jalan Diponegoro on both sides of the party headquarters.
Passers-by and supporters of Megawati who had heard of the attack began to assemble outside one of the cordons, near Cikini railway station.

After about an hour of stone throwing, the chief of the Central Jakarta police command, Lieutenant-Colonel Abu Bakar, intervened and called a cease-fire between the two groups. He urged Megawati’s supporters to evacuate the building and surrender it to the police, promising that it would be considered to be in a condition of status quo, thus indicating that the police intended to seal off the building. He then telephoned Megawati, who seems to have agreed to let her supporters evacuate the building under the observation of foreign and domestic journalists. Before the agreement was implemented, however, the attack started again with intensified stone throwing. Dozens of anti-riot police then broke down the fence around the PDI headquarters and charged in, interspersed with the red-shirted young men. Large parts of the building were destroyed in the attack and by a fire which broke out during the mêlée. Several people were killed or injured, both by fire and blows from batons and rattan sticks. Although the military afterwards claimed that no firearms were used in the attack, according to the National Commission on Human Rights, Komnas HAM, at least one of Megawati’s supporters died from gunshot wounds. The commission, in its subsequent investigation of the events, confirmed the death of five people, all Megawati supporters, in the attack, and more than one year after the event, another 16 people were still reported missing.

Around 9 a.m., the police had captured the building and closed the area around it to the public and to reporters. Some of the more seriously injured of the defenders were carried off in ambulances, while dozens of others were detained and taken to the Jakarta police headquarters. The secretary general of the PDI’s central board under Soerjadi, Buttu Hutapea, now emerged and was victoriously lifted onto the shoulders of the red-shirted youths and hailed with applause. ‘For far too long this office has not been used as it should have been’, he said to reporters outside.

Meanwhile, the crowd of people outside the cordons continued to swell. A free-speech podium was erected, and the speakers expressed their support for Megawati and the need to fight for democracy and justice. People sang protest songs, and some minor clashes with security forces took place. Rumours also began to spread that up to 50 people had been killed in the attack on the PDI headquarters and that the corpses had been heaped in a mass grave.

As the situation grew increasingly tense, Lieutenant-Colonel Abu Bakar agreed to let five people go and see the PDI building, accompanied by security
forces. After 15 minutes the five envoys came out again. One of them told a journalist that ‘there is nothing inside, but blood is spilled everywhere’. As the group tried to address the crowd, one of them was hit by a rock. At this, the crowd began to throw stones, wood and parts of a demolished iron fence at the troops. Some of the crowd began to advance towards the line of policemen, who fought back with their batons and shields.

The crowd eventually calmed down somewhat. Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, a deputy chairman of Megawati’s central board, came to the scene and tried to negotiate with the authorities. Meanwhile, the number of people near Cikini railway station continued to grow, swollen largely by high-school students on their way home from school. From a few thousand people in the morning, it was estimated that the crowd grew to over 10,000 people in the afternoon.

At around 2.30 p.m. the stone throwing started again, more intensely than before. The police troops were forced to retire from their blockade line in order to protect themselves. However, the counter attack came shortly afterwards, with the police using tear gas, water cannons and batons. Chased by the security forces, the crowd ran eastward along Jalan Diponegoro, setting fire to a couple of buses that were parked on the street. Several people were caught by the security forces and beaten with sticks and batons. On reaching the intersection of Jalan Diponegoro and Jalan Salemba the crowd split into two, one heading south and the other north. More buses and other vehicles were set on fire, and several traffic lights were smashed with stones. Several buildings had their windows destroyed or were set on fire. The riots continued well into the evening with many smaller shops being looted or set on fire. The reinforced security forces, meanwhile, concentrated on sealing off the riot-hit areas to prevent the unrest from spreading. Gradually during the evening the troops moved in and the rioters dispersed. Around 1 a.m. the police and the military had regained full control over the city and the fires and looting came to an end.

Although the attack on the party headquarters was meant to look like an internal showdown between the rival supporters of Megawati and Soerjadi, the role of the security forces seemed conspicuous. As public attention began to reflect badly on the military, Soerjadi’s camp vehemently asserted that their supporters alone had carried out the attack without any help of the security forces, although Soerjadi acknowledged that his side had informed the security forces about their action beforehand. Secretary General Buttu Hutapea openly admitted that he had prepared and led the task force that attacked the party headquarters. According to Soerjadi, the attackers were all PDI cadres, although he answered evasively when asked in an interview whether he had
The Deposing of Megawati

involved hoodlums (preman) in the operation. 'I do not know exactly, but technically those who I brought [there] were PDI people', he said. The suspicions that Soerjadi had hired hoodlums for the take-over were confirmed the following year. In May 1997, 49 toughs who claimed to have taken part in the attack on the PDI headquarters filed a law suit against Soerjadi and four other PDI functionaries for not paying the allegedly agreed financial compensation for their services. According to their leader, Seno Bella Emyus, he had received a total of 11.5 million rupiah (4,800 U.S. dollars) as a down payment ahead of the attack and had been promised another 200 million (83,000 U.S. dollars) to be paid after the attack, an amount never paid. Although the court rejected Seno Bella’s suit on the grounds that there had not been any legally binding agreement between Seno Bella and Soerjadi, the court believed it to be true that Soerjadi had hired the thugs for the attack and that Seno Bella had received the payment of 11.5 million.

The deployment of hoodlums was a long-standing tactic in Indonesian politics, dating back at least to the 1940s. Since the early years of Indonesian independence, political parties, the military and other outwardly respectable patrons had formed alliances with the underworld in order for the latter to perform various murky services, such as staging violent demonstrations and riots, beating or intimidating political opponents and attacking their residences or offices. Under the New Order, leading military figures emerged as the dominant patrons of underworld thugs, with senior officers such as Ali Moertopo, Benny Moerdani and Prabowo Subianto, largely in succession, controlling vast underworld networks. The links of the political parties to the underworld, meanwhile, appears to have been severed, just like the parties’ links to society in general, during the early New Order.

In the case of the PDI, there are thus few indications of the deployment of hoodlums before the beginning of the 1990s. As we have seen, however, in 1991 two supporters of the Group of 17 were kidnapped and beaten, allegedly on Soerjadi’s orders. In the same year, a group called the Democratic Youth (Pemuda Demokrat) also emerged. It was not formally affiliated with the PDI, but appeared to be associated with Soerjadi’s adversaries in the Group of 17. The group was involved in several aggressive demonstrations against Soerjadi in mid-1991. Apparently in an effort to counter the threat from the Democratic Youth, another youth organisation, supporting Soerjadi, was founded in May 1991, called the Indonesian Buffalo Youth Movement, GBMI (Gerakan Banteng Muda Indonesia). Although evidence is patchy, it appears that both the Soerjadi camp and the Group of 17 from around this time began to develop
their respective networks of thugs to intimidate and pressure the other side. The physical clashes between the two sides at the 1993 Medan congress testified to the rise of thuggery as a political tactic in the party.

Thuggery and the use of violence seemed to be on the rise in the 1990s not only in the PDI, but also in society in general. Mob violence appeared to be increasing in the mid-1990s, as well as brawls between high-school students. Moreover, the hoodlums seemed to become more prominent and visible in various aspects of ordinary life, particularly in the big cities. This phenomenon gained widespread public and media attention following the murder by thugs of a police officer in a Jakarta shopping centre in 1995. The event, as argued by Loren Ryter, sparked the 'phenomenal appearance on the national scene' of the term preman in the sense of extortionists and hoodlums. The term preman, however, did not simply represent a criminal thug, but also implied links to and covert authorisation from those in power.

This implication was evident in the 27 July attack on the PDI headquarters, which was widely and probably correctly interpreted as a joint operation between Soerjadi’s thugs and the security forces, rather than, as the intention seems to have been, as an internal party conflict of little interest to the police, military or society at large. As it was, the event reflected badly on the regime, not only because of the reports that security forces had taken active part in the attack, but also because of the government’s apparent sanctioning of the violence and Soerjadi’s deployment of preman.

The judicial aftermath of 27 July continued to undermine the credibility of the country’s already disrespected legal system. In spite of the deaths of at least five Megawati supporters in the attack, no investigation was launched into their probable murder, and Buttu Hutapea, in spite of his open confession that he had organised the attack, was not prosecuted. Instead, 124 supporters of Megawati were put on trial, accused of having initiated the violence. The highly publicised court proceedings were often farcical, with the prosecution appearing ill-prepared and judges at times falling asleep during sessions. The judicial officials, moreover, were heckled by the hundreds of Megawati supporters who came to listen to the proceedings, and the judges had to be escorted by riot police from their courtrooms. Most of the accused were eventually, on 28 November 1996, sentenced to four months and three days of imprisonment for failure to disperse after being ordered three times by the security forces to do so. The prison terms exactly equalled the terms which the defendants had already served in detention, and they were subsequently released immediately after the verdicts were passed.
The Deposing of Megawati

Aberson Marle Sihaloho, who, as we have seen, had long been a vehement critic of the government, was also put on trial, charged with defaming the president, military and government because of a statement he allegedly had made at the free-speech forum at the party’s headquarters in July 1996. According to a recording, which Aberson claimed was a forgery, he allegedly said that the president had seized the independence of the Indonesian people and that they had been robbed of their freedom. He was sentenced in July 1997 to nine months’ imprisonment.

The 27 July riots also provided the government with a pretext for cracking down on the leftist opposition, sections of which had tried to associate themselves with Megawati in the wake of the Medan congress. Several of the NGO activists in MARI were brought to trial on charges of subversion or other political offences. The organisation worst hit by the crackdown was the Democratic People’s Party, PRD, which was condemned by the government as communist and was accused of having masterminded the 27 July riots. In all, more than a dozen activists were tried and several of them, including PRD leader Budiman Soedjatmiko and the labour leader Muchtar Pakpahan, were sentenced to long prison terms for subversion. For the government, the 27 July riots provided a welcome pretext for repressing the radical leftist opposition which had begun to emerge as a thorn in the side of the regime.

In the context of this broad sweeping-up action, the authorities tried to implicate Megawati and her supporters as subversive and harbouring communist sympathies. In the months following the 27 July attack, Megawati and many of her supporters were on several occasions questioned about their alleged connection with the PRD, and government officials, including President Suharto, implied that the PDI had been infiltrated by communists. The military chief of social and political affairs, Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid, reportedly accused Megawati and her sister Sukmawati of aspiring to overthrow the government through bringing about a mass uprising, and he compared Megawati to the Philippines’ Corazon Aquino. The alleged conspiracy also involved the NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid, whose role, the general said, would resemble that which had been played by Cardinal Jaime Sin in the overthrow of President Marcos in 1986. Megawati and Sukmawati responded by suing Syarwan for defamation, but the parties eventually reconciled as Syarwan retracted his statement.

Overall, the attempts to associate Megawati with allegedly subversive and communist groups such as the PRD seem to have been unsuccessful. The government’s strategy of accusing its political adversaries of being communists...
did not have much credibility in the 1990s and had even become the subject of indirect ridicule and cynicism. Megawati was careful not to associate herself with the oppositional left or to advocate any radical mass actions or unconstitutional ways of unseating the government. As a consequence, the attempts to implicate Megawati and her supporters as communist sympathisers rather strengthened the impression of government and military heavy-handedness in the aftermath of her ousting from the PDI chair.

Megawati thus continued to assert that she was the party’s legitimate chair, and in September 1996 she opened a new party headquarters in East Jakarta, the purpose of which was to facilitate the party’s consolidation under her leadership and to prepare for the general election. The government reacted by saying that her opening a party office was unlawful and that Megawati and her supporters did not have the right to carry out any political activities. The office was closed at the end of September by the East Jakarta mayoralty. Megawati’s camp also submitted a list of candidates for Parliament to the General Elections Institute in September, but the institute rejected it and instead received the list of candidates compiled by Soerjadi’s central board. Just as with the legal endeavours of Megawati’s camp, these measures served to keep her in the public limelight and strengthen her reputation for righteousness and firmness of principle. Her activities also continued to receive considerable media attention in the lead-up to the May 1997 election, and there continued to be great public interest in news about the PDI, especially news favourable to Megawati’s cause. For example, a Jakarta tabloid, *Inti Jaya*, multiplied its edition by printing sensational and controversial news about the PDI debacle in Megawati’s favour. Apparently, the paper could still not meet the high demand and was reportedly sold for twice its face value and was widely circulated in photocopied version.

Many people also seem consciously to have regarded Megawati’s struggle against the New Order as a parallel to Sukarno’s struggle against the colonial regime in the 1920s and 1930s. Megawati herself drew on this parallel when she, at the end of her published speech at the PDI’s 24th anniversary, cited an alleged message to her from Sukarno: ‘Megawati! My struggle [was] easier because I expelled the colonisers, but your struggle will be more difficult because you will face your own people’.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In spite of the high hopes when Megawati had been elected to the party chair that she would be able to forge unity in the PDI, the party appeared to be
drifting in the beginning of 1996. Apart from the challenge of Jusuf Merukh’s rival central board, which appeared to have little support among the party’s rank-and-file, there were several signs of conflict among the PDI’s more mainstream cadres and leaders over the extent to which the party should challenge the government in its attempts to bring about political reform. This rift was not new and had been apparent already before Megawati’s ascendency to the party chair, especially around the 1993 MPR session. However, Megawati’s weak political leadership and evasive stance concerning many central political issues, such as the presidential nomination, seemed to aggravate this split in the party’s ranks. In the first months of 1996, the split became particularly acute among members of the party’s parliamentary faction, and this open rift provided an opportunity for the government to oust Megawati by mobilising the more compliant group around Soerjadi. The government-sponsored operation led the PDI to split, irrevocably as it turned out, into one more pro-government faction under Soerjadi and one more critical and reform-oriented faction under Megawati.

The government’s reasons for ousting Megawati was not that she was particularly oppositional or critical of the government, which she was not in comparison with Soerjadi’s confrontational attitude before and after the 1992 election. The decision was probably more motivated by a fear on behalf of the government that the PDI, because of Megawati’s broad popularity, would make significant inroads on Golkar’s absolute electoral majority, especially in a number of strategic provinces, such as East Java, Central Java and Jakarta. Another, probably equally important reason, was that Megawati seemed to be less inclined to bow to pressure and comply with the government’s insistence on unanimity in the MPR, particularly concerning the presidential election.

The operation to oust Megawati at the June 1996 Medan congress followed a long-standing, well-tried modus operandi for government interference in the political parties and other nominally independent socio-political organisations. Megawati’s popularity and high-profile resistance to the government’s meddling, combined with higher levels of political awareness and access to alternative sources of information, resulted in more widespread public resentment against the heavy-handed involvement of the government compared with earlier comparable operations. As Megawati uncompromisingly continued to assert her legitimate right to the party chair, mainly through legal endeavours, her reputation for justice and righteousness was enhanced in the eyes of the wider public, whereas the government’s crude manipulations and deployment of naked force were exposed. Meanwhile, in her struggle against the regime,
Megawati was careful not to associate herself with forces outside the permissible political spectrum or to stand out as subversive or to advocate radical mass actions. The result was that the conflict took on a strong ethical dimension, with the government and the Soerjadi camp coming across as manipulative and morally corrupt in the eyes of the wider public, thus significantly damaging the political legitimacy of the government and the political regime in general.

NOTES

3 E.g. *Jakarta Post* (22 February 1994) and *Merdeka* (31 October 1995).
4 *Forum Keadilan* (12 February 1996) and *Suara Independen* (October/November 1995). At the time, it was not known who had initiated the campaign, but Aberson later admitted that he had started the initiative, encouraged by young PDI activists in Central Java; see Haribuan (1996: 138). The questionnaires were first spread in Central Java, where the suggestion reportedly gained substantial support, and they were subsequently spread among other party branches as well.
6 *Kompas* (14 January 1996).
12 *Jakarta Post* (1 February 1996).
15 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
16 This impression is gathered from interviews and media reports. Moreover, when asked whether Megawati gave directives to the party’s parliamentary faction, Soerjadi laughed disparagingly and said: ‘How can she do that, she never comes to Parliament’; interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
18 *Jakarta Post* (13 March 1996).
The Deposing of Megawati

19 Suara Independen (March 1996).
20 Jakarta Post (13 March 1996) and Kompas (14 March 1996).
21 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
22 Interview by the author, Jakarta (14 March 1997).
23 One of Megawati’s close aides, Kwik Kian Gie, claimed that Megawati and Soerjadi had an ‘excellent relationship as far as Megawati [was] concerned’, and that Soerjadi was offered any position he wanted in the party except the party chair; interview by the author, Jakarta (17 March 1997).
24 Haribuan (1996: 168). Megawati probably mistakenly sets the time for the meeting to April. The leadership meeting that discussed the military’s strategy for maintaining security in the 1997 general election and the 1998 MPR session was held at the end of March; see Kompas (30 March 1996).
25 This was, for example, the view of Kwik Kian Gie; interview by the author, Jakarta (17 March 1997). Aberson Marle Sihaloho also implied as much in an interview in Haribuan (1996: 138). Outside observers who have made similar analyses include Raillon (1997: 208), Fealy (1997: 32), McIntyre (1997: 18) and Eklof (1999a: 29–34).
26 E.g. Anderson (1996a), Arbi Sanit in Haribuan (1996: 149–150) and Eklof (1999a: 33). Cf. also Imawan (1996: 7). The trend to interpret Indonesian politics in these terms was inspired by Anderson (1972), as discussed in chapter 1 above.
27 I owe the latter argument to Patrick Walters, Jakarta correspondent for The Australian; interview (14 March 1997).
29 In the 1992 election, Golkar gathered 54.4 per cent of the votes in Jakarta, 55.5 per cent in Central Java and 58.8 per cent in East Java, all of which were well below the organisation’s national average of 68.1 per cent; see Baroto (1992: 250) for the results by province.
30 Fealy (1996: 260) and Kompas (8 September 1994).
31 Merdeka (4 May 1996).
32 This complaint was one of the main reasons cited for her ouster at the 1996 Medan congress, and similar complaints had been heard already in 1994; see Media Indonesia (8 April 1994).
33 Interview with Kwik Kian Gie, Jakarta (17 March 1997).
35 Both Nico Daryanto and Kwik Kian Gie concurred that only Soerjadi dared to challenge Megawati for the party chair; interviews, Jakarta (14 March 1997 and 17 March 1997 respectively).
36 Kwik Kian Gie, for example, said that Soerjadi was known to be opportunistic and lacking in morality and principles, and that he was driven solely by personal ambition when he agreed to replace Megawati; interview by the author, Jakarta (17 March 1997).
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

37 Interview, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
38 This point was, for example, made by Budi Hardjono, interview by the author, Jakarta (20 November 1998).
39 Interview by the author, Jakarta (7 October 1997).
40 Jakarta Post (2 May 1996) and Merdeka (8 June 1996).
41 Jakarta Post (2 May 1996 and 16 June 1996). The board reportedly did not receive any reply to the letter.
42 Suara Pembaruan (15 May 1996).
43 Soekarnoputri (1996a: 14).
44 Jawa Pos (3 June 1996). See Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1995: 7-8) for the statutes. According to van Dijk (1997: 407), the delegation first visited the PDI headquarters to put forward their demands, but apparently failed to do so. Van Dijk does not give a source for this information, and I have not been able to confirm it elsewhere.
45 For discussions about the legal aspects of holding a congress, see e.g. Bisnis Indonesia (4 June 1996), Suara Pembaruan (6 June 1996 and 8 June 1996) and Kompas (15 June 1996). For the relevant statutes, see Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (1995: 7). The claim that the Munas results needed to be ratified by a congress had been propounded by Jusuf Merukh already when his rival board was set up in late 1994; see Tiras (12 January 1995). At that time, however, the demand did not get the support of the Soerjadi group.
48 Jakarta Post (13 June 1996).
49 Kompas (13 June 1996). On the eve of the congress, the decision to expel the 16 board members was announced, but those affected did not recognise its validity; see Suara Pembaruan (20 June 1996).
50 Kompas (13 June 1996). On the eve of the congress, the decision to expel the 16 board members was announced, but those affected did not recognise its validity; see Suara Pembaruan (20 June 1996).
51 Suara Pembaruan (8 June 1996) and Jawa Pos (11 June 1996). The director-general of social and political affairs, Soetojo N. K., in a written interview with Haribuan (1996: 117), moreover, did not answer the question of whether the ministry had investigated the legality of the statements.
52 Jakarta Post (12 June 1996) and Weekend Australian (15/16 June 1996).
53 See e.g. Jakarta Post (15 June 1996) and Suara Pembaruan (18 June 1996). The Komnas HAM, founded in the wake of the 1991 Dili massacre in East Timor with the purpose of improving the human rights image of the New Order, wrote in its annual 1996 report that the ‘government/security apparatus involved themselves excessively and one-sidedly and in a manner not appropriate to their function as
The Deposing of Megawati

54 Jakarta Post (21 June 1996) and Merdeka (21 June 1996).
55 Kompas (21 June 1996).
56 Merdeka (21 June 1996).
57 Jakarta Post (21 June 1996).
58 Media Indonesia (22 June 1996)
59 Media Indonesia (22 June 1996) and Jakarta Post (23 June 1996).
60 Jakarta Post (22 June 1996).
61 However, a deputy chair, I Gusti Ngurah Sara, turned out to be a Megawati supporter and rejected his election to the new central board.
63 Nico, although he felt that Megawati had failed to accommodate him (as well as Soerjadi) during her tenure as party leader, claimed that he did not want to get involved in the campaign to remove her. He claimed, moreover, that he had discouraged his followers from getting their hands ‘bloody and dirty’ through involving themselves in Megawati’s deposing; interview by the author, Jakarta (14 March 1997).
64 Jakarta Post (23 June 1996) and Suara Karya (24 June 1996).
65 Weekend Australian (22/23 June 1996).
67 For the rise of alternative media, see Stanley (1996) and Eng (1997), and for the significance of the Internet, see Hill and Sen (1997).
68 Media Indonesia (8 June 1996) and Kompas (17 June 1996). See also Tiras (13 June 1996) about some of the demonstrations of support for Megawati.
70 Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (1997: 7) and The Nation (24 June 1996).
72 Confidential interviews with two PRD activist, Jakarta (26 November 1998).
73 Jakarta Post (24 July 1996). The editorial even claimed that it was the first such forum in three decades.
74 See further Antlöv (1996b: 9) and Supriatma (1997: 11–19) about the free-speech forum.
76 The rendering of the events of 27 July is, where not otherwise stated, based on two first-hand accounts, Tempo Interaktif (3 August 1996) and Kabar dari PIJAR (27 July 1996), and two summaries of the events based primarily on first-hand sources, Luwarso (1997a: 22–35) and Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (1997: 18–26).
If the Medan congress, as its supporters claimed, was an ordinary congress, it should have been the fifth in the party's history. However, in the confusing arguments over the legality of the assembly, it was claimed that the 1996 congress was a continuation of the 1993 Medan congress, which had been the fourth.

E.g. Aspinall (1996: 5) and Mallarangeng and Liddle (1997: 170). Megawati was also of this opinion; Soekarnoputri (1996b). According to Luwarso (1997a: 22–23), the men in red were commanded by the commander of the Central Jakarta military district, Lieutenant-Colonel Zul Effendi.

Soekarnoputri (1996b)


Luwarso (1997a: 26).

Tempo Interaktif (3 August 1996).

Tempo Interaktif (10 August 1996).

Jakarta Post (31 August 1996). See further Luwarso (1997a: 47–56) for Buttu's claims as to how the take-over was planned and carried out.

Tempo Interaktif (10 August 1996).


For Ali Moertopo's hoodlum network, see Bourchier (1990: 193–194). The extra-judicial so-called Petrus (Penembakan Misterius, mysterious killings) killings of thousands of thugs in the mid-1980s appear to have been related to an effort led by Benny Moerdani to eliminate this network, and to replace it with thugs loyal to himself; see Bourchier (1990) and van der Kroef (1985). Suharto's son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, rose rapidly in the military during the last years of the president's rule. Before that, he had served in East Timor for several years in the early 1990s, where he helped build networks of vigilante groups; see Feith (1992: 68–69). After being stationed in Jakarta in the mid-1990s, Prabowo apparently continued to build up his network of hoodlums in the capital, largely through the elite unit Kopassus, which he commanded.


Ryter (1998: 48). The term, the origin of which is the Dutch vrijman, or 'free man' in the sense of privateer, had previously been used mainly to denote soldiers or policemen in civilian clothes; Ryter (1998: 49–50).


Interview by the author, Jakarta (29 September 1998).

Australian (22 July 1997).
The Deposing of Megawati

96 See Human Rights Watch/Asia and Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (1996) and Luwarso (1997a: 94–143 and 294–318) about the crackdown against the PRD and other leftist opposition. Indonesia's anti-subversion law – which formally was not a law, but a presidential decree issued by President Sukarno in 1963 – provided the government with a sweeping tool for prosecuting political opponents and was heavily criticised by lawyers and human rights activists both in Indonesia and internationally; see Thoolen (1987: 85–94) and Amnesty International (1997).


100 *Forum Keadilan* (7 October 1996).


102 Soekarnoputri (1997).
CHAPTER 12

From the 1997 Election to the Fall of Suharto

THE 1997 GENERAL ELECTION

After Megawati had been deposed of the party chair at the June 1996 Medan congress and her supporters had been ousted from the party’s headquarters the following month, Soerjadi embarked on a campaign to consolidate his leadership over the party and start the preparations for the general elections. Soerjadi’s apparent involvement in the 27 July incident, however, proved to be a liability for him, with widespread speculation that the government-sponsored party chair might be prosecuted for his alleged role in the incident. The demand that Soerjadi be put on trial was loudly propounded in the frequent anti-Soerjadi demonstrations which Megawati supporters staged in different places around the country. His attempts to consolidate the party, moreover, met considerable opposition. Many of the party’s district branches flatly rejected the results of the 1996 Medan congress and continued to be loyal to Megawati’s central board. On several instances in the last months of 1996, when Soerjadi visited provincial and district branches in order to consolidate the party, he was greeted by demonstrators who derided him with slogans and threw rotten eggs and other objects at the party chair and his supporters. When Soerjadi, for example, visited his hometown, Ponorogo in East Java, demonstrators pounded on the door of the hotel where he was staying with his entourage, warning them not to set foot outside. In Wonogiri, Central Java, demonstrators tried to stop Soerjadi’s car on the way to a consolidation meeting, but failed and instead went on a rampage, beating several PDI functionaries who supported Soerjadi and attacking passing cars. Although Soerjadi on several instances received police protection from the crowds, the security forces generally seemed to take a lax attitude to the anti-Soerjadi protests. A pro-Megawati activist in Central Java even said: ‘Before they [the security forces] chased after us, now they even support our demonstrations’. Both Minister of Internal Affairs Yogie S. M. and Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Soesilo Soedarman said that
From the 1997 Election to the Fall of Suharto

they ‘felt sorry for’ (kasihan) Soerjadi, but offered no help for the beleaguered PDI chair.³ The Wonogiri incident, Yogie said, was just a small matter that could be solved by the PDI members themselves. Further undermining Soerjadi’s position, the government then, at the end of November, hinted that the party might be allowed to hold an extraordinary congress to replace Soerjadi, an option which, however, was ruled out a few days later by a spokesman for the ministry for internal affairs.⁴ In the face of the unexpected strength and persistence of the opposition against Soerjadi, it thus appears that the government from the end of 1996 tried to dissociate themselves from the PDI leader whom they had installed less than six months earlier. Senior government and the military officials probably felt that Soerjadi had become a liability, not only to the PDI, but to the government as well, and the attempts by these officials to distance themselves from Soerjadi was probably meant to diffuse the widespread criticism over the biased stance of the government in the PDI conflict. In spite of these difficulties, Soerjadi remained optimistic about the party’s prospects before the election, and he hoped that the PDI would improve its result over its 1992 showing and overtake the PPP as the second place finisher in the election.⁵

The general elections, scheduled for May 1997, largely followed the same script as earlier New Order elections. The campaign rules were somewhat stricter than in previous elections, with street rallies being banned in favour of campaign activities in enclosed premises, which were expected to draw smaller crowds and to be easier to handle for the security forces. The official campaign period, which started on 27 April, was limited to 27 days, but in order to limit the possibility of violent clashes between supporters of different parties, each of the three contestants was only allowed to hold campaign activities on every third day in each province throughout the country, thus effectively restricting the campaign for each election contestant to nine days.⁶ In addition to averting violence, the regulation also served to prevent any of the parties from developing a momentum in their public meetings. The campaign was instead supposed to be conducted through supposedly more mature political forms, such as televised ‘dialogues’ where election campaigners held pre-recorded and edited discussions with a small studio audience.⁷

As the election campaign got underway, however, the Soerjadi camp appeared to be severely demoralised, and the party displayed little enthusiasm in its campaign. Soerjadi reportedly had difficulties in filling the lists of candidates for the regional parliaments because many PDI members and cadres refused to be nominated.⁸ On the national level, many of the party’s cam-
paigners were previously little known to the public, and most of the party’s well-known and popular representatives, such as Megawati, Guruh Sukarnoputra, Kwik Kian Gie and Sophan Sophiaan, boycotted the election. In sharp contrast to the 1992 election, the party’s rallies were quiet and sparsely visited. Soerjadi was shown on television addressing only a few hundred supporters in all but empty stadiums. For example, at a rally in Gianyar, Bali, only 110 people showed up to listen to Soerjadi, a crowd far outnumbered by the 600 security personnel present. Another rally in Surabaya was cancelled after supporters of Megawati had entered the premises and ascended the podium, causing a commotion. In several occasions Soerjadi also had to flee from egg-throwing crowds of angry Megawati supporters, who regarded him as a government puppet. A joke circulated that Soerjadi campaigned like a panther – moving at night and seen by no one.

Also in contrast to the 1992 election, the party did not stand out for any particular policy or reform suggestions. As political scientist Sjamsuddin Haris commented, the party’s representatives probably had little credibility in promoting democratic reforms against the background of the obviously undemocratic procedures surrounding Megawati’s ousting. In general, the party’s campaign themes were uncontroversial and stated in general terms. The party’s 16-page election manifesto, for example, included calls for an end to corruption, for the economy to be based on the family principle, for better consumer protection, for more popular political sovereignty, for the elections to be honest and fair and for the quality and independence of the political parties to be improved. The manifest contained little in terms of substantial policy suggestions, and to the extent that concrete policies were suggested, they largely concerned matters of marginal importance, such as a suggestion to scrap import duties on foreign books. The party’s most controversial proposal in the 1992 election, to limit the number of presidential terms, was not voiced.

With the PDI hampered by its internal problems, the PPP could effectively take over the PDI’s former role as a party for the small people. The PPP also focused on the lack of democracy in the implementation of the election, and threatened to reject the result if the election were rigged. The party’s rallies drew large crowds, especially in Jakarta and other cities in Java, and many of Megawati’s supporters seemed willing to channel their political aspirations through the PPP. In early May the new informal coalition between the PPP and Megawati’s supporters became manifest with the apparently spontaneous emergence of the slogan Mega-Bintang, which literally translates as ‘mega star’,
but which also means ‘superstar’. The slogan was accompanied by a symbol, carried at PPP rallies around Java, combining the PPP’s party symbol of a star with the red colour of the PDI. Pictures of Megawati were also displayed at the PPP’s rallies, and the word Mega-Bintang was used as a political slogan. The government, evidently cautious of the emergence of the new coalition, banned the Mega-Bintang, both slogan and symbol. The use of pictures of people in the election campaign had been banned since the 1992 campaign.

Already in February 1997, Megawati had rejected the election, saying that it would have a ‘legal defect’ (cacat hukum).13 By the end of the campaign period, moreover, she publicly stated that she would not use her right to vote.14 Although she did not explicitly urge her followers to abstain from voting, which would have been illegal, her announcement was expected to influence many people. Many observers consequently expected that the number of voters abstaining or casting invalid votes would increase substantially. However, a rumour in political circles ahead of the election had it that the result would be rigged in favour of the PDI, allowing the party to gain approximately the same share of votes as in 1992.15 As 25 more parliamentary seats were contested in 1997 than in 1992, such an outcome would allow the PDI to increase its representation in the legislature, something which would save the face of the evidently unpopular Soerjadi, while at the same time slamming Megawati and her supporters.

In the polls, which were held on 29 May 1997, however, the PDI declined disastrously, collecting only 3.1 per cent of the votes, down from 14.9 per cent in 1992.16 The party declined drastically all over the country, with the exceptions of East Timor and West Kalimantan, where the party dropped relatively moderately from 16.0 per cent to 13.5 per cent and from 21.5 per cent to 15.1 per cent respectively. According to the first provisional election results of 5 June, the party’s representation in Parliament would decline from 56 to 10, with the party even failing to gain any representation at all in its former stronghold of Jakarta. The party obtained less than 2 per cent of the vote in the capital, meaning that Soerjadi, who had topped the party’s Jakarta list, failed to win a seat in Parliament. This poor showing in the election produced an immediate problem for the functioning of the legislature, because if the PDI, as indicated by the provisional results, were only to gain 10 seats, the party would not have enough parliamentarians to be represented in all its 11 commissions. The government supported a suggestion to correct the PDI’s poor election result by simply transferring some thousands of Golkar votes to the PDI, but the proposal was rejected by the PPP, and was also questioned by legal experts. In
the final vote count, however, the PDI’s number of votes in the province of North Sumatra had increased substantially – by 64,000 votes or 19.4 per cent – over the provisional results, enabling the party to get two parliamentary seats instead of one from the province, and thus a total of 11 seats in the Parliament. The PPP seriously questioned the vote count, but the authorities gave no plausible explanation for the large discrepancy between the provisional and final results. It was probably no coincidence that the additional seat went to Fatimah Achmad, who had led the committee that organised the Medan congress to depose Megawati.

Predictably, the election resulted in a landslide victory for Golkar, which gained 74.5 per cent of the votes, its best result ever and a substantial increase over its 68.1 per cent in 1992. The PPP also fared well, securing 22.4 per cent of the votes, an improvement of 5.4 points. Officially, the turn-out remained high at around 90.6 per cent, an insignificant decline of 0.3 percentage points from the 1992 turn-out. This figure, however, concealed considerable geographic variation, with the turn-out in many places in Java declining, probably reflecting the abstention of many Megawati supporters. For example, according to the official figures, the turn-out in Jakarta decreased from 93.5 per cent in 1992 to 88.1 per cent, and in East Java it dropped from 88.9 per cent to 85.0 per cent. In the East Java capital of Surabaya, the turn-out was only 78.5 per cent. According to the official figures, however, the fall in turn-out in Java was offset by increases in other provinces, so that nationally, the turn-out remained high at over 90 per cent.

Just as after previous elections, both the PPP and the PDI made numerous allegations of vote rigging and of violations against the election laws by the organisers of the election. In contrast to the aftermath of the 1992 election, the PDI was relatively subdued in its criticism, whereas the PPP was more vigorous. On 23 June 1997 representatives of all three election contestants signed their approval of the final result of the 1997 election. Soerjadi, however, was conspicuously absent at the ceremony, and the PDI was instead represented by the party’s secretary general, Buttu Hutapea.

The 1997 election had followed the same principal pattern as earlier elections under the New Order, being a carefully managed affair designed to ensure a large victory for Golkar, thus demonstrating the government’s continued legitimacy. Compared with earlier elections, however, the interference and manipulation involving the PDI ahead of the 1997 election was too extensive and too conspicuous for the election to fulfil its purpose. It was obvious that the PDI’s disastrous result was a consequence of voter distaste with
From the 1997 Election to the Fall of Suharto

the government’s engineering, and that Golkar’s result to a large extent was explainable by the extensive manipulation of the election procedures and the vote count. The government’s treatment of Megawati appalled many people who earlier might have believed that the country, however slowly, was moving in the direction of greater democracy. Against this background – and in comparison with the 1992 election – the 1997 election seemed to represented a reversal of the hopes among some observers that the election system was moving towards greater freedom and honesty.

FROM ECONOMIC TO POLITICAL CRISIS

Shortly after the general elections an increasingly serious economic crisis began to affect Indonesia, originally as an effect of contagion from neighbouring Thailand. In August 1997, the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, lost almost 15 per cent of its value against the U.S. dollar, after the Indonesian central bank allowed the currency to float in the middle of the month. In spite of the government’s attempts to restore confidence in the currency through cutting government spending, increasing interest rates and announcing a deregulation package, the rupiah continued to depreciate in the following months. The failure of the government to stop the rupiah’s fall seems mainly to have been the result of a widespread loss of confidence among Indonesian businessmen in the government’s capacity for effective action, due to the prevalence of corruption, patronage and cronyism. At the end of October, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, IMF, which included further deregulation measures, tight fiscal policy and financial aid from the fund, was announced, but the agreement failed to restore market confidence in the Indonesian currency, which by December 1997 had lost 58 per cent of its value to the U.S. dollar, making it the worst performing currency in the world. In the last months of 1997, the currency crisis turned into a full-blown economic crisis, as Indonesian companies, many of which had huge unhedged loans in foreign currencies, began to default on their debt payments. Millions of employees around the country were laid off, and prices on many basic goods and foodstuffs rose sharply, which meant drastically deteriorating living conditions for many people.

Even though the government had problems in dealing effectively with the economic crisis, its control over the political system remained intact. In keeping with the New Order’s political ritual traditions, the 1,000 members of the MPR assembled on 1 October 1997 in order to begin preparations for the
March 1998 general session. In comparison with earlier instances, the assembly line-up appeared to consist more exclusively of compliant delegates, indicating an increasingly narrow social base for President Suharto and the regime. Four of the president’s children were amongst the delegates, as were the wives of several senior government and military officials. In contrast to earlier instances, however, neither leader of the country’s two largest organisations, Abdurrahman Wahid of the traditionalist Muslim NU and Amien Rais of the modernist Muslim Muhammadiyah, were appointed by the president as legislators. Each of them headed organisations which claimed more than 30 million members, and both had in the preceding years established themselves as popular and independent-minded leaders unafraid of directly criticising the government or even President Suharto. Together with Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais were the most popular and potent critics of Suharto, but all three were also generally widely respected as moderate leaders advocating peaceful and gradual political reform. By excluding all three of them from the MPR line-up, President Suharto thus signalled that he envisaged no political reform or change, even of the moderate kind.

In early December 1997, however, State Secretary Moerdiono announced that the president would take a ten-day rest, cancelling his participation at a meeting of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum as well as a scheduled visit to his wife’s grave in Central Java. There was no mention of Suharto being ill, but appearing on television he looked frail, and worries over the president’s health triggered a sharp decline in the already devalued Indonesian currency. As the president thus looked more vulnerable than he had in several years, students and other oppositional activists began to voice their calls for Suharto’s resignation openly in demonstrations and other actions around the country. Amien Rais now emerged as a major spokesman for the opposition and declared himself willing to be nominated as a presidential candidate. In early January 1998, after the President’s budget speech in Parliament had triggered a collapse of the currency’s value, Amien Rais called for an alliance between Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and himself to work for political reform and to challenge Suharto’s leadership. Although Megawati expressed her support for the idea, nothing came of it, largely because of Abdurrahman Wahid’s suspicion of Amien Rais, who had a history of promoting anti-Christian and anti-Chinese sentiments. In mid-January, Wahid suffered a stroke and was hospitalised, thus forcing him to suspend his political activities.

In January 1998 Megawati also emerged publicly to challenge Suharto. A couple of days after Amien Rais’s call for a common platform, Megawati, in
spite of the government’s warnings, held a meeting at her home to commemorate the PDI’s 25th anniversary. On the eve of 10 January 1998, in front of reportedly thousands of supporters, she declared herself willing to lead the country if it was the will and demand of the people. She also openly called on President Suharto to step down, and in doing so, she evoked the memory of her own father’s resignation:

On this occasion, I appeal to the whole Indonesian people: Do not renominate retired General Soeharto to become president for a seventh time. Because a term in office of more than 30 years as president indicates an effort on behalf of President Soeharto to turn himself into president for life. The Indonesian nation must not make that mistake for the second time. [...] I will try to remind all of the Indonesian people and nation what history has already taught our nation: At the time when Bung Karno was still the president of the Republic of Indonesia, we doubted that there was anyone who could replace him. Evidently history proved otherwise! Bung Karno, with all his greatness, willingly and earnestly, let go of all his positions and sacrificed everything he possessed in order to fulfil the demands of the time.

Bung Karno once said to me at the end of his life: ‘...My child, remember all these things in your heart. Don’t tell the people about my suffering and illness; let me be sacrificed so that Indonesia will remain united. I do this for the sake of the unity, integrity, wholeness and glory of the nation. Let my suffering bear witness that even the power of the president has its limits. Because the only eternal power is the power of the people, and above it all is the power of God almighty!’”

As the March 1998 MPR session approached, the main threats to the smooth running of the session now seemed to come from outside the assembly. Neither Megawati, Amien Rais nor any of their supporters were included in the MPR, and there was consequently little chance of their formally being nominated to run against the president. Megawati, however, intensified her political activities in the wake of her party anniversary speech, and she addressed numerous gatherings of students and other activists in the run-up to the March MPR session. In January, prominent playwright and activist Ratna Sarumpaet took the initiative to form an umbrella organisation for the anti-Suharto opposition, called Indonesian Solidarity for Amien and Mega, SIAGA (Solidaritas Indonesia untuk Amien dan Mega). The organisation was specifically created to support the presidential election bids of Amien Rais and Megawati, and
SIAGA, as well as other oppositional groups, staged several demonstrations in the months leading up to the MPR session, calling for political and economic reform and a change in national leadership.27

The government and the military appeared to take the increasingly loud anti-Suharto protests and challenges to his leadership seriously. Ahead of the MPR session, security forces arrested numerous students and other demonstrators and abducted several activists who protested against the re-election of Suharto. The abducted activists included the secretary general of SIAGA, Pius Lustrilanang, and a member of Megawati’s central board, Haryanto Taslam. Although both of these activists later resurfaced, the whereabouts of several others were never disclosed.28 In contrast to the 1993 MPR session, when the military had expected the threats to the smooth running of the assembly to come from inside its ranks, the main threats now came from outside. In order to forestall any disturbances from students and other activists, the military reported that 25,000 troops would be deployed in the capital to secure the assembly.29

The PDI’s minimal MPR delegation, meanwhile, made few headlines in the run-up to the general session, and the faction made no major attempt to propound political or other reform in spite of the loud calls for change outside the assembly. The compliance of the party’s MPR faction was probably more than anything else due to demoralisation as a result of Soerjadi’s unpopularity and the party’s extremely poor election result. Soerjadi, who shortly after the 1997 general election had declared his intention to resign as the PDI leader at the party’s congress, scheduled for the following year, appeared more or less to have lost interest in leading the party. In contrast to his earlier habits as party leader, he now rarely talked to the media and seemed instead more interested in tending to a fruit and vegetables plantation, which he owned in Sukabumi, West Java.30

On 1 March 1998, President Suharto read his accountability speech to the MPR. As on earlier occasions, both the PPP and the PDI voiced some criticism over shortcomings in the speech. Both Soerjadi and the PPP leader Ismail Hasan Metareum complained that the president had failed to discuss the need for political reform in his speech, and Soerjadi criticised the president for not mentioning the problems of corruption and business monopolies. Megawati went even further in her criticism, and speaking at a press conference attended by domestic and foreign journalists in her Jakarta home, Megawati – who claimed to represent approximately 20 million PDI members and sympathisers – rejected the president’s speech outright. She criticised the president for failures in six major areas: the failure to uphold justice and the rule of law; the
flaws in the implementation of the 1997 general election; the prevalence of corruption, nepotism and other malpractices which had exacerbated the economic crisis; the emergence of riots and communal violence around the country as a result of government manipulation; the increasing incidence of poverty and social and economic disparity in the wake of the economic crisis; and the circumstance, reported by the American economic magazine *Forbes* in July 1997, that President Suharto allegedly had amassed a private fortune of 16 million U.S. dollars during his term in office.31

In spite of the loud calls from Megawati, Amien Rais and students and other activists for the MPR not to re-elect Suharto, the MPR unanimously elected the incumbent president on 10 March, and on the following day his chosen deputy, Habibie, was elected as vice-president, likewise by acclamation. More than anything else, Suharto's re-election and the smooth running of the 1998 MPR session demonstrated the president's continuing control over the formal political system. Few people, however, interpreted his re-election as a sign of renewed confidence in his leadership. Suharto, after having looked vulnerable in the months leading up to the assembly, seemed to have regained the political initiative, and for the opposition movement it looked as if the window of opportunity for political change and reform had closed. Suharto looked set to stay in office for the foreseeable future and to lead the country in the painful process of economic recovery.32

After the MPR closed its 1998 session, Megawati diminished her public political activities and statements and distanced herself from the student protests that continued in the months after the closing of the MPR session. Up until Suharto's resignation in May 1998, Amien Rais instead emerged as the most prominent critic of Suharto and as a largely self-appointed spokesman for the students and the emerging broad anti-Suharto movement. Megawati, by contrast, was reluctant to be involved in the opposition against Suharto, and as the protests gathered momentum in May, Megawati seems to have been repelled by the openly oppositional and disrespectful attitude of many of the protesters. On 13 May, she attended a memorial ceremony at Trisakti University in Jakarta where four students had been shot dead by security forces the day before, but in contrast to many other critical figures who also attended the ceremony, Megawati declined to give a political speech. According Kwik Kian Gie, one of her close aides, Megawati felt that the day should be reserved for mourning the four victims and that 'everything that needed to be said, had already been said long, long before'.33 Similarly, Kwik explained her stance in connection with the occupation of Parliament during Suharto's last days in power:

287
When the students gathered in front of the Parliament/MPR building and almost every famous person gave agitating speeches deriding Pak Harto, Megawati did not come forward at all. Consequently, Megawati was accused of not providing leadership when it was expected. I asked her about this criticism. She asked me back, what was there left to say after everything had been said long, long before. [...] She also questioned for whom the leadership was meant. For the Indonesian people or for the students who had gathered in front of the Parliament and MPR building? She also said that she knew what was going on there: [It was more about] excessively deriding pak Harto than about putting forward any constructive thoughts in order to resolve the crisis which mars our nation.

Kwik apparently saw the need to defend Megawati against the criticism that she was a weak leader who failed to provide leadership at a crucial moment. As we have seen, Megawati had since her ascendency to the party chair displayed a calm, patient and seemingly docile leadership style, an impression strengthened in the course of her struggle against the government and the military in the wake of her ousting from the party chair in mid-1996. When she now did not involve herself directly in the efforts to bring down Suharto, she shielded herself from accusations that she tried unconstitutionally to unseat the president, accusations which might have damaged her hard-fought reputation for justice, calm and decency. By not involving herself too closely in the anti-Suharto movement, she also avoided the risk of acquiring an excessively controversial and oppositional image, which might turn into a liability and diminish her credibility as a leader for all Indonesians. Although she was criticised for her silence and passivity in the events immediately surrounding the fall of Suharto, this stance served – in the longer term – to preserve her political reputation and capital, and allowed her, in some ways, to project an image of standing above the fray of politics, in a similar way as her father had done.

CONCLUSIONS

The government-initiated operation to oust Megawati from the PDI chair had been staged in order to secure Golkar’s absolute electoral majority and Suharto’s smooth re-election as president by acclamation. Superficially, these objectives had been achieved, but at considerable cost for the government, and more broadly, the regime in general. The exposure of government manipulation and repression to achieve the objectives vastly decreased their usefulness for conferring popular support for the government. Both the PDI’s decline and
Golkar’s gain in the 1997 election were too drastic and implausible to pass for convincing indicators of popular political sentiments. Similarly, with students and opposition leaders loudly protesting against Suharto’s re-election ahead of the 1998 MPR session, his unanimous re-election by the compliant assembly failed to convince most people that the ageing president had been bestowed with renewed popular confidence to lead the country. Inside the assembly, the PDI’s weak faction of demoralised Soerjadi supporters had very little credibility to advocate political reform, and, in contrast to earlier MPR sessions particularly in 1993, the party made no significant contribution to promote political change or reform in the assembly.

Megawati, by contrast, publicly challenged the president and called for his resignation shortly before his re-election. After he had been re-elected, however, Megawati apparently resigned herself to the fact that the MPR had re-elected Suharto in accordance with the constitution. After the MPR closed its session, she was reluctant to take a leading role in the continuing opposition movement, and she seems to have felt that the students’ criticism of the president was disrespectful and excessive. As a consequence of Megawati’s passive stance and the weakness and lack of credibility of the Soerjadi camp, the PDI played a virtually insignificant role in the immediate events leading up to the fall of President Suharto in May 1998.

NOTES

3 Media Indonesia (20 November 1996) and Kompas (21 November 1996).
4 Kompas (23 November 1996) and Republika (26 November 1996).
5 Forum Keadilan (5 May 1997).
8 Republika (12 May 1997).
10 Republika (12 May 1997).
12 See Ariwibowo et al. (1997).
13 Bali Post (13 February 1997). The term, as we have seen, was the same as the one which General Feisal Tandjung and other military officials had used in the context of the campaign to thwart Soerjadi’s re-election to the PDI chair in 1993.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

14 The Australian (23 May 1997).
15 Two months before the election, both Nico Daryanto, who was close to Soerjadi, and Kwik Kian Gie, a close supporter of Megawati, were positive that the election would be rigged in Soerjadi’s favour; interviews by the author, Jakarta (14 March 1997 and 17 March 1997 respectively). A member of the unofficial Independent Election Monitoring Committee, KIPP, in Yogyakarta also believed that blank or invalid votes cast in the region would be transferred to the PDI; South China Morning Post (12 May 1997).
16 For the election results, see Kompas (24 June 1997).
18 Kompas (24 June 1997).
19 Forum Keadilan (16 June 1997) and Jakarta Post (3 June 1997).
20 Kompas (24 June 1997). As of 24 June, the PPP claimed it had reported 1,033 cases of violations in the election to the Panwaslak; PPP Online (24 June 1997).
21 This summary of the development of the crisis is based on Eklöf (1999a: 96–121). For more extensive analyses of the economic crisis in Indonesia, see McLeod (1998) and Hill (1999).
23 Jakarta Post (16 September 1997).
24 The Age (8 January 1998).
26 Kabar dari Pijar (10 January 1998), rendering the whole text of the speech. Megawati’s mentioning of the possibility of making the same mistake a second time referred to the conferral of the title president-for-life on Sukarno by the 1963 MPRS, which she had publicly rejected the month before; see Kompas (24 December 1998).
30 Detektif & Romantika (14 February 1998).
31 Jakarta Post (2 March 1998) and KITLV Daily Report (5 March 1998). The article about Suharto’s wealth was published in Forbes (28 July 1997).
33 Kwik Kian Gie (1999: 16). Soerjadi also attended the memorial ceremony and tried to address the students, but was forced to flee inside one of campus buildings after he was verbally abused and met by stone throwing; see Detektif & Romantika (23 May 1998).
CHAPTER 13

Conclusion

For more than three decades, from 1966 to 1998, Indonesia was dominated by the authoritarian New Order regime of President Suharto. The regime claimed popular legitimacy both on the basis of the economic development and improved standards of living it delivered for the majority of Indonesians, and on symbolic political grounds. The New Order put in place an elaborate political system featuring ostensibly democratic institutions, such as regular general elections, nominally independent political parties and a mainly popularly elected Parliament. These institutions were intended to mask a hegemonic political culture which did not permit any challenge to those in power or any threat to the elaborate political architecture of the regime.

Within this system, the role envisaged for the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI, which had been founded in 1973 as the result of a government-imposed merger of three nationalist and two Christian parties, was that of a pliant state corporatist party. Its existence was meant, together with the other legal political party under the New Order, the Islamic United Development Party, PPP, to enhance the democratic credentials of the government and at the same time demonstrate a broad consensual support for the overall arrangements and goals of the regime. The parties, however, were not meant to become proponents for reform or vehicles for dissent, and the authorities frequently interfered with the PDI’s leadership elections and other party affairs in order to ensure that the party did not turn to opposition. Largely as a consequence of these interventions, the PDI was beset with almost constant internal conflict up until the mid-1980s, rendering it virtually insignificant as a political force.

From the second half of the 1980s, by contrast, the party began to develop in an unexpected direction to become a major source of criticism against the regime and a sometimes vocal advocate of political reforms and a number of controversial suggestions, most of which bore a leftist imprint. In doing so, the PDI challenged the hegemonic political culture which served to maintain the regime and preserve the paramount position of those in power, including
President Suharto. For the most part, the challenge from the PDI did not take on the form of a direct confrontation against the government or the political culture of the regime, but rather consisted of an appropriation of the hegemonic political culture. Historically and for its political identity, the PDI largely shared the same ideological framework as the New Order, which had its origins in the intellectual concepts and symbols developed by Sukarno and other leading nationalist figures during the pre-independence period. The PDI, consequently, was well positioned to appropriate the political culture of the New Order, and the more critical elements within the party could effectively contest the hegemony of those in power from their own premises and ideological platform. This challenge caused a significant erosion of legitimacy for the regime, especially during the years leading up to the fall of President Suharto in May 1998.

THE ICONISING OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS

In 1945, Indonesia’s most prominent nationalist leader, Sukarno, formulated Indonesia’s state philosophy, Pancasila, which consisted of five principles designed to accommodate all of Indonesia’s diverse political, cultural and religious groups. The five principles were belief in one God, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. Under the New Order, however, Pancasila was turned into an instrument of exclusion and repression, in stark contrast to Sukarno’s explicit inclusive intentions. Symbolically, these efforts on the part of the New Order culminated with the passing of the 1985 Law on the Political Parties and Golkar, which prescribed that all political organisations must adhere to Pancasila as their only basic principle. Because of the vagueness of Pancasila – which, according to Sukarno, was its very strong point – it provided little in terms of guidance for political action and policies. For those in power during the New Order, however, the main purpose of Pancasila was to preclude the rise of any alternative political ideologies or movements which might threaten their hold on power. To this end, government officials thus evoked Pancasila to locate any political discussion, suggestion, organisation or actor outside the permissible boundaries of the hegemonic political culture. This use of Pancasila as an exclusionary tool by those in power was demonstrated on several occasions when the government rejected the PDI’s suggestions for political reform. The country’s 1945 Constitution, very vague and generally lacking in detail, was employed in similar ways, as were other symbols with nationalist connotations, such as New Order, national stability, national interest and unity and integrity. The thrust of the allegations by senior government and
military officials was that those who advocated policies or aspirations that were not in accordance with Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution or any other nationalist symbol evoked were unpatriotic or even subversive. Essentially, the exclusionary use of these nationalist symbols served the same purpose as the New Order’s ideology of anti-communism, although the evocation of national icons provided those in power with a more subtle and generally less draconian tool of repression than the ideology of anti-communism.

The practice of evoking nationalist symbols as an exclusionary tool, in effect, turned these symbols into icons which largely became bereft of their original substance and largely void of content. To question or even to attempt to discuss the content of the symbols risked inviting allegations of unpatriotic behaviour and attitudes or even treason and subversion. The hegemonic authoritarian and exclusionary interpretation of central national symbols thus precluded any substantial discussion of what the deeper significance of these symbols might be in the contemporary context and what relevance they might have for central political, economic and social questions. The practice of iconising backed by coercion resulted in a strong element of political correctness in the New Order’s political culture, in which it was often more important to evoke the right symbols than to discuss how they should be interpreted or employed in order to achieve a desirable objective or development. As a consequence, the New Order political culture was characterised by an abundance of politically correct statements about the icons, but little substantial discussion about their significance and positive contributions. The right of definition of the icons seemed very much to be connected to political power; those in power defined the correct place and use of the icons.

The New Order’s political culture shared with earlier political culture in twentieth-century Indonesia a strong reluctance to acknowledge that there were fundamental lines of division and conflict in Indonesian society. To the extent that differences of opinion and interest were visible, the hegemonic political culture prescribed that these should be phased out through the process of musyawarah (deliberation), resulting in mufakat (consensus). These two concepts were the core of the New Order’s Pancasila democracy and were supposed to represent an indigenous Indonesian political culture with long historical roots. In terms of their intellectual history, however, they were derived from Islamic political theory, mediated through early twentieth-century West Sumatran political culture. As they were employed during the New Order, they resembled ‘invented traditions’ in the sense of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1984). The principles of musyawarah and mufakat as a model for
decision-making thus represented a ‘high’ political culture in contrast to the less perfect procedures of open debate and voting, which above all were associated with Western parliamentary democracy and regarded as unsuitable to Indonesian culture and conditions. As a result, Pancasila democracy and its core concepts of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* became another set of nationalist icons in the political culture of the New Order, and to advocate voting as a principle for decision-making implied an unpatriotic and unseemly commitment to a set of alien political ideas associated with Western colonialism and imperialism.

**PANCASILA DEMOCRACY: AN ELITIST UTOPIA?**

A central factor in the rise of the New Order in the second half of the 1960s was the broad consensus among the elites about the need to limit popular political participation. This consensus, above all, emerged as a reaction to the spectacular rise of the Communist Party and the theatrical mass politics of Sukarno’s last years in power. In order to limit mass political participation under the New Order, the permanent links of the political parties with their broader popular constituencies were severed. The masses were instead to be ‘floating’ and only allowed to participate in the nation’s political life in the circumscribed general elections once every five years. These general elections were not mechanisms for the exercise of popular sovereignty, but carefully managed and manipulated national rituals designed to renew the government’s ruling mandate without contesting its hold on power. The role of the political parties in this ritual – or ‘festival of democracy’ in the rhetoric of the regime – was as lesser alternatives to the government’s electoral vehicle, Golkar. Their participation in the election was meant to lend credibility to the ostensibly democratic and pluralist character of the regime. In both the 1977 and 1982 elections, the PDI generally fulfilled this mission, although the party’s weakness and lack of popular credibility, especially in the 1982 election, seem to have caused some concern in government circles over the party’s ability to perform its assigned role.

During the period under study, however, the elections also provided the party with an arena for contesting the government’s legitimacy and the hegemonic political culture, both directly and indirectly. The party’s mobilisation of large crowds of people in the 1987 and 1992 elections implied popular dissatisfaction with the government and raised the spectre of mass politics associated with the outlawed Communist Party and the late Sukarno era in the first half of the 1960s. The PDI’s apparent turn towards mass politics was consequently
rejected by senior government and military officials. The youthful, participatory spontaneity on the part of the PDI’s supporters in those elections also contrasted with the New Order’s hierarchical and politically exclusionary character and implied dissatisfaction with the regime among broad strata of society. This dissatisfaction was mainly related to the increasing social and economic disparity and the increasingly blatant corruption in government and big business circles from the second half of the 1980s. In the 1987 election, when the PDI for the first time fielded a member of the Sukarno family, the former president’s eldest daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri, as a candidate for Parliament, Sukarno’s image came to represent this opposition. Although the opposition generally was diffuse and unfocused, it was manifest in the strong showing of popular support for the PDI in the election campaign. In the 1992 election, Sukarno’s standing as a symbol of opposition to the New Order was even more pronounced, mainly because of the greater popular dissatisfaction with the regime paired with the more controversial stance of the PDI in the campaign.

Even though the PDI mobilised large crowds of people in its election rallies, most leading PDI representatives seemed to concur with the basic tenet of the New Order that politics were mainly to be the concern of the country’s elites and that the less educated and supposedly less politically aware masses of the people should not be allowed to have any substantial influence in national politics. The dominating sentiment among the political elites was that it was more important to have the right policies than to convince the masses of the people, who often were regarded as uneducated or even outrightly stupid, of the justifications and advantages of the policies propounded. This attitude, which reflected a paternalistic and essentially undemocratic attitude, seemed to be dominant among the established political elites, whether in the political parties, Golkar, the government or the military. The patriarchal attitude was justified in terms of the need for the political parties and Golkar to provide political education to the people. The same attitude was apparent in the government’s stance towards the parties, with notions such as the government being the patron of the political parties, guiding them from behind (tut wuri handayani) and at times accusing them of being immature or not yet grown up.

In the New Order political culture, the evocation of the ‘people’ (rakyat) – which had been one of Sukarno’s favourite expressions – was toned down, and the word was turned into another icon with nationalist connotations. In spite of the lip-service paid to the notion of popular sovereignty, there seemed to be little commitment among the political elites to any broader popular political
participation or significant influence for the broader masses of the people. Essentially, the idea of popular sovereignty was alien to the New Order’s Pancasila democracy, with its underlying assumption that decisions should be based on what was good and right. The ‘people’ was instead evoked as a metaphor for those higher ethical principles, with little concern for the actual opinions and aspirations of the broader masses of the people. Virtually all political organisations and their representatives, as well as government and military officials, instead claimed to speak for the ‘people’, conveniently ignoring the circumstance that there were deep and fundamental lines of division between different groups and layers of the Indonesian population. Conversely, speaking for a certain group or segment of the people seemed to be anathema, and the allegation of doing so was used to sideline political opponents and dissidents. Instead of acknowledging that differences of opinion and interest among the population were legitimate and that the role of the political system must be to provide institutions and arenas for negotiation between those different aspirations, the differences were often swept under the carpet and pressured into a superficial consensus, or simply repressed, by those in power.

The reluctance to admit that there were divisions among the people which a healthy political system should reflect, was not conducive to the emergence of substantial political discussions. Because virtually all members of the political elites, implicitly or explicitly, claimed to speak for the ‘people’ there was little incentive to formulate or advocate controversial suggestions or detailed policy suggestions which, by necessity, would be likely to favour certain groups or segments in society over others. Politicians instead tended to put forward vague and undetailed proposals and programs, framed in terms of what was felt to be just and good for everybody, and discussions about the possibly controversial details of the policies that might serve to achieve such goals were largely avoided.

For an outside observer of Indonesian politics, the concepts of musyawarah and mufakat seem to suggest the negotiation between different aspirations and interests, ideally resulting in a compromise to which all participating groups and factions can commit. In the New Order’s political culture, however, the musyawarah process was generally one in which the stronger side pressured the weaker to comply in order for an ostensible consensus to prevail. The underlying assumption behind, and justification of, this practice, as well as behind the reluctance to admit that there were legitimate differences of opinion between different segments of the population, was the notion that one right, good or just policy or solution existed to a given problem. This idea – essentially the idea of ‘natural law’ in Western intellectual terminology – was difficult to
reconcile with the idea of popular sovereignty, as demonstrated already by Sukarno’s and other early nationalists’ criticism against parliamentary democracy for allowing majority votes to determine what was right in place of ethical principles. On the same lines, mufakat in the political culture of the New Order was to reflect ethical principles rather than comprise an imperfect outcome of negotiation and compromise. In practice, however, the definition of what was good and just was intimately linked to the relations of power, with powerful agencies, such as the military, government, Golkar and, above all, President Suharto, asserting their right to define those superior ethical principles. The musyawarah process, in this context, aimed at pressuring dissenting voices into compliance. In the terminology of the family principle, which evoked the family as a model for society and the state, musyawarah resembled the negotiation between a parent and a toddler: the parent, who generally sees himself or herself as acting according to what is just and good, will impose his or her will on the child, and the aim of the negotiation is to make the toddler comply without loud protests and anti-social behaviour. Analogously, those in power under the New Order tried to make the political parties comply without breaking the appearance of consensus.

Just as the parent, those in power under the New Order could employ a number of sanctions if the negotiations failed to result in compliance – although the coercive measures employed by the Suharto government could be immensely more draconian than those which most parents would consider. The New Order’s set of coercive methods included intimidation, ostracism, covert manipulation, imprisonment and physical violence, and the mere threat – implicit or explicit – of those methods were generally effective in silencing dissenting voices and keeping the opposition at the margins. The coercive tactics were permanent and integrated features of the New Order’s political culture throughout its tenure in power. Even though the regime could acquire a decent and civilised facade, and such methods could keep a low profile, there was always a latent awareness among political actors that transgressing the limits of the New Order’s political culture was likely to have unpleasant or even devastating consequences. The level of coercion and repression varied over time and with the circumstances, partly in relation to a struggle within the regime, which focused on sections of the military on the one hand and the president on the other. At times, when the PDI appeared to be moving towards the outer limits of the permissible boundaries, the coercive threats, in form such as communist allegations, politically motivated criminal accusations or kidnappings and violence, were deployed. The threat or deployment of such
tactics by those in power should not be seen as just a last resort when other measures failed. Such coercion was instead an integrated part of the political culture, without which its hegemony could not have been maintained.

**MORAL EROSION OF THE NEW ORDER**

Under the New Order, a number of sensitive social and political issues were banned outright from discussion, such as ethnic and religious animosity and the corruption and nepotism in high-level government circles. It was forbidden to question the 'truth' of some of the national icons of the regime, such as *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, or to propound any political ideology, such as communism or Sukarno’s leftist teachings. In spite of these restrictions – which effectively ruled out discussion about several of the country’s most important problems – the political parties under the New Order were, in theory, to be 'programme oriented', meaning that they should generate suggestions for political programs and policies. There was little interest from the government in the concrete political proposals that the parties presented, and the attempts by the PDI to put forward concrete policy suggestions or suggestions for political reform were generally met with suspicion or outright rejection. Even though the PDI, especially through its research body, Litbang, tried to develop its capacity for policy-making, the party generally failed to function as a significant source of policy thinking, and only on a few occasions during the period under study did the party present concrete and substantial proposals of its own.

The relative lack of capability and expertise on the part of the political parties provided the government with arguments against allowing them more influence in government and decision-making and served to strengthen the notion that there were no credible alternatives to the incumbent government and president. The government thus had a distinct interest in keeping the parties from developing into independent and competent sources of alternative policies which might challenge the government’s policies and hold on power. The PDI's attempts to develop its capacity for independent policy thinking were consequently met by suspicion or outright rejection by government officials, such as the suggestion that the PDI form a shadow cabinet, the campaign to recruit intellectuals to Litbang and the refusals to discuss the party’s proposals for economic competition legislation in Parliament and political reform in the MPR. There were few rewards in the system for politicians who tried to advocate independent and critical policies, and doing
Conclusion

so was instead likely to invite the deployment of coercive measures by those in power. Politicians who were compliant and refrained from criticising the government, on the other hand, were rewarded with material compensation and status-filled positions in the political system. Largely as a consequence of the strategy on the part of those in power to nurture compliant and uncritical politicians, many legislators and other PDI politicians appeared to be lacking in skills and knowledge as well in ethical principles and personal integrity. As will be discussed shortly, however, sections within the PDI began to challenge these circumstances during the period under study.

Meanwhile, those in power, or those defending the regime, often appeared to do so on the basis of very weak arguments. To the extent that the PDI did propose controversial reforms or alternative policies, these were generally rejected through non-arguments, including bland assertions that the existing system was already adequate or that there was no need for change. Charges of corruption – all but evident even to the most casual observer of the late New Order – were generally ignored or rejected with authoritarian warnings not to make groundless accusations or generalisations. Icons such as Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution often also replaced substantial counter-arguments and were evoked with their exclusionary purposes without reference to any substantial contents associated with those icons. Sometimes the icons even seemed to be used by government and military officials as a matter of routine, such as when the PDI’s suggestion for electoral reform in 1992–93 was rejected with reference to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, neither of which even mentioned elections or political parties.

The failure to counter the PDI’s proposals through substantial arguments indicated a lack of moral justification and self-confidence on behalf of those in power and those defending the regime. Consequently, the government’s electoral vehicle, Golkar, often seemed defensive and avoided political discussions and debates with the other election contestants. To a great extent, the problem for those who defended the regime was that the moral decay was intimately linked to the apex of its power, that is, to President Suharto, who during his last years in power became increasingly associated with corruption, nepotism and manipulative politics. Even for those of his aides who may have felt that the moral erosion was a serious problem, there was little scope to criticise or challenge the president within the boundaries of the system and the prevailing political culture. The demotion of General Moerdani and his supporters in the military seemed to demonstrate the futility of challenging the paramount position of the president. Conversely, defending the president and the system
which served to maintain his power, even if morally corrupt, could carry considerable rewards.

For sections of the PDI, however, the moral corruption in government circles opened doors for the PDI to criticise the regime from its own ideological platform, that is, the appropriation of ideology in the terminology of James Scott (1985). The efficiency of much of the party’s criticism was due to the fact that this criticism could be phrased in the rhetoric of the regime and through evoking the very same national icons, such as Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the family principle, musyawarah and mufakat, which government and military officials themselves frequently evoked. This appropriation of the New Order’s ideology by the PDI served to expose the moral corruption of the regime and the inconsistencies in the government’s adherence to its own principles. The PDI thus stood out as the most vocal proponent of reform within the system for most of the decade leading up to the fall of Suharto in May 1998. With the main exception of the 1997 election, the party was a more vigorous proponent of change than the other legal non-government party, the PPP. Although the PDI’s efforts to bring about change through constitutional mechanisms achieved precious little in concrete terms, the party’s contestation of the hegemonic political culture contributed in important ways to the erosion of the regime’s claims to popular legitimacy, especially in the last years of the period under study.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ETHICS OF POWER

The so-called floating mass doctrine of the New Order served to separate the political parties and politics in general from the population at large and, effectively, to free politics at the elite level from the notion of popular accountability. According to the constitution, the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR, embodied the people’s sovereignty, but membership of the assembly was controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government. Critical candidates were generally sorted out before the general elections through various methods, including the raising of technical and administrative obstacles, communist allegation, threats and intimidation. As a result, party legislators and representatives mainly relied on the support of government or military officials and institutions for their positions. There was little commitment among most of the political elite to the notion that politics should be governed by ethical principles, such as honesty, justice or any deeper commitment to political ideals or principles. Politicians, moreover, were not accountable for their policies and conduct towards the people.
Conclusion

In the New Order’s political culture, political ethics became synonymous with maintaining unity and working for a ‘high’ political culture embodied in the principles of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, especially in connection with decisions seen as crucial in national politics, such as the presidential election and other key decisions taken by the MPR. The idealisation of *mufakat* as a form for decision-making served to justify compliance and the lack of commitment to ideological and political principles on the part of the political parties and their representatives. Through the ethics of *mufakat*, the failure to stand up for ideas and principles was transmuted – albeit unconvincingly – to a *noblesse oblige* in the interest of the nation.

In practice, the definition of these ethics depended on the structures and relations of power. In the absence of voting, there was no convincing mechanism to determine the will of the people or the majority of its representatives. The consensus was instead dictated by those in power, whether they were represented by the government, the bureaucracy, Golkar or the military. For political party politicians, proximity to, and support from, those in power seemed inherently to imply moral righteousness and good ethics, rendering the notion of popular accountability meaningless. Otherwise highly acclaimed ethical principles, such as justice, non-violence, tolerance and respect for differences of opinion, could be disregarded as long as there was backing from those in power.

During the period under study, the lack of popular accountability led to an increasing distance between the regime and society at large. This rift and narrowing social base of the regime manifested itself most conspicuously in the rising popular resentment against the prevalence of corruption and nepotism and the widening social and economic gap. Some politicians who articulated this rising resentment chose the PDI as their political vehicle, resulting in the rise of a ‘new breed’ of politicians, who, from the late 1980s, began to challenge the prevailing political culture and its conflation of power and ethics.

INDEPENDENT PARTY OR CORPORATIST INSTITUTION?

Although the role envisaged for the PDI in the New Order’s political system was that of a compliant state corporatist party, the party began during the period under study to develop in the direction of becoming an independent and critical opposition party. This development was not only an internal party development, but linked to the struggle between President Suharto and the military, which brought about a political climate of greater openness, or *keterbukaan*, in the period between 1987 and 1994. As the president strength-
ened his personal influence over Golkar during the period, sections of the military leadership, especially those associated with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and subsequently defence and security minister, General Benny Moerdani, apparently began looking to the PDI as an alternative political vehicle. The PDI leaders, including both Soerjadi and Megawati, seemed to enjoy good relationships with sections of the military leadership, especially General Moerdani. From the perspective of the dominating state-centred paradigm in Indonesian political studies, the PDI has in this context been seen as a pawn in the struggle between Suharto and the military. The present study, however, has shown that the party leaders also actively nurtured their and the party’s relationship with the military, and that this strategy often allowed them a greater manoeuvring space to challenge the regime and propound their political ideas and reform suggestions. This strategy on the part of the PDI leaders thus allowed the party to become more assertive and critical, especially in the first half of the 1990s. The importance of the support from the military, moreover, was demonstrated by the ousting of Soerjadi in 1993 and Megawati in 1996. Both of these events – guided from behind by the president’s hand – seem to have been related to the declining influence of Benny Moerdani in the military and Suharto’s success in regaining control over the armed forces. With the challenge to his authority from the military fading, the president felt secure to move against the PDI to bring the party back to its originally envisaged role of a compliant state corporatist party – or a ‘chicken flea party’ (*partai gurem*), as the PDI had been known in the 1970s and 1980s.

In a general sense, the PDI’s greater assertiveness during the period was linked to certain social developments outside the immediate political sphere. During the period under study, higher levels of education and an increase in the flow of information outside the government’s control contributed to increasing levels of political awareness and critical sentiments among the population at large. As we have seen, there was also increasing resentment over the rising social and economic inequalities, as well as the prevalence of corruption and nepotism, especially in government circles. This broad resentment was voiced by the ‘new breed’ of more critical PDI politicians, who thereby turned the PDI into the most vigorous proponent of social and political change within the New Order. At least from the late 1980s, there was thus pressure within the PDI for the party to move in the direction of becoming more critical and independent of the government. Largely – but not exclusively – those advocating a more critical stance were relative newcomers on the national political scene, and many were associated with the party’s research body, Litbang, which was
Conclusion

revived in 1989. The pressure for the PDI to become more critical led to increasingly severe tensions within the party between what we may call the 'old guard' of generally compliant professional party politicians and the 'new breed' of politicians with mainly non-political backgrounds. Most of the latter were recruited during Soerjadi's first tenure as party leader between 1986 and 1993 and were largely intellectuals, businessmen and middle-class professionals. The old guard, by contrast, consisted mainly of elder politicians who were long since accustomed to working in the political culture of the New Order and whose careers and economic existence largely depended on their positions in the political system. For them, the transmutation of compliance into an ethical principle served to justify their largely unprincipled political conduct, while proximity to power relieved them of popular accountability. Many of those politicians seemed to conflate their own personal interests with those of the party, and they were often more than willing to seek the government's assistance to resolve internal party disputes, as long as doing so was believed to serve their personal and group interests. The Group of 17 dissidents, who almost incessantly challenged the PDI leadership from 1987 to 1996, typified this group of politicians.

The 'new breed' of politicians, on the other hand, was mainly derived from social groups of middle-class intellectuals and professionals who rose to prominence in the preceding decades of strong economic development in Indonesia. From a platform of greater personal social and economic independence, they could articulate more broadly felt demands for greater openness, justice and public accountability on the part of the regime, as well as contesting the corrupt and manipulative practices of the New Order's political culture. The most vocal and prominent representative of the new breed of politicians was Kwik Kian Gie, but there were several others as well, including those members of the Sukarno family who became active in the party during the period.

During the period 1986–93, Soerjadi and party secretary general Nico Daryanto stand out as middle, or transitional, figures between the old nurtured politicians and the new breed. They were markedly less compliant than their predecessors and, especially in the 1992 general election, the PDI under Soerjadi vocally advocated controversial proposals for political reform and accused the government, and even President Suharto, of not carrying out their duties properly and of violating the constitution. The PDI leaders, however, were not prepared to fight to the end for the party's suggestions, meaning to force a vote in the MPR or to reject the government's policies outright. The struggle over the extent to which the PDI should confront the government and
stand up for its principles and proposals was at the heart of most of the party’s internal controversies during the period under study. The split was exacerbated after the 1992 election, especially around the 1993 MPR session, when there was serious disagreement in the party over whether or not the PDI should nominate a candidate other than Suharto for president, as well as over whether the party should persist in its demands for political reform and force a vote in the MPR. When the party eventually nominated Suharto and dropped all its controversial suggestions, there was widespread disappointment, both within the party and among reform-oriented groups outside the PDI, with its performance. Much of this resentment focused on Soerjadi personally. Largely as a consequence of the PDI’s failure to press ahead with its reform demands, Soerjadi came to be seen as opportunistic and as representing the older compliant tendencies in the party. The conflict came to the fore again in 1996 over the suggestion that the party nominate Megawati for president in 1998 and over the extent to which the PDI should confront the government in Parliament. The conflict was fuelled by the government’s intervention to depose Megawati in mid-1996, an event that caused the party to split – irrevocably, as it turned out – between one government-recognised, largely compliant, faction under Soerjadi, and one more oppositional faction led by Megawati.

SUKARNO, MEGAWATI AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL ENGINEERING

The greater social discontent discussed above was the breeding ground for the rise of Sukarno’s memory as a symbol of opposition to the New Order. From the time of the official rehabilitation of the former president’s memory in 1978, the government had tried to objectify his memory in order to turn him into a nationalist icon representing the achieving of national independence and the origins of the Indonesian state. For the government, honouring Sukarno’s memory was meant to enhance the legitimacy of the regime through the projection of continuity between the original nationalist project and the New Order. In allowing the PDI to use Sukarno’s image and symbolism in the 1982 and 1987 election campaigns, the government tried to bolster the PDI’s performance in order for the party to function as a more credible counter-weight to the Islamic PPP. The underlying assumption behind this strategy on the part of the government and the military seems to have been that Sukarno would be harmless as a nationalist symbol and that allowing the PDI to use his image, if anything, would enhance the nationalist credentials of the regime.
Conclusion

Sukarno’s forceful emergence as a symbol of opposition, however, indicated that the government’s efforts to use history for legitimising purposes were largely unsuccessful, and the former president’s popularity instead turned out to be a double-edged sword for the regime. For the PDI’s youthful supporters in the 1987 election campaign, Sukarno symbolised a more participatory, egalitarian and socialist nationalism in contrast to the politically exclusive, elitist and socially conservative New Order. The implication of opposition was evident already in the 1987 election, but it was then generally diffuse and not manifest in any articulate political alternative. In the 1992 election campaign, by contrast, the opposition was more evident, following a broadening of the political agenda and increasing social discontent among the population at large since the previous election. As a consequence, Sukarno’s image emerged as a more manifest symbol of opposition to the New Order and, more specifically, to President Suharto. The force of Sukarno’s image as a symbol of opposition, moreover, was enhanced by the PDI’s more controversial stance in the election – which included fierce attacks on the political system and economic disparity by Sukarno’s youngest son, Guruh Sukarnoputra – and the government’s ban of the use of Sukarno’s image.

In comparison with her brother, Megawati stood out as less controversial and vocal in the 1992 election campaign, and she had, moreover, been little active in Parliament since she became a legislator in 1987. However, her election to the PDI chair at the end of 1993, evidently against the will of the president and the government, seemed to signal that the government’s control over the political system and society in general was beginning to slip and that the opposition, manifest in Sukarno’s symbolism, was gathering force. These notions were expressed in the emergence of the new term *arus bawah*, meaning ‘aspirations from below’, which seemed to signal a broadening of the political agenda and the rise of a more participatory political culture. Such hopes among Megawati’s supporters and other reform-oriented groups outside the party were related to a general sentiment that the paramount authority of President Suharto had begun to decline and that the septuagenarian president’s long rule was nearing its end.

Megawati, meanwhile, was careful not to exploit her relationship with her father too conspicuously, nor to advocate openly any of his leftist political teachings. Although Megawati on several occasions criticised the government and the political system, she did not transgress the limits of permissible political discussion and opinion in her statements. Taken together, however, her criticism, and the vigour with which Megawati propounded her views,
especially during her first six months as party leaders in the first half of 1994, seemed to signal that the PDI was moving to become more oppositional. Moreover, in contrast to the prevailing practice, Megawati largely refrained from praising the president for his achievements, thereby implying dissatisfaction with his rule. Through largely latent means, Megawati could thus express opposition without directly confronting the government.

The president and the government responded to the rising tide of the opposition and the rise of prominence of *arus bawah* through a crackdown on the dissent and through deploying the manipulative and coercive tactics characteristic of the regime. From mid-1994, the political climate was circumscribed, signalling the end of the period of *keterbukaan*. For the PDI, the less open political climate manifested itself in the government’s attempts to destabilise Megawati’s leadership through the sponsoring of rival factions in the party, both on the provincial and national levels, and the allegations that her supporters had been involved with the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party, PKI. Implicitly, the accusations were also aimed at Megawati herself, through allegations that Sukarno had been sympathetic to the PKI in the 1960s and through accusing her husband, Taufik Kiemas, of having past communist links.

Throughout these campaigns, however, Megawati maintained a calm and steadfast, principled stance which challenged the hegemonic political culture, not so much through direct statements and actions, but more through Megawati’s refusal to bow to pressure from the government and military authorities. Megawati’s challenging attitude was particularly evident in her steadfast refusal to negotiate over the East Java leadership conflict, even after President Suharto in early 1996 had called on all sides to deliberate in order to solve the conflict. Megawati’s demonstrated firmness of principle further strengthened the impression that she and the PDI were in opposition to the government. However, partly because of her calm and respectful attitude in the face of the harassment from the government, and partly because her sex implied softer, female-gendered qualities, Megawati came to represent opposition without appearing opinionated or confrontational. In the course of her struggle against the regime, Megawati instead acquired a reputation for calm, patience, justice and decency. These were thus qualities which she acquired in her struggle against the New Order, and she could no longer be explained away as merely a symbol of her father’s popularity.

The heavy-handed tactics deployed by the government in dealing with Megawati highlighted the contrast between the ethical qualities Megawati represented and those of the male-dominated, military-bureaucratic and authori-
tarian regime, especially after Megawati was deposed by the government-sponsored PDI congress in Medan in June 1996. In the wake of the congress, Megawati and her supporters continued to assert her legitimacy as party leader and openly accused the government of manipulating and meddling in the party’s affairs. This high-profile and confrontational strategy exposed the Machiavellian methods deployed by the government and the military in their efforts to preclude the possibility of political change – even moderate – emerging from within the system. Megawati gained widespread public sympathy for her struggle against the authorities, which in the public mind, more than anything else, was framed in terms of ethics.

The unprecedented public exposure of the unethical character of the New Order’s political culture and the apparent disregard for popular political aspirations on the part of those in power significantly contributed to the declining legitimacy of the regime during its last years in power. The government’s heavy-handed treatment of Megawati seemed to engage large parts of the population, including many who previously may have taken only a limited interest in politics. Many people consciously saw her struggle against the New Order as a parallel to Sukarno’s struggle against the Dutch colonial regime, illustrating that the regime was widely seen as morally corrupt and lacking in popular support. The popular resentment that the Megawati affair gave rise to was a major factor which undermined the legitimacy of the government, as well as President Suharto personally, during their last years in power, thus contributing in important – but largely indirect – ways to the chain of events that resulted in Suharto’s resignation in May 1998.

THE LEGACIES OF THE NEW ORDER’S POLITICAL CULTURE

During the last years of President Suharto’s rule, the political culture nurtured during more than three decades of New Order rule in Indonesia was creaking in the joints. The government’s attempts to frame its political system and political culture in traditionalising and nationalistic terms seemed increasingly unconvincing because of the moral corruption of the those in power, paired with its blatant disregard for notions of popular sovereignty and accountability. In spite of the government’s claims to the contrary, the New Order’s so-called Pancasila democracy did not primarily reflect traditional Javanese ideas of power. The New Order sprung from an elitist conviction about the necessity to limit popular political participation, and the hegemonic political culture left little room for broader political participation. Exclusionism, elitism, moral
corruption, coercion and lack of negotiation and substantial discussion – these five descriptions briefly sum up the late New Order's political culture.

That political culture did not go away with the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, nor with the end of his successor B. J. Habibie's term in office in November 1999. Much of the disillusion among the more progressive reformists with Indonesia's shaky democracy at the time of writing seems to be related to continuing influence that the New Order's political culture appears to exercise. Although the ethical dimension has become much more prominent in Indonesian politics – mainly as a reaction to the moral corruption of the previous regime – the notion of popular accountability seems to find little resonance among the political elites. Those elites still appear to be less oriented towards their popular constituencies than towards the centres of political and economic power. Many of the icons of the New Order, such as anti-communism, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, also continue to be evoked, often in ways that obstruct discussion about several of the most important and fundamental questions facing the nation. Substantial debates and discussions about concrete policy issues are still rare and politicians – not least President Megawati – continue to claim to represent the whole people instead of acknowledging the legitimacy of differing opinions and aspirations in a democratic polity.

To the dismay of the many more progressively reform-oriented Indonesians, the PDI-P – together with the second largest party in the 1999 general election, Golkar – seems today to be perpetuating the political culture of the New Order rather than leading the reform process towards greater freedom and democracy. Discouraging as it may seem for the development of Indonesian democracy, this continuity is unsurprising from the perspective of the party's ideological proximity to the New Order and its recent history of working within and appropriating the New Order's hegemonic political culture. Politically, much has improved in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, but if the country is to succeed in building a more democratic political culture for the future, the remaining legacies of the previous regime and its authoritarian political culture will have to be discarded in favour of a true commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty.
Books and Articles


Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia


—— (1996b) 'Revolution or Peaceful Evolution in Indonesia?', NIASnytt, no. 3, pp. 9–10.


Bibliography


Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia


—— (1979) 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 4.


313
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia


—— (1999b) Colonialism in the 1990s: The Use of History in Dutch-Indonesia Relations, Research Monographs, Bangkok: Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

—— (1999c) ’Megamania!’, Inside Indonesia, no. 57, pp. 18–19.


Bibliography


Godelier, Maurice (1978) 'Infrastructures, Societies, and History', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 763–768.


Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia


—— (1991) *PPP dan Politik Orde Baru* [The PPP and the politics of the New Order], Jakarta: Gramedia.


Bibliography


Karlsson, Klas-Göran (1997) 'Tio år som skakat världen eller tio århundraden av förtryck' [Ten years which shook the world or ten centuries of oppression], in Lars M. Andersson and Ulf Zander (eds), In med historien! Fem historiker om korta och långa perspektiv i samtidshistorien, Lagerbringbiblioteket, Lund: Historiska institutionen vid Lunds universitet and Historiska media, pp. 42–60.

Keppres 15/1984, GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) dan Ketetapan MPR 1988 (1988) [Presidential decree 15/1984, GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy) and the decisions of the MPR 1988], Jakarta: Akademika Pressindo.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia


—— (1999) PDI Perjuangan dan Megawati Soekarnoputri [The PDI - in struggle and Megawati Soekarnoputri], Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan PDI PERJUANGAN.


—— (1994) 'On the Fall of the Parliamentary System', in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, Melbourne: Monash University.
Bibliography

Asia, no. 31, Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, pp. 39–42.


Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

Cross-Cultural Understanding, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 28, Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, pp. 211–238.


Bibliography


Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia


Bibliography


Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia


Bibliography


Soekarno (1963) *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, vol. 1 [Under the banner of the revolution, vol. 1], Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit 'Dibawah Bendera Revolusi'.

Soekarnoputri, Megawati (1993) *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan! Pokok-pokok Pikiran Megawati Soekarnoputri* [I have already unfurled the flag! Main lines of thought of Megawati Soekarnoputri], Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.


Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia


Bibliography


van Klinken, Gerry (1994) 'Sukarno’s Daughter Takes over Indonesia’s Democrats', Inside Indonesia, no. 38, pp. 2–4.


Bibliography


Weatherbee, Donald E. (1966) Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution, Monograph Series, no. 8, New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.


Zulkifli, Arief (1996) PDI di Mata Golongan Menengah Indonesia [PDI in the eyes of the Indonesian middle class], Jakarta: Grafiti.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

The Age (Melbourne, daily)
Angkatan Bersenjata (Jakarta, daily)
Asiaweek (Hong Kong, weekly)
The Australian (Sydney, daily)
Australian Financial Review (Canberra, daily)
Berita Buana (Jakarta, daily)
Bisnis Indonesia (Jakarta, daily)
Detektif & Romantika (Jakarta, weekly)
DeTIK (Jakarta, weekly)
Editor (Jakarta, weekly)
EIU Country Report Indonesia (London, quarterly)
Eksekutif (Jakarta, monthly)
Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong, weekly)
Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook (Hong Kong, yearly)
Forbes (New York, bi-weekly)
Forum Keadilan (Jakarta, bi-weekly)
Gatra (Jakarta, weekly)
Harian Rakjat (Jakarta, daily)
Inti Jaya (Jakarta, weekly)
The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, daily)
Jawa Pos (Surabaya, daily)
Jayakarta (Jakarta, daily)
Kedaulatan Rakyat (Yogyakarta, daily)
Kompas (Jakarta, daily)
Media Indonesia (Jakarta, daily)
Merdeka (Jakarta, daily)
The Nation (Bangkok, daily)
Pelita (Jakarta, daily)
Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung, daily)
Prioritas (Jakarta, daily)
Republika (Jakarta, daily)
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, daily)
Suara Independen (Jakarta, monthly)
Suara Karya (Jakarta, daily)
Suara Merdeka (Semarang, daily)
Suara Pembaruan (Jakarta, daily)
Bibliography

Sunday Age (Melbourne, weekly)
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, daily)
Tempo (Jakarta, weekly)
Tiara (Jakarta, bi-weekly)
Time (Asian edition) (Hong Kong, weekly)
Tiras (Jakarta, weekly)
Waspada (Medan, daily)
Weekend Australian (Sydney, weekly)

ONLINE MEDIA AND NEWS SERVICES

PPP on-line <http://www.ppp.or.id/pemilu> (version current at 29 June 1997).
Tempo Interaktif <http://www.tempo.co.id> (version current at 8 May 2002).
Index

New Order interpretation of, 57, 71, 95, 189, 292, 298–300
1949 Constitution, 33
1950 Provisional Constitution, 33
27 July 1996 incident, 264–269, 278
30 September 1965 coup attempt, 44, 124, 146, 149, 232, 233, 242
4 sikap politik. See four political stances (of the PDI).

abangan, 34, 87, 93
Abdullah, Abdulguni, 208
Abdullah, Nazaruddin, 204
Abdullah, Taufik, 95
ABRI. See military.
ABS, 195–196
Abu Bakar, 265
Aceh, 122, 204, 240
Achmad, Fatimah, 197, 215, 249, 250, 251, 254, 256, 259, 260, 282
Achmad, Suparman, 249
Adam, Marwan, 246
Agum Gumelar, 214, 215, 230
Agung Laksono, 158
Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, 71, 91, 93, 174
aliran, 33–35, 39, 47, 53, 56, 57
Amaruddin, Achmad, 184
America, 124. See also United States.
Amir Machmud, 55, 71, 94
Anderson, Benedict, 4–5, 6, 12, 57
APEC, 236
Aquino, Benigno, 94
Aquino, Corazon, 224, 269
Aribowo, 237
army, 36, 38, 4, 45, 48, 56. See also military.
arus bawah, 226, 229, 238, 305–306
Asal Bapak Senang, 195–196
ASEAN, 284
Asiaweek, 15,
Asmasoebrata, Alex, 127, 161, 163, 196, 197, 199, 234
Asmasoebrata, Ferry, 199
Asmasoebrata, Ipik, 82, 117
Aung San Suu Kyi, 224
Australia, 15
Badjieber, Zein, 185
Bahar, Ahmad, 25, 149
BAIS, 214, 229
Bakin, 66, 67, 68, 131, 214
Bakorstanas, 145, 147, 234
Bakorstanasda, 233
bakso, 155
baléo, 97–98
Bali, 45, 149, 150, 160, 161, 228, 262, 280
Balithang. See Lithang.
Bandar Lampung, 91, 93
Bandung, 93, 233
Bangka Island, 206
Banjarmasin, 151
bunteng, 118
Banyumas, 90
Barth, Fredrik, 7
Batubara, A. P., 68
beamtenstaat, 12
becak, 150
Benda, Harry, 4, 39
bersih diri, 112, 145
Bertrand, Jacques, 107
Bhutto, Benazir, 224
Blitar, 86, 206, 224, 236
Index

Bogor, 86, 93, 180, 193, 234
Bojonegoro, 85
BPKP, 130
Briwijaya Division, 236
Broad Outlines of State Policy. See GBHN.
Brooks, Karen, 150
Brown, Colin, 35, 45
Buang, Muhammad, 184
Buleleng, 150
Bung, 206
bureaucracy, 50–51, 54, 79, 106, 121, 143, 144, 153, 157, 160, 162, 227–228, 249. See also monoloyalty.
Burke, Peter, 14
Burma, 224, 225
caretaker board, 200, 201–203, 208–215 passim
Catholic Party, 52, 54, 55, 63, 78, 105, 205
Central Java, 33, 44, 45, 53, 71, 88, 90, 161, 178, 204, 252, 278
Central Kalimantan, 194, 240
China, 124
Chinese, 52, 58, 82, 284
Christians, 45, 57, 59, 58, 66, 215, 284. See also Catholic Party; Parkindo.
Ciawi, 234
Cikini railway station, 265, 266
Cisarua, 122
class, 6, 9, 12, 28, 30, 93, 119, 125. See also middle-class.
Clinton, Bill, 207
colonialism, 25, 63, 270, 294, 307
communism, 125, 308
and the New Order, 44–47, 112, 123, 145, 146, 147, 148, 293, 298. See also massacres, of communists; PKI.
conglomerates, 109, 120–121, 150
Constituent Assembly, 37
constitution, 37. See also 1945 Constitution; 1949 Constitution; 1950 Provisional Constitution.
cooperatives, 120–121
Cornell University, 4
corporatism, 12, 36, 38, 54–59, 215, 291, 301, 302
corruption, 12, 18, 35, 82, 83, 87 108–110, 121, 130, 143, 144, 151, 157, 163, 164, 172, 235, 249, 264, 280, 283, 286–287, 295, 298, 299, 301, 302. See also nepotism; rent-seeking; Suharto, family business interests of.
Cribb, Robert, 35, 45, 145
Crouch, Harold, 11, 48, 51, 129, 200
CSIS, 14, 105
dangdut, 155
Darusman, Marzuki, 121
Daryanto, Nico, 78, 82, 90, 105, 110, 115, 119, 122, 123, 128, 141, 149, 154, 175, 176, 179, 180, 182, 186, 194, 197, 251, 260, 303
Democratic Youth, 267
Deperpu, 126, 259
DeTik, 14
Dewantoro, Ki Hadjar, 28–29, 56
Dibyo Widodo, 261
Dili massacre, 129, 274
Diponegoro Division, 94
Djadjono, Marcellianus, 24
Djadjang Karniadi, 232
Djaka, I. G. N. Gde, 72–73
Djajarwi Hadikusumo, 49
Djojohadikusumo, Soemitro, 130
DPA, 171, 195, 206
DPR, 31. See also DPR-GR; Parliament.
DPRD. See regional parliaments.
DPR-GR, 37
dual function, 36, 112, 141
and the PDI, 66, 69, 74, 81, 105, 182–183, 204, 236, 249, 259. See also military, and the PDI; military, role in politics.
Dutch East Indies, 25, 26. See also colonialism.

East Java, 45, 53, 122, 125, 151, 161, 224, 236, 252–253, 262, 282
East Kalimantan, 161
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

East Nusa Tenggara, 66
East Timor, 129, 131, 161, 194, 204, 274, 276, 281
economic crisis, 283–284, 287
economic development, 51, 54, 81, 91, 219, 291, 303
economic disparity, 18, 87, 150, 151, 153, 184, 192, 204–205, 287, 295, 302, 305
economic policy, 120–121, 130, 133, 144, 153, 173. See also state budget; taxes.
Editor, 14, 175
education policy, 83, 155
Effendi, Zul, 276
elections, 31, 79–81, 84, 110, 148, 172, 174, 185, 291, 294, 300
1955 election, 33–35, 39, 56
1971 election, 48, 50–54, 55, 64, 79, 101, 129
1977 election, 65–66, 79, 103, 294
1982 election, 71, 78, 79 88 105, 294, 304
1997 election, 229, 237, 238, 245, 250–251, 252, 278–283, 287, 289, 300
1999 election, 19
Emmerson, Donald, 12
Emyus, Seno Bella, 267
England, 124
family principle, 24, 28–32, 39, 41, 47, 56, 81, 119, 131, 132, 150, 153, 227, 280, 297, 300
Far Eastern Economic Review, 15, 107
Fatmawati, 206
Feith, Herb, 4, 39
floating mass, 54, 69, 79, 153, 160, 235, 300
Forbes, 287
foreign aid, 58
foreign policy, 154, 236
formatur system, 208, 210, 213, 214–215, 231, 239
four political stances (of the PDI), 69, 70, 105, 182, 236, 247, 259
Friedman, Jonathan, 6–7
functional groups, 36–38, 48, 50, 56, 59, 108. See also Golkar.
Gadjah Mada University, 157
Gaffar, Afan, 227
Gambir incident, 262–263
Gandhi, Indira, 224
Garuda Pancasila, 124
GBHN, 83–84, 109, 111, 138, 162, 171–172, 184, 185, 187, 227
GBMI, 267
Geertz, Clifford, 33, 46
gender, 6. See also women.
General Elections Institute. See LPU.
Gianyar, 280
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, 187
GMNI, 70, 78
Godelier, Maurice, 8
faction in Parliament, 121, 131–132
faction in the MPR, 108, 109, 115, 172–175, 184–187
Goodfellow, Rob, 46, 233
gotong–royong, 73, 85, 97, 131, 132
Gramsci, Antonio, 9
Guided Democracy, 36–39, 44, 45, 47, 53, 56, 87, 119. See also Old Order; Sukarno.
Habibie, B. J., 143–144, 182, 212, 287, 308
Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo, 48–49, 53
Hadiwasito, H. Soetjipto, 142
Halawa, Ohiao, 25
Hamengkubuwono IX, 206
Hamid, Syarwan, 199, 256, 260, 269
Hardi, 48
Hardjanto Sumodisastro, 67–73 passim
Hardjono, Budi, 129, 147, 187, 194, 202, 204, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 246–247, 248, 260
Haris, Sjamsuddin, 280
Index

Hariyoto, 214, 230
Harmoko, 156, 212, 214, 224, 228, 229, 250, 259
Harsono, Kentot, 163
Harsudiono Hartas, 189, 153, 172, 180
Hartono, R., 232, 234–235, 243
Harun, Hasril, 224
Haryanto, Dimmy, 198, 260
Hasan, Usman, 174
Hatta, Mohammad, 65, 89, 92, 95
Hendropriyono, 213, 215, 230, 241
Hill, David, 15
Hobsbawn, Eric, 293
hoodlums, 68, 199, 267–268. See also preman.
human rights, 152, 204, 274
Hutapea, Buttu, 256, 265, 266, 282
ICMI, 143–144
Imawan, Riswandha, 15, 23
IMF, 283
India, 224
Internet, 14, 262
Inti Jaya, 270
IPKI, 52, 54, 55, 63, 65
Irian Jaya, 93. See also West Irian.
Islam, 30, 65, 80, 96, 98, 139, 143, 146. See also Muslims; NU; PPP.
Ismail, Chairuddin, 198
Ismunandar, 195, 202, 215
Ismeni, Mohammad, 64–73 passim, 126
Jackson, Karl, 11
Jackson, Michael, 150
Jakarta, 90, 92, 93, 124, 125, 150, 154, 156, 157, 160, 161, 163, 194, 252, 280, 281
Jakarta Post, 14, 151, 174, 183, 196, 198, 225, 233, 241, 264
Japanese occupation, 31–32, 34
Jaringan, 58
Java, 35, 89–90, 160, 227, 257, 280–282. See also Central Java; East Java; Jakarta; West Java; Yogyakarta.
Kahin, George, 27
Karim, Rusli, 23
Kediri, 91
Kekeluargaan. See family principle.
Kelompok 17. See Group of 17.
keterbukaan, 107, 129, 147, 153, 156, 158, 230, 301, 306
Khomeini, 139, 150
kidnapping case, 180, 194, 196, 297
Kiemas, Taufik, 88, 141, 233, 242, 249, 250, 258, 306
King, Dwight, 11, 58
KIPP, 290
komisaris desa, 160
Konmas HAM, 258, 265, 274
Kompas, 88, 14, 151, 154, 207, 210
Kopassus, 230, 276
Kopkamtib, 67, 101, 112–113, 123, 145
Kopo (Bogor), 180, 214
Kosgoro, 157
Kostrad, 44
Labrousse, Pierre, 86, 148
Laksamana Sukardi, 181, 215, 257
Lampung, 93
land disputes, 152, 153, 228, 229
Lane, Max, 109, 112
Lawson, Stephanie, 8
Lay, Cornelis, 24, 105
Lee Kuan Yew, 149
Lev, Daniel, 37
Liddel, William, 4, 12, 39, 56–57, 95, 97, 183
Litaay, Alexander, 215, 234, 257
Litbang, 118–119, 121, 131, 133, 149, 154, 160, 181, 215, 255, 298, 302
Litsus, 145–147. See also screening.
LPU, 88, 92, 127, 145–148 passim, 161
Lustrilanang, Pius, 286
MacIntyre, Andrew, 57, 58
Mackie, Jamie, 57
Madiun, 35
Madjied, Abdul, 69
Madura, 253
Mailoa, Josef Mathius, 165, 228

335
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

Malik, Adam, 239
Manado, 92
Mangil, 165
Marbun, B. N., 117, 186
Marcos, Ferdinand, 94, 269
Marhaenism, 28, 35, 37, 45, 47, 49
MARI, 263–264, 269
Marsoesi, 67, 68, 123–124, 125, 195, 213, 214, 215
Mar’uf, Mochammad, 235
Marxism, 28, 30, 80, 94
massacre, of communists, 44–45, 46, 246
Masyumi, 33–35, 37, 45, 47, 49
Material-Spiritual Group, 55
May, Brian, 49, 55–56, 57
Mbatemooy, Gerry, 215, 231, 234
McIntyre, Angus, 25, 89
McVey, Ruth, 12, 38,
Medan, 93, 230, 235
1993 PDI congress, 195, 197–201, 216, 225, 226, 256, 268
1996 PDI congress, 256, 258–262, 263, 278, 282, 307
Media Indonesia, 201
Mega–Bintang, 280–281
Merauke, 205
Metareum, Ismail Hasan, 131, 183, 286
middle-class, 45, 303
mitul dhuwur mendhem jero, 95, 149, 224, 232
military, 17, 86, 197, 286
faction in Parliament, 131, 249
role in elections, 53, 54, 79, 93, 105, 141, 146
role in politics, 12, 33, 37, 47, 48, 112–113, 145. See also army; dual function;
police; Sukarnoputri, Megawati, and the military.
Minahasa, 204
Mintareddja, M. S., 50
Moerdani, Benny, 77, 105–107, 112–113, 115, 123, 126, 134, 141, 142, 145, 175, 181, 184, 211, 214, 229, 235, 242, 267, 299, 302
Moerdiono, 94, 121, 226, 284
Moertopo, Ali, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 66, 68, 86, 105, 113, 211, 267
Moluccas, 93
monoloyalty doctrine, 50, 52, 60, 79, 227, 228
Morfit, Michael, 80, 114
MPP, 123, 259
MPP, 31, 48, 83, 94, 132, 157, 158–159, 163, 298, 300
1978 session, 66
1988 session, 107, 108–116, 119, 122, 144, 145, 158, 162, 185
1998 session, 235, 238, 247, 283–287, 289
1999 session, 169
PDI faction in, 123–124, 235
MPRS, 46, 47, 191
Muhammadiyah, 284
Munas, 213–215, 247, 256
Murba, 52, 54, 55, 63, 65, 239
Muslims, 11, 17, 229, 245, 284
and the New Order, 45, 56–57, 59, 86, 87, 143–144. See also Islam; NU; PPP.
musyawarah, 30, 32, 36, 41, 73, 85, 97, 110, 113–116, 123, 131, 132, 136, 163, 187, 227, 258, 293–294, 296–297, 300, 301
Naro, Djaelani, 50, 113, 115, 116
Nasakom, 51, 61, 94
Nasution, Abdul Haris, 36–37, 53, 56
Nasution, Muhidin, 65
Nasution, Yahya, 175
National Council, 36
nationalism, 26, 27, 32, 52, 64, 80, 96, 223, 226, 292, 304–305
natural law, 296
nepotism, 143, 153, 163, 287, 298, 299, 301, 302. See also Suharto, family business interests.

Netherlands, 26, 27, 32

New Order, 1, 3, 11, 19, 39, 45, 56, 69, 81, 91, 92, 96, 120, 291–292, 294. See also political culture, of the New Order.

NGOs, 11, 23, 258, 263–264, 269

Nilsson, Göran B., 17

North Sulawesi, 204

North Sumatra, 93, 161, 230, 282

NU, 33–35, 38, 45, 47, 50, 53, 55, 102, 225, 243, 257, 284

Nuwa Wea, Jacob, 197, 199, 207

Oetojo Oesman, 186

Oetomo, Imam, 236

Old Order, 1, 63, 91, 94. See also Guided Democracy.

openness. See keterbukaan.

Opsus, 49, 50

orientalism, 13

Osa Maliki, 48

Österberg, Eva, 7

Pakistan, 224

Pakpahan, Muchtar, 263, 269


Pandaan, 67

Panggabean, M., 85

Panwaskat, 162, 290

Parkindo, 52, 54, 55, 63


Parmusi, 49–50, 53, 55, 225

Partai Murba. See Murba.

PARTINDO, 38

Patani, 240

PDI–P, 3, 19, 308

pembangunan. See economic development.

people power, 94, 257

Pepabri, 142, 144

Perti, 55

pesantren, 53

Petition of 50, 235

Petrus killings, 276

Philippines, 94, 157, 224, 240, 257, 269

Philpott, Simon, 13


PNI, 27, 28, 30, 33–35, 38, 45, 47, 48, 51–55

passim, 63, 64, 65, 70, 71, 73, 87, 88, 94, 105, 122, 128, 242

police, 68, 131, 147, 194, 196, 197–198, 218, 233, 262–263, 264–266, 268, 278

political culture, 2, 4, 133, 203, 205, 216, 227, 238

of the New Order, 173, 179, 181, 188–189, 291–308

Ponogoro, 278

PPP, 23, 24, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 80, 83, 87, 96, 106, 146, 148, 156, 160, 175, 185, 286, 291, 300, 304


faction in Parliament, 131–132, 228


Prabowo Subianto, 267

PRD, 263, 269

premahan, 266–268. See also hoodlums.

presidential election, 157–159, 171, 172–183, 229, 238, 245–248, 271. See also presidential succession; Suharto, election as president.

presidential succession, 18, 111, 143, 245–246. See also Suharto, election as president.

press, 151, 155, 186, 201, 233, 250. See also media.

Princen, Johannes Cornelis, 263

prison, 162, 268–269
Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia

priyayi, 34
Probosutedjo, 73
PSI, 34, 35, 37, 45, 47, 58
PSII, 55
Purwokerto, 90
Quarles van Ufford, Philip, 5
radio, 155
Raid, Zakaria, 69, 70
Rais, Amien, 284, 285, 287
rakyat, 151, 205, 219, 295. See also wong cilik.
Ranger, Terence, 293
Reeve, David, 24, 32, 51, 58
Reformasi, 3
regional parliaments, 145, 146, 154, 185, 240, 279
regional rebellions, 36, 37, 49
regional representatives, faction in the MPR, 108, 173, 184
Reid, Anthony, 224
rent-seeking, 12, 144. See also corruption; nepotism.
Republika, 182
Revolution (of 1945–49), 148, 159
riots, 262–267, 287
Robison, Richard, 12
Rocamora, Eliseo, 35
Roem, Mohammed, 49, 225
Rudini, 121, 123, 125, 127, 142, 147, 153, 155–157, 169, 175, 178, 180, 181, 184, 212
Russia, 124
Rustam, Supardjo, 72, 74, 78, 92, 96, 115, 126
Rustandi, Achmad, 175
Ryter, Loren, 268
Sabang, 205
Sadikin, Ali, 220
Saleh, Ibrahim, 116, 185
Salomon, Kim, 8
Samarinda, 92
Santoso, Amir, 198
santri, 34
Sanusi Hardjadinata, 64–70 passim, Saptamarga, 142, 242
Sara, I Gusti Ngurah, 275
Sarumpaet, Ratna, 285
Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, 156
Sawito Kartowibowo, 65
Schmitter, Philippe, 59
Schreiner, Klaus, 96
Schwarz, Adam, 181, 183
Scott, James, 9–10, 173, 300
screening, 148, 214, 233–234. See also Litsus.
SDSB, 229, 240
Seda, Frans, 205
Sekber Golkar. See Golkar.
Semarang, 48–49
Sembiring Meliala, 174, 212
Seskoad, 241
shadow cabinet, 85, 97, 117, 133, 152–153, 298
SI, 26
SIAGA, 285–286
Sidel, John, 58
Sihaloho, Aberson Marle, 130, 146–147, 184, 187, 194, 198, 210, 245, 246, 248–251, 259, 269
Sin, Jaime, 269
Singadilaga, Dudy, 122, 125
Singapore, 149
Sirait, Sabam, 67, 74, 168, 173, 185–187, 249, 250
Siti Hardijanti Rukmana. See Tutut.
Sjamsuddin, Nazaruddin, 182
Soebagyo, 258
Soehandy, 197
Soedjatmiko, Budiman, 263, 269
Soedjatmoko, 34
Soegiarso Soerojo, 124, 149
Soegimin, Hari, 74, 117, 147, 163
Soekarno–Hatta International Airport, 89
Soelaksono, 185
Soemitro, 107
Soenawar Soekowati, 64–72 passim, 79, 122
Index


Soesilo Soedarman, 207, 256, 278

Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, 178, 195, 202, 215, 257, 266

Soetojo N. K., 256, 274

Soewardi Soerianingrat. See Dewantoro, Ki Hadjar.

Solo, 86, 204, 262

Sophiaan, Manai, 242

Sophiaan, Sophan, 151, 175, 179, 180, 182, 242, 249, 250, 280

South Kalimantan, 181

South Sulawesi, 204

South Sumatra, 122, 161

Spiritual-Material Group, 55

SPSI, 121

state budget, 130, 155, 249–250, 259, 284

State Secretariat, 232

students, 45, 84, 86, 155, 177, 178, 180, 182, 229, 230, 284–289 passim.

Suara Independen, 14

Suara Pembaruan, 144

Subagyo, Achmad, 73, 74, 127, 195, 197, 199, 200, 202, 210, 215, 260

Subchan, 53

Sudarman, 70

Sudharmono, 85, 97, 106, 111–113, 115–116, 123, 124, 143, 156, 183, 226, 243

Sudibyo, 214

Sudirman, Basofi, 230–231, 236, 248, 252

Sudomo, 67, 68, 70, 129, 153, 162–163, 178, 206

Sudradjat, Edi, 197, 200, 235


election as president, 66, 74, 111, 175–183, 245, 251, 253, 285–287, 304

fall of, 3, 13, 18, 288–289, 300, 307, 308

family business interests, 15, 87, 106, 109, 120, 154. See also presidential election; presidential succession.

and the PDI, 64, 69, 72, 78, 81, 92, 115, 157–159, 180, 193, 197, 209, 213, 248, 264, 306

and Sukarno, 86, 89, 95, 106, 149, 246, 251–252

Suhud, Kharis, 115

Sukamto, Adriana Elisabeth, 82

Sukardi, Laksamana, 118

Sukarnadidjaja, Achmad, 65, 66

Sukarno family, 105


and the New Order, 85–88, 89, 94–96, 149, 224, 236, 304

PDI use of, 71, 88–92, 98, 106, 144, 148–152, 159, 164, 237, 305

political thinking, 27–32, 53, 119, 292, 297, 305. See also Marhaenism; Suharto, and Sukarno; Sukarnoputri, Megawati, association with Sukarno.

Sukarno, Rachmawati, 53, 89, 90, 101, 167, 236, 237, 246

Sukarno, Ratna Sari Dewi, 237

Sukarno, Sukmawati, 88, 89, 90, 232, 237, 246, 263, 269

Sukarnoism, 223. See also Marhaenism; Sukarno, political thinking.

Sukarnoputra, Guntur, 53, 65, 68, 88, 101, 237


Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 3–4, 18–19, 24, 25, 88–92, 141, 144, 280–281, 283–289 passim, 304, 308


election to Parliament, 96, 149–151, 204, 295, 305

and the military, 134, 213–215, 216, 228, 236, 241, 257, 302


Sukirman, Eddy, 127

Sukowaluyo, 149, 186

Sukowati, Edwin, 207–208, 215, 234

Sumanto, Agung Iman, 127

Sumatra, 36. See also Aceh; Lampung; North Sumatra; South Sumatra; West Sumatra.
Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia

Sunday Age, 151
Surabaya, 92, 201–202, 231, 280, 282
1993 PDI extraordinary congress, 202, 206, 207–212, 213, 216, 258
Sutiyoso, 263
Sutjipto, 210, 231, 258, 262
Surakarta, 113, 115, 142, 144, 172, 175, 178, 181, 182–183, 187, 200, 229
Swaraj Maharddhika, 151, 167
Syailutf Sulun, 94
Syakur, Jusuf, 156
Sutrisno, Try, 113, 115, 142, 144, 172, 175, 178, 181, 182–183, 187, 200, 229
Tanah Abang, 156
Tanah Lot, 228
Tandjung, Feisal, 196, 197, 198, 232, 233, 255, 256, 258, 259, 261, 264
Tanter, Richard, 46
Tarto Sudiro, 195, 198
Taslam, Haryanto, 286
taxes, 83, 121, 249
television, 151, 155, 156, 164, 279–280, 284.
See also media; TVRI.
Tempo, 14, 84, 94, 163, 177, 178, 179, 184, 193, 205, 215, 230
Tempo Interaktif, 14
Thailand, 283
Thompson, Paul, 16–17
thugs. See hoodlums; preman.
Tjan Silalahi, Harry, 171
Tobing, Jacob, 131
TPDI, 261
Trijakti, 173, 184, 187, 188
Trisakti University, 287
*tut wuri handayani*, 200, 295
Tutut, 213, 224, 243, 252
TVRI, 228, 241.
See also television.
ulama, 53. See also NU.
United Development Group, 55
United Nations, 49
United States, 157, 207. See also America
Unity and Integrity Group, 210–215 passim
University of Indonesia, 168, 177
Usep Ranawidjaja, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 105
Wahid, Abdurrahman, 225, 236, 237, 243, 253, 257, 269, 284
Wahono, 186, 212
wahyu, 251
Walandou, Mrs, 69, 70
Walters, Patrick, 273
Van Dijk, Cees, 146
van Klinken, Gerry, 11, 23, 212
Wanhankamnas, 189
Vatikiotics, Michael, 45, 57
Wauran, Markus, 178, 249, 250, 260
West Irian, 49. See also Irian Jaya.
West Java, 93, 141, 232–233
West Kalimantan, 122, 161, 281
West Sumatra, 30, 161, 293
Wibisono, Christianto, 82–83
Widanarko, Bambang, 141, 165
village commissioners, 160
Willis, Paul, 9
Wirahadikusumah, Umar, 115
Wirayawan, Hari, 154
Witoelar, Rachmat, 131
Wolfowit, Paul, 117, 134
women, 224–225. See also gender.
*wong cilik*, 119, 125, 189, 205. See also rakyat.
Wonogiri, 278–279
Yoga Sugama, 68
Yogyakarta, 90, 93, 157, 161, 178
YPDI, 117, 133
Zulkifli, Arif, 24