Popular hostility and official ambivalence in Indonesia to the United States-led ‘War on Terror’ seem easily understandable in the world’s largest Muslim country. But this kind of analysis misses the complexity of Indonesia and the host of internal differences behind this opposition. Military and bureaucratic elites since independence have worked to create a more secular nationalist Indonesian identity out of a multi-ethnic/religious mix, often provoking religious opposition. This dynamic (found also in Turkey, for instance) has especially shaped Indonesia’s encounter with and view of the outside world – and not least its reaction to events affecting the Muslim world.

In this short study, the author explores Islam as a domestic political variable in Indonesia’s foreign policy since independence. Here, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita argues that increasingly Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world has become based on domestic political struggles. In support of his argument, the author mainly draws on material from the period when President Soeharto’s New Order regime ruled Indonesia but brings in more recent material from the post-Soeharto era to demonstrate how Indonesian foreign policy is still shaped by the same forces today.

Containing a wealth of information on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how the world’s largest Muslim country is reacting to the international challenges of the modern world.

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INDONESIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD
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INDONESIA
AND THE
MUSLIM WORLD
Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond
ANAK AGUNG BANYU PERWITA
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‘Why bother to write a study on Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy’, asked a friend of mine, ‘when there is nothing much to write?’ My response to that precarious question is that, although at first glance there would seem to be nothing to much to write, the ‘revival’ of Islam in Indonesia’s domestic politics as well as in world politics in the late 1980s has marked the repositioning of religious factors in international relations. Moreover, the topic did not invite wider attention by foreign policy scholars, especially Indonesians. In addition, this topic has also become one of the ‘political mysteries’ of the Soeharto era.

My effort to uncover this ‘mystery’ began in the middle of 1998 or just a month after the resignation of President Soeharto, which was then followed by the mushrooming of Islamic political parties in Indonesia. This phenomenon was believed to be one of the crucial indicators of dramatic changes in Indonesia’s domestic political map and of the re-emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian politics.

This changing domestic political architecture, then, became a prime motive for me to write this study, which assumes that foreign policy begins at home. The other motive was the scarcity of studies of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Even though many studies have been conducted on Indonesia’s foreign policy, state–society (Muslim community) perspectives in Indonesia’s foreign policy remain scarce.

I am indebted to the people who contributed their assistance, sincere encouragement and warm support to the completion of my thesis, which forms the basis of this book. First of all, I was guided and advised by Professor Colin Brown and Dr Jim Schiller at Flinders University in Adelaide, Australia.
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I am also grateful to my colleagues at the Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, particularly Dr Bob S. Hadiwinata and Dr Aleksius Jemadu for their warm attention and support. I am also grateful to Dr Timo Kivimäki and particularly Gerald Jackson at NIAS for helping me to transform my doctoral thesis into a published book.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to express my deepest thanks and greatest appreciation to my wife, Kusumayanthi, and my sons, Dharma Sewaka Perwita and Satwika Perwita, for their endless love and patience and to whom I dedicate this book.

Bandung, December 2006
### Glossary, Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces), now TNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAIS</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen dan Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASMI</td>
<td>Barisan Sukarela Muslim Indonesia (Brigade of Indonesian Muslim Volunteers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMA</td>
<td>Bangsa Moro Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU PKI</td>
<td>Badan Penyelidikan Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDES</td>
<td>Center for Information and Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Consultative Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCEC</td>
<td>Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEFO</td>
<td>Conference of Emerging Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-8</td>
<td>Developing Eight (consists of 8 OIC members: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLU</td>
<td>Departmen Luar Negeri (Department of Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Darul Islam (House/Abode of Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mosques)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles (series of agreements between the PLO and Israel signed in Washington on 13 September 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKWAJ</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah (Forum of Communication of the Devout Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUI</td>
<td>Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic Brotherhood Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Golongan Karya (the Functional Group), ruling party during the New Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisbullah</td>
<td>Defenders of Allah (God), name of the Islamic militia during the Indonesian revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFM</td>
<td>Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICKI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICM</td>
<td>Islamic Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFTA</td>
<td>Intra-Islamic Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGGI</td>
<td>International Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IINA</td>
<td>International Islamic News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPNU</td>
<td>Ikatan Putra Nadhlatul Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPTA</td>
<td>Intra-Islamic Preferential Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Intra-Islamic Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISBO</td>
<td>Islamic States Broadcasting Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMI</td>
<td>Jama’ah al-Ihkwan al-Muslimin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADIN</td>
<td>Kamar Dagang dan Industri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISDI</td>
<td>Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPI</td>
<td>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIM</td>
<td>Muslim Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, short for Majelis Mujahidin untuk Penegakan Syariah Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indonesia and the Muslim World

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama)
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NEFOS New Emerging Forces (Communist forces and the new states of Asia and Africa)
NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State)
NU Nadhalatul Ulama (Revival Ulama), traditional Muslim organization founded in 1926.
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
Old Order Sukarno era, 1959–1966
OLDEFOS Old Emerging Forces (Western or imperialist forces)
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
P4SB Pemuda Pendukung Pengiriman Pasukan dan Sukarelawan ke Bosnia (Youth in Support of the Sending of Troops and Volunteers to Bosnia)
Pancasila The five principles of Indonesian national ideology
PCPP Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila (Intellectuals’ Association for the Advancement of Pancasila)
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PMII Pergerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Students)
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PRC Peoples’ Republic of China
Glossary, Abbreviations and Acronyms

PRRI  Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

PWI  Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Journalists)

SDSB  Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah (National Sports Lottery)

SPCPD  Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development

TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)

UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force (in Former Yugoslavia)

Wanhankamnas  Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional (National Security and Defence Council)
### Chronology of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Declaration of Indonesian independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Moh. Hatta articulates the principle <em>Bebas-Aktif</em> (Free-Active) foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Netherlands finally acknowledges Indonesian independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Failed coup by Indonesia’s Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Soeharto takes power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Indonesia rejoins the UN after one-year absence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Establishment of ASEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>OIC established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Indonesian delegates attend OIC summit but do not seek full membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Communist victory in South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Indonesian occupation of East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Iranian revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Soviet invasion of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Outbreak of Iran–Iraq war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>End of Iran–Iraq war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Fall of Berlin Wall and end of Soviet power in Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology of Events

1990  Indonesia becomes full member of OIC
1990  Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; OIC split
1990  ICMI established, chaired by Habibie
1991  First Gulf War; Indonesia refuses to participate but does not support Iraq
1991  Break up of Soviet Union; independence for five Soviet Central Asian states
1991  Soeharto undertakes biggest foreign trip, attending NAM and OIC summits
1992  Jakarta summit of NAM (with Indonesia in chair)
1995  Srebrenica massacre in eastern Bosnia
1995  Assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
1995  End of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
1997  Asian economic crisis
1998  Fall of Soeharto; succeeded as president by Habibie
1999  Habibie allows UN-supervised referendum on independence for East Timor
1999  General Election; re-emergence of Islamist parties in Indonesia
1999  Gus Dur elected president
2000  Outbreak of second Intifada in Palestine
2001  Gus Dur impeached; succeeded as president by Megawati Sukarnoputri
2001  9/11 attacks on the US
2001  US invasion of Afghanistan
2002  Formal independence of East Timor from Indonesia
2002  First Bali bombings by terrorist groups
2003  US-led invasion of Iraq; Indonesia highly critical
Indonesia and the Muslim World

2004  General election; Golkar wins the election
2004  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins the first direct presidential election
2004  PLO leader Yasser Arafat passes away; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono makes a first visit to the Middle East
2005  First publication in Denmark of Prophet Muhammad cartoons
2006  World-wide condemnation of Prophet Muhammad cartoons, also in Indonesia
2006  D-8 summit in Bali; Indonesia to chair D-8 for next two years
Background

One of the crucial and challenging issues in foreign policy is the understanding of how foreign policy is developed and conducted and why a particular state takes a specific foreign policy decision and action. This is due to the complexity of the structure and the process of foreign policy-making. It involves not only the interplay of both internal/domestic and external/international stimuli but also the psychological environment – ‘existing circumstances as they are perceived by decision makers’ – and operational environment – ‘the conditions of world politics as they exist at any moment in time’. This complexity is also due to the difficulties in identifying the factors that determine foreign policy-making and affect foreign policy makers, particularly in third world countries.

Demographically, with Muslims approximately 88 percent of its population, Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. However, to borrow Hefner’s words, Indonesian politics are non-confessional, not being based on any one religion. Indonesia is also not a secular state. But nor, says Tarmizi ‘is it a theocratic one. Some countries lie between the two categories ... and Indonesia is one of them’. In Surbakti’s words, Indonesia can be categorized as a ‘religiously accommodating state’ in which the nation-state is regulated and managed according to national ideology. The cultural and religious diversity of Indonesia has given Islam a ‘unique’ position in Indonesia’s political system. As Madjid notes, Islam has consistently played the role of ‘rallying ideology’ in Indonesia’s political system or ‘an ideology of re-building society on moral and healthier lines’.

This book is not intended to be a general examination of the factors that determine Indonesia’s foreign policy but rather a look at the position
of societal factors – Islam and the Muslim community – in Indonesia’s foreign policy and the degree to which Islam influences Indonesia’s foreign policy.

The argument

The major hypothesis in this book is that ‘foreign policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents’. More specifically, it examines whether Indonesia, as a country with a substantial Muslim population, has taken Islam into consideration when formulating and implementing its foreign policy. By testing the above hypothesis, this book shows the relationship and linkage between society (Islam and the Muslim community) and the state in the foreign policy of Soeharto’s Indonesia toward the Muslim world. This study ends by exploring this state–society dynamic in the post-Soeharto era.

The extent to which the Islamic factor has played a crucial role in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been subject to debate. Suryadinata, for example, argues that ‘Islam has not been a major consideration in Soeharto’s foreign policy’. Other scholars disagree, Sihbudi for instance maintaining that ‘Indonesia’s relations with Middle East countries, and also Indonesia’s attitude toward certain issues in the region, cannot be separated from the influence of the “Islamic factor”’. Azyumardi Azra, a leading Islamic scholar, has also noted a similar view on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. He argues:

Even though Islam has formally not been a factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the Indonesian government seems to take careful consideration when issues relating to Islam and Muslims appear at front.

Azra also points out that:

It is correct that Jakarta seems to consistently play down the Islamic factor in its foreign policy. But on the other hand, there are some cases where Islam seems to have been taken into serious account by the Indonesian government.

Another analyst of Indonesia’s foreign policy argues that ‘Islam, however, is not without influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy, but that
Introduction

influence has been expressed much more in the form of constraint than in positive motivation.’17 Meanwhile, a former foreign minister acknowledged that ‘in certain issues, Islam has coloured the nuances of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.’18 If nothing else, the range of views clearly shows that the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy remains quite debatable.

The cases

This study focuses on Indonesia’s New Order foreign policy with special reference to Indonesia’s relations with the Muslim world but looks beyond this to the post-Soeharto era. Key issues here are Indonesia’s participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and such other Islamic-related issues on the world stage as the Moro problem, the Palestinian issue, the Gulf War, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. Specifically, this book explores the impact of religion (Islam), particularly the religious groups (the Muslim communities), on foreign policy issues. In terms of Surbakti’s analysis, this book investigates the nature and the characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world using the typology of ‘secularization of the polity’ and ‘religionization of polity’19 or the influence of religion (Islam) as articulated by the Muslim community on government (state) policies, particularly foreign policy.

This book is intended to help overcome the scarcity of studies on the role of society/the Muslim community in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This book is conducted at both the macro and micro level of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It is a macro study because it covers the broad aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Soeharto, i.e. political, military, economic and cultural aspects. It is also a micro study, focusing at the level of public participation, particularly from Indonesian Muslim community, in the formulation and implementation of Indonesian foreign policy toward the Muslim world as specific topic and theme.

The book does not aim to measure all determinant factors of Indonesia’s foreign policy (though it does consider and mention these when relevant). However, generally it explores only the position of Islam as a societal factor in influencing Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world under Soeharto and since then. In other words, it explores the nature of the relationship between Islam, as a societal factor, and the state in terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation.
Structure of the book

This book is divided into a further seven chapters. Chapter Two discusses the domestic context of Indonesian politics in which Islam played a significant role. It also discusses the development of the Muslim world as the international context of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Chapter Three commences the set of case studies examining Indonesian relationships with the Muslim world. This chapter analyses Indonesia’s participation in programmes of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It also covers the objective of Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC, the significance of the organization in Indonesia’s foreign policy and Indonesia’s contribution to the political, economic and socio-cultural aspects of the OIC. This chapter also discusses Indonesia’s involvement in the economic grouping of some Muslim countries of the D-8 (Developing Eight).

Chapter Four addresses the level of engagement of Indonesia in the regional conflicts in the Middle East. It explains Indonesia’s involvement in the Palestinian problem. This issue has not only been one of the crucial issues faced by the Muslim world but also it has become a focus of attention of Indonesia’s Muslim community for more than five decades. In this connection, domestic resistance to establishing diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel is also discussed. The last issue is the first Gulf War. Here, the interaction between state and society on this issue – which some elements of the Muslim community perceived as part of a religious war between Islam and non-Islamic forces – is examined in order to get a fuller picture of Indonesia’s responses to the first Gulf War (as well as to the second Gulf War and subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003) and generally, Indonesia’s attitude toward the Middle East.

Chapter Five discusses Indonesia’s involvement in facilitating the peaceful settlement of the Moro problem between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. This chapter analyses the internal dimensions and external factors of the Moro problem and its impact on Indonesia’s decision to get involved in helping to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

Chapter Six analyses Indonesia’s involvement in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This chapter explains two levels of engagement between Indonesia’s Islamic society and the state. At the society level, Indonesia
showed the utmost concern by providing financial support for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and developing the Jihad forces to help Bosnia-Herzegovina struggle against Serbia. At the state level, Indonesia proposed diplomatic efforts to end the war and actively participated in UNPROFOR, the UN’s peacekeeping forces there. This chapter, then, analyses the dynamic interaction between the society level and the state level of Indonesia’s engagement in an Islamic-related issue of world affairs.

Chapter Seven discusses the latest developments of the role played by Islam and the Muslim community in post-Soeharto Indonesia’s foreign policy. It focuses on the delicate dilemma of the Indonesia’s government in balancing the voices of Muslim communities in foreign policy-making and its domestic agenda. The campaign of ‘the war on terror’, the US attack to Iraq in 2003 and the publication of caricatures of the prophet Muhammad are elaborated to analyse the role of Islam in contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, discusses the nuances of Islam and its position in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the structures and patterns of foreign policy-making and the level of Indonesia’s involvement with the Muslim world. It also discusses the relation of the findings to the theoretical framework used in this study as well as to the post-9/11 international situation in which Indonesia finds itself today.

Notes

5. See Hefner (1999a), p. 206
6. According to John L. Esposito, there are three general orientations in the governments of Muslim countries: Secular, Islamic and Muslim. In secular, it separates Islam from the state and restricts religion to private life. Turkey is the appropriate example of it. In Islamic, the state proclaimed Islam as the character of the government and the law. It is used not only to legitimate domestic rule but also to strengthen state’s foreign policy, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the Muslim orientation, Islam is declared as state religion and the shariah is believed to be source of law. It requires that the
head of state must be a Muslim and state controls religious affairs, such as Malaysia, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan. See Esposito (1987), p. 24. See also Esposito (1991), p. 96.


8. Surbakti (1991), p. 33. According to him, this type of state is ‘responsive toward religious groups’ demand and interests to both domestic and foreign policies as long as they are not contrary to national ideology.

16. Ibid.
18. Interview with former foreign minister Ali Alatas.
Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Muslim World in the Changing Global Environment

Indonesia’s foreign policy has always to be consistent with Pancasila and the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.¹

The state will never monopolize the religious life of Indonesian society, and no religions can monopolize the government’s policies and activities either.²

The roots, nature and evolution of Indonesian foreign policy

In principle, Indonesia has followed a Bebas-Aktif (independent and active) foreign policy since the seminal speech on the basic principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy by Vice President Mohammad Hatta in September 1948.³ In the history of Indonesia’s international relations, this basic principle has served as the ‘unchallengeable doctrinal basis of foreign policy’.⁴

This chapter examines the roots, nature and evolution of the ‘Bebas-Aktif’ principle that has produced continuity and discontinuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It also discusses the place of Islam in Indonesian politics and the development of the Muslim world as the internal and external environment of Indonesian foreign policy.

The Bebas-Aktif foreign policy under Sukarno

Like that of any other country, Indonesia’s foreign policy is derived from the country’s unique cultural values, historical experiences, aspirations of
its society and its strategic position in world politics – in other words, ‘a cluster of orientations’.

Historically, the main roots of Bebas-Aktif as the basic principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy can be found in the first and fourth paragraphs of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution in which Indonesia committed itself to abolish colonialism and create a world order based on independence, peace and social justice. Further, the fourth paragraph states that Indonesia was obliged to take an active role in achieving world order based upon freedom, eternal peace and social justice. Even though the 1945 Constitution did not explicitly elaborate on the specific nature and characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy, it represents the core values of Indonesia’s foreign policy, such as to safeguard national independence, sovereignty and security; maintain internal consolidation; and safeguard economic interests.

As a post-colonial state, Indonesia showed a strong anti-colonialist commitment based upon its experiences in achieving and maintaining national independence. In addition, the world situation after World War II with the rise of a bipolar international system demanded that Indonesia should ‘play no favorites between the two opposed blocs and [follow] its own path through the various international problems.’ In his famous speech of 1948, Mohammad Hatta stated:

Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. ... The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face. ... The lines of Indonesia’s policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interests to service.

With the above formulation, Indonesia’s government wanted to show its position both to the international system and to its domestic environment. Internationally, it demonstrated its attitude and stance in world politics by choosing to remain non-aligned in the Cold War rivalry.
between the two superpowers, the USA and USSR. This position prevented Indonesia earning the enmity of either party, preserved national interests, and permitted Indonesia to build amity with all nations on a basis of mutual respect. It also demonstrated that the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy, as Rizal Sukma notes, was more dictated by the reality of world politics and its possible impact on domestic politics than by religious concerns. Domestically, the policy was intended to help minimize the ideological rivalry among the competing political elites, particularly between ‘secular nationalism’ and ‘religious nationalism’. The basic components of Indonesia’s foreign policy, anti-colonialism and nationalism, in essence show the domination of secular-nationalists over the religious-nationalists in managing Indonesia’s foreign relations.

The international and domestic contexts within which the Indonesian government had to put the Bebas-Aktif principle into effect, though, were rarely static. Thus different governments/regimes have adopted different interpretations of the principle.

In the early period of the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy, 1948–50, Indonesia faced the challenge of maintaining its national independence and consolidating its status in world politics. As Anak Agung explains, during the revolution two crucial objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy were defending Indonesia’s freedom against the Dutch and seeking international recognition of Indonesia’s independence as declared by Sukarno and Hatta. A combination of diplomasi (diplomacy) and perjuangan (struggle) were seen as the best means to accomplish these goals. More practically, Indonesia tried not to ally itself with either bloc by establishing diplomatic relations with both of the two superpowers.

The implementation of the Bebas-Aktif policy changed when the Sukiman cabinet, a strong anti-communist cabinet installed in 1951 and dominated by the Masyumi (modernist-dominated Islamic Party), signed the Mutual Security Act with the United States in 1952 in order to gain economic aid. This agreement was perceived by some Indonesian political leaders as violating and betraying the Bebas-Aktif policy. The signing of the agreement led to a split in Masyumi. One Masyumi leader, Mohammad Natsir, condemned the agreement for being ‘clear evidence of deviation from [an] independent foreign policy’ and forced the Sukiman cabinet to resign. One crucial lesson that could be learnt from this resignation was, as Anak Agung notes, that ‘any administration that challenged the traditional
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foundation of the foreign policy of the republic and deviated from it could not stay in power.15 This was the only occasion in independent Indonesia’s history when a cabinet fell over foreign policy issues.

Sukiman was succeeded as prime minister by Wilopo, who was followed by Ali Sastroamidjojo in July 1953. As the new prime minister, Ali put a different emphasis on the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy by broadening the definition of the Bebas-Aktif principle.16 In contrast to the policy of previous cabinets, Ali established a more balanced relationship with the communist and non-communist states. This policy was congruent with the objective of the Bebas-Aktif policy that Indonesia would establish mutual cooperation and friendship with every country in order to preserve international peace. As a consequence of this policy, Indonesia established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1954. This was followed by the opening of diplomatic relations with several other communist countries.

The other feature of Ali’s foreign policy was the initiative to host the historic Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 which produced the Bandung Principles. These principles emphasized peaceful co-existence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and promoted Afro-Asian solidarity. Ali’s cabinet was also the first to campaign for the internationalization of the West Irian dispute with the Dutch at the UN General Assembly. By organizing the conference, Indonesia hoped to get support of the Afro-Asian countries for its claim on West Irian.17 This conference also marked a closer relationship between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China when they signed an agreement on ‘dual citizenship’18. All in all, Ali’s initiative to broaden the implementation of the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy ensured that Indonesia would play an active role on the international stage as well as having ‘reasonably balanced relations’ in world politics.

Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif foreign policy was radically changed during the Guided Democracy period, which began on 5 July 1959 when Sukarno signed a decree that enabled him to abandon the provisional constitution of 1950 and re-adopt the 1945 Constitution. This decree marked the end of the Liberal Democracy period, and gave him greater power to run the country.

During the Guided Democracy period, the three major actors in Indonesian politics were Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party
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(PKI) and the military. This triangle of forces gave Sukarno a central role in domestic and international issues that he had lacked under the parliamentary system. Sukarno believed that the radicalization of foreign policy and coercive diplomacy could serve Indonesia's national interests, which he saw as being aimed to 'sustain national unity and establish a just and prosperous society'.

In order to pursue these national goals, Sukarno brought three different ideologies (nationalism, religion, and communism) into the foreign policy domain. The first ideology led to a radical policy in which he identified international imperialism, colonialism and capitalism as Indonesia's main enemies and declared Indonesia's struggle against them should continue. The second ideology was concerned with the role of religion in Indonesia's political process. The third ideology was linked to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China. However, although foreign policy can be regarded as a reflection of domestic politics, 'no evidence of Islamic influence was manifested in foreign policy'.

To implement the above policy, Sukarno used two important aspects of Indonesia's diplomacy: conventional diplomacy and diplomacy as an instrument of revolution. These two aspects complemented each other as well as giving content to each other. With these kinds of diplomacy, Sukarno began to radicalize Indonesia's foreign policy with the aim of liberating West Irian. The question of West Irian, as Leifer points out, was not only perceived as the fundamental symbol of national unity but also a matter of personal prestige for Sukarno.

Soon after the inclusion of West Irian (subsequently known as Irian Jaya) as an Indonesian province in 1962, Sukarno proposed the idea of NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) as an 'international united front' to reject the power of the neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism of the West. With this idea, he divided the world into two major groups, namely OL-DEFOS (Old Emerging Forces), comprising the Western or imperialist forces, and NEFOS, which consisted of Communist forces and the new states of Asia and Africa. The idea of NEFOS was an example of Sukarno's use of external actions to divert public attention from growing domestic divisions and economic problems within Indonesia. It was also, in part, designed by Sukarno to instill national pride.

Indonesia's foreign policy took a more radical and militant form when Sukarno reacted to the establishment of the Federation of Malay--
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Indonesia in 1963 by declaring the campaign of Konfrontasi (confrontation) to ‘crush Malaysia’. Sukarno believed that the formation of Malaysia represented the colonialist powers’ attempt to maintain their domination of the newly emerging states, particularly Asian countries.27

In the period of the Guided Democracy, Indonesia’s foreign policy became ‘Sukarno’s personal domain’. Sukarno exercised a prerogative role here and considered Indonesia to be a world leader. This strong perception became clearer when Indonesia withdrew from the UN in 1965 and proposed the creation of the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) to replace the UN system. Asian communist states such as North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) strongly supported this idea and even assisted in establishing its headquarters in Beijing. This strong solidarity among communist states and Indonesia led to the formation of the Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Hanoi–Pyongyang–Beijing axis.

Domestically, the close relationship between Indonesia and the communist states, particularly with the PRC, increased the PKI’s power. Meanwhile, Sukarno’s radical and militant foreign policy did not bring a crucial improvement to the Indonesian economy. On the contrary, this policy led to the deterioration of national resources. Politically, there was also a strong rejection by the military of the concept of NASAKOM (Nationalisme, Agama dan Komunisme or Nationalism, Religion and Communism). This led to the coup in 1965 that marked the end of Guided Democracy and thence to the emergence of military rule under the leadership of General Soeharto.

Under Sukarno, Indonesia’s foreign policy was conducted with a very high profile. This was mainly due to Sukarno’s need for Indonesia to have an international stature in world politics. Furthermore, the strategies that Sukarno implemented to achieve international status were also quite radical, challenging the West and making an alliance with the communist countries.

The New Order era and ‘true’ Bebas-Aktif foreign policy

Indonesia entered a new era following the fall of Sukarno in 1965. In this new era, known as Orde Baru (New Order), the country was led by General Soeharto. The essential characteristic of the New Order was that the military became the most important actor/decision-maker in both the domestic and foreign policy of Indonesia. Warshawsky even suggests that
the military was ‘the only truly national institution capable of assuming authority in the post-coup era’.

Another characteristic of the New Order was that the grip of the state over society became much tighter than during the Guided Democracy era. Nonetheless, as under the Old Order, the New Order administration applied the same ideological foundation of Pancasila (the five principles originally formulated by Sukarno in 1945) and same constitutional structure of the 1945 Constitution to its politics. The New Order introduced the idea of ‘purifying of the implementation’ of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in national political life. The New Order perceived that, during the Sukarno era, Indonesia had deviated from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, the New Order was strongly anti-communist, had a commitment to economic development and political stability and had a pragmatic international outlook. These three crucial aspects were applied to achieve and protect national interests both domestically and internationally.

Under the leadership of General Soeharto, Indonesia’s foreign policy was adjusted to the new circumstances of domestic and external environment in three ways. First, the conduct of foreign policy was based on the internal strength produced by the adoption of pembangunan ekonomi (economic development) as a dominant theme of Soeharto’s regime. Second, Soeharto also pursued the creation of stabilitas nasional (national stability) as a pivotal prerequisite for economic development. Internal stability could only be achieved through recognizing the dominant position of the military in politics. In turn, the New Order regime believed that economic development and internal stability could only be achieved by pursuing a totally different style and initiative in foreign policy. These two core political values (economic development and political stability), then, served as the basis of the legitimacy of the New Order in managing both domestic politics and Indonesia’s foreign relations.

But Soeharto’s main focus, at least initially, was on domestic politics not foreign policy. He aimed at restoring national economic prosperity as the primary national political priority. In 1967, the New Order regime released its Undang-Undang Penanaman Modal Asing or Law regarding Foreign Investment as a tool of economic foreign policy to invite foreign aid and investment. However, a low-profile foreign policy downplayed Indonesia’s role on the international stage.
Secondly, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Soeharto also began to move closer to Western countries. Soeharto introduced an open-door policy in order to invite foreign aid and investment, particularly from the Western countries to rehabilitate the national economy.

As the third aspect of the ‘new’ foreign policy strategies, Soeharto ended the confrontation with Malaysia. This was the first major foreign policy initiative of the New Order administration. It indicated a substantial change in Indonesia’s foreign policy and showed a new commitment to a good-neighbour policy and the importance of strong regional ties in its foreign policy.

Soeharto went even further by paying special attention to the interests of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. With a series of diplomatic actions led by the foreign minister, Adam Malik, the chief architect of Indonesia’s New Order foreign policy, ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok. The establishment of ASEAN was a manifestation of the Bebas-Aktif principle, which emphasized the importance of a good-neighbour policy in the region.

This regional group comprised five Southeast Asian nations: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. As Anwar explains, the major aim of the creation of this association was to ‘help create an environment conducive to Indonesia’s domestic political stability and economic development by removing possible sources of conflicts and distractions’. This was due to Indonesia’s concerns about ‘the spillover of domestic tensions in the region’, which could have a politico-security impact on other states in the region. The New Order was quite concerned with the instability of many of the states in the region. Hostilities continued in Vietnam and Cambodia while guerrilla movements of varying strengths operated in the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Malaysia.

More importantly, as pointed out by Leifer, with the establishment of ASEAN the Southeast Asian countries could find a common mechanism to manage regional stability. Indonesia stressed regional economic and social cooperation to improve the internal structure of the various states so as to help them eliminate the root causes of these disturbances to the region as a whole. Thus, ASEAN became the most important of the ‘concentric circles in Indonesia’s foreign policy.’
The next priority of Soeharto’s foreign policy was to restore Indonesia’s relations with the US and Japan. During the Sukarno era, Indonesia’s relations with the US were tense because of its close relations with the USSR while Indonesia had only a limited interaction with Japan. Closer and better relationships with these two countries could help Indonesia to pursue its domestic goals of negotiating the rescheduling of Indonesia’s foreign debt repayment, attracting foreign investment for national development and restoring and stabilizing national economic conditions.

In order to achieve these goals, Indonesia implemented the so-called ‘diplomacy of development’. This diplomacy coloured the style of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the New Order. An early success of this diplomacy was the creation of the International Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in Amsterdam in 1967. The IGGI was ‘the medium through which foreign aid was dispensed for Indonesia’s economic recovery and development’. This group also acted as ‘a watchdog to monitor the progress of economic performance and to advise an appropriate response in terms of aid’. From 1967 to 2000, the IGGI (now CGI or Consultative Group on Indonesia) has given foreign aid to the amount of US $100.5 billion.

As the central figure in Indonesia’s foreign policy, Soeharto took a more cautious but more assertive view than Sukarno. With respect to the Bebas-Aktif principle, a few years after the creation of ASEAN, Indonesia took part in the international action to condemn Israel for the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This event then led to the crystallization of Islamic solidarity, which resulted in the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Rabat, Morocco, in 1970. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country in the World, showed its commitment to the fostering of the international Muslim brotherhood (Ukhuwah Islamiyah) but seemed to conduct a cautious policy on the establishment of the OIC by not sending a delegation to the first and second meetings of the OIC. This was because ‘sending a delegation to the first and second conferences of the OIC would have jeopardized Indonesia’s relations with the Western world’.

Indonesia did send a delegation led by foreign minister Adam Malik to the third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Jeddah in March 1972, the aim being to promote international cooperation between Indonesia and the Islamic states based on the Bebas-Aktif principle, Pancasila, the
1945 Constitution and the UN Charter. It did not base its participation on Islamic principles. Indonesia declined to sign the OIC Charter and thus became a full member of the organization because the OIC Charter stated that membership was open to 'every Muslim State', Indonesia declaring that it was not an Islamic state. This position made Indonesia a unique participant in the OIC. It also showed that Islam had been contained as a basic principle in determining Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Soeharto’s obsession with avoiding the possibility of the threat of communism in Indonesia pushed him and the military to invade East Timor in 1975. In the following year, East Timor was declared the 27th province of Indonesia. But the problem was not yet over as Fretilin guerrillas continued to fight for East Timorese independence. More importantly, on the international front, East Timor became the most pressing issue in Indonesia’s diplomacy.

With the rapid changing of Indonesia’s domestic (political stability and economic boom) and international environment (détente between US and USSR) in 1970s and early 1980s, Indonesia’s foreign policy became more assertive. Several international issues demonstrated this increased assertiveness. The first indication was Indonesia’s proposal for the ‘cocktail party’ and Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) as political mechanisms in helping to solve the Cambodian problem. Another example was Indonesia’s willingness to play a leadership role in the Third World. As the host of the Asian-African Congress in Bandung in 1955, which produced Dasa Sila Bandung (the ten Bandung principles) as the basic principle of the relationships among non-aligned countries, Indonesia set the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as one of its essential foreign policy priorities. Indonesia’s growing interest in the development of the NAM can be seen from two important measures.

In April 1985, Indonesia hosted the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung. Even though this event could not issue important recommendations for the future development of Asian and African countries, by hosting this commemoration Indonesia showed its strong commitment to global issues, particularly the issue of the North–South dialogue in the international arena.

Second, and more importantly, Indonesia showed its willingness to claim the leadership of the Third World countries by applying for the chairmanship of the NAM. Its first application in 1987 was defeated largely
due to the perception of some NAM leaders of Indonesia’s close relations with the Western World (especially the US) and more importantly the issue of East Timor. Indonesia was finally elected as NAM chairman for 1992–95 after the NAM Ministerial meeting at Accra in September 1991. This position implied that, even though the Cold War era had ended, the NAM in Indonesia’s view was still relevant as a political force to increase the socio-economic capability of Third World countries and to enhance the efforts of the establishment of

a new international order and international relations based on freedom, eternal peace, justice and common prosperity through friendship and international cooperation without differentiating ideology, political system and economic system.\textsuperscript{55}

Indonesia emphasized the issue of economic development as the main agenda of the NAM and encouraged an increase in the intensity of North–South dialogue as well as in South–South dialogue as the main keys of diplomacy of development of the NAM.\textsuperscript{56}

The chairmanship of the NAM also gave Indonesia the opportunity to conduct what Soeharto saw as the ‘ideal way’ of the ‘Bebas-Aktif’ foreign policy. This was indicated by several crucial steps such as Indonesia’s ‘non-alignment’ policy with respect to the conflict in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{57} Another step in the conduct of the ‘Bebas-Aktif’ foreign policy was President Soeharto’s meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Jakarta in 1994.\textsuperscript{58} The meeting was held as the continuation of a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. Considering that there were no diplomatic relations between Israel and Indonesia and there was a possibility of rejection of the meeting by Indonesia’s Muslim community, Suharto met Yitzhak Rabin not as President of Indonesia but in his capacity as NAM chairman. As Djiwandono explains, ‘without his capacity as NAM Chairman, it would have been impossible for President Soeharto to receive PM Rabin in the present situation’.\textsuperscript{59}

With this visit, President Soeharto wanted to show NAM member countries that the ‘NAM will be able to play a positive and constructive role for world peace if it can avoid a confrontation policy’\textsuperscript{60} and, more importantly, the concrete examples of the implementation of the true Bebas-Aktif foreign policy.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, President Soeharto appointed NAM special envoys and a special advisor to the foreign minister. He also
installed several Indonesian economic experts as a special team as part of his domestic political appointments to help overcome debt problems of NAM countries.\textsuperscript{62}

The effort to 'redefine' the implementation of the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy reached its peak when Indonesia decided to normalize its bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in August 1990. These had been frozen for 25 years because allegedly the PRC had backed the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Despite some objections, Soeharto recognized that the PRC was one of the important major powers in Asia Pacific with whom Indonesia needed a diplomatic relationship.\textsuperscript{63} He believed that new diplomatic relations with PRC would bring some positive effects at both bilateral and regional levels in the post-Cold War era. For Indonesia, it was quite obvious that normalization of relations with the PRC would enable the creation of a new positive pattern of relationships in the Asia Pacific region that could encourage the process of political-security arrangements in the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{64}

Another crucial example of the implementation of a purified Bebas-Aktif policy was Indonesia's decision to dissolve the IGGI when Jan Pronk, the Chairman of the IGGI, criticized Indonesia's domestic policy in handling the Dili tragedy in November 1991.\textsuperscript{65} This decision clearly indicated that, even though economic development was the highest priority of Indonesia's foreign policy, it did not necessarily mean that any country could interfere in matters Indonesia regarded as internal.

As the continuation of a more assertive foreign policy, Indonesia also showed its strong commitment to the development of the Asia Pacific region. In politico-security terms, Indonesia endorsed the idea of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a multilateral security arrangement that would enhance the level of mutual reassurance among the countries in the region, particularly with the major powers. In economic terms, Indonesia's commitment at the regional level was indicated by hosting the second APEC meeting at Bogor in November 1994. In fact, many analysts believed that Indonesia's commitment to the idea of an Asia Pacific free trade area was not driven by economic factors but by Indonesia's desire to be recognized as an important international leader, particularly in the Asia Pacific region.\textsuperscript{66}

The above description suggests that Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto showed different characteristics to that of the Sukarno era.
These differences were mainly in terms of the ways in which the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy was interpreted.

The implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the New Order was not without criticism. One of the areas in which Indonesia met criticism in its foreign relations was on the issue of East Timor. However, given the domestic and international political situation, it was likely that Indonesia’s policy on this issue would become a major catastrophe. Another criticism of the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy was Indonesia’s conclusion of the ‘Agreement on Maintaining Security’ with Australia in December 1995. Aisyah Amini, a member of parliament from the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party), for instance, argued that this agreement was a denial of the ‘Bebas-Aktif’ principle.

Sukma argues that, in conducting its foreign policy, Indonesia was intent on ‘keeping all options open’ so that it could define the meaning of Bebas-Aktif in very loose terms. In other words, as Sukma explains, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Soeharto was conducted in ‘a broader, more flexible and more pragmatic’ manner than under his predecessor, Sukarno. More importantly, the Bebas-Aktif policy was always defined without the inclusion of religious sentiments.

Islam and the New Order’s politics

The New Order and the Islamic community: A fragile alliance and controlled participation

At the beginning of the New Order era, the government perceived Islam as ‘the most important civil force in society’. Together with the army, Islamic groups were the largest political forces that strongly supported the New Order in crushing the communists. The period 1966–69 saw a ‘honeymoon’ between the government, military, students and anti-communist groups, including Islamic organizations.

However, in expecting that its political power in the period of the New Order would increase, the Muslim community had seriously miscalculated. The military/ABRI, which was dominated by officers from the (secular) nationalist group, still had the perception that Islam could threaten political stability and that the Muslim community still wanted to establish an Islamic state. The ‘temporary alliance’ between the New
Order and Muslims was over by 1969, particularly because government attention was already fully concentrated on the 1971 general election.\textsuperscript{71}

As Ramage explains, there are at least three characteristics of the New Order’s changing perceptions of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the defeat of communism in Indonesia left Islam as the only major ideological alternative to the New Order itself. Second, the New Order government still had a strong perception of the possibility of the intention of Islamic parties to impose the establishment of an Islamic state or, at least, the implementation of Islamic laws in government policies. Lastly, since \textit{Pancasila} had become \textit{asas tunggal} or the sole foundation of all organizations in 1984–85, then political development should be put behind the need to accelerate the pace of economic development. In other words, the New Order regime put economic development and political stability as the top priority of national development. Hostility to political Islam, then, crystallized in the New Order regime, particularly within the military. As Liddle notes, this attitude of the New Order to the political Islam led to the perception of Islam as ‘political enemy number two’ after communism.\textsuperscript{72}

The New Order regime produced several policies designed to eliminate the possibility of political instability but which were categorized by many Muslims as anti-Islamic.\textsuperscript{73} The policies, as Santoso (1995) argues, were aimed at positioning Islam on the periphery of Indonesia’s political life. The perception of Islam as a threat to the political system of the New Order pushed the regime together with the military to adopt a policy of containment and of de-politicization of Islam.

One strategy applied by the New Order to contain Islam as a political power was that of ‘divide and rule’.\textsuperscript{74} The major aspect of this strategy was that Islam could continue to develop its religious and cultural dimensions without entering the political arena (de-politicization of Islam). This policy caused ‘internal conflict’ among Muslims in which, as Starkey argues, Soeharto successfully divided the Islamic community.\textsuperscript{75}

In order to further de-politicize Islam, the New Order regime began to rationalize the Indonesian political party system by ordering the nine existing political parties, excluding Golkar, to fuse into two parties. The four Islamic parties (\textit{NU, Parmusi, PSII, Perti}) joined to form the PPP (\textit{Partai Persatuan Pembangunan} or United Development Party).

The first indication of the de-politicization of Islam under the New Order came before the 1971 general elections when Soeharto refused to
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lift the ban on the Masyumi. Then, to replace the Masyumi, Soeharto approved the establishment of a new Muslim party, Parmusi, on the condition that no prominent former Masyumi leader played an active role in the new party. Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice President, also wanted to create another Muslim party, the Islamic Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia), but this was rejected by the New Order regime.76

The decisive victory of Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Group) in the 1971 election, in which Islamic parties received only 27 percent of the votes cast, as compared with 44 percent at the 1955 election, indicated the decline in Islam's position in Indonesia's politics and the success of Soeharto's policy of de-politicizing Islam.77 The election results were not surprising since the government had given Golkar access to the villages and massive financial and political support, both of which were denied to other parties. The 1971 elections marked the final collapse of Islamic parties as effective political forces.78

The government further tried to manage, if not to interfere in, Islam and the affairs of religious organizations by forcing them to ratify state policies and pushing them to elect leaders and screen parliamentary candidates acceptable to the regime. This was because the New Order remained very wary of Islamic influences in politics and still tried to ban manifestations of Islam that clearly had political aims to establish an Islamic state.79 From 1969, the New Order also controlled the pilgrimage (haj) to Mecca. In addition, the government established the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975, a quasi-official body that coordinated the uneasy relationship between the government and the ulama.80

The next policy, implemented in 1982, was to apply Pancasila as Kebijaksanaan Asas Tungga (the sole foundation policy) for all social (including religious) and political organizations for the sake of national stability and unity. The application of ‘ideological conformity’ aimed at decreasing, if not removing, the influence of ideology and religion in politics. It can also be seen as the New Order’s attempt to homogenize the national political platform as the prime foundation for political stability. For the Muslim organizations and community, this process of Pancasila-ization was once again perceived as an effort ‘to prevent Muslims from ever again becoming an independent base of political power’.81
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Moreover, the inability of Islam to further play a significant role in politics – domestic and international – was due to the absence of any strong political party, organizations or institution that united all Indonesian Muslims. This was not only because of internal conflict within Islamic groups but, more importantly, because the government successfully prevented the emergence of such an organization. Even though the PPP was the only Islamic political party, it was unable to unite all Indonesian Muslims. This was mainly due to the PPP being established by the New Order. Deliar Noer notes that numerous Islam organizations such as the government-sponsored Indonesian Council of Ulama, the Council of the Propagation of Islam, and other social organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah had failed to represent Indonesian Muslims’ interests. By applying the above policies/strategies, the New Order regime successfully weakened the power of the Muslim politics so that effectiveness of Islam as a political ideology could be terminated.

In this context, as Hassan argues, the relationship between the state and religion is influenced by the internal dynamics of Muslim societies. By in the social arena, Islamic organizations were more effective in lobbying the government. The government decisions banning the national sports lottery (SDSB), regulating Islamic marriages, supporting Islamic banking, halal (religious pure) food labeling and the lifting of the prohibition on the use of jilbab (Islamic veil), were some examples of Muslim organizations’ influences on government policies.

Despite the New Order regime’s success in de-politicizing Islam, in the late 1980s a revival of Islam as a political force was underway, particularly among the young generation. Some observers believed that one of the factors behind the re-emergence of political Islam was the demands of the Muslim community for a stronger political voice in domestic politics. Another important factor was the Iranian revolution. But others argued that the most important factor was the change in Soeharto’s perception of the Muslim community, as discussed in the following section.

Establishment of ICMI: the revival of political Islam or a new source of political legitimacy for the New Order?

From the late 1980s to the 1990s, Soeharto changed his domestic policy and tried to re-build a stronger political coalition with Islam. There were two major reasons for his changed policy towards Islam. The first was
Soeharto's political need to respond to what he perceived to be declining political support for him from the military. Much like his predecessor who once looked to the communists to counteract unhappy army officers, Soeharto now looked to Islam to play the same role. The second reason was the external impact of the political revival of Islam globally. From the late 1970s and early 1980s, the popularity of Islam began to rise significantly in Indonesia. As a source of spiritual, ethical, social and political advice, the Islamic revival in Indonesia was also part of a movement occurring throughout the world, in places as far apart as Iran and Egypt.

The major result of this new relationship between Islam and the New Order occurred in December 1990 when with the support of President Soeharto Dr. B.J. Habibie, the Minister of Research and Technology, established and became chairman of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). ICMI played a significant role in sponsoring the expansion of the authority of Islamic courts; greater Muslim programming on television (including lessons in the Arabic language); the appointment of ICMI leaders to high office such as cabinet ministers and provincial governors; and establishment of the Islamic Bank Muamalat in 1991, the Abdi Bangsa Foundation and the Center of Information and Development Studies (CIDES), considered the association’s think-tank, as well as of the Islamic daily newspaper, Republika. With all of the above initiatives undertaken by ICMI, Islam became more assertive politically and economically.

The establishment of ICMI, as Liddle has argued, was the clearest step taken by Soeharto to accommodate the desires and sensitivities of the Muslim community and deepen his own identification with Islam. Even though the establishment of ICMI invited some public debates and controversies, ICMI, which gained support from almost all government officials and prominent Muslim political activists and intellectuals, can be regarded as the ‘sign of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life’. He further argued that the establishment of ICMI was merely to create a political tool for those in power. Moreover, it was also a ‘political move by the government’ that accidentally met a demand by the Muslim community for a greater position in politics.

A similar view was noted by a senior researcher, who said that the establishment of ICMI was an illustration of the ‘accommodation’ policy of Soeharto in managing the Indonesian Islamic community. This policy
aimed to please the Muslim community in order to have it express its support and loyalty towards the existing power holder. However, he also argued that ‘even though the pressure of the Islamic community was getting stronger in policymaking, Soeharto still had the ultimate authority to control it for the sake of his political interests’.

Some elements of the Islamic community (such as Nadhlatul Ulama) and the military, however, strongly resisted the creation of ICMI. K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid of NU contended that ‘I am ready anytime to enter and join ICMI, if the fundamentalists, the militants, do not control it, if Professor Habibie does not use it for group interest politics.’ These critics perceived ICMI ‘not as a vehicle for Muslim penetration of the state but for state penetration of Islam’.

In the military itself, there was also resistance to acknowledging ICMI due to the fear of re-politicizing the Islamic community. The secular-nationalist faction of ABRI perceived that the establishment of ICMI would boost the reemergence of Islam as a political force in Indonesian politics, which in turn would jeopardize political stability and national unity. This military faction also suspected that the revival of Islam as indicated by the establishment of ICMI ‘would re-open old and divisive debates on whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state.’ This resistance led to the creation, initiated by General Edy Sudrajat, of ICKI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia or the Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals), which was non-sectarian. However, this association did not get approval from President Soeharto until it changed its name to PCPP (Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila, Intellectuals’ Association for the Advancement of the Pancasila). This was mainly because the former name of the association could give a negative image to the public that there was a conflict between the military and the Indonesian Muslims.

These events indicated that there were endless suspicion by the military towards the emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian politics, which they perceived could jeopardize national unity and stability. Moreover, this also reflected the competition between the Muslim community and secular-nationalists in the military to control policy making of the New Order regime.
The Muslim world in the Cold War era

The rise of the Soviet Union and the United States as superpowers after World War II marked the outbreak of the Cold War and of a bipolar system in international politics. The major manifestation of this bipolar system was the division of nation-states along ideological lines and the emergence of a military alliance system around the globe. As a consequence, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America were all directly or indirectly affected by the bipolar system of superpower rivalry. As Allison and Williams argue, ‘the superpower rivalry is not only unavoidable, it is also both intensive and extensive including the Muslim world’.101 Fred Haliday even notes that the Muslim world, due to its population, massive oil resources, and strategic location, has been the most unstable region in the whole Third World since the 1970s.102

Yet the period after World War II was seen in a very different light in many Muslim countries. Islam, not the bipolar division of the world, was seen as the crucial element of world politics. Many independent Muslim states were established between the 1950s and the 1970s in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.103 For these countries, argues Noor Ahmad Baba, Islam provided ‘a strong moral force and source of identity’ vis-à-vis their ex-colonial masters. Islam was a ‘vital driving force’ in their independence struggle against colonialism for many countries, including Indonesia.104 Further, this process of decolonization, particularly in Asia and Africa, also provided the setting for efforts aimed at Islamic unity.105 In other words, Islam became an integrative value in many countries in those regions. Some Muslim countries such as Libya and Yemen even rejected the contemporary international system and supported Islamic universalism.106

Further, this perspective encouraged the establishment of some sort of Islamic bloc, to unite the entire Muslim world, laying down the relationships between individual Muslim states and providing a framework for coordinating them in their international relations, in order to counter the Western and Communist blocs.107

This phenomenon may be described as ‘neo-pan Islamism’.108 This movement, according to Baba,

is not aimed at restoring Islamic unity as was the pan Islamic movement of nineteenth century, nor is it an indication of the desire to
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re-establish the traditional Islamic system of the conduct of external relations. It is rather a desire to cooperate as an Islamic bloc within the community of nations.\textsuperscript{109}

The major consideration producing the desire to create an Islamic bloc – as Chaudri Nazir Ahmad Khan, a former Attorney-General of Pakistan, put it – was the belief that:

The future of the Muslim countries lies in the strength and their unity ... a common global organization of all Muslim states is essential for safeguarding and promoting the interests of World Muslims.\textsuperscript{110}

Nevertheless, the underlying problem for the establishment of an Islamic bloc was the significant differences among the many Muslim communities in the world. Muslims and Muslim communities are not identical. The world of Islam is not monolithic and the diversity of interpretations, institutions, faith, and practices within the Islamic world is very great. Islam thus inspired two contradictory tendencies: the first towards union, the second towards distinctness.

Moreover, the capacity to unite politically under the banner of the Islamic bloc was also curtailed by other interests, both domestic and international. The discussion of five major world issues below show the interplay of the different domestic interests of the Muslim countries and the interests of the foreign actors, particularly the major powers.

\textit{The Arab-Israeli conflict}

The Arab-Israeli conflict has had a defining impact on the political development of the Muslim world. It is also a conflict that has made the Middle East ‘the most unstable and strategically alarming’ region in the whole Third World.\textsuperscript{111}

The first Arab-Israeli war occurred in May 1948 when the Palestinian Arabs and Arab League rejected UN Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into two sovereign states, one Jewish and the other Arab.\textsuperscript{112} The Israelis, with political and military support from many different countries including the US and Soviet Union, had won the war by December 1948.

The war between Israel and the Arab world resumed in 1956 and continued in 1967, pushed by the pan-Arabism of Nasser of Egypt. Within
In 1967, Israel conquered the Arabs (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) and took the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Serious political problems in the Middle East continued when an Israeli burnt the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem on 21 August 1969. This created massive anger and protests from the Muslim world and, as has been seen, led to the establishment of the OIC in the same year.

The Arab-Israeli conflict triggered different perceptions and attitudes among Muslim countries. The conflict even increased intra-Islamic rivalries in the region and the involvement here of the superpowers. Egypt and Jordan, for example, recognized Israel in 1970 and pushed the conflicting parties (the Israelis and Palestinians) to find a comprehensive solution of the conflict. Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan were the significant proponents of the peace process dialogue. Other Muslim countries, such as Libya, Iraq and Yemen, criticized the policies and the efforts taken by Egypt and Jordan. They even declared a war against Israel to free the Palestinians from the Israeli occupation. Internationally, this conflict had also become an important area of struggle for influence between the superpowers.

The Arab-Israeli conflict entered a new phase when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli invasion not only targeted the PLO but also the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon where many Palestinians were massacred by Christian Lebanese militias under Israeli leadership. This event aroused outrage from Muslims around the world and strengthened support for the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel.

More importantly, the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and Israel also further radicalized Islamic militancy. In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict, still unresolved after more than fifty years, significantly influenced the historical and emotional ties of anti-Western sentiment across the Muslim world and became the focus of attention of many Muslims against the West, particularly the US.

The Iranian revolution and its impact on the world affairs

One of the major events in the Muslim world that had a tremendous effect on both the Muslim world and world affairs generally was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The Iranian revolution, which was marked by the fall of Shah Reza Pahlevi, also marked the revival of Islam as a sig-
significant political force in many Muslim countries. The significance of the Iranian revolution on the Muslim world was that it has accelerated and even radicalized the Islamic revival in many Muslim countries both directly and indirectly.114

The Iranian revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, not only destroyed the old power structure consisting of the Shah, the aristocracy and the Westernized upper and upper middle class but more importantly changed the nature of Iran to become a nation-state based on Islamic orthodoxy (Shiism).115 More importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini appealed for an Islamic umma to comprise all Islamic countries and rejected the international system led by the US and USSR. This appeal was based on the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which held that

all Muslims are one umma and the government should exert itself continuously to achieve the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world and the non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers.116

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the emergence of Islamic states in Central Asia

Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was prompted by Moscow’s rising frustration with the communist regime of Afghanistan under the leadership of Noor Mohammad Taraki in December 1979, the underlying reasons for the invasion were the geopolitical position of Afghanistan in Central Asia and Moscow’s fear of ‘Islamic fundamentalist contagion’ from revolutionary Iran to Afghanistan and thence into, then, Soviet Central Asia.117 Militarily, the invasion not only brought Soviet forces several hundred kilometers closer to the Persian Gulf, it also triggered significant increases in Soviet military capabilities in the region.

The invasion was also pushed by internal demographic concerns. The 1979 census showed that the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia had grown five times faster, from 35 million to 49 million during the 1970s, than the rest of the Soviet population.118

The Soviet invasion provoked different responses from the rest of the world. The US, for example, condemned the invasion and rallied the Muslim states of the Middle East against the Soviet Union. When the issue of the invasion of Afghanistan came up for a vote in the UN Secu-
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In the 1980s, Indonesia faced increasing geopolitical tensions and shifting geopolitical alignments. The Sowki (Non-Aligned Movement) Council, only Ethiopia and South Yemen – among Moscow’s Muslim world allies – voted against the resolution that condemned the invasion, while Algeria, Syria, Libya and North Yemen abstained. The anti-Soviet Mujahedeen were supported by the US and other Western countries. They received about US 7 billion in military and economic aid between 1979 and 1989.119

The combination of three different factors – its anti-Iranian policy, Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and desire to build oil pipelines from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf through Afghanistan – drove the US to support the Mujahedeen.120

Islam in Afghanistan was radicalized more by the Soviet invasion than by the revolution in Iran. This was indicated by the emergence of the Mujahedeen in their struggle against the Soviet invasion. Thus, the Soviet invasion, which aimed to prevent the radicalization of the Soviet Union’s own Muslims, strained its relations with the rest of the Muslim world and became a general diplomatic embarrassment to global Soviet prestige.121

In the end, the radicalization of the Mujahedeen’s struggle over the Soviet occupation and the US support to its struggle gave significant impetus for the emergence of six Muslim republics from the former Soviet Union in the Trans-Caucasus (Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).122

The tension between Iran and Iraq

The Iran revolution of 1978–79 also had a momentous significance for other Muslim countries, particularly Iraq. At first, the overthrow of the Shah’s regime by the Islamic revolution was received in Iraq and other Gulf states with mixed feelings. It was perceived that the new regime in Iran would follow a foreign policy sympathetic to the aspirations of other Muslim countries as well as to Arabs more generally. Furthermore, some Baath leaders in Iraq, who were very critical of the Shah’s hegemonic policy, held that the Iranian revolution might provide an opportunity for trust and cooperation with other Muslim countries.123

However, Iran’s message to Iraq and its neighbours was clear: it aimed to export the Iranian revolution and to establish an Islamic government that would enforce Islamic law and deal with domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with Islamic standards.124 For Iraq, this Iranian foreign policy was clearly expansionist. So for Iraq, the only certain way
to abort the revisionist policy of Iran was by destroying the source, moral and material, of Shia inspiration: the Khomeini regime. Saddam Hussein was particularly concerned about the belligerent propaganda of the new revolutionary leadership and its explicit call for the overthrow of the Baathist regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. He was also worried that the situation in Iran might appeal to Iraq’s Shia population and might encourage rebellion from the South of Iraq. The outbreak of the eight-year Iran–Iraq war in 1980 was the result. Thus, Islam divided the two countries each wanting to be the Gulf’s paramount power rather than acted as a unifying force.

*The Gulf War in 1991 (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait)*

The combination of economic interests (oil) and the need to seize regional leadership in the region were crucial considerations for Iraq to invade Kuwait. Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were also deeply rooted in history, geography and ideology. Iraq had claimed Kuwait as part of its national territory since the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the Iraq interest in Kuwait had less to do with legal or historical rights than the fact that Kuwait possessed mammoth oil wealth.

The Arab states were deeply divided in responding to Iraq’s invasion; they were also to diverge on the means for resolving the conflict. The division was essentially between those in the American camp and the so-called radicals. Palestinians and Jordanians spoke of Islamic commitments as they signed up to fight alongside the Iraqis. King Hussein of Jordan, for instance, declared ‘this is a war against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone.’ Libya, Yemen and Algeria (Islamist radicals) also gave their support to Saddam. Saddam also found political support not only in Arab lands, but also in non-Arab Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia.

Egypt, however, adopted a tough stance condemning the invasion and even offering to send its volunteers to help save Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia and the holy places. Other Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco also gave their support for Kuwait. Muslim countries from different regions such as Turkey, Nigeria and Indonesia urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and called on the UN to solve the conflict immediately. The Gulf war thus saw Islam on both sides of the battle lines. There was no single Islamic position on the war,
each faction in multifaceted Islam having its own ‘nuanced’ and ‘interested’ view.\textsuperscript{131}

**The Muslim world in the post-Cold War era: The global revival of political Islam**

The most prominent feature of international politics in the late 1980s was the collapse of the Soviet power, which resulted in the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the global political structure and the dynamics of international relations changed dramatically. The bipolar system was swept away and the ideological conflict between the US and USSR disappeared. A new era, labelled the ‘new world order’, emerged.

The post-Cold War environment has enabled the emergence of societal factors, cultural and religious, as a new focus in global interactions.\textsuperscript{132} Religion, in particular, is now seen to add a serious dimension to international relations.\textsuperscript{133} In the words of Juergensmeyer, the global interactions in the post-Cold war era are marked by ‘the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances’.\textsuperscript{134} In this context, the revival of (political) Islam has become a significant ideological force in the Third World, particularly in the Muslim world.

Islamic revivalists, Mir Zohair Husain argues, can be categorized into four broad types: fundamentalists, traditionalists, modernists, and pragmatists. However, fundamentalists are often perceived by the West as representing the only type of revivalism.\textsuperscript{135} The Islamic revolution in Iran, to a very large extent, has been viewed as a significant example of Islamic fundamentalism. Its implications extend far beyond Iran’s border. Further, it has also invigorated the Islamic political struggle in many parts of the Muslim world in Asia, Middle East, and North Africa. Thus, the revival of political Islam in this respect is simultaneously global, regional, national and locally specific.

However, the use of the concept of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is pejorative and misleading in assessing the role of Islam in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{136} This term can be categorized into two ways, at least, as the term is:

1. misunderstood (or at least should be understood in accordance with the proper teaching and guidelines of Islam), and
2. now widely used to describe the current conflict, real or imaginary, between Islam and the West.\textsuperscript{137}
The failure to distinguish between 'Islamic fundamentalism' and political Islam produces crucial misinterpretations about political Islam. As Bassam Tibi argues:

We must never lose sight of the distinction between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism; any promotion of hostility to Islam itself in the guise of a clash of civilization would unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists in their efforts to antagonize the West.\textsuperscript{138}

In many Western countries, fundamentalism connotes intolerance, terrorist activities, radicalism, militancy and violence.

Although the Islamic revival is manifested differently in each Islamic country, certain common themes and characteristics are discernible. As Andrew Tan points out:

Islamic revivalism is a result of the Muslim world’s disillusionment with Western civilization and its search for an alternative model that would allow for the development of Islamic society organized according to the teachings of Al-Quran. The revivalism is also a reaction against modern Western-style capitalist development.\textsuperscript{139}

Thus, the Islamic revival can also be seen as a unifying factor and a focal point for rallying political resistance against both the international system and the state itself. The significant rise of political consciousness of the Indonesian Muslim community, for example, is one of the crucial indicators of the Islamic revival in the post-Cold War era.

The multiplicity of the meanings of the revival of political Islam can also be seen in the effort to establish the ‘non-territorial Islamic state’\textsuperscript{140} or the cross-border flows of political Islam between (Muslim) groups/entities operating in different countries.\textsuperscript{141} Khomeini’s proclamation that he would export the Islamic revolution to any part of the world, particularly to the Muslim world, was the clearest indicator of the desire to establish an Islamic \textit{umma} that encompasses all Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{142} This phenomenon is consistent with the proposition of ‘the hyperglobalist thesis’ that new forms of religious (social) political organizations will supplant traditional nation-states as the primary political units of world society\textsuperscript{143}.

Externally, according to Lubeck the revival of political Islam has been influenced by two factors.\textsuperscript{144} Firstly, the Western powers helped to
bring about the rise of the Islamist movement when they encouraged the governments of their client states to eliminate the Leftist ideological movement. The support of the West for the struggle of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989 was an obvious example of this. Secondly, the West helped the international Islamist networks through the promotion of global telecommunications technology. In this context, the rapid development of global communications has facilitated the globalization of political Islam, both on the ideological and operational level, including the spread of activities by Hamas (a radical wing of the Palestinian struggle) to many parts of the Muslim world.

The Western world was convinced that the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be followed by the significant emergence of Islam and Islamic potential in international relations. This explained the West’s animosity towards Islam as a religion or towards what it called ‘politicized Islam’. Hence, Islam was considered by the West as the confronting force leading to the appearance of political Islamic culture, which is the new threat in the wake of the demise of communism.

For many Western countries, the nature of the Islamic threat was not only political but also demographic and socio-religious. Many Western political analysts assumed that the relations of the West and the Muslim world would be conflictual in nature. The Islamic threat, Mohsinpouri writes, replaced the Soviet threat as the principal strategic threat of the post-Cold war era.

Misunderstanding of political Islam, then, led to the perception that, in the post-Cold War world, the global conflict would be between the Muslim world and the West. Surprisingly, some Islamic states, as Gerges points out, seem to confirm Western perception of an Islamic threat by affirming that they would replace the Soviet Union as the major challenge to the West. Some Islamic states, such as Iran and Sudan, see their primary task as ‘resisting growing Western influences on the institutions, policies, and more importantly, the identity of the Muslim societies from the symptoms of Westoxification and socio-cultural contamination.’

As Peter Chalk has argued, Iran and Sudan have sponsored the violent manifestation of Islamic identity and adopted the militant concept of the *al-jihad al saghir* (the holy war), which emphasized legitimate forms
of strife with other humans through war and violence as an integral part of their domestic and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{151}

The tragedy of September 11 in the United States, followed by other terrorist attacks in many regions of the world, including in Indonesia, marked the end of the post-Cold War era in international relations. Further, it has also seen the revival of radical Islam in general and in Indonesia in particular, which has produced more complicated situations in global politics. The Western world argued that the revival of radical Islam has been one of the prime reasons for the emergence of Islamic terrorism. To borrow the RAND Corporation study of Angel M. Rabasa et al, the sources of Islamic radicalism that produced (Islamic) religious terrorism can be classified into three classes: conditions, process and catalytic events as shown in the figure below.\textsuperscript{152}

The revival of radical Islam has become a significant ideological force in the Third World, particularly in the Muslim world. The rise of many Islamic movements emerged in the wake of specific social and political crises in many Muslim world, including Indonesia. In the post-Soeharto Indonesia, the number of Islamic radical groups has significantly increased in politics since the late 1990s especially in the current situation

**Sources of Islamic radicalism**

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of the post-September 11 international system. It means that the religious (Islamic) factor in Indonesia’s politics will become a more significant factor in the future due to the greater convergence of the domestic (societal) and the Muslim world (transnational) dimensions.

Notes
1. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.
2. President KH Abdurachman Wahid’s statement on the commemoration of Nuzulul Quran at the Istiqlal Mosque, 25 December 1999 (Kompas, 26 December 1999).
3. The original title of the speech is ‘Mendayung Di antara dua karang’ [Rowing between two reefs]. This speech was made before the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee) on 2 September 1948 in Yogyakarta. See Anak Agung (1973), p. 23.
5. See Rosenau (1976), p. 16.
8. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
24. For further elaboration on this issue, see for example Anak Agung (1973) and Djiwandono (1996).
29. For a recent analysis of the close relationship between the PRC and PKI, see Sukma (1999).
32. These five principles were belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through deliberation, and social justice for the Indonesian people. The New Order took a more authoritarian interpretation of *Pancasila*. See Eklöf (1999), p. 6.
38. For a more comprehensive elaboration on Indonesia’s foreign policy and ASEAN, see Anwar (1994).
39. Ibid., p. 47.
41. This concept refers to regional relations in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s relations with the West and Indonesia’s relations in multilateral forum (UN).
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47. Ibid.
49. The issue of Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC will be elaborated more comprehensively in Chapter 3.
50. Interview with a foreign policy analyst from LIPI, 9 August 1999.
57. Indonesia’s policy to the conflict of Bosnia is elaborated in Chapter 6.
58. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 4.
60. Ibid., p. 96.
64. See Sukma (1994).
68. Ibid.
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72. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 104.
76. Ibid. p.10.
81. See Hefner (1993), p. 4. A discussion can also be found in Hefner and Horvatich (1997), p. 78.
82. This statement was argued by Dr. Deliar Noer, an Islamic scholar who was very critical to the New Order regime. The Jakarta Post, 30 January 1995.
83. Ibid.
86. Ibid. p. 164.
88. For a clear chronological elaboration of the ICMI, see Hefner (1999b). See also Thaba (1996), pp. 290–300.
91. There are at least three different interpretations of the purposes of ICMI – namely political, social and economic. First, some groups of Indonesian society (Christian minority and non-santri) perceived ICMI as ‘the opening wedge in a new attempt to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state’ and as ‘a typical example of New Order bureaucratic politics’. Second, the main goal of ICMI was seen as ‘to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia’. Lastly, ICMI could serve as ‘a weapon in a struggle of ordinary Indonesians against the predatory business elite of the New Order-style capitalist development’. See Liddle (1996a).
92. Ibid. p. 614.
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94. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 4 November 1999.
95. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
107. Ibid., p. 269.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., p. 274.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 507.
124. Ibid., p. 117.
131. Ibid., p. 484.
132. For further discussion on this issue, see Huntington (1996), especially chapter 1.
133. Ibid.
148. One of the most controversial scholars who argued about the changing nature of global conflict between cultures (civilizations) is Samuel P. Huntington. (1996).
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CHAPTER THREE

The Relationship with the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Introduction

Indonesia’s participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference is unique. Even though it has participated in this Islamic-based interregional organization almost since its formation in September 1969, Indonesia is not a full-member due to its refusal to sign the OIC Charter.1 Despite this, according to a senior Indonesian diplomat, Indonesia is acknowledged as one of the important participants of this organization.2

This chapter first discusses the historical and political background of the formation of the OIC, then discusses Indonesia’s objectives in taking part in the OIC in 1969. The next part of this chapter examines the changes in Indonesia’s policy to the OIC in the 1980s and 1990s. It also elaborates the political, social and economic contribution of Indonesia to the development of the OIC. The emergence of the D-8 (Developing 8) as an effort to accelerate economic cooperation among eight OIC member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria and Iran) is also examined in this chapter. It shows that Indonesia always refused to pursue the goal of Islamic solidarity among the members of the OIC. Instead it pushed the need to strengthen political, economic, social and cultural cooperation among developing countries. The final section discusses the absence of an Islamic factor in Indonesia’s policy in the OIC.
The Relationship with the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Political Background to the Establishment of the OIC

The origins of the OIC can be seen in the pan Islamism of the nineteenth century and followed by other significant events in the post-World War II era. The OIC was established at a meeting held on 22–25 September 1969 in Rabat, Morocco. The major aims of the conference were to deplore the act of arson at the holy Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 and for participant countries to declare their firm resolve to close ranks and to consult together, as well as promoting close cooperation among members in the economic, political, cultural and spiritual fields. The summit, which was attended by the representatives of 24 countries (but not Indonesia), also agreed to convene a meeting of foreign ministers of participating countries in 1970 to establish a general secretariat in Jeddah and to appoint a secretary general for the organization. The formal name of the organization (in English) was the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The first conference of Islamic foreign ministers in Jeddah during 23–25 March 1970, as a significant continuation of Rabat summit, elected Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia as the first secretary general of the OIC. The secretary general was called upon to elaborate the organizational structure of its main bodies and mode of operation. In the third Islamic foreign ministers’ conference, held at Jeddah from 29 February to 4 March 1972, the participant members agreed on the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Since the Rabat summit, the membership of OIC has grown rapidly from 24 to 54 member states plus two observer states (Kazakhstan and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two Muslim communities (Turkish Muslim Community of Kibris and Moro National Liberation Front). Its membership includes monarchies, republics, Islamic republics and military dictatorships. In terms of world economic standards, they include countries from the highest per capita income group and countries from the lowest group.

Even though the number of participating states has increased dramatically, the process of institutionalization of the OIC as a modern international organization has not gone smoothly. According to Abdullahil Ahsan, citing Tunku Abdul Rahman, this was mainly due to ‘the ego and indifference’ of some member states and the lack of common political,
economic, social and cultural factors.\textsuperscript{9} Despite this wide diversity, as John O. Vol has pointed out, the ‘OIC has become a global formal network of official linkages among states, in which the majority of the population is Muslim’\textsuperscript{10} and is the most significant institution of global political Islam.

The Charter did not precisely prescribe the conditions for OIC membership. According to Article VIII of the Charter, ‘every Muslim state is eligible to join the Islamic Conference upon submission of an application expressing its desire and preparedness to adopt this Charter’. The meaning of the term ‘Muslim state’ was vague and in practice it has frequently been used inconsistently.

\textbf{Indonesia and the OIC During the 1970s and 1980s}

Indonesia did not send a delegation to the 1969 Rabat conference, nor to the first and the second Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers (ICFM).\textsuperscript{11} The major reason for this was that the New Order government was still consolidating its domestic power. The inclusion of Islam in foreign policy making at this time would only have constrained Indonesia’s internal political consolidation. Moreover, the government, particularly the military, still had a strong perception that Islam could threaten Indonesia’s political stability and that elements of the Muslim community still wanted to establish an Islamic state. Thus the New Order regime did not want to include Islamic sentiments in Indonesia’s foreign policy due to domestic political considerations. Furthermore, the 1971 election results, which gave a decisive victory for Golkar, was also a crucial starting point for the New Order to make clear that Islam was not a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. More importantly, with higher priority given to regional cooperation and stability, Indonesia put the regional grouping ASEAN, established in 1967, as the cornerstone of its foreign policy rather than the OIC.

Indonesia’s first attendance at a major meeting of the OIC was the third ICFM in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1972. At this meeting, Indonesia’s delegation, headed by foreign minister Adam Malik, was instructed by President Soeharto to promote cooperation among the members of the OIC based on equal partnership and the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{12} Indonesia would only participate in the OIC in a loose and non-binding way without involving Islamic sentiments\textsuperscript{13} and to the extent that this was consistent with the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{14} In this context, President Soeharto regarded the
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UN as being a more important multilateral forum for Indonesia’s foreign policy than the OIC.

Soeharto also perceived that the OIC was not reliable enough in settling all issues related to Islam. This was mainly due to the ‘ideological’ barriers and internal divisions in the OIC. The lack of strong internal cohesion among the organization’s members pushed Indonesia to limit its political commitment to the OIC. As a former foreign minister noted, ‘considering the lack of cohesion among the OIC members, President Soeharto never showed any interests in Indonesia being too deeply involved in the OIC’. Moreover, as one senior diplomat remarked:

During that period [1970–1980s], OIC was divided into two main groups: revolutionary (progressive) and conservative Islamic states and it will be good for Indonesia to stay away from these two groups in order to lessen the internal conflict among the members.

Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC, as Kusumaatmadja noted, was also partly motivated by a political reason: ‘to prevent the organization from becoming a pan-Arab organization. Indonesia instead encouraged the OIC to become a mainstream movement among developing countries’. In addition, as Amien Rais noted, the OIC was also divided into Arab (pan Arabist) and non-Arab camps, which in turn weakened the internal unity of the OIC as a multilateral organization. As a result, Indonesia had no strong political commitment to enhancing its relations with the OIC. Its level of involvement in the OIC thus was very limited.

Furthermore, President Soeharto perceived that any close relationship with the Muslim world via the OIC would become a serious political hurdle to Indonesia’s relationship with the Western world. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Indonesia’s relations with the Western world were seen as much more significant in the sense that Indonesia needed large-scale foreign investment and aid to accelerate its economic development. The position of Indonesia in the OIC, in other words, can be seen as a compromise between a ‘policy of accommodation’ to domestic political circumstances and the political imperative of Indonesia’s good relations with the Western world.

However, the Indonesian government was determined to maintain its participation in the OIC, reflecting the fact that Indonesia has the
largest Muslim population in the world. As Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the next Foreign Minister after Adam Malik, stated, ‘Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC is an indication that our foreign policy cannot ignore that 88 percent of our population which belongs to the Muslim religion.’ This attitude reflects the ambiguity of most of Indonesia’s policies toward the OIC. On the one hand, Indonesia’s limited membership of the OIC was based on the country’s official non-Islamic status but on the other hand Soeharto had also to respect the voice of Islam within Indonesian society for the purposes of his domestic political needs; Indonesia thus needed to participate in the OIC.

Some Muslim leaders – of NU and Muhammadiyah, for instance – regretted the government’s refusal to sign the OIC Charter, while the ‘secular-nationalists’ and non-Muslim elites applauded this policy. In order to calm down such domestic debate within the political elite, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, issued a press statement that ‘the government was not yet prepared to sign the Islamic Charter because Indonesia was not an Islamic state.’

From the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah in 1972 Indonesia committed itself more actively to participate in these conferences. This was mainly because domestically the New Order government had succeeded in controlling political Islam and consolidating its political power. Despite this, Indonesia asked the OIC to apply looser criteria for membership in its case, because the country still rejected Article VIII of the OIC Charter that stated that ‘every Muslim state is eligible to join the Islamic Conference’. While Indonesia still refused to sign the Charter, it committed itself to participating in OIC based on the 1945 Constitution. The position of Indonesia in the OIC was thus as an ‘active participant’.

This attitude of Indonesia toward the OIC has been constantly maintained for more than two decades. Even though Indonesia was prepared to participate actively in OIC programmes, it would not make religious considerations the main objective of its involvement. The ultimate rationale for Indonesia’s participation in the OIC was said to be not Islamic sentiments but rather to fully implement the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy as stated in 1945 Constitution. This ‘secular’ attitude was a deliberate effort to ‘express at least nominal solidarity when appropriate in order to contain and deny the Muslim community the ability to mobilize
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its strength which might jeopardize domestic stability. To put it another way, the New Order regime had to reconcile its main political objectives of preserving the non-religious identity of Indonesia with the need to respond to domestic political and social realities.

Commenting on Indonesia’s participation in the OIC from the 1970s to the late 1980s, Imron Rosyadi, a member of the House of Representatives from the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan noted that it was static, half-hearted and a mere formality.

Indonesia and the OIC in the 1990s

The end of the Cold War and alteration to Soeharto’s domestic political agenda in the 1990s marked a heightening of Indonesia’s role within the OIC. Indonesia, for example, finally sought full membership of the OIC in 1990. The alteration of Indonesia’s membership of the OIC was due to changes of the OIC membership criteria to a looser one. After strong lobbying by Indonesia, the new criteria no longer explicitly mentions ‘Muslim states’; rather, states that have a Muslim population can or may join the organization.

Soeharto attended the sixth OIC summit in Dakar, Senegal, in December 1991, the first time an Indonesian President had attended such a meeting. This summit was also the first held in black Africa. As Azra argues, Indonesia had changed its foreign policy toward the Muslim world, particularly to the OIC, since the late 1980s. Indonesia was following more active and assertive policies to the Muslim world and establishing closer relations with Muslim countries. With his attendance in the OIC Summit, Soeharto not only aimed to show the Indonesian Muslim community his greater concern about the Muslim world, but more importantly his growing interest in the issues pertinent to Islamic sentiment in domestic politics.

Domestically, as already mentioned, in 1990 President Soeharto demonstrated his greater ‘Islamicity’ by giving his approval for the establishment of ICMI, which served as a new political machine of the New Order regime. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, political Islam had re-emerged as a force in Indonesian politics while Soeharto’s political support from the military and his political legitimacy had been significantly diminished. Thus, the formation of ICMI was not only aimed at building closer links with the Indonesian Muslim community but also at
co-opting this community and providing the regime with a political tool that could be used to mobilise political support for Soeharto. His first attendance at the summit was also believed by many analysts as a result of political lobbying from some prominent Muslim leaders at ICMI and as a political effort to attract the support of Indonesia’s Muslim community for the 1992 general election.33

There were also significant changes in international relations with the end of Cold War and revival of Islam in world politics. More importantly, the summit in Dakar was quite significant due to the rapid changes in the international system, particularly the Western world’s perception of the Muslim world.

Soeharto’s attendance at the Senegal summit was also aimed at increasing the international status of Indonesia in the Muslim world. Indonesia then utilized the Islamic solidarity of the Muslim world to mobilize political support for Indonesia chairing the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992. Moreover, on the issue of East Timor, Indonesia asked the Muslim world’s leaders to give their support to Indonesia at any meetings of the UN General Assembly. In fact, the Muslim countries were the major supporters of Indonesia in dealing with the East Timor issue at the UN.34 With full support from the OIC, Indonesia used the organization to gain votes in the UN General Assembly on the East Timor issue and even justify its policies on East Timor.35

During his attendance at the OIC summit, Soeharto proposed some political, economic and cultural programmes to assist with the major problems that most OIC members faced. In his speech, specifically Soeharto stressed the need for the OIC to further enhance its cooperation in the field of family planning, management and telecommunications.36

**Political aspects of Indonesia’s OIC involvement during the 1990s**

The increase in Indonesia’s political role within OIC became apparent when it proposed ways of improving the world’s image of Islam. In the post-Cold War era, Islam has often been associated in Western eyes with terrorist activities and various acts of violence throughout the world. As a result, this situation has created a negative image of Islam in the Western world. For Indonesia, the sharp increase in the threat of Islamic fundamentalism was one of the important issues that the OIC had to solve following the OIC summit in Senegal in December 1991. As Ali Alatas
has remarked, ‘Islam is often associated with terrorism and various violent actions. This negative image is often portrayed of Islam, which is not based on facts.’ He further elaborated:

Terrorism and violence exist everywhere. It has nothing to do with religion but more on the socio-political conditions in each country … We also have to differentiate between terrorism and struggles for independence. They are not the same.37

Ali Alatas argued that, in order to improve the position of the OIC in world politics, the organization should convince the world that the Muslim world is not associated with terrorism and other violent activities. He further warned that the Western world’s misunderstanding of Islam and terrorist activities would not only give a negative impression to Islam itself but also put the OIC in a position of enmity with the Western world. This would not be good for the future of the OIC.38 Moreover, he noted, ‘it was our obligation to improve the image of Islam and the position of the OIC, otherwise the OIC would lose its relevance’ .39

This was one of the crucial issues discussed at the seventh OIC summit in Casablanca, Morocco, on 10–11 December 1994.40 To improve the tarnished image of Islam, the OIC members unanimously agreed to review an unprecedented plan to stop the export of fundamentalist violence.41 Indonesia, together with Egypt, called for OIC members to refuse to finance or support ‘terrorist acts’ and to make sure that their territory was not used by violent groups to plan or carry out such attacks. More specifically, OIC members were asked ‘not to host, train, arm, finance or provide facilities’ for violent Islamic groups.42

Cancelling the negative views of Islam remained the top item on the agenda of the OIC when Indonesia hosted the OIC foreign ministerial meeting in Jakarta in December 1996, a gathering officially opened by President Soeharto. By hosting this conference, Indonesia automatically took over the ministerial chair from Guinea. This chairmanship reflected a growing acceptance of Indonesia’s Islamic credentials by other OIC members. As foreign minister Ali Alatas remarked in his speech at the conference:

There is today a growing tendency in some circles outside the Islamic world to distort the truth about Islam by portraying it as the
new adversary of Western civilization after the demise of international communism. This dangerous concept makes no distinction between acts of terrorism and the legitimate struggle of our brother Muslims for their inalienable political rights.43

He also further commented that:

Admittedly, there have been occasions when acts of senseless violence have been committed while unjustifiably invoking the name of Islam. Such acts have been condemned by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as violations of the teachings of the Holy Qur’an and the tenets of Islam. But the world at large will never be able to make this vital distinction until we are able to effectively communicate Islam for what it really is – a force for peace, justice and common good, a way of life that has intellectually enriched Western civilization itself.44

With the above speech, Indonesia not only emphasized that Islam was not the enemy of the Western world but also flagged the need to improve the image of Islam in the changing map of world politics. In his opening speech, President Soeharto mentioned that:

To seize the opportunities and face the challenges of a new century, the Muslim Ummah must put its house in order. It should aim at sustaining the effort of consolidating the national resilience of each (Muslim) country and engender political stability at the national, regional and international levels. Muslims in a country or region will never make any progress if they are constantly being involved in internal conflicts and wars with their neighbors. More importantly, force and violence are not characteristics of Islam.45

In this context, Soeharto suggested the OIC increase its efforts to unite its members and put more realistic priorities on its programs in order to improve the image of Islam.46 By emphasizing this issue, Indonesia showed its intention to exert a moderating influence on the Muslim world in an effort to eliminate the causes of the false perceptions of the Muslim world by the Western countries. Indonesia also positioned itself to take the role of facilitating communication between the Muslim and the Western world.
Indonesia’s other significant political contribution to the OIC was its role in facilitating the end of the conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front over the Moro problem (see Chapter 5 below).

Indonesia’s economic participation in the OIC

In the economic field, Indonesia endeavoured to enhance cooperation among OIC members. For nearly 30 years the OIC has been so occupied by political issues that economic cooperation had been left behind. Trade amongst members was quite insignificant in comparison to their trade with non-Islamic countries. During early 1980s and 1990s, intra-OIC trade represented only 10 per cent of the total trade volume of OIC members, while 60 per cent of OIC members’ trade was still oriented towards developed countries.47

The flow of trade among OIC member countries amounted to only US$19.3 billion in 1990 and increased marginally to US$26.6 billion in 1991.48 According to a report compiled by the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade, such a low proportional share of intra-organizational trade essentially reflects lack of complimentarity on the part of member country economies as well as lack of close trading links and regional arrangements.49

During the period 1980 to 1990, OIC export performance continued to stagnate. Total exports were US$185 billion in 1980 and stood at only US$186 billion in 1990. In 1991 the value of world exports and imports were estimated at US$3,530 billion and US$3,660 billion respectively, out of which Islamic countries’ share stood at only 6.8 per cent and 6.2 per cent, respectively. There has been indeed a decline in the market share of Islamic countries in world trade. As a proportion of world exports, their share fell from 15.1 per cent in 1980 to only 4.36 per cent in 1990 before increasing marginally to 6.8 per cent in 1991.50

In the light of this weakness of intra-organizational trade, Indonesia urged the OIC to boost its economic cooperation. At the sixteenth Ministerial Meeting of the OIC in Morocco in January 1986, foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who led Indonesia’s delegation, said that OIC member countries should focus more on efforts to increase economic cooperation and help poor Islamic countries in overcoming their difficulties.51 He noted ‘we have to try to settle the existing political differences
among us, therefore we would be able to concentrate our attention on facing our economic problems and challenges. In other words, the OIC members needed to have the common political will in order to further bolster economic and trade relationships between them.

A concrete action that Indonesia proposed to enhance economic cooperation among OIC members was a long-term trade financing scheme to be run by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The main objective of this scheme was to promote trade between Muslim countries. Muslim countries facing severe financial constraints could utilize special funds from the IDB to promote trade, which would in turn advance the welfare of the country in trouble. This idea was backed by most OIC members at the second meeting of COMCEC (the Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation) in Istanbul in March 1986. The project, which started in 1987, made an initial US$300 million available to fund trade among OIC member states in non-traditional goods. This meeting also agreed to look at ways of demolishing non-tariff barriers and of introducing an Islamic trade preferential scheme.

Even though this project was very promising in promoting trade among OIC members, Indonesia did not make full use of loans from the IDB as one of the specialized institutions of the OIC. This was mainly because many Indonesian projects intended to be financed under the auspices of this bank could not meet the bank’s technical requirements; they also failed to meet the feasibility studies conducted by an international consultant on every project proposed to be financed. Indonesia has received only a few loans from the IDB to finance development projects in fishery, livestock and cement development projects. In addition, the country had utilized only US$11.24 million from the total export-financing scheme between 1988 and 1998 whereas Malaysia, for instance, utilized US$56.71 million in the same period. Even President Soeharto himself asked the IDB to continue its efforts to help Indonesia and other developing countries in solving their economic and social problems. In his opening speech at the annual meeting of the IDB in Jakarta on 29 November 1995, Soeharto urged the IDB to ease the terms of its assistance for heavily indebted countries. He also called on IDB member countries to heighten economic cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral bases as a way to offset the decline in capital flows from developed nations.
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As a former chairman of the Middle East Committee of KADIN (Kamar Dagang dan Industri or the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) explained, Indonesian businessmen were reluctant to apply for a loan from the IDB due to its tough technical procedures. In contrast, a senior Indonesian diplomat in charge of economic cooperation with the OIC argued that this scheme has not worked smoothly not due to technical reasons but mainly because of the lack of political commitment in the OIC and IDB itself. She commented that the programme had been based only on rhetoric. The failure of Indonesia's Muslim businessmen to get loans from the IDB was due to the lack of technical preparation for doing business with their counterparts from the Muslim world, and particularly the lack of commitment of IDB to assist Indonesia's businesses. In order to further boost the growth of economic cooperation between Indonesia and the Muslim world, Mari‘e Muhamad, the Minister of Finance, urged the IDB to be more flexible in its loan to Indonesia's businesses.

Indonesia also took the initiative to host an international seminar on Inter-Zone Cooperation in Free Trade and Industry in Jakarta in January 1994. At this seminar, Indonesia urged OIC members to give more attention to the impact of economic globalization, increase the competitive advantage of the trade products of OIC members, and share common views to attract foreign direct investment. A similar message was also emphasized by Ginanjar Kartasasmita as a representative of Asia in the tenth COMCEC meeting in Istanbul in October 1994. He added that OIC members should be pragmatic and realistic in putting their economic interests above their political interests.

Enhancing economic cooperation among OIC members also became one of the crucial agenda items of the 24th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jakarta during December 1996. In Indonesia's view, as articulated by Ali Alatas, it was quite crucial for the OIC to set economic cooperation as the main focus of its programmes rather than political issues. This would enable the OIC to accelerate economic cooperation among its members.

As Ali Alatas postulated in his speech ‘it is the time for the OIC in a more interdependent era to leave the political differences among the members and take the economic issues as its top priority.' He further urged the members of the OIC:
To utilize the existing database at the Trade and Information Network of Islamic Countries (TINIC) and the OIC Information Network System (OICIS-NET), to launch effective trade and investment facilitation programs to mobilize the private sector in economic endeavors; and to apply the evolutionary approach so that we do not have to wait for all members to be ready to participate in a project before we could launch and pursue it. And the major prerequisite to achieve the above actions is to muster political will.72

In his opening speech, President Soeharto also underscored the importance of economic cooperation as a field often neglected by the members of the OIC.73 He also expressed the belief that, with the resources available, the OIC could make a substantial contribution to South–South cooperation. The meeting then agreed to forge economic cooperation and to examine the possibility of establishing an Islamic common market.74

However, it soon became clear that there was a difference of opinion between Indonesia and the majority of OIC members on the question of how this heightened economic cooperation could be achieved.75

The 8th Summit of the OIC held in Tehran, Iran on 9–11 December 1998 officially called for the formation of an Islamic Common Market. The Muslim common market had the potential to extend from Morocco and Algeria in the west, all the way to Indonesia in the east. By establishing the common market, Muslim countries would be able to solidify their unity through common economic and business interests.76

Members of the OIC agreed, as a preparatory phase, to set up the Intra-Islamic Regional Cooperation (IRC), which would provide an opportunity for members to understand and appreciate each other’s economic concerns and sensitivities.77 The next phase was to establish the Intra-Islamic Preferential Trade Area (IPTA) as a forum to provide preferential treatment to each other in trade. The Intra-Islamic Free Trade Area (IFTA) was to be the third phase of the Islamic Common Market. It involved free movement of all goods across the member countries without any common trade policy but with the condition that a certain percentage of the traded goods must be of indigenous content. The fourth phase was to establish an Intra-Islamic Customs Union, which would enable the member countries to have a common tariff policy towards the
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non-member countries. The final phase was the creation of the Islamic Common Market (ICM).

Despite these plans being drawn up, the position of Indonesia in relation to these developments was ambivalent. Even though Indonesia had not objected to the idea of establishing an ICM, it asked OIC members to consider this idea more deeply. It argued that OIC members should take into account at least two crucial difficulties in establishing the Islamic Common Market. The first problem lay in the geographical proximity of the members. OIC members are located on different continents, which would create problems in uniting the market. Political inclinations and lack of strong political commitments to these arrangements were also an ‘ideological and political barrier’ to the OIC implementing this idea.78

More importantly, Indonesia opposed the use of ‘Islamic solidarity’ as the main propeller of economic cooperation among OIC members.79 As one Indonesian senior diplomat argued, the basic reason for this economic cooperation was the need to increase the level of prosperity among OIC members and for that reason religious solidarity could not be used as a tool for establishing closer economic cooperation; rather, weight should be put on the common need to increase economic interaction among the members.80 Moreover, to establish the Islamic Common Market, the idea should be backed by a very strong political will from all OIC members. However, most members still faced crucial economic and political domestic problems and depended on financial assistance from Western countries or other international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. As such, the ICM idea would only sharpen the clash of interests between the Muslim and the Western worlds.81 On top of that, Indonesia had put more emphasis on economic regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific region through ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).82 In other words, the idea of establishing an Islamic Common Market was too ambitious and unattainable.83

Indonesia asked the OIC to consider the idea of using technical cooperation as a more pragmatic and realistic way of boosting economic cooperation among OIC members. It argued that the biggest problem for economic cooperation in the OIC was the lack of concrete plans and failures in implementation.84 As a former Indonesian foreign minister pointed out, if the OIC already has some of the institutions and mechanisms that could be used to promote intra-OIC trade and economic coopera-
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tion, then why did the members not optimally use the OIC instruments (the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and COMCEC). In other words, ‘why should we waste our time and energy by creating new mechanisms (Islamic Common Market)?’

The above discussion has shown that Indonesia has consistently stressed the need to accelerate economic cooperation between OIC members based on pragmatism and not on Islamic sentiments. It has also shown Indonesia’s consistency in promoting economic cooperation in the OIC by maximizing the use of established institutions and mechanisms in the organization. Further, Indonesia had different approaches, promoted a more pragmatic and attainable way, with the majority of OIC members in enhancing the economic cooperation within the OIC.

The Emergence of the D-8 (Developing 8): New economic cooperation within the OIC

The unsatisfactory progress of economic cooperation among Muslim countries in the OIC became the impetus for certain Muslim countries (Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria and Iran) to create a smaller network for economic cooperation under the framework of the so-called D-8 (Developing-8). The D-8 countries argued that the OIC was too big to effectively enhance the economic cooperation among OIC members. Furthermore, the economic disparity among OIC members was also too wide.

This idea, which originally came from the prime minister of Turkey, Necmetin Erbakan, aimed to unite the Islamic countries in facing the unfairness and the ambiguous attitudes of the Western world in trade and economic development. The D-8’s main objectives were to pave the way for further cooperation between developing Islamic countries from three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe), in order to cope with the tight competition existing among developed countries. ‘Currently, the developed nations are getting richer while the poorer are becoming poorer, and this is threatening world peace’ said Erbakan in the two-day meeting of foreign ministers from eight countries to lay the foundations of the D-8. The grouping focused on two major areas: regional economic cooperation among Islamic developing countries from three continents; and international solidarity to promote peace and economic relations.
Erbakan argued that this new grouping could be used to boost members’ negligible economic ties and to work in parallel with the G-7 in discussing global economic issues and searching for the best solutions to overcome the global economic and trade obstacles. Erbakan expected that the D-8 could become a ‘new world economic power’, based on the fact that the total population of the members of the D-8 reached nearly 800 million, 70 per cent of the world’s 1.1 billion Muslims. The grouping’s membership ranged from Southeast Asia to the western part of Africa. It reflected five different streams of Islamic culture: Malay, Persian, Balkan, Arab and Black African. Trade among them was not developed enough and unequally distributed. Total exports of the D-8 countries to world markets in 1996 amounted to US$2092.29 billion, of which US$15.41 billion (7.62 per cent) was to OIC member countries and only US$7.38 billion (3.65 per cent) among the D-8 countries themselves. Total imports of the D-8 countries from world markets reached US$221.45 billion in 1996 and only US$7.19 billion (3.25 per cent) came from among the D-8 countries.

In addition, trade between D8 members is not distributed evenly. Some countries have trade relations with all members, while others have trade relations with no other members at all. Iran, for example, had no trade relations with Nigeria. Even so, based on the above figures and conditions, greater trade relations between the D-8 countries is still possible. In responding to this idea, Indonesia was very cautious. This was mainly because some of the members explicitly wanted the economic grouping to be based on Islamic principles. Indonesia, however, opposed the use of ‘Islamic principles’ as the basis of D-8 membersip. As Nana Sutresna (Indonesia’s contact person to D-8) noted, ‘we urged that the membership of D-8 should not be based on religion but on the size of population’. He further added ‘the membership is open to countries with populations of more than 40 million and Malaysia as a prominent developing country is an exception’. Indonesia’s objection to the use of Islamic principles as the main foundation of D-8 was accepted by Turkey. The Turkish foreign minister, Tansu Ciller said that ‘the D-8 group would not be an entity based on religion although the current participants were all Islamic countries and this economic grouping will grow in time and admit as members many other states’. This position was then accepted by all D-8 members.
As the initial step towards a D-8 summit, Turkey hosted a two-day meeting of foreign ministers on 13–14 June 1997. The meeting agreed that the main objective of the D-8 was socio-economic development among its members. It also adopted its six principles: ‘peace instead of conflict, dialogue instead of confrontation, cooperation instead of exploitation, justice instead of double-standards, equality instead of discrimination, and democracy instead of oppression’.100

The first summit meeting of D-8 heads of government was held in Istanbul on 15 June 1997. At this summit, as with Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC, Soeharto emphasized the need to have closer cooperation among developing countries to enable them to accelerate development and eradicate poverty.101 He also suggested the new economic grouping draw up realistic and pragmatic plans so that efforts were not be obstructed by overly ambitious goal setting, lack of commitment and insufficient funds.102 The summit agreed to encompass all areas of economic cooperation and political consultations and coordination at international fora.103 It also accepted six projects of cooperation in the areas of trade, human resources development, communication and information, banking and privatization, agriculture, and industry.104 These projects would become promotional and sustainable projects of the D-8 for pushing and enhancing economic cooperation among members.105

Nevertheless, the establishment of the D-8 as a new economic grouping produced a variety of different responses. Many Arab countries that had huge oil resources signalled their ‘dislike’ of the D-8. Saudi Arabia, for instance, argued that any efforts to heighten economic cooperation among the OIC members should not be channelled through a smaller and more select group but within the framework of the OIC and subsidiary institutions such as the COMCEC.106 Saudi Arabia also noted that not a single country from Muslim Central Asia had been invited to join the D-8.

More seriously, critics also argued that, while Bangladesh was one of the least developed countries, Malaysia has a thriving capitalist economy and to attempt to integrate them into a single market was foolhardy.107 The Western world gave similar responses to the emergence of the D-8. As the Jakarta Post and Republika reported, Western diplomats (particularly the US) tended to see D-8 as standing for ‘Disaster 8’ rather than ‘Developing-8’, regarding the group as a potential calamity club.108 Politically, the West
perceived that this new economic grouping would become an ‘Islamic bloc’ that could create new potential hostilities with other economic and political groupings and even with the other Islamic countries.109

Domestically, Indonesia’s involvement in the D-8 also attracted many different comments. Thee Kian Wie, one leading economist at LIPI noted that ‘in the early stages of the D-8, we were not cynical about the existence of the D-8. It was because the D-8 has good potential to grow, if it could be managed effectively’.110 Pande Radja Silalahi, a leading economist at CSIS, argued ‘even though the major population of the members of D-8 were Muslim, the bottom line of economic cooperation among them should be based on economic rationality otherwise this new grouping would have no significant impact on the economic development of its members’.111

A more optimistic view about the future of the D-8 was voiced by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). Its vice chairman, Fadel Muhammad, said that ‘KADIN would support the formation of D-8 in order to boost Indonesia’s trade with any Islamic countries and KADIN would facilitate the possibility to establish cooperation networks with any chamber of commerce of the members’.112

There were cynical comments about Indonesia’s involvement in the D-8 too. It was argued by some political analysts that ‘the D-8 was no more than a new talk shop of leading members of the OIC’.113 They argued that Indonesia’s participation in the D-8 only boosted President Soeharto’s efforts to strengthen his political position both domestically and internationally by showing Indonesia’s growing concerns with issues pertinent to the Islamic world, such as economic prosperity.114

The above views clearly show contrasting ideas about Indonesia’s involvement in the D-8. Economically, this idea was less pragmatic and unlikely to succeed due to the structural and geographical constraints among the members, but politically, it could serve as a ‘pilot project for economic cooperation’ of eight members of the OIC in order to strengthen the position of Islamic countries vis-à-vis developed countries.

In the post-Soeharto era, the D-8 lost its significance following the financial crisis that hit Indonesia. Indonesia has relied on the IMF’s programme for its economic recovery and focused its domestic economic restoration on getting support from developed countries. The sustainability of D-8, then, has been put aside by the government. After nine years of inactivity, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reactivated the
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D-8 by hosting its second summit on 11–13 May 2006 in Bali. This summit refocused the economic cooperation between members in promoting trade, particularly among private companies. However, the success of this new economic cooperation among these eight OIC members still has a long way to go due to their domestic economic problems.

**Indonesia’s socio-cultural contribution to the OIC**

In the social-cultural field, Indonesia’s contributions to the Muslim world have focused on improving the quality of human resources in Muslim countries, the flow of information between Muslim countries and exchange of ideas on the promulgation of Islamic values. As Indonesia’s minister of religious affairs noted in his speech at the 6th Conference of the Ministers of Awqafs (Islamic promulgation) and Islamic Affairs in Jakarta in October 1997, instead of being trapped in political differences, ‘this conference will be of utmost importance if we can proceed with a simple, well-planned and continuous program’\(^{115}\) to increase the welfare of the ummah (Islamic community). By emphasizing the need for more concrete actions that the OIC should take, Indonesia asked the OIC members to show the world that ‘Islam is a peace-loving religion’\(^{116}\) and that ‘Islam can provide answers to overcome their problems and challenges.’\(^{117}\) By hosting international Islamic conferences on these issues, Indonesia has tried to attract the attention of the OIC members away from complex political issues to social-cultural issues.

This speech, again, shows that Indonesia urged the OIC to emphasize the significance of pragmatic programs in dealing with the issues that most OIC members faced. More importantly, Indonesia also asked the members to show the world that ‘Islam is a non-violent and friendly religion.’\(^{118}\)

Since the late 1980s, Indonesia actively hosted international Islamic conferences on several important issues such as food production, family planning, communications development, biotechnology and tourism.\(^{119}\) As a modern international organization, the OIC had already set up many subsidiary organs, specialized institutions, and affiliated institutions related to the above issues. Yet Indonesia together with other members felt that those institutions were not optimally used to solve the common socio-cultural issues such as the lack of human resources and technology faced by member countries.
In the sector of information and communication, for instance, the OIC established the International Islamic News Agency (IINA) and the Islamic States Broadcasting Organization (ISBO). These two specialized institutions aimed at transmitting information, spreading da’wah (the teaching of Islam) and promoting awareness of the heritage of Islam. Yet, most OIC members argue that these two institutions had not achieved their purposes due to the lack of facilities, human skills and capital.

In order to improve the unbalanced flow of information, and operational activities, Indonesia hosted the second meeting of post and telecommunications ministers of the OIC in Bandung in November 1991. At this meeting, Indonesia offered to share its experiences in the field with OIC members where it had a proven record and to use its telecommunications training and education centres for the benefit of all member countries. All OIC members accepted this offer; implementation of this programme was administered by the Ministry of Information and conducted in the Balai Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Penerangan (Education and Information Training Agency) in 1992 in Yogyakarta. From 1992 to 1995 at least 150 participants from all OIC member countries took part in this training. The meeting also agreed to intensify exchanges of experience and skills among OIC members and further promote joint investments and industrial development programs in post and telecommunications sectors.

Like other aspects of Indonesia’s contribution to the OIC, Indonesia’s participation in the social-cultural field was also based on non-religious factors. In his closing speech to the Bandung conference, Indonesia’s Minister of Post and Telecommunications, Soesilo Sudarman, stressed that the common perceptions and cooperation which resulted from the meeting were based on the spirit of the Ten Bandung Principles adopted by the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung to promote cooperation among Asian and African countries, particularly in fighting against colonialism.

The absence of Islamic factors in Indonesia’s policy to the OIC

The above discussions show that Indonesia has never made its involvement in the OIC the main priority of its foreign policy. In the New Order period, this was clearly indicated by Soeharto’s reluctance to attend most OIC summits or to apply to be a host of OIC summits. The ‘minimum’ of political relations also enabled Indonesia to have more flexibility in its
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relationships with both Islamic countries and the Western world. This is an example of what Gregory Raymond calls a ‘necessity of foreign policy’ for Indonesia to conduct an equidistant relationship with the Muslim world and Western countries.

A retired general who is also well known as a Muslim intellectual argued that ‘the influence of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy to the OIC was very limited’. He further commented that ‘Pak Harto (Soeharto) has never placed Islam as a key determinant in foreign policy, he always put pragmatism (national interests) as a sole consideration’. More importantly, ‘our foreign policy to the OIC was much dependent on the condition of domestic politics’.

As a result, Indonesia has never had any significant political priorities in its relationship with the OIC. The minimalist political interaction with the OIC under Soeharto was due to the New Order’s Islamophobia in which ‘Indonesia did not want to be perceived by Western countries as giving room for (Islamic) radicalism of some of the OIC members’.

Meanwhile the Department of Foreign Affairs, as the institution responsible for the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy, had similar views regarding the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. In most of Indonesia’s policies towards the OIC, the religious factor (Islam) was never considered as the major determinant factor in policy-making and implementation. One senior diplomat maintained that ‘Islam is viewed only as a cultural aspect of a bilateral or multilateral relationship with any Islamic country in the OIC’. He continued that ‘[d]omestically, we regarded the Muslim community as one of the sources in policymaking, but Islam has never been internalized in foreign policy making to the OIC’.

Another senior diplomat even argued that ‘[t]he Department of Foreign Affairs is a rational actor in which we never considered Islam as an instrument or objective of Indonesia’s foreign policy’. As a result, a former foreign minister acknowledged that ‘there is no direct link between Islam and the content of Indonesia’s participation in the OIC’.

One senior researcher at a government research institute remarked that the OIC would be effective only in settling international problems pertinent to Islamic issues so long as it did not involve the interests of the Western world (in particular, the US). A similar comment was also given by a leading Middle East analyst who argued that, due to internal
political problems among the OIC members, the OIC could not face the international challenges of global politics.\textsuperscript{135}

Quite surprisingly, the response of Indonesia’s Muslim society to Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC was weak. It seems that the Muslim community did not actively respond to Indonesia’s changing role in OIC. The Muslim community did not often articulate its interests to government about what should be done in the OIC. This was because the Muslim community paid only little attention to the OIC.

The major reason for this was that the OIC was seen to be preoccupied with the internal conflicts among its members, particularly among Gulf and Arab countries. Given the internal problems of the OIC, the Indonesian Muslim community was quite pessimistic about the real benefits and even the future of the OIC. Thus, Amien Rais noted that the OIC was only a paper tiger in dealing with the issues of the Muslim world. He argued that the existence of the OIC was felt only in its conferences and there was no follow-up to the decisions made there.\textsuperscript{136} Another reason related to the previous one was that the OIC was dominated by the issues of Arab countries vis-à-vis the Western world.

Amien Rais also added that ‘the Muslim community has never even openly asked the government to host the OIC summit’.\textsuperscript{137} The disinterest of the Muslim community regarding Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC thus gave President Soeharto an ‘unchallengeable’ political opportunity to set and conduct foreign policy as he desired.

Despite the absence of Islamic factors in Indonesia’s behaviour toward the OIC, Indonesia needed to maintain its involvement in the OIC in order to get support from Islamic countries on foreign policy issues that involved the interests of the Western world (e.g. the East Timor issue). In this context, the OIC become a diplomatic tool for Indonesia in multilateral fora such as the UN to protect Indonesia’s national interests vis-à-vis the West.\textsuperscript{138}

Even though Indonesia participated more actively in the OIC during the 1990s, the old pattern of ambiguity towards Islam noted earlier by Azra remained clear.\textsuperscript{139} This was mainly due to the changing domestic political context and the political agenda of the New Order regime. In other words, the need to include Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy has always been paralleled with the condition of domestic politics. In the post-Soeharto’s Indonesia’s foreign policy, the country’s position in the
OIC remains the same. The consistency on the implementation of the *Bebas-Aktif* principle in foreign policy, particularly of the exclusion of the religious factor, is a major aspect of Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC.

**Conclusion**

From the discussion above, it can be concluded that Indonesia’s foreign policy decision makers in the New Order period did not see Islam as having a crucial role in determining Indonesian foreign policy. In most aspects of Indonesia’s involvement toward the Muslim world, Soeharto tended to avoid the religious links in any forms of cooperation with other states. Nor has this approach changed much in post-Soeharto Indonesia. As such, Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC has never been driven by Islamic considerations but rather by pragmatic assessment of the country’s economic and political needs. It has been noted by most respondents that this is part of the implementation of the *Bebas-Aktif* principle in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Indonesia’s approach to the OIC has not created significant difficulties in the country’s relations with the Western world. On the contrary, as this chapter shows, in its efforts to improve the image of the OIC with regard to Islamic radicalism and terrorism, Indonesia has tried to act as a bridge in relations between the Muslim and the Western worlds.

In all aspects of Indonesia’s involvement toward the OIC, particularly the political, economic and social aspects, Indonesia has based its contributions on non-Islamic sentiment and never wished to identify itself closely with the OIC. The refusal to use ‘Islamic solidarity’ has created ambiguity in Indonesia’s attitude toward the OIC on one hand, but it has also given more flexibility in its relationship with the Western world on the other hand. These two different characteristics of Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC (ambiguity and flexibility) have been aimed at its domestic and international environment. Domestically, the ambiguity reflects Indonesia’s efforts to constrain the power of Muslim society while internationally flexibility has been used as a political tool by Indonesia to gain support from the Muslim world for the pursuit of its international interests.

The changing nature of both the domestic and international environments since the late 1980s have had a significant impact on Indonesia’s participation in the OIC. Yet, the changing attitude of Indonesia toward
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the Muslim world, particularly in the OIC and the idea to establish the D-8, was consistently based on the political agenda of President Soeharto. In this context, Islam was manipulated by Soeharto as a tool of political mobilization for the sake of his domestic political interests.

Moreover, Indonesia's Muslim community has shown little interest in most aspects of Indonesia's participation in the OIC. The combination of the internal dispute in the OIC and the lack of attention from Indonesian Muslim community were the factors of Indonesia's minimal political interactions with the OIC.

Notes

1. See http://www.dfa.go.id/events/ktm-oki/member.htm and see also Directorate General of International Organizations (1991), p. 82.
2. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat via email, 8 March 2001.
3. Ahsan (1985), p. 52
13. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 5 September 1999.
15. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 5 August 1999.
17. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 1 September 1999.
18. Ibid.
20. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 5 September 1999.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 17.


27. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 5 August 1999.


33. After attending the OIC Summit, Soeharto then also visited the Saudi Arabia to conduct a pilgrimage (haj). This visit was also believed as an obvious effort to gain more sympathy from the Muslim society. In this context, Soeharto has played the ‘Islamic card’ in order both to build a policy coalition and retain political power. This understanding is based on several interviews from September to November 1999. Most of the respondents also linked this phenomenon with the establishment of ICMI as Soeharto’s new political supporter in December 1990.

34. Based on several interviews with senior diplomats from August to December 1999.


37. Ibid.

38. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.

39. Ibid.

40. In this summit, the Indonesia’s delegation was headed by foreign minister Ali Alatas. President Soeharto was not be able to attend this summit due to a heavy domestic agenda. The Jakarta Post, 30 November 1994.

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43. Statement of Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia at the 24th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Jakarta, 9 December 1996.

44. Ibid.

45. Speech of President Soeharto at the 24th Ministerial Conference of the OIC, Jakarta, 9 December 1996.


49. Ibid.


52. Ibid.


54. Ibid.


60. Ibid.

61. The Middle East Committee aimed at promoting Indonesia’s trade with Middle East.

62. Interview with a former Chairmen of the Middle East Committee of KADIN, 2 September 1999.

63. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 3 September 1999.


67
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68. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Media Indonesia, 10 December 1996.
73. The Jakarta Post, 10 December 1996.
74. The Jakarta Post, 14 December 1996.
75. The idea of the establishing Islamic Common Market actually surfaced for the first time in Dhaka in 1993. This idea aimed to foster the trade between countries of the Muslim world as well as their industrialization. This was based on the several reasons, including to increase the level of economies, standards of living, and industrial development in the Muslim world. Rah- man, Hussain and Akkas (1996), pp. 34-39.
77. Ibid., pp. 41–48.
78. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 2 September 1999.
79. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 8 October 1999.
80. Ibid.
81. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 17 November 1999.
82. Interview with a senior diplomat, 8 October 1999.
83. The Jakarta Post, 10 December 1996.
84. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 17 November 1999. See also Suara Karya, 7 December 1996.
85. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999. See also the editorial of the Jakarta Post, 13 December 1996.
88. Ibid.
90. The Jakarta Post, 6 January 1997.
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95. Ibid., p. 6.
96. Department of Foreign Affairs (1999a ), p. 3.
100. Department of Foreign Affairs (no date), p. 4.
103. See Istanbul Declaration of the first D-8 Summit, p. 3.
106. See Department of Foreign Affairs (1999a ), p. 11.
112. Ibid.
114. Interview with some Indonesian scholars, 8 October 1999. This phenomenon was indicated by the fact that realistically President Soeharto no longer had sufficient political legitimacy. As such, they believed that, with Indonesia’s participation in the D-8, Soeharto could gain significant political legitimacy from Muslim society. Moreover, the establishment of the D-8 took place just one year before Soeharto stepped down from the power. Unfortunately, President Soeharto was unable to use this ‘Islamic card’ to retain his presidency in May 1998.
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115. Speech of the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. H.Tarmizi Thaher as the Chairman of the session at the First Plenary Session of the 6th Conference of Ministers of Awqafs and Islamic Affairs of the OIC, Jakarta, 29 October 1997 (http://www.dfa.go.id/english/pidmenag2910.htm). See also Republika, 31 October 1997.

116. Speech by President Soeharto at the opening of the 6th Conference of Ministers of Awqafs and Islamic Affairs of the OIC, Jakarta, 29 October 1997 (http://www.dfa.go.id/english/pidmenag2910.htm).


119. This was compiled from several dailies such as The Jakarta Post, Republika, Suara Karya and Suara Pembaruan from various years (1989 to 1997).


121. Interview with a senior diplomat, 4 November 1999. See also The Jakarta Post, 8 November 1991.


124. Ibid.

125. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 26 August 1999. Usually Indonesia’s delegation was led by the country’s vice president as the highest ranking delegate to the OIC Summit.

126. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 8 October 1999.


128. Interview with the chairman of ICMI, 1 September 1999.

129. Interview with the chairman of ICMI, 1 September 1999 and interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 29 November 1999.

130. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 30 August 1999.

131. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 10 August 1999.

132. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 September 1999.

133. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.

134. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 9 August 1999.


136. Republika, 9 December 1996.
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137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

Indonesia’s Responses to the Middle East Conflict

Even though Indonesia has many national interests in the Middle East, it has no comprehensive policy toward the region to pursue those interests.¹

Introduction

As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, Indonesia has had a long relationship with the Middle East.² Its political engagement in the region started in 1945 when Indonesia focused its diplomacy on seeking recognition and support from Middle Eastern and African countries for its independence.³ The next involvement was when Indonesia initiated the idea of promoting cooperation among Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries against colonialism. This idea then became the foundation of the Asian-African Conference and the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. Yet the pattern of interaction between Indonesia and the Middle East never developed into a more ‘institutionalized’ one, particularly during the Soeharto era.

This chapter focuses on several crucial issues in the Middle East including the problem of Palestine, Indonesia’s relations with Israel and the first Gulf War. These regional issues are not only linked with the Middle East but are also pertinent to the Muslim world as a whole. They became a major influence on Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world and invited the attention of Indonesia’s Muslim community.

Unlike with regard to Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC, the response of Indonesia’s Muslim community to events in the Middle East
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has been loud and clear. Structurally this has been articulated through many different channels. Yet still, this chapter argues, the role of the state has been more dominant than that of society in the making of foreign policy towards the region. Here, the state has tended to ignore the views of the Muslim community, except in the case of Israel.

Indonesia and the Palestine issue: The Muslim voice in the Palestinian–Israeli peace process

The Palestine issue has been the source of conflict in the Middle East for more than 50 years. During this period, essentially Indonesia’s involvement in the region has been linked with Islamic sentiments and support for the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel.4 Since the late 1940s, Indonesia has shown its solidarity with and support for the struggle of the Palestinians including their demands for the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied following the Six Day War of 1967.5

This has been shown by Indonesian support for all UN resolutions on the Palestine issue adopted since Indonesia joined the world body in 1950.6 All these resolutions required the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a principal condition for the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

Indonesia has always argued that its attitude is consistent with the values stated in the 1945 Constitution. As one diplomat has asserted, the support of Indonesia for the struggle of the Palestinians was based on universal values, such as abolition of any form of colonialism and national self-determination as stated in the 1945 Constitution, and not on Islamic solidarity. He further added that Indonesia did not want to mix universal values and Islamic sentiments in its foreign policy, particularly toward the Palestine issue.7

Yet Indonesia’s policies toward the Palestine issue have been perceived as inconsistent and insufficient by some radical elements of Indonesia’s Muslim communities.8 This is because the Indonesian government has always avoided giving any more than political support to the struggle of the Palestinians. During the Arab-Israeli military conflicts of 1967 and 1973, for instance, Indonesia’s policy was to give its support to UN resolutions without giving any of the concrete assistance that had been requested by some Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria. They asked Indonesia to give them its military support as a symbol of Islamic solidar-
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ity, but Indonesia refused. Indonesia’s Muslim community, on the other hand, maintained that the issue of Palestine was not only political but also religious. Therefore, Islamic sentiments should be accommodated in Indonesia’s policy toward Palestine.9

Indonesia’s inconsistent attitude toward Palestine was quite obvious in 1974 when the government, particularly the military/ABRI, did not give the green light to the PLO to upgrade its representative office in Jakarta into an embassy.10 The main reason behind this refusal was the concern of the military about PLO ties to the communists during the 1960s and 1970s.11 Other military concerns were the spread of terrorist activities conducted by several factions within PLO and the negative impact of the spread of radical Islam on Indonesia’s Muslim community.12

Moreover, as one senior diplomat argued, the government, especially the military, did not want to be perceived by Western countries, particularly the US, as having close relations with the PLO.13 In the government’s view the opening of a PLO embassy in Jakarta would only endanger Indonesia’s relations with the Western world. He further added that Indonesia wanted to get a green light from the US government before permitting the opening of a PLO embassy in Jakarta. Other Indonesian scholars shared this view. This informant also noted that Indonesia’s dependency on the foreign aid of the Western world had given Indonesia fewer policy options toward the Middle East.14

The Indonesian government’s refusal to permit the PLO to open an embassy drew criticism from Indonesian Muslim groups. NU and Muhammadiyah argued that this policy was an obvious example of the inconsistent policy of Indonesia to the struggle of the Palestinians.15 One Islamic activist even argued that Indonesia’s decision to permit the PLO to open an embassy was highly dependent on the US policy to the Middle East.16

Indonesia began to change its policy toward the Palestine issue in the late 1980s. The first indicator of the changes of Indonesia’s attitude to the Palestinian issue was signaled by President Soeharto in November 1987 in commemorating the ‘International Day of the Struggle of the PLO’. On this occasion, he said that ‘Indonesia has always considered the Palestinians a sacred cause’ and ‘as part of the irreversible global movement against colonial rule and alien domination’.17 Soeharto further noted that real peace in the Middle East could be achieved only if the Palestinians
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had the right of independence and freedom to establish their own state as well as the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories. These principles were also emphasized by the foreign minister, Ali Alatas, in his speech at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva on 13 December 1988. There he said that ‘Indonesia, within its means and abilities, will continue to provide all possible assistance to the Palestinian people in the legitimate realization of their sacred cause’.

In order to show Indonesia’s support for the Palestinians, in December 1987 President Soeharto received a courtesy call from Dr Sami Mussalam, assistant to the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat. This visit was intended to explain the preparations the PLO were making for the proclamation of a Palestinian state in 1988, and to seek Indonesia’s support for that proclamation. When Yasser Arafat made this proclamation on 15 November 1988 in Algiers, Indonesia’s response was rapid. Indonesia gave its recognition the following day. In an official statement announcing Indonesia’s recognition of the new Palestinian state, the Department of Foreign Affairs said that recognition was a clear indication of the long-held support by Indonesia for the struggle of Palestine and also fitted with the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which aimed at abolishing colonialism and creating a world order based on independence, peace and social justice.

The main reason for these changes was the government’s perception, particularly in the military/ABRI, that the PLO ‘no longer posed a serious threat’ to Indonesia. Internationally, the perception of the Western world toward the PLO has also changed due to several series of peace talks between Israel and the PLO. Other scholars have added that these changes were also due to ‘the changing domestic political map of Indonesia’, in which Islam was becoming more politically assertive. In this context, the changes of Indonesia’s policy toward the PLO were pushed by simultaneous developments in Indonesia’s international and domestic environments.

However, some analysts have asserted that the altered Indonesian policy to the PLO was driven more by Soeharto’s interest to gain significant support from the Middle East countries for his bid to chair the Non-Aligned Movement. Others have argued that this was also due to the need to gain political support on Indonesia’s policy on the issue of East Timor. In this context, the changes in Indonesia’s policy toward the PLO
can be seen to have been influenced by Soeharto’s hidden political agenda. In other words, the Soeharto regime manipulated the foreign policy issue to satisfy its domestic political and international objectives. Considering the changes in domestic politics and in the international arena in the post-Cold War era, Soeharto adjusted his foreign policy in order to maintain his domestic power and expand his international status.

Indonesia’s recognition of the Palestinian state drew positive reactions from the Muslim community. Lukman Harun in his capacity as chairman of *Muhammadiyah*, for instance, warmly welcomed this recognition as representing a shift in Indonesia’s attitude toward the struggle of the Palestinians. It also cleared the doubts of Middle Eastern countries about Indonesia’s commitment on the Palestine issue (and Muslim world more generally) in the previous two decades. The change of Indonesia’s policy toward Palestinians was followed by permission being granted to the PLO to open its embassy in Jakarta a year later.

Nonetheless, Indonesia’s radical Muslim groups such as KISDI and DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*) were still disappointed with the government’s policy on the Palestinian issue. They felt that Indonesia’s policy still was not yet strong enough in support of the Palestinian people. There was also dissatisfaction in more mainstream Islamic quarters. For instance, Hasan Basri, the chairman of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, pointed out that:

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Since Indonesia’s Muslims have a very long historical relationship with the people of Palestine, we will always support the struggle of Palestinian people to establish its own state and more importantly to liberate the Mosque of Aqsha which is the original qiblah (orientation point for prayer) of the Muslim community.

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In order to express their solidarity, the Indonesian Muslim communities, particularly under the coordination of *Muhammadiyah*, helped the Palestinians with ‘daily need’ assistance by donations of money, clothes and even some dry foods. This concrete aid from Indonesia’s Muslim community, even though a small amount, not only indicated moral support but more importantly the solidarity of *umma* between the Palestinians and Indonesia’s Muslim community.

This support triggered the establishment of more significant and closer transnational ties among Islamic groups in Indonesia and the Pal-
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estinians, particularly between the DDII and radical Palestinian groups like Hamas. By now the government welcomed closer ties between Indonesian Muslims and Palestinians and, in this pre-9/11 environment, it no longer worried much about the possibility of the spread of the Islamic radical and militant movements to Indonesia. The Indonesian military shared this view.

A more significant change in Indonesia's attitude toward the PLO was its granting of permission to the PLO to open an embassy in Jakarta in 1989. This policy was not only based on the current domestic political developments, namely the re-emergence of Islam in Indonesian politics, but also based on the US giving the green light for Soeharto to permit the PLO to set up its embassy. It had taken 15 years for the PLO to get this permission. Although it might be argued that Indonesia's policy toward the PLO was very cautious and perhaps even timid, given the country's heavy economic and political dependence upon the Western world, it is not surprising that Indonesia conducted a very prudent policy toward the PLO. In other words, Indonesia had no option but to base its policy on the strategic interests of the Western world towards the Middle East.

Even though the Muslim community welcomed the government's decision to permit the PLO to open its embassy, the reactions of the Indonesian Muslim community as represented by Muhammadiyah and NU to the 15-year delay in taking this decision were quite strong. They argued that this was a clear example of the insensitivity of the Indonesian government to the Palestinian issue. They had asked the government to permit the PLO to open an embassy since 1974. Yet, the government had refused their demand by arguing that Palestine was not yet a sovereign nation-state.

The nature of Indonesia's support for the struggle of the Palestinians for a fully independent homeland basically remained the same even after Yasser Arafat's third visit to Jakarta in September 1993. This was the first time that he was granted the red carpet treatment normally accorded to visiting heads of state. Arafat's first visit to Indonesia had been in July 1984. In this two-day visit, he commented that the struggle of the Palestinian people was not based on religion but on nationalism. He further noted that 'the ultimate goal of the struggle of the Palestinians was to form a democratic nation-state for all the people of Palestine who comprise different religions.' His comments, of course, were warmly wel-
comed by the Indonesian government as representing the ‘genuine struggle of the Palestinians’. On the other hand, Muslim society in Indonesia perceived Arafat’s statements as an effort to abandon the Islamic roots of the Palestinian struggle against Israel. The second visit of Arafat to Jakarta was in September 1992 when he attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The third visit of Yasser Arafat to Indonesia, which now chaired the Non-Aligned Movement and was the world’s biggest Muslim country, was highly significant for the PLO in its efforts to gain wider international support from Third World countries. This visit (which Secretary of State Moerdiono described as the first visit of Yasser Arafat to Indonesia in his capacity as the president of Palestine) was aimed to brief Indonesia about the background to a series of agreements signed between Palestine and Israel that allowed for mutual recognition and for an autonomous Palestine in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank.

Indonesia hailed this new peace initiative between Palestine and Israel positively and welcomed these agreements as ‘a significant breakthrough that could pave the way for a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian issue in the Middle East’. President Soeharto also reiterated Indonesia’s political support for this new development as an effort to form a sovereign state of Palestine and to bring real peace to the Middle East. Indonesia urged Israel to respect this new peace initiative by withdrawing its troops from Jerusalem. Indonesia also stressed that the most important thing after the signing of the DOP (Declaration of Principles) was the consistency of the two parties, particularly Israel, in implementing all aspects of the agreement.

The reactions of some of Indonesia’s Muslim community, including Muhammadiyah and DDII, to this new peace initiative were quite negative. Muhammadiyah in its statement commenting on the agreement noted that this agreement was only a part of US political strategies to prevent the establishment of a free and independent Palestine. They saw the agreement with Israel as a ‘sell out’ and said that the PLO had acted ‘illegally’ by signing the deal.

A Muslim group calling itself ‘the Indonesian Committee for the Liberation of Palestine’ denounced the PLO by saying that its diplomacy no longer served the interests of Muslim Palestinians or the world Muslim community. This group was established by Lukman Harun just after
the establishment of the Palestinian state in December 1988. It comprised Indonesian Muslims who were concerned with the struggle of the Muslim world to liberate Palestinians from Israel by any necessary means. This Muslim group was also one of the radical and militant elements among Indonesian Muslims that did not acknowledge the existence of Israel. This group further commented:

The PLO does not represent the Moslem Palestinians who are loyal in fighting for their legitimate rights. History has shown that the main focus of the PLO struggle is to serve the interests of the organization and that of Arafat.

Another Muslim group, KISDI, said the agreement opened the way for the recognition of Israel by Muslim states. It was thus illegal and should be opposed by all Muslims. KISDI argued that the Palestinian land belonged to the Muslim community and could not be sold to anyone at anytime. Moreover, Jerusalem was the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which was the original qiblah of the Muslim people. KISDI also called the agreement ‘a big piece of theatre’, directed by the US and performed by the PLO and Israel. Other Islamic groups such as the DDII also considered that this agreement was insufficient to comprehensively settle the Palestinian problem. They argued that the agreement contained five points disadvantageous to the Palestinians: it omitted any regulation of Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip and Jericho; it did not discuss the status of Jerusalem; it did not discuss the fate of the two million Palestinian refugees; it fixed no time limits for its revision; and it separated the two autonomous Palestinian areas by an Israeli area.

Even though some of Indonesia’s Muslim community criticised the agreement and regretted the government’s position on the peace initiative, Abdurahman Wahid, the chairman of NU backed Indonesia’s position toward the PLO. He argued that this agreement was the significant initial step toward a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian issue. It was appropriate for Indonesia to welcome and support the agreement as an effort to end the conflict between Palestine and Israel and to create a new regional order in the Middle East. Abdurrahman, as the next section of this chapter shows, argued that peace in the Middle East could be achieved only by recognizing the existence of Israel.
The different perceptions of Indonesia’s Muslims over the Palestinian issue showed that there was a significant split within the Muslim community. *Muhammadiyah* and radical Muslim groups perceived that the Palestinian issue was related to Islamic sentiments whereas the moderate group represented by NU (like the Indonesian government) saw the Palestinian issue only as a political issue.

However, despite criticism from some elements of Indonesia’s Muslim community, Indonesia stuck to its firm stand. As one senior diplomat in charge of Middle East affairs explained, the critics did not significantly influence foreign policy toward the PLO, and showed that they misunderstood the essence of the Palestinian problem. He further argued that this was due to Hamas propaganda that the Palestinian problem was a ‘war of religion and faith’, a message passed to Indonesia via Hamas’ relations with some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community. He further argued that Hamas had manipulated the Palestinian problem in order to achieve ‘the Islamization of Palestinian-Israeli conflict’. However, the Indonesian government maintained its firm position on the Palestinian issue by excluding Islamic sentiments.

The continued support of Indonesia for the PLO was reiterated by President Soeharto when, for the first time, he visited Jordan in November 1996. His visit to the Middle East was perceived by some political analysts as an effort to show his growing concern for international issues pertinent to the Middle Eastern affairs and Islamic sentiments. He stated in his meeting with King Hussein that the peace accord between the PLO and Israel was a significant step towards building new regional order in the Middle East; Indonesia would consistently support the Palestinians in their efforts to establish an independent state with Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as its capital.

Indonesia then donated US$2 million to assist the Palestinian authority to overcome its financial crisis. The donation was presented by the foreign minister, Ali Alatas, on behalf of President Soeharto to the Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat, at the OIC summit in Teheran on 9 December 1996. This donation was part of the US$5 million pledge that Indonesia made to the Palestinian people during the 2nd International Conference on Economic Aid for Palestine in Paris on 9 January 1996. This financial assistance was the most meaningful aid that Indonesia had given to the Palestinians since the 1940s. The reaction from the Indone-
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Indonesian Muslim community to this financial aid was very positive. Lukman Harun viewed this aid as an initial step to strengthen the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel.64

Despite the above changes in Indonesia’s policy toward the PLO, Indonesia’s policy was still cautious and tended to wait for the responses of the Western world toward the region before formulating and implementing its own policy. The above discussion shows that, even though Indonesia always maintained the argument that its policy on the Palestinian issue was simply to implement the Bebas-Aktif principle, in reality Indonesia’s policy was far from free or independent and active.

The prudent policy of Indonesia towards the Palestine issue reflected the fact that politically, Indonesia was very dependent on Western world policy, particularly the US. Economically, Indonesia relied heavily on Western aid and investments. In other words, Indonesia’s policy to the Palestinian issue was based on pragmatism. The lack of a proactive policy towards the PLO limited Indonesia’s bargaining power in dealing with most crucial issues and problems with Middle East countries vis-à-vis Israel and the Western world.

On the other hand, even though Indonesian Muslim groups (particularly radical groups) reacted strongly to the Palestinian issue, there were different interpretations within them on the issue. They also had different responses to the government policy here and, more importantly, they did not have more effective ways of channelling their views in order to influence policy making.

Indonesia and Israel: Domestic resistance to Indonesia’s foreign relations in the Middle East

In Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, the Palestine issue and the debate over Israel’s attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia are significant related issues. As one senior diplomat in charge of African and Middle Eastern affairs remarked, Indonesia would not open diplomatic relationships with Israel as long as there was no comprehensive political solution of the Palestinian problem.65

The controversy over the issue of diplomatic ties with Israel arose publicly when Indonesia expressed its displeasure and regret over the visit to Singapore by Israeli President Chaim Herzog in 1986.66 Indonesia’s
official statement issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs said that ‘while Indonesia realizes that the visit is a matter between Singapore and Israel, it may have negative impact on the unity of ASEAN’. It also added that ‘Indonesia has consistently supported the rights of the Palestinians and that Israel should withdraw all its troops from the occupied Arab lands’. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja pointed out that Singapore should at least have had some consideration for its neighbours’ concerns and hoped the visit would not strain ASEAN’s integrity. As a part of Indonesia’s displeasure with this visit, the government recalled its ambassador in Singapore for consultation.

Indonesia’s Muslim community, represented by the Indonesian Council of Ulama and two other large Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, fully supported the government’s policy on this issue. In a formal statement, they said that the visit of President Herzog was not favourable to the unity of ASEAN. Furthermore, the Muslim community also recognized the rights of the Palestinian people and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories.

The next international issue, which triggered a long-lasting controversy over the question of Israel, was Ali Alatas’s ‘unintentional’ meeting with the Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres, in Vienna when they both attended a world conference on human rights in June 1993. Indonesia’s news media reported that there was a special meeting between Ali Alatas and Shimon Peres to discuss the possibility of opening diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Israel. These reports invited various reactions from the Indonesian public, especially from Muslim leaders.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, of course, denied the reports and released a statement that Alatas and Peres were seated at the same table along with eight other foreign ministers during a luncheon hosted by Austrian foreign minister, Aloys Mock. The statement further said that the Israeli foreign minister only posed a question to Ali Alatas on when Indonesia would open diplomatic ties with Israel. The position of Indonesia toward Israel, according to this statement, was quite clear: that Indonesia supported the position of the Arab countries and that, as long as the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict had not been comprehensively resolved, Indonesia could not consider opening diplomatic ties with Israel. In addition, the statement also mentioned that:
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The foreign minister is astounded by such reports that are very speculative and give the impression as if an official meeting between the foreign minister of Indonesia and Israel has taken place to discuss the possibility of opening diplomatic relations.73

A month later, an Indonesian daily reported that the Israeli Ambassador to Singapore, Danny Meguido, had visited Jakarta to meet with senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs to open talks on the prospect of opening diplomatic ties.74 It was also reported that Israeli businessmen had travelled to Jakarta to establish trade contacts.75 These reports were neither denied or confirmed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, although it did say that ‘some efforts were being made for rapprochement following the opening of ties with India and China in 1993’.76 The Department of Foreign Affairs publicly denied the report, saying that ‘this report was totally baseless and we know nothing about this visit’.77 In fact, a secret meeting in Jakarta between the Israeli Ambassador to Singapore and some senior officials from the Directorate General of Political Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs did take place.78

Despite these denials, the report drew negative reactions from Muslim society. The chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah (the Muhammadiyah Youth Organization), Dr M. Dien Syamsuddin, regretted this visit as a ‘political harassment’ by Israel of Indonesian sovereignty. He urged the government (the Department of Foreign Affairs) to openly explain this visit to the public in order to avoid different misperceptions in the Muslim society.79 Lukman Harun slammed the idea of opening diplomatic ties with Israel. He said that ‘any efforts taken to open diplomatic relations with Israel would run counter to both the Pancasila state ideology and the 1945 Constitution, which oppose any form of colonization’.80 He also asked:

How could Indonesia open diplomatic ties with Israel, while the country continues to occupy the Palestinian land which it seized in the 1967 war? As long as Palestine has not reoccupied that space as a free, sovereign nation, Indonesia should not consider opening ties with Israel.81

Furthermore, Indonesia had more national interests in the Arab states than in Israel and Indonesia’s relationship with Arab states should
be taken into account in this matter. He emphasized that ‘what Indonesia
needs to do is to further improve its relationship with the Middle East
[Arab states] rather than to open diplomatic ties with Israel.’ On top of
that, the Muslim community would condemn the initiative to have diplo-
matic ties with Israel and would even take any actions necessary to over-
turn any decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. In more
diplomatic language, Aisyah Amini of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP), in her capacity as the chairman of Commission I on Foreign Affairs
of the DPR (House of Representatives), said that Indonesia – as chairman
of the NAM – should endeavour to be the last developing country to open
relations with Israel. This was mainly because, as Aisyah remarked, ‘anti-
Israel sentiment still runs high among the Muslim public and we should
wait and assess further developments in the peace efforts.’

Other political observers made similar comments. Riza Sihbudi, a
leading expert on Middle Eastern affairs, noted that it was too early for
Indonesia to open diplomatic ties due to the uncertain progress of the
peace initiative signed between the PLO and Israel. He further argued
that opening diplomatic relations with other states should be based on
national interests and, for the time being, Indonesia had no significant
national interests to develop with Israel. Diplomatic ties with Israel, he
explained, would only create ‘domestic political chaos’ that could ruin
Indonesia’s national interests (national stability). This was mainly because
the Muslim community still perceived Israel as ‘the major enemy’ of the
Muslim world. Chalid Mawardi, a former Indonesian ambassador to
Syria and a Muslim political activist, noted that ‘diplomatic ties with Isra-
el is not an urgent priority for Indonesia and we do not need to open it in
a hurry.’ He also said ‘diplomatic ties with Israel would hurt the Muslim
world.’ Mawardi even warned that diplomatic ties with Israel would not
only ruin Indonesia’s relationship with the Middle East but also it would
become a ‘political boomerang’ for both Indonesia’s domestic politics and
in its relationships with the Muslim world.

The negative reactions of the Muslim community toward Israel’s in-
tention to open diplomatic ties became stronger when the Israeli prime
minister, Yitzhak Rabin, made a surprise short visit to Jakarta on 15
October 1993. Even though Secretary of State Moerdiono argued that
President Soeharto received Yitzhak Rabin in his capacity as chairman
of the NAM, this visit created different interpretations in the domestic
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domain. The Indonesian authorities, in fact, went out of their way to avoid the impression that the visit was that of one head of government to another. Prime Minister Rabin arrived without state protocol and met with President Soeharto not at the state palace but in his private residence without any protocol and unaccompanied by any other state officials. Nevertheless, in this informal and highly covert diplomacy, the two leaders agreed that they would create ‘a step by step’ favourable condition to realize diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Massive objections to opening diplomatic ties had been voiced by many elements of Indonesia’s Muslim community. A group of at least 100 anti-Zionist youths demonstrated in front of the mosque at the Taman Ismail Marzuki in Jakarta demanding that the Indonesian government should not recognize Israel. The demonstrators, who burned two Israeli flags and a picture of the Israeli prime minister, said they were against any efforts to bring Indonesia and Israel into any form of relationship and insisted that their protest was for the upholding of the aspirations of all Muslims.

Other groups of students from different universities throughout Indonesia also came to the House of Representatives. The main aim of their visit was to have a meeting with Commission I to ask the position of the House of Representative on the possibility of the opening of diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Tel Aviv. Commission I urged the government to postpone the forging of diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Israel until ‘the right time’ and commented that the visit of Yitzhak Rabin to Jakarta would enable President Soeharto as the chairman of the NAM to influence and to urge Israel for returning the occupied territory to the Palestinians.

Many Muslim leaders expressed surprise at Yitzhak Rabin’s visit and urged the public to keep calm. Lukman Harun said that the visit obviously showed the inconsistency of Indonesia’s attitude toward the Palestine issue. On the one hand, Indonesia always argued its strong support for the Palestinians but on the other hand the visit could be interpreted as recognition of Israel’s occupation. Another political analyst, Amien Rais, argued that there were at least three points that should be taken into account considering the impact of this visit. Firstly, Indonesia should carefully consider whether it was the appropriate time to open diplomatic ties with Israel. In this context, Indonesia needed to await further develop-
ments in the peace process between the PLO and Israel. Secondly, as stated in the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia should always make every effort to abolish any form of colonialism, particularly in the case of Palestine. Lastly, Indonesia should also carefully consider the costs and benefits of opening diplomatic relations with Israel. The above views signalled the rejection of the Muslim community to the intention of Israel to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

The position of the Indonesian government, as noted by one senior diplomat, was to welcome the intention of Israel to open diplomatic ties.\textsuperscript{100} This position, according to the diplomat, was a part of the Bebas-Aktif principle. However, due to the absence of a comprehensive political solution of the Palestinian problem and, more importantly, the massive domestic resistance particularly from the Muslim community, Indonesia postponed making such a diplomatic opening and instead shifted course to consider initiating economic/trade relations with Israel.\textsuperscript{101}

The only political rationale for Indonesia to reject the Israeli initiative was concern for domestic religious sensitivities, namely the government viewed it would face massive resistance from the Indonesian Muslim community to this establishment of diplomatic ties. That in turn would decrease and even jeopardize Soeharto’s political legitimacy.

According to Ali Alatas, Indonesia had no intention of opening diplomatic ties with Israel and supported the Palestinians’ struggle to regain their homeland.\textsuperscript{102} On other occasions, he said that it was premature for Indonesia to consider opening diplomatic relations with Israel even though the latter had agreed to recognize the need for an autonomous Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{103} Indonesia’s stance on this policy, however, was not rigid. He emphasized that, ‘[i]f the PLO and Israel can live in peace by the new signed peace agreement, there will be no point in sticking to the present policy.’\textsuperscript{104} However, while the reason that Indonesia used to reject diplomatic ties with Israel was politically correct, the most crucial consideration was the Islamic issue.

Even though on many occasions during the New Order period Indonesia maintained its ‘official’ position to postpone any diplomatic relationship with Israel, ‘unofficially’ the government, particularly ABRI/the military, showed an interest in having a diplomatic relationship with Tel Aviv.\textsuperscript{105} According to a retired general who is also a prominent foreign affairs observer, such a diplomatic relationship would have enabled ABRI
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to purchase more sophisticated military equipment and conduct regular military cooperation with Israel. In other words, he argued that ABRI preferred Indonesia to have diplomatic ties with Israel. The preference of ABRI in the opening of ‘official’ diplomatic ties with Israel was mentioned implicitly by the minister of defence and security, Edi Sudrajat, when he said that ‘it is no longer a taboo to discuss it and Indonesia may open ties with Israel once all the other Middle Eastern countries have established diplomatic relations.’ The military’s position stirred up a wide public controversy, particularly when the mass media cited reports that ABRI already had long-established unofficial military contacts and had cooperated on several military (intelligence) matters with Israel. It was also reported that Israel had trained the anti-terrorist unit of the KOPASUS.

Interestingly, the head of ABRI’s Centre of Information (Kepala Pusat Penerangan ABRI), Brigadier General Syarwan Hamid, denied the media reports on military cooperation between Indonesia and Israel. He further noted that, due to the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Indonesia had never had any military cooperation with Israel nor had Indonesia ever purchased any military equipment from Israel. The only Indonesian military interaction with Israel was when ABRI had sent peacekeeping forces to the Middle East under the auspices of the UN. General Faisal Tanjung, chief of the armed forces, also publicly denied the reports that Indonesia had conducted military exercises with Israel or purchased military equipment such as the A-4 fighter aircraft from Israel. He added that ‘the military cooperation between Indonesia and Israel was nonsense and we never even purchased any weapons from Israel.’

However, the different perceptions within ABRI itself concerning its position on opening diplomatic ties with Israel showed that there was a split on this issue, particularly between the nationalist-secular and the Islamic factions. As a retired general argued, General Faisal Tanjung was seen as a representative of ABRI Islam (a faction in ABRI concerned with the Islamic dimensions of national and international issues), while Edi Sudrajat represented the nationalist-secular faction of ABRI. The ABRI Islam faction perceived that the issue of opening diplomatic ties with Israel was strongly related to Islamic sentiments and rejected Israel’s initiative to establish diplomatic ties. On the other hand, the nationalist-secular faction looked at the issue from a pragmatic perspective and sup-
ported the idea to open diplomatic ties in order to increase Indonesia’s military and intelligence capability.

Given the possible massive resistance from the Indonesian Muslim community, the firm stance of the Department of Foreign Affairs denying any links and the split within ABRI made President Soeharto postpone the idea of having diplomatic ties with Israel. More importantly, he asked the minister of defence, General Edi Sudrajat not to give any further comments on this issue to the public and reminded him that this issue had been handled by the Department of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{113}

The next major controversy inviting domestic debate was the visit of four Indonesian journalists (from *Media Indonesia*, *Business Weekly*, *Eksekutif Magazine* and *Republika*) to Israel in February 1994. The first three publications represented nationalist viewpoints and while the last represented the Islamic group. The journalists had been invited by the Israeli government and were asked to produce objective reports on Israel. They also met with Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin. In an interview reported in *Republika* daily, the prime minister said that Israel really wanted to establish diplomatic ties with Indonesia as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{114} Clearly the Israeli government was trying to use the diplomacy of journalism to push for opening of diplomatic ties with Indonesia. The government hoped that the journalists would report to the Indonesian public about Israel’s strong desire to have diplomatic relations with Indonesia. By having diplomatic ties with Indonesia, Israel would not only be able to exercise its formal capacity as a nation-state in Southeast Asia but also to have formal access to expand its political, military and economic influence in the region.

The visit, of course, drew strong negative responses from the domestic sphere. The Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Information and *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia* (PWI, the Association of Indonesian Journalists) strongly disagreed with the visit and said that it was against national policy and Indonesia’s immigration laws.\textsuperscript{115} Ali Alatas remarked that the Department of Foreign Affairs had not been consulted about the visit and had no knowledge of the journalists’ plan; if the Department of Foreign Affairs had been consulted, it would have rejected the visit.\textsuperscript{116}

Negative reactions to the visit also came from the House of Representatives’ Commission I.\textsuperscript{117} This parliamentary committee regretted the visit and asked the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department
of Information to give a full and clear explanation about the visit and its impact on the Israeli initiative to open diplomatic ties with Indonesia. Ali Alatas, in his response to the questions from Commission I, said he understood the journalistic merits of the visit but he suspected that the visit could send the wrong signals about Indonesia’s policy toward Israel.118

The visit has also invited protests from some groups of Indonesian youth. A youth group named Delegasi Pemuda Penyelamat Wibawa Indonesia (the Youth Delegation of Saviours of Indonesian Dignity) held demonstrations in front of the Department of Foreign Affairs.119 They condemned the visit as a betrayal of the struggle of Muslim warriors against Zionism and demanded that the PWI suspend the journalists’ membership of the association. They even asked the PWI to launch an investigation into the possibility that the journalists had become tools of Zionist propaganda.120 In response to such demands to suspend the journalists’ PWI membership, Edi Elison, Executive Editor of Media Indonesia and a member of the delegation, argued that the visit had nothing to do with the PWI and more importantly the Israeli government had invited the journalists individually.121 He further argued that ‘we did not even need to ask permission from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Departemen Penerangan [Ministry of Information] to visit Israel’.122

Interestingly, the journalists’ visit to Israel was supported by B.J. Habibie (then chairman of ICMI). As reported by The Jakarta Post, Habibie gave his approval for Nasir Tamara of Republika to make the visit in order to find out the truth about Israel and claimed that he did not see anything wrong with the visit.123 Habibie’s approval was the only support for the visit publicly stated by any government official. This response showed that the government was not speaking the same language on the possibility of opening diplomatic ties with Israel. Given the fact that Habibie was a close Soeharto ally, his approval also indicated that covertly President Soeharto might have been trying to get information about the willingness of Israel to open diplomatic ties with Indonesia by utilizing an informal tool of diplomacy. The significance of the participation of Republika on the visit was that Soeharto utilised his Islamic card on the possibility of measuring domestic resistance to the idea of having diplomatic ties with Israel.

The visit was more significant considering that it took place just a month after a meeting between a US senator, Arlen Specter, and President
Soeharto in Jakarta. Senator Specter, an Israel lobbyist in the US Senate, asked President Soeharto about the time frame for the establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and Indonesia. President Soeharto, as cited in Merdeka daily, noted that it was only a matter of time.124

Another significant controversy was aroused by the November 1994 statement of Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) on the need for Indonesia to have diplomatic ties with Israel.125 This controversial statement was made by Gus Dur in a press briefing shortly after his visit with Djohan Effendi and Habib Chirzin to Israel on 25–28 October 1994. They visited Israel as Muslim scholars at the invitation of the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, to attend an international conference on peace and religion.126 The Jakarta Post and Kompas reported that the visit was an initiative of the Israeli government to invite them to attend the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan on 26 October 1994.127 Republika daily also reported that, after attending the signing, Gus Dur had a meeting with an assistant to Israel’s foreign minister to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Israel.128

Gus Dur, who was the chairman on the Nahdlatul Ulama, said that the time had come for Indonesia to consider diplomatic relations with Israel. He added that, in anticipating the future, Indonesia should pay attention to all angles (including those that had not been covered by the Arab-Israeli peace accords) and in the interests of its own foreign policy.129 The visit also aimed to strengthen relations between the two (civil) societies. Gus Dur argued that increasing society-to-society relations between the two nations could serve as a strong foundation for diplomatic ties. He argued even further that ‘as a nation-state, we [Indonesia] cannot isolate ourselves from the rapid changing of international politics so that it is a reality of life for Indonesia to have a diplomatic relationship with Israel’.130

Predictably Gus Dur’s visit to Israel and particularly his statement on the need for Indonesia to have diplomatic ties with Israel triggered negative reactions from Indonesia’s Muslim community as well as from the House of Representatives and Department of Foreign Affairs. Muhammadiyah and the DPR’s Commission I argued that Gus Dur’s visit could not be seen as representing the Muslim communities. The Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs stated that the government saw it as an individual visit that did not represent the government’s formal policy.

Hasan Basri, the chairman of MUI (the Council of Indonesian Ulama), argued that it was inappropriate for Gus Dur as NU chairman to suggest that the government of Indonesia open diplomatic ties with Israel. It would not only hurt the Muslim community but more importantly it would also betray the struggle of the Palestinians. Moreover, as Dr. Anwar Haryono of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia argued, Abdurrahman’s visit to Israel, once again, showed the split voices of the Indonesian Muslims on the Palestinian-Israel issue.

Interestingly, different perceptions of this idea also occurred within the NU itself. Kyai Haji Moch Ilyas Ruhiyat, Rais Aam (chairman of the legislative council) of the NU, stated that Gus Dur’s idea did not represent the NU as a Muslim organization; it was his own individual idea. Moreover, over 50 respected ulama, led by Abdul Rasyid A. Syafei, pressured the House of Representatives into joining their campaign against what they saw as possible links with Israel. They lashed out at practically everybody allegedly displaying a favourable stance on Israel, including a certain Moslem leader who ‘in full awareness wants to establish relations with Israel’. In their statement, they said that ‘we call on Indonesian Muslims to beware of infiltration attempts by Jewish lobbyists into Indonesia’ and even declared that ‘establishing ties with Israel is haram’ (religiously forbidden). Moreover, the ulamas even urged Muslim organizations to reprimand and take punitive actions against Muslim leaders who urged established relations with the leaders of Israel and called on the government to reject establishing diplomatic, trade or cultural ties with Israel.

Aisyah Amini of the House of Representative had similar views to the ulama on Gus Dur’s idea. She argued that there were no significant reasons for Indonesia to build diplomatic ties with Israel and that the idea was also out of step with Indonesia national interests. She even asked what Gus Dur’s real intentions were in raising this sensitive issue in public. Another member of the House of Representatives, Abu Hasan Sazili of Golkar, argued that Indonesia should consider all aspects of its national life very carefully before deciding to open diplomatic ties with Israel.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas regretted Gus Dur’s visit to Israel and also reiterated that Gus Dur’s idea was not in line with the
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official stance of the Indonesian government. Indonesia had consistently supported the struggle of the Palestinians to have their own state, this being Indonesia's main precondition of establishing diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv. He also added that ‘our official policy of not having a diplomatic relationship with Israel was unchanged’. Furthermore, he asked the press not to exaggerate the idea due to the sensitivity of the Muslim community to the idea of having diplomatic relationships with Tel Aviv.

On Gus Dur’s visit to Israeli, the reactions were overwhelmingly negative and no one even expressed formal support for this visit. The above reactions clearly showed that within the Indonesian Muslim community there was a division of perceptions on the need for Indonesia to have diplomatic ties with Israel. Despite the hostile reaction of his proposal, Gus Dur seems not to have changed his ideas on opening up relations with Israel. As we shall see below, Gus Dur again raised the issue during his time as president.

The debate on whether Indonesia should forge diplomatic ties with Israel continued when the mass media reported that the government of Indonesia had rejected the wishes of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to visit Jakarta as a part of his Asian tour in August 1997. The report of Netanyahu’s plan to visit Jakarta was, of course, denied by the Department of Foreign Affairs and secretary of state. Ali Alatas said that there had been no such request to visit Jakarta from Netanyahu and the report was totally baseless. Secretary of State Moerdiono said that he knew nothing about the request.

Some political analysts believed that there had been a request from Netanyahu to visit Jakarta but, considering the possible negative reactions from the Muslim community to such a visit, the government had decided to reject the request. As some interviewees argued, if the government had given the green light for Netanyahu to visit Jakarta, it would have created more negative political pressures on the New Order. At that time, the New Order was already suffering serious damage to its political legitimacy from its own people and the government was aware of it. The analysts also believed that Netanyahu’s main objective in visiting Indonesia was to further explore the possibility of opening diplomatic ties. However, overcoming the massive resistance of Indonesia’s Muslim community to this was the ultimate insurmountable hurdle to forging diplomatic ties with Israel at this stage.
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In this context, and with the Muslim community very outspoken in articulating its opposition to opening diplomatic ties with Israel, Indonesia had no other policy option but to accommodate Muslim interests and demands by rejecting such an opening. At this time, strong pressures from and the influence of the Muslim community regarding Israel were the biggest Islamic influence on Indonesia’s foreign policy. In effect, the Muslim community exercised a veto on any attempt to open diplomatic relations with Israel. On this issue, then, the Muslim community was a significant actor in the formation of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

Soeharto was actually not so much responsive to the demands of the Muslim community as more anticipative of the possible negative impacts of opening ties with Israel on the Muslim community, something that could jeopardize his domestic political power. Ultimately the president aimed to build a policy coalition with the Muslim community but more important was the desire to stay in power. President Soeharto’s domestic political agenda was thus the major consideration in Indonesia’s refusal to open diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.

In the period since 1998, Indonesia has continued to keep a diplomatic distance with Israel. During his time as president, Gus Dur again tried to open a frank discussion on the possibility of having diplomatic relations with Israel. He repeatedly argued that, if it was to play a major role in facilitating peace in the Middle East, then it was politically necessary for Indonesia to have diplomatic ties with Israel. As one might expect, this idea was bitterly opposed by many Muslim groups. They even accused Gus Dur of being insensitive to Muslim feelings in his foreign policies. Even though, as before, there remained a lack of support for Gus Dur on this issue among the political elites, still the biggest obstacle to building diplomatic relations with Israel was the resistance of the Muslim communities, particularly the hardline groups.

The breakdown of the Middle East peace process and outbreak of the second Intifada in Palestine both occurred during Gus Dur’s presidency. What with these tragedies, as well as more recent events (like Israel’s brutal military attacks on Lebanon that have enraged many Indonesians), it is no wonder that today there seems no longer to be any support in Indonesia for an opening towards Israel at any level, diplomatic or even social.
The 1991 and 2003 Gulf wars: Responses of Indonesia’s government and reactions of the Muslim community

Unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the attack of the United States and its coalition allies on Iraq in the middle of January 1991 aroused widespread reactions in Indonesia. Some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community saw the US attacks on Iraq as an attack on all of the Muslim world. The US attack, which involved the mobilization of nearly one million troops and the diplomatic involvement of the international community, was also a crucial case for relations between the state and the Muslim community in Indonesia. Reactions to the Gulf war were not only manifested in street demonstrations and public statements by several political and religious leaders and organizations but also in the initiative of some Islamic groups to send a number of its followers to Iraq as volunteers. In fact, according to Pelita and Republika, this Islamic group had prepared its followers to be sent to Iraq.

The Muslim community itself, which was divided into several streams with different religious inclinations and political interests, revealed quite different perceptions of the Gulf war and of the government’s responses to it. The Central Board of the Nadhlatul Ulama, for instance, released a statement that deplored and condemned the US response to Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. In its statement, the NU mentioned that the massive bombardment of Iraq by the US was not commensurate with the US reaction to the Israeli annexation of Palestinian and Arab territory in 1967. It also called on all sides involved in the war to soon agree to a ceasefire and avoid more casualties and damage. The central committee of the Ansor Youth Movement, a division of the NU, asked its members to be ready at any time to be sent to Iraq as volunteers. Other Islamic youth organizations such as the PMII (Pergerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Students), IPNU (Ikatan Putra NU, Association of the Sons of the NU) and Komite Solidaritas Islam (Committee of Islamic Solidarity) condemned the outbreak of war, demanded the withdrawal of the US-led multinational force from the region and even urged the Indonesian government to take a more active role to end the war by sending troops.

A less radical position was taken by some other Islamic groups. The executive board of Muhamadiyah said that it was not necessary for Indo-
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Indonesia to take sides as the Gulf crisis was multi-dimensional in nature involving many countries’ economic, military and ideological interests. It also called on Indonesian Muslims to remain calm and not to overreact. Similar pleas came from Muslim intellectuals in the Empati Foundation (Centre for Islamic Studies and Development). This foundation, led by such leading Muslim scholars as Nurcholish Madjid and Quraish Shihab, called on Indonesian Muslims not to be provoked by emotional agitation, for any reasons, into ‘a battle for the sake of Palestine and the Arabs in general’. It also remarked that the Gulf war should be seen as a ‘war of ambitions’ between persons or groups and not as something triggered by religion.

The government made similar arguments about the war. Commenting on the perception of some radical Islamic groups that the Gulf war was a conflict between Islam and non-believers, the minister of religion, Munawir Sjdzali, said that the war was not a religious war but one resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Sjdzali, who at one time was ambassador to Kuwait, warned Indonesian Muslims not to be provoked by the issue of a religious war. He further explained that ‘the cause and the reason of war is not religion but economy and politics. It is a war for a control of the oil sources in the Gulf region’. This warning was then followed by a joint statement by a number of Indonesian religious leaders that called for an immediate end to the Gulf war and urged the Indonesian people not to be lured into believing that it was a religious war. President Soeharto reportedly welcomed this joint statement and stressed that the war was not a religious but a political one.

The military also emphasized that the Gulf war was not a religious one. Brigadier-General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, the head of ABRI’s Centre of Information, asked Indonesians not to be easily influenced by the provocative ideas on the Gulf war and to act proportionally. More specifically, the armed forces commander General Try Surtisno stated that Indonesian military members should not get involved emotionally in the war. He added that ‘ABRI will crack down hard on any kind of disturbance relating to the war so that the continuity of Indonesian development efforts will not be endangered’.

Despite different perceptions of the Muslim community on the Gulf war, many elements of the Muslim community urged the government to play a more active role to end the war. They believed that Indone-
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Indonesia’s attitude to the Gulf war was too cautious and insufficiently active in making diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict.167 Lukman Harun, the chairman of the Committee of Islamic Solidarity, said that Indonesia as the biggest Muslim country in the world should take more initiatives to mediate between all parties.168 He further urged the government of Indonesia to take the initiative to invite the leaders of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to meet at the negotiating table.169

Other Islamic organizations such as the MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama) and DMI (Dewan Masjid Indonesia, Council of Indonesia’s Mosques) also asked the government to take a more prominent role in finding a comprehensive solution to the Gulf crisis.170 The Ulama even asked the government to put the Gulf issue at the top of the agenda of the OIC and called for a special OIC summit to further discuss a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis.171 The Nadhlatul Ulama argued that this was the right moment for Indonesia to take a leading role in contributing to world peace by initiating a world conference to solve the Gulf problem or at least to ask all parties to agree to a ceasefire.172

Even though the Muslim community demanded that the government take a more active role in ending the Gulf war, the government maintained that Indonesia had responded ‘proportionally and rationally’ by inviting the parties to stop the war.173 The foreign minister, Ali Alatas, argued that ‘we cannot step into the Gulf crisis suddenly and offer our solutions to the conflict. We would be kicked out’.174 He further explained that Indonesia would do its best to solve the conflict and if the parties asked for our participation to solve the conflict then Indonesia would take an active role.175 In this context, Indonesia, according to Ali Alatas, would always support UN initiatives to find diplomatic means of achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict.176 All Indonesia could do, according to Ali Alatas, was to encourage diplomatic efforts to resolve the Gulf war.177 He added that ‘diplomatic channels are still open for a peaceful settlement of the problem and there is a need to not only end the war but also to solve the underlying cause of the conflict in the region.’178

However, the Muslim community protests continued, these mainly directed at the United States. A number of bomb threats were directed at US properties including the US embassy and American-owned Citibank office in Jakarta.179 These various forms of anti-US activity were obviously the first and clearest manifestations of Indonesian Muslim protest against
the United States. In order to calm these emotional Muslim responses, the speaker of the House of Representatives, Kharis Suhud, called on the press to help maintain national stability by not blowing the issue out of all proportion, but write stories in such a way that the public would place national interests (domestic political stability) above anything else. In addition, the minister of home affairs, Rudini, further noted that massive street demonstrations against the United States were not the appropriate way to channel Muslim solidarity to the Gulf war. He further asked members of the Muslim community to channel their solidarity in written form to relevant parties instead of staging demonstrations that might disrupt public order.

The Indonesian government tried to avoid any deep involvement in the war, being careful not to give the impression that Indonesia’s foreign policy was determined by any religious factor. Moreover, Indonesia had no policy options nor initiatives other than to support the solution to end the war taken by the UN. Simply stated, Indonesia’s lack of geo-strategic interests in the Gulf and the involvement of political and economic interests of the Western world put Indonesia in the position of having to ‘join the chorus’ of policy options proposed by the United States. In addition, the different perceptions and even competing interests of some Muslim countries (the PLO and Saudi Arabia, for instance) placed Indonesia’s government in a difficult situation in terms of taking sides in the Gulf war. This was shown by government statements that Indonesia did not condone the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait but on the other hand it refused to send troops to Saudi Arabia as a part of multinational forces to defend the country from a possible Iraqi invasion.

Indonesia’s attitude to the second Gulf war in 2003 was in marked contrast to its previous response to first Gulf war. The magnitude and nature of the issues involved in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were quite different in comparison with Gulf war of 1991. Indonesia could not accept that the reasons of US attack on Iraq were to combat terrorism and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The response of Indonesia’s Muslim communities was even much stronger; the US attack on Iraq was also seen as an attack on all Muslims. The anger of Indonesia’s Muslims, of course, generated a more complicated situation for the government to balance its foreign relations with the United States and its domestic economic and political agenda.
Conclusion

Based on the discussions above, it can be concluded that Indonesia's attitude toward the Middle East has been reactive in nature. In the New Order period especially, Indonesia's primary concern was to avoid giving Islam prominence in its foreign policy toward the Middle East. It is crucial to note that, even though Indonesia extended its support to certain Middle Eastern countries or groups of Muslim people, it was basically not on the grounds of the Islamic factor. Rather it was on the basis of domestic and international political pragmatism on the part of the New Order regime.

The reactive nature of Indonesia's attitude toward the Middle East was clearly shown in Indonesia's policy toward the Palestinian issue. On the one hand, Indonesia maintained its support for the Palestinians but on the other it was very dependent on the Western world, particularly the United States, in terms of making policy. This was mainly due to the fact that good political and economic relations with the Western world were top foreign policy priorities for Indonesia under Soeharto.

This chapter has also shown that, unlike the minimal attention paid by Indonesia's Muslim community towards the OIC, on the Middle East the Muslim community has been very outspoken on Indonesian government policies dealing with the issues in the region.

This chapter has also shown the different perceptions and attitudes within the Indonesian Muslim community over the issues in the Middle East. Some Muslim groups have always linked the issue of the Middle East with Islamic sentiments. As a consequence, they have urged the government to conduct policies based on Islamic solidarity. On the other hand, other Muslim groups have not related these issues to the Islamic sentiments but to the universal values as stated in the Indonesian constitution of 1945.

The above situation was clearly illustrated in the issue of Israel's apparent intention to open diplomatic relation with Indonesia. In this case, the voice of the Muslim community was even more significantly articulated and stronger in rejecting the idea of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel than on the Palestinian issue. This was mainly due to the perception of most of the Muslim community that Israel was the major enemy of the Muslim world. Yet other Muslim groups (NU, notably Gus
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Dur) perceived that the time had come for Indonesia to consider diplomatic ties with Israel. The NU argued that the idea of having diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv had nothing to do with religious sentiments but was related to regional peace in the Middle East.

Further, the Israeli government utilized many different channels in its attempts to open diplomatic ties with Indonesia. In formal ways, Israel approached Indonesia by conducting high-level diplomatic talks including a short visit by Prime Minister Rabin to meet President Soeharto. In informal ways, Israel conducted several actions including business visits, diplomacy by journalism and even a personal invitation for Gus Dur to visit Israel. The use of many different channels by Israel demonstrated that Israel was quite serious in establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Yet, to date full diplomatic ties between the two countries have not been realized due to the strong opposition of much of the Indonesian Muslim community.

The minimal attention to the religious factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Middle East was demonstrated by the ‘wait and see’ attitude of Indonesia towards the 1991 Gulf war. Indonesia’s inactive and cautious attitude to the Gulf war, similar to its attitude to the Palestinian issue, was caused by the deep involvement of major powers, particularly the Western world, in the Gulf war. The interests of the Western world in the Gulf paralyzed Indonesia’s willingness in trying to mediate the conflict in the Gulf. At the same time, the government warned its people that the Gulf war was not a religious war between Islam and the non-Islamic world. The reluctance of Indonesia to get deeply involved in the Gulf war also showed that Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Middle East was determined by non-Islamic factors.

The above case studies have demonstrated that the influence of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Middle East has been marginal. This chapter has also shown that the Bebas-Aktif principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy has always been ‘the shield’ of Indonesia’s inability to produce a more assertive policy to the Middle East.

The discussions in this chapter have also demonstrated a significant growth of political consciousness and awareness within Indonesia’s Muslim community on foreign affairs and its aim at providing a balance to the secular nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. In short, the Muslim community has become more outspoken and
politically assertive on the foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the role of the state has been more dominant than that of society (the Muslim community) and, during the period of the New Order regime under President Soeharto, to a very large extent the government has manipulated Islam for its domestic political purposes.

Notes
2. For further discussion on this matter, see Mashad (1999), pp. 9–20.
4. Ibid.
5. Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani indicated that the leaders of the Indonesia’s independent movement of including Sukarno, Agus Salim, and Hatta voiced their support for the struggle of Palestinians against Israel. See Pelita, 1 December 1987; Suara Pembaruan, 3 December 1987.
7. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 19 August 1999.
10. Interviews with various Indonesian scholars, 30 August 1999.
13. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 August 1999.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with a Muslim activist, 4 November 1999.
18. Ibid.
19. Department of Foreign Affairs (no date).
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24. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 29 August 1999.


26. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 28 September 1999.


32. Interview with a Muslim activist, 30 August 1999.

33. Interview with a Muslim activist, 4 November 1999.

34. Interview with several senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 August 1999.

35. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.

36. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 19 August 1999.

37. Ibid.

38. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 19 August 1999.

39. See *Suara Karya*, 20 September 1993. A similar view was also noted by an Islamic scholar, interview, 30 August 1999.

40. Interview with an Islamic scholar, 30 August 1999.

41. Ibid.

42. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 4 November 1999.


44. This statement is taken from the briefing by the Director General of Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, of newly appointed Indonesian ambassadors to various Middle Eastern countries, Jakarta, 25 August 1998.


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49. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 9 August 1999.
53. Republika, 23 September 1999.
54. Ibid.
56. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 4 November 1999.
57. Ibid. He noted that DDII had political and financial relations with Hamas, which stood on the radical wing of the Palestinian movement and was the biggest opposition to the PLO.
58. Ibid.
59. Media Indonesia, Kompas, Suara Pembaruan on their editions, 13 November 1996.
60. Based on several interviews with Indonesia’s foreign policy analysts, August to December 1999.
61. Media Indonesia, 13 November 1996.
63. The Jakarta Post, 10 December 1997.
64. Republika, 14 November 1996.
65. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 2 November 1999.
67. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. This meeting has been reported in most Indonesia’s daily such as Suara Karya, Suara Pembaruan, Merdeka, Republika, Kompas, The Jakarta Post on their various edition 24–28 June 1993.
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78. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 2 November 1999.


85. Ibid.


97. Ibid.


99. Ibid.

100. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 19 August 1999.
101. Ibid.


104. Ibid.


106. Interview with a retired General, 31 August 1999. He further noted that secretly ABRI – especially KOPASUS (the Army special forces) – had already had some military intelligence cooperation with Israel.


108. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.


112. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.

113. Ibid.


122. Ibid.


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131. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.

144. Initially, this report was released by the Israeli newspaper, *Yediot Aharonot*. See *Media Indonesia, Republika, Suara Karya*, 20 August 1997.
147. Based on several interviews during October to November 1999.
148. Ibid.


162. *Suara Pembaruan*, 1 February 1991; *Antara*, 1 February 1991; *Kompas*, 1 February 1991; *Merdeka*, 1 February. This statement was signed by Hasan Basri of the MUI, Dr. Sularso Sopater of Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia/PGI (the Communion of Churches in Indonesia), Kartosiswojo of the Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia/KWI (Conference of Indonesian Bishops), Ida Bagus Oka of Parisaha Hindu Dharma Indonesia/PHDI (Indonesian Council for the Hindu Religion), and Tedja Rasjid of the Perwakilan Umat Budha Indonesia/Walubi (Representation of the Indonesian Buddhist Community).


166. Ibid.


178. Ibid.


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183. The difficulties of Indonesia’s government to further play its active role in seeking a peaceful settlement to the Gulf war occurred when the Palestinian foreign minister Farouq Khaddoumi urged Indonesia to play a more active role in finding a solution to the war. The Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Talaat Amin, hit back at the Palestinian envoy, saying that Khaddoumi was not a Palestinian envoy but ‘an Iraqi agent’. The differing attitude of various Muslim countries on this issue made Indonesia less likely to take sides in the 1991 Gulf war. *The Jakarta Post*, 21 February 1991.
Introduction

The question of whether or not Islam has influenced Indonesian regional policy is discussed in this chapter, which focuses on Indonesia’s diplomatic role in facilitating the peaceful resolution of the Moro problem in the Philippines. This issue was quite significant not only for Indonesia but also for ASEAN. This is mainly due to the fact that ASEAN has long been the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy and, regionally, the security and political stability of Southeast Asia plays an important role for both member countries and extra regional powers.

According to a former Indonesian foreign minister, it is quite important here to distinguish between the terms ‘facilitate’ and ‘mediate’ in order to seek Indonesia’s role in the peaceful settlement of the Moro problem. Mediation implies that the Moro National Liberation Front is a national entity; since the MNLF is regarded as a separatist movement aiming at the independence of the ‘Bangsa Moro’ (Moro nation) from the Republic of the Philippines, we prefer to use the term ‘facilitate’ rather than ‘mediate’. Still, one of Indonesia’s chief negotiators recognized that Indonesia’s role ‘in practice was mediation’.

The main argument of this chapter is that Indonesia did not base its role in facilitating the peaceful solution of the Moro problem on religious (Islamic) solidarity with the Moro. On the contrary, Indonesia based its role on the regional cohesiveness of Southeast Asia. In this context, for Indonesia the need to have significant regional stability in Southeast Asia was much more crucial than religious solidarity. The other major argument of this chapter is that the success of Indonesia in facilitating the
peace process of the Moro conflict was also utilized to bolster the prestige of the Soeharto regime both internationally and domestically. Moreover, the role of the ‘state’ in facilitating the peace process was quite strong and pivotal. And unlike other international issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments (e.g. Palestinian problem, and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina), the government succeeded in helping to resolve the conflict between the two parties.

On the other hand, the role of Indonesia’s Muslim community on this issue was so limited as to be almost insignificant. This was mainly due to the government's argument that the Moro problem was a domestic problem of the Philippines. More importantly, for many Indonesian Muslims the Moro problem was not seen as a crucial issue.

The chapter first elaborates the internal dimension of the Moro problem. It discusses the history and the roots of the struggle of the Muslim Moros to separate from the Philippines. It also addresses the efforts of the Moro National Liberation Front to internationalize the Moro problem as an issue of concern for the ummah (Islamic community) worldwide. The internationalization of the problem of the Muslim minority on Mindanao invited the attention of the Muslim world. The second part of the chapter delineates the uses and the failure of Islamic diplomacy by the OIC and the role of Indonesia in the OIC concerning the Moro issue. The final section, which is the main theme of the chapter, discusses the direct role of Indonesia in facilitating efforts by the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF to seek a comprehensive solution of the Moro problem.

The Moro Problem: The Nature of the Conflict

The question of the Muslim minority in the southern Philippines has been an issue for governments in Manila since Spanish rule commenced in the mid-sixteenth century. For more than three centuries, the Spanish attempted to contain the Muslim Moros, followed by the 47 years of the US occupation, but all in vain. When the United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946, the objection of the Moros to their inclusion in the Republic of Philippines was quite strong. This is mainly due to the perception of the Moro people that shifting the reins of the government from the US to the Filipinos not only threatened their economic survival but also their culture and local identity as well.
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Even though the post-war Philippines provided the local elite, including some Moros, with the opportunity to participate fully in the politics of independence, for most Moros the creation of a nation-state dominated by Christian Filipinos was viewed as an effort to marginalize and minoritize their Islamic status. Their strong Islamic identity pushed the Moros to struggle for self-determination in order to establish an independent Islamic state. In their perception Christians, whether Spanish, American or Filipino, were imperialists who should be fought against. In the words of Rosario-Braid, the problem in the southern Philippines is not a ‘Muslim problem but is in fact a Christian problem’.

Between 1946 and 1968, the struggle of the Moros still took a non-violent/non-military approach. The Moro resistance and assertion of self-determination against the government of the Republic of the Philippines took on a new and significant phase when Datu Udtog Matalam (the former Governor of Cotabato) formed the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) and declared the Moros’ independence from the Republic of Philippines in 1968. In its manifesto, the Bangsa Moro declared its desire to secede from the Republic of Philippines, in order to establish an Islamic State that shall embody their ideals and aspirations, conserve and develop their patrimony, their Islamic heritage under the blessings of the Islamic universal brotherhood.

This movement also called on all Muslims in the southern Philippines to conduct a jihad against the Philippines government, and established the MNLF as the armed wing of MIM in 1969. The establishment of the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, was not only driven by the resurgence of Islamic identity among Philippine Muslims who felt oppressed at the hands of a Christian-dominated government; more importantly it was also driven by the need to put their armed struggle into a more unified framework. When it was founded, the main task of the MNLF was leading the Moro people towards the revolutionary path for the primary objective of reacquiring the Bangsa Moro people’s freedom and independence and setting themselves free from the clutches of Filipino terror and enslavement.

The ultimate goal of the MNLF was to change an independent Bangsa
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Moro homeland into a *Darul Islam* (Islamic state).* Further, as Aguja notes, the causes of the Muslim Moro struggle were also 'economic deprivation, lack of political participation, inadequate health and social services, lack of infrastructures and minority-majority structural distractions'. Those factors, Aguja argued, were crucial catalysts of the Moro struggle for self-determination. In the words of Thomas McKenna, the struggle of the Muslim Moro is:

> A self-consciously Islamic Movement ... a response to Philippine Christian chauvinism, and a desire to strengthen social and political connections between Philippine Muslims and the Islamic world.

In other words, ethno-religious conflict and the problems of economic change in the southern Philippine were the root causes of the war.* The MNLF was thus the latest manifestation of the long struggle of the Moro for self-determination. As shall be seen this struggle had three vital elements.*

**Indonesia and the failure of Islamic diplomacy of the OIC in the Moro conflict (1972–1992)**

The armed conflict between the MNLF and GRP became more violent and important between 1972 and 1975. On 21 October 1972, a month after President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, the conflict in Mindanao was approaching a full-scale civil war that was very brutal and costly. The government estimated that around 120,000 people were killed, more than one million were made homeless and over 200,000 Moro refugees fled to Sabah. This situation led Nur Misuari, as the leader of the MNLF, to visit Libya and other Arab countries to solicit armed support. The MNLF then became the most important rallying symbol of the Moro struggle for self-determination, which aimed to defend the homeland and Islam as the way of life of its peoples.

The MNLF also became a popular revolutionary movement, enjoying almost universal support from Muslims in the Philippines as well as Moros abroad. More importantly, the civil war between the MNLF and the GRP from 1972 to 1975 also marked the internationalization of the Moro problem into a world political affair, and particularly as an international issue in which the MNLF played on Islamic sentiments. Obviously,
the internationalization of the Moro problem was a political move of the MNLF in order to gain support from the Muslim world in achieving its political objectives.

A more intensive involvement of foreign (particularly Muslim) countries began in 1972 when the Marcos regime took eight Muslim ambassadors on a tour of Mindanao to show that the charges of genocide by the MNLF were exaggerated. The ambassadors found that ‘no strong evidence exists of state-supported genocide’. A year later at the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah, Libya unsuccessfully lobbied the members to conduct an economic and political blockade against the Marcos government. However, most OIC members expressed their concern over the treatment of Philippine Muslims and released a recommendation for a peaceful settlement. At this stage, the very first attempt to solve the ‘Filipino Muslim problem’ was prompted by ‘information received from the OIC Secretary General’. The OIC sought the ‘good offices’ of the Philippine government ‘to guarantee the safety and property of the Muslims in the Philippines as citizens of that country’.

Indonesia was the only member who had a ‘different position’ in the OIC, saying that ‘the Moro problem was principally the domestic affair of the Philippines and it was not the main duty of the OIC to interfere in the affairs of any country’. The position of Indonesia on this matter was that it wished to exclude the Moro problem from the major attention of the OIC. Indonesia sought to maintain the principle of solidarity and mutual help among ASEAN members by lobbying the OIC not to release any strong resolutions on the Moro issue. The major consideration of Indonesia’s diplomacy in the OIC on the Moro conflict was that, in the early years after the establishment of ASEAN, it was important for Indonesia to have good bilateral relations and avoid political friction with the Philippines government. As a senior diplomat argued, ‘[to] support the deep concern of the OIC members to the Moro problem would only create a political disadvantage for the unity of ASEAN’.

In 1974, a similar meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur. Here, Malaysia urged the Philippine government to find ‘a political solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders and, particularly, with representatives of the MNLF’. The meeting also officially recognized the MNLF as the representative of the Filipino Muslims. For the first time, the OIC mentioned the MNLF in its resolution and called for negotiations between
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the two parties. This political recognition by the OIC of the struggle of the Moro was crucial for the MNLF to formally internationalize its political struggle. In addition, the MNLF wanted a formal recognition as an independent Muslim state, military assistance, and the breaking by OIC members of all diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the GRP.26

In this context, the MNLF tried to gain diplomatic and political support from the members of the OIC. Different OIC members responded to these efforts in different ways. Libya, for instance, one of radical members of the OIC, not only supported the struggle of the Muslim Moro with economic aid but it also provided military training and equipment for the Moro army.27 However, such other members of the OIC as Indonesia tended to take a more prudent attitude to the problem not only due to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs but also due to the importance of ASEAN solidarity.

In this OIC conference, Indonesia continued to exert a moderating influence by calling for a ‘just solution within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines’.28 It argued that a recognition of the MNLF as a ‘single entity’ separate from the sovereignty of Philippines would only worsen the intensity of the Moro conflict and jeopardize the steps toward a solution taken by the GRP.29

The above meeting in Kuala Lumpur created a new political problem between Malaysia and the Philippines. It also put the fragile unity of ASEAN into jeopardy just 7 years after its establishment. Indonesia, as the one of ASEAN’s founding members, tried to mediate this political friction by urging the two countries to pay more attention to the promotion of regional solidarity and unity rather than the pursuit of ‘narrow’ national interests that might jeopardize the stability of ASEAN.30

However, instead of seeking a comprehensive settlement with the Moros, the approach of the Marcos regime to the Moro conflict was that of ‘carrot and stick’.31 The carrot approach was designed to entice various Moro fighters into abandoning their struggle but ‘the stick’ – the state’s superior instruments of violence – received more emphasis.

This approach provoked a larger-scale armed conflict with the MNLF. However, by 1975 the civil war had reached a political and military stalemate. This development proved encouraging for MNLF efforts to seek full membership in the OIC but the organization, after strong political lobbying by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who met
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with some key Arab members, rejected this idea since it would worsen the conditions necessary for a peaceful solution between the GRP and MNLF. Indonesia argued that to accept the MNLF membership in the OIC would also be counter-productive for both regional and international security. However, Arab oil-producing countries supporting the Moros threatened to apply an oil embargo on the Philippines. Considering the possible political and economic impact of such an oil embargo, the Marcos government called for a cease-fire and initiated a process of negotiation with the MNLF.

At a subsequent meeting in Jeddah in July 1975, the Philippine government for the first time organized political panels to negotiate with the MNLF. This meeting was a direct response to calls from the OIC for a peaceful solution to a conflict that it had recognized as internal to the Philippines. The crucial point that was agreed upon at this meeting was that the Philippine government would grant autonomy to the Moros. The idea of giving the Moro ‘autonomy’ was actually set out in the ‘Working Paper of the Committee of Four of the OIC’ consisting of Senegal, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. The idea of autonomy provided the Moros with self-government within the framework of Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was the maximum result of negotiations between the Philippine government and MNLF since the Marcos regime maintained that the Moro problem was the internal affair of the Republic of the Philippines and that ‘any solution to the problem should be put within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines’. Yet, the MNLF could not really accept this idea.

At the same time, Marcos also realigned his foreign policy to win over the Muslim world and intensified his diplomatic initiatives by recognizing the PLO, opening embassies in seven Muslim countries, strengthening its relations with other Southeast Asian, South Asian, Middle Eastern and African Muslim countries and even sending the first lady, Imelda Marcos, to the Middle East as a special emissary to Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria in November 1976. In addition, President Marcos met the OIC Secretary General, Amadou Karim Gaye of Senegal, in order to re-convince him that the Moro problem was an internal affair of the Philippines.

In Southeast Asia, Marcos intensified the Philippines’ bilateral relations with Malaysia and more importantly with Indonesia by personally visiting Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to gain political support to solve
the Moro problem within the framework of Philippine national integrity. With all these foreign policy initiatives toward the Muslim world, the Philippines laid the groundwork for political, social and cultural exchange with the Muslim world and consolidated high-level diplomatic contacts aimed at resolving the Moro problem. The political result of these diplomatic approaches to the Muslim world was crucial in the sense that, under pressure from the OIC, the MNLF finally dropped its demands for Bangsa Moro independence and acquiesced to political autonomy.

After the state visit of Mrs Marcos to Libya, the Philippine government and MNLF started a series of meetings in Tripoli under the auspices of the OIC to hammer out the terms of a more comprehensive agreement aimed to end the Mindanao war. On 23 December 1976, the ‘Tripoli Agreement’ was signed by Deputy Defence Minister Carmelo Barbero for the Philippine government, Nur Misuari, the chairman of MNLF, Amdou Karim Gaye, the Secretary General of OIC, and Minister Ali Abdul-sallam Treki as chairman of the negotiations and for the host country, Libya.

This agreement, which was initially hailed by the Muslim world as a ‘breakthrough’, outlined ‘the general principles for Muslim autonomy in the Philippine’s South’. The agreement provided for the granting of autonomy to 13 of the 23 provinces in the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, and the cities located therein within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. It also mentioned that the autonomous regional government would have its own executive, legislative and judicial branches, and a regional security force independent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This agreement would also enable the Muslim Moros to establish courts based on Shariah law and their own Islamic schools and universities, economic and financial systems.

Several months after signing the agreement, the Marcos government implemented its own version of autonomy by establishing two separate regional governments, which in the view of the Moros were ‘regional but not autonomous’. The implementation of this new rule by the government of the Philippine, of course, provoked protests and hostilities from the Moros. Furthermore, as Bertrand has argued, there were also some differences over the means and implementation and vacillation on the part of the Marcos government. The MNLF accused the Marcos re-
gime of insincerity in the peace negotiations and using the agreement as a means of temporarily defusing the armed conflict and weakening the Moros.\textsuperscript{49} The MNLF concluded that Manila’s primary objectives in the agreement were to halt the MNLF’s military struggle as well as to pre-empt an oil embargo by OIC member countries dissatisfied with the failure to implement the agreement.\textsuperscript{50}

At the same time, the resumption of the conflict was also accompanied by the fragmentation of the Moros. They split into three big factions: the traditional MNLF under Nur Misuari, a moderate MNLF wing under Macabaton Abbas and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) under Hashim Salamat.\textsuperscript{51} Even though the traditional MNLF under Misuari was still the biggest faction, this fragmentation reduced the bargaining power of the Moros vis-à-vis the Philippine government. Furthermore, it also divided the support of the Muslim countries. Egypt, for instance, gave its support to the MILF while Libya supported Misuari. The OIC at its ninth ICFM in Dakar on April 1978 recognized only Nur Misuari as the chairman of and spokesperson for the Moro people. As a result, the comprehensive solution to the Moro problem could not reach its crucial objectives.

During the early 1980s, efforts towards achieving a comprehensive solution to the Moro problem produced insignificant results. On the one hand, the split in the Bangsa Moro resulted in a call from the Muslim countries to the MNLF to unite prior to new negotiations to put the Tripoli Agreement into effect. On the other hand, the Marcos regime consolidated its diplomatic missions in the Muslim world. This was mainly in response to the resolution of the eleventh ICFM in Islamabad in 1980, which requested OIC members ‘to assert economic, social and political pressures on the government of the Philippines to induce it to implement the Tripoli Agreement’.\textsuperscript{52} Psychologically, this request gave moral and political strength to the Moros as well as boosting the MNLF’s international posture.\textsuperscript{53} Considering the possible negative outcomes of the request of the OIC on the Philippines, Marcos sent emissaries to the fourth Islamic Summit in Casablanca, and to the World Muslim Congress in Karachi in 1984.

Marcos himself also held bilateral meetings with the leaders of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore and visited Saudi Arabia’s King Khaled. The main aim of his visit was to persuade the Southeast and South Asian countries and Saudi Arabia to suspend economic and political pressures on the GRP.
On his visit to Jakarta, President Marcos met with President Soeharto to discuss ASEAN concerns of the Moro problem. He also wanted to obtain the political assurance of President Soeharto to prioritize the domestic integrity of the Philippines and regional unity of the ASEAN in seeking the settlement of the Moro problem. The response of Indonesia was quite clear: Indonesia supported the national integrity of the Philippines and assured Marcos that Indonesia would only assist in the settlement of the Moro problem within the framework of the national unity of the Philippines. The diplomatic result of these intensive meetings with the Muslim world was the reaffirmation of their commitment to respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines and the cancellation of oil embargos on the Philippines.

The next crucial step of the OIC in solving the Moro problem was to hold a meeting between the Philippine government and MNLF in Jedda in January 1987. This meeting agreed to discuss autonomy, ‘subject to democratic processes’. The new Aquino government also started diplomatic initiatives by briefing Islamic diplomats in Manila about the government’s peace programme, which emphasized that the Tripoli Agreement was being implemented within constitutional processes. Two years later, under the Republic Act 6734, Aquino established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the Moros were reluctant to accept this idea because of restricted aspects of the ARMM.

The initiatives to solve the Moro problem gained more momentum when Fidel Ramos was elected President of the Philippines in 1992. He personally asked the OIC and particularly Indonesia to help to find a comprehensive and permanent solution the Moro problem for the sake of the national integrity of Philippines and the regional stability of ASEAN. This he asked when he visited Jakarta and met with President Soeharto on 23 September 1993. The most crucial objective of his visit was to personally persuade Indonesia to preside directly over the peace process between the MNLF and GRP. The response of President Soeharto was that Indonesia would do so if the OIC agreed.

The role of Indonesia in the peace process of the Moro conflict (1993–1996)

The direct participation of the Indonesian government in the peace process first began when a special delegation of the President of the Philippines, led
by Emmanuel Palaez, visited Jakarta on 20–22 May 1987 to meet President Soeharto and convey the official request of the GRP that Indonesia help find a peaceful settlement of the Moro conflict. The GRP expected the Indonesian government to: (1) urge the MNLF to find a peaceful solution on Mindanao and accept all necessary conditions to the peace settlement, and (2) support the GRP in the OIC concerning the Moro conflict. Commenting on this request, President Soeharto indicated his willingness to assist the GRP in proposing a diplomatic approach that would bring a comprehensive peaceful solution of the Moro conflict.

This visit produced a variety of reactions from elements of Indonesia’s Muslim community. Since the late 1980s KISDI, for example, had always stressed that it was the right of the Moros to have their own independent state separate from the Philippines. They urged the government to show more political solidarity and support for the Moros in achieving their ultimate goal. The government, of course, totally disagreed with the KISDI statement. As one senior diplomat argued, the independence of the Moros as a nation-state would trigger wider separatist movements in the region and in Indonesia itself, such as in Aceh, thus becoming a very negative precedent to the regional cohesiveness of ASEAN. In contrast to KISDI, from the 1980s other big Muslim organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah had urged the Indonesian government to help the parties to the conflict find a comprehensive solution of the Moro problem.

By the time that Indonesia became directly involved in the peace process, there had been 23 years of intermittent war between the two parties. As Djalal argues, Indonesia became involved at a time when the conflict had already reached its climax and ‘seemed to be drifting in no clear direction’.

Indonesia’s participation in the peace process was formalized when the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Istanbul in 1991 called for the enlargement of the Quadripartite Committee into the Ministerial Committee of Six. The ministerial meeting of the OIC in Karachi on 25–29 April 1993 unanimously agreed to support Indonesia as chairman of the Committee of Six. According to a senior Indonesian diplomat, this was because Indonesia was the biggest Muslim country in the world and had a very strong leadership role in the region, also because of the success of Indonesia’s diplomatic role in seeking a peaceful
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and comprehensive solution of the Cambodian problem.66 The Committee of Six was mandated with the task to ‘settle the Moro problem once and for all by reaching a negotiated settlement in a just, comprehensive and peaceful manner’ based on the Tripoli Agreement.67 But as has been discussed earlier, the Tripoli agreement was perceived by the MNLF as neither a complete nor detailed agreement and there were many loopholes in it. Thus, the main task of Indonesia was to revise and ‘translate’ that agreement into a more practical one. This task was not easy due to the worsening situation in the southern Philippines.

The importance of regional stability in the Southeast Asian region

As has been noted earlier, even though the Moro problem was geographically so close to Indonesia, politically Indonesia was actually a ‘latecomer’ in the situation.68 For more than two decades, the Indonesian government had consistently seen the Moro problem as being an internal affair of the Philippines and adopted a policy of non-interference. Moreover, within Indonesia itself there was no strong sympathy from Muslim groups for the Moro cause.69

Indeed, unlike on the Middle Eastern issue, the response of Indonesia’s Muslim community to the Moro problem was quite limited, the issue receiving little significant attention from most Indonesian Muslims. This apathy put the government in a stronger position in controlling the voice of the Indonesian Muslim community. More importantly, it gave the government a freer hand in finding ways to help the conflicting parties achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem. As a result, the voice of the Muslim community on this issue was insignificant in the foreign policy-making process.70 As a senior Indonesian diplomat argued, the insignificance of the voice of the Muslim community was also due to the success of the government’s policy of containing the Moro issue domestically by arguing that it was not a religious conflict.71

To further reduce the negative impact of the Moro problem on perceptions of Indonesian Muslims, the government also limited any news related to the Moro separatist movement by focusing on the importance of regional peace and stability of the Southeast Asia. As Wiryono, one of Indonesia’s chief negotiators, argued, ‘we need to have peaceful surroundings around Indonesia.’72

Indonesia also wanted to play a more constructive role within ASEAN by easing the tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines over
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Sabah in order to establish a more secure and stable Southeast Asia. This tension had its roots in the Malaysian political, financial and military support for the MNLF, particularly from the state of Sabah. In this context, Indonesia’s involvement in the peace process of the Moro problem would be crucial for bringing peaceful conditions to the ‘growth triangle’ involving parts of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Indonesia’s chairmanship of the Committee of Six gave some comfort to the Philippines’ government. In its eyes, even though Indonesia was the biggest Muslim country in the world, it would be more neutral and even-handed than the OIC in general and in particular such member countries as Malaysia and Libya. Indonesia’s role as a primus inter pares (first among equals) in ASEAN and its success in helping to settle the Cambodian conflict were also important reasons for the Philippines to request Indonesian help in settling its domestic problem. As Foreign Minister Ali Alatas pointed out at the fourth round of formal peace talks:

Since the outbreak of the conflict in 1972, Indonesia, being a close neighbor and fellow member of ASEAN, has followed developments in the Southern Philippines with great concern. Indeed the Philippines is an integral element of the ASEAN body politic and any pain or disaster suffered by one part of that body politic is bound to distress all the other parts.

This stress on regional commitment was very crucial due to the perception of some ‘radical’ Muslim countries that all Muslim countries should put ummah solidarity above other ‘secular’ interests such as regional and international peace. It is clear that Indonesia’s role in the Moro problem had nothing to do with Islamic sentiments but rather with the need for peace and regional stability of Southeast Asia. This was outlined in the concentric circles of Indonesian foreign policy in which Indonesia sought to secure its immediate neighbourhood first and foremost and hence to achieve regional peace.

Domestically, Indonesia’s involvement was also aimed to show the Muslim community that the New Order regime would not tolerate any efforts to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia as a whole or any separatist movements. The key target here was the struggle by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) to form a separate Islamic state in Aceh. As Sastrohandojo emphasizes, even though Indonesia acknowledged the
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existence of the MNLF, it did not mean to promote separatism, particularly religious separatism.78 Thus, in dealing with this problem, the government was strongly united and committed to the principle of national integrity.

The Philippines was also convinced that Indonesia was more able to maintain a healthy balance between religious solidarity and regional stability in presiding over the committee. With Indonesia’s chairmanship, the Philippines government clearly expected many benefits including help to protect Manila from criticism from other Muslim countries and persuading the MNLF to agree to come to the negotiating table. At the same time, the Philippine government was also very confident that Indonesia would ask the MNLF to accept the best possible solution offered by the Philippines. More importantly, the MNLF perceived that Indonesia could play a fairer role as it had shown in the process of the peaceful settlement of the Cambodian conflict.79

It is also worth noting that there were no significant different perceptions within the government itself toward the Moro problem. Unlike on the issue of Bosnia, Deplu (the Department of Foreign Affairs) and ABRI spoke with the same voice of the importance of maintaining regional stability and security.80 The military was subsequently responsible to the execution of its role as peace monitoring forces to oversee the ceasefire in the Moro region, while the main task of Deplu was to conduct its role as a facilitator of the peace process at the negotiating table.81 In this context, the foreign minister served as the head of the facilitators and was directly responsible for this to President Soeharto.

Diplomatic steps in the peace process

As an initial step in facilitating the settlement of the Moro problem, Indonesia hosted an informal exploratory talk at the presidential palace at Cipanas, 80 kilometres south of Jakarta, in 1993. This meeting was presided over by Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, and attended by Manuel T. Yan, chairman of the GRP Peace Panel; Nur Misuari, chairman of the MNLF; and six ambassadors of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six82. In his opening speech to this meeting, Ali Alatas said that:

As a neighboring country and as a fellow member of ASEAN, Indonesia has a natural interest in the success of the peace process in view of the mandate of its constitution, which enjoins Indonesia
to contribute to the achievement and maintenance of a world of greater peace, justice and security.\textsuperscript{83}

He also added that ‘Indonesia had only the deepest understanding of the issues involved in the negotiation, although this was purely an internal matter to the Philippines’.\textsuperscript{84}

Even though the discussions were exhaustive at both the plenary and technical committee levels, the process went smoothly, resulting in a Statement of Understanding, which agreed to the holding of ‘Formal Peace Talks’ to further discuss the issues contained in the Tripoli Agreement that had not yet been finalized and to focus on the delicate question of ‘the transitional implementing mechanism and structure’.\textsuperscript{85} Further, it acknowledged that this agreement actually had been an important milestone in the peace process.

Nevertheless, Indonesia realized that there was still a considerable gap between the positions of the GRP and MNLF. Hence, although Indonesia at all times maintained that its role was to facilitate rather than to mediate, at times it was forced to resort to mediation when negotiations reached an impasse, something that happened many times.\textsuperscript{86} Indonesia’s insistence on being regarded as a ‘facilitator’ was based on its position that the problem was a domestic matter of the Philippines.

Indonesia’s role was therefore to provide a venue and create an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and compromise so that the matters left unfinished by the Tripoli Agreement could be completed.\textsuperscript{87} In order to complete this task, Indonesia pursued two different approaches: political (preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution) and military (by sending military observers). In its preventive diplomacy, Indonesia facilitated informal meetings at which the conflicting parties could meet informally and without any preconditions. These informal meetings were also aimed at breaking the ice and exploring possibilities to set up negotiations in a relaxed environment. The second military approach aimed to create a more stable and secure environment in the Moro area by maintaining a ceasefire between the conflicting parties.

In order to oversee the ceasefire, the two sides also asked Indonesia to send military officers, something that was warmly welcomed by the minister of foreign affairs, Ali Alatas: as ‘a crucial step to find a breakthrough to the Moro problem’, he stated, ‘Indonesia is ready to send its military officers to Mindanao.’\textsuperscript{88}
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A second round of formal talks took place on 1–5 September 1994 in Jakarta, resulting in the signing of an Interim Agreement. This agreement reflected the increasing political will of the two parties to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement and more importantly also showed their enhanced mutual trust by keeping the negotiators in contact with each other. The most important result of the agreement was to give autonomous status to the Moro people. The biggest hurdle, however, remained the mechanism for implementing autonomy.

At the end of the third round of formal talks, which were held on 28 November–2 December 1995 in Jakarta, an agreement between the GRP and MNLF representative was signed. This agreement represented about 90 per cent of the autonomy contents of the Tripoli Agreement. The contours of a final agreement began to be visible but the three toughest and most difficult issues had yet to be resolved. They were integration of MNLF forces into the armed forces of the Philippines; the mechanism for the formation of the Provisional Government; and the formation of a Special Regional Security Force. In the opening of the fourth-round talks, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas noted that,

although we had not reached the end of our quest, we had at least reached the final crossroads, and the next steps would have to take us either of two ways: one leading to continuing strife and suffering, the other, the road of compromise, leading to the end of our quest, a just peace and shared prosperity.

The fourth and final round of formal talks was held on 29–30 August 1996 in Jakarta. Here, the two parties agreed to initialling of the GRP–MNLF Final Agreement, which called for the setting up of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) as a forerunner to an autonomous Muslim region. Additionally, under this agreement, Nur Misuari and the MNLF were put in charge of a special council to oversee development projects in 14 provinces on Mindanao. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated that the peace deal was ‘an important step toward the realization of a political stable, socially cohesive and economically progressive Southeast Asia’. He went further by saying that ‘in a very real sense, it will move us yet closer to our goal of a new regional order of durable peace and stability, shared prosperity and mutual tolerance’.

123
The peace process facilitated by Indonesia involved at least 70 meetings at the technical level, seven informal consultations, and eight Mixed Committee meetings, which were held in the southern Philippines. Four rounds of formal peace talks and the ninth Mixed Committee meetings were held in Jakarta. Three consultations at the level of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six were held respectively in New York, Jeddah, and Jakarta. All of these meetings were approached by use of *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus), said to be characteristic of the ASEAN way of diplomacy.

The approach here was to take up the easier issues first and the more difficult ones later. And when consensus was lacking, there was resort to consultation within each side and then between the mediator and each side separately, to relay and resolve proposals and counter-proposals. By implementing these approaches, Indonesia avoided formal mechanisms and legalistic procedures for decision making and relied on consultation and consensus to achieve collective goals. In this context, the ASEAN way emphasized ‘a setting of negotiations which take place not as between opponents but as between friends and brothers.’ In addition, Indonesia suggested ideas, played a role in narrowing the gap and served as a bridge to the parties when they had reached the point of impasse. This situation took place when the GRP and the MNLF were deadlocked over the issue of the number of the MNLF troops to be incorporated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

In addition to its political role, on behalf of the OIC Indonesia also served as an interim ceasefire monitor-observer. The main tasks of the mission were to oversee the ceasefire between Philippines and MNLF forces and to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the GRP and MNLF. In conducting this task, the Indonesian military did not face any major problems due to the strong political will of both parties to settle the conflict.

In his closing remarks at the final round of the talks, President Soeharto stressed that ‘the peaceful settlement of the rebellion would be a positive contribution toward efforts by the seven-nation ASEAN to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region.’ Specifically, President Soeharto stressed that, ‘through the peace process, there has been a building of confidence and trust between the Philippines and Indonesia which should bode well for their common prosperity.”
nal agreement between the Philippine government and MNLF was signed at Malacañang Palace in Manila on 2 September 1996. The success of Indonesia in helping to solve the Moro problem not only raised the position in world politics of the OIC – as the first party which had mediated an agreement (the Tripoli Agreement) – but also boosted the status of Indonesia in the Muslim world by creating a more peaceful and stable region in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

From the above discussions, it can be concluded that the conflict in the southern Philippines had many dimensions (economic, political and ethno-religious) with a long history of mutual mistrust and animosity between the conflicting parties. On certain issues, the religious dimension was quite clear and obvious, sometimes blurring the peace process of the Moro problem.

Nevertheless, Indonesia consistently maintained its position that the Moro problem was not a conflict of religions but rather a separatist movement in a sovereign state. This consistent attitude of the Indonesian government was the major factor for the success of the peace process between the GRP and MNLF.

Indonesia’s involvement in the Moro problem stressed the national integrity of the Philippines as a single nation-state and the regional unity of Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, the need to have regional security and solidarity among ASEAN members was a more important item in its foreign policy in the region than building religious (Islamic) solidarity with the Moro people. This was mainly because ASEAN was the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Furthermore, Indonesia also emphasized that it was merely playing the role of facilitator. This role was based on the perception that the Moro problem was an intra-state conflict, and that Indonesia did not want to be seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of another country. In Djalal’s words, Indonesia played a role in preventive diplomacy insofar as such a role was requested and accepted by the conflicting parties. In this context, on behalf of the OIC, Indonesia helped to shape both the process and the outcome of the peace agreement between the GRP and MNLF. Further, by facilitating the resolution of the Moro conflict, Indonesia gained
more prestige in the region as well as in the Islamic world. Domestically, it also increased the government’s status with its Islamic community.

Notes
1. For a more detailed elaboration on the history of the struggle of the Moro Muslim society, see for instance McKenna (1998), especially chapters 4 and 5.
7. Ibid., p. 10.
13. For further elaborations on this matter, see for example Abinales (1998), pp. 81–94.
18. International support for the Moros started in the late 1960s when reports of massacres of Moros hit world headlines. The first country that openly reacted was Libya. The President of Libya, Muammar Qadafi said that his government would come to the rescue of the Moros in Mindanao and Sulu.
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if the mass killing did not stop. Many other Muslim leaders in Asia and Africa also shared the same sentiments. At the state level, the first foreign leader to extend concrete help to the Moros was Tun Datu Mustapha Haron, Chief Minister of Sabah. He even allowed the Moros to use Sabah as a military training camp, supply depot and communication centre. See Jubair (1999), pp. 173–174.


21. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat through email, 8 March 2001.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.


29. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat via email, 8 March 2001.

30. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 August 1999.


33. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 September 1999.


35. Ibid.


38. These were the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Algeria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.


40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
44. Quoted from McKenna (1998), p. 167.
49. Ibid.
54. Interview with a senior Indonesia diplomat, 8 March 2001.
55. Ibid.
57. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 9 August 1999.
59. Ibid., p. 2.
60. Ibid.
62. Interview with a senior diplomat, 9 August 1999.
65. Members of the Ministerial Committee of Six were Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Libya, Somalia, Bangladesh and Indonesia. See Address by H.E Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia to H.E. Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia in Initialling Ceremony of the Final Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, Jakarta, 30 August 1996. See http://www2.
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66. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 30 September 1999.


68. Ibid., p. 201.

69. Interview with a Muslim activist, 9 August 1999.

70. Interview with a senior diplomat via email, 8 March 2001.

71. Ibid.


73. For further elaborations on this issue, see for instance Tan (2000), pp. 18–19.

74. Interview with a senior diplomat, 23 August 1999.

75. Interview with an Indonesian foreign policy analyst via email, 27 June 2000.


77. Some ‘radical’ Muslim countries such as Sudan and Yemen argued that the Muslim world has an obligation to increase the number of Islamic-based nation states in order to counter the domination of Western world. Interview with a senior diplomat, 2 November 1999.


80. Interview with a retired General, 31 August 1999.

81. Interview with a senior diplomat via email, 8 March 2001.


84. Ibid., p. 16.

85. Ibid.


87. Ibid.
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89. Ibid., p. 6.


91. Opening statement by H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, at the fourth round of formal peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, Jakarta 29 August 1996.

92. Ibid.


95. Ibid.

96. See Report by H.E Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs to H.E. Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Initialling Ceremony of the Final Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, Merdeka Palace, Jakarta, 30 August 1996.


98. Publicly and formally, Indonesia’s role was a facilitator but due to the delicate issues covered in the peace process, Indonesia also played its role as mediator. Interview with a senior diplomat, 25 November 1999.


102. Document by the Directorate-General of Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, on ‘The role of Indonesia as the Chairman of the Committee of Six-OIC in the peace process of the GRP-MNLG’. No date, p. 10.

103. Indonesian military forces to this mission were Contingent *Garuda* XVII–1, 2, 3 and 4 led by Brigadier General Asmadri Arbi (15 personnel) Brigadier General Kivlan Zein (16 personnel), Brigadier General Aqlani Maza, MA (16 personnel) and Brigadier General Zainal Abidin (10 personnel). They served for three years from September 1996 to September 1999. Yearly Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Ali Alatas. Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, p. 20.
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104. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.


106. Ibid.

107. See the opening statement by H.E. Mr Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, at the fourth round of formal peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, Jakarta 29 August 1996.

108. Interview with a former Foreign Minister, 30 November 1999. He even mentioned that the success of Indonesia in the Moro issue became the ‘only political achievement’ of the OIC in settling the (international) conflict.

Indonesia and the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The support of Indonesia for the struggle of the Bosnian people was not based on Islamic solidarity but on essential values of the basic rights of freedom as stated in the 1945 Constitution.¹

Introduction

The role of the Indonesian government in trying to find a settlement to the war in Bosnia, and the deep concern about and involvement of Indonesia’s Muslim community in this war, is the focus of the last of my case studies. In analysing this case, this chapter discusses the debate amongst Indonesia’s foreign policy makers and between the ‘state’ and ‘society’ in response to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As this chapter shows, there were significant competing attitudes amongst Indonesia’s foreign policy makers. The Indonesian Islamic community also put forward its own views on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were quite different to those of the government on this issue. It is noteworthy that there were also different views on the Bosnian conflict within the Islamic community itself.

In order to map out the foreign policy debates between the state and society on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this chapter firstly discusses the nature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its implications for the Muslim world. The next section describes and explains the reactions and the responses of the Muslim community of Indonesia to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thirdly, the discussion examines the Indonesian government’s initiatives and policies toward Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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The War in Bosnia and the reactions of the Muslim world

The nature of the war in Bosnia has been subject to conflicting interpretations. Analysts such as Francine Friedman argue that ethnic-religious hatred was the most visible issue in the war, whereas Lenard J. Cohen contends that the religious element was a significant factor in explaining the cause of the war. In the words of Srdjan Vrcan, the war can be described as representing the violent conflict between ‘the politicization of religion’ and ‘religionization of politics’. As the war progressed, the predominantly Muslim Bosnian state leadership increasingly resorted to Islamic religious phrases and symbolism in order to gain more political and financial support from the Muslim world.

But clearly the war also had a nationalist political aspect. Nationalism was certainly at the root of the failure of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1980s and subsequent withdrawal of Slovenia and Croatia from the federation in 1991. Separation was violently opposed by the Yugoslav government, which was dominated by Serbs working to fulfil their dream of a Greater Serbia. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was thus sent in to crush the separatists but without success. These events in turn led to a successful independence referendum and the subsequent separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the federation in April 1992, followed soon afterwards by Macedonia.

With Yugoslavia now comprising only Serbia and Montenegro, there was great determination by Serbian nationalists to realize their dream of a Greater Serbia incorporating Bosnia and parts of Croatia. Here they had the full support of the Bosnian Serbs, who totally opposed independence. Great swathes of Bosnia territory were seized with the help of JNA troops wearing Bosnian Serb uniform but supplied with equipment and material by Belgrade. Paramilitary forces from Serbia (and later Croatia) also entered the war. This Serbian action was a clear violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this early stage in the crisis, the European Community, United States and Canada blamed Serbia for its military aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and recalled their ambassadors from Belgrade. At the same time, they imposed an arms embargo on the area whose main effect was to weaken the defence of the Bosnian state against insurgent Bosnian Serb and later Croat forces that were well supplied by Belgrade and Zagreb.
For the Muslim world, though, it was the religious element rather than the nationalist element that was predominant. Moreover, the war situation invited broad sympathy for Bosnia's Muslims from all Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia was the first Islamic country to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also provided emergency aid to the Bosnian people to the value of US$15 million.7

Soon after the war began, the OIC in its two-day meeting on 16–17 June 1991 in Istanbul called for the UN to send forces, and for the organization to enforce peace if economic sanctions failed to halt the bloodshed.8 The OIC also agreed to request military action against the Serbs if the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro approved by the UN Security Council the previous month did not end the war.9 In his opening speech at the meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel remarked that the OIC was more than ready to respond to any UN appeal for military forces to restore peace in the region.10 Indonesia still believed that the UN would take any necessary actions to stop the war.11 Considering the slow action taken by the UN on the war, on 20 May 1992 the OIC asked its members to withdraw their ambassadors from Belgrade. In a statement issued in Jeddah, the OIC secretary general, Hamid Al Ghabid, condemned the UN for its failure to stop the war.12

A more significant diplomatic initiative of the Islamic countries took place in Jeddah in December 1992 when Islamic foreign ministers attended an emergency meeting to call for a special UN General Assembly session on the war and to consider additional assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina.13 In the opening speech of the meeting, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia called on the UN to allow Bosnian Muslims to arm themselves for self-defence against the Serbs.14 Some radical members of the OIC, such as Libya, Iran and Yemen, even urged all the OIC members to send troops and weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately. Bosnia-Herzegovina's President, Alija Izetbegovic, in an emotional speech to the meeting, said his people only wanted defensive weapons 'not for revenge but for self defence'.15 He further said 'please, please stop the genocide against the people of Bosnia Herzegovina either by war or peace ... please choose to either defend us or allow us to defend ourselves'.16

But after a long debate all members accepted the idea of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia that all actions taken by the OIC should be put under the common actions decided by the UN. Indonesia in its capacity as the
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chairman of the NAM had stressed the need to create conducive conditions to pave the way for a political settlement through negotiations. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas argued the need for the OIC to support political moves to enable the UN secretary-general to have more authority in solving the crisis. He even noted ‘blaming the problem on one party and taking unilateral military action [by the OIC] would not solve anything and even make the situation worse’\textsuperscript{17}. The OIC’s final declaration ‘asked the UN Security Council to immediately take all necessary measures against Serbia and Montenegro including the use of force in compliance with Article 42 of Chapter Seven of the UN Charter’.\textsuperscript{18} The OIC also asked the UN Security Council ‘to review before January 15, 1993 the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina in order to implement UN resolutions’.\textsuperscript{19}

In essence, this draft was the result of compromise among the OIC members since some countries including Iran had called for sending Islamic volunteers to Bosnia and Herzegovina unilaterally. Teheran also indicated its readiness to send arms if the weapons embargo against Bosnia was not lifted.\textsuperscript{20}

The militancy of the attitudes of some of the Islamic countries to the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina pushed Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, the chairmen of the Geneva-based conference on former Yugoslavia, to meet with Islamic foreign ministers to try to moderate their clamour for the use of force against Serbia and pour cold water on Muslim hopes of UN military intervention to help Muslim Bosnians.\textsuperscript{21} They explained that the UN and the EC were against the OIC demands and ruled out lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. They argued that ‘it is a very dangerous idea because what it would lead to is the widening and deepening of the war in the Southern Balkans’.\textsuperscript{22} They further asserted that the idea of some of the OIC members to send Islamic military forces to help the Bosnians was an unrealistic proposition.\textsuperscript{23}

The diplomatic efforts of Vance and Owen did not make the Islamic countries moderate their demands. The OIC secretary general, Hamid Al Ghabid, sent a letter to the five permanent UN Security Council members on 3 February 1993 to request that the Council hold an emergency meeting on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.\textsuperscript{24} At a meeting in Karachi in May 1993, the OIC pledged an additional US$85 million for Bosnia and repeated its call to the Security Council to lift the arms embargo.\textsuperscript{25} In July 1993, some OIC members even proposed a plan to send
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17,000 troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though Indonesia could accept the idea of some OIC members to send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia’s stance was that it would only follow peace initiatives undertaken by the UN. As Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said, ‘we need to comply with Security Council resolutions. We should not violate international law.’ These actions, again, showed not only the deep concern of the Muslim world and reflected a growing consciousness of Islamic solidarity on international issues but also different perceptions and attitudes among OIC members over the issue of Bosnia.

A year later, the OIC held an extraordinary foreign ministers conference in Islamabad to call for the arms embargo against Bosnia to be lifted and sanctions against Serbia tightened. The meeting, attended by 51 member countries of the OIC, also remarked that:

If no Security Council confirmation is forthcoming, the OIC membership, along with other UN members, will come to the conclusion that members acting individually or collectively can provide all means for self-defense to the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Concerning the above decision, Alatas remarked that Indonesia did not mind if (some) OIC members provided military assistance to Bosnians, but it preferred to maximize the political attempts to settle the issue of Bosnia. Thus, Indonesia maintained that a diplomatic approach was the best approach to settle the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina and was reluctant to adopt a military approach.

The demand of some Islamic countries to send troops and weapons in support of the Muslim Bosnians was strengthened in Casablanca when the OIC summit meeting was held there in December 1994. Some Muslim leaders of the OIC members, driven by moral outrage at Europe’s failure to protect Bosnian Muslims from the Serbs, endorsed a strong strategy that hinted at defiance of a UN arms embargo.

The final resolution of the Casablanca summit stated ‘the OIC readiness to cooperate with all UN member states who exhibit a willingness on their own initiative to provide the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the means for self-defense.’ The ministers also simultaneously offered the UN an amended peacekeeping strategy for Bosnia, based on expanding the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with contingents from Mus-
The Indonesian delegation again argued that any means taken to solve the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina should run parallel with the UN resolutions and that it was inappropriate for the OIC to conduct actions unilaterally or individually. In other words, Indonesia supported the UN decision to deploy UN peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR).

The next meeting organized by the OIC was of defence and foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur 13–14 September 1995. At this meeting, the OIC member states agreed to supply arms to the Bosnian government. The meeting also agreed to establish the Assistance Mobilization Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its main tasks were to conduct a series of consultations to appoint coordinating staff, determine the priorities and the programme of works for the procurement and the delivery of the weapon systems and equipment, and to translate it into executive actions. Again, Indonesia showed its prudent policy by rejecting the idea of supplying arms to the Muslim Bosnians and arguing that the OIC should consider more carefully all political costs and benefits of its policies concerning the Bosnian issue due to the complexity of the issue.

Even though the above discussions showed the consistent support for the struggle of the Bosnia people from the Muslim world, on the other hand it also clearly reflected the different perceptions and attitudes of the Indonesian government as compared with the rest of the Muslim world on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Viewed as a whole, while some Muslim countries preferred to emphasize military actions either unilaterally or multilaterally to end the war, Indonesia prioritized diplomatic initiatives and political activities to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indonesia believed that these approaches could significantly reduce the level of tensions and violence.

**Reactions and responses of Indonesia’s Muslim community to the war in Bosnia**

The prolonged war between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and the ethnic cleansing by Serbian troops, of which Bosnian Muslims were the primary victims, aroused a solidarity movement by Indonesian Muslims with their co-religionists. Reactions from Indonesian Muslims varied...
from public statements at large meetings or gatherings to angry demonstrations and even solidarity missions to show their sympathy and solidarity with the struggle of the Bosnian Muslims. According to Azra, the response of Indonesian Muslims to Bosnia-Herzegovina was more passionate than to any other international issues pertinent to Islamic sentiment, including the plight of the Palestinians.37

The first reaction of Indonesian Muslims, voiced by the chairman of the Committee of Islamic Solidarity, Lukman Harun, was to condemn the military aggression and violence committed by Serbia and state that the UN Security Council and the US needed to intervene to settle the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Bosnian Muslims were attacked and killed by the Serbian troops.38 Lukman Harun argued that the Western countries, particularly the US, had a ‘double standard policy’ on Bosnia.39 On one hand, the Western world condemned the Serbian aggression against Bosnia, but on the other hand they did not take any concrete actions to stop the aggression.

The United Development Party (as the only Islamic party in Indonesia at that time) urged the UN and OIC to take action against the Serbian militiamen and formulate appropriate action to stop the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims.40 Muhammad Dja’far Siddiq, the deputy secretary-general of the PPP, urged the OIC to take all necessary action to help the Bosnian Muslims under siege from Serbian forces.41 Dr Amien Rais deplored the fact that the reaction of Muslim countries to Serbian brutality was so slow. He added that the Muslim world and individual Muslim countries had all failed to display unity in acting quickly to resolve the war.42 Due to the perceived partiality of the UN on Serbia, he urged Muslim countries to immediately take their own action against Serbia.43 The Islamic Solidarity Committee, one of the organizations established by the Indonesian militant Muslim community, based in Jakarta and whose main concern was to help the struggle of the Muslim Bosnians, even argued that ‘Islamic countries must be ready to supply Muslim Bosnians with arms to enable [Bosnia] to defend its independence and sovereignty’.44

Statements by the Central Board of the Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (ANSOR Youth Movement) and Forum Komunikasi Islam Jakarta (Islamic Communication Forum of Jakarta) urged the Indonesian government to play an active role in the efforts to end the war, in line with the basic goals of Indonesia’s foreign policy, and if necessary to freeze its dip-
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lomatic relations with Yugoslavia.45 Other local Muslim leaders, including Lukman Harun who was one of the most outspoken Indonesia's Muslim leaders, also demanded that the government follow the policy of Iran and Malaysia to sever diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. He noted that even the Philippines, a country with a Catholic majority, had downgraded its diplomatic representation with Yugoslavia.46

A different perception of the need to maintain diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia was voiced by Marzuki Darusman from the government-backed Golkar faction in the DPR (House of Representatives). He argued that Indonesia should not hastily follow Iran and Malaysia in breaking diplomatic ties and noted 'Indonesia should take a diplomatic stand that will make it an acceptable NAM leader’.47

The chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Hasan Basri, called on Indonesian Muslims to provide humanitarian assistance to the Muslim community in Bosnia through the Indonesian Red Cross. Further, he called on the Indonesian government to take a firm stand and to make a strong protest against Serbia.48

In Yogyakarta, Dr Amien Rais asked the Indonesian government to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. The formal recognition by Indonesia of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rais explained, would have a very positive impact on the international community, particularly in the Muslim world, considering Indonesia's status as the biggest Muslim country in the world.49 He argued that Indonesia's diplomatic relations were automatically ended when Yugoslavia broke up. He continued, '[t]he Indonesian government should not have any illusions that there is a Yugoslavia now and Indonesia should no longer acknowledge Yugoslavia as a unitary nation-state’.50

In response to the criticisms from Indonesia's Muslims, the minister of foreign affairs, Ali Alatas, emphasized that the Indonesian government had from the beginning taken a clear and firm stand on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.51 He explained:

We had recognized the existence of Bosnia Herzegovina as an independent state since 20 May 1992 and had also voiced our concern and criticism in the OIC meeting in June 1992 and supported the UN initiatives to put an end to the war.52
Ali Alatas also noted that, considering Indonesia’s position as the future chairman of the NAM, it should take prudent action on Bosnia because Yugoslavia was the current chairman of the NAM and the chairmanship should be transferred to Indonesia in a smooth way. Therefore, Indonesia could not give up its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia as some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community demanded.53

The position of the Indonesian government on Bosnia-Herzegovina was also repeated by the director-general of the International Organizations Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Hadi Wayarabi. Responding to the demands by some elements of the Muslim community that the government should break off its diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, he said that Indonesia would not take that action due to its ‘broader political interests’ as a future chairman of the NAM.54 Despite maintaining diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, he added that the government would recall the Indonesian ambassador to Yugoslavia if the situation became worse. In this case, the political priority of Indonesia to take the chairmanship of the NAM was more crucial than hastily giving its political and religious solidarity to the struggle of the Bosnians. In other words, Indonesia placed a higher priority on the pragmatic issue of presiding over the NAM than on pursuing moral interests in its foreign relations.

On 19–25 September 1992, two Indonesian Muslim leaders, Lukman Harun and Djili Assidiki, visited Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to seek a clear description of the situation plus the information needed to help decide what further steps should be taken by Indonesian Muslims.55 On their return, they reported that Bosnian refugees needed three kinds of assistance: military, political and humanitarian. They said the Bosnian people expected the Indonesian government and people to provide that assistance: political assistance through severance of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, humanitarian assistance through the MUI and military assistance through multilateral forces.56 Based on their report, they organized a demonstration at Pejambon (the Department of Foreign Affairs) and sent a petition to the Department repeating that the Indonesian government should break off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and provide financial assistance to the Bosnians.57

In order to provide this financial assistance, Indonesian Muslims organized a national charity fund-raising programme to support the Bosnians. The fund raising collected Rp6 billion (or US$3 million).58 H. Mu-
hammad of the committee said the fund would be channelled through a delegate of the Bosnian government who visited Jakarta at the end of October 1992. On 22 October 1992, the Department of Foreign Affairs also announced that the Indonesian government would give US$100,000 in cash for humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be channelled through the UNHCR.59

Students continued their demonstrations against the government policy on Bosnia. On 30 October 1992, more than 100 students of the University of Indonesia marched to the Yugoslav embassy and the House of Representatives (DPR) to condemn the cruelty and barbaric actions of Serbian troops against Muslims in Bosnia and to demand that the Yugoslav government pull its troops out of the country and respect the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.60 The students also urged the government to take a stronger stance against the atrocities in Bosnia Herzegovina and send a peacekeeping force under the coordination of the UN to Bosnia-Herzegovina.61 A different concern was expressed by the Jakarta-based Association of Muslim Doctors. The association not only raised US$9,500 from its members for the Bosnian people but more importantly declared its readiness to travel to Bosnia to provide medical assistance to the Bosnian Muslims.62

The ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims remained a subject of continuing concern to many groups of the Indonesian Islamic community in the 1993–1995 period. Further manifestations of solidarity with Bosnian Muslims came from the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI or Forum of Islamic Fraternity), which urged the UN to take tougher measures to end the war in Bosnia and asked the OIC to send troops to help keep the peace. It has also implored the Indonesian government to defend the Muslims in Bosnia by sending troops as part of the UN peacekeeping force.63 In its statement to welcome the Muslim New Year, Muhammadiyah appealed to Indonesia’s Muslims to continue to give their moral and material (financial) support to Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.64 It also urged the government to take a firmer stand on the conflict.65

Similar desires were also voiced by Indonesian students calling themselves the Indonesian Student Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They demanded that the UN immediately dismiss a peace plan proposed by international mediators. They also denounced the UN for doing so little to stop the slaughtering of the Bosnian Mus-
Muslim students from several universities in Jakarta also staged a demonstration outside the House of Representatives (DPR). The students who joined the ‘Pemuda Pendukung Pengiriman Pasukan dan Sukarelawan ke Bosnia’ (P4S or Youth in Support of the Sending of Troops and Volunteers to Bosnia) urged the Indonesian government to send peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN and they offered themselves for training by the Indonesian armed forces before being sent to the war-torn country. The demonstration illustrated, once again, the demand from the Muslim students on the government to send troops or even to join other Muslim nations in pledging troops to help defend Muslim Bosnians in the face of aggression by the Serbs and Croats. However, the government maintained that Indonesia would not send its troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina due to its pragmatic reasons to chair the NAM.

A tougher stance by the Indonesian government was also urged by the KISDI. They judged that the UN had ‘tied up the feet and hands’ of the Bosnian Muslims by refusing to lift an arms embargo imposed on them at the beginning of the three-year war. They also accused the Western world of conspiring to destroy predominantly Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina and called on the government to sever ties with Belgrade. KISDI concluded that Indonesia’s policy was too cautious and inconsistent and called on the government to ‘take concrete actions it has initiated, which is to call for a meeting of the UN Security Council and pressure it to lift the arms embargo’. The chairman of KISDI, Achmad Soemargono, said ‘we call on the government to express our country’s concern over the situation by sending assistance the Muslim Bosnians need’. KISDI even stated that ‘our organization is ready to mobilize and send volunteers as Jihad forces to fight on the Muslim side of the Bosnian people against the enemy of the Islam’. In order to show its readiness to send Jihad forces to Bosnia, KISDI organized a rally and established an organization of volunteers ready for deployment to Bosnia named BASMI (Barisan Sukarela Muslim Indonesia or the Brigade of Indonesian Muslim Volunteers).

The declared willingness of the Muslim community to send volunteers to defend Bosnia on the one hand genuinely expressed the religious sense of Muslim brotherhood. On the other hand, the initiatives may also be viewed as the Muslim community’s criticism of the vague position of the Indonesian government with respect to the situation in Bosnia.
initiatives also functioned as a reminder from the Muslim community of the importance of the active principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

In this context, the attitudes of some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community toward the Bosnian issue only served as a political tool to invite wider concern and emotional sentiment of the community toward international issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments without having any significant impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the issue in Bosnia.

**Policy debates and state-level initiatives: Political support, diplomatic efforts and the issue of sending troops to Bosnia**

Commenting on the Muslim community’s demand that the government should take more concrete actions on Bosnia, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas rejected the notion that Indonesia was not forthright in expressing its views on Bosnia. Indonesia, he pointed out, always supported the resolutions adopted by the OIC calling on the UN to consider military action if economic sanctions failed to stop Serbian attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina; this was based on the basic right to independence as stated in the 1945 Constitution. He also reiterated that Indonesia had repeatedly stated its concern over the atrocities occurring in the former Yugoslav republic. ‘Our standing regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina is very clear,’ he said.

At the 10th NAM summit on 1–6 September 1992 in Jakarta, the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina aroused controversy among the member countries. At the opening of the summit, nearly all the members condemned the aggression of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his speech, President Soeharto declared that speedy and resolute action was needed to end the war and uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity and cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He urged the Non-Aligned Movement to play a more active role in the settlement of the war. The final position of the NAM on Bosnia-Herzegovina called for full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also supported the proposals of the London conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina and urged all parties to the conflict to resolve their problems in line with the conclusions of the London conference and to fully respect the UN Charter.
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President Soeharto himself agreed that Indonesia should take more concrete steps to deal with the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Ali Alatas noted, Indonesia had recalled its ambassador to Yugoslavia, Sunjopto Pamungkas; the ambassador would remain in Jakarta for ‘an indefinite period’. Indonesia had also summoned the Yugoslavian chargé d’affaires to express Indonesia’s indignation at the worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.78

More importantly, in July 1993, Ali Alatas said that Indonesia was also considering dispatching troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN.79 But he added that the plan had not yet been finalized as talks on the subject were still going on between the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and Security, Edi Sudrajat and the commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Faisal Tanjung.80

Islamic organizations and some members of the DPR hailed Ali Alatas’ statement on the plan to send troops to Bosnia. They argued that this decision was a major change in the government’s policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.81 Djafar Siddiq of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) said that the deployment of Indonesian troops would not only provide a significant effort to end the war but also internationally it would increase the status of the Indonesian armed forces and lead to a significant improvement in Indonesia’s image in the Muslim world. A similar opinion was also expressed by the chairman of the MUI, Hasan Basri. He supported the plan because it had noble aims to fight the cruelty of the Serbs.82

Meanwhile, in the military itself, there was a sharp difference of opinion between Generals Faisal Tanjung and Edi Sudrajat on the type of forces that Indonesia would dispatch and on whether or not Indonesia should also send weapons to Bosnia.83 Surprisingly, General Faisal Tanjung publicly commented that ‘ABRI is ready to send its weapons and combat troops to Bosnia in order to help the struggle of Muslim Bosnians’.84 This statement illustrated policy differences between ABRI and the Department of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned earlier, the Department argued that Indonesia’s decision to send troops should not be taken hastily due to the complicated situation of the war in Bosnia. Moreover, a senior diplomat had said that the government was only considering sending troops to Bosnia but it had not taken the final decision to do so.85
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In order to ease the friction, Edi Sudrajat then released a statement to clarify Faisal Tanjung’s statement, saying that ‘the policy of the Indonesian government to send troops to Bosnia was the ultimate authority of President Soeharto.’ This policy friction, which was based on the difference of political and religious backgrounds within the military and between the military and Department of Foreign Affairs, clearly shows the power competition between Islamist and nationalist-secular factions in influencing foreign policy making. On the issue of sending troops, ABRI was divided into two large factions: Islam and nationalist-secular, while the Department of Foreign Affairs as a whole represented the nationalist-secular. The Department did not want Islamic sentiment to play any part in Indonesia’s decisions toward the Bosnian issue while the Islamic faction in the military argued that Islamic sentiment could not be separated from responses to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The statement of General Tanjung was perceived by the Department of Foreign Affairs as an effort by elements in the military to involve Islamic sentiment in foreign policy-making. It was also perceived by the Department as an effort to push the Muslim community into becoming more involved in the formation of foreign policy.

President Soeharto then took a middle way to reduce the friction and decided that Indonesia would send military observers rather than combat units to Bosnia under the auspices of the UN. Here, President Soeharto himself did not explicitly solve the policy conflict between the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Rather, as a retired general has argued, this was another case of President Soeharto solving policy friction among his ministers by utilizing the Javanese model of problem resolution. As such, it was the coordinating minister for politics and security, Soesilo Sudarman, who on behalf of the Indonesian government announced that Indonesia was unable to send combat units because it would take extraordinary preparation to organize, train and equip mobile units. He further added that the geographical condition of Bosnia was very different from that of Indonesia or Cambodia, for instance, where Indonesian troops were participating in a UN peacekeeping force. In reality, sending troops or volunteers to the battlefield was as complicated politically as it was financially.

The above arguments were not accepted by some elements of the Muslim community. Hussein Umar of the DDII rejected Soesilo Sudar-
man’s statement while extolling the examples of poorer states such as Bangladesh, which was perpetually troubled by floods, and Palestine, which had not even a free territory; both had sent troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Malaysia, Indonesia’s closest neighbour, had not only dispatched troops but also secretly sent military weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina. KISDI argued that what Indonesia lacked was not resources or capacity but political willingness to involve its forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A more neutral comment was made by the chairman of the MUI, Hasan Basri. He expressed his hope that the government’s decision to send observers to Bosnia Herzegovina was only an initial step to be followed by dispatching military forces. In fact, the announcement of Indonesia’s policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina by Soesilo Sudarman showed the firm position of Indonesia on the issue of Bosnia. It could also be interpreted as a political victory of the nationalist group over the Islamist group within the government.

Soon after the announcement, around 3,000 Muslims gathered at the Al-Azhar Mosque in South Jakarta to protest the decision and urge the immediate sending of troops to Bosnia Herzegovina. The demonstration, which was organized by KISDI, also demanded that the government close the Yugoslav embassy in Jakarta. Some Muslim leaders also openly expressed their disappointment with the government’s reluctance to send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, rejecting the argument that Indonesia did not have enough resources to do so.

The government’s decision could be interpreted as a moderate attempt to save face before Indonesia’s Muslim community, which was demanding that the government send combat troops to Bosnia. More importantly, the government’s stance was both ‘an effort to downplay the Islamic factor’ in Indonesia’s response to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ‘a political compromise’ by President Soeharto with respect to the competition for power among the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs and the rising demands of Indonesia’s Muslim community.

The report to President Soeharto of the Indonesian ambassador-at-large to NAM, Achmad Tahir, who was assigned to visit Europe and gather information on Bosnia-Herzegovina, could also be viewed as an effort to calm down the emotions and the demands of the Muslim community. At a press conference after meeting with President Soeharto, Achmad Tahir said that the Bosnian representative at the Geneva peace
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talks wanted only humanitarian relief supplies (medicines, clothes and foods), not weapons nor military forces. This statement, of course, provoked a wide range of reactions from the Muslim community. Some Muslim leaders, such as Lukman Harun and Achmad Sumargono, saw this report as contradictory to the statement of Amer Bukvic, the chairman of the Bosnian Information Centre, that Bosnia needed peacekeeping forces and weapons in order to contain the Serb attacks. They even argued that the ambassador-at-large had misrepresented the real situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the sake of justifying Indonesia’s policy of not sending troops. They then repeated their demand that the government immediately send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Even though some elements of the Muslim community still demanded the government send troops, the minister of foreign affairs, Ali Alatas, reaffirmed that Indonesia would send only military observers and 100 medical specialists from the military in coordination with the UN. The Indonesian military forces to be sent on this mission were the Garuda XIV Contingent. Additionally, he also offered financial assistance worth US$5 million to the Bosnian people. Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed forces, General Faisal Tanjung, reaffirmed that Indonesia would send 20 military observers and had prepared medical personnel for duty in Bosnia Herzegovina under the auspices of the UN; they would be dispatched in October 1993.

Indonesia’s position was reiterated by President Soeharto when he met the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eljia Izetbegovic, in Jakarta on 25 January 1994. The visit of the Bosnian President was aimed to personally request Indonesia to send troops to the region under UN auspices and ask Indonesia to use its international influence to convene an international peace conference. President Soeharto implicitly declined to agree to send troops by saying to his Bosnian counterpart that ‘Indonesia will continue to support Bosnia-Herzegovina in the current conflict and will help efforts to bring the war to end’ In order to find any possible peaceful mechanisms, President Soeharto then instructed Nana Sutresna, the NAM chairman’s chief executive assistant, and Nugroho Wishnumurti, Indonesia’s ambassador to the UN, to solicit support for the Bosnians and begin preliminary preparations for meeting with other NAM members as well as to conduct talks with NAM’s coordinating bu-
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reau at the UN with the objective of helping find a peaceful settlement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.108

The next step that President Soeharto took was to visit Bosnia-Herzegovina on 13 March 1995. To most Indonesian dailies, the visit to Bosnia in a middle of war was perceived as a historic and brave visit. Interestingly, the idea to visit Bosnia-Herzegovina apparently did not come from the Department of Foreign Affairs but from Probosutedjo (Soeharto’s step-brother) and some Muslim leaders at ICMI. They believed that, with this visit, President Soeharto would be able to get more political support at home from the Muslim community.109

Soeharto’s visit, of course, was celebrated by the Islamic community as a crucial step to support the struggle of Muslim Bosnians. It indicated ‘a growing concern’ of President Soeharto to the issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments.110 Yet, Secretary of State Moerdiono, who was part of the presidential entourage to Sarajevo, said that President Soeharto visited Bosnia in his capacity as the chairman of the NAM and not as Indonesian president.111 This statement again showed the ambiguous position of the Indonesian government on Bosnia-Herzegovina.112

Diplomatically, Soeharto’s visit was aimed at seeking a peaceful solution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its objective was to demonstrate a free and active foreign policy. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs apparently saw the major objective of this visit was to serve domestic politics but at the cost of giving religious sentiment a place in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy.113 Some analysts and some leaders of the hardline Muslim groups perceived the visit as a clear indication of Indonesia’s ambiguity on the issue of Bosnia Herzegovina.114 On one hand, this visit gave the impression that the government took Islam into account in its policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It could also be seen as a symbolic gesture of Muslim brotherhood to the Muslim Bosnians out of the needs of a domestic Indonesian political agenda. On the other hand, the government always maintained that the Indonesia’s position on the Bosnian issue was not related to Islamic sentiments.

President Soeharto also initiated fund raising throughout Indonesia for the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aim being to build a mosque as a symbol of Islamic solidarity between the peoples of Indonesia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This step was believed by some militant Islamic groups to be an attempt by President Soeharto’s to divert
domestic concerns from possible military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina to socio-cultural issues.115

During his visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Soeharto offered Indonesia’s ‘good offices’ to the conflicting parties to end the war via a comprehensive two-tiered diplomatic approach.116 First, Indonesia offered to serve as a facilitator of any peace talks between the parties (not as a mediator to the conflict). Second, Indonesia offered to provide the framework for the peace process.117 The mechanism of the peace talks proposed a series of meetings in a two-tier approach starting with a joint meeting among leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. The outcome of the meetings was to be formalized in a wider international forum, including the UN Security Council, the five-member Contact Group (Germany, France, Britain, the United States and Russia) and other countries with a particular interest in a final settlement of the conflict in the Balkans.118 The basic principles of the negotiations were to include peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, acceptance of relevant UN resolutions, protection of ethnic minorities, and the honouring of internationally-recognized borders.119

President Soeharto gave senior diplomat Nana Sutresna the job of attempting to realize this peace proposal. His main task was to get in touch with the sides involved in the conflict and set a plan to meet in Jakarta.120 Yet, Nana Sutresna acknowledged that a lasting solution to the conflict was difficult due to the complex situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.121 Realistically, Indonesia’s proposal to emphasize a direct-dialogue process among the conflicting parties rather than to set the agenda of dialogue was attainable but it was operationally complicated due to the interplay of political and primordial sentiments in the Bosnian issue.122 Furthermore, Ali Alatas also explained that, despite international efforts including international offers to facilitate a peace conference, the political goodwill of the leaders in the former Yugoslavia was a prerequisite for any peaceful solution to the crisis in the war-torn region.123 But this goodwill was lacking.

In other words, the success of any peace initiative would depend on the good behaviour of the warring parties concerned. The worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that this Indonesian initiative was never taken up. The leaders of the conflicting parties had no strong
political commitment to back up the peace plan initiated by Indonesia and some even said that they knew nothing about the plan. Western countries including the US seemed to be reluctant to acknowledge or support the peace proposal that Indonesia offered. Ali Alatas denied this, saying that ‘Indonesia’s proposal to help facilitate a peaceful solution to the conflict had been submitted to the conflicting parties ... and they know about it and have agreed to it in principle.’ Furthermore, Ali Alatas stressed that it was the prerogative of the leaders involved in the conflict to make the effort and take the initiative to exploit the opportunity that Indonesia was offering them. The reluctance of the parties involved in the conflict clearly meant that the Western and particularly the Balkan leaders did not prefer Indonesia’s peace initiative but rather those made by the US, EU and Russia. Implicitly, the Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that Indonesia’s peace initiative would also reach a diplomatic impasse.

Despite an undertone of pessimism and doubts about the likelihood of success, legislators and some leaders of Indonesia’s Muslim community gave their support to Indonesia’s proposal. Gus Dur and Hasan Basri as well as Theo Sambuaga, a legislator representing Golkar, supported the peace proposal and noted that Indonesia’s proposal added a fresh new dimension to the peace process in the Balkans.

To the militant Muslims, the peace proposal offered by President Soeharto was not only obsolete but also demonstrated a lack of serious political preparation by the Indonesian government to implement the peace initiative. It was also not a ‘smart choice’ for Indonesia to give a chance to the Serbs to participate in the peace talks. In their opinion, the only option Indonesia had was to give military support and send combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, some elements of the Muslim community perceived the peace initiative as nothing more than diplomatic lip service by the Indonesian government toward the Bosnian issue.

Internationally, the Indonesian proposal did not draw spectacular reactions. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali welcomed President Soeharto’s initiative, ‘considering the fact that peace efforts made in the area have so far reached a dead end.’ The foreign policy community in Jakarta, speaking for their respective governments, endorsed Indonesia’s peace plan, while at the same time wondering why it came so late.
The peace initiative was not welcomed very enthusiastically by the Western world.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the massive movements of the Muslim world in dealing with the complex situations in which ethno-religious elements, historical roots and the political interests of other countries intertwined in prolonging the war in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Muslim world failed to display unity in responding to the attitude of the Western world in this issue.

This chapter has also provided the national and international context for Indonesia’s response to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian war was perceived by many Indonesian Muslims as a significant international issue pertinent to Islamic sentiments. Similar to the Muslim communities’ responses to the Middle East, their voices concerning the conflict in Bosnia were also very outspoken. While it is arguable that Indonesia’s Muslim community expressed its deep symbolic concerns and showed its sincere solidarity with the struggle of the Muslim Bosnians, the community had no united views on Bosnia and was thus unable to exert a significant political influence on Indonesia foreign policy-making on this world issue. Further, its pressure on the government was quite symbolic in nature, and related to the principle of Muslim brotherhood. On the other hand, the responses of the Indonesian government toward Bosnia-Herzegovina were pragmatic and realistic as far as it was concerned. However, the Muslim community saw the government response as lacking in principle or even a shield for weak leadership; moreover it smacked of diplomatic opportunism to meet the needs of the government’s domestic political agenda.

At the other extreme, this chapter also depicts the competition for power within the state apparatus, that is between the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Defence and the military in formulating the state’s policies on Bosnia-Herzegovina. To some extent, this competition for power was the result of local or domestic political struggles between Islamic and nationalist-secular factions in Indonesia’s politics, the battleground here being whether or not Islam should be taken into account in the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy pertinent to the Muslim world. It seems obvious that President Soeharto used this competition and the
differing views of the Muslim community on the ‘domestic mechanism’ of foreign policy-making in order to retain his political power.

Notes
1. Interview with an Indonesian senior diplomat, 28 September 1999.
5. Ibid., pp. 74–98.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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31. Ibid.
33. It was argued that safe areas under UNPROFOR protection should be expanded to include all the land allocated to the Bosnian government under the latest plan from the Western contact group. *Media Indonesia*, 16 December 1994.
36. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid. Malaysia had broken its diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia soon after the Serb aggression against Bosnia.
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61. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Interview with a Muslim activist, 31 August 1999. KISDI claimed to have signed up more than 10,000 volunteers ready to go to fight Serbs. See also *The Jakarta Post*, 19 October 1995.
73. Ibid. In Indonesian, ‘basmi’ means to wipe out, eradicate or exterminate.
75. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
82. Ibid.

83. General Faisal Tanjung was believed to be part of the green (Islamic) faction in the army (which was concerned with Islamic dimensions of national and international issues), while Edi Sudrajat came from the nationalist-secular (red and white) faction of ABRI. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999. For interesting discussion on the Islamist and nationalist groups in military, see for instance, Emmerson (1999), p. 60–68.

84. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.

85. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 5 August 1999.


87. Interview with a foreign policy analyst, 27 June 2000.

88. Interview with a senior Indonesian diplomat, 5 August 1999.


90. This model was utilized by taking a third way (harmonization of policy options) without judging which of the original positions was more feasible or applicable. Resolution was usually taken over by another (third) person assigned by President Soeharto. By using this model, President Soeharto was able to preserve the political loyalty of his ministers for the sake of his political needs. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.

91. Soesilo Sudarman was believed to be one of strong proponents of the nationalist group in military. Interview with a retired general, 31 August 1999.

92. Ibid.


94. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 31 August 1999.


98. Several interviews with Indonesian scholars and Muslim activists, August–September 1999.

99. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 5 and 9 August 1999. See also Sukma (1999), p. 139.

100. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 22 November 1999.

107. Ibid.
109. Interview with an Indonesian senior diplomat, 30 September 1999.
110. Based on interview with an Indonesian senior diplomat, 30 September 1999.
112. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 5 August 1999.
113. Interview with an Indonesian senior diplomat, 30 September 1999.
114. Interview with some Indonesian scholars and Muslim activists, August–September 1999.
115. Interview with a Muslim activist, 31 August 1999.
117. Ibid.
120. The peace initiative that Indonesia offered to Bosnia was known as ‘The Jakarta Initiative’ or *Prakarsa Jakarta*. Media Indonesia, *Kompas, Republika*, 25 July 1995.
122. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 30 September 1999.
126. Ibid.
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127. Ibid.

128. Interview with an Indonesian senior diplomat, 10 August 1999.


130. Ibid.

131. Interview with a Muslim activist, 22 November 1999.


133. Ibid.
Despite the marginalization of political Islam during much of the Soeharto era, one of the major developments that may have had a significant impact on state–society relations in the late New Order period was the revival of Islamic-oriented middle-class politics. The young Islamic generation began to speak significantly about the need for a greater role for Islam in domestic politics and foreign policy-making.

The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 opened up new opportunities for political Islam to re-enter the arena of Indonesian politics. This was seen, for instance, in the establishment of new Islamic political parties and their participation in the general elections of June 1999 and April 2004. Many of the new political parties adopted Islam as their ideological orientation and utilized Islam as their political linkage between the party, Muslim communities and the state. The most interesting feature of the establishment of these new Islamic political parties is that most do not endorse the creation of an Islamic state as their primary objective but rather advocate Islamic values as a source of inspiration in the democratization discourse.

The resignation of Soeharto, on the other hand, also gave significant momentum to the emergence of radical Muslim groups. These included *Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah* (FKWAJ) with its paramilitary group, *Laskar Jihad*, plus several other paramilitary groups: *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Holy Warriors) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (now under police detention for his alleged involvement in several bombings), and the *Jama'ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (JAMI or Muslim Brotherhood) and the Front of *Hizbullah*. 
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Many of these are new groups that emerged during the interregnum of President B.J. Habibie. They tend to adopt a literal interpretation and understanding Islam. There were reports that leading members have been close to certain army generals, sponsored (or at least assisted) by certain circles within the ‘Green’ faction of the Indonesian military. Moreover, these groups have been utilized by this ‘Green’ faction to further justify its own political agenda. The main goal of these groups is to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia or, at least, to implement Islamic law (Shariah) as a state ideology in Indonesia.

However, the main reasons of the increased radicalism and militancy of these groups were the government’s failure to enforce the law and solve a number of ethno-religious conflicts as well as the rampant corruption found at all levels of society. Therefore, Azra pointed out that one of the important solutions to mitigate the rise of radicalism is ‘to restore government authority and re-strengthen law enforcement agencies.’ Besides that, another scholar has also asserted that the rise of these radical groups was ‘a consequence of interrelated developments at both domestic and the international levels ... and a combination of different factors, both religious and political, in forging its activism and militancy.’

The attacks of 11 September 2001 and resulting global ‘war on terrorism’ have dramatically altered the political and security environment in the Muslim world. It was not only the terrorist attack itself that has changed the environment but, more importantly, the US response and the ways in which Washington has conducted its fight against terrorism; these have provoked critical concerns in the Muslim world. The support of Muslim countries for the war on terrorism has also varied. Some Muslim countries have given their total support (such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan), some have given verbal support (namely Tunisian and Morocco), while like some Egypt and Indonesia have given support but tempered this with criticism.

Such different reactions to the US war on terrorism have also occurred in Southeast Asia. Some countries like Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines seized on the war against terrorism as an opportunity to strengthen closer military cooperation with the US. Malaysia used the fear of terrorism to weaken the Islamic political opposition by suggesting an association between them and terrorist groups. From the Indonesian standpoint, dealing with Islamic radicalism/extremism posed a more complicated and
complex political challenge to the government of Megawati Sukarnoputri, which was in power at the time of the 9/11 attacks. This was mainly because the government had to balance domestic political demands from the Muslim community against Indonesia’s involvement in the US ‘war on terrorism’. As Rizal Sukma has argued, there were two factors explained the government’s difficult situation. The first factor was the Megawati government’s lack of Islamic credentials. The origins of the ruling PDI-P were on the secular-nationalist wing of Indonesian politics. No doubt this was one reason why President Megawati had not tried to solicit support for her presidential campaign from mainstream Islamic organizations. The second factor was the highly competitive nature of domestic politics following the fall of Soeharto’s regime. Whatever her secular-nationalist origins, Megawati realized that she could not hold on to power without the support of Islamic political parties. This situation has prevented her from taking a more decisive stance on the issue of terrorism.

The massive reaction of some elements of Indonesia’s Muslim society against the war in Afghanistan and subsequent US invasion of Iraq led to waves of anti-Western mass demonstrations (especially against the United States and its war on terrorism). Here could be found clear examples of how the term *jihad* emerged as an essential element of Islamic ‘symbolic politics’ in international affairs. Further, this massive reaction also fuelled a strong determination by Indonesia’s Muslim community to participate in formulation of the country’s foreign policy. The government was very concerned that the war in Afghanistan, the Iraqi occupation and the policy of the United States to fight terrorism across the globe could increase domestic support for Islamic radical groups such as the *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front) and *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Troops).

But, on the other hand, the response of some in Indonesia’s Muslim community was inconsistent when the UN informally requested that Indonesia join the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. They opposed the plan, arguing that Indonesian troops would only be used as ‘a buffer for the US in dealing with the people in Afghanistan’. Moreover, they even organized massive demonstrations to ‘sweep’ Indonesia clean of Westerners (Americans). Daily demonstrations took place in front of the US embassy. Even though these demonstrations were largely peaceful, its participants were those Muslims likely to think of *jihad* as a holy war,
in the literal sense of using violence against the US in the event of attack against Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14} Ja’far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, even responded to the 9/11 attacks in strong terms:

\begin{quote}
We would like to grieve for the US [but] you should learn from your arrogance. For Muslims, we would like to congratulate you for the revenge upon terrors committed by the biggest terrorist nation in the world, the United States, on Muslim nations.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

To some extent, the above critical voice of an Islamic militant group, the anti-American demonstrations and the unfortunately slow response of President Megawati combined to damage Indonesia’s political stability. During her visit to the United States just a few days after the 11 September attack – President Megawati was indeed the first leader of a Muslim country to visit the US after the attacks – she joined the condemnation of the terrorist attack and expressed her government’s readiness to cooperate in the war on terrorism. But at home her statements were strongly rejected by hardline Islamic groups, who even argued that the president had surrendered to US pressure to support the war on terrorism. Also within her government there was intra-cabinet dissent over Megawati’s support of US policy. Vice-President Hamzah Haz and several members of the Muslim political elite blamed the terrorist attacks on America’s ‘sins’ and refused to acknowledge that such militant Muslim groups as \textit{Jemaah Islamiyah} and \textit{Laskar Jihad} might be a threat to national and regional security, even though they had a record of violence.\textsuperscript{16} As a result President Megawati felt compelled to state that no country could attack another country for whatever reason.\textsuperscript{17}

For much of the rest of her presidency, therefore, President Megawati seems to have preferred to adopt a middle-way policy in the war on terrorism. While supporting international cooperation against terrorism, she also became critical of the US attack on Afghanistan and later Iraq. To some extent, this middle-way policy help calmed the anger of Muslim hardliners.\textsuperscript{18} In one of her speeches, President Megawati urged Indonesia’s Muslims to uphold the peaceful ideals of Islam and resist thoughts that ‘justify terrorism or any acts of violence’. This speech was an example of Megawati’s efforts to simultaneously support the US-led war on terrorism and reach out to moderate Muslims, who were extremely wary of her government’s efforts to crack down on Islamic militants.\textsuperscript{19}
Azyumardi Azra, a leading Islamic intellectual and a political commentator, argued that President Megawati had not done enough to reach out to moderate Muslims and seemed timid in confronting terrorism for fear of a political backlash. He further said, ‘She should not be afraid to be critical of the radicals, because the radicals are not supported by many Muslims.’

None the less, in many respects the dynamics of both the international environment and domestic situation had put the government in a delicate situation, facing the dilemma of having to balance the development of democratic practices in (foreign) policy-making against the need to ensure domestic security in Indonesia.

Even though radical Islamist organizations with their anti-American protests did not enjoy the support of the majority of the population (nor were their followers are significant in number), their Islamic discourse did affect the image of Indonesian Islam in the world. Thus, the increasing leverage of radical Muslim groups in Indonesia’s politics helped shaped foreign perceptions of Indonesian Islam. This was mainly because of the Megawati government’s lack of action against the campaigns by hardliner Muslim groups. This situation led to the accusation that Indonesia and neighbouring countries in the region were a hotbed of militant Islam and international terrorism. Indonesia was even perceived as the weakest link on the fight against terrorism. These accusations, of course, had a negative impact not only on Indonesian Islam but also on Indonesia’s credibility in the eyes of international community.

However, President Megawati’s later tougher and firmer policy toward the radical Muslim groups in the period following the first Bali bombing in 2002 helped restored the government’s credibility. The government was able to convince the public and, more importantly, the parliament on the need for anti-terrorist legislation. Even so, some analysts maintained that the inability of the government to take the matter very seriously and its lack of strong enthusiasm for curbing militant groups still made Indonesia one of the weakest links in international coalition against terrorism. This was illustrated by criticism that the government was not restricting the activities of the militant groups and seemed limited in its response to them, as if not wishing to appear ‘anti-Islamic.’

Yet, despite the government’s more tougher approach from 2002, the international community (particularly the United States) still considered that Indonesia had not done enough efforts to crack down on the
radical Muslim groups. These foreign perceptions were not totally wrong because the hardliner Muslim groups could indeed have threatened the survival of her government as well as her domestic political and economic agenda. That said, foreign criticism was mainly due to the fact that the government’s inability to deal with militant groups was related to its domestic political calculations. President Megawati herself viewed Muslim support as an essential part of her political legitimacy.25

The administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elected in late 2004, has largely followed what Megawati’s had done on fighting terrorism. In addition, his administration has even tried to curb terrorist activities by involving itself in, if not controlling, the curriculum of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). Within one year of the new government coming to power, in its efforts to weaken terrorist activities the national police had succeeded in killing Dr Azhahari and other several key terrorist activists.

As stated above, the demand of Indonesia’s (radical) Muslim community for greater participation in foreign policy-making can be clearly seen as ‘a desire for recognition’ of the Muslim voice in Indonesia’s foreign policy, which is perceived to be a significant part of the ‘public sphere’ in the state–society relationship. Even though initially most efforts at Islamic revival have been directed internally at Muslim society, the effects has been to colour and even complicate some issues of international affairs.26 As Azra has noted, the revival of political Islam may continue to affect the course of Indonesian politics as a whole, including foreign policy.27

Thus, the growing militancy and power of Islamic political pressures from the Muslim community continues to put the Indonesian government in a huge policy dilemma. Moreover, the government/state remains in a position of having to ‘accommodate’ Islamist wishes in the policy-making process and faces considerable political risk from the domestic radical Islamic opposition if it were for instance to cooperate too closely with the United States on issues related to political Islam.

The latter concern stems from the question whether or not the US war against terrorism is going to become a war against democracy. Even Amnesty International has reported that US actions have more effective in eroding international human rights and democracy than in fighting terrorism.28 Moreover, it is not just the belief of Indonesia’s Muslim community but is international public opinion generally that the US has ap-
plied double standards to its policy on democracy and human rights to different areas of the world, as for instance in Middle East and Southeast Asia. Such a policy is not something that Indonesia could wholeheartedly support. Indeed, so far for instance it has condemned US foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and stated it views the US as part of the problem in the Middle East.

Many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals have even argued that, ‘while some of their more authoritarian neighbors, like Malaysia or Pakistan, have suddenly become the new darlings of Washington, Indonesia is being orphaned because it is a messy, but real, democracy’. A stronger statement expressed by militant Islamic groups argues that the US policy in fighting terrorism is no more than a war against Islam. Even moderate Muslim leaders have objected to the way the US is conducting its war against terrorism and the way it has handled foreign policy. The most popular preacher on Indonesian television, Abdullah Gymnastiar – known as Aa Gym – has said, ‘I am very sad that a big country like America could have the heart to oppress and destroy small countries without any reasons, it has raised hatred against America among the international community’. A similar sentiment was also voiced by Syafii Ma’arif, the former head of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Islam organization. In his opinion, ‘Mr Bush was a “war criminal” for invading Afghanistan and Iraq without United Nations support’.

The above statements clearly illustrate the tension between security and democracy in the war on terrorism. The US needs Indonesia as a Muslim ‘ally’ in the fight against terrorism but, on the other hand, the US cannot construct a high-security state and foster democracy at the same time. At the street level, the anti-American feeling in Indonesia has significantly increased, which has complicated and made the governmental position much more difficult. As a result, Indonesian foreign policy-makers need to think very carefully about how to manage Indonesia’s long-term relationship with the US. This is particularly so in connection with one of Indonesia’s major interests, economic recovery.

However, the role of Indonesia’s Muslim community in foreign policy issues largely depends on the condition of domestic politics. The existence of many fragmented and fractious Islamic groups, who by their size and disunity do not pose a threat to the current political order, could possibly provide the basis of ‘moderate’ foreign policies for the govern-
ment. It is a common phenomenon in many developing countries that governments can easily make a link between domestic political stability and security of the state in order to increase their leverage over domestic politics. Such an assumption is mainly based on the fact that the governments have their own political needs and agendas and seek to maintain them in the name of domestic political stability and security. In the case of state–society relations in today’s Indonesia’s foreign policy, to borrow the words of Acharya, ‘concerns for domestic stability and regime security [have] proved decisive’.\(^{36}\)

The development of international issues of interest or concern to the Muslim world plays a significant role in influencing the foreign policy process in Indonesia today. One example of this changed situation was the visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Cairo in November 2004 to express the condolences of the Indonesian people to the Palestinians at the death of President Yasser Arafat. In this his first visit to the Middle East, the president was accompanied by several prominent Indonesian Muslim leaders, namely Hidayat Nurwahid, speaker of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Assembly), Din Syamsuddin, chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama), Hasyim Muzadi, chairman of the NU, and Amin Abdulla, leader of Muhammadiyah. This visit could be seen as having certain symbolic meanings.\(^{37}\) It showed that Indonesia retained its full political commitment to supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people and was a good friend of the Muslim Middle East as a whole. Certainly, it also underlined the point that today any idea of Indonesia forging a diplomatic relations with Israel is dead. However, this visit, as Azra has argued, also sent a wrong message. The struggle of the Palestinian is clearly not identical with the struggle of Islam. In fact, this is the struggle of secular nationalists without particular reference to Islam or any other religion.\(^{38}\)

Another example of an international issue related to the Muslim world having an impact on Indonesia is the alleged desecration of the Koran by American troops at the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. The resulting Muslim outrage led to anti-US demonstration held by thousands of Indonesian Muslims who urged their government to freeze Indonesia’s relations with the US.\(^{39}\) On the other hand, there is also a misperception in the US that there are radical Islamic components in Indonesia that support terrorism.\(^{40}\) This was one of the crucial tasks of President Yud-
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Hoyono’s visit to the United States on 25–27 May 2005: to explain that, in order for there to be more constructive relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, the West should be sensitive to the feelings of Muslim people around the world. As The Jakarta Post wrote in an editorial at the time: ‘Expression of Indonesia’s desire to intensify relationships [with the US] – trade and security – should not prevent the sending of a clear signal that we stand opposite the US on many international issues’.

Recently, caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad first published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005 provoked many large protests and even anger by Muslims around the world, including in Indonesia. This event not only spurred peaceful street demonstrations and some violence from many Muslim groups in most parts of Indonesia but hardliners in particular also demanded that the Indonesian government freeze its diplomatic ties with Denmark.

In response to the anger of Indonesian Muslims, President Yudhoyono said in a news conference that publication of the cartoons was an ‘act of blasphemy and had clearly offended Muslims. The Indonesian government condemn[ed] the reprinting of the images by Western European media’. He added, ‘The Indonesian government comprehends the reactions and protests of the public over the cartoons. But it is proper for us to accept the apology extended to us by the Danish government through its envoy in Jakarta and the Danish newspaper itself’. However, President Yudhoyono also appealed to Indonesian Muslims to stay calm and maintain order. He also said that the government had taken bilateral and multilateral steps to resolve this act of intolerance and ignorance.

The level of public participation, particularly from the Muslim community, in foreign policy will be largely determined by the government’s response to its domestic activities as well as its trans-national networks. While, the government’s response itself depends on the government’s political agenda of needs and the capabilities of domestic societies to involve in the foreign policy issues.

Ultimately, however, the level of public participation in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy, particularly from the Muslim community, will be largely determined not so much by such international events than by the government’s response to the domestic activities of Islamist groups as well as their transnational networks. In turn, this response itself depends on the government’s own political agenda as well as on the
ability of domestic Islamists to successfully involve themselves in foreign policy issues.

Islam in Indonesia has offered a form of ‘symbolic politics’ that has been useful as a tool for involving and exploiting certain (Muslim) elements of society in the process of democratization and foreign policy formation in Indonesia. The ‘symbolic politics’ of Islam is concerned with political cultural conditions as well as with the degree of engagement of political elites and wider (Muslim) society in the making of Indonesian foreign policy. It also presents both cognitive and affective features, which allow the society to understand and respectively develop an attitude toward foreign policy issues based on their values and beliefs. In this context, ‘symbolic politics’ have fulfilled certain functions and roles for both political elites and society as a whole.

As has been discussed, in the Indonesian foreign policy-making process, such ‘symbolic politics’ have played not only an instrumental role for decision-makers to influence the society in foreign policy issues but also an interpretative role. Their instrumental role has been to win political support for certain policies; divert the attention of the wider society from certain political issues; provide filters for containing dissent; and strengthen government legitimacy. Their interpretative role has involved object appraisal (in which the society can understand and tolerate the complex situations of foreign policy) and social adjustment in which the Muslim community can rely on political symbols to cope with dissatisfaction and frustrations caused by changing domestic and external socio-political conditions. In other words, symbolic politics will lead to further debate and contention between pragmatism and rationalism in the shaping of Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Soeharto era.

Notes
2. As Azra pointed out, the rise of political Islam is ‘the most visible political development’ in the era of post-Soeharto Indonesia. See The Jakarta Post, 22 November 2001.
4. The green (Islamic) faction in the army was concerned with Islamic dimensions of national and international issues. See Azra (2002).
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5. This allegation was made by Munir, chairman of the Kontras, Jakarta, 30 November 2002.


8. For further discussion on this issue, see Sayyid Al (2002).


11. This term has a broad spectrum of meanings, including fight against one’s own innermost selfish tendencies. For further discussion on this term, see for instance, Rabasa et al (2004), p. 217.


13. The Jakarta Post, 21 October.


20. Ibid.

21. For further discussion on this issue, see for example Gersham (2002).


28. See the annual report of Amnesty International 2005. In this annual report, Amnesty International says the war on terror has eroded human rights standards and allowed governments to openly defy international law in the name of national security.
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30. Ibid., p. 22.
31. Ibid., p. 182.
33. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
41. See the editorial of The Jakarta Post, 25 May 2005.
42. The Jakarta Post, 4 February 2006.
43. The Jakarta Post, 11 February 2006.
44. Symbolic politics can be defined as ‘collective process of construction, distribution and internalization of political symbols (phrases, images, norms, rules, etc.), which present a significant influence on foreign policy during the democratization process’. See Corneliu (2000).
45. Ibid., pp. 2–12.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

What do the case studies tell us?

This chapter draws together the main themes that have been addressed throughout this book and relates them to the major questions outlined in the introductory chapter. These questioned the position and importance of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world, the reactions of the Muslim community to the international issues pertinent to Islamic feelings, the influence of the Muslim community on foreign policy making, the state’s efforts to justify its foreign policy on non-Islamic grounds, and the extent of Indonesia’s involvement with the Muslim world during the Soeharto era and afterwards. The above main issues shaped the central theme that has guided this study, which focuses on an explanation of the ‘state–society’ relationship in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world.

This study started from the premise that foreign policy begins at home in which the domestic political process, including personal rule, political institutions, political affiliations and the strength of civil society, are significant factors in the making of foreign policy. Furthermore, the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy analysis is also based on the idea that there might be a clash of particularistic interests within the environment of national institutions as well as between government institutions and the domestic community. As this study demonstrates, the state and Indonesia’s Muslim community have had quite different views on some international issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments. Consequently, there have been competing interests between the state and Indonesia’s Muslim community when the country has attempted to shape its foreign policy towards the Muslim world.
In the history of modern Indonesian politics, the interaction between the state and the Muslim community have been coloured by tensions. As discussed in Chapter 2, antagonism and mutual suspicion were the main characteristics of this interaction. Basically this stemmed from different political interpretations of Islam as well as from the political interests of Indonesia’s Muslim organizations being quite different from those of the state. Some Muslim groups believed that Islam served both as a religious and political force influencing the policy-making process.

The struggle between the dominant political subcultures of secular-nationalists (mostly Abangan Muslims and non-Muslims) and religious-nationalists (mostly Santri Muslims) was also reflected in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially toward the Muslim world. In principle, the basic components of Indonesia’s foreign policy – anti-colonialism and nationalism – were the result of the victory of the secular-nationalists over the religious-nationalists in managing Indonesia’s foreign relations. Although not rejecting anti-colonialism and nationalism as guiding principles, religious-nationalists wanted to add religious sentiments to them in managing both Indonesia’s domestic politics and international relations, or at least to have religion influence foreign policy-making. In other words, disputes about Islam’s place as a basis for all policy has been a source of conflict between the state and society (particularly the Muslim community) in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

It is also noteworthy that the growing demands of Indonesian Muslims for greater participation in foreign policy-making was also triggered by developments in the Muslim world in which political Islam re-emerged as a global political force in the 1980s and particularly after then in the post-Cold War era. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the double standards of Western (particularly the US) policy towards the Muslim world were the major reasons for the revival of global political Islam.

This book has explored the position and the influence of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world by looking at four different case studies (the OIC, the Middle East crisis, resolution of the Moro problem and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and at Indonesia’s reactions to those current international developments of interest or concern to the Muslim world. These case studies have provided insights into the interactions between the state and Indonesia’s Islamic community in
the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. They have also demonstrated the continuity and changes in perceptions and attitudes to Islam and its position in Indonesia’s foreign policy not only during the time of the New Order regime but also since the fall of President Soeharto.

Even though during the New Order period Indonesia actively participated in most OIC programmes, it never claimed that its participation was based on religious considerations; rather, participation was based on Indonesia’s desire for political cooperation among developing countries. Internationally, this political stance served as a diplomatic tool to maintain a balanced relationship with both the Muslim world and Western countries. It has meant that Indonesia had a ‘wide’ involvement in the OIC but without a ‘deep’ level of commitment. Moreover, the influence of the Muslim community in influencing Indonesia’s policies to this religious-based international organization was insignificant. This is because Indonesia’s Muslim community had only a minimal interest in increasing the welfare of the global ummah. In fact, it paid attention only to international issues in which Islam was threatened by or in conflict with other non-Islamic values or forces.

On the other hand, Indonesia needed to maintain its participation in the OIC in order to get political support from Muslim countries on foreign policy issues that involved the interests of the Western world (especially the East Timor issue). In other words, Indonesia’s participation in the OIC was driven by pragmatic reasons dictated by Soeharto’s domestic and international agendas. At that time or since then, Indonesia has never played a prominent role nor occupied an important position in the OIC. The position of a ‘wide involvement without deep level of commitment’ also seems to have been adopted by the four presidents to succeed Soeharto: B.J. Habibie, Gus Dur, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Unlike Indonesia’s involvement in the OIC, the interaction between the state and the Muslim community toward the Middle East has been quite intense and obvious. The voices of some of Indonesia’s Muslim communities in expressing Islamic sentiments have been also strongly articulated through many different channels. However, Indonesia’s government has always avoided the inclusion of religious factors in its foreign policy toward the Middle East, an approach that in turn has triggered huge emotional responses from the Muslim community, particularly from the ‘scripturalist’ and the ‘hardliner’ groups.
Conclusion

The first issue that invited significant responses from Indonesia's Muslim community was Palestine. Even though the Indonesian government has always maintained that support for the struggle of the Palestinians was based on universal values as stated in the 1945 Constitution, Islamic sentiments could not be totally denied on this issue. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy that there were different interpretations within Indonesia's Muslim community itself on the Palestine issue. Chapter 4 has shown that some 'hardliner' Muslim groups, which are in a minority in Indonesia, linked the issue of Palestine with Islamic solidarity. The Palestine issue, according to them, was part of the conflict between Islam and the non-Islamic world. As a result, some Muslim groups staged huge demonstrations and demanded that the state give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle. They argued that, as the country with the world's biggest Muslim population, Indonesia had a moral obligation to provide sustained support for the Palestinians.

The attitudes of the Indonesian government toward the Palestine issue changed significantly in the late 1980s. One of the significant indicators of the shift was the decision to permit the PLO to open an embassy in Jakarta. However, the alteration of Indonesia's attitude toward the Palestinians was not triggered by the continuous demands of some Islamic groups. Rather, it was due to other reasons, namely, the changing domestic political map in which the Muslim community grew to be a more significant societal group in domestic politics as well as the new agendas of Soeharto's political need to chair the Non-Aligned Movement and Indonesia's need to get political support for the issue of East Timor from Middle Eastern countries. Another significant reason was the US approval for Soeharto to permit the PLO to open an official diplomatic residence in Jakarta. In this context, the changes of Indonesia's policy toward the PLO were pushed by the simultaneous development of its international and domestic environments. With this policy shift, Soeharto not only obtained more political support from Indonesia's Muslim community but also he changed the perception of Indonesia in the Muslim world.

An even more significant political concern for Indonesia's Muslim community was the issue of opening diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Israel. On this issue, Indonesia's Muslim community was outspoken in rejecting any idea of formal relations with Israel. However, on this issue Soeharto was not so much responsive to the demands of the Muslim
community as cautious of any possible negative repercussions that might reduce his legitimacy. In other words, the government’s policy of refusing to establish diplomatic ties with Israel was not due to Soeharto’s changing sensitivity toward the Muslim community but rather to the need to gain political support from the Muslim community for the sake of his own domestic political agenda. More importantly, the decision not to establish diplomatic ties with Israel was a key means of dampening Islamist opposition besides being used to build political coalitions with elements of the Muslim community that would be useful to further foster Soeharto’s domestic political power.

The tension between the state and the Muslim community was also evident over the issue of the 1991 Gulf War. The government always argued that this was not a religious war between Islam and the non-Islamic world. While some Muslim groups saw it as part of US neo-colonialism towards the Muslim world, others saw it strictly in terms of a religious war. Despite different perceptions within the Muslim community on the Gulf War, one thing that can be underlined here is that some Muslim groups demanded that the state take more initiatives to help find diplomatic efforts to end the war. However, Indonesia maintained a ‘wait and see’ policy toward the Gulf War, being fully aware and wary of the deep involvement of the political and economic interests here of the major powers. In other words, Indonesia’s reluctance to become further involved in the Gulf war was due to its perception of the need to maintain good relationships with the Western world.

On the Moro issue, the Indonesian government showed its deep concern to find a comprehensive peaceful solution of the conflict. As other cases have shown, Indonesia’s initiative to find such a solution was not based on religious solidarity (between fellow Muslims) but on the crucial need to have regional unity and cohesiveness in Southeast Asia. It was more important for Indonesia to have regional stability in the region than to build religious solidarity with the Moro people. This is because a strong regional orientation was (and remains) the central priority of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indeed, a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia is the major concern of the ‘concentric circles’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Domestically, Indonesia was also in the position that it had never tolerated separatism nor (from choice) allowed a separatist movement to grow in Indonesia. It is also crucial to note that even though the situation
of the Moros provoked widespread sympathy from around the Muslim world, the influence of Indonesia’s Muslim community on government policy on this regional issue was virtually non-existent. This was mainly due to two factors: the success of the Indonesian government in convincing the Muslim community that the Moro problem was a domestic problem of the Philippines; and the continuous efforts of the government to limit and even hamper any negative impact of the Moro conflict on Indonesia’s national unity.

On the issue of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia’s Muslim community showed its deep concern for the survival of the Muslim Bosnians. Not only were strong statements released in support of the struggle of the Muslim Bosnians and demonstrations held against Serbian atrocities but also the community provided financial aid and even offered to send volunteer missions to aid the Bosnians. On the other hand, the state maintained that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had nothing to do with religious sentiments. This attitude aroused the anger of the Indonesia’s Muslim community against the state.

Interestingly, there were also sharply different perceptions and frictions within the state regarding policies on Bosnia between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military, particularly over the need to send Indonesian military troops. The Department of Foreign Affairs as a whole represented the nationalist-secular point of view. It did not want Islamic sensitivities taken into account in any Indonesian decision on the Bosnian issue. Within the military, there was friction between the ‘secular-nationalist’ and ‘Islamist’ factions on this issue, the Islamists arguing that domestic Islamic feelings could not be ignored. Such power struggles and factional competition was a feature of Indonesian politics in the 1990s.

Indeed, it was friction within the political elite on Indonesia’s policy on Bosnia that led to a polarization between the ‘secular-nationalist’ and the ‘Islamist’ groups. The secular-nationalist faction of the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs perceived that the revival of political Islam had pushed the re-emergence of Islam as a political force, which in turn invited greater demands of the Muslim community in foreign policy issues based on Islamic sentiments.

This case study and the issue of Indonesia’s eventual decision not to open diplomatic ties with Israel are the only two case studies where the competition for power and influence within the state (particularly within
the military and between Deplu and the military) are clearly noticeable in the making of foreign policy. Soeharto, however, was able to handle the strategic power struggle between the competing groups. In various ways – by signalling Indonesia’s readiness to send military observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, mobilizing financial aid from Indonesia’s Muslim community, building a mosque as a symbol of Islamic brotherhood between Indonesia’s Muslim community and the Muslim Bosnians and more importantly by visiting Bosnia in the middle of the war – Soeharto successfully manipulated the power struggle between the two competing groups.

The position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world

Overall, during much of the Soeharto era the state positioned Islam at the periphery of Indonesia’s political stage. The role of the Muslim community in foreign policy issues depended greatly on the domestic political situation. Sometimes, however, Indonesia’s Muslim community was able to play a substantial role in influencing Indonesia’s politics hence also its foreign policies. The growing militancy of some elements of the Muslim community encouraged the government to ‘accommodate’ their wishes in the policy-making process. This situation is obviously shown in Chapter 4, which describes the outspoken voices of Indonesia’s Muslim community on Middle Eastern issues, particularly on the idea of having diplomatic ties with Israel.

Even though over the years the Indonesian government has strived to deny a significant role for Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, this study has demonstrated that – at least on the issues of the Middle East and Bosnia-Herzegovina – the major hypothesis in this study is applicable, namely that foreign policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents. In short, these findings clearly show that the government was aware of the need to take Muslim aspirations into account in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

More importantly, Chapters 4 and 6 not only describe a large-scale mobilization of Indonesia’s Muslim community over the situations in the Middle East and Bosnia but also these chapters reveal sharply different perceptions within the state itself toward the above issues. In other words, these two chapters are the only case studies where the state was not a ‘unitary-actor’.
Conclusion

However, as the discussion so far indicates, Islam has been used by the government in its practice of realpolitik. Moreover, in some case studies, Islam was only important in the implementation of foreign policy not in its formulation. This is because Islam was used to justify and legitimate foreign policy actions. More importantly, the state manipulated Muslim opinion on foreign policy issues of particular interest to Muslims in order to bolster Soeharto’s position in domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world during the Soeharto era can be viewed as the implementation of a policy of ambiguity.

The (in)significance of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world

As it is quite clear from the arguments outlined above, the Soeharto regime disregarded Islam as a crucial factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. Further, the New Order regime successfully hampered Islam from becoming a major focus of most controversial issues in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It is a fact of major importance to this study that Indonesia’s foreign policy has been conducted without involving Islam formally and explicitly. Unlike the foreign policy of many Muslim states in which Islam played a dominant role, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Soeharto regime carefully avoided the use of Islamic terms and symbols in Indonesia’s foreign policy. In this context, Indonesia’s policy toward the Muslim world was governed by rationality and pragmatism rather than by emotion or religious sentiment.

None the less, the input of Indonesia’s Islam community was one of the contributing factors in the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. As has been discussed in the case studies, the foreign policy of Indonesia under Soeharto toward the Muslim world was the result of a mostly one-sided domestic political struggle between domestic actors (particularly the Muslim community) and the state, each with conflicting interests in the international issues pertinent to Islamic feelings, and thus with different foreign policy preferences.

Specifically, in some cases (Israel and Bosnia-Herzegovina), massive mobilization by Indonesia’s Muslim community at the domestic level motivated the state to consider their demands in the conduct of foreign relations toward the Muslim world. In this context, Indonesia’s Muslim community has provided the domestic political context for the role and
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position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. Empirically, the major findings of this study fit with Hagan’s proposition that ‘the state’s conduct of foreign policy is a function of its current internal political dynamics’. In other words, there was a strong link between the condition of domestic politics and Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. However, the New Order regime could almost always successfully avoid Islamic identification and mobilization in the realm of domestic politics and foreign policy where these might have a potentially negative impact on national security, stability and unity.

This study shows that, despite a significant growth since the late 1980s of political consciousness and awareness within Indonesia’s Muslim community in foreign affairs of interest or concern to it, the state still plays a very decisive role in Indonesia’s foreign policy making. This was particularly evident during the Soeharto era when the voices of the Muslim community were effectively tamed. This quiescence was due to two main strategies adopted by the Soeharto regime: inclusionary, aimed to co-opt Islam into conditional participation in the domestic political process that was principally controlled by the State; and exclusionary, seeking through repression to deny any influence for Islam in the wider political community. In this context, the Soeharto regime was largely successful in containing and neutralizing political Islam in domestic politics. However, Islamic sentiment continued to be a factor that the government had to take into account in certain foreign policy issues relating to the Muslim world (for instance Israel and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

This study has also shown that, in the case of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world, the state is the most significant actor both in the making and implementation of this foreign policy. However, especially since the fall of Soeharto, there has been a revival of political Islam, represented by many political parties and hardliner groups, which has increased the importance of Islam as a factor in the formulation of both domestic and foreign policy. As such, besides the state, various groups in Indonesian society also have a continuing role to play in this area. This is particularly the case with the different Muslim groups who, informed by and using their transnational networks, have shown an ability to articulate their concerns and interests on different foreign policy issues.

The interaction on the foreign policy issues between the state and Indonesia’s Muslim community has thus had several domestic political
Conclusion

consequences. Essentially, by taking the aspirations of different Muslim groups into account, the state has been able to reduce domestic opposition and build political coalitions, hence retaining its domestic political power. In this context, the strong domination of the state shown in the present study indicates that what has been found in Indonesia is the model of the state leading society, that is a strong state guiding its society toward adaptive foreign policy behaviour with the purpose of maintaining the power of the state. Even though this study has demonstrated that the state has a ‘domestic agential power’ or the ability to shape the domestic realm and construct a foreign policy (relatively) free of domestic social structural constraints, the link between current domestic political dynamics and the international environment is very obvious.

The major empirical consequence of the above pattern of interaction between the state and the Muslim community is that, on most issues pertinent to the Muslim world, Indonesia has adopted a ‘policy of ambiguity’. Basically, this policy has been the result of needing to balance domestic politics with international conditions (Indonesia’s close relations with the Western world, particularly the United States). Part of the dynamic here is that the Muslim community in Indonesia is not monolithic – rather it is divided along different aliran (streams), political interests and affiliations – and that, internationally, Indonesia has not wanted to be perceived by the Western world of having too close relations with the Muslim world, particularly with the radical Muslim states.

Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world in the New Order period was paralleled by Soeharto’s motivation to control the role of Islam in domestic politics and retain political power by manipulating the demands of the Muslim community. The phenomenon of growing militancy and political demands were very obvious when we look at the state’s responses to the demands of the Muslim community on the issues of Israel and Bosnia. In other words, Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour toward the Muslim world was heavily influenced by the Soeharto regime’s responses to the activities of the Muslim community. As a result, the level of Indonesia’s foreign policy commitments and activities toward the Muslim world was reactive in nature. In other words, Indonesia tended to conduct a minimalist approach in its foreign policy toward the Muslim world. In turn this limited Indonesia’s foreign policy commitment toward the Muslim world.
Of course, while this study has strived to give an understanding of the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy, there will always be further questions. For instance, to what extent would Indonesia's foreign policy be more significantly determined by the Islamic factor if Indonesia's Muslim community had greater coherence and provided a steady political direction in its lobbying on the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world? Would the secular nature of Indonesia's foreign policy be altered to an Islamic foreign policy, or at least would Indonesia have a more Islamic orientation in its foreign policy toward the Muslim world?

The above questions are quite crucial in an understanding of post-Soeharto Indonesian foreign policy, especially in the current situation of the post-9/11 international system where (militant) Islam is misperceived as a new global threat while domestically, with the growing political awareness and power of the Muslim community, there has been a rapid transformation of the political map with a significant increase in the number of Islamic political parties and radical groups since the late 1990s.

In other words, the need to engage a higher level of participation of the societal factor, particularly the Muslim community, in Indonesia's foreign policy implies a significant response of the state to rapid changes in the domestic arena as well as the challenges of the politics of globalization in the post-Soeharto era. This means that the Islamic factor in Indonesia's foreign policy will become a more significant factor in the future due to the greater convergence of the domestic (societal) and the Muslim world (transnational) dimensions. In this context, the degree of ‘secularization of policy’ and ‘religionalization of policy’ concerning the relationship between the state and religious community at the national level will remain debatable and will continue to be a controversial topic in Indonesia's foreign policy in the future.
Appendix

State–society relations in foreign policy studies

The role of the societal factor is crucial in foreign policy making and behaviour. This factor at the domestic level motivates and influences the ruling elites (the policy makers) to manage the foreign policy and external relations of states. However, its exact impact on foreign policy is not easily determined because it is only one determinant factor and perhaps not even the most important one. The impact of societal factors is often filtered through or influenced by other factors such as geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations, economic needs and regime interests.

Nonetheless, this book argues that domestic politics provide the context for the role and influence of Islam on Indonesia’s foreign policy. This is because the state’s conduct of foreign policy is a function of its current internal political dynamics.¹ The Indonesian Muslim community’s demands for greater participation in foreign policy making, particularly toward the Muslim world, can be seen as ‘a desire for recognition’ of the Muslim voice in Indonesia’s foreign policy, which it perceived as part of the significant ‘public sphere’ in state–society relationship.

The theoretical framework for this book is provided by studies of state–society relations in foreign policy analysis, in which there are three major alternative theoretical models.² The first model is Statist. This approach, which closely corresponds to Realist theory, assumes that ‘state decision makers formulate foreign policy largely autonomously of societal influences’.³ The state is assumed to be much stronger than the society so that the role and the influence of society in foreign policy can be neglected. This model argues that states have full authority (institutional autonomy)⁴ in managing their foreign relationships and tend to neglect
the societal factor in foreign policy making. In this context, the state demonstrates its role to be ‘domestic agential power’, i.e. able to shape the domestic realm and construct foreign policy relatively free of domestic social structural constraints.\(^5\)

The second theoretical approach is the Societal approach. In contrast to the first, the Societal approach assumes that societal groups within the state play a dominant and continuing role in foreign policy. This approach has two models: the pluralist model and the Social Blocs model. The first model is based on the assumption that ‘political leaders care most about maintaining a high level of domestic political support’, which is ‘a prerequisite both for maintaining and for maximizing’\(^6\) their influence on and effectiveness of foreign policy decisions. The latter model involves ‘a variety of alternatives to pluralism, including elite, Marxist, corporatist and sectoral blocs’ of society.\(^7\) This approach emphasizes the role of the press, non-governmental organizations and other groups in society as pressure groups in controlling and even directing the issues and contents of foreign policy making.

The last approach is the Transnational approach, which emphasizes the existence of a global society. This approach assumes that ‘societal groups with similar interests (or even common interests) and objectives will form political coalitions which surpass national boundaries’.\(^8\) These networks of cooperation provide issues that foreign policy actors should take into account in foreign policy formulation. The goals of transnational society may range from working to transform particular regimes (e.g. to fight communist regimes) to mediating and settling international conflicts (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict), putting new issues on the global agenda (e.g. environmental issue) and changing global values, standards and norms (e.g. democratization and human rights).

In the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world, it is argued that the role of the state is very dominant. This was indicated by the role of government (president, military and bureaucracy) in domestic as well as foreign policy, which was determinant and pivotal. Thus, the Statist approach is centrally important. Nonetheless, the role of societal and transnational approaches (the role of Muslim communities in domestic and in international arena) cannot be neglected in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This is because the societal groups and the existence of global society cannot be separated in the for-
eign policy analysis. In other words, there is a linkage between developments in the domestic and external environments and Indonesia’s foreign policy making process and implementation.

The theoretical framework of this study thus draws on all three approaches to state–society relations identified above. The linkage between the economic, social, political and cultural facets of Indonesia’s Islamic community and Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world is examined. This book uses the three above approaches in Indonesia’s foreign policy with special reference to the Muslim World.

In principle, the interactions and linkages between domestic and external environments may serve two types of domestic political objectives, namely building political coalitions and retaining political power. The first consequence assumed that foreign policy decision-makers ‘need to build domestic support for any proposed policy initiative’. Building political coalitions plays a very important role in many Third World foreign policies since the interaction between domestic support and foreign policy making is a primary value in domestic political standing. Foreign policy decisions become ‘political resultants’ which reflect ‘the political strategies necessary to build agreement’ with the domestic structure ‘to support implementation of policy’.

In the second domestic political objective, a foreign policy decision ‘should be adjusted so that it imposes fewer domestic costs’ in order for governments to retain political power. Hence, in order to stay in the office, a national leader who faces significant domestic opposition from the wider domestic structure or who needs to increase domestic and international political legitimacy, needs to raise public perception of foreign policy issues. In many Third World foreign policies, retaining political power is a more dominant theme than coalition building. Yet many Third World countries might always be able to impose rational foreign policy initiatives without worrying about domestic political opposition.

There have been a number of studies of Indonesia’s foreign policy both at the macro and at the micro level. Previous studies focused on the political background of Indonesia’s Bebas Aktif foreign policy (Anak Agung 1973) and the personal domination by the president of Indonesia’s foreign policy making during the Sukarno–Soeharto eras (Weinstein 1973, Hein 1986 and Suryadinata 1996). Some studies examined more specific themes in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Mozingo (1981) investigated
the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China from the post World War II to 1967, while Anwar (1994) explored Indonesia’s contribution to the regional development of Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Djiwandono (1996) studied Indonesia’s foreign policy behavior toward the Soviet Union with special reference to West Irian and the Malaysian confrontation. Sukma (1998) examined the factors that shaped Indonesia’s decision to normalize diplomatic relations with China. Prasad (2001) studied the role of Indonesia in the peaceful resolution of the Cambodian problem.

Nonetheless, studies of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy, particularly the study of state–society relations in Indonesia’s foreign policy making under Soeharto, are scarce. In most literature on Indonesia’s foreign policy, relations between state and society (especially the Muslim community) have not been the primary focus of studies. As MacIntyre has argued, this was mainly due to the fact that the policy making under the Soeharto era was very heavily ‘state-centered’. As a result, the possibility for ‘extra-state actors’ (society, for example) to play a major role in (foreign) policy formulation was very limited.16

However, there have been two significant studies on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The first study was written by Michael Leifer (‘The Islamic factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy: A case of functional ambiguity’) in a book compiled by Adeed Dawisha.17 Leifer’s work examined the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Sukarno era and the early New Order era. The second study was a book written by Rizal Sukma, which investigates the historical developments of the involvement of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy from the Sukarno era to the Habibie era. This monograph also discusses the inability of Islam to significantly influence Indonesia’s foreign policy due to its internal weaknesses.18 One difference between Sukma’s monograph and the present study is that the latter utilizes more specific case studies in order to examine the state–society relations in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

Even though there have been few studies on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, this does not imply, of course, that many studies have not been undertaken on the role of religion in foreign policy analysis. Several survey-based studies have found that religious affiliation influenced foreign policy decision makers in other countries. As Fox
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argues, foreign policy decision makers who are religious affiliated tend to be more politically conservative than those who are not. Fox finds that Israeli foreign policy and the foreign policy of Arab states have been largely based on religion.

The importance of the role of Islam as a major factor in the foreign policies of many Muslim states has been explored by Dawisha. He argues that Islam ‘constitutes a part of the images and perceptions, even attitudes and value systems of decision-makers’ in Islamic countries or countries with a Muslim majority. He also explained that, since Islam ‘does not subscribe to the separation of religion from politics’ or to the separation of religion and state (din wa dawla), then Islam can ‘act as a force when it functions as an integrative force, creating consensus on foreign policy objectives when it provides l’esprit de corps and when it helps in mobilizing external resources in support to the state.’

In the foreign policy of Muslim states, James Piscator argues, Islam tends to play one of three roles: confirming; contradicting or even obstructing the state’s foreign policy goals and facilitating the implementation of foreign policy. In other words, Islam can facilitate and support the making and implementation of foreign policy, and on the other hand, it can also constrain foreign policy.

The influence of Islam on foreign policy making in the Muslim world has become more visible since the Iranian revolution in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini took over power from Shah Reza Pahlevi. The Iranian revolution has not only changed the structure of Iran’s domestic politics but also, dramatically, the behaviour of Iran’s foreign policy, a change that has given rise to fears in the Western bloc.

In Iran, for example, R.K Ramazani argues that Islam motivates commitment, strategies and the decisions of Iran’s foreign policy. In this case, Islam serves as a communicator and justifier of the foreign policy behaviour of Iran. Khomeini proclaimed that he would export Islamic revolution to all Muslim countries and attempt to boost a revolutionary movement in other countries around the world. In the case of Iran, Islam has directed the substance of its foreign policy. He further argued that Iranian foreign policy was shaped by ‘a certain conception of an Islamic order.’

A similar role of Islam can also be found in Malaysia’s foreign policy. Here, Islam serves not only a symbolic function but also under the
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Mahathir administration as an identity in foreign policy. In other words, Islam ‘has provided direction and content for the foreign policy of Malaysia’. Nair argues that Islam has played four major roles in Malaysian foreign policy. First, Islam has served as ‘a means of mobilizing support among the Malay community’. Second, it reduced the conflict between the government and Muslim opposition. Third, the government used Islam to help contain ‘the tide of international Islam flowing into Malaysia over the authority of government’ and lastly, it has been utilized as a foreign policy tool to strengthen world Muslim solidarity.

In this context, Islam could serve as ‘a motivator, legitimator or even a justifier for a particular foreign policy’. The ruling elites and the governments, as Dawisha notes, use Islamic terms and symbols in foreign policy issues to mobilize political support among their people or to mitigate opposition. This is because, as Dawisha argues, ‘the historical, social, economical differences existing between the various Muslim countries have given Islam a different coloring, a different resonance’ in the foreign policy of various Muslim countries. At this point, it has been also the aim of the present study to decipher the similarities and differences in the influence of Islamic ideas in selected Muslim states with the role and position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

It is also not the intention of this study to further develop conceptual or even theoretical frameworks but it is rather an attempt to utilize an existing conceptual framework (‘the interactive relationship between state and society’) as a tool of analysis in the study of foreign policy, particularly in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

Data collection and procedures

This book utilizes a combination of ‘case-based, model-based and explanation-based’ research methods. The analytical model of this study, which links the domestic structure and foreign policy behaviour of Indonesia towards the Muslim world, can be pictured as opposite:

The analytical model, as Hudson et al explain, is designed to help explain how domestic politics, especially the growing demands of particular elements of society and the competing power and interests between the state and society, affect foreign policy behaviour. They further argue that ‘the foreign policy behavior of the regime will, under certain circumstances, depend on the regime’s response to domestic activities taken by a
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particular society at a given time’. The model also suggests that ‘the choice of regime response, in turn, depends on two clusters of variables’, namely ‘the regime’s agenda of needs’ and ‘the capabilities of domestic societies/groups to disrupt the pursuit of this agenda’.

This book utilizes the above explanatory model in examining the case studies in order to see what they may tell about Indonesia’s management of its foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

In explaining the case studies, a broad range of primary and secondary sources were utilized. An extensive range of both oral and written interviews was undertaken with government policymakers, both civilian and military, their advisors, observers and commentators on political matters, and foreign policy in particular. In this book nearly all interviewees are Muslim.

The other primary sources of this book include official and unofficial documents obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other government institutions pertinent to the research topic. Most of the documents were open to the public but some were confidential, including the reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President. The secondary sources included newspapers, books, journals, magazines, and websites both in Indonesian and English.

Analytical model

1) Regime strengths and weaknesses

2) Societal group (Islamic society) characteristics and activities

3) Regime choice of foreign policy responses: agenda of needs and capabilities of domestic groups to disrupt the agenda

4) Foreign policy behaviour
Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. This concept was borrowed from Theda Skocpol. See Hobson (2001), pp. 395–414.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid. p. 124.
11. Ibid., p. 122.
12. Ibid., p. 124.
20. Ibid., p. 62.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 178.
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28. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p.4.
33. Ibid., p. 55.
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