IN THIS BOOK, the authors discuss media coverage of major conflicts, from the Gulf War in 1990/91 to the NATO military operations in Libya in 2011 and the now ongoing civil war in Syria. Through in-depth analysis of Norwegian and Swedish media coverage of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Afghanistan War from 2001, the Iraq War from 2003 as well as more recent conflicts, the authors claim that legal issues are poorly covered in the running news coverage of major conflicts. Underreporting of legal issues is especially problematic in relation to new forms of warfare involving extra-judicial killing by drones of targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. While historically Sweden and Norway have had different security policy orientations, the tendency is toward the two countries becoming more closely oriented through Nordic defense cooperation and participation in the wars in Afghanistan and Libya.

The authors criticize mainstream media for under-communicating what security risks this support for the regime change strategies pursued by the US/NATO in the so-called ‘global war on terror’ implies for the Nordic countries. The book further discusses the challenges war and conflict reporting face when confronted with major security leaks through WikiLeaks and the classified information revealed by Edward Snowden. Theoretically, the findings are related to the theories of threat society, new wars and risk-transfer warfare as well as to Johan Galtung’s theory of war and peace journalism. Analyses are inspired by critical discourse analysis as elaborated in Norman Fairclough’s and Ruth Wodak’s works.

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Nordicom’s activities are based on broad and extensive network of contacts and collaboration with members of the research community, media companies, politicians, regulators, teachers, librarians, and so forth, around the world. The activities at Nordicom are characterized by three main working areas.

• **Media and Communication Research Findings in the Nordic Countries**
Nordicom publishes a Nordic journal, *Nordicom Information*, and an English language journal, *Nordicom Review* (referred), as well as anthologies and other reports in both Nordic and English languages. Different research databases concerning, among other things, scientific literature and ongoing research are updated continuously and are available on the Internet. Nordicom has the character of a hub of Nordic cooperation in media research. Making Nordic research in the field of mass communication and media studies known to colleagues and others outside the region, and weaving and supporting networks of collaboration between the Nordic research communities and colleagues abroad are two prime facets of the Nordicom work.

The documentation services are based on work performed in national documentation centres attached to the universities in Aarhus, Denmark; Tampere, Finland; Reykjavik, Iceland; Bergen, Norway; and Göteborg, Sweden.

• **Trends and Developments in the Media Sectors in the Nordic Countries**
Nordicom compiles and collates media statistics for the whole of the Nordic region. The statistics, together with qualified analyses, are published in the series, *Nordic Media Trends*, and on the homepage. Besides statistics on output and consumption, the statistics provide data on media ownership and the structure of the industries as well as national regulatory legislation. Today, the Nordic region constitutes a common market in the media sector, and there is a widespread need for impartial, comparable basic data. These services are based on a Nordic network of contributing institutions.

Nordicom gives the Nordic countries a common voice in European and international networks and institutions that inform media and cultural policy. At the same time, Nordicom keeps Nordic users abreast of developments in the sector outside the region, particularly developments in the European Union and the Council of Europe.

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In yearbooks, newsletters and survey articles the Clearinghouse has an ambition to broaden and contextualize knowledge about children, young people and media literacy. The Clearinghouse seeks to bring together and make available insights concerning children’s and young people’s relations with mass media from a variety of perspectives.
NEW WARS, NEW MEDIA AND NEW WAR JOURNALISM
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Professional and Legal Challenges in Conflict Reporting

Stig A. Nohrstedt & Rune Ottosen
New Wars, New Media and New War Journalism

*Professional and Legal Challenges in Conflict Reporting*

Stig A. Nohrstedt & Rune Ottosen

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Foreword

This is the fourth and last Nordicom book from our joint research on war journalism that started in 1992 with the project "Journalism in the New World Order". Besides the Nordicom publications our co-operation over the years together with a network of colleagues has also been reported by the Swedish Board of Psychological Defense (SPF) and in several journals and books. In addition the first volume from the project was accompanied by a second volume (and a fifth book) edited by Wilhelm Kempf and Heikki Luostarinen with the same publisher. We are grateful to Ulla Carlsson and all her colleagues at Nordicom for fruitful co-operation during these years.

When we edited our first book in the series *Journalism and the New World Order. Gulf War, National Discourses and Globalization* (2001), the summary of the media experience from the Gulf War in 1990/91 was essential. George Bush senior had declared 'the New World Order' with hope of a new dawn after the cold war and the defeat of communism. When the book came out in 2001 we did not know that we had a decade ahead of us with new wars in the so-called global war on terror including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At that time we could not have imagined that ten year later Norway would bomb Libya with assistance of the Swedish Air Force.

All these wars and the legislation to fight terrorism have changed the conditions for war journalism in a dramatic manner. We are worried about the working conditions for journalism and the general public’s right to information because journalism and media installations have been targets in these wars. The lack of respect for The Geneva Convention and the attacks on journalists’ integrity are constant reasons for worries. The war in Iraq 2003 is a blatant case of lack of respect for international law and was a challenge for journalists who more often than not have low competence regarding legal issues. The underreporting of legal aspects in the mainstream media will be at the centre of attention in the following chapters.
While the previous books we edited had authors from around the globe, offering comparative perspectives on the Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this one is a monograph. The ambition with this book is to synthesize the findings from our earlier works updated with new research on conflicts like Libya 2011, the drone war against terrorism and new challenges for journalism with information providers such as bloggers, WikiLeaks and dissident intelligence officers. We hope this book can be useful for all those critical reporters fighting a battle every day to tell the truth under difficult circumstances. We have seen in our work that despite all attempts to blur the truth through propaganda, PSYOPS and manipulation, clever journalists can make a difference. This book is written in their honour.

The content is based on a variety of sources including previous publications authored and edited by us. So even though a large part of the book contains new texts, written especially for this publication, we also draw upon earlier work written together or individually. In the introductory chapter we draw the lines back to our first book, *Journalism and the New World Order: Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization in the Gulf War*, published by Nordicom, as a point of departure. The section about computer games as war propaganda in the first chapter draws upon Ottosen’s article “Targeting the player: Computer games as propaganda for the military-industrial complex” in *Nordicom Review* No. 2, 2009; the section on PSYOPS operations on Ottosen’s chapter “PSYOPS or journalism? Norwegian information warfare in Afghanistan” in Leon Barkho’s (ed.) *From Theory to Practice. How to Assess and Apply Impartiality in News and Current Affairs* (2013). The second chapter is an updated version of an jointly authored article in Eric Wilson (ed.) *The Dual State Parapolitics: Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex* (2012). The third chapter is an updated version of “War Journalism in the threat society: Peace journalism as a strategy for challenging the mediated culture of fear” by both authors in *Conflict and Communication Online* vol. 7 no. 2., 2008. Chapter four has also partly been published as “Brothers in arms or peace? The media images of Swedish and Norwegian defence and military”, a jointly written article in *Conflict and Communication Online* vol. 9, No. 2, 2010. Chapter five is an updated version of “Wikileaks: Ethical minefield or a democratic revolution in journalism: Case study of the impact of the Afghanistan coverage in the Norwegian Daily *Aftenposten*” by Ottosen in *Journalism Studies* vol 13 (2) 2012. The chapter about Libya draws partly upon the article “How they missed the big story: Norwegian news media and NATO’s military operations in Libya” by Ottosen together with co-authors Tore Slaatta and Sigurd Øfsti in *Conflict and Communication Online* vol 12 no 1, 2013. The seventh chapter draws partly on Ottosen’s “Under-reporting legal aspects of use of drones in international conflicts: A case study of *Aftenposten* and the *New York Times*”, published in *Conflict and Communication Online* vol 13. no. 2, and “How the
use of drones in the war on terror might contribute to violence in the Middle East” in Luftkrigsskolens skriftserie vol 29, 2013.

We want to thank all the colleagues that have contributed to our previous publications and with whom we have collaborated over the years. Among them are: Laurien Alexandre, Stephen Baker, Jörg Becker, Peter Bergletz, Angelica Carfora, Noam Chomsky, Marie Comrie, Bernt Eide, Elisabeth Eide, Mohamed El-Bendery, Karman Erjavec, Ståle Eskeland, Tine Ustad Figenschou, Robert Fisk, Christian Flatz, Susan Fountaine, Des Freedman, Johan Galtung, Gunnar Garbo, George Gerbner, Marina Ghersetti, Johan Gunnarsson, Anders Somme Hamme, Martin Hartlieb, Stig Hjarvard, Ellen Hofsvang, Nathalie Hyde-Clark, Birgitta Höijer, Ivar A. Iversen, Anders Johansson, Sophia Kaitatzki-Whitlock, Wilhelm Kempf, Tawan Kupe, Armin Lanzinger, Lars Lundsten, Heikki Luostarinen, Jake Lynch, Hanne M. Mathisen, Annabell McGoldrick, Greg McLaughlin, Denis McQuail, Toby Miller, Hamid Mowlana, Brigitte Mral, Julius Mucunguzi, Sean Phelan, Snezhana Popova, Ulrika Olausson, Michael Reimann, Kristina Riegert, Susan Ross, Dennis Schiller, Roland Stanbridge, Matteo Stocchetti, Dayan Thussu, Oddgeir Tveiten, Evelyna Vatova and Berit von der Lippe.

We also want to thank our institutions Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, Örebro University, and Department for journalism and media, Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Science for academic and financial contribution to this book. Ottosen has received support from the Norwegian non-fiction Literature Fund and Stiftelsen Fritt Ord, Oslo, has also supported the publication financially. In the earlier projects we have had financial support from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Joint Committee of the Nordic Science Research Council (NOS-S) and the Norwegian Council for Applied Media Research. The study on media reporting of the Kosovo conflict was initiated by the director, Roland Nordlund, at the former SPF that also financed it. For all this encouragements and support we express our sincere gratitude. Finally, we are grateful to Riber Hansson for his generous offer to copy his cartoon on the front page of the book.

Söderbärke and Oslo, September 2014

Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen
Chapter 1

Introduction

The war correspondent is an endangered species – and that is a serious problem for democracy. Media companies everywhere are reducing the number of foreign correspondents – and reporting from armed conflicts has become increasingly dangerous since the early 1990s. According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) annual reports, 2,271 journalists and media personnel were killed between 1989 and 2010 while doing their jobs. The highest number of deaths occurred in the 18 months between 2006 and mid-2007, when 277 were killed while reporting from Iraq after the US and UK military intervention of 2003. In Syria alone, 27 journalists were killed between 2011 and 2013 (Reporters Without Borders 2014). The retiring chairman of the IFJ, Aidan White, notes in the 2010 report that since 2007 the figures have decreased and that some improvements have been made when it comes to international attention to the journalists’ security matters – in particular the Security Council Resolution 1738 of 2006. But he also concludes that there is much more to be done: “The IFJ has monitored profound changes over the last two decades. We have found that media employers are investing less in safety training and support for freelance staff and stringers in the field. Newsroom budgets are being cut. There is less investment in investigative journalism and foreign coverage.” (White 2011: 3) For the affected journalists (whose vocation is to report the realities of war to the public), and their families, these sacrifices are serious, of course. The trend is a looming threat to citizens’ right to information in a democratic system, and the possibility of forming enlightened opinions about the conduct of their elected leaders in conflicts, politics and warfare. Since 1997, Unesco has worked on the issue of security for journalists and has helped to promote UN Security Resolution 1738 of December 23, 2006: “Journalists, media professionals and associated personnel engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians and shall be respected and protected as such, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.” (Unesco 2012) As a follow-up, on November 26, 2013, the
Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity, setting November 2 as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists (UN 2013).

The challenge for journalists and for media researchers interested in war news is to understand and relate to the extensive and rapid changes that characterize it in the globalizing era (cf. Carpentier 2006). How does one understand what the new media technologies (including the Internet and all its possibilities and problems), imply for journalism in general and for war journalism in particular? Media technology and journalism evolve, of course, and depend on other changes: political, economic, and military. From a global perspective, the historic upheavals at the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 are all indications of a fundamental change in international politics which called for new political maps, strategies, and alliances. The sharp divide between a democratic and market-liberal West, on the one side, and a more authoritative and centrally-planned East, on the other, slipped away when the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia gradually, and with national variations, democratized politically and liberalized economically.

For journalism as a profession, it seems difficult to learn from the turmoil of international politics because the instruments for systematic learning are not in place. Apart from the special cases in which courts of justice, press complaints commissions, or boards of ethics examine the borderline cases of journalism, and when documentation is compiled to verify the factual circumstances and make judgments, it is extremely rare for experiences to be gathered and analyzed in such a way as to provide guidance for the future and for other colleagues (Esser 2009; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Moreover, mediated discussions on news journalism are focused on daily events, with a scenario-based and anecdotal approach to knowledge – which means that the more general lessons are not prioritized. The common view is simply that because all news and assignments are unique they cannot be generalized. This event-oriented approach to knowledge also means that it is difficult for journalists to reflect on explanatory contexts and multilevel explanations – not least regarding their own profession’s practices and its routines. In this book, which deals with news journalism in armed conflicts, we want to contribute to a more complex and comprehensive perspective in which the changing conditions and possibilities of war journalism are related to historical, political and other societal developments. Our hope is that it may stimulate more systematic learning within the profession.

The ambition is also that this book will inspire other media scholars to conduct studies of war journalism that are relevant to the profession’s need for more general knowledge and systematized experiences. The main problem for media research in this area is not lack of comprehensive theories about the development of the field but, rather, too few attempts to link theories to empirical observation in order to test their sustainability. To put it simply, there
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are neither research projects nor established methods with enough power to answer the questions about how war journalism has changed in interaction with media technologies and political-economic developments since 1989. Nor does there seem to be research funding available for larger-scale projects by research councils, branch agencies or media companies. Consequently, media research is often characterized, as is journalism, by anecdotal and case-based forms of knowledge instead of by generalized explanations for the continuous and complex changes in the media field. In particular, media studies able to provide historical overviews are – apart from purely idiographic studies of individual companies and media policies in certain countries – extremely rare (Esser 2009; Nohrstedt 2009; Ottosen 2009).

This book cannot replace comprehensive research into the history of war journalism, but it will at least try to outline a perspective of how this specialized area of journalism has changed since the Cold War. Such a sketch is a necessary first step in the development of general conceptions and must, as we see it, be created by integrating reflections about the basic changes regarding technology and organisation in the media with the changing historical and political-economic characteristics of the times. But our purpose is not merely to provide an explanatory perspective of the circumstances, conditions, and consequences of war journalism. We also want to point out some fundamental problems in the war journalism of today, and to propose ways of addressing them.

In the chapters that follow we will present empirical research findings from studies that we and other researchers have conducted. These results can be seen as fragments that we analyze in relation to the theoretical arguments and hypotheses that may explain the complex and changing reality (war journalism during the last 20 years) that we are investigating. The book’s contribution is not intended to compensate for the lack of larger longitudinal research projects, but is a suggestion for paths of research that promise to generate general knowledge about the complex development of the war journalism field. It is hoped, however, that this book will also inspire discussions about practical ways for strengthening professional integrity and quality – as well as journalists’ skills – in war reporting over the longer term.

As a tool for analyzing war coverage and as a thought-provoking instrument for the improvement of the media coverage of war and conflicts, the book takes advantage of Johan Galtung’s model for war and peace journalism as an example of how new perspectives and alternative ways of reporting can offer new insights for reporters as well as for the audience. The peace journalism side of the model takes a moral and ethical point of departure, acknowledging the fact that media themselves play a role in the propaganda war. It presents a conscious choice: to identify other options for the readers/viewers by offering a solution-oriented, people-oriented, and truth-oriented approach. This, in turn, implies a focus on possible suggestions for peace that the parties to the
conflict might have an interest in hiding (Galtung 2002; cf. Ottosen 2010). In his latest book, Jake Lynch (2013) suggests what he calls a “global standard for reporting conflict” (Ottosen 2014); it draws heavily upon Johan Galtung’s model for peace journalism but is also inspired by authors within the paradigm of peace journalism (Hackett 2006; Shinar 2007; Freedman & Thussu 2012). Lynch uses his experience in conflict zones to suggest that a peace journalism approach can also be used in the covering of social concerns such as the war on drugs in Mexico, post-apartheid conflicts in South Africa, and the need for land reforms in the Philippines. In a critical review of the peace journalism model he acknowledges Robert Hackett’s attempt to compensate for the rigid character of the Peace journalism model (see chapter 4) and benefit from the more flexible approach by Pierre Bourdieu which allows media to be viewed as “a relatively autonomous institutional sphere.” (Hackett 2006) Lynch also discusses the relationship between social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in light of James Curran’s statement that television remains the most influential medium despite the scandals revealed through social media. In his final chapter, Lynch presents a content analysis of conflict coverage in British media during a short period in May 2012. He also draws heavily on the Don Shinar’s Galtung-inspired five-point model, with emphasis on exploring the background to a story, giving voice to all the parties, coming to creative conflict resolution, exposing lies on all sides, and drawing attention to peace stories and post-war developments. Lynch suggests a new approach based on these authors and our own suggestion of combining the peace journalism approach with critical discourse analysis (CDA) (see Chapter 4; see also Lynch 2014).

To facilitate feasible as well as legitimate conflict resolutions, reporters covering wars need insights into human rights and legality. As we show in this book, uncertainty (and even disinformation) about the legal dimensions of a conflict or violent situation often influence the framing of news stories in international reporting. The ways in which vital questions about legitimacy and legality (such as whether the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was a violation of international law and whether the NATO bombing of Libya in 2011 went beyond the mandate of UN Resolution 1973 justifying the no-fly zone but hardly the regime change) are commented on and answered by the media will obviously have significant implications for how these wars are understood by the public. And that, in its turn, will in some cases – where democracies are involved – decisively influence how violent conflicts develop and end.

Does the media promote illegal wars?
There is reason to suspect that a certain lack of legal competence in the journalist profession makes the media an easy target for war propaganda that
trivializes war crimes. We believe, therefore, that urgent consideration should be given to the democratic and legal consequences for our countries if they take part in illegal wars. According to the professor of law Ståle Eskeland, Norway’s participation in recent wars, starting with the NATO military attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999, is a violation of its constitution and of international law. Professor Geir Ulfstein, argues that the turning point came after 9/11, when the United States chose not to ask for a UN mandate for its intervention in Afghanistan but instead attacked Afghanistan as the right of self-defense. Norwegian politicians still insist that this argument for the attack on Afghanistan is supported by international law; Ulfstein believes that the government’s confusion and weak legal arguments can create a dangerous precedent (Ulfstein 2008). His analysis has later been confirmed by Wilhelm Agrell, the Swedish expert on intelligence analysis (Agrell 2013).

Ulfstein refers to the statement by the prime minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, in parliament on November 8, 2001 in which it was claimed that not only did the US have a legal right to self-defense but that the NATO Pact implied a duty for Norway to participate in the intervention. Ulfstein (2003) agrees that the right to self-defense could be justified after the massive terrorist attacks on 9/11, but he also argues that it is doubtful whether the US had the right to a continuous war against Afghanistan, even though al Qaeda had used that country as a base for the 9/11 attacks. In another article, Ulftstein (2008) sees the attack on Afghanistan in light of previous military attacks by the US against Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, and Sudan in 1998. Ulfstein argues that such uses of force have the character of revenge or punishment, rather than of self-defense, underlining that international law does not permit the use of force as a reprisal, and he warns against using Security Council Resolution 1368 to legitimise a military attack against Afghanistan. Although the resolution refers to the right of states to self-defense, it is not a given that the attacks on the US give the right to military violence on the massive scale seen in Afghanistan. It is worth noting here that Norwegian and Swedish politicians have used Resolution 1368 in exactly the way to which Ulfstein alerts us (cf. Agrell 2013; see also Chapter 4 for further details).

In an interview with the Norwegian daily newspaper Klassekampen in May 2011, Ulfstein stated that during the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 the bombings undermined the UN mandate by actively supporting the rebel forces’ attempts to overthrow the Gaddafi regime – with regime change as the obvious result. When Norwegian and Swedish politicians speak about international legal issues they rarely talk about the attack on Afghanistan in November 2001 but choose to concentrate on the fact that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission later acquired a UN mandate. Significant for this way of arguing is an article in the tabloid Verdens Gang on June 7, 2009 by the state secretary in the ministry of defense, Espen Barth Eide, and the question
needs to be asked whether Scandinavian politicians use humanitarian rhetoric precisely because they suspect they have a weak legal case (Ottosen 2009). Wilhelm Agrell’s critique of the Swedish government’s Afghanistan policy is even more fundamental from a democratic viewpoint: the motive for not spelling out in public that Sweden took part in a war was that the policy had no chance of acceptance by the general public (Agrell 2013). The mainstream media in the Scandinavian countries are not seen as making much effort to take up the role as the Fourth Estate by raising relevant questions about the legality and legitimacy of the wars in which their military forces are involved. We will return to this point later.

The role of the UN in a comparative perspective

The legal issues above are closely linked to the significance of the UN in the foreign policies of Sweden and Norway. As historical background to an understanding of Sweden’s and Norway’s role in the “war on terror” it is important to emphasize that in their approach to security policy the Scandinavian countries have a common notion of the UN as a key factor. Even though the two countries hold different official positions in the international security political landscape – Sweden formally a nonaligned country and Norway a NATO member – they have shared the view that a legal military intervention should be based on a UN decision.

That Sweden, through secret co-operation with the US, was a de facto ally of NATO during the Cold War, is not the point here (Agrell 2013; Holmström 2011; Tunander 2012). Both countries, in their approach to global issues, have laid emphasis on the need to anchor military interventions in the United Nations, preferably in a UN Security Council resolution. In the Afghanistan war the legal aspects are complex. Two operations – the American-British response to the 9/11 attacks through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the multinational ISAF – were gradually integrated. The first’s claim to legality was based on the principle of the right to self-defense and the second based on Security Council Resolution 1368 (see Chapter 4 for details). However, the juridical controversy about whether this de facto legitimizes the US-led counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan after 2007 (in which the OEF and ISAF missions were merged) is of less importance. Our main focus is on the international political relations between the superpower US and the UN in the wars after 1989, and the implications these power games have had for the media coverage and the public discussions. If we go back to earlier global military-media events such as the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq War of 2003, and Libya in 2011, we find a consistent pattern that began with the Gulf War and which indicates that the UN has been a political hostage to the propaganda.
The Gulf War as a point of departure

_A … for globalization studies by cross-national analysis of war journalism_

It is reasonable to regard the Gulf War 1990-91 as a conflict with paradigmatic importance as a global event in the era of globalisation after the end of the cold war, not least because of the consequences for war journalism of the political changes and the development of new media, in particular satellite TV news channels such as CNN. In early studies (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Kempf & Luostarinen 2002) we compared the reporting of the 1990-91 Gulf War in several countries’ media to investigate whether war journalism was becoming increasingly homogenized and Americanized. In other words, the project _Journalism in the New World Order_ applied a number of methods, both quantitative and qualitative, to find out if America’s powerful position as the only superpower remaining after 1989 implied that its war propaganda had a substantial impact on European media’s news reporting. The results managed to bring some nuances to the conflicting claims in the globalization debate. Firstly, it was shown that the American propaganda disseminated from the White House (including the depiction of the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein as a new Hitler) was widely displayed immediately in the US media, but only somewhat later in the European media. Secondly, a specific comparative analysis of the European media showed that the enemy picture promoted by the American president and the Pentagon had an effect earlier in the NATO member countries (for example, the Norwegian and German media) than in the nonaligned countries (the Finnish and Swedish media). We explain these results on the one hand by the media dependence of the international power structure (that America’s superpower status gives its media an agenda-setting influence on the media in many other countries) and on the other hand by the media’s relative adherence to own-country foreign and security policy (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001). Hence, the results from the project _Journalism in the New World Order_ confirm that globalization processes in the media certainly imply a deterritorialization of war reporting at the same time as these findings confirm that national frames still have an effect on how the news is presented locally.

Findings from our later study of the Iraq War 2003 suggests that the significance of the Gulf War 1990-91 has been underestimated as a global media event influencing more recent conflicts (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005). In the Gulf War study published in 2001 we suggest that this war “will haunt us for decades and perhaps centuries to come”. The reason for such a prediction was that the Gulf War 1990-91 was partly a confrontation between the Muslim world and the West, and also a conflict between the international community (represented by the so-called UN/US alliance) and Iraq. Among many Muslims the war was regarded as an attack on the Muslim nation (al-Umah). The split
between the general public in the Muslim world and the West and their allies in some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia can be analysed as a breeding ground for radical Islamist groups and terror organisations such as al Qaeda. Thus the Gulf War is an important background for the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent “war on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. In contradiction to Jean Baudrillard’s (1991) assertion that the Gulf War “never happened” we suggest, rather, that the Gulf War “never ended” because there is a continuation of lawless military violence: from the no-fly zone without any UN mandate at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Libyan War in 2011.

B … and for historical studies of the media’s reporting of the legal aspects

The Gulf War 1990-91 was framed by the US-led coalition as an example of the UN’s ability to act collectively in order to stop an illegal invasion. It is obvious that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was a clear case of aggression; never before in the history of the United Nations had one member state simply annexed another. On that very day, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 660 condemning the aggression and demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Four days later, the Council adopted Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions against Iraq (with conditional exceptions for medicine and food). Article 42 of the UN Charter permits the Security Council to take military action if it considers that economic sanctions have proved inadequate, but the Council did not properly assess the impact of the sanctions. At the same time, the United States built up a massive military force in Saudi Arabia, which borders on Kuwait and Iraq. After three months of economic sanctions, the US introduced a draft resolution requesting a mandate to go to war unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait before January 15, 1991. Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized member states “co-operating with the government of Kuwait” to use “all necessary means” to implement the decisions of the Council. Resolution 678 was adopted by twelve votes to two (Cuba and Yemen), with one abstention (China). US president George H Bush decided that the time had come to unleash Desert Storm. During the four months between August 2 and the end of November, the Security Council met in a number of sessions and adopted 12 resolutions about the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Then, once the US and its allies had acquired the mandate to go to war, the UN did not take any further actions until Iraq had surrendered three months later (Garbo 2001).

The UN/US alliance started the bombings on January 16, 1991. After the victory six weeks later, the regime of sanctions was kept in place as a means of securing the implementation of the peace treaty imposed on Iraq by the
Security Council. Resolution 687 was adopted on April 3, 1991, dealt with the ceasefire, and upheld all the earlier resolutions. The contested boundary between Iraq and Kuwait was confirmed. The resolution also commanded Iraq to destroy all chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and, in addition, never to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, Iraq was ordered to put up a fund financed by Iraqi assets to pay compensation for all losses and damages due to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

The Kurdish minorities in the north and the Shiites in the south of Iraq rose up against the ruling dictatorship in the country, inflamed by the defeat of Saddam Hussein and encouraged by statements from the US president. On April 5, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 (against votes from Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and with abstentions from China and India) which urged Iraq to stop the repression against its people and allow humanitarian aid. Troops from the US, France, the Netherlands, and the UK invaded the north of Iraq and established protected areas, without a specific mandate from the UN (Zacklin 2010). Later, the Iraqi government agreed that the coalition’s troops should be replaced by guards under UN command.

Most importantly, the three intervening powers (the US, the UK, and France) – again without any specific authorization from the Security Council – declared “no-fly” zones forbidding Iraqi air traffic north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd. The CIA also established a Military Co-operation Center in Zakhu, a mere stone’s throw from the Turkish border, in support of Kurdish resistance groups, and launched a covert operation to destabilize the Iraqi government (Garbo 2001). In retrospect, there appears to be a connection between these subversive actions in the midst of a humanitarian aid program and what was later known as the Bush doctrine which was declared in the State of the Union address in January 2002 and included three main strands: the concept of “pre-emptive war”; regime change through military action; and the aggressive promotion of democracy, US-style (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2012).

In August 1996, armed struggle broke out between Kurdish groups, and Saddam Hussein sent troops to the north while at the same time his troops broke a CIA-funded covert operation. According to US officials and Iraqi dissident sources, more than 100 Iraqis associated with this operation were arrested and apparently executed (Smith & Ottaway 1996). Foreign aid organizations, fearing reprisals, left the civilian population to fend for itself. This tragedy demonstrates the severe risks involved if humanitarian work is combined with military operations.

We have related these events in some detail for the purpose of establishing a backdrop to the media’s neglect of the legal aspects of the Gulf War 1990-91 and its aftermath. Findings from our study of the Norwegian coverage of the Gulf War suggest that the media did not ever make a point of the fact that the
implementation of the no-fly zone lacked a UN mandate (Ottosen 1994). The transition of a war based on a clear mandate by the UN into a *de facto* permanent war passed unnoticed by the media. This was never an issue among either Norwegian or Swedish politicians. The Scandinavian politicians seem to have been satisfied with a UN resolution to refer to, even though “facts on the ground” suggest that the resolution was no longer relevant for the continuous war that continued for months and even years after the resolution had been implemented. In that respect the Gulf War became the first test of a new strategy by the US superpower which – when it was possible – made the UN an instrument of regime change under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, a strategy that was further supplemented by the attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999, in the Iraq War 2003, in Libya in 2011, and in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2014.

The connection between the Gulf War and the bombing of Yugoslavia

There is a strategic link between the sidetracking of the UN and mobilization through the media at the time of the Gulf War 1990-91, and the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. NATO, aware that a resolution in the UN Security Council to go to war against Yugoslavia would be vetoed by Russia and China, chose for the first time in its history to unilaterally attack another country without a UN mandate. The concept of humanitarian intervention was used to justify the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia which were intended to stop Milošević’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It was put out again that the “evil” had to be stopped before Milošević could commit even worse crimes (Chomsky 2000). When one focuses on the legal aspects of the US strategy in relation to the role of the UN, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 exemplifies the conditional nature of the Security Council’s resolutions for legitimacy and the mobilisation of opinion support. The superpowers always have a number of different strategic options and in cases such as Kosovo, where UN legitimation is not possible, another option is to change international law by force – that is, *de facto* jurisdiction. The UN in 2009 issued the Security Council Resolution 1674, “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), but the question is if the mechanism of humanitarian intervention will be used by UN if it challenges the interest of great powers.

Even though Milošević clearly had blood on his hands and was responsible for major violations of human rights, a more sober historical review suggests that the Gulf War of 1990-91, as well as the war in Yugoslavia 1999, should remind us that the black and white images of war propaganda are never suitable as compensation for a deeper analysis. More complex issues such as the colonial heritage of Western hegemony, unsolved border conflicts, and oil and
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Water resources (not to mention religious tensions) are all parts of a complicated scenario that calls for dialogue and conflict resolution like that suggested in the UN Charter (Galtung 2002; Chomsky 2000). The bombing of Yugoslavia aimed at removing one of the last communist-related dictatorships in Europe. The situation in Kosovo leaves much to be desired from a human rights and democratic point of view. One and a half decades after the Kosovo conflict some steps have been taken towards normal relations between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians, but that does not make the NATO intervention legal. Since June 1999, when the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) occupied Kosovo, it was technically under a United Nations mandate, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, although still formally a part of the former Yugoslavia. Russia and China had also agreed to that mandate, which specifies the role of KFOR to ensure an end to interethnic fighting and atrocities between the Serb minority and the Kosovo-Albanian majority. According to UN Resolution 1244, Kosovo would remain part of Serbia pending a peaceful resolution of its status. That UN resolution was, basically, ignored by the US, the EU and NATO in 2008 (Engdahl 2012) – and in retrospect it is also debatable whether the military operations were legitimate, considering the human costs, which should be assessed and evaluated in relation to alternative conflict resolution strategies. In practical terms, such alternatives never came to the attention of the Western leaders, for whom the strategic objective seems to have been the credibility of NATO as the guardian of their political and security interests (Chomsky 1999 p. 134 ff). Immediately after the bombing of Serbia in 1999 the Pentagon seized a 1,000 acre large parcel of land in Kosovo to establish one of the largest US overseas military bases in the world, Camp Bondsteel, with more than 7,000 troops in 2012 (Engdahl 2012). The area of Camp Bondsteel has been leased for 99 years. The strategic interests of the USA were not discussed by the mainstream media when they argued in favor of NATO intervention in 1999 (Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002).

Afghanistan in the historical context of the new world order

After the 9/11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US, the American government claimed the right to self-defense against the Taliban regime as well because they had accepted the terrorist bases on Afghanistan territory. On October 7 of the same year the US, aided by British and Australian forces, launched air attacks on Afghanistan under the label “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” without any clear sanction from the UN Security Council (the latter had, however, expressed its support for the Afghan people’s wish to replace the Taliban regime). The US policy for regime change in Kabul was, with that in mind, designed to unofficially assist the internal resistance (primarily the so-called...
Northern Alliance) in the struggle against the Taliban government with its left hand, and, with its right hand, to implement the UN mandate by military attacks against the al Qaeda camps in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the Taliban regime had been removed the UN Security Council entered the scene and legitimized the regime change policy by Resolution 1386 which authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Karzai government to “maintain security”.

Norway and Sweden, traditionally separated in their political security orientation, both ended up with military forces in Afghanistan. The mainstream media in both countries welcomed the Scandinavian military interventions and echoed the flexible political rhetoric that the politicians in the two countries used to justify this costly experiment – costly in terms of both the thousands of Afghanistan lives and the few Swedish and Norwegian lives, as well as the money spent on a military experiment and the secret financial support to the corrupt Kharzai regime. We borrow the term “experiment” from the Norwegian social scientist Astrid Surkhe. In her book Eksperiment Afghanistan (The Afghan Experiment; Surkhe 2012) Surkhe detects three fundamental contradictions in the Western strategy for Afghanistan: To wage war in the name of peace; to plan for a democratic future and expect it to be accomplished by short-term solutions; and to quest after democracy in a traditional conservative Muslim society – and at the same time demand that it should be build on liberal democratic values. Norway and Sweden have transferred remarkable amounts of development aid in the last decade to Afghanistan, with Norway alone spending 5,000 million kroner. According to Surkhe, Afghan society has not been able to absorb these huge amounts of aid from the West, with expanding corruption as a result (Surkhe 2012).

The first years of this social and military experiment were accompanied by wishful thinking among Swedish and Norwegian politicians. What they saw, without looking too closely, was a society heading towards democracy; more girls attending school, and an improved security situation (Agrell 2013). As ISAF, including Norway and Sweden, is ready to withdraw forces in 2014, the last decade’s realities on the ground are coming out into the open. In the summer of 2013 (as we write) “everyone” seems to agree that this was a war that could never have been won – which is quite remarkable and worth noting because it says a lot about short memory, not least among responsible politicians and the media (Eide & Ottosen 2013).

The Afghanistan mission is the biggest NATO operation ever and has included 130,000 soldiers from around 40 countries; 2,700 soldiers from the international forces have lost their lives, together with between 20,000 and 30,000 Afghan lives (Knutsen 2012: 23-24). As the “rats are about to leave the sinking ship” military personnel are starting openly to reveal what they have been expecting for a long time. It was a war that was lost from the start. Dag Henriksen, a
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lecturer at the Norwegian Air Force Academy, explains how Jaap Willemsen, deputy commander of ISAF 2005-06, said in an interview that during his six months’ service in ISAF he found that there was no common military strategy for ISAF. Each unit from different countries tried to control their “own territory” as best they could – with a minimum of co-operation (Henriksen 2012: 133; cf. Agrell 2013).

So what is the root of this failure? The Norwegian social scientist Torbjørn Knutsen searches for explanations at the very start of the process after 9/11. US president Bush declared a war on terror without any detailed planning; by September 15, Operation Enduring Freedom was already a fact. The plan was to remove the Taliban regime, but nobody really knew what would happen afterwards (Knutsen 2012: 25-27). The same neglect of contingency plans repeated itself in 2003 when Iraq was invaded. The quick-fix solution in Afghanistan was to select Hamid Kharzai as future president, although he had no real legitimacy without the presence of ISAF (Børresen 2012).

The question is why Norwegian and Swedish politicians went along with this adventurous experiment in Afghanistan, and why they even contributed military forces. For our purpose the most essential question is: Why did the media promote the explanations and the rhetoric of the politicians without critical questioning? We are afraid that the answer is quite simple. The Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, has explained it frankly: “We went to Afghanistan with our most important ally, and we will leave with them.”

The former commander in the Norwegian Armed Forces and military analyst Jacob Børresen puts it like this: “For Norway, with the US as its most important ally, it would have been difficult not to show solidarity and deliver a force in Afghanistan when the US asked us.” (Børresen 2012: 193) Behind the humanitarian rhetoric of the Norwegian politicians that was the real reason why Norway sent armed forces to Afghanistan, an analysis that is confirmed by Wilhelm Agrell (2013; see Chapter 4). According to Børresen, however, the decision to send Norwegian soldiers to the ISAF force was based on a flawed diagnosis, recommending the wrong medicine, and could not be anything but a necessary defeat (Børresen 2012: 187-190). For a small NATO member country like Norway, it is important to please the US – or at least not to offend it. Adapting to the US global strategy has been a cornerstone in Norwegian foreign and security policy. Perhaps more remarkable is that for all practical purposes this was the same reason behind Sweden’s participation in the Afghanistan military and social adventure. As Agrell concludes from an analysis of the Swedish contribution to the ISAF mission, even as a non-NATO member, officially speaking, Sweden has based its foreign and security policy since 1989 on close co-operation with neighboring NATO countries as well as NATO at large. As in Denmark and Norway, the political elite in Sweden felt the need to confirm their loyalty to the US and NATO after 9/11 and the
political crisis within NATO in connection to the Iraq War 2003 (Agrell 2013: 84-85). The explanation for the failure of the officially independent media in Norway and Sweden to scrutinize the Afghanistan policy more than scratching here and there on the surface (such as criticism of the Swedish troop units not being properly equipped against road mines) has partly to do with the general pattern of journalistic needs to avoid censure for not being patriotic and loyal to “our young men and women” in the armed forces who were risking their lives for a better future in Afghanistan (or elsewhere). The political doxa is a reality for media and journalists, and it may cost you a lot as a journalist – even your job – to deviate from it. But besides these well-known pressures on the institution of journalism, there is another important factor related to globalization. We will discuss it more extensively in the last chapter; for the time being we contend that lack of professional competence in the international law and human rights aspects of the “global war on terror” seems to be a major obstacle preventing the media and journalists from taking up the role as a fourth estate in the field of foreign and security politics, at least in the Scandinavian countries.

The Iraq War 2003 and the Libyan War 2011 – continued regime-changes with the UN as hostage?

The Iraq War in 2003 had no UN Security Council resolution to legalize and legitimize the military intervention and occupation of Iraq that the US carried out together with the UK and with token support from an “alliance of the willing”. But even so, the UN subsequently allowed itself to be utilized in the reconstruction process, after the allied forces had replaced the Saddam Hussein regime with a government based on a domestic Iraqi coalition. The creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq made the UN responsible for peace and security in the country from July 2004, together with the Iraqi government (see Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546).

The NATO involvement in the Libyan War of 2011 displayed the same pattern of misuse of the UN and blurring of the legal issues. In this case the legal foundation was the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Once again, the leading Western countries used the issue of a no-fly zone as the point of departure for a NATO attack, with regime change as the final outcome, although this was clearly not the official intention of Resolution 1973. Des Freedman and Daya Thussu argue that the Libyan War of 2011 should be viewed in light of a US policy which reduces the UN to a secondary role-player, or even to an outmaneuvered bystander: “The NATO-led bombardment of Libya in 2011 is a continuation of the policy of “regime change”, which the US has enunciated and mainstream Western media largely endorsed (Freedman & Thussu 2012: 1).
The Libyan War of 2011 differs from the previously mentioned wars in that the US did not take the lead in the mobilization for military intervention. Instead, France took on the leader’s jersey. The “Arab spring” reached Gaddafi’s dictatorship too, when an armed uprising began in the eastern part of Libya bordering on Egypt. The Security Council in consensus adopted a resolution (SC Resolution 1973) that encouraged the parties to avoid violence against civilians and provided member states with the right to intervene for humanitarian action, notably in the form of a no-fly zone that could be maintained even with recourse to military means (Ottosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2013). However, Resolution 1973 had, according to several Security Council members’ views, clear restrictions, and did not allow military occupation, troops on Libyan soil, or military intervention for regime change. In Chapter 6 (Media and international law: Two cases of Norwegian and Swedish press coverage of the Libya War 2011) we analyze the questions raised by the formulations of the resolution, and, furthermore, how the Norwegian and Swedish media reports failed to recognize the political and legal implications of such a widely dispersed diplomatic uncertainty. It was due to this neglect that journalism failed to provide the general public with the necessary knowledge on both the international legal aspects of the NATO air operations and the political reasons for the international community’s relative passivity in the Syrian conflict. There are two sides to the development of international law during the timespan we are dealing with here: on the one hand, there is the principle of responsibility to protect adopted by the UN to safeguard civilian populations from genocide and to avoid situations similar to the terrible Rwandan massacres of 1994, an important step forward for the protection of human rights and security. On the other hand, we have seen this very principle being misused as an pretext for regime changes, as in Libya 2011 (Tunander 2012).

Globalization and war journalism

The globalization process is a theme on a number of levels (politics, economics, warfare, media, and journalism) that has been central to the research on war journalism that we have conducted over the last 20 years. The debate on globalization was most intense in the 1980s and 90s, with discussions concerning its character; whether it was a new phenomenon; and if it could be expected to lead to increased affinity or, on the contrary, to increased conflicts and hostility between social and ethnic groups, different cultures, and civilizations (see for example Held 2000; Beck 1992, 2006; Huntington 1996). In media and journalism research the debate flourished around questions such as whether media reports, news content, and journalistic forms and professional conditions were becoming increasingly uniform globally. News journalism, especially,
was discussed in terms of homogenization, Americanization and expectations of a “global newsroom” in the making (see for example Hafez 2007; Thussu & Freedman 2012; cf. Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001).

A combination of new satellite technology and 24/7 reporting set a new standard and the world changed. It was becoming a “single place”, as Robertsson (1992) has suggested. The compression of the world seems to be a good reason for questioning overly simplistic assumptions about increased global homogeneity, unification, and harmony. In contrast to exaggerated assumptions about the global village, our suggestion is that contradictory tendencies should also be examined: fragmentation, complexity, and different forms of the globalizing processes in various regions and countries, together with increased heterogeneity.

The growing market for translational news has made the makers of foreign policy more sensitive to media channels outside the national territory. This does not make the assumption of a “CNN effect” any more true today than when Daniel Hallin studied the media impact on the Vietnam War (Hallin 1986). The media war coverage and its effects on foreign policy and public opinion is rather conditional, and depends on whether or not there is a strong consensus among the political elites. Only where there is a “political vacuum” will the media coverage have “tactical” effects; that is, it will affect the conduct of military operations but will hardly have more far-reaching strategic effects (Strobel 1997: 223). This analysis, with its main focus on media-policy relations within a national context, was elaborated in a more globalized perspective in our *Journalism in the New World Order*. Transnational media agenda-setting effects of any magnitude will only emerge in countries where the political agenda is not settled on the actual issue (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001: 249). Thus, even though the translational news media could be important agenda setters in specific rare cases, our research findings, and those of others, suggest, firstly, that generally it is the national political agenda that influences the media agenda rather than the other way around; and, secondly, that the national media is only influenced by the agenda of transnational media in a domestic political vacuum. In other words, the mainstream media tend to be loyal to their government’s policies and the cross-national differences in media coverage often follow that pattern. For example, findings from our previous studies indicate that war news in NATO member countries, such as Germany and Norway, appear to have more in common than in Norwegian and Swedish media, although the latter two countries have more in common culturally, politically and geographically (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005).

From a more historical perspective, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the increased globalization of news coverage will, owing to the growing number of transnational media channels and internet-based news providers, make
national news cultures more sensitive to influences from abroad – for example with respect to priority and the framing of news. That, in turn, will, presumably, make national policy makers more receptive to the ways in which international conflicts are constructed symbolically in the transnational news-flow. Nation states are no longer the dominant actors on the international political scene that they were once, owing to new forms of politics that have been possible partly through the development of new information communications systems (ICTs). Steven Livingstone (2011: 20), for example, argues that the CNN effect research should seek new directions after the Gulf War and focus more on the “relationship between governance and the nature of a given information environment”.

In retrospect, the Gulf War 1990-91 will, perhaps, remain the most unified coverage cross-nationally of a single conflict because of the dominant position of CNN. Many countries with weak national news services gave in, and at times simply sent the CNN version out on the air (Wicks & Walker 1993). This will never happen again because the monopoly was broken when other players entered the market: BBC World, Fox Television and other global channels, among them a Russian, a Chinese, and a French. Now, at least 40 global channels are competing for the attention of viewers (Thussu 2007).

War reporting is a special branch of news journalism that has always brought its practitioners into situations with particular difficulties and problems. News reporting of all kinds regularly, of course, confronts reporters and editors with lobbyists and other stakeholders who want to push through their messages to the public, but in a democracy it is extremely unusual for them to risk their lives in exercising their profession. Nor do journalists elsewhere accept that their movements and access to information sources are controlled by other parties. But this is the rule rather than the exception for war correspondents, and the situation for local journalists, freelancers and stringers is sometimes even worse. For example, after the US intervention of 2003, female Iraqi journalists have had to face extreme conditions – probably the worst in the world – with threats, kidnappings, and assassinations (Al-Kawi 2010) the root cause of which is the crucial importance of their reporting for the development of war operations and for the “battle of hearts and minds”. Parties on both sides in the conflicts try in every way (including persuasion and the filtering of sources but also by threats of physical force) to influence news content, and in particular to prevent the reporting from jeopardizing their own war efforts.

In the history of war, propaganda has always been complementary to armed warfare, and even in ancient times the belligerents tried to demonize the enemy while their own fighters were depicted as heroes and glorified for their courage and sacrifices (Knightley 1982). In authoritarian states, the media is one of the branches of government and an instrument for the manipulation of public opinion, but in democratic societies the role of the media (and of journalism) is much more complex and delicate since institutionally it is not supposed to
be controlled by the authorities (in open societies it is even more urgent for military success to have the support of public opinion – but based on free and informed consent rather than commands). This paradox is accentuated by the rapid growth of media pluralism during the last two decades. Never have there been so many different media voices and views in the marketplace of ideas, while at the same time the Western liberal democracies are waging war again and again in the name of democratic values. How this paradox is possible, and handled in practice, is a demanding topic for research in the field of war journalism. In the following pages we will sketch out some possible trajectories for the development of the field. Unfortunately we do not see much reason for optimism for either democracy or the conditions of war journalism unless important reforms are launched and implemented in the near future.

In contradiction to the principle of institutional media freedom in liberal democracies, in recent wars news reporting is – according to several studies – becoming increasingly drawn in as a central battleground (Taylor 2000; see also Allan & Zelizer 2004; Freedman & Thussu 2012; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Tumber & Palmer 2004). According to Martin Shaw, the intense media coverage and the continuous attention of human rights organizations have resulted in a new type of warfare: “risk-transfer war” (Shaw 2005: 1). The leading Western countries’ warfare is carried out in ways designed to place the physical dangers – but also all political, economic, and moral hazards – on the enemy alone to bear. This assumes that the warfare of one’s own side is portrayed in the media as legal, legitimate, and in accordance with humanitarian principles. Another media and war historian, Philip Taylor, has similarly described the media and journalists as willing or unwilling participants in the wars – but participants nevertheless (Taylor 2000). Basically, these developments that involve the media more and more in the conflicts depend on the breakthrough of democracy, and the implication that democratic states can not – at least not for very long – wage wars that are not accepted by public opinion.

But other factors also contribute to this development. All conflicting parties are investing more and more resources in war propaganda as the number of media platforms is growing and, as a result, international opinion is becoming increasingly decisive for the fortunes of war. Military operations are often preceded by protracted peacetime campaigns to prepare the public and to build support for future action (Luostarinen 2002). But instead of trying to censor the media, as in authoritarian regimes, propaganda strategists in democratic states aim at smooth co-operation with journalists by providing generous amounts of information designed to match media logic while supporting the war plans at the same time. The press conferences at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Riyadh during the Gulf War in 1990-91 is a good example: as entertaining as they were with dramatic video footages of the cruise missiles, the precision bombings of Iraqi military facilities and the Patriot anti-robot missiles supposedly

The further development of warfare in the new world order proclaimed by the US president at the time, George H Bush, resulted in the approach of “embedding” war correspondents, which the US initiated on a grand scale before the Iraq War of 2003. The project included around 700 journalists who were offered pre-training to follow the American troops when they invaded Iraq (Katovsky & Carlson 2003). According to the American media scholar Robin Andersen, this and other examples of extensive and close cooperation between the military and the media in the US has created a military-entertainment complex with a substantial influence over war journalism, public opinion, and conflict policy in the last decades – not to say the last “century of war” (Andersen 2006).

News editors and war correspondents are of course aware that the parties in a conflict try to exploit the news for propaganda purposes, and at least some editors and reporters try to find strategies to preserve their professional integrity and independence. One such resistance strategy would be not to let yourself be “embedded” with the military but to seek out events and to interview sources outside the control of the authorities. During the Gulf War in 1990-91, the journalists who chose not to submit to the military command’s pool system, the so-called “unilaterals”, sometimes had to endure aggressive criticism from colleagues when the pool journalists realised that they had been misled by the press officers and their trusted sources (Fisk 2005: Chapter 15). Another approach that some journalists and editors apply in order to reject their role as a propaganda device is to focus as much as possible on reporting the “true face of the war”, as it was formulated by several Swedish news directors when we interviewed them before the start of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, that is, the intense phase of the Gulf War (Nohrstedt 1992; 2009). By this expression the news managers referred to war reporting which emphasises innocent civilian victims. In Nohrstedt (2009) we explore some empirical trends in war journalism based on a historical, comparative analysis of findings in Swedish media studies from the Gulf War 1990-91, the Afghanistan War 2001, the Iraq War 2003. One of these trends is a gradual increase, in the war reporting, of attention to the civilian victims.

**Gender relations**

The protection of women and children has always been a part of war rhetoric (Enloe 1990). Nation states today have added the use of gender equality rhetoric, or a specific feminist rhetoric, to this scenario in order to mobilize support for war (Abu-Lughod 2002; Eisenstein 2002; Mral 2004). There are several tensions
within such rhetorical tightrope balancing, a balancing between the protection/victimization scenario and the liberation/gender equality scenario (von der Lippe 2011). The quest for humanitarian intervention to protect women is also to be found in literature on Libya (Weiss et al. 2011). One example from the Libyan War is the woman who claimed to have been raped by Gaddafi’s soldiers and who gained global media attention (ibid.); another is that people in Gaddafi-controlled areas were subject to propaganda from the regime about the imminent danger of being raped if and when the opposition forces would arrive. It is well known that rape has throughout history been a part of warfare, and that women’s guarded sexuality has been seen as part of (and a symbol of) the purity and integrity of the nation. Vulnerable women are used in propaganda to justify military intervention (von der Lippe 2011). During the power struggle in Benghazi, stories were circulated in global media that Gaddafi had equipped his soldiers with Viagra to sustain the rapes (CNN May 17, 2011). (Amnesty International (2011) looked into the allegation and found no evidence for it.) Another aspect is the under-reporting of women in war news, which relates to a focus on the battlefront and on weaponry more than on civilians and survival (von der Lippe 2011). Female journalists also tend to be more vulnerable than men in conflict zones, as has been well documented during the Iraq War of 2003 (Al-Kawi 2010).

The power of the visual

Visual reports from the battlefield – and in particular of civilian casualties – have come to be of particular importance and are used as powerful ammunition in the propaganda war. The importance of this material for opinionbuilding has increased dramatically because of the Internet and various forms of new media. With the explosive growth of communication channels, news sources, and the supply of visual images, facilitated by the combination of Internet and mobile camera technology, visual reporting is one of the hottest battlezones in the new wars. It was thus no coincidence that before the Afghan war in 2001 the Pentagon bought up all satellite photo coverage of that country to control the images in the media (Becker 2004). But not even total control of the stratosphere managed completely to prevent unwanted pictures of the victims of Western countries’ warfare, because Al Jazeera went into competition with CNN and BBC World in the international television market. The Qatar-based channel was the first and only foreign television channel licensed by the Taliban regime in Kabul to report from inside Afghanistan, and Al Jazeera could therefore send visual reports of the large number of innocent civilian victims killed by the US airstrikes (Figenschou 2004); this is how these images reached television viewers around the world, despite the satellite photo embargo. While Al Jazeera offered
a different and critical alternative to the Western media during the later wars in Gaza 2008, Libya 2011, and Syria 2012, the channel’s reporting was at the same time influenced by the Qatar government, which played an active role in the regional conflict, including supplying weapons and intelligence information to the rebels (Tunander 2012) – a further example of how the media tend to reflect the policy of their own government, and a theme to which we will return in this book. When the media fail to take the part of critical watchdog the arena is opened up for other actors. The breakthrough of WikiLeaks in the global public sphere, over the video film that revealed how, in 2003, a US helicopter crew killed two Reuters photographers and several other civilians in Baghdad, is another manifestation of the increased historical significance of the visual forms of war reporting. In some areas, Wikileaks has taken over the watchdog role when the mainstream media failed to do so. On the other hand, WikiLeaks has been criticized as lacking ethical standards: in August 2011 251,287 documents from embassy files were published revealing the names of sources and exposing them to risk (Ottosen 2012). As we shall show later in this book, WikiLeaks and other whistle-blowers, like Edward Snowden in 2013, can change the way the history of international conflicts is written, through the publication of classified documents from government and diplomatic archives.

These examples underline the importance of access to visual documentation from conflict arenas. Michael Griffin has pointed out that “photographs may be more important for their role in priming pre-existing interpretive schema, linking the viewer’s memory to familiar news categories and scenarios, than for their specific referential or descriptive function.” (Griffin 2004) In her books On Photography and Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag shows that visuals relate to our emotions and historical memory in a different and much more powerful manner than does the written text (Sontag 2003). Those in charge of propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOPS) are, of course, fully aware of this. It is one reason why journalists and photographers, as potential messengers to a larger audience, are denied access to the battlefield and why their whereabouts are controlled by military forces through the embedded system. Later in this book we shall elaborate on the Fallujah case during the Iraq War of 2003 and Israel’s attack on the ship to Gaza flotilla in 2010 as examples of how control of visual reporting was an essential motive for restrictions on photographers and on mobile phone connections, to prevent the distribution of unfavourable visuals (Eide & Ottosen 2008).

The military-entertainment complex

One crucial aspect of the new visual globalized culture is the merging of entertainment and traditional news. This has structural and economical importance
because the news industry has to a large extent been bought by the entertainment industry. Time and Warner bought CNN, the Disney Company bought ABC, and the relationship between news and entertainment in the Fox channel has changed the format and tone of television news. There is more entertainment in the news and more news about entertainment (Andersen 2006). The ways in which war and conflicts are reported has changed as a consequence of this development. Robin Andersen introduces the notion of “military-entertainment complex” to understand the new structural relations between the defense industry, the news industry, and the entertainment industry, and how the relationship between fact and fiction in war propaganda has been affected (ibid). The Center for Public Integrity has documented that on 532 occasions during the Iraq War of 2003 the Bush administration produced a total of 935 false statements (Ottosen 2009). At the press center in Qatar, the stage was designed by Hollywood consultants to make the “performance” by the military spokesmen more convincing and mediatized. The merging of journalism and entertainment in representations of war is in itself a field to explore for more empirical research. The co-operation between Hollywood and the Pentagon is significant for understanding the cultural-industrial complex. The Pentagon is sent about a hundred movie manuscripts every year and decides to co-operate in about one third of them. Negotiations and compromises are usually necessary in order to satisfy the Pentagon’s interests. There is also competition between different branches of the military: a liaison officer works full-time to “sell” the Air Force to Hollywood and for the production of the movie “Air Force One”, the US Air Force lent six F-158 planes free of charge (Robb 2004).

Another example is “Black Hawk Down”, based on the failed “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia in 1992, in which 18 American soldiers died (Robb 2014). In this case, the Pentagon liked the script because the heroic images of the soldiers dying in battle helped to rewrite the image of a failed operation. The film got Pentagon support, but at what price? “If you want to use the military’s toys you’ve got to play by their rules,” said military technical adviser John Lovett (AP 2001). The military historian Lawrence Suid explained in detail how this system for mutual explanation works in the book Guts & Glory. Suid calls it a “system for mutual exploitations” (Robb, 2004: 234). A new level in the co-operation between Pentagon and Hollywood was reached in 2012 through the film “Act of Valor”. The characters in the movie are real Navy Seal soldiers, and the movie reached a new level of war propaganda by reducing the fiction elements (Washington Post February 24, 2012).

The movie “Zero Dark Thirty” is on the border between fact and fiction, for the dramatization of the killing of bin Laden is based on internal documents from the CIA. The director has since been praised, almost excessively, for being brave enough to “tell the truth” in the movie about torture. Manohla Dargis of the New York Times:

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However unprovable the effectiveness of these interrogations, they did take place. To omit them from “Zero Dark Thirty” would have been a reprehensible act of moral cowardice. It’s difficult to watch “Zero Dark Thirty” without seeing it as a movie about how torture helped us catch Osama bin Laden.

(New York Times December 17, 2012)

In Norway and Sweden, as in other Western countries – if not globally (Thussu 2007) – the influence of US popular culture is substantial, and all the issues in connection to Andersen’s notion of a “military-entertainment complex” are also relevant for the media market in those countries (Golding & Harris 1997).

Computer games as a tool for propaganda

It is difficult to recruit young people as consumers and customers of the traditional news media as they seek information about conflicts and war through entertainment and media platforms such as computer games (Ottosen 2009c). In 1999, Americans named videogames as their favorite form of home entertainment for the third year in a row. Twice as many people nominated videogames as those who chose watching TV (Poole 2004: 6). After the Cold War had come to an end a new generation of computer games emerged from research within the armed forces aimed at developing training videos for military personnel (Held 2000; Lenoir 2000). We will draw the historical line between research and development in the defense industry, and see the development of new games as an instrument for recruitment to the armed forces and as a tool in the global battle for hearts and minds in the so-called “global war on terror”.

In a 1996 policy paper, the US National Research Council acknowledged the importance of co-operation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the entertainment industry on issues such as computer modeling and simulation technology. The report makes the following statement: “For DOD, modeling and simulation technology provides a low-cost means of conducting joint training exercises, evaluating new doctrine and tactics, and studying the effectiveness of new weapon systems.” (quoted in Burston 2003)

The significance of this co-operation manifests itself in computer games in the commercial market. In 2002, the game “Desert Storm” was launched, more than ten years after the Gulf War and one year before the next war in Iraq. The timing was hardly a coincidence: it was helpful to recreate the memory of winning the war in 1991 over the same enemy as in the up-coming war (for which new recruits would be required) and to influence the opinion of the younger generation. To win the game, you have to act as the American soldiers did in 1991. If you are on the Iraqi side, tough luck. You would lose and get killed. What message does this send to young people, mostly boys, in
a pre-war situation? And what is the effect on their perceptions of international human rights? (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005)

One of the biggest successes in the global computer market is the official US army computer game (Nieborg 2006). From the time of its release on July 4, 2002 until 2006, “America’s Army: Recon” was upgraded with 22 new versions (Løvlie 2007). The game comes in different versions, one of which reproduces the image of courageous American soldiers, and is available free of charge on the Internet. The introduction on the home page is clear enough: “The Soldiers in Special Forces are a reflection of the Army within which they serve. They are courageous, intelligent, and resourceful and dedicated individuals.” A new version was launched in 2003 (the same year as the invasion of Iraq) at the Electronic Entertainment Expo in Los Angeles, May 13-16, in a combination of real and virtual events. Real tanks were placed outside as the Air Force Division 101 launched a simulated attack (Pilet 2003). Inside the Expo, the new game was introduced as a tool to recruit soldiers to the real US Army at the same time as it was introduced free of charge as a video game on the Internet (Løvlie 2007). By November 2003 it already had between two to three million users; by fall of 2011 the number had passed nine million, and according to Wikipedia it ranked among the most popular games on a global scale.

The question, of course, is why the game is offered free when it has such global market potential. A tool for recruitment in the American market is the most obvious answer. In addition, the purpose is to strengthen the image of the US army among the domestic and international public (Løvlie 2007:14). In an interview with the Army News Service, Colonel Casey Wardynski, director of the OMEA, project director of “America’s Army” and associate professor of economics at the US Military Academy, made clear how efficient a tool it was: “The game has generated interest in the army and has taught people about soldiering.” (McLeroy 2009) In a survey of youth aged 16 to 21, 29 percent said that “America’s Army” was the most effective method of generating interest (Petemeyer 2004). Nor should the game be underestimated as a global instrument of propaganda. The game is, of course, extremely one-sided in its approach and offers the military solution as the only solution to a conflict. In addition, all issues are seen through an American perspective.

The web page of “America’s Army” is updated all the time, introducing real soldiers, each with a name, picture and autobiography, thus blurring the distinction between the “real heroes” in the service of the US and the fictitious soldiers in the computer game.

Other examples include computer games such as “Army of Two”. Companies such as “Kuma” can be analysed as a breeding ground for war propaganda narratives in the entertainment segment. One example, from 2005, is the release by Kuma of a mission called “Assault on Iran”, inspired by the ongoing tension between the US and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear facilities (Ottosen 2009c).
Robin Andersen suggests that an additional problem is that the techniques in the videogames are also implemented, in war reporting, in the newsrooms of the major news channels. Thus, the core components of the imagery in the videogames create the same kinds of illusions as in the real wars portrayed on television (Andersen 2006; Ottosen 2007).

New social media

The former journalist and now professor Joris Luyendijk uses his experience as a reporter in the Gulf War in 1991 and his recent observations (during the Arab Spring) as an anthropologist to explore, in Hello Everybody, the potential of social media as a real alternative, in conflicts, to the mainstream media (Luyendijk 2006). Digital media and social media offer some alternative perspectives for reporting from war and conflicts, but the authors of this book will warn against exaggerating the importance and direct impact of the relationship between social media and social movements. Christian Christensen has studied a special form of war reporting in which soldiers from the battlefield in the Iraq War 2003 published their own experiences on YouTube and acted as amateur reporters who tell about their everyday lives as a modern form of “letters to the families back home”. The visual reports of day-to-day activities obviously have a strong emotional appeal to the relatives at home, and the stories are full of digital footage from the war zone. These narratives provide supplements that allegedly depict the “reality of war” more closely than does the mainstream media coverage (Christensen 2010). Daniela Dimitrovas and Matt Neznanski (2006) have compared war news reporting online with the traditional newspaper. They notice that the two formats represent different versions and that the online versions offer a new type of dialogue with readers. However, they underline that one should not overestimate how many readers will actually take the opportunity to use online media to participate in the public discourse on war and conflicts. On the other hand, in a study of how the mainstream media reported about war blogs at the beginning of the Iraq war 2003, John Jordan (2007) has revealed that traditional journalism was severely disturbed by the competition from bloggers, who were “dismissed simply for being alternative.” (Jordan 2007: 294) And during the Arab Spring social media have, in some cases, been able to outmaneuver the authorities’ attempts at censorship and control (Dunn 2010). Dunn’s study, however, shows how the leadership of the so-called “6 April movement” and a tiny number of the many thousand members of the network’s Facebook group actually took part in conversations in the social media. A note of scepticism about the media hype over the effect of new media on the events also comes from the well-known paradox: it was when, in the spring of 2011, the Mubarak regime closed down the Internet,
that tens of thousands of young demonstrators took to the street and fought the decisive battle that led to regime change (Coombs & Holladay 2010). So far, it seems that social media and online media will play a increasingly significant role in coming conflicts for opinion building and political mobilisation, but global television and traditional media will still be the most important arena for the battle of “hearts and minds” in the coming years.

Neither the traditional nor the new media, however, operate in isolation. On the contrary, they are influenced, and sometimes even staged, by other organizations and strategic actors in ways that threaten their integrity and professional independence. It is particularly so for war journalism because of the high stakes involved, including human lives. War journalism is a vocation in a contextual setting of public relations and war propaganda, opinion spins, information warfare, information operations including psychological operations, and physical threats and violence.

Information warfare and public relations

War journalism should be seen in the larger context of inter-organisational relations (Dinan & Miller 2007). Business communities and the state have both, in recent decades, increasingly invested in public relations and spin-doctors to influence the media agenda and, in a wider sense, the public discourse (Dinan & Miller 2007). Guy Golan (2011) argues that an increasing number of news stories in the media have their origin in information subsidies from power circles in society. By referring to the notion of agenda-indexing, Golan argues that topics related to national security and finance are more vulnerable to PR campaigns than other issues because of their complexity and a lack of resources in the newsrooms to check facts and sources. This has grown worse after 2009 because of the cut-backs in staff owing to the financial crisis (Pickard & McChesney 2011). The mainstream media is thus more likely than ever to reflect the thinking of governments and the military-industrial complex in their coverage of war and security policy issues (Golan 2011). In the field of studies of war journalism there is a paradigm of research, with Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent in 1988 as a wellknown example, which emphasizes the dependency of media coverage on dominant political elites, authorities, and pressure groups and that is still relevant although it has also been criticiized and modified (for example Hallin 1986; Schlesinger 1990; Lang & Lang 2004; Entman 2003). This is not the place to elaborate on this debate, except to mention that agenda-setting and public opinion-building are not exclusively controlled top-down. Under certain conditions – for example when catastrophic war adventures have been made common knowledge despite attempts by the responsible power holders to deny the facts and distract the public’s eye – the
mainstream media also harbors antiwar voices with counterframes that mimic the shifts in public opinion (see, for example, Klein, Byerly & McEachern 2009).

PSYOPS, PR, and spin

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are an integral part of modern warfare, operating on the borderline between the battlefield and civil society; they have the potential to cause ethical problems by blurring the difference between journalism and military operations, and represent a potential threat to journalistic integrity. Previous research provides ample evidence that PSYOPS can be very effective in influencing the framing of news stories. The toppling of the statute of Saddam Hussein and the coverage of the battle of Fallujah in 2003-2004, through enemy images of the al Qaeda leader, al Zarqawi, are but a few examples of this (Ottosen 2009).

NATO’s PSYOPS policy

Information strategies are increasingly inherent in modern warfare. In the Information Operations Roadmap, Donald H Rumsfeld, the former US defense secretary, states that information is currently “critical to military success and will only become more so in the foreseeable future” (2003: 3). This awareness implies that substantial resources are invested in “non-kinetic” measures aimed at influencing the hearts and minds of the people. The US 2009 budget for research on the development of psychological operations was $15.5 million (United States Special Operations Command 2009: 255), and NATO has acknowledged that the alliance should learn from the US’s emphasis on PSYOPS (Collins 2003). Official PSYOPS policy is documented in Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (AJP-3.10.1(A)). The use of media is a priority: “A wide range of media may be employed in a protracted PSYOPS effort, including radio, TV and film.” (NATO 2007: 66) The familiar distinction between white, black, and grey propaganda is here applied to PSYOPS:

a. White. An accurately acknowledged source. The actual sponsor correctly advertises production or sponsorship.

b. Grey. An unacknowledged source. It is not clear which individual, organisation or government is claiming production or sponsorship responsibility.

c. Black. Falsely advertised source. The product or activity was actually produced by a different individual, organization or government than that claimed.

(NATO 2007: 99)
In plain words, white and black PSYOPS is the difference between propaganda based on true or on false information. There is no secret that there are different schools of thought within NATO on this issue. While the US has a tradition of using black propaganda on some occasions, the Norwegian policy is to only use white PSYOPS. During the administration of George W Bush, the Office of Strategic Influence was established and authorized to use black propaganda in the international battle for hearts and minds. When the *New York Times* leaked the existence of the office in January 2004, it was closed down officially. However, in a speech a few months later, Donald Rumsfeld, defense secretary at the time, made clear that the black operation would continue through other channels. According to the *Los Angeles Times* the responsibility for these operations had been transferred to the Central Command (Ottosen 2009).

NATO member countries such as Denmark and Norway are committed to NATO’s PSYOPS policy, but their armed forces also have their own policies. For example, the Norwegian ISAF forces are, on the one hand, bound by the loyalty to NATO but, on the other hand, have a commitment to respect the integrity of the media. Spokesmen for the Norwegian armed forces explicitly express respect for the impartiality of journalists (Ottosen 2009). The critical point – that does not seem to be well-covered in the mainstream media – is that participation in international operations under NATO command, as exemplified by the ISAF’s PSYOPS policy in Afghanistan, is, in practical terms, challenging such statements of principle. We will take the Norwegian case as example of how the applied NATO PSYOPS policy in the Afghanistan war implies the opposite of independent media.

### NATO’s PSYOPS in practice: Norwegian ISAF forces as a test case

The Norwegian PSYOPS definition is similar to that of the US:

> Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are defined as planned operations in times of peace, emergency, armed conflict and war directed at hostile, friendly and/ or neutral targets to influence attitudes, emotions and behavior to achieve political and military aims (Forsvarets Fellesoperative doktrine, 2000: 77).

Norwegian armed forces thus define psychological operations as a mean of controlling the perceptions and behavior of its target groups – who are usually the civilians living in the area where military operations are being carried out. Scholars and governments abbreviate the term “psychological operations”, in slightly different ways but here we will use “PSYOPS” as do the Norwegian government and military (based on Ottosen 2013c).
According to NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (2007), PSYOPS have three basic aims:

a. Weaken the will of the adversary or potentially adversary target audiences.

b. Reinforce the commitment of friendly target audiences.

c. Gain the support and co-operation of uncommitted or undecided audiences.

(NATO, 2007: 18)

Within NATO, the main target of PSYOPS operations is often the foreign audience on the ground where a conflict or war is taking place, but the operations also have consequences for home audiences. The US army has used local television stations as training posts for some of its psychological operations personnel. The information on the blog site The Upshot (2009) reveals that, since 2001 at least, both WRAL (a CBS affiliate in Raleigh, NC) and WTOC (a CBS affiliate in Savannah, GA) have regularly hosted soldiers from the army’s Fourth Psychological Operations Group on active duty as part of the army’s “Training With Industry” program.

Taylor cites PSYOPS operations during the Iraq War 2003 and he emphasizes that “the battle for hearts and minds was … also directed at world opinion.” (Taylor 2003:11) He finds that the three main aims for PSYOPS mentioned above are carried out as an integral part of military operations. According to Paul (2008), PSYOPS is part of the military strategies, and the core provider of information under the umbrella of Information Operations (INFO OPS), which defines it as: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security.” (Paul 2008: 163)

This differentiation applies to NATO’s structure as well. NATO does not see INFO OPS as a separate area of warfare, but as a co-ordinating and synchronising unit of several military capacities – all with the objective of winning the battles of “hearts and minds”.

In a 2007 article in Forsvarets Forum (NAF’s independent magazine) Captain Ola Bøe-Hansen provides examples of how Norwegian troops have contributed to PSYOPS in Afghanistan. The troops have, inter alia, been involved in the ISAF-produced newspaper Sada-e Azadi (“Voice of Freedom”) and a radio station with the same name (Bøe-Hansen 2007). The newspaper is the largest in Afghanistan, and the radio station broadcasts 24 hours a day. In a separate study, Ottosen (2013) concluded that Sada-e Azadi contained propaganda for NATO and could not be regarded as a professional journalistic product.

The intent behind the PSYOPS messages is seldom announced. The whole point is that it should be difficult to separate messages from normal journalistic media from those from PSYOPS media. The role of media in PSYOPS is simply a technical device, as explained in NATO’s PSYOPS doctrine:
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Media for PSYOPS use are the approved means, technical or non-technical, which establish any kind of communication with a target audience. They can be used to supplement or replace direct interpersonal communication in cases where the audience is inaccessible, unreceptive or simply too large to be approached exclusively by interpersonal methods (NATO 2007: 65).

The doctrine also outlines the benefits of using radio broadcasting in PSYOPS. It describes radio stations as “exceptionally well suited to the dissemination of PSYOPS products”. Among the benefits are its range, timeliness and “speed that is rivalled only by TV.” (NATO 2007: 72)

The existence of PSYOPS and other war propaganda strategies in warfare makes it urgent to develop a journalistic counter strategy because otherwise media will take part in the propaganda campaigns rather than enlighten the public.

The challenges

This book gives us the opportunity to discuss whether war journalism has the capacity to meet these challenges – challenges regarding the dramatic changes in the international political situation, the media-technological development, and the new ways of warfare – that have emerged during the last two decades. In the Gulf War of 1990-91 a UN alliance of countries joined forces to stop the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. This alliance included both Western powers and forces from Muslim countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the UN Security Council retrospectively legitimized the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. But in this war hardly any Muslim countries took active part in the fighting against the Taliban. The exception was Turkey, which had about 1,300 soldiers stationed in the country in 2012. It is true that some Muslim countries (for example, Pakistan) agreed to bases and to transportation on their territories. But, strikingly enough, neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia has engaged in the war. In the Iraq War of 2003, pursued by the US and the UK together with the so-called “alliance of the willing” led by the US president George W Bush and the UK prime minister Tony Blair after unfounded accusations against Iraq of concealed weapons of mass destruction in violation of the UN embargo, no Muslim country participated with troops. Turkey, after a parliamentary decision, even refused to make air bases available to its NATO allies the US and the UK (Hammond 2004). In light of these facts it can be concluded that the “war on terror” which Bush proclaimed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has created major tensions between the West and significant parts of the Muslim world.

For the leading Western powers, increasing media competition and pluralism has resulted in a war conduct that gradually is becoming what Martin Shaw (2005) has called “risk-transfer wars”: warfare designed to force all risks – physi-
cal, economic, and political – on the opponent. Own losses are minimized through the use of air and naval forces that attack the enemy from a distance without much risk to their own soldiers. However, risk transfer is also about the propaganda war and avoiding negative publicity about the human costs – hence the attempts to restrict media coverage; for example the censuring of photo opportunities at the Dover airforce base where the body bags of fallen soldiers are being transported back to the US. It also implies that political and military leaders are trying to downplay and minimize media coverage of civilian suffering and deaths (so-called collateral damage) as a consequence of own forces’ activities. This is the rationale behind commandeering the satellite photos from Afghanistan, as well as the attempts to prevent media reports from the combat zone. The effect on public opinion of WikiLeaks’ exposure of a US helicopter shelling civilians in Baghdad in 2003 is evident, precisely because of the assurances in America’s war propaganda that its conduct in war is guided by all possible humanitarian considerations. And part of the reason that war correspondents’ work has become increasingly dangerous over the past two decades lies in the new forms of Western warfare. In Chapter 3, “Targeting journalists and media in the new world order”, we elaborate on the increased risks for journalists reporting from war zones and further discuss the alarming figures of dead and missing war correspondents – possibly the tip of the iceberg – that conceal an alarming tendency to play down respect for the Geneva Convention and international law in general that is also exposed by Western democratic countries in their war conduct.

The UN system and the status of international law seems to be increasingly questioned, notably in the war on terror and the West’s new warfare. But the Arab Spring and the wave of liberation from dictatorships and oppression that engulfed the Middle East from Tunisia to Syria seems to put the entire international system for dealing with threats to peace and security into question. While the new world order after the Cold War could have initiated a renewal and advancement of the UN’s role for norms development and conflict resolution in the international arena, there are indications to the contrary. This means major challenges to journalism, and handling them makes necessary a review of the requirements that should be expected from the professional journalists.

One of the major challenges is how professional journalism should approach the superpower US’s foreign and security policy. It has consistently, at least after the Cold War, ruthlessly pushed through what Washington regards as America’s political and economic interests, regardless of whether the policy is supported by the international community and the UN. Time after time, the superpower has, by virtue of its powers (especially its military and economic strengths), violated the principles of other countries’ national sovereignty and the prohibition against unilateral preventive and regime-changing wars.
The superpower’s politics and the new Western warfare contain a number of more specific challenges for a journalism that strives to provide the general public with enough information to be able to take a view on how the laws of war are applied, or not applied. The insertion of special operations forces on other countries’ territories in secret, and without legal permission, occurred during the wars in Afghanistan, Libya, and most recently in Syria, according to reliable sources. The killing (that is, extrajudicial execution) of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan is the most familiar example, but similar operations have occurred both earlier and later in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in Yemen and Gaza (Zenko 2013).

The increasingly widespread use of so-called drones (that is, unmanned armed light aircraft) to attack targets deep inside foreign territory or behind the front lines, is primarily a US game that means that Western warfare moves quickly into prohibited terrain according to international law. But journalists seem to lack the competence and interest to highlight the legal and political aspects of this warfare; only the technical and sciencefiction aspects of this way of war by remote control seem to attract media attention. By implication, we can conclude that “risk-transfer-wars” (as a label for the leading Western countries’ way of pursuing war) have never been more successful than as drone attacks.

We believe that the responsibility of media and journalists for the democratic deficit – that the general public is kept in ignorance about the forms and civilian casualties of the so-called humanitarian interventions – has to be discussed, and in particular the journalistic shortcomings in scrutinizing the international legal issues of how the Western democracies’ participation in the war against terrorism came about, and the consequences thereof.

There is hardly any doubt that the continued lack of principles in the foreign and security policy area will foment hostility, retaliation and the increased attractiveness, in many parts of the world, of terrorism. The civilian casualties are increasing as this illegal warfare is spreading, and the official humanitarian motivations for the Western ways of war will increasingly be regarded hypocritical, dishonest, and misleading. We further maintain that as citizens of Norway and Sweden we have every reason to ask ourselves whether journalistic shortcomings in this area is an important reason why our two countries, together with Denmark, have distinguished themselves in the recent wars of Afghanistan and Libya by eagerly contributing military flight operations and army troops under NATO command. This policy is in sharp contrast to the Scandinavian peace-making tradition and the moral self-understanding of being humanitarian superpowers that have previously characterized the Scandinavian countries’ behavior in the international arena. In previous studies we have warned for a kind war journalism that looks more like arms dealers’ advertisements and action movies than critical examinations of our countries’ foreign and security policy statements and their implementation (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2012). Will
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this war drum-journalism get the upper hand in our countries’ participation in the NATO-led military operations for regime change? Or will the professional ambition of depicting the “real face of war” resist the war propaganda and, instead, lead to war crimes and violations of human rights being reported to public, even when the abuses are carried out in the name of democratic ideals and in ways typical of the new Western warfare?

We contend that these questions about the content and forms of war journalism are matters of public concern, as conflict reporting can have lethal consequences. When the leading powers and politicians beat the war drums, uncritical journalism could be partially responsible for the deaths of young men and women in our armed forces, and for the killing of innocent civilians in the war-stricken places. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect is that these casualties are the result of a policy which is not supported by public opinion in our countries. Nor is this policy a national interest, because it was rarely debated publicly or put to test in a general election. This is the central professional ethical issue in war journalism, one with which we deal more specifically in several of the chapters, including “Brothers in Arms and Peace?” (Chapter 4).

Since we believe in a more ethically responsible war journalism that stand up for the democratic demands on the powerful and their politics, we discuss in the concluding chapter how this could be accomplished. Is the internal professional self-critique sufficient or are complementary measures needed? It is definitely urgent to strengthen, in all possible ways, profession/ethical monitoring and accountability as important instruments elevating quality and professionalism, but it is naive to believe that this is enough. Both the internal and external media-critical debates are characterized by a lack of continuity and an obsession with individual shortcomings. Other – external – democratic stakeholders must be involved in order to make lasting improvements, and it is obviously essential that journalism’s integrity and independence is protected from government interference and censorship.

One way forward might be for journalism education to make greater efforts to investigate, identify, and critically discuss the war journalism practices, and thus provide a better basis for discussion of professional ideals, ethical guidelines, and their implementation. There is a lot that can be done, and in the concluding chapter we present some proposals. We also take up some other ideas of how the professional quality of war journalism could be improved: for instance, peace journalism and human rights journalism as alternatives to the mainstream journalism that so many analysts find so inadequate. But above all we believe that courses in international law and human rights must be a central part of journalism education programmes and training courses, combined with more researched-based literature than is generally the case. It is by the application of knowledge and learning, not through censorship and external control, that a democratic and sound development of conflict journalism can be ensured.
Notes
3. This section is based on a EU application to the call FP7-SSH-2013-2 with Rune Ottosen as coordinator.
Chapter 2

Targeting Journalists and Media in the New World Order

In November 2001, and again in April 2003, the US Air Force bombed Al Jazeera’s offices in Kabul and in Baghdad. This was not the first time that the media was chosen as a military target – Serbian television was bombed during the 1999 war against the former Yugoslavia.

What these incidents had in common was that they occurred in so-called “pre-emptive wars” lacking a UN mandate. As civilian targets, media outlets should have been protected by the Geneva Convention. Although there have been independent investigations of the incidents by the Committee to Protect Journalists and the IFJ, and there are no doubts about who was responsible, the attacks seemed to yield no legal or political consequences (Ottosen 2007). This chapter will discuss the moral and legal basis for the attacks. Our thesis is that the concept of “humanitarian intervention” was a cornerstone of the pro-humanitarian propaganda in 1999 and 2003. The idea of justifying pre-emptive attacks with humanitarian rhetoric can be traced back to a policy document from the Carnegie Endowment at the beginning of the 1990s in which are found influential contributors such as the former secretary of state Madeleine Albright. Many of the arguments used to justify the Bush doctrine (see the Introduction to this volume) can be traced back to this document (Gowan 2001: 39). This chapter will analyze the paradox of the Western media which, while frequently expressing concern for “freedom of expression”, has not protested more strongly against such attacks on journalists.

The United States and the Geneva Conventions

The legal arguments in this chapter will, in the main, relate to the Geneva Conventions which came to the fore in international law with the establishment of the normative legacy of the Nuremberg Trials which established the principles that legalism and technicalities could not be a substitute for individual and
moral choices and conscience. After World War II, the United States publicly defended these principles, including the humane treatment of all categories of prisoner taken in almost all manner of international conflicts. The US was not only a signatory but also the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, as the original signed copies reside in a vault in the State Department (Mayer 2008: 8). There are, however, many examples of the difference between speech and reality as a result of the numerous US-led interventions in other countries (Chomsky 2004). After being found guilty in a case concerning the use of military force against Nicaragua in 1986, Washington withdrew its approval of the International Court of Justice (Eskeland 2003: 12). Even though the first of our case studies, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, occurred during the Clinton administration, there is no doubt that respect for international law fell dramatically during the presidency of George W Bush. The lack of respect for the Conventions and international law was openly admitted by Vice President Dick Cheney talking at Meet the Press on the first Sunday after 9/11 2001, when he frankly stated:

> We'll have to work sort of the dark side, if you will … We've got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies – if we are going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in. And, uh, so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal basically, to achieve our objectives.

(Mayer 2008: 9-10)

The treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, the kidnapping of suspected terrorists and bringing them to other countries for torture, and other examples, are practices coming out of this rhetoric (Andersen 2006). One effect of this belief has been the torture and abuse of prisoners by US forces during the “war on terror”. Larry Siems examined over 140,000 government documents to prove that the level and amount of force is very much higher than has been acknowledged by US officials and the mainstream media (Siems 2011: 14-17). We argue that the bombing of media outlets should be included in this list of shame.

**Media and wars**

All parties in modern warfare acknowledge the media as essential in the battlefield for propaganda and as a battleground to “win hearts and minds.” (Allan & Zelizer 2004) Although the CNN effect as a phenomenon is debated and scholars argue about the extent to which the media has a direct or indirect effect on the decisions made by political and military leaders, nobody denies that
the global media is something that all parties in a military conflict have to deal with in one way or another (Thune 2009). The media themselves acknowledge their role as an arena of interest by the different parties, as this quote from the Washington Post indicates:

Almost by definition ... a war waged on live television is a war in which political and public relations considerations become inextricably bound up with military tactics and strategy ... how victory is won is almost as important as victory itself (Washington Post March 23, 2004).

The fact that media to an increasingly degree play an import role in warfare puts on the agenda several issues of ethical and legal interest. The NATO attack on the television building in Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo War, and the American attack on Al Jazeera in Kabul in 2001 and Baghdad in 2003 are examples of military interference in journalism which raises a lot of questions such as:

Were the media targeted because of the role they played in informing the global public about the warfare, including potential "collateral damage" such as civilian casualties?

If they were targeted because of their journalistic activity what was the rationale behind the decisions?

What legal consequences could such acts have?

What will be the long-term effect for journalism, if journalists and media are to be considered as legitimate targets in modern warfare?

The impact of the visual

The importance of visual images is essential in modern warfare; thus the breakthrough of CNN during the Gulf War in 1991, with a de facto monopoly of 24/7 broadcasting to a global audience, became a historical milestone (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001). The combination of effective management of the media and journalists through the International Press Center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the new global television technology, is the background to George Gerbner’s statement that: “The boiling point is reached when the power to create a crisis merges with the power to direct the movie about it.” (Gerbner 1992: 244)

Jörg Becker has underlined the importance of iconic images in the collective memories of wars:

Thus the perception of wars (comparable only to top class sport competitions), especially of individual battles or victories, is almost always linked with a single image. An icon. This applies to D-Day in the Second World
NEW WARS, NEW MEDIA AND NEW WAR JOURNALISM

We will argue that it is no coincidence that the three cases we will use in this study involve separate attacks on television facilities.

**Theoretical reasoning for the hypothesis that the US military forces attack journalists**

The series of incidents discussed above have been interpreted as intentional crimes and violations of the Geneva Convention committed by US military forces. But we have also seen that clear and direct evidence is not easy to get.

The research studies, reports, and investigations that are available confirm in many ways the difficulty of substantiating beyond doubt that such crimes have been committed. We recognize this as characteristic and typical for suspicious cases of dual state activities in which one must search for alternative strategies for analysis, and we attempt to make deductive conclusions starting from a theoretical and contextual analysis of warfare in the “the new world order”. In the following paragraphs we will address four relevant points: the development of mediated war reporting; the importance of visual representations in the new wars; the increased attention to civilian casualties (the “body count”); and professional strategies of integrity within the journalist profession. Exploring these aspects will make it possible to argue that US military forces have developed a strategy of – in some special instances – shooting at journalists.

**The development of mediated war reporting and the new Western way of warfare**

It is generally acknowledged today that media are strategically important in modern wars. Besides warfare on the ground, at sea, and in the air, the media have become a battlefield (Ottosen 2009). This is partly explained by the dramatic development of the media sector, where ever more media, journalists, and information providers compete for people’s attention and opinions.

In Martin Shaw’s study, *The New Western Way of Warfare* (2005) he describes the changes as a “risk-transfer” kind of warfare. According to Shaw, modern wars are conducted under constant surveillance by international organizations, legal institutions, media, and civil society. From this it follows that not only
do wars actualize physical risks but also, increasingly, political risks. Military superiority is the traditional strategy to transfer the risks to the enemy forces. The new wars, however, are pursued in ways that, in addition, are aimed at placing the political risks at the opposite side of the conflict. This is evident for example when the UN Alliance in the Gulf War 1990-1991, NATO in the Kosovo conflict 1999 or the US Alliance in Iraq 2003 tried, at almost at any price, to avoid their own military losses, choosing, for instance, air operations at high altitude which exposed the civil population to considerable risks due to reduced precision (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001, 2004, 2005). But this method of warfare was adequate for the main aim: avoiding the political risks connected to rising numbers of casualties among American military personnel.

This kind of warfare, however, created legitimacy risks – at least indirectly – because it led to increasing numbers of civilian casualties. Although Shaw (2005: 83) is not entirely clear about the consequences of the casualty statistics (on the one hand he mentions the twentieth century trend of “overwhelmingly civilian casualties” but on the other hand he also speculates about whether this trend might be reversed) he is very explicit when it comes to the massacres of civilians as a “completely predictable consequence of … the protection of Western military personnel.” (op. cit.: 86) And he further emphasizes how important it is in the new wars for Western politicians to avoid public attention to “suffering and deaths” among civilians as directly caused by Western military forces. This could be avoided partly by defining these deaths as collateral and not intentional, and partly by media manipulation and “spin” (op. cit.: 92 ff).

In an analysis of the “risk economy” of the Iraq War 2003, Shaw elaborates on the relative importance of casualty figures for the general outcome of this war – “its military and political success has been the most problematic of all new Western wars.” (op. cit.: 99) In a comparison between the “casualty rates” of the Gulf War 1990-1991 and the Iraq War of 2003, which Shaw refers to and regards as credible, his conclusion is that costs in human lives “were actually higher in 2003” (op.cit.: 109 and 122). As in the previous Gulf War in 1991, it was said by US and UK politicians and militaries that civilian casualties should be avoided at all costs by conducting warfare with high-precision “surgical” weapons. But mainly due to the goal of the invasion (to topple the Saddam Hussein regime) the ground operations were extensive which implied that reporters questioned the sanitized propaganda pictures: “It sounds surgical in theory. In practice, it still leaves a mess. Television pictures of weeping local residents suggested civilian casualties” (op. cit.: 110). Body-counting has been the “holy grail of casualty information” in the risk economy of new Western wars, according to Shaw, because it tends to be the crucial argument for critics of the military conflict strategy and its ideology: “By showing that the outcome of war is more deaths than the ideology of “precision weaponry” allows, body-counting can enter a countervailing entry in the bookkeeping of
armed conflict.” (op cit.: 119) This has happened very much because of the development of new media and particularly the Internet, which has opened up for “virtually real-time analysis” of casualties. This is why Shaw calls the wars from the Kosovo conflict and onwards “Internet wars”. However, some of the online sites for reports about the consequences of the warfare for human beings, not least civilians, are probably exaggerating the figures, and Shaw relies on Carl Conetta’s analysis as a more sophisticated and conservative estimate. But even his assessments – although with lower casualty numbers – lead to the conclusion that “the portion of war fatalities that were civilian noncombatants may have been twice as great” in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) than in the Desert Storm (1990-1991) (Conetta 2003).

Now, it is not completely decisive for the risk economy of wars (to continue with Shaw’s terminology) whether the civilian casualty rate is higher or lower from one war to another. Shaw emphasizes that the major factor for failure or success for the war policy is how it affects the risk calculation for an intervening nation’s own troops, personnel and citizens. The Iraq War became such a debacle for the US and UK leaders because of the combined effects of a rationale for the intervention that was later revealed as flawed (the non-existent weapons of mass destruction) and the counter-productive consequences of the occupation for the terrorist threat, which increased rather than decreased after the war, together with the promise of a surgical war that was not at all the outcome “on the ground.” Shaw contends that more important for the media agenda and the evaporating credibility of the Iraq War policy were the specific incidents of harm caused by the Fallujah assault and the Abu Ghraib pictures of torture of Iraqi prisoners – both incidents breaking out in the media immediately after the most deadly month on record for US soldiers in Iraq (April 2004). Shaw (2005: 124) concludes that “it was cruelty rather than killing that in the end defined, in global media and politics, the violence of the occupation towards Iraqis”.

Mediatization of modern warfare

Even though Shaw emphasizes globalization within the media sector and that media monitoring today is not restricted by the issue of national borders that drives the need for the transfer of the political risks, he does not elaborate on how the media – through manipulation, staged events, and spectacles – has itself become part of the new warfare. This is, however, central for Simon Cottele’s analysis of “mediatization” in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States as well as in the subsequent “global war on terror”. The attacks on the United States which would not have had any purpose whatsoever unless they attracted the media’s attention. To be completely clear: the
special media-related conditions of threat-society (Nohrstedt 2011: 17-51) have never been more evident than in the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With very modest manpower, economic, and technical resources, the terrorists managed to direct an onslaught which in terms of “mediatization” was generally targeted to get worldwide saturation and devastating global consequences. And, as always, when terror is involved the aim is to disseminate fear. But the “war on terror” is also pursued with the same media-related preconditions, and the Bush administration’s new warfare in many ways used the media as a centerpiece. Examples are legion: Colin Powell’s accusations against Iraq in the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 with all kinds of visual and audio communication techniques; the missile attacks on Baghdad (with the purpose of causing “shock and awe”) that started the war; the “rescue” operation to save Jessica Lynch; the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad; the embedded war reporters; and President Bush’s “mission accomplished” speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln are all eminent examples of warfare in which the media are deeply involved. These spectacular events would not have happened without the media’s presence – or at least not in the same way – because the combat role of the media is far more important than its function as conveyor or mediator of news.

Embedded within these media spectaculars are political-identity components that consequently polarize the conflict between a “we” and a “them”. Whereas the implicit “we” strive toward truth and justice and that weapons of mass destruction should not be in the possession of dictators, and the bombardment that “we” conduct aims at minimizing the number of innocent victims and to shortening the war and “our” soldiers never leave a comrade behind, “they”, on the other hand, are marked by false promises, lies, injustice, the absence of the will to resist tyranny, and a power based upon coercion instead of democratic consent.

In the case of President Bush’s landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln and the speech to the troops on board, the spectacle reached an all-time high with a scenography that clearly and intentionally aimed at establishing references to the president’s role in the movie “Independence Day”, in which the “virtual” president mobilizes the peoples of the world against the inter-planetary invaders. In this media-event the military-entertainment complex detailed by Robin Andersen in her analysis of media and war in the twentieth century becomes so obvious that it is almost a parody: “It was the choreographed final sequence of a narrative of invasion that turned battle into entertainment in real time, and took the representation of war to a new level – one of stagecraft on a grand scale.” (Andersen 2006: 227, cf. Mral 2004: 60 ff.)

Some elements of the visualized mediatization may inspire, at least in retrospect, laughter rather than fear and terror. But there is a problem here for the journalist profession that needs to be highlighted: that visual reporting in
news media might suffer from less reflexivity than textual reporting. In a study of how the Swedish news media reported Colin Powell’s presentation of the accusations against Iraq before the Security Council in February 2003, Nohrstedt concludes that although the three studied newspapers – Aftonbladet, Expressen and Dagens Nyheter – treated the US accusations critically in their written stories, in their visual material the representations assumed that Powell’s charges were accurate. For example, graphic illustrations showed through maps that Iraqi missiles equipped with chemical warheads could reach the neighboring countries, and Swedes living in or visiting those countries reported that they were terrified of the prospect of being targeted by such weapons of mass destruction (Nohrstedt 2005). Other studies of the media coverage of the Iraq War indicate that in the African media, for instance, footage seems to be dealt with less critically in the newsrooms than text, and visual war propaganda is therefore probably more efficient than textual (Mucunguzi 2005; Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005). This can of course work either way – if the media were more receptive to the visual US propaganda than to the textual representations, in other instances (the cases of Falluja and Abu Ghraib mentioned by Shaw, for example) anti-war propaganda might have a major impact on the legitimacy and success of the war policy. Because of this, visual reports from the battlefield, and in particular of the effects on civilians of the warfare, tend to be extremely contested and controversial. Here we are approaching the key component of our analysis and deductive explanation as to why it has become increasingly dangerous for journalists to report from the theatres of war in the new world order. But before we sum up the argument we will address two other themes: whether war journalism focuses more on civilian casualties in the most recent wars than previously; and how (if at all) journalists as professionals try to avoid becoming a propaganda tool for the opposing parties in modern wars.

The inter-discursive relations between war propaganda and the discourse of compassion

War propaganda is well-known for its polarized discourse when it comes to how the main actors, motives, warfare and truths are treated: the “enemy” is painted in black while the “own” side is white. This pattern has been empirically and historically verified again and again from ancient to modern wars. Not least, war propaganda has used images – written and visual – to depict innocent victims and civilian casualties in a polarized way. There are, to borrow the classical distinction from Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), “worthy” and “unworthy” victims, meaning that the innocent civilians killed by the enemy are “worthy” of all attention and empathy whereas the innocent civilians that are killed by our own forces are “unworthy” in the sense that they
should preferably not be exposed and discussed in public too much. Only the enemy is guilty of intentionally bombing the civilian population – in order to weaken resistance to its authoritarian will.

The media coverage of the Gulf War, with its images of surgical warfare and “smart bombs”, was probably quite extreme as a mediated war propaganda discourse in the Western countries; there are plenty of media studies confirming this and there is no need to repeat their findings here (e.g. Bennett & Paletz 1994). In one of our own studies, news editors of leading Swedish media, interviewed before Desert Storm started in January 1991, were asked what they regarded as specially important to achieve in their reporting of the coming war. Several responded that their priority was to describe the “true face” or the “real face” of the war (Nohrstedt 1992). This was important since it was expected that the opposing parties would try to conceal how the civilians suffered during the military confrontations (Nohrstedt 2009). When some of the interviewees were contacted again after the war, and asked whether they thought that their coverage had been successful in reporting the “true face”, they admitted that they had failed – and, furthermore, they expected this to be repeated in the future.

From the 1980s onwards, the media reporting of distant suffering from disease, famine, genocide, and so on, has grown and been heavily exposed in television coverage of aid concerts and other celebrity media events. It seems that a discourse of compassion has reached general audiences and triggered engagement for the innocent victims even at great distances and all over the world. Some theorists have taken that as an indication of globalization or of the cosmopolitanization of empathy and concern for fellow human beings (Beck 2006). Without elaborating on this topic in detail, we contend that this mediated discourse of compassion has a bearing on how victims are reported in war journalism. A study of media reporting from the Kosovo conflict in 1999 showed that the NATO propaganda plan to once again televisually re-present a surgical war failed because journalists and media, approximately two weeks into the bombing justified as an effort to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian troops and paramilitaries, shifted from the one-sided coverage of the Kosovo-Albanian refugees as the “worthy” victims and widened the scope to include the Serbian civilian casualties. Hence there was no repetition of the clinical war images from the Gulf War of 1990-1991 reported in the studies of British, Norwegian, and Swedish media (Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States initiated what in modern times must be the most emphatic and compassionate reporting in Western media. Never have the victims been exposed to such a degree. And never have the media on another continent identified so strongly with the shocked and mourning relatives and their compatriots. “Today we are all American”, as the headlines announced in the leading European press, in an unprecedented expression of
extensive and deeply felt sorrow with the “worthy” American victims.

When the Bush administration initiated the “global war on terror” shortly after 9/11 the prime target and battlefield was Afghanistan. This led to new reports about civilians being killed. Although the war leaders made attempts to control photographs of dead women and children, international media disseminated footage that showed the “true face” of the war. Nothing, however, was equal to the images from the jet-powered onslaught on the World Trade Center buildings and the panic-stricken crowds rushing through Manhattan streets. Al Jazeera, as the single television channel allowed to work inside Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, was the major supplier of visual representations of the Afghanistan War (this is definitely one important aspect of the US attack on the channel’s office in Kabul). That Al Jazeera had become a main player on the international television market also had consequences for the subsequent phase of the “global war on terror” and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

When it comes to the coverage of civilian casualties, studies have shown that there is a trend – from the Gulf War 1990-1991 till the Iraq War 2003 – of increased media attention to the “true face”. The available statistics do not indicate a very dramatic change, but nevertheless there is this gradual development in war journalism, from a couple of percentage points of the total news material in the studied Swedish media in the Gulf War to between 5 and 6 per cent in the Iraq War (Nohrstedt 2009: 91). The propaganda war about who are the “worthy” victims had intensified, probably because Arab media such as Al Jazeera had begun to compete with CNN and BBC World. But there might also be another explanation: that the journalistic task of revealing the “true face” of the wars had become a professional strategy, at least in the Swedish news media. It seems that the news editors interviewed in January 1991 indicated that it was an important aim but also a strategy for escaping the propaganda trap. By focusing on the civilians’ fate in wars it would be possible to avoid the sanitized images and pictures that the US press officers were so eager to share with the media personnel gathered in the press center at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during the Gulf War.

The dual state and security policy

The (un)legal basis for the attack on former Yugoslavia

NATO decided unilaterally to attack the former Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. The UN Security Council did not authorize it. The political rationale given was that there was a humanitarian crisis going on with thousands of Kosovars in danger of being killed or ethnically cleansed if the international community did not intervene militarily against the Milošević regime. There is some dispute over the seriousness of that situation (Chomsky 1999), but even if the Kosovo
Albanians *were* driven out in large numbers, that is not an acceptable explanation for an intervention not in accordance with international law. The UN Security Council passed a non-binding resolution formulated so as to avoid a veto from Russia and China denouncing the actions on the ground as violations of the UN Charter and calling on Serbia to cease the fighting. One could argue like Michael Ignatieff who, in his book *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*, asserted that the United States had a responsibility to create a “humanitarian empire” through nation-building and, if necessary, military force. We strongly disagree with this position but it is an argument that you can relate to and meet with counter-arguments. NATO, instead, went down the road of “new speak” and “retroactivity”, adopting (or “interpreting”) the language, purpose and meaning of the non-binding resolution as a *de facto* authorization for international action to prevent a local breach of the UN Charter. We think it is highly unlikely that this move by NATO can be said to have a legal basis. And who, in the first place, had given NATO the mandate to start the bombing as a form of “executive decision”?

The lawyer Vidar Helgesen, the former state secretary in the Norwegian foreign ministry and minister for European Affairs in the conservative government after the election in 2013, wrote an unusually solid legal analysis of the basis in international law for the attack. He concluded:

> … such a basis does not exist either in the UN Charter or in customary international law. There is no basis for saying that the intervention has created the basis for new international law. (Helgesen 1999: 43) [author’s translation]

The Norwegian decision to join NATO’s war against Yugoslavia was taken in a closed session in the Stortinget (the Norwegian parliament) without written communication between the Cabinet and the Stortinget (Ottosen 2001). In his memoirs, the Norwegian prime minister at the time, Kjell Magne Bondevik, refers to the closed meeting in the Stortinget where he recommended the use of force even without explicit authorization from the UN. He refers to UN Resolution 1199 and a report from the UN secretary general expressing concern for the civilian population. Based on an evaluation of the humanitarian situation the Stortinget accepted this argument and, to Bondevik’s surprise, a unified Storting including the Socialist Left Party (SV) supported the decision (Bondevik 431-432). There is no doubt that Milošević was responsible for human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing and would have deserved a conviction in his trial in The Hague if he had not died before the trial ended (Nilsen 2007). Even if one accepts that the humanitarian situation on the ground in Kosovo created a dilemma about the use of force (Pharo 2000), it is obviously the role of the media to debate such dilemmas, including the legal basis for an intervention, but the media in Sweden and in Norway both failed to create a public discourse about these important concerns (Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002).
One issue the media might have addressed could have been the legal consequence of Norway’s taking part in a potentially illegal war. Norway could potentially have been prosecuted for its military support for the illegal bombing – but this was not an issue in the political discourse of Norwegian politicians (Eskeland 2003). On the contrary, Prime Minister Bondevik, publicly defending Norway’s participation, insisted that the operation was a “humanitarian intervention” and not a war. Many years later he admitted that he was wrong not to admit it was a war when NATO bombed the former Yugoslavia in 1999 (Ottosen 2009: 28), but to this day he maintains that the bombing could be justified on humanitarian grounds (Kahrs 2012).

We will come back to the implications of the use of humanitarian rhetoric to justify *de facto* violations of international law. To place this in a Scandinavian context we will emphasize that to misinform the public, as part of a covert agenda, is not a new phenomenon, as the following example from the Cold War in Sweden indicates.

*Sweden and the Catalina story*

Journalists and media have particular difficulties when dealing with activities that can be characterized as dual state or deep politics. In Norway and Sweden both the Cold War and the wars after 1989 are examples. The so-called Catalina story is a case from the era of politically frozen relations between the Western countries and the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1950s; relations that also involved an officially nonaligned country such as Sweden in the shadows of secret intelligence operations for the West. Officially, Sweden had stated after 1945 that it would continue its traditional foreign and security policy with its roots in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars – and would stay outside of military alliances. It was believed to be a position that would contribute to stability in the Nordic region and would avoid Soviet hostility and aggression. Strong national military defense forces should guarantee that Sweden was self-reliant and capable of protecting its territory without foreign assistance, which, for example, motivated investments in a national industry for the production of military aircraft and one of the strongest air forces in the world outside those of the major powers.

In reality, the military links to the Western countries and the NATO alliance were many and important, although hidden from the general public and most members of parliament. The so-called Catalina case in 1952 was an event that threatened to draw open the curtain and reveal the secret co-operation between the Swedish military and the NATO countries. It was actually not one event, but two linked events, which were about two airplanes that had been lost over the Baltic Sea. What was reported in the news was that a DC-3 aircraft had disappeared without any explanation. A Catalina rescue plane that was sent
out to search for the lost DC-3 was itself shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft and the crew was killed. Many years later it was revealed that the DC-3 was spying for the United States and that it was shot down over Soviet sea territory.

One well-known and successful reporter, Massi Svensson, at the leading quality newspaper in Sweden, *Dagens Nyheter*, had a remarkable chance of a world scoop when the widow of one of the DC-3 crew gave him her husband’s personal diary in which he explicitly wrote about the secret spy operations and that the plane had been shot at by the Soviet forces before. But the journalist kept the diary, without publishing anything about it, for 20 years, when he told the story in his memoirs. It is clear from his recollections that he never thought of releasing this news because it could have damaged Swedish national interests (Svensson 1972, quoted in Guillou 2009). The secret dual state activities of the United States led to the involvement of Swedish authorities, to the deception of the Swedish public, and eventually to self-censorship by a leading journalist. In the concluding section we will come back to the principal issues for journalism in relation to this type of activity.

Case studies and empirical findings

**Case 1: Bombing of Serbian television in 1999**

On April 23, 1999, NATO planes bombed Radio-Televizija Srbije in Belgrade as part of the air war over Kosovo (Chomsky 1999). Sixteen media-related workers were killed and 16 others were wounded. That the station was a legitimate target was officially acknowledged by NATO spokesmen at a press conference at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on the day the bombing took place. Colonel Konrad Freytag, who spoke at the press conference, used the propagandistic nature of Serbian television as a justification (Gierhart 2008:10). It was later admitted by personnel organizing NATO’s information strategy that they used two different justifications for the bombing and that this was a tactical error. One justification was linked to the accusation of the alleged presence of military facilities in the television building and the other was the propagandistic nature of Serbian television (Gasser 2003).

Yugoslavia filed a lawsuit at the UN international tribunal in the International Court of Justice against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK, claiming that the attack on Yugoslavia was illegal, but the case was dismissed (Eskeland 2003: 12). According to Cindy Gierhart the only way the bombing of Radio-Televizija Srbija could have a legal basis would be if it could be justified under Article 79(2) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which gives journalists protection as civilians “provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.” (Gierhart 2008: 6) This means that if journalists, apart from being employees
of the belligerent state, had no part in hostilities; then they should be afforded protection by the Geneva Conventions as civilians. An opposite example was the case of three media workers who were brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. One of them, Ferdinand Nahimana, was found guilty of inciting genocide for broadcasting on Radio Rwanda the contents of a fake document that led to the killing of hundreds of Tutsi civilians. Nahimana’s case is extraordinary since he is also an academic holding a Doctorate in History and the author of many books. He was, however, a founder of the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and was convicted for not having done anything to stop the inflammatory broadcasts of the RTLM after April 6, 1994, as according to the judgment he had operational control over the personnel of the radio station. The trial received attention since it was the first time since the Nuremberg Trials that “hate speech” had been prosecuted as a war crime. On December 3, 2003 Nahimana was sentenced to life imprisonment (reduced to 30 years after appeal) for the crimes of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement directly and publicly to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity. In his defense, Nahimana claimed that he had no formal responsibility at the station when the massacre started. According to his French lawyer Jean-Marie Biju-Duval, the conviction marked the end of a “certain right of evidence” before international justice. “There was the idea that there was a right of evidence inherited from common law … the protection barriers have been removed one after another,” said Biju Duval (World News 2004). We will not go into the issue of whether the evidence against Nahimana was good enough for a sentence of 30 years in prison; we would rather see the discussion in light of the bombing of Radio-Televizija Srbije in 1999.

The sentence against Nahimana was welcomed by human rights activists all over the world. Even though the ruling can be said to legitimize the right to intervene in the “free flow of information”, the organization Reporters Without Borders welcomed it since stopping the massacre in Rwanda in the short term was more important than protecting the freedom of expression of those responsible for the genocide in the long term. In a statement the following argument was used: “Even if no country is today in a situation comparable to Rwanda’s at the time of the genocide, these sentences should serve as a call to order to all the publications that constantly flout the most elementary rules of professional ethics and conduct.” (Reporters Without Borders 2003) Could the same arguments have been used to bomb Radio-Televizija Srbije? In our view it could not.

Since the 16 media workers killed in the Radio-Televizija Srbije building had no known involvement in any hostilities and were not accused by anybody of taking up arms or of any other hostilities, they should have enjoyed protection as civilians. They had done nothing other than show up for work. The final report of the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that: “NATO intentionally bombed the Radio and TV station and the persons killed or injured were civilians.” (Gierhart 2008: 12) There is no doubt that the Radio-Televizija Srbije broadcasts were highly propagandistic. But even though Milošević’s views on journalism are questionable, this is not regarded as an international crime and cannot, according to the Geneva Convention, be used to justify the use of military power. A historical precedent was set during the Nuremberg Trials: Hans Fritzsche was found not guilty even though he was head of the radio division at the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. The reason given was that he was not in a high enough position to formulate the propagandistic and antisemitic broadcast – he simply carried it out. The legal issue here is that propagandistic statements alone have historically not constituted criminal activity (op. cit.: 15). The question of whether the bombing violated the laws of war was under investigation at the prosecutor’s office of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. When the prosecutors decided not to bring charges against NATO countries for bombing the Radio-Televizija Srbije, it was because they believed that the underlying reason for the attack was military. A report prepared by staff lawyers and submitted to the ICTY prosecutor concluded that there may have been a violations of the laws of war during the Kosovo campaign, but that no incident gave sufficient evidence for opening a criminal investigation. Gierhart, who has analyzed the legal aspects of the bombing, holds that this decision cannot be legally justified:

While this author agrees that military command and control center are legitimate military objectives, it does not seem the committee’s report went far enough to prove that [Radio-Televizija Srbije] served as a command and control center for Milošević. The report proved that NATO believed, or at least claimed, that it targeted [Radio-Televizija Srbije] for this reason. But the report did not prove that RTS really served that function. While this author cannot prove that RTS did not serve as part of the command, control, and communications centre for Yugoslavia, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that it did serve that purpose. And here we must remind that, when “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes … is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not be so used (Article 52(3) of Protocol 1).” (Gierhart 2008: 16)

If one accepts Gierhart’s legal arguments one possible conclusion is that NATO countries were not brought to court because it could be problematic to justify the whole bombing as a “humanitarian intervention”, which was the core argument in NATO’s propaganda for starting the illegal war in the first place (Eskeland 2003: 12).
Case 2: The bombing of Al Jazeera in Kabul 2001

Al Jazeera was established in Qatar in 1996 and represented an ideological alternative to Western channels by offering Arab perspectives on global events. It was established as an independent channel financed by the Qatari government through a $150 million loan. Although controversial for broadcasting detailed images of civilian casualties and dead American soldiers, it has established itself as a respected news organization. Not only did Al Jazeera provide a platform for the criticism of Western policy but, for the first time, Arab journalists publicly censored Arab governments and Arab regimes. As a result, governments from Morocco to Iraq closed down Al Jazeera offices and expelled reporters (Berenger 2006). Al Jazeera was the only news organization to remain in Kabul in 2001 after the Taliban expelled all other foreign reporters, and through this Kabul office – which was bombed twice during the Afghanistan invasion – it had access to Taliban leaders and Osama bin Laden. Al Jazeera was condemned by the US administration for giving voice to terrorist leaders, and even though attempts were made to put pressure on the government in Qatar, the Western monopoly over global news broadcasts was broken for ever (Figenschou 2004). Al Jazeera was attacked on November 13, the same day Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance. Al Jazeera reporters were out in the streets covering the city’s fall when their office was hit. “The office had been known by everybody, the American airplanes knew the location of the office,” said Al Jazeera’s managing director Mohammed Jamin al-Ali (Suskind 2006: 138).

The respected BBC reporter Nik Gowing conducted his own investigation and concluded that the Americans were responsible although he could not establish that the television station was deliberately targeted (Ottosen 2009). When Gowing interviewed a high-ranking US officer and asked whether, according to the Pentagon, the electronic signals were the reason for the attack, the officer answered that it was not the responsibility of the US military to determine whether the signals from a news office are regular news broadcasts or espionage or the like (Gowing 2003).

In his book *The One Percent Doctrine*, Ron Suskind analyzes the event and, based on conversations with high-ranking officials in the CIA and the White House, he concludes that “there was satisfaction that a message had been sent to Al Jazeera.” (Suskind 2006: 138) Evidently his sources clearly saw this as a deliberate attack.

Case 3: The bombing of Al Jazeera in Baghdad 2003

On April 8 during the invasion of Iraq, the Al Jazeera office in Baghdad was bombed and television journalist Tarek Ayyoub was killed. Abu Dhabi TV was hit almost at the same time. Abu Dhabi TV is based in the United Arab Emirates and is operated by the government. Before the Iraq War, Abu Dhabi
TV was an entertainment channel rather than a news channel, but it started to broadcast news around the clock when the war broke out. As Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV were the only two international media organizations with their own offices in Baghdad, Gierhart concludes that these attacks were most probably deliberate (Gierhart 2008). At that time, the head of Al Jazeera had offered the American government detailed information about the location of their office, and the leadership of Al Jazeera asked ironically whether by doing so they had offered the Pentagon the necessary information to put them out of business (Figenshou 2004). After an independent investigation, the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) found no evidence that the bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate hit, but nonetheless held the US government accountable since media companies should be protected as civilians under the Geneva Convention (Gierhart 2008). In a leaked memo, which appeared in the British newspaper the *Daily Mirror* in November 2005, Bush allegedly told Tony Blair that he wanted to bomb Al Jazeera’s headquarters in Qatar as well but, according to the leak, Blair talked him out of it. An indication that the story was based on fact came when a British Cabinet Office civil servant was charged under the UK Official Secrets Act for leaking the document. The former British home secretary, David Blunkett, wrote in his diary (later sold at auction) that Bush had urged Blair to bomb Al Jazeera headquarters. Blunkett obviously did not realize that targeting media in order to stop it from broadcasting is illegal (Gierhart 2008: 24). Although US officials have never admitted it, all indications point in the direction that Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV were targeted because they were broadcasting outside the control of the United States and the “coalition of the willing”.

**Case 4: Attacks on journalists**

We have now reviewed three cases in which four different television buildings were most likely to have been targeted by NATO and US forces for being just that – television facilities. If we go into the issue of attacks on individual journalists, the picture becomes even grimmer.

On April 8, 2003, the Palestine Hotel came under attack at the same time that the Abu Dhabi TV and Al Jazeera offices were bombed, and television journalist Tarek Ayyoub was killed when he was on the roof of the building, about to broadcast. On that day around a hundred other journalists in Baghdad were operating out of the Palestine Hotel as well, when a US tank opened fire. Reuters cameraman Taras Protsyuk and Spanish cameraman José Couso of Telecinco were killed. On the day before, an Al Jazeera staff member was stopped at a US Marines checkpoint. His car was shot at after he had been stopped and given his ID as a journalist. He was not hurt but his car was badly damaged. The Al Jazeera staff also read this as a message. Although the United
States admitted these episodes, the official story was that they were all accidental. An independent investigation for the CPJ concluded that the shelling might have been accidental, but that the military had the responsibility for the killings and that the attacks could have been avoided if information about the journalists staying there had been distributed to the ground forces (Committee to Protect Journalists 2003).

The statistics indicate that journalists might have been targets in recent wars. According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) more than 1,100 journalists and media employees were killed on duty between 1995 and 2007. Even though this chapter has concentrated on journalists killed by the United States/NATO, it must be underlined that in Iraq the vast majority of the journalists were killed by militants and insurgents. For the year 2004, statistics showed that 65 per cent of all killed journalists were killed by Iraqi militants or their foreign supporters and 95 per cent of the journalists killed were Iraqis (Ottosen 2007; see Conclusion for more recent data).

The number of journalists killed worldwide has risen 244 per cent between 2002 and 2007. Statistically, journalists were ten times more likely to be killed in Iraq than the 250,000 American and British soldiers deployed there. Iraq has been the most dangerous place to work as a journalist in recent years (Ottosen 2008). Of the 129 journalists who were killed in Iraq, only seven were embedded. On several occasions during the Iraq war, Pentagon officials alerted journalists who were not embedded about the risks of being outside the military protection in the embedded system. The signal was clearly that if you chose to be independent (“unilateral”) you had less protection (Balguy-Gallois 2004: 5).

The embedded journalists were protected physically by being in military units and, perhaps even more importantly, their presence was regarded as legitimate by the military. The question is whether non-embedded journalists and media facilities are in all practical terms regarded as illegitimate. And the concern is whether their independence from the United States/NATO is one of the reasons they lack protection. This has a legal and an ethical side to it.

**Deductive-theoretical conclusion**

*The legal issue of the protection of journalists*

The US has admitted bombing the Radio-Televizija Srbije station in Yugoslavia in 1999, but has not admitted purposefully targeting media in Afghanistan or Iraq (Hammond & Herman 2000). If the attacks have been deliberate they will have been violations of international humanitarian law. The most essential law in this respect is the Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions, which states that non-embedded journalists are civilian unless they jeopardize that status by taking part in hostilities. This article is in principle a solid legal
framework for protecting journalists against attacks but because the United States has never ratified Protocol 1 we must rely on the customary nature of the protocol (Gierhart 2008: 8). In formal legal terms this means that all states are bound by the protocol, whether they have signed it or not, if the rules are considered to be fundamental and/or widespread. To become customary international law two criteria must be fulfilled: (1) it must be present in state practice; and (2) there must be proof that states follow this rule because they believe it is the law (the legal term for this is *opinio iuris*).

In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross published a book containing all the rules of humanitarian law it considered to be customary. Article 79 regarding journalists was among the rules mentioned in the book. Even though United States has not ratified the protocol it has resigned itself to be bound by the same wording of Article 79 as reproduced in Security Resolution 1738 of December 23, 2006: “journalists, media professionals and associated personnel engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians and shall be respected and protected as such, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.” In legal terms this means that Article 79 of Protocol 1 binds the United States even though that country has never ratified it (Gierhart op. cit.: 9).

Finally, there is the ethical aspect of bombing television stations you dislike (Balguy-Gallois 2004: 11). Is it acceptable to send a military unit across the globe and bomb it merely because you disapprove of its content? Or, to put it more polemically, what would the reaction be if the Taliban decided to send a mission to Atlanta to blow up CNN because of its perceived anti-Muslim character?

Although it is not possible to draw any absolute conclusion in cases of dual state activities because of their intrinsically covert character, it is plausible to conclude that the sequence of military attacks from by US troops on media workers, from the Kosovo conflict in 1999 to the Kabul incident in 2001, and the simultaneous attacks on international media in Baghdad on April 8, 2003, are all elements in a media management strategy. The purpose, as Phillip Knightley has said, is to issue a serious warning:

> The Pentagon is determined that there will be no more reporting from the enemy side, and that a few deaths among correspondents who do so will deter others. To that end I believe that the occasional shots fired at “media sites” are not accidental and that war correspondents may now be targets, some more than others. (Knightley 2004: 104)

Available evidence does not support the alternative explanation that these are all collateral damage in violent and dramatic situations. The motives are there, documented by the explicit statements of members of the Bush administration such as Dick Cheney. From the US military and propaganda perspective it would
be rational to emphasize the risks and dangers for un-embedded journalists in visiting the theater of war. As a dual state strategy it is by definition something that would not be officially admitted, and hence the denials by the US side have no relevance for testing the hypothesis that we have discussed here. But what are the responses from the international community? Are there signs of the international legal institutions having drawn the same conclusion for which we have argued? We believe that Security Council Resolution 1738 protecting journalists indicates that the UN, as the highest body for the interpretation of customary law, has already concluded that it is plausible that the cases discussed here are examples of deliberate and strategic killing of journalists. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to issue the resolution.

The use of humanitarian rhetoric was part of the NATO propaganda to justify the war (Hammon & Herman 2000). Only years later, after he had left office, would Bondevik admit that Norway took part in a war (Ottosen 2009: 28). To have an open and frank debate over whether Norway was about to break international law before the attack took place was in the area of what Pierre Bourdieu classifies as doxa, the not mentionable (von der Lippe 1991: 145-67). In reality, all major decisions in military and security policy matters are decided according to Norway’s membership in NATO and the alliance with the US (Linneberg 2001). For Sweden, the policy to send troops to Afghanistan and the NATO/ISAF operation is apparently a new step since Sweden is formally a non-aligned country. In a dual state perspective, however, this is the controversial consequence of a clandestine pro-US policy that can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War. As in the Catalina case of 1952, the situation in Afghanistan illustrates the consequences – for officially non-aligned countries as well – of the dual state activities pursued by the US as the remaining superpower (Wilson 2012). The practice of targeting media outlets has created a dangerous precedent, repeated in Libya in 2011 where Norway took part in the bombing and Sweden was involved in support functions (see Chapter 7). Reporters Without Borders condemned NATO airstrikes on the Tripoli headquarters of the state-owned national TV broadcaster Al-Jamahiriya and two of its installations on 30 July in which three of its journalists were killed and 21 others were wounded. In a statement, NATO said that it carried out the air strikes in order to silence the regime’s “terror broadcasts” and put a stop to its “use of satellite television as a means to intimidate the Libyan people and incite acts of violence against them.” (Reporters Without Borders 2011) When NATO uses arguments like this, ignoring the principle that civilian targets should be protected by the Geneva Convention, it creates a dangerous precedent that can backfire on Norwegian and Swedish journalists in future conflicts.
Chapter 3

Peace Journalism as a Strategy in the Threat Society?

The “global war on terror” and environmental concerns such as global warming and climate change constitute part of what seems to be a historical change: from risk society to threat society, with a culture of fear that challenges journalism in more severe ways, perhaps, than ever before. Threat perception management has become a central element in general politics, and in identity politics in particular. Fear of events such as 9/11 makes it possible for governments to impose martial law and generates a public environment in which permanent fear has become the predominant state of mind (Nohrstedt 2010). In this situation, journalism must find new ways of mobilising public support for democratic and peace-promoting ideals (Pludowski 2007).

This chapter focuses on the consequences of these trends in late modernity for war and peace journalism. Risk is a central concept in the debate about the threat society. Stuart Allan, for instance, defines risk as: “The chance or possibility of danger (harm, loss, injury and so forth or other adverse consequences) actually happening.” (Allan 2002: 209) In a modern society it is difficult to imagine a public discourse on poverty and peace without discussing the role of the mass media. But mass media are also essential in framing and creating the general public’s understanding of global issues like terrorism and war (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2004).

The thesis of this chapter is that the “global war on terror” is not just another war, nor a new war, but something of a much more severe magnitude: a global conflict between dominant, rich centers of power in the world and dominated, poor marginalized peoples and cultures. In addition it is a conflict driven by and embedded in an emerging transnational culture of fear. At a discursive level this would imply a shift: from representations of risks in terms of probabilities, unforeseeable consequences and uncertainty to representations of threats in terms of certainty and predictable negative consequences in the near future (Höijer 2006: 2).
On the one hand, the culture of fear, with its imagined increase of threats and dangers, fosters a general need to know and understand the accuracy of these perceptions, and the conditions behind one’s own anxiety and worries. On the other hand, the capacity of news journalism to satisfy this growing need for reflexivity is probably less and less adequate for a number of reasons that have to do with crucial trends in late modernity. The mismatch between knowledge needs and current media trends can be outlined with regard to processes of globalisation, mediation of a culture of fear, changes of the global mediascape, and the increase of visual communication in media culture. We will elaborate on the needs and possibilities of a reflexive and conscious war journalism in the late modern culture of fear by discussing (1) the shift from risk society to threat society,¹ (2) the special features of the “global war on terror” discourse, (3) the importance of new media, (4) the implications of visualisation of the media culture, and (5) concrete findings from an analysis of a Norwegian newspaper’s coverage from the Iraq war.

Historical background: Journalism in the new world order

The roots of the recent trends in what we might call a global conflict discourse can be traced back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s when the “new world order” as defined by George Bush Sr in connection to the Gulf War in 1991 introduced a new era of US hegemony. In conjunction with the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution, all issues concerning “international” and academic concerns about “space” in general have changed (Ekercrantz 2007: 169). The dramatic events on 9/11 once again altered the global discourse order (Fairclough 2006); the war on terror has shifted the focus, and the power centres in the North have defined a new agenda reflecting global interests (Miller 2007). The media flows and failures are part of a larger international problem anchored in our mainstream media system (Schechter 2006: 79).

Findings from our Gulf War study suggest that the significance of the Gulf War in 1991 has been sadly (and much more than is generally thought) underestimated as a global media event influencing the present global conflict formation (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001, 2004, 2005; Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002). As we indicated in the Introduction to this volume, that war polarised the relations between some radical political groups in the Muslim world and the West, providing a breeding ground for radical Islamist groups and terror organisations such as al Qaeda. The Gulf War in 1991 was also a breakthrough for modern propaganda techniques, broadcast live by CNN on a global scale (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001).

The simplistic enemy image of Saddam Hussein at the time, as a “new Hitler”, the villain who had violated international laws and human rights, framed the
global news and overshadowed many of the structural concerns of the conflict such as access to oil, religious, and cultural issues and a fight for political and military hegemony over the region in general. A similarly simplified propaganda was used by Western powers and NATO in later events and the Hitler metaphor was repeated during the NATO war in the former Yugoslavia in 1999, this time to portray Slobodan Milošević. The concept of humanitarian intervention was developed further and used to justify the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia to stop Milošević’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Again, we heard that the evil had to be stopped before Milošević committed even worse crimes (Chomsky 2000).

A more sober historical review of these conflicts suggests that the Gulf War in 1991, as well as that in Yugoslavia in 1999, should remind us that in a war the picture is never in black and white. More complex matters such as the colonial heritage of Western hegemony, unresolved border conflicts, and oil and water resources – and not to speak of religious tensions – are all part of a complicated scenario that calls for dialogue and conflict resolution as suggested in the UN Charter (Galtung 2002; Chomsky 2000). The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the war in the Middle East in the summer of 2006 involving Palestinians, Israel and Lebanon; the tension in the Horn of Africa and the bombing of Somalia by US planes in January 2007; and the ongoing clashes in Sudan: all remind us that the rupture lines in the background of the Gulf War 1991 still exist. Each of the countries in the Middle East has a historical legacy of myths and traumas linked to religion and the conviction of being “chosen”. In the Gulf War, Muslims fought Muslims and conventional wisdom in the Western world held that this split of the Arab-Muslim world was part of the victory. In 1991, acting in the name of the United Nations, the Western world provided a violent and simple answer to a highly complex issue, and the consequence may well be a new round of this spiral of violence as well as the risk of new conflicts and fissures between North and South (Esser 2009). In 1991 and 2003, we heard that a multinational humanitarian intervention would provide a new framework for democracy in the Middle East and that the bombing of Yugoslavia 1999 should remove the last communist-style dictatorship in Europe. Democratic rhetoric was also at the core of US propaganda before the invasion of Iraq 2003 but recent events speak for themselves. The promise of democracy has been replaced by chaos and violence in Iraq, and the Balkan conflicts are still unresolved, with an uncertain future for Kosovo (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005).

The relations between power politics and the UN is part of this global picture. When the US failed to rally the UN behind the war effort in Iraq 2003, it established the “coalition of the willing” and invaded without a legal mandate. When the occupation was a fact, the UN was invited in as a “peace-keeping factor”. Bush’s administration defined the UN as “irrelevant” when, in March 2003, the majority of member states resisted being involved in the invasion. However, by the autumn of 2003, the UN had already taken
**NEW WARS, NEW MEDIA AND NEW WAR JOURNALISM**

*de facto* responsibility for the chaotic situation created by the illegal invasion, through Resolution 1511 in which the Coalition Provisional Authority (that is, the US-UK force) is said to be “temporary”. In Article 5, the Authority is asked to “return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable.” (Prashad 2003) The failure to create a stable government after the election in 2005 is evident. One of the issues that media have failed to address is what this will mean in the long run for the credibility of the UN. It is also an important issue for African media, since peace efforts in conflict-ridden areas such as Congo and Sudan are also implemented in the name of the UN (Østerud 2007).

This broad picture should be seen as the backdrop to a North-South approach to modern war and conflicts. Africa has, in the last decade, been haunted by wars in, for example, Sudan, Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. These wars have been underreported in the Western media because they do not represent a challenge to Western interests on the same level as do the Middle East and South Asia (Thussu 2006) – and since news reporting in the South is still dependent on the news flow from the North these wars are underreported in Africa as well. Thussu suggests that in the South, ordinary people as well as journalists have been more reluctant to swallow the simplistic propaganda from power circles in the North because of their colonial past.

Returning to the broader picture of the “new world order”, we observe the problems inherent in forcing Western style democracy upon a hostile Iraqi population. The problems in the “war of terror” are obviously a challenge for global media. The combination of the US military intervention in the name of “humanitarian intervention” and “democracy”, and its simultaneous refusal to accept the Hamas victory in the Palestinian election as the most prominent example undermines the of democracy argument. This is a big challenge for media since the relationship between conflict resolution and peacekeeping is imposed within the framework of a UN model that has failed in the “war on terror”. The Norwegian political scientist Øivind Østerud is among those who have documented that the most violent and conflict-ridden areas are those places where the US has forced through elections without there being established democratic institutions or free media. So-called democratic experiments are failing in Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon. In Iraq and the Palestinian territories it has been amply demonstrated that elections and democracy are not the same thing. When Hamas won the election, Israel, with the full support of the US, refused to accept the result and a breakdown in the democratic Palestinian structures was the result. In Iraq, the Sunni minority refused to accept its loss in elections since the sectarian parties that won had no policy for reconciliation and nation building. Thus, “quick” elections without any foundation in existing structures will lead to chaos because the losers do not believe that those in power will respect the minority. In the Palestinian territories, Western powers chose to
support Fatah, which lost the elections, and thus undermined the legitimacy of democracy. Fatah, in the eyes of the Palestinian people, exposed itself as a tool of foreign intervention (Østerud 2007). According to Østerud there are two lessons to be drawn from this: the first is that organising elections does not automatically lead to democracy and stability, for if you remove a dictator like Saddam Hussein through military intervention, corruption and undemocratic structures can occur in new forms – elections thus lead to a democratic fiction. The second lesson is that semi-democracies tend to be more vulnerable to violence than authoritarian systems and real democracies. Semi-democracy causes resistance and has no power to withstand violence. There is no evidence that, in the long run, forced elections and semi-democracies serve democracy, as anarchy and violence replace the relative stability that an authoritarian system can produce. But even though this model has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East it is still the chosen model for the UN in Africa.

What role can media play in such a situation? It is difficult to see the media playing an independent role, given the huge economic interests involved. There is obviously rivalry for hegemony in Africa involving great powers: China, the US, and the EU, and it is difficult to see a UN policy free from these interests. As indicated in the Introduction and revisited in the Conclusions we conceive the media after the Gulf War 1990-91 as situated in a global crisis for the international system of collective security. We will outline a theoretical perspective below that, we hope, facilitates understanding of the challenges that journalists face when reporting about the consequences and features of this crisis. But, before that, a few words about risk communication research in Nordic media studies.

Nordic studies of journalism, crisis communication and threat society

Several studies and reports about the role of the media in crisis and risk communication have been conducted in recent decades in the Nordic countries, but there is still a lack of fundamental research in the field (for example, Sandberg & Thelander 1997; Dahlström & Flodin 1998; Vettenranta 2005; Bjerke & Dyb 2006; Hormmoen 2011). Paul Bjerke and Evelyn Dyb’s book Journalistikk i risikosamfunnet (Journalism in the Risk Society) builds on the theories of sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on the risk society and late modernism. Current discussions on journalism often emphasise that contemporary media are too commercial and/or unserious. Bjerke and Dyb argue that the risk society has replaced the industrial society and produced new conflict dimensions and new identities. Contemporary journalism has to be understood and explained by concepts adequate to this society: it has to contribute to the
citizens’ perception, understanding and construction of their environment as a society of considerable environmental risk and growing social uncertainty.

One interesting aspect within the debate of risk-journalism is the relationship between the coverage of natural disasters, health risk, and man-made risk through war and terror. Findings from research on the 2004 tsunami and the attack on the town of Fallujah just a few days before the tsunami struck suggest that the threshold for publishing details of human suffering is much higher in controversial incidents like government sponsored military attack than in connection with a natural disaster like the tsunami, where only nature itself can be blamed (Ottosen 2007).

The theory of threat society focuses on the importance of media as facilitators of otherism, that is, a politizised construction of dangers and risks in such a form that a certain group, ethnic or other, is defined as a threat *per se* (Nohrstedt 2010). Wars may be regarded as the crisis type *par excellence* in threat society, because in war propaganda the “enemy” is by definition discursively constructed as a threat. Recent research on crisis communication processes contends that media disseminates information that encourages fear to “become a dominant public perspective … [and] a way of looking at life” (Altheide 2002: 3) and that media are crucial for global crises because they construct “the world as a whole.” (Cottle 2009: 1) Simon Cottle furthermore makes a distinction between “mediation” and “mediatization” which is relevant for analysis of media’s role. “Mediation” refers to the conveying function of the media, whereas “mediatization” means that the crisis is created in and by the media. Ontologically speaking, the problems and dangers do not constitute a crisis without the public opinions and perceptions that the media stages and performs.

Together, these studies provide the cornerstones of the theory of threat society and how it differs from risk society: Firstly, “mediatization” separates threat society from risk society, where the role of media is limited to mediation. Secondly, through “mediatization” the media becomes the place and scene for political manifestations and planned “events” aiming at the realisation of power ambitions and political objectives. Thirdly, the media-centered politicization in threat society implies that an (other) ethnic or social group is pointed out as the carrier of the actual threat – that is, there is a clear presence of identity politics expressed in terms of “we” and “them” in the threat society (Nohrstedt 2010).

**Globalization and risk**

Any contemporary analysis of journalism and conflict must now also take into account the context of cultural and economic globalization ... as well as, more specifically, media globalization (Hackett 2006: 16).
Globalization in all its multifaceted forms has led to increased awareness of risk and threats, even those beyond one’s immediate surroundings, and to their being perceived as more worrying than ever before. The horizon of our knowledge of conditions in distant places has been widened, and with it our insight into global threats to security and health (such as terrorism, environmental pollution, and epidemics spread either by humans or other carriers) has deepened. At the same time as globalization brings about an expanded risk and threat awareness, it also places ever-growing demands on people’s confidence that society and responsible authorities can protect the populace from these dangers. According to Anthony Giddens, among others, the nation state has declined in importance, and politicians have for the most part lost control over the course of development owing to the challenge that globalization poses to the national sphere from above, below, and the side – power is not only shifting upwards to the global arena, but also downwards through decentralization to the local level, and sideways through economic integration over national borders in the form of regional co-operation. Life and existence appear to be random and out of control, which leads to a widespread sense of disempowerment (Giddens 2003: 24; 28; 33). This experience of vulnerability in (late) modern society has, according to Ulrich Beck, led to a shift in the politics of what he calls “risk society” away from distributing wealth towards being about the distribution of risks (Beck 1992). From the perspective of a society distinguished by diminished trust, where policies are judged according to successfully distributing risks, it is not farfetched to predict a development towards an ever greater crisis tendency. Progress has admittedly led to modern society’s being able to tackle a significant number of threats to its citizens’ health and safety, threats such as urban fires and the previously endemic diseases tuberculosis and polio, but new and old dangers can still cause great harm to both people and property. Natural disasters in recent years (the great tsunami of 2004; hurricanes such as Katrina), accidents involving complex technical systems (air and ferry traffic; nuclear power), and international terrorism are all reminders of society’s vulnerability (cf. Boin et al. 2005: 1). Furthermore, “the underlying paradigm has shifted from local to global.” (Lagadec 2005: 3) In sum, the expanded, global perceptions of threats are presumably increasing crisis tendencies in societies.

This trend is, however, complicated, and notoriously difficult to predict when it comes to contingencies. A number of factors intervene: differing knowledge and psychological strategies in the reception processes at both the individual and the collective levels. Here, our focus is restricted to the ways media may affect the threat and risk perceptions of the general public. The problem with media in this respect is that they are a carrier of globalization processes and, at the same time, restricted by a national outlook. The implied media audiences and the framing of the news are both defined within the confines of a “methodological nationalism.” (Beck 2002; Beck 2006: 24 ff.)
The special features of the “global war on terror” discourse: an example of communication in threat society

A particularly complex configuration is the global discursive order that has appeared after 9/11. According to Fairclough, it should be understood in relation to a general change in US foreign and security policy strategy from “soft power” to “hard power”. In his analysis, the discourse on terrorism after 9/11 is embedded in a discursive order which connects it with discourses on globalism and the knowledge-based economy. In relation to the latter two discourses, and together with them, it constitutes “a change in the ‘nexus’ of strategies and discourses which globalism is part of, and … a further inflection in the trajectory of globalism itself.” (Fairclough 2006: 141) In the kind of Critical discourse analysis (CDA) that Fairclough conducts the contextual meaning of the “global war on terror” discourse can be interpreted by establishing its relationship to, on the one hand, the post 9/11 changes in international politics (in particular US foreign and security policy) and, on the other hand, the foregoing hegemonic discourses on the global political arena. In this way he takes account of both continuity and change within the discursive order of globalism. In drawing on Jackson’s (2005) study, Fairclough (2006: 144) in his critique further identifies four main themes that characterize the “global war on terror” discourse:

- This is a new era, posing new threats, which requires new responses.
- America and its allies (and indeed “civilization”) face unprecedented risks and dangers which call for exceptional measures.
- Those who pose these risks and dangers are the forces of “evil”.
- America and its allies are the forces of “good”, and their actions are informed by moral values.

Fairclough questions the validity of each of these themes and argues that they are basically all false or twisted. President Bush’s statement that after the day of 9/11 “the night fell on a different world” is simply not true according to Fairclough: “the argument is fallacious.” [italics in original] The attacks were “serious acts of terrorism”, “morally indefensible” and an “indiscriminate assault on innocent civilians”, as Fairclough underlines. But that does not make them inherently epoch-shifting: “This attack became epoch-changing only because it was self-consciously represented in this way by politicians and officials with the power, partly through their capacity to shape the global media agenda, to make it so.” (Fairclough op. cit.: 145) The decision to represent the attacks in this way was a legitimizing move, according to Fairclough, which gave leeway to radically new political steps and measures. In a similar vein he argues that the second theme is “a scaremongering overstatement” because in comparative terms the terrorism threat is not vast and immediate for the
American people. Rather, expressions of this theme can be interpreted as “attempts to induce fear in order to legitimize policies and actions which would otherwise be unpalatable for many Americans.” (op. cit.: 146) The third theme is beyond the ground of rational argumentation, and representing an antagonist as “evil” legitimizes all kind of extreme measures, following Fairclough’s critique. You cannot argue with, negotiate with, or treat the evil ones as rational beings – the only possible response is war (op. cit.: 147). The former British prime minister, Tony Blair, has been the most outspoken promoter of the fourth theme since the Kosovo conflict of 1999. He has claimed that “values and interests merge”, meaning that defending national self-interests and the common interests of the international community are one and the same. This, however, seems like a less than modest attempt to give moral dignity and legitimacy to the interests of some particular nation states – and this is especially so since after the Iraq war it is difficult to see how on balance it has increased the moral good, as Fairclough sarcastically comments (op. cit.: 147-48). In conclusion, then, the four main themes are all rejected as invalid because they are either simply incorrect or exaggerated representations of reality. Besides the contextual and thematic dimensions of the “global war on terror” discourse Fairclough also analyses the semantic use of notions such as “terrorism” and “pre-emptive strikes”. He notes, as others have done before him, that the term “terrorism” is notoriously problematic because it has been “used in an opportunistic way as a catch-all category to brand and condemn a wide variety of forms of the use of force, while excluding others which arguably do constitute terrorism”. The first problem is whether a distinction is made between terrorism and (legal) resistance. Secondly, in the real world there are violent actions by states that qualify as “state terrorism”, but the practice is to exclude them from the discursive use of the term “terrorism” (op. cit.: 152-53). With regard to the notion of “pre-emption” frequently used by the Bush administration, Fairclough agrees with Chomsky that what the US is actually pursuing cannot be properly called a strategy of pre-emptive war but a strategy of “preventive war”, which is not accepted under international law. In its consequences, Fairclough warns, this terminological slant in the “global war on terror” discourse on the side of the war alliance will probably start a new international arms race (op. cit.: 154).

The media as carrier of a culture of fear
In our comparative study of the Gulf War in 1991 we found that the domestica-
tion of global news, framed through a perspective highly influenced by the US version of the events, played and important role in the overall framing of the Gulf War story (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001). If we draw a parallel to the global
coverage of 9/11 2001 we see that national presentation of local threat is a common feature in many countries, including Norway (Ottosen & Figenschou 2007). Mediatization of the threat policies, as well as of politics in general, implies that the media and the journalists are ever more involved in, and are carriers of, the culture of fear. For example both terrorists and their opponents in the “global war on terror” apply media management strategies in their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the general public. However, journalist professionals and the media companies generally lack efficient counter-strategies against these attempts to exploit – in particular – news journalism’s penchant for spectacular, dramatic and threatening news with accompanying visual images.

Media’s role in society in general has increased in importance and this tendency is particularly evident in relation to war and conflicts, to terrorism and also to risks and threats. Modern wars are waged as both military and media operations (Taylor 1997). For democratic countries, involved in military conflicts, support from the general public is the sine qua non for the mobilisation of necessary resources, not to talk about victory. Some wars can, perhaps, even be explained by the role of the media, when one considers the extreme media attention to military conflicts and how it can be exploited to change a political situation and agenda. Was not this factor one of the most important behind the Bush administration’s decision to declare war after the 9/11 terror attacks and for several reasons? The reasons: first, that the media’s attention is alerted to a degree that otherwise would not occur; second, that the loyalty and patriotism whipped up in a state of war is a huge political asset for the government in place; and third, that not only do journalists accept certain restrictions on human rights in general, they are even prepared to accept restrictions for themselves. Terrorism is no doubt almost unimaginable without the communicative possibilities that modern mass media provide (cf. Klopfenstein 2006).

It is obvious that behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a media strategy of this kind. Both timing and targets indicate a cruel calculation of how media could be manipulated for promotion of the al Qaeda ideology. When it comes to somewhat less extraordinary risks and threats, such as for example global warming or bird flu, the mediation effects are no less. Political programmes and protection measures – either individual or collective – would be very different without media attention. But the role of the media cannot be properly understood unless the fear factor’s crucial importance for the media economy has been dealt with. The exploitation of threats and risks is fundamental to news journalism as an institution. Exaggerations and premature warnings, therefore, pass the gate-keepers on a daily basis. In relation to the authoritative definition of risk in science (risk as the function of probability and consequence: R=P x C), the media usually focus only on the consequence factor. In particular, when it comes to risk situations of a low probability and high consequence type, the media logic tends towards worst possible scenario reporting that may cause
considerable problems in terms of anxiety, emotional energy, and the waste of resources of many kinds.

As they are the key institution for a vibrant public sphere, the media’s receptivity to all kinds of risk and threat images makes it urgent that they develop a high level of reflexivity and openness about this. But here we face an even more serious deficit in journalism. The lack of critical and investigative reporting of the threat-perception management strategies to which media are exposed is one of the greatest obstacles to the enlightenment of the public about politics and opinion-building today. Rarely does one see journalists trying to dig beneath the surface of promoted risk and threat messages. The obvious example is the mobilization period before the Iraq war 2003, when the US media in general, and also several of the British media, failed in their watch-dog function and fooled large parts of their audiences into believing the accusations that the Saddam Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction and was involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Only very few media bothered to publish any self-criticism when it soon became obvious that the official arguments for invading Iraq were misleading – the noticeable exceptions being The New York Times and The Washington Post, which came out with excuses more than a year after the war started. Colin Powell, the US secretary of state at the time who gave a highly profiled speech in the UN Security Council where he presented what he claimed were proofs of Iraqi guilt, later called this event the darkest moment in his career.

It would not be completely off the point for many in the media to say something equally self-critical. In any case, media in other countries and in different political settings had no special difficulties with finding experts and commentators who questioned the accuracy of the Bush and Blair administrations’ allegations and thus framed the reports from the Security Council meeting in a more critical mode (Nohrstedt 2005). However, research findings indicate that even American media revealed some degrees of independence with respect to the Bush administration’s shifting “global war on terror” rhetorical agenda. When the White House, three weeks into the Iraq war, changed the focus from weapons of mass destruction to toppling the tyrant in Baghdad, the press corps at White House and Pentagon press briefings kept their weapons of mass destruction focus – but whether that implied a more critical reporting at the later part of the “battle of Iraq” is not entirely clear (Clifton 2007: 8).

A special problem is the media’s difficulty in handling and critically scrutinizing the transnational processes of perception management that have become increasingly important owing to globalization. It is one of the more specific characteristics of the “global war on terror” that the superpower, which declared it, does not acknowledge any restrictions of territory, time, culture, and probably not even legality on its operations. Consequently, the transnational
dimensions of the “global war on terror” discourse are essential to our understanding of the effect of the mediatization of this discourse. With respect to the transnational dimensions, the national outlook of mainstream media is, of course, even more troublesome because many of the political, legal and other consequences of the “global war on terror” are transnational – for example, the level of surveillance of travellers, financial transfers, and immigrants. A case in point is that of CIA flights between countries and continents with suspected terrorists on board. Since these activities were accepted by the nation states involved it took some time before they were brought to the general public’s attention. It seems that only after some investigating journalists had made contact with a rather eccentric nongovernmental organisation (whose members are fascinated by aircraft-spotting) that the story took off. But it took time to hit the news. It is normally only when national or local politicians (or other members of the elite) object to activities that impinge on civil and human rights that the media are likely to engage in some investigative research of the matter. For the rest, the mediated transnational “global war on terror” discourse will be situated within the horizons (Nohrstedt 2007) of what is accepted by the economic, political, ideological, and similar interests controlling the big international news channels – and among them American ownership and influence is substantial (McPhail 2002; cf. Fairclough 2006: 171). But – and this is an important reservation – it is an empirical and open question to what extent and in what ways transnational discourses are re-contextualized when crossing the borders between national/local settings. The implication is that it would be wrong to ignore that the globalization of the media facilitates some steps towards a cosmopolitan public sphere (Fairclough 2006: 171; cf. Beck 2006). In the next sections we will deal with the changes in the international media landscape and the institutional conditions for the emergence of a reflexive and cosmopolitan discourse on the “global war on terror”.

We have gone to some lengths above in referring to Fairclough’s analysis of the “global war on terror” discourse because we regard it as generally relevant and basically sound as well as productive for analytical purposes when dealing with journalism in the threat society. But our aim in bringing it into this chapter is not to accuse the news media of not pursuing this kind of analysis in their daily reporting. Our intention is to use it as a tool for discussion about institutional conditions for mainstream media when approaching a global discourse like that of the “global war on terror”. Using Fairclough’s explication of this globally dominating discourse for a diagnosis of what can and cannot be expected by media is one way to lay some ground for future proposals of how, and in what ways, news journalism can be improved professionally and democratically. Let us sum up what conclusions follow from such an attempt to “measure” the status of ordinary news journalism in relation to the “global war on terror”.

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1. The contextual and re-contextualizing perspective that emphasizes the inter-discursive relationship between the “global war on terror” and previous discourses on globalism and the knowledge-based economy is notoriously absent in normal news reporting. The reasons for this are, \textit{inter alia}, that all discussions and references to hegemonic ambitions and strategies internationally are regarded in mainstream media as views and not facts and, if not raised by the normal sources (politicians and members of the elite), are not considered worth reporting. This also has a lot to do with what has been called the epistemological horizon of news journalism, namely the professional assumption of a transparent reality accessible through observations and interviews (Nohrstedt 2007). But, in addition, the inter-discursive relations noticed by Fairclough are all located on a supra-national level related to policy making in agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G8 summits and, as such, beyond the normal national outlook of the mainstream media. Therefore those types of policies and powers are under-reported in the media.

2. Of the four themes mentioned by Fairclough three are of a kind that has rarely – if at all – been challenged and scrutinized by the news media. Without denying the existence of a few critical voices here and there, it is evident that the first three are aired again and again by the media, basically because they are part of the political rhetoric of the superpower and its allies, with their dominant position as news sources and agents in international politics. Hence, in this case the main explanatory factor is the news values applied by the journalist profession and in addition comes the shared interests between the hegemonic transnational elites represented by the Bush administration and in international media such as CNN and BBC World.

3. The only theme that has been opened up for public attention and discussion seems to be the fourth: the claims by the Bush and Blair administrations that they were the forces of good, acting on moral grounds in international politics. In this instance it is notable that the critical attitude did not appear primarily in the American mainstream media, but in media in other countries, the main explanation being that leading politicians in, for example France, Germany and Russia, objected to the military intervention strategy promoted by the US and the UK against Iraq in 2003. In their respective countries’ media this opposition received significant attention, which contributed to a radically different framing of coverage than in the mainstream US media, for instance (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005).

4. When it comes to semantics it goes without saying that the vague and unspecific ‘terrorist’ label was reproduced uncritically by most mainstream
media in the US and in Europe. It has furthermore been exploited in political conflicts as a convenient rhetorical instrument to raise sympathy of the superpower for all kinds of policies. Even in situations where such support would be difficult to gain, as in the Balkans and for policies of otherism and the exclusion of Muslims, the terrorism theme is appropriated in attempts to legitimise such specific, local procedures (Erjavec & Volcic 2006). The notion of “pre-emptive” war has certainly penetrated the media deeply – and widely too, through the news value mechanism mentioned above. But in this case it has not been appropriated for local use to the same extent – so far, we might add, mindful about the escalation in the Middle East in connection with the Iran nuclear industry and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Once again, the main explanation is the representatives from other nation states that have “balanced” the US influence on the media outside of the US. One can also probably conclude that the terrorism notion as well as the “global war on terror” concept that the Bush administration frequently and immediately attached to the 9/11 attacks (and for understandable reasons) was far easier to accept worldwide than the related concept of “pre-emptive war”, partly because the former was linked to horrifying assaults against civilians whereas the latter is connected to a controversial US security strategy.

As a preliminary attempt to assess the institutional shortcomings of news journalism in relation to the “global war on terror” discourse, we should like to avoid the impression of a totally bleak situation with nothing good to expect from news journalism on conflict resolutions and peace building. Let us very briefly, since these findings have been reported elsewhere (Nohrstedt 2009), merely mention three trends in Swedish war journalism from the Gulf War 1990-91 to the Iraq war 2003. First, media tend to give increasing attention to war’s “true face”, to the sufferings of civilian populations and civilian victims of warfare. Second, the conditions of war journalism are receiving increased attention over time and are reported with self-critical reflection; the attempts of the involved parties to manipulate the reporting by more or less sophisticated means and propaganda strategies have to a certain degree become news material, which has led various media to express reservations about the reliability of their reporting and to encourage the audience to be critical. Third, visuals have been given an ever-increasing space that, however, has not been accompanied by greater reflexivity; the contents of visuals have not been subjected to the same critical scrutiny as the contents of texts, or led to warnings to the audience.

Whether these findings have a more general and international relevance is too early to tell although they may hypothetically be reason for some optimism with regard to war journalism and its role in violent conflicts. But what about the new media in this context, since the study mentioned here, as did most
research on conflict journalism, dealt only with traditional media? Will they change the balance in conflicts between the media management strategists and the journalist? In the next section we will try to make a preliminary assessment.

New media – a global public sphere with increased pluralism and alternative discourses?
The global mediascape has become more pluralistic and new alternative media are challenging the mainstream media. Not only is Al Jazeera and other Arab channels competing with the dominant Western media on the global 24/7 news-market, but the emergence of the Internet and the different forms of information traffic, communication, and debate have led to speculation and hopes for a more deliberative and more global public sphere. We shall comment on the different types of new media step by step. But, first, an overall conclusion: the so-called marketplace of ideas has grown at a remarkable speed, with new markets of competition where dominance is challenged by newcomers – at the same time as previous success stories are continuously copied and modified with uncertain outcomes. To make a prognosis in this field is thus extremely difficult.

The history of transnational media started, of course, long before the entrance of satellite television, the cable system, and the Internet. Even before the news agencies there were print media that reached an international audience. But we shall put history aside and concentrate on more recent developments: from 1989 onwards, with a special focus on media and international conflicts. It is common knowledge that the Gulf War 1990-91 meant a commercial breakthrough for CNN as the leading provider of international visual news. The channel was first to take full advantage of the skyrocketing demands for war images, and was well-resourced to meet the requests from national television companies all over the world. In Sweden, for example, the national news agency found that many of its clients switched to CNN for immediate and live footage from the theatre of war. The dominance of US propaganda in the media coverage internationally was massive, according to a number of studies at the time (see Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Kempf & Luostarinen 2002). This should not only be explained by a “CNN effect”, because the international political situation and the fact that the UN had sanctioned the military intervention encouraged journalists and the general public to take a pro-alliance view. But the strong commercial position of CNN meant that the channel had an impact on the “media war” as waged on television screens worldwide. This is in stark contrast to the media rivalry over the Afghanistan War of 2001 and the Iraq War of 2003. Al Jazeera had been established in the meantime and turned out to be a strong competitor to CNN, not only in the Arab world but also internationally. With
its unique accreditation to air footage from Kabul under the Taliban regime, the Qatar-based channel could provide visual news material highly valued on the international television market. In the Iraq War 2003, the competition had increased even more, and also in the Arab world, but together with other television channels in the region Al Jazeera continued to be a strong competitor to CNN, BBC World, and other transnational companies in the West, not least with the effect of visual attention to civilian suffering and casualties that resonated with the compassion discourse (Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002; Höijer 2004). In its Iraq War coverage, Al Jazeera was considerably more critical than the major American television networks (Aday et al. 2005).

However, the role of the Al Jazeera is debatable. In the Middle East it has been pointed out as the leader of a wind of change for almost the entire television market (El Bendary 2003; see also El Bendary 2005), but also as a Trojan horse of the US and Israel, and an agency promoting a pan-Arab public sphere (Sakr 2007). Leaving aside the impact of the Arab televisions channels, when comparing satellite television channels with nationally relayed television channels from the “global war on terror” research findings are not completely consistent. In one study, the results indicate that “dominant” framing (routinized news from primary definers such as politicians and other authoritative sources) is more or less equally frequent in satellite and in national television news reports (approximately every fifth item). But with regard to more in-depth reporting (for example, feature reportage in which differing views are displayed and discussed) the satellite news is more generous (eight per cent compared to four per cent). Simon Cottle regards this as some reason for hope because it may indicate that the new media architecture supports a “politics of pity – or a politics of shame.” (Cottle 2006: 37) Since his results are not specified for the various satellite channels (the group includes BBC World, CNN International, Fox News and Sky News Australia) the findings are not easy to interpret. Another study reports contrary findings: that compared to national television channels in Canada and the US, the cable channels CNN and Fox News were both “… much more consistent with the administration’s framing … Fox News however presented the administration’s framing with unusual intensity in a number of ways” (Clifton 2007: 20). This also seems to confirm the results from other studies of Fox News showing the channel to be one of the strongest and bluntest supporters of the war in Iraq (Aday et al. 2005).

The Internet offers a number of facilities and formats for communication and news services that go beyond the traditional one-way flow. Interactivity is, technically speaking, the unique feature of many of these new media, but it is far from clear to what extent, and for what purposes the new ICT is used (Buskqvist 2007; El-Gody 2012). Expectations that deliberative democratic communication would flourish have not been confirmed, generally speaking (Hacker & Van Dijk 2000). For war journalism, the findings so far reveal a divided
picture. In a study of Iraq war news on the home pages of the *New York Times, The Guardian, Al Abrams* and Al Jazeera it was found that the “Arab media were clearly more critical of the war than the two coalition newspapers”, with the Qatar-based television channel decisively more critical than the Egyptian newspaper’s homepage (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern 2007: 162, 164). In sum, the web pages did not differ from the pattern that would be expected had the study compared the printed and televised versions. If we then turn to more unique forms of Internet-based information, such as chat-rooms and blogs, the question remains of the extent to which they are truly alternative media, compared with traditional press, radio and television, in their representation of violent conflicts. From the general re-mediation theory it would follow that new media and old media reversibly affect each other in the permanent drive towards increased immediacy, leaving little hope of dramatic shifts between different media generations (Bolter & Grusin 1999). This general conclusion seems to be confirmed when it comes to war reporting. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, for example, contends that alternative online news sources such as blogs may have importance as counter-hegemonic media, although their roles are somewhat contradictory and uncertain. On the one hand they “reframe” news stories that are first published in the mainstream media and in that way lend them new meanings and take away their status and legitimacy. But on the other hand information on the blogs is so dependent on the mainstream news media as sources that these alternative online news sites may contribute to the dominant position of the former (Boyd-Barrett 2007). And the information warfare that has been going on in the traditional mass media has, in the “global war on terror”, taken ground on the Internet, with terrorism and counter-terrorism being fought out electronically. The multiplicity of information and sources, as well as reduced timeframes as defining features of the Internet communication on web pages and chat rooms, seem also gradually to affect the traditional news media, with the result that the gatekeeper function is diminishing (Klopfenstein 2006).

In addition, large segments of the youth feel this is “more of the same” and turn their backs on traditional news media altogether (Ottosen 2007b). As an alternative they seek cultural and visual impulses in entertainment and new digital media such as computer games, films, and interactivity in the blogosphere. Myspace and YouTube seem more interesting, for millions of media users, than BBC World, Fox News, or Al Jazeera. Some of these new media cater for critique of the mainstream media and encourage general media reflexivity (Figenschou 2004). If journalism stays unfit to meet these challenges it might be marginalized altogether. It seems plausible that traditional journalism may not be able to manage, because it would demand an entirely new professional epistemology from that which has been its trademark so far – that is, an epistemology assuming a completely transparent reality (Nohrstedt 2007; cf. Conclusion; see also Berglez 2013).
The power of the visual images

Visualization of the media culture is another trend that confronts news journalism and media reflexivity with increased challenges. Terrorists and anti-terrorist agencies have improved their efforts and skills in managing the media by video, photo and other visual means. Governments and military institutions have for, example, been successful in developing visually based media strategies in time of crisis, through public relations (PR) firms, PSYOPS, and disinformation. Through different kinds of visual spin techniques, power centres have been able to influence the journalistic framing of global events and the images of oppositional policies and movements (cf. Introduction).

Visual components play a huge role in PSYOPS. We offer here a few examples: the combination of visual persuasion and organized PSYOPS campaigns to influence the news agenda is evident with regard to the removing of the Saddam statue when the US forces entered Bagdad; in the so called “release” of Private Jessica Lynch during the ground offensive in Iraq; and in the attempt to link the alleged threat from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to the attack on Fallujah in November 2004 (Eide & Ottosen 2007).

Before analyzing these empirical cases we will underline the importance of pictures and other visual elements in the news agenda. One reason for putting more emphasis on the visual aspects of journalism is simply that we remember visual better than verbal impressions (Magnussen & Greenlee 1999). We see pictures in the same way as we view the world in general and we tend to accept what we see as the truth (Klaren 1996, in Eide 2005). Research on the decoding of pictures in the brain also shows that it matters how the pictures are organized on the pages. We remember better and put more weight on pictures that are placed on the left side of a page. Rudolf Arnheim (1988) puts it like this: “The left side is endowed with special weight; it assumes the function of a strong centre with which the viewer tends to identify.” Susan Sontag suggests that press photographs even have a “deeper bite” than movies or television since they “freeze-frame” events in a single image: “In an area of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something and a compact form of memorizing it.” (Sontag 2003, quoted in Artz 2004: 81)

Pictures, cartoons, and other visual elements play an important role in creating enemy images that is an important part of propaganda in war journalism (Ottosen 1995). The heated debate on the Muhammad drawings printed in Jyllands-Posten caused a global controversy about freedom of expression, intercultural relations and religion (Eide et al. 2008). Since visual persuasion takes a short cut to our emotions (Eide 2005), the presence of visual elements should play a more important role in the debate on peace journalism. Sometimes the absence of pictures is also a problem since modern journalism, especially television, depends on pictures to tell a story. Therefore we have to acknowledge
from the outset that without pictures or other visual elements most stories will never surface in the news. The lack of visual representation has kept important conflicts outside the news agenda in the mainstream Western press in cases such as East Timor, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire (Zelizer 2004: 116).

In an essay comparing the use of photographs in news magazines’ coverage of wars such as the 1990-91 Gulf War, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Michael Griffin underlines the importance of visual images in the framing of stories (Griffin 2004), relying on an analysis of the magazines *Time*, *Newsweek* and *US News & World Report* for his conclusions. Griffin stresses that the photographic image will not in itself draw attention to human suffering and create empathy with the victims of war. Representational legitimacy remains tied to power and visual images in the mainstream media that are more likely to produce enduring symbols of that discourse than to give us alternative perspectives (op. cit.: 400).

But it is also well documented that the framing of a television news story depends on what photos are available. The same footage can, however, be used in quite different framings. During the attacks on Afghanistan in October 2001, the BBC filmed desperate Afghan refugees in camps and later sold them to ABC. The US broadcaster changed the framing of the story and blamed the Taliban rather than the US bombing for the refugees’ desperate situation (Miller 2007: 85-86).

**First case: The Jessica Lynch story**

The Jessica Lynch story has already been used to show the fuzzy border between fact and fiction in war propaganda (Ottosen 2004). The story of her capture by the Iraqis and her rescue by US special forces became one of the great patriotic moments of the conflict – but the propaganda story turned out to be pure fiction. She was not wounded in battle but was injured in a car accident. As a PSYOPS operation, how she was wounded was irrelevant. The point was to frame the story as a distraction from the problems in the war so as to avoid the Vietnam syndrome. If we look at the foreign news pages in *Verdens Gang* (*VG*) on April 2, 2003, the day the Jessica Lynch story broke, we find a double page in *VG*’s first edition under the headline: “A whole family wiped out”. A huge photo of a screaming man, Kazem Mohammed, and pictures of bodies in coffins illustrated the story. We learn from the text that the whole family was killed by US bombs. It was a rare moment for civilian casualties to feature in the forefront of *VG*’s coverage. On the same day *VG* published a second edition. By now the spin story of Jessica Lynch had occurred. The story of Kazem Mohammed in the new edition was reduced to much shorter piece; the picture of Mohammed is now quite small and one of the pictures of a family member in a coffin has been removed. Most of the two-page spread
is now covered by the smiling face of Jessica Lynch under the headline: “The prisoner of war Jessica (19) free”. In the story, Pentagon sources tell of the “rescue operation”, adding that the last few days have been used to hunt for Ali Hassan al-Majd, “the man who in 1988 was allegedly behind the gassing of 5,000 Kurds in northern Iraq”. The contrast between the innocent-looking and attractive Jessica and the mention of the monstrous figure Hassan al-Majd bears all the marks of a PSYOPS operation (Eide & Ottosen 2007). The relationship between good and evil is established and the new framing draws attention away from the civilian casualties in the first edition. The combination of enemy images and visual attention of the attractive female soldier is also interesting from a gender perspective (von der Lippe 2006). The contrast between the beast-like image of Ali Hassan al-Majd and the beautiful woman representing the armed forces of the US, although still responsible for the death of Kazem Mohammed’s family, is striking. And here we are at the core of perception management. The intention of this PSYOPS was to establish positive connotations with the US and to demonize “the other”: an essential element of the attempt to create links between the Saddam Hussein regime and al Qaeda.

Second case: Fallujah

In an earlier work, Ottosen examined VG’s coverage of Fallujah (Ottosen 2009). With that work as the basis, we will dig deeper into how the visual representation of the battle was presented to the readers of VG during the attacks on Fallujah in November 2004, and show how the purpose of the operation was to justify the attack that left Fallujah in ruins and with hundreds of civilian casualties: the operation, named “Dawn”, could, according to VG, develop into the most difficult street battle the Americans have fought since the Vietnam War and the battle over the town of Hue. VG portrays the resistance as “a desperate and sometimes invisible enemy that knows the city and every house as well as its own pocket”. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld is quoted saying that the purpose of the battle is to “strangle the rebellion in Iraq once and for all. And to clear the ground for the elections in January.” The rhetoric in his quoted words includes all the signs of propaganda: “Success in Fallujah will be a setback for the terrorists in the country”, he says at a press conference in the Pentagon. At that time 42 rebels had been killed; to balance this VG quotes a doctor in Fallujah who, according to AP, reported about 12 civilian casualties and 17 wounded, among them a five-year old girl and a ten-year old boy. Rumsfeld uses the word “job” to describe the attack: “This is a difficult job”; and his words are uncritically used by VG in the story. Rumsfeld promises “to fulfil the job and not stop in the way the Americans did in April”. The war represented by the metaphor “job” is commonly used in earlier war propaganda (Luostarinen & Ottosen 2002).
A more detailed exposition would place the November massacres against the background of the failed operation in Falujah in April of the same year. It would indicate a possible hidden agenda of revenge for the humiliation that the US soldiers were exposed to at that time. To quote the same journalist on April 1, 2004: “The scenes from Fallujah were so grotesque that US television viewers were protected from the pictures. At least two bodies were dragged through the streets by a car. The corpses were hung in telephone wires.” The images of the dead soldiers were published in many Western media and were obviously humiliating for the US, so revenge could be behind the attack six months later. But revenge was never an issue in the Norwegian media coverage (Eide & Ottosen 2007). The readers of VG received little information about the situation facing the civilian population of Fallujah – but of course this should be seen in light of the circumstances in which these five articles were written. The Pentagon’s media strategy was to control the access to information. It is not our intention to moralize about the journalist at VG, but, still, it is intriguing to see in retrospect what was missing in these articles and, interestingly enough, British newspapers such as The Guardian were able to print critical articles about Fallujah with numerous pictures to underline the massive destruction. The information was available soon afterwards for those who wanted it (based on Ottosen 2007). The Guardian had a fully illustrated supplement on January 11, 2005 – to our mind an effective piece of peace journalism, since it used photos to document the devastation of the city and the consequences for the civilian population. The Iraqi medical doctor and writer, Al Fadhil, entered the city on December 24 and documented the effects of war through a diary and photos. He talked to some lingering civilians who blamed the US forces and also the resistance fighters who didn’t care about their destiny and their ruined city. He entered the city center on December 24, and wrote: “By 10 a.m. we were inside the city. It was completely devastated, destruction everywhere. It looked like a city of ghosts.” (Fadhil 2005) Using photographs, he documented destroyed mosques and ruined homes, dead bodies, insulting slogans written in English on bathroom mirrors.

The contrast is striking between The Guardian, which chose to find an alternative source to document the horrors of war, and VG with its traditional use of information distributed by elite sources and intended to draw attention away from civilian casualties.

One of the paradoxes in the so-called “global war on terror” is the chaos created in Iraq when the US forces left the country. Al Qaeda had no presence in Iraq before the invasion in 2003. In January 2014, al Qaeda took control of the city of Fallujah (later identified as the group ISIL). As always, the civilian population paid the price (BBC World January 4, 2014).
Peace journalism as a strategy of reflexive and conscious journalism?

Peace journalism has been suggested as an alternative journalistic programme. It relates to dissident voices in opposition to the naivety of traditional and uncritical war journalism and to peace and conflict research. As professional credo, peace journalism has developed counter-strategies and an alternative agenda. The basic idea is to escape from the war propaganda trap of symbolically constructing armed conflicts as polarised, black and white, and as win or lose situations – these ways of portrayal and of storytelling are, however, the staple food of the journalist profession, and will not easily be replaced. If the traditional media are themselves unable to relay alternative perspectives and voices, the danger is that those parts of the global village that feel marginalized will turn to terror in order to make a difference to the media agenda. Peace journalism, as suggested by Johan Galtung (2002), defines war as a problem in itself and promotes non-violence as a means of conflict resolution. Galtung’s model builds on the dichotomy and contrast between what he calls war journalism and peace journalism. Peace journalism has inspired individual journalists to look for alternative framing in a news environment highly influenced by propaganda and PSYOPS, but the question is whether this is enough to make an overall impact on the global news agenda where such forces play a strong role in shaping the cultural and political atmosphere (Miller 2007).

Galtung’s model includes four main points to contrast the two approaches: war journalism is violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented, and victory-oriented. This approach is often linked to a zero-sum game where the winner (as in sports journalism) takes all, and a prototype of what one might call traditional mainstream war coverage, without journalists reflecting on the fact that media itself is playing a role in the conflict, and often escalating conflicts by reproducing propaganda developed as part of media strategies and PR campaigns by the parties involved (based on Ottosen 2009; cf. Chapters 1 and 4).

The peace journalism approach assumes a moral and ethical point of departure, acknowledging that media themselves play a role in the propaganda war, intentionally or unintentionally. The peace journalism approach may make a conscious choice to identify alternative options for the readers/viewers by offering a solution-oriented, people-oriented, and truth-oriented approach that means focusing on possibilities for peace that the opposing parties may have an interest in hiding. Peace journalism is people-oriented in the sense that it focuses on the victims (often civilian) and thus gives a voice to the voiceless. It is also truth-oriented in the sense that it reveals untruth on all sides and focuses on propaganda as a means of continuing the war (Galtung 2002: 261-270).
In their book *Peace Journalism* (2005), Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick further developed Galtung’s model and turned it into a practical tool for journalists. They have themselves been practising the model in media such as SKY and BBC, and offer techniques showing how to practise peace journalism, demonstrated with examples from their own journalistic practice. They argue that the peace journalism option accepts that every war takes places in an atmosphere of propaganda in which the parties often offer confrontation as the only path. By pointing in the direction of a peaceful solution, journalists can offer the audience a broader perspective in a given conflict by using “insights of conflict analyses and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting.” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005: 5) They see the potential of peace journalism as the provision of a road map “tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the story they cover and the consequences of their journalism” into what they call the “ethics of journalistic intervention”. Their ambition is to raise “awareness of nonviolence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting.” (ibid)

Peace journalism can be seen as a normative mode of responsible and conscientious coverage of conflict that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards war and peace (Shinar 2007). Shinar maintains that peace journalism questions the media preferences for violence, simple descriptions, fighting parties, conflict, “sports-like situations” and lack of interest in peace-related stories and topics. In contrast, Shinar suggests a focus on:

- Exploring backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, and presenting causes and options on every side so as to portray conflict in realistic terms, transparent to audiences;
- Giving voice to the views of all rival parties;
- Offering creative ideas for conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping and development;
- Exposing lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and revealing excesses committed by, and suffering inflicted on, peoples of all parties;
- Paying more attention to peace stories and post-war developments than to regular coverage of conflict;
- Promoting realistic and cautious attitudes towards the success that peace journalism may have in overcoming resistance and rejection, as well as criticizing excessive enthusiasm on the part of peace journalism supporters.
Preliminary conclusions

We have developed some ideas in this chapter that could serve as a point of departure for the further debate on the conditions for a national news agenda in a globalized media environment (for example, Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Given the theoretical points of departure and the empirical observations mentioned above, it seems important to consider the extent to which the peace journalism model is adequate for the present global situation. Even though peace journalism can offer a working tool for individual journalist in a hectic newsroom, we raise the question of whether this is enough to change a global news agenda highly influenced by PSYOPS and perception management. Our findings presented here, with examples from the war in Iraq 2003 in general and during the attacks on Fallujah in particular, call for more focus on how media researchers and journalist should meet these challenges. Supported by recent literature, we suggest that the capability of power circles in the military-industrial complex to influence the global news agenda through PR techniques and perception management are much more efficient than often suggested (Schechter 2006). We would suggest that the following complications are discussed further:

Provided that it is correct to state, as we have done in this chapter, that the “global war on terror” is something much more far-reaching than any previous war – and even more than the so-called new wars – the peace journalism strategy seems to have some shortcomings. It aims at situations of military violence and how they are reported instead of the polarisation and mobilising processes, including the making of threat-policy, which eventually may lead to open violence. In this respect, peace journalism could probably learn from crisis communication research, which focuses more on the processes and mechanisms that explain the emergence of crises. Since both terrorism and counter-terrorism nurture a culture of fear abroad as well as domestically, it may be better to explore the role of the media for the kind of cultural and sense-making activities that tend to create a shift from risk society to threat society.

Our reflections based on Fairclough’s analysis of the “global war on terror” discourse, and the empirical observations from the Iraq war 2003, indicate that the media by themselves are to only a very small degree (or not at all) capable of resisting threat policy strategies. On the contrary, it seems that the media logic, in many ways, provides the means and mechanisms by which such policies can be pursued easily and with great success by strategists competent to muster them.

The conflict resolution activities and peace journalism courses and seminars offered by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or journalism schools are certainly very important for the resistance against the proliferation of threat policy. But it seems that something equivalent to the Swedish Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the Norwegian International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) is needed in the media sector in order to counter the increasingly threatening features of the “global war on terror” discursive order. In combination with a UN-based early warning system for new upcoming media waves of threat policy, such institutional reforms might turn the tide of a fear culture flooding the news media in late modernity. In relation to the UN policy for democratization, with its focus on elections and legal reforms in authoritarian countries, such a media monitoring institute could be a “missing link” in the attempts to support democracy and human rights.

Note
1. For a more detailed presentation of the concept of threat society, see Nohrstedt 2010.
Previous research shows that national contexts have substantial framing effects on mediated war discourses. After 9/11 and the “global war on terror” international politics changed dramatically, and new foreign and security policy alliances have emerged. In the Scandinavian region the previous division between NATO members (Denmark and Norway) and non-aligned countries (Finland and Sweden) has gradually become less important and new patterns of co-operation are taking over. The Nordic countries are presently involved in a formal defense co-operation through NORDCAPS (Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangement for Peace Support), NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Co-operation), and NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defense Structures).

In this chapter we investigate what this new situation means for security policy discourses in the media. By analyzing the proposal for closer military co-operation between the NATO member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden, jointly presented by the two countries’ commanders-in-chief in August 2007, we will critically consider how useful Johan Galtung’s peace journalism model is for the analysis of such a debate. As a complementary approach we propose critical discourse analysis (CDA) because of its more sophisticated methodology for contextualizing.

The strategic importance of Norway and Sweden
First, some background on the strategic importance of Scandinavia in the global security political theatre. Norway, on the border of the former Soviet Union/present Russia has always been essential for NATO; the huge sea areas between Norway, Russia and Svalbard is of utmost importance for naval strategies and the gathering of intelligence (Wormdal 2011; Tunander 1989). During the Cold War any critical reporting on sensitive military issues was met with suspicion and counter-measures. The Norwegian Freedom of Expression Commission admit-
In 1999 that there were restriction on the freedom of expression in Norway in the field of security policy during the Cold War (Dahl & Bastiansen 1999).

In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing newspapers and magazines started to challenge the pro-NATO policy advocated by the mainstream press (Hellebust 1990). Newspapers such as *Ny Tid*, *Klassekampen* and *Ikkevold* printed a series of articles that represented a new kind of investigative journalism in the field of security policy and foreign policy. Journalists were prosecuted for disapproving articles on the secret police and investigative reporting on NATO exercises against civilian demonstrators. Reporters and editors of *Ny Tid* and *Klassekampen* were convicted. In Sweden, in a similar case, the journalists Jan Guillou and Peter Bratt of the magazine *Folket in Bild* were sent to jail for revealing the secret intelligence organization IB. Common to these cases was that legislation to protect Norway and Sweden against foreign spies was used. There is a clear parallel between these cases and the treatment of whistle-blowers like Bradley (Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden in the present atmosphere in the US.

In Norway in 1985 the offices of *Ikkevold* (a magazine for Norwegian war resisters) were raided by police who arrested journalists and confiscated the list of subscribers. The background was a series of articles revealing that secret US listening facilities in the north of Norway violated the official Norwegian security politics which claimed that no foreign bases should be situated on Norwegian soil. Despite the fact that the reporters had used open sources, anti-spy laws were again used in the trial. When, in 1986, a majority in the Supreme Court (by one vote) acquitted the reporters, the freedom of expression in Norway was extended in the area of security politics (Ottosen 2010).

A new basis was also created for the possibility of investigative reporting in the mainstream press. In 1997, the journalist Ståle Hansen of *Nordlands Framtid* won an award from the Foundation for a Critical and Investigative Press (SKUP) for revealing that Norwegian fighter planes were equipped to carry nuclear weapons and that in the 1950s and 60s Norwegian pilots received training in using such weapons contrary to Norwegian policy. The journalist Inge Sellevåg of *Bergens Tidende* received an SKUP award in 2000 for his critical reports on the radar station in Vardø close to the Russian border (Hjeltnes 2010: 246). He concluded that the radar played an important role in the plan for a new American “star wars defense”: Norwegian defense authorities had always denied this claim (*Dagbladet* May 22, 2000).

A precondition for critical journalism in the field of security policy and international conflicts is that the journalists take a distanced view of what politicians declare as national interest. In all the Nordic countries we find periods of self-censorship at times when public sentiment is influenced by fear of a foreign “threat” (Dahl 1999). Arne Ruth, the former editor of *Dagens Nyheter*, has pointed out the lack of interest in the Swedish press in digging into the painful story of how large sections of the Swedish media expressed pro-German
attitudes during the Second World War. He explains that a self-critical process first became possible when it was legitimized from “outside” by foreign reporters. Only when foreign media started writing about the Swedish contribution to the money-laundering of valuables plundered by the Nazis from the Jews was it no longer possible to defend self-censorship in the Swedish media.2

Self-censorship is well known in a Nordic context. At various times journalists have failed to provide public access to sensitive issues that touch the interests of the nation. Finnish journalists had problems writing critically about their powerful neighbor in the east during the Cold War (Thölix 1999). In this volume we will document examples of how Norwegian and Swedish media have failed to raise critical issues of national interest on matters related to NATO and ISAF.

Earlier research
Our earlier studies of media coverage of the Gulf War 1990-91, the Kosovo War 1999, the Afghanistan War 2001, and the Iraq War 2003 have revealed the different framing of these conflicts in our respective countries’ media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005; Nohrstedt, Höijer & Ottosen 2002). However, considering the close collaboration between Norway’s and Sweden’s troops in Afghanistan, and also with US and other NATO members’ military forces during the “global war on terror”, it seems important to analyze how these changes are discursively constructed for public information and deliberations. A particularly interesting and relevant case here is the ongoing political elitist debate within the Nordic defense forces seeking a new role in the post-Cold War era.3 The main question in this chapter is if and how these strategical security policy matters are constructed and manufactured for deliberations by public opinion.

Methodological approach
The earlier research mentioned above concerning the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq were all based on extensive empirical material with comparative studies of the media coverage in several countries, including Sweden and Norway. Several methods were used combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of genres, use of sources, and framing. The character of the study presented here differs from the abovementioned since the topic, Nordic defense co-operation, was not a “hot” topic in the news during the selected period 2007-2008.4 The lack of news journalism coverage of this important issue in the mainstream media at that time was actually our first result. Instead of concentrating our analysis on news reporting as in previous studies, our take is on the ways in which editorials, debates and feature articles in mainstream
media relate discursively to the original debate item – or spin – written by the
two commanders-in-chief which brought the military collaboration plans to
public attention. Furthermore, unlike in our earlier studies, the aim here is not
cross-national comparison but, rather, comparative analysis of different types
of media in order to get maximum variation, whether the material comes from
Norwegian or Swedish media. Since the first quantitative result (the lack of
substantial news material) is valid in both countries, the idea here is to look
in more detail at the comments which followed from the initial debate article
in a situation where the space for “legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986; see
also about “doxa” below) was restricted to the minimum. The main purpose
here is not so much the empirical results as such, and as representations of the
conditions of the public sphere in our two countries; we would rather regard
the argumentation as an explorative inquiry into the value of the peace journal-
ism model for media studies of conflict communication and opinion-building.

With these considerations we selected mainstream newspapers and Nettavi-
sen for our analysis. A special reason for the choice of Nettavisen was the
opportunity to include comments from readers in the electronic field beneath
the published article providing responses “from below” on the spin by the elite
sources in the military and political sectors.

A Nordic model?
The Nordic model is often referred to as a role model for other countries since
the self-image of the Nordic countries is often linked to the claim of putting
humanitarian interests to the fore (Leira et al. 2007). The quest for equality,
international solidarity, and the willingness to share wealth with poor countries
as development aid are all included in this self-image. Norway has even tried
to brand itself as a “humanitarian great power” in its official foreign policy
(ibid.). Analysts such as the Norwegian scholar Terje Tvedt have disparaged this
rhetoric and image-building, claiming that the Scandinavian countries should
be judged by their actual policies rather than their self-image (Tvedt 2003).
We support this criticism and will question whether Norwegian and Swedish
participation as allied to the US in the “global war on terror” tends to play a
negative rather than a positive role on the global scene. To be more precise,
we will argue that this self-image might in itself become a risk factor for the
two small countries. Ignoring the actual danger in getting involved as an ally
of the US in the “global war on terror”, by hiding this policy behind humanitar-
ian rhetoric the two countries can easily be dragged into military adventures
framed as peace-building and humanitarian intervention.

We will also consider Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of doxa or the doxic room
(the non-political, non-discussable room) (Bourdieu 1998). The notion of doxa
was originally used by ancient Greek rhetoricians as a tool for the formation of argument by referring to common opinions; the doxa was often manipulated by sophists to persuade the people to follow the arguments of the leaders. In Bourdieu’s use of the notion of doxa he suggests that some issues are not introduced into the public discourse because the leaders simply try to avoid public discussions on certain topics. These issues are, so to speak, kept out of the agenda, leaving behind the false impression of consensus (von der Lippe 1991). We argue that doxa can be a useful approach to understanding why obviously relevant issues such as the common risk for Sweden and Norway through participation in the “global war on terror” is left out of the public debate when defense co-operation between Norway and Sweden is discussed in the media.

In Sweden, the traditional opinion against membership of NATO has grown in the period 2008-12 and has returned to the same level as in the mid-1990s (Bjereld 2013:612, tab. 1). The Swedish opinion on military engagement in Afghanistan has changed from ambivalence to clear resistance – that is, support for withdrawal – during the same timespan (Ydén & Berndsson 2013: 625, tab. 4).

In Norway, a number of polls in the years 2007 to 2010 show a fluctuating majority supporting the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan, but a significant minority of 32 to 37 per cent opposing Norwegian military presence. A survey published by Infact/VG in August 2010 showed a majority in favour of pulling troops out (49 per cent) compared to the 36 per cent who supported the presence of Norwegian forces (Eide & Ottosen 2013: 24).

Since there seems to be unity among politicians in both Sweden and Norway that the two countries should support the US in the “global war on terror”, they apparently try to avoid public debate on the issue by treating it as a topic “beyond discussion”.

The peace journalism discourse

Peace journalism has been proposed as an alternative to traditional war journalism by several scholars as well as some journalists after the original ideas were formulated by Johan Galtung (Galtung 2002) – but it is also disparaged. The BBC reporter David Loyn is perhaps the best example of a well-respected journalist in the mainstream media who has openly opposed the peace journalism approach. In a special issue of *Conflict & Communication Online* the opponents and defenders of peace journalism discuss its relevance and importance. Loyn prefers to use terms such as “truthfulness” and “objectivity” as journalistic guidelines, even though he acknowledges the limitations of those terms: “On this analysis, if we accept that objectivity is at least a worthy aspiration, even though not a tool to achieve the ‘whole truth’, then peace journalism fails a key test by imposing other expectations onto journalists.” (Loyn 2007:5)
Loyn is disturbed by Galtung’s original model for war journalism and peace journalism. According to him, the categories in the model are too dualistic. He claims that journalism as it is practised in everyday news journalism seldom fits into war journalism or peace journalism categories. Loyn presents his own experiences as a reporter in the Kosovo and Rwanda conflicts to suggest that if the peace journalism approach had been preferred the outcome would have been worse because it would have prevented interference to stop mass murders. He argues that in Northern Ireland the peace journalism principle of transparency would have made the secret negotiations between the parties impossible. In the case of Kosovo, Loyn comes very close to the journalism of attachment position by claiming that the Serb atrocities towards the Albanians were the most important issue and should have been in the focus of reporting. By uncritically quoting the former US secretary of state, Colin Powell, describing the political and military nature of US military intervention (it should be winnable, there should be no other option, and there should be an exit strategy), Loyn reveals his shortcomings in understanding the character of the US superpower. Least of all, to our minds, can a superpower be judged solely on its own rhetoric.

At the end of his article Lyon concludes the discussion with some interesting reflections on the quest for objectivity in journalism. In our view the discussion should begin where Loyn stops. The weakness in Loyn’s argument is the lack of context. We agree with Jake Lynch’s criticism of Loyn that propaganda by the different parties in the conflict must be contextualized in the analyses. Loyn does not mention propaganda and media strategies by the great powers through spin and PR, and is thus unable to see the serious challenges confronting journalists in the battlefield and war-zones. Another critic of peace journalism, the media researcher Thomas Hanitzch, approaches it from a completely different angle, arguing that the peace journalism advocates underestimate the material conditions for modern news reporting and overestimate the possibilities for journalist under hectic deadline pressure to contextalize their stories as Lynch and others suggest. He thinks that a complex model like Galtung’s is unfitted for the highly standardized narrative schemes of modern news production and that promoting peace is no more noble than public relations campaigns and the journalism of attachment which suggest military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing (as in Kosovo). Even though Hanitzch is sympathetic to many of the points suggested in peace journalism, such as the exposure of lies, cover-ups, and war crimes on all sides, he suggests that this might as well be labelled “good journalism” (Hanitzch 2007: 7).

In answering his critics, Lynch claims that they underestimate leaders in the Western world when it comes to the willingness and ability to manipulate the media. Lynch argues that it is especially in the phase of a conflict when there is mobilisation to go to war based on rhetoric in favor of “humanitarian intervention” (as in Yugoslavia in 1999 and prior to the war in Iraq in 2003),
that the propaganda dimension must be integrated in the war reporting by the media; and that it is vital that media coverage avoids being seduced by propaganda rhetoric and the vocabulary of spin doctors in favor of war. Lynch stresses that the basic aim of peace journalists is to “create opportunities for society at large to consider non-violent responses.” (Lynch 2007) He censures Loyn for underestimating the effects of propaganda. Quoting Entman, Lynch argues that in order to give the audience the full picture journalists should make visible what the propaganda machinery leaves out: peace alternatives and realistic information on the risky consequences of war (Lynch 2007: 2).

We basically support Lynch’s position and would perhaps put even more emphasis on the impact of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and their influence over media reporting. In retrospect, many of the misleading stories defending the intervention in Iraq 2003 had their origin in disinformation caused by PSYOPS and propaganda (Eide & Ottosen 2008). One important PSYOPS operation was the US army pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein and then portraying it as a spontaneous reaction from the people of Baghdad (see also Introduction, Chapter 3 and Conclusions).

The importance of propaganda before the 2003 Iraq War is underlined in recent literature. In Michael Isikoff’s and David Corn’s book Hubris, the authors argue that the Bush administration misled opinion in their campaign for war to a level that has been underestimated by the media. The US vice-president, Dick Cheney, misused the CIA and picked the information that suited argument for a war, putting aside information contradicting claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. For example in a speech in front of veterans of foreign wars on August 6, 2002, Cheney misused facts from the CIA and claimed: “There is now doubt he is amassing WMD to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” (Isikoff & Corn 2006: 28-29) Isikoff and Corn reveal a forceful will in the Bush administration to go to war on any account. When Karl Rove once told the president about polls suggesting that public opinion opposed the war, the president exploded: “Don’t tell me about fucking polls. I don’t care what the polls say.” (op. cit.: 29) The extent of systematic lies repeated again and again had an effect and public opinion became more sympathetic to war as the solution to the “problem Saddam Hussein”.

The Center for Public Integrity has documented that on 532 occasions the Bush administration produced a total of 935 false statements in the period between October 2002 to August 2003 (Lewis & Reading-Smith 2008).

In our view, David Loyn’s position in the debate takes a naive point of departure. It presupposes that the media start their war reporting with “blank sheets”. We suggest that the peace journalism model can serve as a useful checklist for both journalists and media researchers and as a guideline in a propaganda-infected landscape. Media researcher Wilhelm Kempf has successfully used the peace journalism approach in his own research; he basically
supports the framework of peace journalism even though he criticizes the book *Peace journalism* by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick for its argument against Loyn’s position on objectivity:

To radically turn away from the call for objectivity, as suggested by Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) or Hackett (2006), not only endangers the acceptance of the peace journalism project in the journalistic community, however, but also twists peace journalism into a form of advocacy journalism, which lead directly to PR and propaganda and can squander the trust bonus its recipients grant to peace journalism. (Kempf 2007: 7; cf 2006)

**Critique of peace journalism from a CDA perspective**

In the vibrant debate on peace journalism, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is underestimated. CDA has emerged as one of the most influential approaches within media studies in general and could play a vital role in research on war and peace journalism as well. We believe that the debate on journalism research can gain a lot by drawing more on this linguistically-inspired analysis. There are a number of possible consequences if this idea is pursued in war journalism and peace journalism – both as practice and as object of analysis.

If you define journalism as a discourse this implies that the final journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. All these levels cannot then be collapsed into a singular “manifest content” level for, as in other fields of communication, meaning is based on multilevel inter-relations. This also means that in CDA aspects of mediated conflict coverage that are rarely noticed (or not noticed at all) in debates about journalism, such as the importance of the context, the interdiscursive relations, and the meaning of omissions, are addressed and integrated into the analysis. Considering that the discourse concept is defined by the institutional dimension, the structural conditions and the organisational setting are the center of attention. This is not unique to the CDA, but coherently treated in this approach as fundamental for any reasonable conclusions. Hence, when media content is analyzed the layers of meaning related to and alluding to other discourses beyond journalism itself are of particular importance. These interrelated sets of discourses are, however, not randomly configured in our application of CDA but, rather, regarded as constituting a “discursive order”, a term invented by Norman Fairclough (1995). We will soon exemplify the ways in which these theoretical points of departure are put to use in our analytical work, but first a few more comments to position ourselves in the CDA research field.

The label “critical” has relevance as one common denominator for the CDA researchers as it indicates the normative character of their project(s); communication is explored with the intention of pointing out possible realities other than
that which is under investigation. This normative orientation also comes with a theoretical focus on the relations of power, dominance, and hegemony. These are all challenged as obstacles to the empowerment of the common people caught in the discursive nets spun by ideologues, PR strategists, politicians, and the like. As indicated above, one of the critical angles of CDA research is its insistence on hidden assumptions and latent, but nevertheless relevant, cognitive or emotive discursive elements.

The CDA field is inhabited by three different “schools”: the socio-psychological Dutch variant with Teun van Dijk as the leading figure; the linguistic British school with Norman Fairclough as the best-known scholar; and the discourse-historical approach developed by the Austrian school with Ruth Wodak as the leader (Wodak 1996; 2001). Since Wodak’s appointment at Lancaster University in the UK, the geographical dimension is somewhat obsolete, and in addition it should be mentioned that all these “schools” collaborate extensively and seem to regard their differences as complementary assets.

In this chapter we will rely mainly on the historically oriented variant as developed by Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak & Benke 2001) because of their successful applications of inter-discursive analysis diacronically, and the insights they offer on the operations of contextual conditions for the creation of meaning in different settings such as parliamentary debates, public ceremonies, media, exhibitions, or vox populi chat on the street corner. Owing to practical limitations, we will concentrate on journalism as a discourse related to defense policy discourses in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War. Although this is a limited empirical basis for conclusions about the fruitfulness of applying CDA, we nevertheless hope to be able to make some critical, although constructive, comments to the debate about peace journalism. It makes sense because a war must be analyzed as a historical process starting far earlier than the firing of the first bullet and to understand potential wars and conflicts in the years to come we must look at the arguments in the security policy debate today. As indicated above, we are positive about the intentions and the critique of mainstream war journalism coming from the peace journalism movement but it seems to us that it could benefit from an integration of some of the theoretical ideas that CDA provides about understanding meaning-making as produced by discursive acts. If Norway and Sweden will be involved in future wars we might already, in the contemporary debate, find the reason for this – not only in the arguments supporting a war-oriented policy, but also in topics that are kept out of the debate. Here, we think that CDA has advantages that are not captured by the peace journalism model.

We contend that the CDA approach can offer: 1) a way to manage the demand on contextual reflexivity raised in the debate about peace journalism; 2) integration of the propaganda discourses during peacetime, which are mainly neglected in the Galtung model but might in reality be the most important
stage for media influence on conflict escalation; 3) a historical perspective – especially in the historical CDA approach as developed by Wodak and associates – in which discursive uses of historical analogies and examples are emphasised. In the examples we discuss below two points in particular are important: First, that even a discourse about peace-building and security plans may turn out to be a step towards conflict escalation and should not be left out of the critical analysis. Second, contextually speaking we suggest that even a discourse qualifying as peace journalism according to Galtung’s terminology could, in the context of the “global war on terror”, and depending on its consequences, be suspected of being the very opposite (that is, war journalism). These are challenges for the critical media research field studying mediated conflict reporting today.

**Empirical example 1: Norwegian media**

In the fall of 2007, the heads of Norwegian and Swedish defense at the time, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, published a joint article in the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet* and the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, proposing closer co-operation between the two countries on military affairs and defense issues. Among the proposals were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines, and co-operation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles. In the background there is also the recent issue of Norway replacing its F-16 fighters with a new generation of fighters – the candidates were the Swedish plane JAS Gripen, produced by SAAB, the European Eurofighter and the US-produced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under construction by Lockheed Martin.

As mentioned in the methodological section above, we will analyze, through a case study, how a few selected media in each country covered this initiative as a news event. We will also see which potentially important issues were kept out of the news coverage. The Swedish example is the way *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*, the leading quality paper and the largest tabloid in Sweden respectively, reported about the Diesen-Syrén proposal. The Norwegian case is a news story in the electronic newspaper Nettavisen, owned by the commercial TV station TV2, the only major digital newspaper in Norway which is a purely electronic publication (the other major electronic papers are web versions connected to and owned by print newspapers). Our reason for choosing this Internet outlet is that the readers can comment on the article in an electronic debate forum published after the article itself. By using this in our analyses we are able to include some of the arguments in the public discourse following the article.

The article in question was published for Norwegians in *Dagbladet* August 31, 2007 under the title “Want a Norwegian-Swedish defense?”. The article states that a proposal on defense co-operation turns the traditional way of thinking about
military affairs in the two countries upside down. Norway has traditionally been a NATO member while Sweden has a long tradition of nonalignment which is now partly broken through the country’s membership of the EU.

The article in Nettavisen has a link to the published text in Dagbladet. In the original text by Diesen-Syrén the sovereignty of the two countries is addressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist which does not invite discussion – the crucial question is only touched upon and then dismissed: “We must turn all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet).” The issue of whether Sweden wants to retain its non-alignment security policy could have raised an important debate, but is expelled to a historical past. Further, the two commanders underline that the proposed collaboration is “only” about the purchase of submarines, tanks, and so on. Also mentioned is the co-ordination of “supply, education, training and doctrines”. The framing and tone is assuring and comforting. These new plans are only natural, uncontroversial and part of a necessary development: “The possibilities are already many in the year 2012 and will grow further in the future.” The co-operation will not restrict the freedom of action. On the contrary, it will improve relations: “A deeper Swedish-Norwegian collaboration provides opportunities to make our production of military forces more efficient. In this way we can strengthen our common influence within the entire European and Euro-Atlantic security co-operation.”

In terms of macro-theme the article states that military co-operation makes it possible to finance the production and purchase of defense equipment. By the disposition and the selection of words and expressions the co-operation is described as economically necessary and politically desirable. It is furthermore presented as entirely natural and uncontroversial, as “of course nothing new”; “both sides … will certainly keep their full national right to make decisions about the uses of the forces”; it has “strong political support in both our countries”. However, a certain urgency is indicated because a choice of direction has to be decided: “We now wish to get a clear and broad political mandate to proceed from idea to action. The time is short. In both our countries the defense forces face challenges in the coming years that make decisions about the direction urgent.”

In an attached interview, Sverre Diesen states that he foresees no major practical problems with the proposal and that he regards it as a challenge to the politicians in the two countries. He further mentions that he has sent a written proposal to the Norwegian defense minister at the time Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, claiming that it is now up to the politicians to decide how
close the future defense co-operation between the two countries should be. He stresses that the proposal does not include the controversy over Norway’s choice of a new generation of fighter planes.

Nettavisen asked Diesen whether he suspects problems in NATO because of the proposal. Diesen responds that it is not a problem for a NATO member like Norway and a EU member like Sweden to work closely together. He mentions that Sweden is already a member of NATO’s partner organisation Partnership for Peace (PfP), and also stresses that Sweden is already in the process of adapting to NATO standards in a number of areas. There will be few practical problems because of this, and each country will also, in the future, have full control over its own defense.

Nettavisen then asks Diesen to be more exact on the issue of “common military doctrines”.

He answers [our translation]: “Norway has not decided on a hierarchy of doctrines, but there are several documents offering guidelines at a national level. When we work together in an international context, in UN, NATO, EU, or in PfP, it is vital that one has a common doctrine which is decisive for the policy. Thus it is logical and practical that Sweden and Norway jointly contribute to the development of this doctrine.”

Interestingly enough, Diesen does not comment on the fact that Norway and Sweden both contribute to the NATO-led ISAF force in Afghanistan. And neither the journalist nor Diesen touches upon the historical fact that before Norway joined NATO there was a Swedish suggestion to establish a Nordic defense alliance as a possible alternative solution for Norway and Denmark. This suggestion played a major role in the public debate prior to Norway’s decision to join NATO (Furre 1991). Many people on the left saw it as a preferable solution for Norway. Bjorgulv Braanen, the editor of the left-wing newspaper Klassekampen, also made a point of this in his commentary on September 4, stating that it was “a tragedy that the plan for a joint Nordic defense co-operation was smashed after the [Second World War] by US-loyal top politicians who preferred membership of NATO”. With this position, Klassekampen is a dissenting voice in the Norwegian media landscape.

The response from the readers

Twelve different contributions on Nettavisen’s website covered a number of issues. Interestingly, several of the comments touched upon historical facts in the relationship between Sweden and Norway.

The first was by Leif Rognan under the title “Illusion about security”. This op-piece falls within what we could call a traditional pro-NATO discourse. He rejects the idea that even a totally integrated Swedish-Norwegian defense will offer Norway the security the country needs with Russia as an increasingly
self-conscious neighbor. He suspects that this proposal will be used by the Norwegian left to weaken NATO and the US. He fears that in practical terms this will weaken “our” defense capability and bring “us” to a situation similar to the appeasement policy prior to the Second World War. He ends with a wish that Norwegian politicians will, despite this new Nordic hype, not be tempted to undermine “our” freedom and independent policy. His last sentence is: “If our foreign and security policy is to be based on hatred for the US we will face an insecure future.”

The next comment is written in the tradition of what one might call a traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel. It is by the pseudonym “Tittenteii” under the humorous title “Swegian defense co-operation”. Its ironic undertone is struck by the introductory statement: “First we can get back Jamtland and Herjedalen” [areas in the border region that once belonged to Norway]. Then Tittenteii reminds us that Sweden saw to it that Norway had to pay more to the EU for the agreement of the European Economic Area (EØS) than was originally proposed and suggests that Sweden probably will “help us” by increasing the defense expenses as well.

“Tiger” replies to this, picking up on the half joking tone, and suggests that if we must have a new generation fighter planes we should choose the Swedish fighter JAS-Gripen. But he thinks the money could be better used on health care and for elderly people. He also suggests that we stop the “madness” and refuse to buy the more expensive American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

“Ola Smart” replies: “Bullshit! JSF is decades ahead and much more advanced than Eurofighter and Gripen. We need the best plane and JSF is the best.

“JKT” replies to this: “Of course we must co-operate with Sweden. We need much closer ties than today”. Without saying so explicitly, this is relaunching the old idea of a joint Nordic defense alternative, proposed by Sweden before Norway joined NATO.

“Sceptical” answers ironically: “Great idea, bring in Finland and Denmark as well.”

“Tordensiold” skips the irony and suggests that the whole Nordic region (including Iceland) should have a joint defense, economically and practically.

“Balle Balle” answers: “This doesn’t work. The Swedes do this just to help Russia and the US to split our country in two”. He complains that the only unsolved issue is the border of the indigenous Sami area. According to him, the Norwegian-Swedish issue was dissolved when Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905. He wonders whether Swedish membership of NATO would be a new beginning for a closer relationship.

“PEM” picks up on this and claims: “I never understood why the union was dissolved … I see no advantages in a border and customs”. He mentions similarities in language and other reasons to want the union back, and regrets that the plans to merge the national telecompanies Telia and Telenor failed a
few years previously. He calls for formalized co-operation in more areas. Closer
ties with Sweden are much better for Norway than traumatizing the nation with
a new battle over EU membership.

“Ola Smart” is provoked. “What kind of bullshit is this?” He returns to the
traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel discourse and reminds that the
Swedes emptied our silver mines, and the Danes, during the period when they
were in union with Norway, brought us into several wars. “You are ignorant
and should read more history,” he claims.

“Affe” agrees with the last comment and claims that the Danes took our
language away, overtaxed us and suppressed us. “Ask the people on the Faroe
Islands if they enjoy Danish rule,” he asks polemically.

“Lars” thinks it is fine to shop in Sweden since prices are lower there. “But
we are closer to the Danes in mentality and way of life,” he claims. “Sorry, that’s
the way it is.” But he adds that the Swedes “are better than us at negotiations
and agreements – there we can learn something.”

And then the debate is over. Nobody mentions the fact that Norway and
Sweden are fighting together in Afghanistan, allied to the US in the ISAF forces
under NATO leadership in the “war on terror”. This important fact, so vital for
future events in the “global war on terror”, is not mentioned by Nettavisen,
Diesen or any of the Norwegian discussants.

**Empirical example 2: Swedish media**

When the commanders-in-chief of Norway and Sweden present the plans for
increased military collaboration in public, for Swedish citizens, the format is an
article in the *Dagens Nyheter* under the headline: “New defense co-operation
between Sweden and Norway” (August 31, 2007). As mentioned above, the
article urges – in general and vague language – that old ideas of sovereignty
must be forgotten, and obviously the text is intended to help the readers forget
all about them.

Two themes are absent from the article, themes that would be entirely rel-
levant to the historical-political substance of the matter: the Swedish proposal,
after the Second World War, of a Nordic defense alliance which had substantial
general support in the Nordic countries as an alternative to NATO; and the
fact that both countries are partners of the US in the EU/NATO operations in
Afghanistan as part of the “global war on terror”.

The semantic manoeuvres that the two commanders use are clearly intended
to avoid the concrete implications of the far-reaching co-operation plans. Con-
sequently, throughout the article they use abstract and imprecise expressions
when touching upon the kind of military joint venture of the future: “Euro-
Atlantic security co-operation”, “the international community (UN/EU/Nato)
“international peace operations”, and so on.
Since the proposed military co-operation is said to include 18 areas, of which only five are specified in the article, it is reasonable to expect that the collaboration will not only increase between the two Scandinavian countries but will also be extended to other NATO members. But this is not a theme in the article. On the contrary, it is quite remarkable how one-sided and energetically they argue when emphasising that freedom of action will grow because of the co-operation.

In the subsequent media coverage, silence or consensus is predominant. The debate is mention in the news, but without reference to any crucial questions or critical comments by the news media themselves or the public. The leading tabloid, Aftonbladet, reports briefly about the main content of the proposal, with some quotations from the article but no further comments (September 1, 2007). The implication of closer co-operation with NATO as a military alliance is remarkably absent in this social-democratic newspaper. In contrast, three Norwegian newspapers8 carried editorials commenting the proposal, but did not carry the story as news.

However, the foreign editor of the Dagens Nyheter contributes with a comment in its editorial of August 31, 2007. Since the 1990s, the newspaper had promoted Swedish NATO membership in its editorials, and the plans for Swedish-Norwegian military co-operation obviously gave the foreign editor an occasion to once again criticize the stubborn reluctance of the politicians to spell out in public the changes that had actually taken place in Swedish defense policy. The editorial’s headline “Open door to NATO” indicates that the defense collaboration should naturally be followed up with an application for Swedish NATO membership. Nevertheless, this is not something the editor expects to happen, primarily because left-wing politicians will continue their opposition and also because “there are only political losses to be made in a situation where the overwhelming majority of the Swedes are opponents to an application”. According to the editor, “… everything that is done points in the direction of an application being the natural consequence, at the same time as the official rhetoric pretends not to know what is actually going on.” He ends with the argument that it would be more honest to be outspoken – but without expressing much hope about that either. His final line of the editorial is: “What is happening is going to happen anyway.”

In an analytical comment on the proposal of defense co-operation in Dagens Nyheter on the same day, Ewa Sternberg claims that holy cows in Swedish defense policy are on their way to the slaughterhouse. One of them is the non-alignment policy if “we are knitting us together with the NATO country Norway”. She also mentions the polls showing that the Swedish people are against membership of NATO. “But an alliance with Nordic neighbour-countries does not need to be perceived so negatively. Even if the co-operation with Oslo brings us closer to Washington /…/ In the future there may be a Finnish army, a Swedish air force and a Norwegian navy in Scandinavia.”
An additional remark on the August 31 article on defense co-operation is that in a news bulletin a couple of weeks later (September 24) the web edition of Dagens Nyheter reported that the Norwegian broadcasting co-operation, NRK, had revealed that a classified report from the commander-in-chief Sverre Diesen expressed his view that Norway could not count on NATO in a serious conflict with Russia. The reason given is that NATO is so preoccupied with the “global war on terror”. An invasion of Norway is not a realistic scenario – but the fish, oil, and gas resources in the north could become challenges for Norway in its relations with the big military power in the east.

In conclusion the Swedish media discourse on defense co-operation is constructed as a noncontroversial and depoliticised issue, although one commentator mentioned that it would bring Sweden closer to NATO. Otherwise the rhetoric of the article by the two commanders seems to have been uncritically accepted – the proposed plans are simply the natural next steps on a road already chosen, and economic gains and operational improvements are the only objectives. The only disapproving point raised is when Dagens Nyheter repeats, yet again, that it would be helpful if, in particular, the social democrats acknowledged in public what they had long agreed to in private: increased collaboration with NATO. That there could be any conflict risks involved in becoming militarily engaged in the “global war on terror” in Afghanistan or elsewhere is remarkably absent from the Swedish discourse.

The debate on a joint defense revisited

In the summer of 2008 the heads of defense in Sweden and Norway picked up the debate again. This time they also invited the head of defense in Finland. In a joint article, Sverre Diesen, Håkan Syrén and Juhani Kaskela suggested a common Nordic defense system (Aftenposten June 18, 2008). They refer to the article by Diesen and Syrén in August 2007 and state that many of the suggestions have been discussed further and that a joint report has been presented to the ministers of defense in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, where 140 suggestions for mutual defense co-operation had been identified. Out of these they suggest that 40 should be implemented immediately. Among them are: “maritime surveillance, surveillance of the airspace, mutual land forces, common areas for practice, mutual Nordic bases for sea, air, and land support, medical support and military education”.

The article’s main argument is that the budget cuts experienced by the military forces in the three countries allow for the options of mutual co-operation or capacity reduction. The reason for these cutbacks is presented in a subtle manner. The doxa in relation to Nordic participation in the “global war on terror” is as obvious here as in the August 2007 article. The issue is only indirectly dealt with at the beginning of the article: “Most countries in the Euro-Atlantic
area have gone through huge reorganisation to prepare their defense to deal with increasingly complex tasks nationally and internationally.” In the report as a whole, the aim of co-ordinating joint efforts on the “global war on terror” is more clearly expressed. As an example point 42.2 of the document, in the following statement: “This could mean to share the burden of a task in international operations by contributing assets from all three nations, simultaneously or in sequence, into one assignment” (Nordic Supportive Defense Structure 2008: B:5).

Another way of putting this (which was not pointed out in the media at the time) is that military capacity in all the Nordic countries had been reduced because resources had been drained through the alliance with the US in the “global war on terror”. The question is whether public opinion in the Nordic countries would have agreed to this trade-off and the use of military and economic resources if the choice had been presented to them in a frank and open manner. In addition, in the Swedish defense debate at least, the huge and often badly calculated costs for the international military engagements have been “hot potatoes” for the government (see below for further details about the lack of transparency in the Swedish debate). After large sections of the Swedish defense industry have been bought up by US capital in recent decades, international collaboration in the “global war on terror” seems to be the reason for the continued spending of large amounts of taxpayers’ money on the defense sector, at the same time as it is the lever that will eventually dispose of the traditional nonalignment policy in Sweden.

*The controversy over the Joint Strike Fighter*

On 20 November 2008, the Norwegian parliament, after a short debate, made the in-principle decision to buy the US Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter as the Norwegian fighter plane of the future. The decision came after a long process in which the Swedish Saab Gripen was also a candidate. It was highly relevant to the debate on closer Nordic defense co-operation. The Swedish government was involved in the marketing efforts to convince the Norwegian politicians to choose the Swedish plane; included in the proposed contract was a comprehensive plan for industrial, economical and military co-operation, and a Norwegian decision to buy the Swedish plane would obviously have been an important step in strengthening Nordic co-operation. It would also mean a more independent role for Norway within the US-Norwegian relationship and NATO. The issue also caused controversy in the coalition government in Norway as the SV (the socialist left party) had, earlier in the process, been in favour of the Swedish/Nordic solution while the AP (the social democrats) supported the American solution. However, in the final vote in the Stortinget the SV supported the decision to choose the Joint Strike Fighter. In 2012, a unified Norwegian parliament finally voted to go for the Joint Strike Fighter.
The decision was met with disbelief from the Swedish government and the Swedish media who had problems understanding the Norwegian decision since, according to estimates, the Swedish Gripen plane would have been cheaper and an important step towards stronger Nordic defense co-operation. In Norway, the public debate and the media coverage was a confusing exercise. Government spokespersons insisted that the Joint Strike Fighter was cheaper and was more suited to fulfilling Norway’s military commitments in international operations. This could have given Norwegian media a reason to go into critical coverage of the whole process, but once again most mainstream media avoided criticism of the government. One important exception was Aftenposten’s journalist Kjell Dragnes who wrote several critical articles on the whole decision process around the choice of the Joint Strike Fighter. The independent Norwegian defense analyst John Berg has reckoned that even the official US figures concede that the Swedish Gripen solution was the cheapest (Berg 2009). The Norwegian Ministry of Defense succeeded in the parliamentary debate after which, on November 20, the government claimed that 48 Joint Strike Fighter planes could be purchased for 18 billion NOK and thus be cheaper than the Swedish Gripen. In the government report to parliament a month after the decision was made it was, however, concluded that 56 Joint Strike Fighter planes would cost 42 billion NOK, which was more expensive than the Gripen. Again, the mainstream media avoided confronting the government over the manipulation of prices and other facts, including the estimated life expectancy of both Gripen and Joint Strike Fighter (Berg 2009). After the decision was taken several of the countries involved in the project got cold feet and withdrew when it became clear that the whole project would be delayed and much more expensive than estimated. In April 2013, the Norwegian broadcasting company NRK-Brennpunkt documented that Norway was the only country involved in the project that had not had a critical political debate about the problems in the Joint Strike Fighter project.

One important aspect of this debate is that the US government has clearly stated that the Joint Strike Fighter fits into its global military strategy. The supporters of the Gripen have claimed that it was better fitted for the defense of the Norwegian coastline, and claimed that it was Norway’s close alliance with the US in the “global war on terror” that made it necessary to buy Joint Strike Fighters.

A few weeks after the Norwegian decision to buy Joint Strike Fighters, the former foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, tried in a public speech to launch again the idea of Nordic defense co-operation, but without much response from Swedish media (Berg 2009b). The Nordic defense concept is still alive in rhetoric from the Norwegian commander-in-chief, Sverre Diesen. In an article in Aftenposten on January 12, 2009 under the title “Why Nordic defense co-operation?” he again argued strongly for the common use of military equipment: “Thus, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the future will be able to operate the same types of tanks, infantry and field artillery”. Interestingly, Diesen does not
even mention, not with a single word, the Norwegian decision, two months earlier, to buy the American Joint Strike Fighter planes.

Obviously Norway has made its choice to maintain its position as the loyal ally of NATO and the US in the “global war on terror”. Sweden’s dilemma – to play a role in the “global war on terror” yet also to be an independent player in the industrial military market for a while – led to friction with the Norwegian government. Once again the doxa of the mainstream media made it almost impossible to confront the political and military elite on a major security and foreign policy issue and the debate in the Swedish and Norwegian media was reduced to a nationalistic quarrel between two neighbors. In both Sweden and Norway the unifying strategic interest at the time seemed to be the intention to continue as brothers in arms on the battlefields of Afghanistan, which therefore did not become an issue in this debate.

In retrospect: Wilhelm Agrell’s analysis and critique of the Nordic countries’ partnership in the ISAF operation

In retrospect, the silence over the Afghanistan ISAF mission in the 2007-2009 articles about increased defense co-operation between the Nordic countries was no coincidence. Nor was the absence of debate in the media. The official political doxa did not allow it, and this ignorance and lack of concern has later been revealed to be part of a process that led to Sweden becoming involved in an undeclared war after almost 200 years of peace.

The decisive step was taken when the UN mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, merged with the US-UK Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2009. The two missions had previously been officially kept apart, although the ISAF mission actually started as a support to the OEF for Denmark and Norway (Agrell 2013:74 ff.). When both missions were coordinated under US military command and directed as a counter-insurgency strategy in 2009, the entire Afghanistan operation transformed into outright war. Legally, the Nordic countries participated, from that point in time, not in any peace-building operations under Chapter VI, but in so-called “peace enforcement” operations regulated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the war laws under the Geneva Convention and its protocols (Agrell op. cit.: 79; 283).

However, neither government wanted to make that clear to their electorates or to members of parliament. Instead, in Sweden for example, the government’s 2010 bill of further contributions to the ISAF operations obscures the real character of this support by rhetoric that Wilhelm Agrell, an expert in intelligence analysis, describes as manipulative in a way which gave the proceedings an Orwellian meaning: “… that ISAF had geared to full-scale counter insurgency in Afghanistan was known worldwide, but is portrayed as unknown in the
government office and parliament.” (op. cit.: 332) How can this be explained and what was the Afghanistan War actually about?

The objectives, or different “wars”, that ISAF was said to achieve from the start in the Bonn Accord of 2001 (that is, security and development for the Afghan people, ending the corruption and opium production) have not been achieved (op. cit.: 302 ff.). But Agrell’s analysis reveals a hidden agenda that is more important for the participant countries than the declarations of peace, security, and development in Afghanistan. According to his analysis, the Iraq War of 2003 had thrown NATO into a crisis as important members France, Germany, and Turkey opposed the intervention and refused to participate. This put even more responsibility on NATO:

For NATO Afghanistan increasingly became a decisive commitment, but it had less to do with the goals from the Bonn Accord to stabilize and to build up the country than to prove the alliance’s credibility and thereby its continuance. Afghanistan simply became the joint operation that was expected to mend the wounded alliance and at the same time demonstrate its relevance outside the earlier European core area, hopefully without creating excessively large and difficult political and military problems at the same time. (op. cit.: 108-109); authors’ translation

Agrell points to the fact that it was not the US, but the Nordic NATO members Denmark and Norway that referred to the mutual protection clause in the alliance’s treaty as motivation for joining first OEF and then ISAF. For Sweden, not a member of NATO but of the Partnership for Peace, this development implied a kind of security political lever by which “… a functional co-operation with NATO step by step was established without having to bring up the formal Swedish non-alignment policy to open reconsideration.” Thus in Agrell’s analysis the security situation was similar for the Nordic countries, irrespective of membership in NATO after, firstly, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 2001 and, secondly, in connection with the Iraq War 2003: “… basically Sweden was in the same situation as its neighbor countries: it was pay-back time, time to make a symbolic indication from the Swedish side too.” Because of its functional dependence on the alliance, of which it was not a member, Sweden was as keen on mending the NATO crisis as its neighbors. From this point of view the political conclusion will probably be that the Afghanistan war was a success: “Maybe the Afghanistan policy was, from the start, more about the forms; about unity behind the formula ‘in together, out together’; about showing that the only existing Western security structure functions after all; and that individual countries join in and offer their tributes more symbolically than in reality. In this perspective Afghanistan is not necessarily a defeat, nor even a fiasco, especially not if the common narrative can be brought to a happy ending where the exodus is pursued according to plans and in controlled forms.” (op. cit.: 304) As brothers in arms, Norway and
Sweden contributed to ease the NATO crisis after the Iraq War debacle. Another hidden agenda to which the Nordic troops contributed was the continual presence (and probably after 2014 as well) in Afghanistan of US forces in separate enclaves like the enormous Marmal base (op. cit.: 312).

In retrospect, the main lesson seems to be that waging war, whether or not it is called a peace operation, is a threat to democracy because of the manipulation and lack of transparency that follows it. “The universal de-democratizing forces of war were appearing here, and this is one of the most important lessons from the Swedish Afghanistan mission, not primarily for political agencies and authorities, but for the Swedish self-understanding of the consequences of waging war” (op. cit.: 333). This applies also to the articles from 2007-2009 about defense collaboration between the Nordic countries. There is much talk about international peace and security in them, but in practice the suggested military reforms are all part of a policy that led to participation in a war about which the general public was not informed and over which they had no influence.

The aftermath on the political scene in Sweden is an open crisis in relations between the government and the military authorities. Since the priority has been the capacity to contribute to international “security operations”, the military sector has seen a reduction of the forces for invasion defense and control of the national territories. The crisis exploded when the supreme commander of the armed forces in Sweden, in an interview on December 30, 2012 in Svenska Dagbladet (a Swedish daily newspaper) said that if it was attacked the country could defend itself for about a week. A media storm broke and the supreme commander, who apparently was exhausted because of work overload, had to take sick leave for a couple of months. It was not only the citizens who were taken by surprise when the concrete consequences of the defense policy were revealed. Members of parliament claimed that they had not been properly informed. The minister of defense tried to calm down the emotions and expressed her trust in the defense authorities’ plans and priorities. Pundits had it that the commander’s sick leave was a kind of severe political influenza. The less amusing part of the public show is of course the reasonable conclusion that the supreme commander seemed to feel obliged to inform the general public about the foreign and security policy realities in a situation where the normal democratic processes are disconnected, both with regard to the political institutions and the media as fourth estate.

Conclusions
The peace journalism model suggested by Johan Galtung is a useful tool as a checklist for journalists and peace researchers. Since Galtung’s approach is somewhat rigid, it has its obvious limitations and should thus be supplemented
with other methods and theories. We suggest that Bourdieu’s notion on doxa and the CDA approach could be such a supplement. Even though the question of audiences as active contributors to the public discourse on war and peace has been addressed in some recent research, the general impression is that a more sophisticated meaning-theoretical point of view would help to bring the debate to a more reflexive understanding of the achievements and limits of the peace journalism program (Kempf 2007:4). The CDA approach in media studies incorporates levels of meaning and the relations between different actors in the discourse analysis as part of the context. The public debates in society influence media texts as do the discourses among politicians, PR-firms and spin doctors. And vice versa. In particular, the CDA perspective helps to explore the ways in which mediated discourses are interrelated with, for example, national and transnational security-policy discourses. In the empirical examples discussed above the silence around certain critical aspects of the plans for closer military co-operation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the hidden assumptions concerning the wider context of the US-led “global war on terror” are such important – though discursively absent – inter-discursive relations. Another example is the silence over the Norwegian satellite station at Svalbard that might be a violation of the Svalbard Treaty (Wormdal 2011).

Our point is that this silence (or doxa) about potential conflict risks and possible involvement in future wars is not reflected in Galtung’s model for war and peace journalism. On the contrary, by ignoring the potential conflict risks of deeper involvement in the “global war on terror” the journalistic examples above would, in some respects, be categorized as peace journalism and in other respects as war journalism. For example, although there is an appeal to a common Nordic peaceful “we” identity, there is no opposite “them” identity or enemy image mentioned in the reports about the proposal for Nordic military collaboration – which would classify the reporting as a case of peace journalism; it puts the emphasis on preventing future wars, albeit by military means. On the other hand, the media discourse on the proposal makes the potential conflict risks “opaque and secret”; it is “elite oriented” and it definitely does not “uncover all cover-ups” (Galtung 2002) – which would place it in the war journalism category.

In addition, we claim that the great variety of positions and points of view of the public (as shown in our empirical examples) does not fit into either the war column or the peace column in Galtung’s model. The elite position in Galtung’s war model is represented by the military and the politicians, but the systematic avoidance of mention of conflict risks, that may facilitate a process toward military conflict escalation, is not considered by the model. The reason for this is mainly that the Galtung model is generally limited to the stage of open warfare, while we would like to draw attention to the need for expanding the analysis to the earlier stages in the conflict escalation processes.
The discourse among ordinary people, though, might pick up historical links, like the suggestion after the Second World War of a Nordic solution as an alternative to NATO for the Scandinavian countries, but could also address scenarios other than that promoted by the elites. New digital media offer an opportunity for the public to forward such positions in opposition to the mainstream media. However, these more popular comments in our empirical cases are more ironic jokes than part of a serious discussion about the possible negative consequences of increased military collaboration. In any case, we suggest that the multi-media landscape, with its different discursive spaces, should also have a place in the future debate on peace journalism.

Models such as Galtung’s are probably not relevant in all conflict situations and stages. Used as a tool for assessing the journalistic contributions to conflict resolutions, they are not without problems because they are generalized, although not properly contextualized. At the same time it must be admitted that there is ample empirical evidence that much of the war reporting in mainstream media is constructed along the lines Galtung suggests. By using CDA as a supplement we suggest a more comprehensive analysis that includes the systematic silencing of certain crucial aspects as well as the voices of ordinary people in the public discourse on war and peace issues – with the objective of identifying the complex discursive constructions and structures that contribute to conflict escalations and wars.

We suggest the following:

1) Galtung’s two polarized models have heuristic value for a reflexive evaluation of journalistic practices – both internally within the trade and by interested people (media researchers and audiences) outside the profession. But they do not contain any recipes in any other ways.

2) As a “philosophy”, peace journalism is far too narrowly defined and could be replaced by some more appropriate term: for example, “consequence-ethical reflexivity” which, in our view, more appropriately expresses the kernel of the peace journalism program.

3) The peace journalism model may gain from being combined with Bourdieu’s theory of ‘doxa’ together with the CDA or other context-oriented methods for analysis of and discussions about what discursive constructions are best at satisfying the requirements of a responsible and consequentially reflexive journalism.

4) This should extend the application field and imply that the role of journalism in the advent of conflicts (that is, the discursive handling of conflict risks) is exposed to critical examination.
Notes
4. Only eight articles were found mentioning the suggestion by the two defense ministers in a search on Retriever, the electronic archive covering all major Norwegian news outlets, in the period August 30-September 7. Most of the eight articles found in a search in the electronic base were editorials, commentaries or small news bulletin pieces.
5. The eight articles found were published in Nettavisen 31.8, NTB 31.8, Aftenposten 1.9, Nationen 1.9, Bergens Tidende 1.9, Trønder-Avisa 1.9, Nationen 1.9, Dagbladet 1.9, Klassekampen 4.9.
6. The journalism of attachment-approach was developed during the Bosnian War by the (at the time) BBC reporter Martin Bell (1996). Bell argued that journalists have a responsibility for the development of the conflicts they are covering. Therefore, he proposed that reporters assume an active position in favor of the victims of war, even if this means support for military interference by NATO. Bell argued that journalists should use their influence as journalists to try to improve the situation of those who cannot help themselves. Bell's position caused a huge debate in which his most important critic was Mick Hume in the essay “Whose war is it anyway? The danger of the journalism of attachment” (Hume 1997). For a full overview of the discussion see Sjøvaag 2005.
7. The debate under the article was accessed on http: www.nettavisen.no September 5, 2007 and kept as a written document. All the quotations from this document have been translated by Rune Ottosen.
8. Two of them were positive (Trønderavisen and Bergens Tidende), while Nationen is more neutral (all of them published on September 1, 2007).
In his celebrated memoirs, *Travels with Herodotus*, the legendary war journalist Ryszard Kapuściński treated the first history of the Western world, dating back over 2,000 years, as a guide and a source of knowledge and reflection on the seemingly eternal wars between East and West (Kapuściński 2007). Like Herodotus, he wondered whether the conflicts in distant places that he reported to the world were completely new or the most recent instances of humankind’s old and tragic fate. He was struck by the “old Greek’s” thorough descriptions of places and peoples and the fact that he had even formulated historical laws based on the eternal sequences of aggression, revenge and counter-revenge (Kapuściński op.cit.: 82 ff.). And he sympathized with Herodotus’s investigative method of listening to every available source (like the wise old men in Persia and Egypt); and was impressed by his enormous project, the collection of all the knowledge of his time. He even described Herodotus as the first globalist because of this open-minded approach: “His most important discovery? That there are many worlds. And that each is different (op. cit.: 264) … in short, he was the first globalist.” (op. cit.: 77)

Is WikiLeaks the Herodotus of our times? This alternative new information provider is definitely part of the globalization processes and the dramatic development of new ICTs and is therefore at least a globalist factor, although not the first or the last. Like the old Greek, it aims at collecting all possible information from all available sources about ongoing distant conflicts. For Kapuściński it was fascinating that Herodotus was also a sort of journalist, maybe the first of the kind in that too, although today we would probably agree that journalism started in the nineteenth century (Chalaby 1998). But what about WikiLeaks? That this alternative information provider has offered a massive amount of relevant news material disseminated by acknowledged journalists and media is obvious. But can one say that just supplying information – however relevant from a democratic point of view – is journalism?
That is the question to be addressed in this chapter. We leave Herodotus and Kapuściński for a moment and apply a more modest historical perspective on the media wars that are the objects for research and discussion in this book. WikiLeaks entered the theater of war in connection with the Iraq War 2003, a conflict with roots in the Gulf War 1990-91.

A new world order, new wars and new media

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was talk of a “new world order” holding the promise of international justice and peace. However, the Balkan Wars of the 1990s gave rise to the concept of “new wars” that, in the wake of the terror attacks of 9/11, have acquired an iconicity rivaling that of fiction films. The 1990-91 Gulf War was the commercial breakthrough for the round-the-clock news channel CNN, as was the war in Afghanistan in 2001 for its competitor Al-Jazeera. The 2003 Iraq War saw the Internet’s great breakthrough in war journalism with the (at first anonymous) icon Salam Pax of the first generation of war bloggers. Starting out as an experiment with limited impact, the breakthrough for WikiLeaks came in April 2010 with the publication of the video “The Collateral Murder”, filmed by the crew of an American Apache helicopter as they shot a group of Iraqis – including two Reuter employees. The source who gave them access to this as well as most of the other hundreds of thousands of documents most probably was Bradley (later called Chelsea) Manning, an American soldier, arrested in May 2010 on suspicion of having passed restricted material to WikiLeaks. The video was edited by the WikiLeaks staff in a manner that raised the question of whether circumstances around the publication could be labeled as journalism (Beckett & Ball 2012). It was edited as story meant for a broader audience and was thus more advanced than the raw information WikiLeaks had dumped on the Internet before.

Later the same year, WikiLeaks published around 90,000 classified documents about the Afghanistan War, which created a wave of reports in the mainstream media about civilian deaths and the US military’s cover-ups of illegal operations. A new world order, new wars, and new media – what impact is all this having on war journalism? Do we see signs of a new war journalism, or perhaps even the development of peace journalism facilitated by WikiLeaks activities?

The Snowden case

Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old former technical assistant for the CIA, had been working for the National Security Agency since 2009 as an employee of various outside contractors, including the defense contractor Booz Allen and
Dell. The waves he caused will ensure that he will go down in history as an American whistleblower alongside figures such as Daniel Ellsberg and Bradley (Chelsea) Manning. She is responsible for handing over material from one of the world’s most secretive organizations: the National Security Agency (NSA).

Through many leaks he revealed that the NSA is running a colossal surveillance operation with the potential to check most electronic signals globally. The leaks have caused diplomatic scandals since revealing that the US has spied even on several of its closest allies.

After several days of interviews *The Guardian* revealed his identity in June 2013, at his request. Since he decided to disclose numerous top secret documents to the public, he was determined not to opt for the protection of anonymity. “I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have done nothing wrong,” he said (quoted in Greenwald et. al. 2013). In a note accompanying the first set of documents he provided, he wrote: “I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions,” but “I will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon and irresistible executive powers that rule the world that I love are revealed even for an instant.”

He claimed that he does not fear the consequences of going public, only that doing so would distract attention from the issues raised by his disclosures. “I know the media likes to personalize political debates, and I know the government will demonize me.” Despite these fears, he remained hopeful that his outing would not divert attention from the substance of his disclosures. “I really want the focus to be on these documents”, he wrote and expressed hope that the debate will trigger action among citizens around the globe for more transparency. He added: “My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them” (quotes from Greenwald et. al. 2013).

Snowden obtained political asylum in Russia in August 2013 after fleeing the US through Hong Kong. The Swedish Broadcasting Company’s TV magazine *Uppdrag Granskning* has conducted a project to identify Sweden-related leaks; one was an account of how the Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment is an active participant in the top-secret program, Winterlight, initiated by the highest level of the NSA, and about conducting the secret hacking of computers.¹

In December 2012, the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet*, through Snowden’s leaks, gained access to a secret document indicating that the Norwegian intelligence service provided the NSA with data from intelligence operations directed at Russia and showing how Norway and the NSA contributed to intelligence on “Access to Russian targets in the Kola Peninsula”. It is also revealed that information had been gathered on “Reports on Russian civilian mutual targets, particularly Russian energy policy”. Listed under “success stories” are strategies for collecting information on “Russian political, natural resources and energy issues” (all quotes from *Dagbladet* December 17, 2013).
Snowden has provided information of the close ties between the NSA and Swedish and Norwegian intelligence. Critical journalism in the Swedish (*Uppdrag Granskning*) and the Norwegian (*Dagbladet*) has highlighted issues that politician rarely talk about in public.

**WikiLeaks – source of truth or target in the threat society?**

Considering the experiences of a number of attacks on critical media coverage in the new Western way of warfare (with the obvious intent of avoiding or at least restricting reports about “the true face of war”), we welcome the appearance of alternative sources such as WikiLeaks. It is, of course, not a new phenomenon for classified military intelligence to be revealed retrospectively; an earlier example that comes to mind is the Pentagon papers, revealed by Daniel Ellsberg in the *New York Times* in 1971 (Apple 1996; cf. Cohen 2010). However, the new Western way of war (cf. Shaw 2005) has changed the conditions and implications of such leaks.

The question here is where it will take us. Probably the revelations will not have a dramatic effect on public opinion. No doubt alternative public information sources such as these are important for widening the global public sphere for discourses about wars. They offer facts to counter the views that the hegemonic powers promote internationally and nationally – but the facts as such are not entirely new and therefore the politicians in government are often successful in their efforts to divert attention, and influence interpretations, from the revelations.

The main question is whether the framing of the “global war on terror” is affected on a larger scale. Factual details, even when they reveal vast numbers of civilian casualties, as in the material WikiLeaks has made public, do not matter that much to general attitudes and opinions or to the media agenda – beyond the moment they are reported. We see this is in the Scandinavian countries where, as we have argued (see Chapter 4) the humanitarian purposes of the military operations in Afghanistan are emphasized by the authorities and in the media. The background information about the true face of the war shakes that propaganda image for a moment, but it does not change the general public opinion. This must be explained partly by the strong self-perception of being a humanitarian and peaceful people, a self-image that rejects contrary information and circumscribes opinion.

Another explanation would be to draw on Entman’s cascade model which has a lot to say about how, metaphorically speaking, the force of gravity helps the state-sponsored views to proliferate, but also about the difficulties for opposite frames to find their way up to the ruling elite circles (Entman 2003). Together with other well-researched theories about the role of the media in shaping
public opinion in conflict situations, it does not support any far-reaching hopes that even massive exposure of censored factual information that goes against the views and information from the authorities will change public opinion or the framing in the media.

The experiences of killed journalists and the case of WikiLeaks should be understood in the context of the emergence of a threat society as a later phase of the risk society about which Beck wrote more than two decades ago (Beck 1992). In threat society there are trends that work as undercurrents, channeling opinions towards accepting violations of human rights and international laws for the sake of security. The culture of fear has a firm grip on popular culture, mediatized discourses, and people’s minds, and is exploited for threat policies based upon speculative threat images together with public appeals for patriotism and trust in the leaders in difficult times. In particular, the militarization of security policy implies that democratic deliberation is molded into an iron cage of complicity and subordination (Nohrstedt 2010).

Historically speaking, 9/11 was certainly a world event with wide and tragic consequences including its effect on global respect for freedom of expression, civil rights and international law. Dissident voices and alternative information sources are regarded as fifth columns instead of as the fourth estate, and are targeted as enemies, almost equal to illegal combatants. Thus the vagueness of international law when it comes to the responsibility to protect human rights and to prevent crimes against humanity – arguments that the NATO used for its intervention in Yugoslavia – has been exploited and extended to legal areas where there are strict regulations such as, for example, the conduct of war under the Geneva Conventions. This stretching of what is legal (or, at least, not prohibited) is a major problem in the new wars, in particular the “global war on terror”. In addition, it is a huge challenge to journalism since one of its consequences is the dramatically increased risks involved for journalists reporting about these wars. The time is ripe for a peace journalism that questions and challenges “military humanism” whenever it appears – for the sake of journalists’ own safety, for democracy, and for an informed global public sphere.

WikiLeaks: a short introduction

WikiLeaks was started in December 2006 and is a collection of leaked documents. Its website refers to Julian Assange (an Australian and a former hacker), its founder, as “the people’s intelligence” and invites respondents from around the world to leak information anonymously. According to the WikiLeaks website itself, it owed its origination to dissidents, journalists, mathematicians, and technologists from many countries. Bradley (Chelsea) Manning, an American
soldier, was arrested in May 2010 in Iraq on suspicion of having passed restricted material to WikiLeaks, and was charged in July of that year with transferring classified data onto her personal computer and communicating national defense information to an unauthorized source (Institute for Public Accuracy 2011). The harsh treatment dealt out to Manning in custody has raised controversy, and human rights activists and organizations have acted on her behalf. She was charged with a number of offenses, including communicating national defense information to an unauthorized source and aiding the enemy, a capital offense, although prosecutors said they would not seek the death penalty. On February 28, 2013, Manning pled guilty to 10 of the 22 charges against her, which could carry a sentence of up to 20 years. One notable charge for which she did not enter a plea is that of aiding the enemy, which could carry a life sentence (NTB February 29, 2013). Eventually she was convicted in July 2013 and sentenced to 35 years confinement with the possibility of parole in eight years, and was dishonorably discharged from the army.

Is WikiLeaks journalism?

The independent commentator David Conley argues that Assange and WikiLeaks hide behind the label “journalism” for opportunistic reasons:

In 1996, he pleaded guilty to 24 counts of computer crime. When he established WikiLeaks in 2006, it wasn’t marketed as “journalism”, nor did Assange boast journalistic credentials. His own essays show his original aims involved anarchic attacks on Western communication technologies.

The crunch will come when, and if, Assange faces charges in the United States. No doubt he hopes to rely on a First Amendment “free speech” defense, which would be strengthened if he can position himself as a journalist … However, if Assange is really a journalist seeking First Amendment protections, why didn’t he treat the raw data journalistically? (Conley 2011)

On the other hand, Beckett and Ball maintain that the question of whether or not to call the activities of WikiLeaks “journalism” is not the essential issue. The de facto impact of the leaks is the crucial point:

Just like any mainstream mass media organization WikiLeaks clearly wanted a wide audience and to have an impact on society. It did not see itself as a niche or personal project. They believed passionately that they were revealing hidden facts that the public needed to be aware of and even act upon. All these are familiar elements of certain kinds of traditional journalism (Beckett & Ball 2012: 26).
The different attitudes towards WikiLeaks show the complexity of the case; there is no clear answer to the question of how news media should deal with WikiLeaks from an academic as well as from a journalistic point of view.

WikiLeaks operates on the borderline between a collection of sources and journalism. This can be exemplified with the Kenyan leak about the serious nature of corruption in Kenya’s national elite, stories to which the Kenyan media did not have access, or did not feel able to make public for fear of reprisal. When it was published it had an introduction written by WikiLeaks staff offering a political context for the document. In their book *WikiLeaks. News in the Networked Era*, Charlie Beckett and James Ball are not preoccupied with what to call WikiLeaks but, rather, with explaining its function:

Those who argue that WikiLeaks easily fits into their definition of journalism are in danger of ignoring how it challenges the validity of those categories. The debate about “WikiLeaks as journalism” is really a debate about what journalism is or is becoming. Instead of asking whether WikiLeaks is journalism or not, we should ask “What kind of journalism is WikiLeaks creating?” The challenge to the rest of journalism is to come up with something as good, if not better (Beckett & Ball 2012: 26).

One of the authors, James Ball, has personally worked for WikiLeaks and is therefore part of the story.

**How do we deal with WikiLeaks?**

The reaction to the activities of WikiLeaks was as hotly a disputed topic as was opinion about whether or not WikiLeaks is a positive contribution to journalism. Both totalitarian and democratic regimes see WikiLeaks as a potential threat. Authoritarian governments and the tightly controlled media in China and across the Arab Middle East have suppressed virtually all mention of the documents. In China, the WikiLeaks site has been blocked by the government’s “great firewall”, and access to other sources of the documents have been restricted. Most Chinese are unable to read the contents of the diplomatic cables (Stanbridge 2011).

In December 2010, the Obama administration and the Department of Defense ordered the hundreds of thousands of federal employees and contractors not to view the secret cables and other classified documents published by WikiLeaks and news organizations around the world unless they had the required security clearance or authorization (*New York Times* December 4, 2010), and the US Air Force blocked the *New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and at least 23 other websites carrying WikiLeaks documents from gaining computer access to its networks (*Reuters* December 14, 2010).
The legal aspects of WikiLeaks

Senator Joseph Lieberman and other lawmakers in the US Senate introduced legislation in December 2010 that would make it a federal crime to publish the name of a US intelligence source – a direct swipe at the secret-spilling website WikiLeaks. By the so-called SHIELD Act (Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination), a section of the Espionage Act would be amended (based on Ottosen 2012). The Espionage Act already forbids publishing classified information on US cryptographic secrets or overseas communications intelligence (that is, wiretapping) and the amendment would extend that prohibition to information about human intelligence, making it a crime to publish information “concerning the identity of a classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United States”, or “concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government” if such publication is prejudicial to US interests (Poulsen 2010).

In January 2011 it was revealed that a secret US government grand jury espionage investigation had been set up to scrutinize WikiLeaks. As a part of the legal process, the US Department of Justice issued a subpoena for the Twitter account activity of several people linked to the WikiLeaks organization, including its founder, Julian Assange. The investigation extended further than American citizens. Birgitta Jonsdottir, a former WikiLeaks activist who is also a member of Iceland’s parliament, said publicly that she had received a notification of the subpoena from the social networking site Twitter. The US government, she said in a subsequent message, “wants to know about all my tweets and more since November 1, 2009. Do they realize I am a member of parliament in Iceland?” (quoted in Stanbridge 2011)

Villain or hero?

Although Julian Assange’s main ambition was to create an organization dealing with information and not practical politics, he doubtless wants to make a political difference through WikiLeaks. He is “enjoying crushing bastards”, as he has put it (quoted in Beckett & Ball 2012: 29). For the right wing, Assagne is a traitor, for the left he is a hero. The right-wing press and some NGOs have taken an aggressive stand against WikiLeaks. Representing this position is the commentator Jeffrey T Kuhner in the Washington Times, with the following statement under the title “Assassinate Assange”:

Julian Assange poses a clear and present danger to American national security. The WikiLeaks founder is more than a reckless provocateur. He is aiding and abetting terrorists in their war against America. The administration must take care of the problem – effectively and permanently. (Kuhner 2010)
The former governor of Alaska and vice presidential candidate for the Republican Party, Sarah Palin, suggested in a similar approach: that Assange should be hunted down “like a terrorist”. The statement was published in The First Post accompanied by a picture of Palin pointing a gun in the direction of a photograph of Assange (Stanbridge 2011).

As a follow-up to this “culture of violence”, to use Johan Galtung’s expression (Galtung 1990), a series of webpages have been launched to “take care” of the mission to kill Assange. Among these are: killassange.com; Killjulianassange.com; julianassangemustdie.com; and julianassangedeathpool.com.

As a respond to the threats, the hate speech, and the repressive measures by the US government, Assange and WikiLeaks have gained substantial support from human rights organizations and grassroots activists all over the world. In a letter from Reporters Without Borders, concern was expressed for the prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks (Reporters 2010). Supportive letters were sent from Article 19 and other NGOs. Thousands of activists all over the world organized rallies in support of WikiLeaks, and even mainstream media such as Le Monde named him “Man of the Year”. Since November 2010, Assange has been subject to a European arrest warrant in response to a Swedish police request for questioning in relation to a sexual assault investigation. In June 2012, following final dismissal by the Supreme Court of the UK of his appeal against enforcement of the European arrest warrant, Assange has failed to surrender to his bail, and has been treated by the UK authorities as having absconded. Since 19 June 2012, he has been inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, where he has since been granted diplomatic asylum. The British government intends to extradite Assange to Sweden under that arrest warrant once he leaves the embassy, which Assange says he fears may result in his subsequent extradition to the US to face charges over the diplomatic cables case (Stanbridge 2011).

The juridical aspects of the responses from authorities in Britain and Sweden is a topic worth more investigative journalism. In the Swedish media, the discussion has been trivialized by the obsession with the accusations of sexual harassment. What has not been a major topic for media attention and debate is the proposition for a new law that will make revelations of the sort disseminated by WikiLeaks and its former partners in the mainstream media a crime. The Swedish law department suggests in the proposal “Espionage and other illegal intelligence activities” (SOU 2012: 95) that a new crime, “foreign espionage” (utlandsspioneri), should be added to the list of exceptions from constitutional protection under the law of press freedom (Tryckfrihetsförordningen), which prohibits public authorities from searching for journalistic sources. An important motivation for this proposal is that the present law is not able to stop leaks about partners of the Swedish military in international military operations (ibid.). If the new crime is included in the Swedish laws revelations like those made by WikiLeaks will be criminalized (cf. Funcke 2013).
WikiLeaks – a response to the failure of journalism?

Many media critics have welcomed WikiLeaks since mainstream media have failed to play a critical watchdog role in dealing with the “global war on terror”. The tendency of the mainstream media to reflect official security policy in war coverage in a given country has been well documented by our research project Journalism in the New World Order (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001, 2010). In our opinion, WikiLeaks should be analyzed in the context of conditions for freedom of expression and as a part of the broader issue of conditions for journalism, rather than as journalism in itself. That said, the whole issue of Wikileaks is complex when seen from an ethical perspective.

The ethical issues

There are obviously several ethical dilemmas posed by WikiLeaks that should worry journalists who use the material in their work. One of them is the lack of transparency within the WikiLeaks organization. As Beckett and Ball put it: “So it is a paradox that WikiLeaks, which takes advantage of the Internet’s ability to hold power to account in a radically open way, is itself not open. By the standards of the Internet as well as conventional journalism, WikiLeaks is not accountable.” (Beckett & Ball 2012: 81) Another ethical problem is that members of the organization are unknown to each other, and some even to Assange.

Another ethical issue is WikiLeaks’ attitude towards protecting those individuals who are unwillingly named in the leaks. This exposure has led government officials, members of Amnesty International, some of Assange’s own colleagues and a handful of nations to denounce him and voice concerns that his behavior and disclosure of secret information may cause serious violence and even death to those exposed in the documents. For example, when he released the Afghan documents, Assange chose not to remove the names of the Afghan intelligence sources for the NATO troops, and this led to the Taliban creating a “wanted” list of over 1,800 Afghans who have been targeted as having collaborated with NATO. A Taliban spokesman is known to have said: “after the process is completed, our Taliban court will decide about such people” (Birmingham News 2010). In its defense, WikiLeaks spokespersons claim that there is not a shred of evidence that anyone has been arrested or killed or has in any other way suffered because of the leaks (Wahlström 2011). In August 2011 the ethical problems with WikiLeaks was obvious when 251, 287 documents from the embassy files were published with all the names of sources, exposing them to great risks. Many of those who had supported WikiLeaks turned away at this stage. In a common declaration, partners in the mainstream media condemned
the leaks, partly because the unedited documents contained numerous names of people who could potentially be harmed by the publication. *Aftenposten*, in a commentary by the journalist Kristoffer Ronneberg, denounced the leaks and expressed concern about the fate of the sources (Ronneberg 2011).

In our view, the most problematic ethical issue is that the reader is unable to detect the motives for leaking all this material in the first place. The newsrooms that get access to these leaks will never be able to tell their readers why the stories were leaked and, eventually, what was not leaked. Such outsourcing of editorial decisions is deeply problematic. The newsdesks that gain access to the WikiLeaks files will find it very difficult to detect whether false information could, for some unknown reason, have been inserted between all the real stories. We know that many reputable news outlets such as *Der Spiegel*, *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and the Norwegian newspaper *Aftenposten* (see below), have chosen to publish the material, insisting that all the facts have been checked and double checked (Haugsgjerd 2011). It is difficult to blame them, and of course a huge amount of stories of public interest have been published thanks to the leaks. But the ethical dilemma is still there and is indeed problematic.

*Aftenposten* and Afghanistan as a case study

We will use the Norwegian media coverage of Afghanistan as the basis for a discussion of the significance of WikiLeaks as a new source for journalists.

The case study: *Aftenposten* and coverage of Afghanistan

WikiLeaks published a large amount (90,000 documents from the period January 2004 to December 2009) of internal documents from US military sources (the “Afghan war diaries”). Only a portion was made public (75,000 documents by July 2010). *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and *Der Spiegel* were given access to the material and published their own stories, based on the same leaks, on the very day that the documents were leaked. The focus in these stories was on the civilian casualties, on increased Taliban attacks, and on the involvement of neighboring countries, such as Pakistan and Iran, in the conflict.

In October 2010 came the “Iraq war logs” (400,000 documents) and in November came the leaks of documents from US embassies worldwide. The newspaper *Aftenposten* has, through unknown sources, gained access to more than 250,000 classified US diplomatic documents.

Regardless of how *Aftenposten* got the material, it was able to publish a considerable number of exclusive stories.
In April 2013, WikiLeaks published more than 1.7 million US records covering diplomatic or intelligence reports on every country in the world. According to The Guardian, the data, which had not been leaked at the time of writing (December 2013), comprises diplomatic records from the beginning of 1973 to the end of 1976, covering a variety of diplomatic traffic including cables, intelligence reports and congressional correspondence. Julian Assange said on publishing the material that WikiLeaks had been working for the past year to analyse and assess a vast amount of data held at the US national archives before releasing it in a searchable form (The Guardian April 2013).

Research method in case study of Aftenposten
A survey was conducted to ascertain whether the stories based on leaks from WikiLeaks differ from the overall Afghanistan coverage in Aftenposten. Was there any difference?

The following research questions were asked:
- Did the access to WikiLeaks result in increased coverage of the war in Afghanistan?
- Are the WikiLeaks-based stories framed differently from other stories from Afghanistan published in Aftenposten?

We used an explorative method in this study since it is impossible to trace a direct relationship between the WikiLeaks material and the published articles in Aftenposten. A search for Afghanistan in the database aftenposten.no yielded 607 hits with the search word “Afghanistan” in the period from July 15 to December 31, 2010 (the number of hits for the full year 2010 was 1,174). In the period January to March 2011 there were 253 hits, although this included a number of articles in which Afghanistan is not the main topic and the material contains everything from news stories and reports of debates to book reviews and the like. The database Retriever (which includes news outlets other than Aftenposten) contained 560 articles on Afghanistan in Aftenposten in the period from July to December 2010.

In the period from January to March 2011 there were 190 hits on Retriever with the search word “Afghanistan”.

The Retriever base contains articles from the online version as well as the print version of Aftenposten. It must be noted here that during this period Aftenposten had a separate desk and staff for its online version; some articles were published in both print and online versions, and some were published exclusively in either the print or the online version (this applies when the search word “Afghanistan” is used alone and when the search words “Afghanistan and WikiLeaks” are used together). The samples in this survey are picked from
both the online version and the print version in order to get as many stories from Afghanistan as possible. All the stories were placed in predefined frames\(^3\) building on Entman’s notion that comparing “media narratives of events … [that] could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story.” (Entman 1991: 6)

Among the interesting stories in the WikiLeaks material are internal discussions between ISAF countries on policy issues and military strategy. In headlines in *Aftenposten* on February 18 and 19, 2011, the focus is on how NATO tried to conceal the killing of civilians and tried to hide the facts about the casualties, and how big military operations were initiated without the prior knowledge of the NATO leadership.

To shed light on the significance of the WikiLeaks, these issues were used as case studies. The material is very extensive, and we have chosen to put emphasis on, and to probe more deeply into some categories of the content whereas a more comprehensive study would have been able to be more specific about the overall framing and whether it is representative of the Afghanistan coverage in general.

First, the period from July 15, 2010 (immediately before the release of the Afghan war diary) to March 2011 was analyzed.\(^4\) In the search, a large number of telegrams from the Norwegian News Agency (NTB) was identified. These, which are usually published without a byline, have been taken out of the analysis since they are not exclusive to *Aftenposten* but are made available to all subscribers to NTB. We have also extracted letters to the editor in order to get a clear focus on the news. In some previous studies of the Norwegian Afghanistan coverage, the question of the use of sources has been vital (Ottosen 2012). Findings from these studies suggest an over-representation of Norwegian sources and elite sources, but since the main purpose of this study is to look at the effect of WikiLeaks on the Afghanistan coverage, the use of sources will not be addressed explicitly here. However, since the WikiLeaks logs are to a large extent based on government documents it goes without saying that these are based on elite sources.

The boundaries between categories are not necessarily clear, and as some items can fit into more than one category we must be careful about placing too much weight on small differences in the quantitative data.

**Sample**

After going through all the articles and selected news stories we are left with a sample of 158 cases from 2010 and 36 cases from 2011. Stories based on WikiLeaks account for 13 of the 158 cases from 2010, and 16 of the 36 cases from 2011.
Analysis: the scope, balance, angle

The coverage of Afghanistan is relatively extensive in 2010, with 29 articles per month on average. Even when we remove the cases dealing with “the Norwegian war” and soldiers at home in Norway (categories with the least reference to Afghanistan), we are left with an article (print and online) every other day. The figure for the first three months of 2011 is slightly lower, with 12 articles on average per month. An undocumented but nevertheless obvious explanation is that in those months the media were more focused on the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.

The significance of WikiLeaks cases

In 2010, few stories from Afghanistan were based on WikiLeaks. Eight of the 13 cases based on WikiLeaks were published in July 2010, after the release of the Afghan war diary; in the rest of the year there was a lot of debate about WikiLeaks in general, and Julian Assange in particular, but this did not influence the Afghanistan coverage to any significant degree.

In 2011, coverage of Afghanistan in general in Aftenposten decreased, while the share of WikiLeaks-based cases increased.\(^5\) We think it is reasonable to assume that the WikiLeaks documents contributed to more coverage of Afghanistan in this period than we would have seen without them. Aftenposten prioritized the stories based on WikiLeaks documents, but published more of them in the online version than in the printed newspaper. Six of the 16 cases were published in aftenposten.no.

To assess whether WikiLeaks issues have influenced the content of coverage, one must look at whether the cases are based on the WikiLeaks documents. It is not possible to draw conclusions for the entire period as WikiLeaks-based stories form such a small part of the sample. However, in July 2010 and in the first three months of 2011, there are numerous WikiLeaks-based stories and we will look more closely at how the WikiLeaks releases affected the Afghanistan coverage in this period.

In July 2010, five of the nine WikiLeaks cases were in the frame of “Norwegian warfare”, and this is consistent with the totality of the material. It can mean either that Aftenposten used WikiLeaks documents to look for important incidents of Norwegian involvement, or it may be an expression of the general tendency to look for a “Norwegian angle” (Rossland 2006).

For 2011 the picture is not very clear. Only one of the cases falls into the frame “Norwegian warfare”, while eight fall into the frame “international politics”. Based on the totality of the material, we are unable to conclude that WikiLeaks has changed the Afghanistan coverage except for an increase in the coverage of themes related to international politics.
More critical framing

There is, however, evidence to suggest that those articles published on the basis of WikiLeaks were given a more critical narrative than the usual coverage in the Norwegian media documented earlier in this chapter. This supports Entman’s statement:

Comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of framing devices can appear as “natural”, unremarkable choices of word or images. (Entman 1991: 6)

As a case study we will use three stories from February 2011 based on allegations that the ISAF forces had launched a major attack without the knowledge of the NATO leadership; how NATO tried to cover this up; and how Norwegian diplomats assisted with the cover-up. The articles were published on February 18 under the title “NATO attack. Political leadership knew nothing”; on February 19 under the title “Lies about the massacre in Bala Baluk”; and on February 20 under the title “NATO suppresses death figures”. This was followed on the next day with an article, not based on WikiLeaks, under the title “NATO killed over 50 in Afghanistan”.

The articles claim that NATO deliberately lied in order to prevent the real numbers of dead being made public, even though NATO had received documentation from, *inter alia*, the Red Cross – and how the UN special envoy Kai Eide was deceived and chose not to go out with a critical statement. The stories also document several attacks in which a large number of civilians were killed, and how NATO’s standard response was to lay the blame on the Taliban. In the article, Norway was accused of actively supporting the suppression of the true numbers of civilian casualties. This was denied by the Norwegian authorities. It is not known where these incidents took place, but the offensive in Helmand in July 2009 was mentioned in several articles (“Operation Jari Khan”). This was the largest airborne offensive by the American navy since the Vietnam War. Both the scale of the operation and the considerable losses of troops made it an important media issue. In this instance WikiLeaks contributed to creating the impression of the dominant role of the US in the warfare.

To find out more about the possible impact of WikiLeaks we looked at how *Aftenposten* covered incidents with grave consequences for civilian casualties before WikiLeaks published the huge leaks mentioned above. The following cases have been picked out:

June 18, 2007: seven schoolchildren killed in the Paktika province. *Aftenposten* published one online story about the incident.
April 29, 2007: at least 25 killed by mistaken NATO bombing in Herat. At least 50 civilians killed during one week in this offensive. No trace of these incidents was found by searching Aftenposten’s archive for April/May 2007.

November 3, 2008: 37 civilians, mostly women and children, killed at a wedding celebration. No article was published about this in the print version, but several articles were published in the online version.

August 21, 2008: the Nawabad massacre in Shindand. Ninety civilians were killed (75 women and children). Aftenposten had minimal coverage in the print edition. There is considerable coverage of this incident online, including the cases that show how at first the US denied killing civilians, and then had to admit it.

September 4, 2009: 70 to 90 killed in the bombing of two lorries transporting gasoline. This was a major international news story, and covered in Aftenposten under the title “Here the Taliban offered free fuel” with a picture of the bombed lorries.

May 4, 2009: Grenari in the Bala Baluk region – 89 civilians killed. NATO claimed that the figure was 26. There was no major article of civilian casualties in the print edition, but the topic is mentioned in other articles. One brief about 140 civilians killed was found. In the online edition there are several articles about the case, one with the title “Dozens of civilians killed” – a major issue in that the US admitted the killing of civilians. American authorities are quoted saying that it was impossible to distinguish between civilian victims and dead Taliban soldiers because all had been buried.

There is very little coverage of these cases in the print version. In the online version we find much more, including cases where it is shown that NATO is trying to cover up the high number of civilian losses. We are left with a picture in which many of the cases are made known online, but not prioritized in the print version. Since Aftenposten did not print articles with such harsh criticism of NATO before WikiLeaks material was available, the findings indicate that the condemnation of NATO in the print version is inspired by WikiLeaks.

Conclusion

WikiLeaks, like Herodotus and his late admirer Kapuściński, are contributors to journalism, although it can be disputed whether they are all journalists of the same kind. The debate about WikiLeaks as journalism should, in our view, be elaborated on and extended beyond the format and information that the organization itself represents – as in the brief examples above we suggest that the discussion should focus on how WikiLeaks and other whistleblowers affect mainstream journalism in general and in other news outlets.

In the study of Aftenposten’s Afghanistan reporting in 2010-2011 the presence of WikiLeaks was noticeable in the print version but not in the newspaper’s
online news. While little explicit criticism of NATO’s responsibilities for the loss of civilian life can be found in the period prior to the WikiLeaks publication, the leaks published in the period February 18-19 2011 are used to frame a harsh critique of NATO and its attempts to hide the loss of civilian lives. Even though the facts about civilian casualties became known in a number of cases through the Red Cross and other sources, the print version showed little willingness to prioritize them. Why the online version was more willing to publish the stories could be something for further research (one explanation might be that more space is available online). It also seems that the impact of WikiLeaks has been more significant in the framing than in the choice of topics. What does this tell us about the nature of WikiLeaks as discussed earlier in this article? WikiLeaks is not journalism – but obviously it is a tool for critical reporting. It is almost as if the facts found in WikiLeaks give Aftenposten the courage to play a more active watchdog role. But the ethical dilemmas arising from publishing this material with, in many cases, unknown sources, remains a problem.

Whistleblowers like Snowden and Manning can never replace journalists, and indeed they are not journalists, but obviously their activities have offered new sources for critical journalists and have shed new historical light on important events such as the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War. They deserve to treated as whistleblowers, not criminals.

 Compared to Herodotus – and for that matter Kapuściński – they are also contributing to global journalism, but in another historical setting and direction. The threat society is marked by a culture of fear that correlates with securitization and surveillance measurements in the continuing “global war on terror”. This is the main context for the importance of WikiLeaks and other whistleblowers. They react to the speculative threat-mongering, repression, and violence that the US has pursued in response to the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks. To comprehend this context we believe that Carl Schmitt’s theory of the dual state (see Chapter 2) will gain renewed actuality (Wilson 2012). Perhaps one can say that while Herodotus and Kapuściński extended the collected knowledge of their respective times horizontally, WikiLeaks and the whistleblowers of the early second millennium do the same – but vertically (that is, they reveal secrets that the political and military elites of the deep state prevent the citizens from knowing).

Notes
2. This section is based on the empirical findings of research assistant Ellen Hofsvang (Hofsvang 2011). She is not responsible for how these findings are used in the analysis and the conclusion.
3. The defined frames were the following: 1. The Norwegian warfare; 2. The Afghan warfare – soldiers in focus;

4. This means that important events such as killing of four Norwegian soldiers at the beginning of July 2010 and the killing of the first female soldier in April 2011 are not included in the sample. Earlier studies revealed that such events involving Norwegian soldiers increased the coverage for a while and that the “Norwegian angle” is more obvious than usual and the framing of Norwegians as “worthy victims” is particularly strong in such periods (Fondenes 2011).

5. For documentation and empirical details see Ottosen 2012.

6. The authors are responsible for the translation of headlines.
Chapter 6

Media and International Law

Norwegian and Swedish Press Coverage
of the Libyan War 2011

This chapter conducts a critical discussion of the ways in which media in Norway
and Sweden reported on controversial legal and political issues in connection
with the Libyan War 2011. It is based on three case studies. The first describes
how the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang (VG) and the Swedish newspaper
Expressen (EXP) covered the way UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was
implemented in the NATO operation “Odyssey Dawn”. The second case study
deals with the same newspapers, but in this case only with editorials about
the extra-judicial killing of the Libyan political leader Muammar Gaddafi. The
third case study analyzes the news coverage (as well as editorials) of Gaddafi’s
death in two broadsheets in the same countries: the Norwegian Aftenposten
(AP) and the Swedish Dagens Nyheter (DN). The chapter also draws upon a
separate study of the Norwegian media coverage of the intervention in Libya
(Ottosen, Slaatta and Øfsti 2012).

In addition to the case studies on the Libyan War there is also, at the end,
an account about media coverage of the chemical attack in Damascus during
the Syrian War and how the international community responded to this war
crime. No doubt the Libyan War casts its shadow over the subsequent conflict
in Syria, and as we explore in this book the historical lessons from the new
wars and the professional learning over time in war journalism, we wanted
to comment – albeit very briefly – on how the latter conflict was covered in
relation to the former.

In a democracy, media should provide relevant information as well as facili-
tate vivid debates and deliberations, which is particularly important in matters
of life and death such as war. But how is this fulfilled when it comes to inter-
national legal matters? Do the media handle this necessary task satisfactorily in
a globalized world that needs transnational opinion-building and reasoning?

We will therefore place special emphasis on how these four Scandinavian
newspapers dealt with the international legal dimensions of the ways that
NATO and its rebel allies conducted regime change in the Libyan War, with a
focus on two important aspects: (1) the process of how international norms are constructed *de jure* and practised *de facto* when Resolution 1973 had legitimised the NATO military intervention, and (2) the illegal killing of the Libyan president as an element in the *de facto* regime change.

The purpose of these samples of cases and newspapers is not to provide the full picture of how the Libyan War and its legal aspects were reported in Norwegian and Swedish news media. Our aim is, rather, to show how professional evaluations of the news coverage could be conducted continuously without too much time and effort. Simply by scanning the headlines and leads of articles in the specific field of reporting, editors and reporters can get a fairly good estimate of what relevant aspects that have, and have not, been covered.

However, even though we do not claim that the content analyses of headlines and leads below provide a comprehensive view of the reporting, they are intended to catch the variations of mediated representations of the legal aspects. Thus in the first case study the focus is on how the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is reported in two leading (popular) newspapers in Norway and Sweden respectively. This study gives at least a glimpse of what most readers were told about the legality and legitimacy of the military operations. The second case study is a follow-up of the first, with a narrower focus on the killing of the Libyan leader and on how this clear case of extra-judicial extermination was commented on by editors in the popular press. The reason in the third study for selecting news and editorials about the killing of Gaddafi in the leading quality newspaper in each of the two Scandinavian countries is to widen the perspective to include the news and views with which the elite media’s readers are supplied. We assume that these two newspapers, *Aftenposten* and *Dagens Nyheter*, represent the best of journalism when it comes to providing contextual information about the normative and legal dimensions of the actual news events, in contrast to what is often said about the popular press.

The Norwegian Air Force took an active part in the bombing and the Swedish Air Force participated with support functions. Given the emphasis the two Scandinavian countries have put on the role of the UN in earlier conflicts, it is relevant to study how media covered the role and authority of the UN for international norm making in the two countries (see Introduction).

**Journalism, human rights and international law – institutional siblings drifting apart?**

Journalism and human rights, together with international law, are historical siblings with roots in the era of enlightenment, but they have grown apart, particularly during the period after the Cold War. Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they had much in common and strove towards the
same humane society and protection of the civilian population against totalitarian regimes, today one wonders whether they might need to revitalize and acknowledge their kinship. Our focus here is on the first of them, the institution of journalism, and its difficulties in promoting knowledge and critical understanding of controversial issues in the legal fields of human rights and international law. From its birth, journalism was embedded in national society, often controlled by the state but sometimes also taking the role of the fourth estate, and as such directing a critical beam on politicians and authorities (Schudson 1978). In that way the media became a crucial component of the democratic system, the marketplace for ideas and debates that created a foundation for legitimate policy-making. Whether opinions were built top-down or bottom-up is not a trivial matter from a democratic point of view (Habermas 1979), and it varies from nation state to nation state and from one period to the next in the history of modern society (Chalaby 1998). However, all these variations are features of national entities – that is, the nation states.

But when it comes to global matters of international and customary laws, including human rights, it seems clear that journalism is in real trouble. Policy-making is far more complicated, with a multitude of agencies, actors, and authorities, and often less transparent, with treaties and conventions worked out during long sessions behind closed doors. Journalist schools provide the student with a basic knowledge of the national legal system, but rarely offer courses in international law or politics or the UN system and its organizations, rules, and cultures. News journalists usually have their own secret network of information sources and routinized beats, which may work relatively well at the local and national levels, but when transferred to the international level these tools become extremely complicated and problematic. For editors, the national political and opinion context is reasonably easy to grasp, but in the field of international politics and law-making most of them have limited competence. So what are the chances that media can provide their audiences, the citizens, with relevant knowledge that facilitates reasoned opinion-building regarding different interpretations of UN resolutions or strong claims by leading politicians – nationally or internationally – that regime change is not only legitimate but also legal (Garbo 2001)? The globalization of conflicts and conflict resolutions, as well as politics, economy, culture, and so on generally challenge journalists and media to broaden their competence (cf. Held 2000). It is our aim in this chapter to make a first test of how some journalists and media tackle this demanding task.

Nationalized foreign news?
Besides the structural difficulties involved for a national institution like journalism to handle international – or global – processes whether political or legal,
our theoretical perspective further includes the assumption that media, generally speaking, construct reports within national frames. We provide here a few comments as to what this means for a comparative analysis of Norwegian and Swedish media discourses on the Libyan War 2011.

As a historical background to understanding Sweden’s and Norway’s role in the “war on terror” one has to appreciate the importance of the UN as a common ground and key factor in their approach to security and foreign policy (see Introduction). Even though the two countries have a different formal position in the international security policy landscape, Sweden being a formally nonaligned country and Norway a NATO member, they have historically shared the view that the UN is the most important organization for dealing with international issues, including the handling of conflicts and the establishment of a legal framework.

But there are differences, too, between Sweden and Norway in the sense that even though Norwegian politicians prefer a UN resolution as the basis for military action, loyalty to the US and NATO is the main feature which is more often than not also expressed in public. Not so in the Swedish public debates. Although Sweden and its military have had close, but secret, relations to the NATO countries ever since the Second World War, the official policy still is nonalignment, with the exception of the duties that follow EU membership. Recently, the traditional introduction to the foreign policy declaration by the Swedish government to parliament, mentioning the UN as the most important international foundation for Sweden’s foreign policy, has been dropped and replaced by a formulation emphasizing Swedish participation in international operations with humanitarian and conflict elimination objectives. But it is taboo, even today, for the Swedish government to openly talk about NATO membership or even to acknowledge the extent to which Swedish troops in Afghanistan, for example, are under the command of US generals (cf. Utrikespolitiska deklarationen 2013; see also Chapter 4).

A long series of media studies have confirmed the general tendency of conflict journalism to follow the policies of their national governments – to “domesticate” or “nationalize” the reporting (for example, Cohen 1963; Hallin 1986; Kellner 1992; Bennett & Paletz 1994; Riegert 1998; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001). In this chapter we will explore to what extent – if at all and if so how – Norwegian and Swedish media display national frames in their coverage of the Libyan War 2011. The fact that for the first time the countries participated together militarily under NATO command makes it pertinent to study whether, perhaps, the substantial gaps between their media found in previous conflicts have diminished or even disappeared in this conflict. Another reason for the following comparative analyses is the need to research possible national media frames with respect to international law and norm-making processes. But before the comparative Norwegian-Swedish media study on the Libyan case we will, in the following sections, summarise our findings from previous studies (Ot-
tosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2013). As in other major international events, the media was an arena for battles about “hearts and minds”. In Libya, the rebels were, from an early stage, able to offer media support including a press center with facilities for foreign journalists (Foss 2012).

Historical background

Given the importance of the UN as a cornerstone in the Scandinavian approach to foreign policy it is essential for journalists to do their homework and actually read the texts of the UN security resolutions. Politicians who claim to have support for their policy in UN resolutions sometimes have weak legal arguments for their case (see Introduction and Chapter 4). In such cases, journalists should be able to raise informed and critical questions about the misuse of legal arguments, and to enlighten the public on these issues (Ottosen 2009).

Both Norway and Sweden, in their foreign policy approach to global issues, have put emphasis on the need to anchor military intervention in the UN, preferably in a UN Security Council decision. Whether the UN resolutions were legitimate grounds for the attacks on Iraq in January 1991 and Libya in April 2011 is not the main point here (Eskeland 2011). The main point is that in the Scandinavian approach the UN Charter is the politically safe haven for military actions. For Swedish and Norwegian politicians it is, for example, essential to be able to say to the public in Sweden and Norway that the participation in the ISAF forces in Afghanistan has been approved by UN Security Resolution 1368 and 1373 (Ørbech 2014). That it is highly questionable whether this resolution actually authorizes a permanent military presence in Afghanistan (Ulfstein 2008), and that the ISAF operations would never have taken place without the unilateral US attack on Afghanistan in November 2001, is of less practical and political importance (see Chapter 4). If we go back to earlier global military-media events such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003 we find an interesting pattern in that it can be argued that the UN has been a hostage in the propaganda war before, during, and after these wars (Solomon 2005). Findings from our previous projects show that behind the rhetoric supportive of the UN shared by Norwegian and Swedish politicians there are also differences between the media in the two countries. There is no doubt that if Norwegian politicians (and media) have to choose between loyalty to the UN and to the US, the latter is preferred. For media in the traditionally nonaligned Scandinavian countries Finland and Sweden, the UN role was significantly more important and the organization was idealised more often than in all other countries analyzed in the project (US, German and Norwegian media) as an instrument for peace. The Norwegian media paid almost as little attention to the UN role in the conflict as did the US media (Kempf 2001; Nohrstedt 2001).
UN Resolution 1973 and the NATO attack on Libya

The dramatic political uprising and revolutions in North Africa in the winter of 2011 caused the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Eventually it spread to Libya (and other countries) and the opposition in Libya took up arms. After having lost control over the oil-rich eastern part of the country, the government forces of Muammar Gaddafi fought back and it soon became a stalemate. With the media strongly referring to Gaddafi’s threat to kill protesters “house by house,” Gaddafi tightened his grip on Tripoli and moved east. The UN Security Council gathered on March 17 and ended by adapting Resolution 1973 which sanctioned a no-fly zone over Libya to protect the civilian population from being attacked by Gaddafi’s planes (Ottosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2012).

The alleged threats by Gaddafi became essential in the arguments for a “humanitarian intervention”. When Norwegian politicians refer to Norway’s decision to join the military operation the core arguments are related to Gaddafi’s speech and the need to stop attacks on the civilian population. When the head of the Norwegian parliamentary committee for foreign and defense issues (now minister of defense in the conservative government), Ine Eriksen Søreide, summarized this at a military seminar in 2012, she was explicit: “A massacre on civilians was likely and close by” (Eriksen 2012: 84). Ola Tunander, after having looked through the evidence behind the claimed threats to the Libyan people, writes that the interpretation of the speech referred to in Western media and used by NATO and politicians in the West are highly questionable. He also claims that preparations for a military intervention had been going on for months and that the speech was used in a propaganda campaign to pave the way for a military intervention (Tunander 2012). The most important thing here, however, is not which version is correct but how Resolution 1973 was used, or perhaps misused, by NATO members when launching the military attacks on Libya in 2011.

The main points of Resolution 1973 were:

• A request for the immediate ceasefire and to stop the violence against civilians

• A no-fly zone over Libya

• Allowance to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians

• A declaration that Resolution 1970 will remain (import and export bans of weapons to and from Libya)

• An affirmation that all assets owned or controlled by the Libyan regime, shall be seized and the value returned to the people.

Resolution 1973 was adopted by the Security Council with ten votes. Russia, China, Brazil and India abstained. South Africa voted for, but worked actively
towards a ceasefire as soon as the NATO bombing began, an indication that those who were behind the original decision were not united behind NATO’s implementation of the decision. A review of the debate in the UN Security Council prior to the resolution shows that even the countries that spoke for the resolution put clear limits on the interpretation of the resolution text.

The minutes of the debate in the Council show that most of the speakers were confident about the limitations of the resolution. Lebanon’s speaker stressed that the text would not result in the occupation of “one inch” of Libyan territory by foreign forces. The representatives of China and the Russian Federation, explaining their abstentions, declared that they prioritized peaceful means of resolving the conflict and that many questions had not been answered about the provisions of the resolution, including, as the Russian representative put it, “how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits of the engagement would be”. He said the resolution included a necessary ceasefire, which he had called for earlier. It came clear at an early stage through public statements that President Putin was skeptical about the resolution. The delegations of India, Germany and Brazil, having also abstained from voting, equally stressed the need for peaceful resolution of the conflict and warned against unintended consequences of an armed intervention. Critical statements were also made by the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Portugal, Nigeria and South Africa (all quotes from UN 2011).

China had not blocked the action with a negative vote in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union, its representative said. It was vital to adapting the resolution that the African Union and the Arab League were supposed to play a major role in following-up the implementation of the resolution. This is clearly expressed in Point 2 of Resolution 1973:

… the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the secretary general to send his special envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc high-level committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution.

The Norwegian political scientist Sverre Lodgaard (2011) stressed that the formal basis for NATO to pursue the bombing lies in the interpretation of formulations in Section 4 “to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970” (2011) combined with paragraph 7, which reads “nor shall [the no-fly zone] apply to flights authorized by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by states acting under the authorization conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people …”.

When NATO took over the military operation, the reactions of the African Union, the Arab League and protests from major powers like Russia and Chi-
na, suggest that NATO’s interpretation of what “benefits” the Libyan people is a legal basis with which other member of the UN Security Council were not comfortable. The long-term outcome of this could be that NATO, through its implementation of Resolution 1973, has undermined the future actions of the UN to prevent humanitarian disasters and attacks on civilians under the principle of the responsibility to protect. This was clearly the case when Russia used its veto to stop a UN resolution against the regime in Syria on February 5, 2012 (Reuters February 5, 2012).

It should also be noted that not even within NATO was there total agreement about the Libyan operations. Countries like Norway and Denmark supported and participated in the bombing. Other countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and Poland refused to participate (Lodgaard 2011).

Underreporting the legal issues

The text of Resolution 1973 and the minutes of the debate in the UN were available for reporters on the Internet the day after it was approved. From a democratic point of view it should be obvious that the actual resolution and minutes should be reported, at least in summary, by the media. Otherwise politicians are free to make their own judgements and interpretations of what the decision means in terms of practical implementation. Below we will study whether the media lived up to the democratic demands or whether they allowed Resolution 1973 to be misused by NATO.

On March 27, NATO allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under UN Security Council Resolution 1973. In official NATO terms it was a unilateral decision:

On March 22, NATO responded to the UN call by launching an operation to enforce the arms embargo against Libya. On March 23, NATO’s arms embargo operation started. NATO ships and aircraft are operating in the central Mediterranean to make sure that the flow of weapons to Libya by sea is cut off. They have the right to stop and search any vessel they suspect of carrying arms or mercenaries. The NATO ships will not enter Libyan territorial waters. NATO has no intention of deploying land forces anywhere in Libyan territory.

In Norway the approval of Norway’s participation with six F-16 planes was secured in a telephone conversation on March 19 between the foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store and the political leaders from the other government parties and the opposition. The formal meeting in Parliament (Stortinget) took place two days later (VG Net April 19 2011). Paragraph 28 of the Norwegian Constitution states that issues of great importance should be dealt with in a government meeting with the king. To decide to go to war in a telephone conversation
is clearly a violation of the constitution (Eskeland 2011). The arguments for military intervention seemed reasonable for the majority of Norwegians at the time. The aim was to stop Gaddafi from attacking the civilian population in Benghazi; only immediate interference could allegedly stop a massacre, the public was told. But from the moment NATO attacked, the military operation de facto also stopped the intended mission of the African Union to avoid the escalating violence. Shortly after the bombing began, the five-member African Union committee on the Libyan crisis called for an “immediate stop” to all the attacks and “restraint” from the international community (NRK Brennpunkt March 12, 2013).

While UN Resolution 1973 was adapted in the spirit of responsibility to protect as described above, according to Phyllis Bennis it also cleared the ground for direct US, British, French, NATO and other international military intervention far beyond the no-fly zone (Bennis 2011). After the Security Council’s March 17 vote, the Swedish and Norwegian politicians expressed their respect for the limitations of the resolution – that it did not open up the option of regime change. When it turned out that the rebel forces were weaker than expected and that a military stalemate with potential fragmentation of the country could emerge, the propaganda changed and soon Western leaders raised the issue of “Gaddafi must go”. The consequence of Resolution 1973 seemed to be regime change after all (Ottosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2013).

As mentioned above the resolution calls for a no-fly zone, as well as “all necessary measures” to protect civilian areas under threat of attack in Libya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. The phrase “all necessary measures” is understood to include air strikes, ground, and naval strikes to supplement the call for a no-fly zone designed to keep Gaddafi’s air force on the ground. The US took credit for the escalation of military efforts, with Ambassador Susan Rice and other Obama administration officials arguing that their earlier hesitation to UN Resolution 1973 was based on an understanding of the limitations of a no-fly zone in providing real protection to (in this case, Libyan) civilians. To quote Phyllis Bennis (2011):

It’s widely understood that a no-fly zone is most often the first step towards broader military engagement, so adding the UN license for unlimited military escalation was crucial to getting the US on board. The “all necessary measures” language also appears to be the primary reason five Security Council members abstained on the resolution. For Russia, China, Germany, India and Brazil, that phrase meant giving the Pentagon and NATO a blank check backed by UN legitimacy. Unfortunately, their unease was not strong enough to result in opposition to the resolution; the collective abstention of the five still allowed the resolution to pass with a ten-zero vote in favor.
This is reminiscent of the no-fly zone in Iraq in 1991, unilaterally implemented by the US and the UK, and which in all practical terms secured the Western great powers a lasting military presence in the region (see Introduction). In the Libyan case, some supporters of the Resolution 1973 (among them South Africa) insisted on explicitly excluding a “foreign occupation force” in the text. But in all practical terms, that prohibition means little. It was admitted by President Obama early on that the CIA had started its own operations to assist the rebels (NYT March 30, 2011) and at an early stage the UK had launched an armed MI6 British intelligence operation inside Libya which was revealed because they made some embarrassing mistakes (Pan African News Wire April 7, 2011). As Phyllis Bennis notes: “… any US, British, or French troops arriving in Libya could easily be disguised as an ‘assistance team’ or ‘training mission’ or any of a host of well-honed diplomatic pseudonyms for what would otherwise be easily identified as foreign occupation forces.” The language expressed was designed to meet regional and international concerns that the UN resolution threatened to turn the Libyan opposition’s struggle into a third US-NATO war in the Middle East (Bennis 2011).

The empirical case: Norwegian and Swedish media coverage of the legal aspects

The empirical research background for this chapter is partly a survey of the Norwegian media coverage of the NATO operations in Libya in 2011 (Ottosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2013) and in addition two minor studies; one about the Norwegian media coverage of Resolution 1973 (Kristoffersen 2011) and the other about the coverage in the Norwegian daily tabloid VG and the Swedish Expressen (Haraldseide 2011). This is of particular interest in comparison to prior studies of these two newspapers in connection with the Gulf War in 1991, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, and the Iraq War in 2003. At that time, the framing of the two newspapers confirmed an overall pattern that the Norwegian coverage was more dependent on US/NATO sources and adjusted more to the official US propaganda than the Swedish coverage (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2001). As indicated above, in the Libyan War 2011 it is plausible to expect the coverage to be more unified because this time the Swedish forces joined the battle with support functions.

The Norwegian media coverage of the NATO implementation of Resolution 1973

The conclusion from the content analyses of the Norwegian media coverage of warfare in Libya is that the media were divided. Both mainstream newspapers
like *Aftenposten* and niche papers like *Klassekampen*, *Ny Tid* and *Morgenbladet* carried a substantial number of critical articles and all the three niche papers wrote disparagingly about the Norwegian participation in their editorials, while mainstream papers like *Aftenposten* supported it. But the niche papers, as well as the mainstream media, lacked the ability to go deeper into the principal questions related to international law (Ottosen, Slaatta & Øfsti 2013).

It is striking that none of the editorials in *Aftenposten* and *VG* find it reasonable to refer to the critical voices opposing the war. They also ignore the fact that the news articles were almost exclusively based on Norwegian elite sources, and mainly sources supporting the war. Instead of using resources to produce criticism and debate themselves, editors left the critical discussion to the authors of commentary and readers’ letters and thus missed the opportunity to develop journalism by absorbing condemnatory voices. We are left with the impression that in many ways Norwegian mainstream journalism adopted a domestic ideal perspective of Norway as a doer of good wanting the eyes of others to see the country’s involvement in humanitarian interventions (see Conclusion).

However, quite a few articles discuss and criticize the government’s media and information strategy and the lack of transparency about the military operations. This confirms a pattern observed in previous studies that the media had, in general terms, learned the lesson from the Gulf War 1990-91 when the Norwegian and Swedish media were influenced by US propaganda (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2011). But this criticism does not elaborate on the limited legal basis for the Libyan intervention and therefore the media failed to provide their audiences with a critical evaluation of whether or not the UN Security Resolution 1973 was respected.

This conclusion was also supported by Kristoffersen’s analysis that revealed a split between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense about Norwegian participation in the bombing. Kristoffersen, with a background as a reporter from the Norwegian TV2 channel, had conducted an interview with the then minister of defense and later minister of foreign affairs, Espen Barth Eide, about the Afghanistan war. Eide had admitted at the time that when Norway’s main ally, the US, requires the deployment of Norwegian forces in NATO military operations, Norway in all practical terms has no option but to accept (Kristoffersen 2010: 26). The study also documents how the Norwegian media’s focus changed from the original purpose of establishing a no-fly zone to the protection of the civilian population from the attacks by Gaddafi’s troops and eventually another case of regime change. This transformation of the objectives explicated in Resolution 1973 is pursued in the day-to-day reporting, but is never discussed as an important issue or highlighted in headlines or editorials. Kristoffersen also shows that the then Norwegian minister of defense, Grete Faremo, tried to keep secret what targets the Norwegian pilots actually hit on the ground. Only when the US television station NBC reported that Norwegian
pilots had bombed Gaddafi’s home and after follow-up pressure from Norwegian journalists, did she admit that Norwegian pilots also took part in the bombing of civilian targets which, on at least one occasion caused the death of innocent civilians – even though spokespersons from the Norwegian defense forces insisted that Norwegian pilots were not responsible for the actual killing of civilians (op. cit.: 23). It is likely that Norwegian pilots also took part in bombing the Libyan state television, which normally has the protection of the Geneva Conventions as a civilian target. We have found no example of media making a point of this or raising critical issues about the matter.

A Norwegian-Swedish comparative study of media perspective on participation in the military intervention

Another study conducted a comparative analysis of how the Norwegian tabloid Verdens Gang (VG) and the Swedish counterpart Expressen (EXP) covered NATO’s implementation of Resolution 1973 (Haraldseide 2011). It analysed if and to what extent the pattern in earlier studies of war journalism (that is, nationalised framing related to the two countries foreign and security policies) was still apparent. The content analysis covers the ten-day period March 17-27 from the adoption of the resolution, the following “Odyssey Dawn” operation, and until the NATO de facto took over and renamed it “Unified Protector”, a label connecting it with the UN principle of responsibility to protect.

In her quantitative content analysis Haraldseide showed that VG had more prominent coverage than EXP with a total of 59 articles while EXP had 47. VG had six editorials during the period while EXP had three. VG also had more commentary articles than EXP.

VG has traditionally nurtured a close relation to the Norwegian defense forces (Ottosen 2009) and this is also evident when comparing VG’s and EXP’s use of sources. While 18 of the sources in VG were from the Norwegian defense forces, EXP had only two sources from the Swedish defense forces. VG had a total of 13 non-Norwegian sources and out of these six were military (mostly American). EXP had 27 Western elite sources and of these only five were military. EXP had more Libyan sources, 19 in all, while VG had only 11.

The pattern of sources in the two tabloids confirms findings in earlier studies. Norwegian media seems to be more dependent on Western and US sources and the military sources have a more prominent role in the Norwegian media coverage than in the Swedish. A similar difference is found in the visual material with eight photos of Norwegian military in the VG while EXP published only one portrait of a Swedish pilot.

Haraldseide also conducted a qualitative study of the two tabloids’ editorials and how they dealt with the security policy issues, including the NATO’s
taking over the operation. As mentioned, **VG** had twice the number of editorials as **EXP**. The first two editorials in **VG** clearly support Norwegian military intervention, with emphasis on the need to protect the civilian population in Banghaz: “if the bastion of rebellion Banghaz should fall the whole debate on the no-fly zone can be buried together with all the Libyans hoping for help from the outside world” (**VG** March 17, 2011). In one editorial on March 17 **VG** attacks the Norwegian foreign minister who, at this stage, expresses some doubt as to whether Norway should join the military operation. **VG** praises Denmark’s decision to send six F-16 planes: “We assume that the Norwegian government will follow the example of the Danes despite Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s intensive efforts in the last few days to paint black anything that tastes of Western interference in Libya.”

In its editorial on March 18, **EXP** also supports UN Resolution 1973 and welcomes the idea of military intervention in Libya in an almost euphoric tone: “The hopeful, magical sentiment behind the Arabic freedom fighters yesterday evening reached all the way into the UN Security Council.” The editorial ends: “The Security Council shows that a better world is possible and that thanks to the Arab freedom fighters.”

Interestingly enough, **EXP** also brings the situation in Bahrain into the picture in an editorial on March 17 with the title “Free Bahrain”. Here the editor writes about double standards when the states in the Gulf area support the no-fly zone in Libya but work against the freedom fighters in Bahrain. It is an interesting case of the pattern mentioned earlier: that Norwegian media are closer to the US position than the Swedish media. **EXP**’s editorial can be read as an indirect criticism of the US, given the fact that the superpower has bases in Bahrain and remained silent when forces from Saudi Arabia crossed the border to help deter the Bahrain resistance movement.

On March 19 an editorial in **EXP** takes a clear position in support of a Swedish military contribution with the title “Send Gripen to Libya”. The editorial is accompanied by a picture of a Swedish pilot beside his plane with the subtext: “Just a cocky exhibition?”.

One line in the subtext is printed in bold, attacking the Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt who, in his blog, had expressed doubt about whether Swedish planes could be under US command. The editorial is full of contempt for the foreign minister, accusing him of giving “cowardly excuses” for not joining the operation. In its third and last editorial on March 22, **EXP** has no doubts about the arguments for Sweden to send Gripen to support the international operations – on the contrary, it is a moral duty. “Do the right thing” is what the headline urges, and the editorial calls the decision to send planes a “moral imperative”.

The pattern of the previous studies is partly confirmed in Haraldseide’s analysis. In the Swedish **EXP** there is slightly more critique of the selective US
policies in relation to dictators in the Middle East than in the Norwegian VG. But when it comes to the issue of whether their own country should participate militarily both tabloids are devoted “war journalism” promoters, to use Johan Galtung’s concept (Galtung 2002), both putting similar pressure on their reluctant foreign ministers who are showing some hesitation over sending air forces to the war zone.

In its last editorial in the period, VG takes a step further and brings in the issue of regime change even by means of extra-judicial execution of political leaders: “[we] will not shed a tear if Gaddafi should be killed” (VG March 27, 2011). We will not proceed with analysing the emotional reactions exposed by the media in relation to the killing of Gaddafi, but will report the second case study of how illegal action in the Libya War – that is, the death of Gaddafi, was reported by the media in Norway and Sweden.

Editorials on the death of Gaddafi in Verdens Gang and Expressen

Both EXP and VG carried editorials on October 21, the day Gaddafi was pronounced dead. EXP used the title “The peace must also be won”. The editorial starts with one of the controversial issues related to the execution of Gaddafi:

There was public happiness when Muammar Gaddafi was found. It would have been better if he had been alive. If he could have been brough to trial in a fair process in Tripoli or transferred to the International Criminal Court it would have been welcome for many reasons. Hopefully he was not executed in a summary manner, hopefully we will not experience legendary tales of his death or martyrdom. (EXP October 21, 2011)

As we now know, Gaddafi was executed in the most brutal manner – shot, stabbed, and lynched. He was placed on public exhibition in the cooling room in a slaughterhouse until the smell from the body became unbearable. While this was documented in all its dreadful details in texts and pictures after the editorial was written, and since the EXP editors did not come back to the topic, we will never learn how they reflected over their shattered hope of a trial in court. In any case, the brutal killing of Gaddafi did not change the paper’s general enthusiasm for the NATO intervention. The EXP editorial claims that the majority of Libyans want democracy after 42 years of dictatorship. In a matter-of-fact manner the editorial warns that this will be more difficult in Libya than in the neighboring countries Tunisia and Egypt because armed groups of rebels must heal “difficult infected wounds created by the civil war”. This realistic observation is followed by what, in retrospect, looks like wishful thinking, since EXP express hope because of statements by the rebel leaders who, after the fall of
Gaddafi’s hometown Sirte, had promised to make themselves replaceable in free elections. The editorial ends with a euphoric look back at March 17, 2011, when “the UN Security Council gathered to decide about a military intervention to protect civilians (in Benghazi) against an urgent national threat. This decision and those NATO efforts that followed were essential for the fall of Gaddafi.” After praising the Libyans for being the real heroes in this tale, EXP warns that they will need humanitarian and civil support from the world in future.

By mentioning the UN resolution, but failing to go into the details of Resolution 1973, the EXP did not contribute to a democratically open discussion of whether the resolution text had been respected and whether regime change was actually meant to be a part of this decision. The wishful rhetoric in the editorial offers no signs of the worried reports from Amnesty International at the time that rebel groups were already involved in human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing (Amnesty International 2011). The city of Sirte was left in ruins and it would have been relevant to reflect upon whether the signs of collective punishment could have been a violation of the Geneva Convention.

The Norwegian tabloid VG had, as mentioned above, promised not to shed a tear if Gaddafi was killed. So it is no wonder that the paper had the headline “The dictator finally fell” on its editorial after Gaddafi had been executed. The text is similar to that in EXP, in both theme and framing, but the language is more enthusiastic and almost euphoric: “Then it was over for Muammar Gaddafi. After ruling Libya with an iron fist for decades, he finally met his fate. One should be careful to rejoice over human death, but Gaddafi chose his own destiny” (VG October 21, 2011). Given the circumstances around the death of the Libyan dictator described above, this is a peculiar way to phrase it. EXP, at least, hoped for a fair trial, but VG seems less worried about the legal issues. VG also underlines the importance of the UN resolution but without drawing attention to the issue that regime change was not actually part of Resolution 1973. VG goes even further than EXP, writing: “UN Security Council managed to gather around a resolution giving the opportunity for NATO to support the rebels with attacks from the air.” The actual text in Resolution 1973, with its emphasis on a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians, is translated into something entirely different giving the false impression that it legalised an offensive military operation for regime change in Libya. The rest of the text is a tribute to the success of a military solution, with a hint about the foreign minister who hesitated about it:

Norwegian fighter planes were among the first to drop bombs over Libya. We should be proud of being part of this operation. It is a reason to remind of those who were skeptical of such an operation. Among them was Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. When Gaddafi now has fallen, and the battle in Libya hopefully reaches an end, these skeptics are left in shame. Norway
and other nations in NATO have, together with the UN, reason to be proud. Reasonable use of military force can, in given situations, make the world a better place. (VG October 21, 2011)

The downside is ignored by VG. No concern for the many civilians killed (also by NATO), no reference to the reports from Amnesty International and others about abuses carried out by the rebels (AI 2011). VG does, however, lift a finger of warning: “We who supported the rebels have to follow [the development] closely and must take our part of the responsibility.”

If VG had been responsible it could have mentioned the reports from Amnesty International, like this quote published a month earlier:

Amnesty International, which has taken testimonies from more than 200 detainees since the fall of al-Zawiya and Tripoli, believes that hundreds of people have been taken from their homes, at work, at checkpoints, or simply from the streets. Many have been ill-treated upon arrest, being beaten with sticks, backs of rifles, kicked, punched and insulted, at times while blindfolded and handcuffed. In some cases, detainees reported being shot after being seized. The organization called on the NTC to prioritize the investigation of those on all sides of the conflict suspected of responsibility for abuses, with a view to prosecution in fair trials that meet international standards and ensuring reparation for victims (Amnesty International 2011).

The editorial offers no reflection over the legal issues and is reminiscent of the black-and-white reasoning typical of war propaganda. And perhaps that is what it is, considering the strong warmongering that the VG disseminated from the start of the war.

The reporting of the killing of Gaddafi in Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter

Besides the comparison between Norwegian and Swedish tabloids in this section we will address how two broadsheets, Aftenposten (AP) and Dagens Nyheter (DN), covered the circumstances around Gaddafi’s death. In the Norwegian morning paper AP the reporting of the killing of Gaddafi was followed in 17 articles during the period between October 18 and December 31, 2011. The comparable number for DN in the same period was 26 articles.

Most of the articles in the AP sample did not deal with legal issues around Gaddafi’s death. The most critical regarding the legal issues is the last article in the sample, from December 17. It is a short telegram with “The Norwegian News Agency” (NTB) as its source and with a quote from the chief prosecutor in the International Criminal Court saying: “The way Gaddafi was murdered
is one of the issues for investigation, since there is a serious suspicion of war crimes, says Moreno-Ocampo.” There are other events that raised the legal aspects. In an article “Demands investigation of Gaddafi” on October 21, the UN Office for Human Rights is reported to call for investigation of the legal circumstances around his death. In another article, “Gaddafi’s death under investigation” on October 23, even the Norwegian foreign minister, Jonas Garh Støre, has some concern for the humanitarian (if not legal) aspects when saying (as quoted from an interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting Company): “Prisoners shall be treated in a human and dignifying manner. We have to talk to the new authorities in Libya about these principles.”

The sample of AP articles in chronological order as formulated in the headlines comprises the following:

- Oct 21 The revolution must deliver
- Oct 21 Boasting of Norwegian efforts – Stoltenberg in the Oval Office
- Oct 21 Libyans in Norway: Now we will build our country
- Oct 21 The NATO planes return home
- Oct 21 Gaddafi’s last stronghold blown to pieces – private homes being robbed
- Oct 21 Demands investigation of Gaddafi’s death
- Oct 21 Libya after Gaddafi
- Oct 21 Said about Gaddafi’s death
- Oct 22 Satisfied voices from the West
- Oct 22 Gaddafi’s death inspires and frightens
- Oct 22 “Should shiver in their pants”
- Oct 23 Weapon hurts women and children badly
- Oct 23 Gaddafi’s death under investigation – contradictions on the destiny of the dictator
- Oct 24 Historical weekend (editorial)
- Oct 26 Now the Libyans are expecting a flow of tourists
- Oct 27 NATO’s warfare and contribution
- Dec 17 Gaddafi’s death could be a war crime

The only editorial that addressed the death of Gaddafi was published on October 24 with the title “Historical weekend”. It does not address the legal issues but is quite critical towards the circumstances around Gaddafi’s death, claiming some similarity to lynching. The theme of the editorial is a celebration of the victory for democratic forces both in Libya and Tunisia. However, Aftenposten expresses concern about the lack of dignity in the situation:

There is no dignity in the showdown with the dictator we have witnessed. Rather a showdown out of control. Our sympathy with the dictator is non-
existent. However, this does not mean that we can close our eyes to a mob that literally ran amok in the meeting with the fallen dictator.

There is no demand for a legal investigation or call for a fair trial, but the event is reported as a disturbing factor spoiling some of the celebrations.

The similarities between the AP and the Swedish broadsheet DN in reporting the rebel forces’ capturing and killing of Gaddafi are substantial when one looks at the daily routine news (see list of DN headlines below). But the legal aspects are mentioned more frequently in the Swedish newspaper than the Norwegian. The DN published 26 news items, mostly short telegrams, in the online version on the topic between October 18 and December 31, 2011 and in addition two editorials. Of these, at least 12 news articles mention the legal aspect in one way or the other. The remaining 14 articles dealt with the way Gaddafi was captured and killed in different versions. Even though the issue of whether the dictator was murdered or killed in action is mentioned, it does not seem to be of much concern in the DN reports, since there is no in-depth discussion or any feature article on the matter. And when one looks at the editorial page it is obvious that the editors and their colleagues do not find the extra-judicial killing of the Libyan dictator much at which to be outraged. Two editorials during the period took up the killing of Gaddafi. In one, on October 21, the author regrets that Gaddafi was not put on trial for his crimes, but also argues that a Libyan court process, with a death sentence as the expected result, would be inhuman too. In the editor-in-chief Peter Wolodarski’s article on October 23 the issue of extra-judicial execution is not referred to at all. Instead, the text contains a summary of the fallen regime in Libya with a headline making the point clear: “Gaddafi’s dream of socialism became a Libyan nightmare”. Thus nor Resolution 1973 or the legality of its implementations is discussed by Wolodarski.

The absentminded attitude of the leading Swedish broadsheet DN with regard to the disputable legality and perhaps also legitimacy of the ways NATO implemented the UN Libya resolution becomes understandable and symptomatic when the newspaper’s firm view that Sweden should join NATO is included in the picture. This blind spot stands out as almost a parody when, in retrospect, the flow of news is studied chronologically for the period October 18 to December 31. A selection of the headlines:

18 Oct Clinton wants Gaddafi dead or alive
20 Oct The world welcomes reports about the capture
20 Oct Expert: A practical solution to kill Gaddafi
21 Oct The horror regime is history
21 Oct Gaddafi is buried in a secret ceremony
21 Oct Amnesty: He should have been put to trial
21 Oct UN wants to investigate Gaddafi’s death
22 Oct NATO ends operations in Libya
22 Oct Syrian opposition needs support
22 Oct Gaddafi’s corpse shown as trophy
22 Oct Commander: "Nobody knows who shot Gaddafi"
25 Oct Gaddafi buried
27 Oct Gaddafi’s chauffeur: He seemed confused at the end
16 Dec Gaddafi’s death could have been a war crime

The article on October 18 reports in 20 lines that Hillary Clinton, at the time US secretary of state, has asked for the Libyan dictator to be caught dead or alive. The news agency AP is quoted as commenting that it is the first time that anyone from the US government has asked for Gaddafi to be killed. Irrespective of this rather clear indication that the extra-judicial killing was ordered by the White House, none of the other 27 DN articles even touch upon the legal responsibility of the US or NATO for the possible war crime. That the dictator’s death was “practical”, as a legal expert put it in the headline on October 20, was probably also true for the US and the other NATO members, but this is not something that DN bothers to care about – not in that article nor in any of the others.

Chaos in Libya – who’s responsible?

Politicians in Norway, Sweden and the other countries contributing to the military intervention all emphasized the “humanitarian” aspects of the operation. The aim was also to introduce Libya to real democracy. How does it look two or three years down the road? Human rights organisations such as Ammesty International and Human Rights Watch express their concern. How about the media? In November 2013, Reuters published a report on food shortages and lack of funds to import wheat and other supplies that never seemed to be a problem during the Gaddafi regime (Reuters November 6, 2013)

The Independent assumed the responsibility of filing a special report on Libya in September 2013 in which some of the issues ignored by politicians were raised. It made a point of the fact that as world attention focused on the coup in Egypt and the poison gas attack in Syria over the past two months, Libya “has plunged unnoticed into its worst political and economic crisis since the defeat of Gaddafi two years ago. Government authority is disintegrating in all parts of the country putting in doubt claims by American, British and French politicians that NATO’s military action in Libya in 2011 was an outstanding example of a successful foreign military intervention which should be repeated in Syria” (The Independent September 3, 2013). Furthermore, it was noticed
that Libyans are increasingly at the mercy of militias that act outside the law. Popular protests against militias have been met with gunfire; 31 demonstrators were shot dead and many others wounded as they protested outside the barracks of “the Libyan Shield Brigade” in the eastern capital Benghazi in June. The Independent also pointed to the failure to report on the situation:

Though the NATO intervention against Gaddafi was justified as a humanitarian response to the threat that Gaddafi’s tanks would slaughter dissidents in Benghazi, the international community has ignored the escalating violence. The foreign media, which once filled the hotels of Benghazi and Tripoli, have likewise paid little attention to the near collapse of the central government. (The Independent September 3, 2013)

Norwegian and Swedish media have shown little interest in following up similar issues. However it should be underlined that the findings from Scandinavian media presented above were produced in a study that only covers the autumn 2011, i.e. the period from when the NATO attack took place until December 31. After that period some Norwegian and Swedish media may have followed up on the issues, but if so unfortunately late – as with The Independent’s report as quoted above. For example, it should be mentioned that Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK) program Brennpunkt one-and-a half year year later, in March 12, 2013, published a investigative report in which several critical aspects of the Norwegian warfare were discussed, including legal issues.

Epilogue I – Norwegian war crimes weaken the UN system?

If journalists and media do not take responsibility for evaluating whether participation in the Libya War 2011 implied war crimes and the outmaneuvering of the UN Security Council’s decisions, who does? As with the WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden’s revelations, in the case of the Libyan War the answer seems to be frustrated whistleblowers within the armed forces. There are indeed indications that NATO at the central level consciously arranged the decision-making processes and the possibilities for minor countries like Norway and Sweden to influence the selection of targets in such a way that the potential ethical and strategic conflicts between the participating NATO countries should not break out before the operations had ended. For example, in a summary of the effects of the Norwegian bombing in Libya, Major Jens Gunnar Haugen Dragsnes asks: “Do we need to understand the effect of the bombs we drop?” In a cost benefit analysis he concludes that through the bombing in Libya Norway has strengthened its popularity in the USA/NATO alliance, but in the long run has contributed “to weaken the future strength of the UN Security Council” (Haugen Dragsnes 2012: 49). He is worried that since 75 per cent of the targets were “stationary”
(warehouses where ammunition could be kept) there were also landlines for communications with obviously civilian relevance, which might be difficult to explain as way of protecting the civilian population. In comparison, only 21 per cent of the targets were military vehicles such as tanks. What worries Haugen Dragsnes is that the short-term credibility of NATO has, by drawing upon UN Resolution 1973, been protected at the price of the long-term negative consequences for the status of the UN Security Council. He is also concerned about the reputation of the Norwegian Air Force. It has been publicly known that Norwegian officers had the possibility of a so-called red-card during the Libyan War of 2011. But was the red-card option used? General major Morten Haga Lunde, who played a central role in the operation, answers (rather vaguely) “maybe” to the question, but underlines that Norway tried to create an atmosphere of consensus rather than confrontation in the process of picking targets (Lunde 2012: 105). Norwegian pilots took part in two types of missions: “planned” and “dynamic”, the latter with targets picked by the pilots themselves. Most targets were defined by NATO. Initially the red-card holders were not invited into the process of picking targets, but later they were invited as observers to the meetings where targets were picked, and eventually they became more involved in the process. NATO acknowledged that all countries had to be pleased if an important mission was conducted (Lunde 2102:105). But as Haugen Dragsnes’ statistics’ show, only a minority of the bombs dropped by Norwegian pilots had been cleared when the Norwegian red-card holders were present. Norway had a much smaller presence in the NATO headquarters of the Joint Force Command in Naples, where 75 per cent of the Norwegian targets were defined.

NATO’s military tactics could not protect the Libyan civilians against attacks from the rebels. A military advisor to General Petreaus in Iraq, David Kilcullen, suggested in a televised interview that NATO should have had an airborne referee function over Libya, with a mandate to interfere if the rebels attacked civilians. This idea was, however, not implemented. Instead, NATO let the civil war follow its own logic and concentrated on bombing targets around densely populated areas, removing the possibility of their use to launch attacks on civilians. In practical terms huge areas around cities like Brega and Mistra were destroyed to “secure” the civilians, but often with the opposite effect. The most controversial instance was when this tactic was applied in the center of Tripoli (including Gaddafi’s palace); Haugen Dragsnes argues that through these attacks NATO might have crossed the line between protecting civilians and enforcing regime change. Even though NATO made clear at several press conferences that regime change was not on its agenda, Haugen Dragsnes concludes that there was every indication that in reality the military tactic was chosen to promote regime change (Haugen Dragsnes 2012: 51). He also asks, rhetorically, whether it is up to NATO to redefine the policy of a no-fly zone under the responsibility to protect principle to a regime change policy without consulting the United Nations.
One political consequence that Dragsnes mentions was that when Norwegian F-16s had bombed the presidential palace in Tripoli on April 25, Putin had immediately declared that nobody had given NATO a mandate to kill Gaddafi. Leading politicians in the UK and US insisted that Gaddafi’s palace was a legitimate target, but Haugen Dragsnes raises another issue: if it was not, “[perhaps] Norway has other interests than the US and the UK. Does this mean that we must also take into consideration what effects our bombs have on our relationship with Russia?” India abstained from voting for UN Security Council Resolution 1973, but declared that NATO had broken the weapons embargo through support for the rebels. The Norwegian officer also mentions that some countries, like China and Russia, protested, claiming that NATO had redefined protecting civilians as air force support for the rebels’ military operations. These countries furthermore blocked a request for a new meeting in the Security Council to reconsider the operations. President Medvedev said that he would never have supported Resolution 1973 if he had known how NATO would misuse it (Haugen Dragsnes 2012: 54).

Epilogue II – media coverage of chemical WMD in the Syrian War 2013

The history of previous wars is never far away in the present conflicts, and this is certainly true of the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards, at least – in some ways – in the minds of decision makers and of public opinion. President Obama has, now and then, and in connection with the Syrian conflict, referred to the experiences of the Iraq War 2003, a war that he had not supported as senator. In the UK, the prime minister, David Cameron, clearly underestimated the resilience of the memories of the false accusations against Iraq that his predecessor, Tony Blair (together with George W. Bush), had proclaimed to be legitimate reasons for military intervention in 2003, and was defeated in parliament on the vote about a military attack on Syria. The UK minister of defense, Phillip Hammond, even had the Iraq War at the front of his mind to the extent that during the debate he twice referred to the Syrian president as Saddam Hussein (Kielos 2013). For the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, another more recent conflict was obviously more relevant, so he mixed up Syria with Libya during a press conference at which he suggested that the war in Syria could be solved by diplomatic means (Dagens Eko September 10, 2013). As the saying goes, military commanders always fight the latest war, and that goes for politicians as well, it seems.

But what about war journalists? Do they learn from past wars? And, if so, what lessons have they drawn? To be more precise: what do journalists learn from history about the risks involved with public trust in war propaganda and
the promotion of military interventions to protect civilians and human rights? We will answer that question based on a limited study of Swedish media reports from the visit by President Obama to Stockholm September 4-5, 2013, immediately after he had declared the US intention to punish the Bashar al-Assad regime for the gas attacks that killed some 1,400 civilians, including 400 children. But first, a general comment on the discursive political context about international norm-setting and law-making.

Normbuilding, internationally, has been contested terrain since at least the end of the Second World War, taking a new direction after the end of the Cold War. Today two conflicting views are struggling for hegemony: (1) the neorealist perspective with nation states interacting with their national interests as a guideline, and (2) the multilateral, UN-focused perspective, with consensus between the member states, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council, as a guideline.

In this struggle the mainstream media such as Dagens Nyheter takes a clear stand on the side of the neorealist option as a consequence of a democratic super-ideology (Tingsten 1952; see Ers 2008; cf. also Andersson et al. 2013: 23 ff., who use the term in a slightly different way). In such a perspective the decisive factor for assessing probable contributions to the international development is the inherent nature of the specific nation state – basically, whether it has a democratic or authoritarian political system. It is always more reasonable to trust and join a democratic country than an authoritarian opponent, irrespective of the former’s or the latter’s track record. The UN institutions and their normmaking will not yield any possibility or potential other than what can be deduced from the members’ combined real-political interests. In other words, according to this perspective there is nothing unique to be expected from the UN processes of conflict resolution. The idea that the UN system, with its slow consensus-based norms-building processes, could accomplish anything beyond the actual national interests of the great powers (American, Russian, Chinese, British or French) is, in practical terms, rejected by promoters of this super-ideology. International and customary law is therefore of secondary importance in judgements concerning the legality and legitimacy of actions and proposals – more important is whether the actions or proposals have a democratic or a totalitarian origin.

This analysis of the real-political theoretical foundation for promoters of the super-ideology is not in conflict with the way Andersson et al. (2013) characterize the controversy about different interpretations of customary laws in recent international conflicts: “It is striking that humanitarian reasons, as a kind of super-ideology, are more and more often used for an argument that the prohibition of violence must not necessarily be respected” (Andersson et al. 2013:24). They mention examples such as the Kosovo conflict 1999 and the Iraq War 2003, where military intervention without the sanction of the
UN Security Council was motivated by humanitarian aims. But those who defend the argument that international customary law has changed in a way that makes unilateral humanitarian interventions if not legal at least legitimate have the burden of proof, according to Andersson et al. (2013). And they conclude that convincing proofs have not been presented, especially because the argument for legal humanitarian intervention without UN Security Council sanction entirely ignores the conventions and resolutions, in particular the UN Charter’s ultimate purpose of avoiding wars clearly stated in the preamble and stipulation of objectives. Politicians should be reminded that their country – by signing the UN Charter – has committed itself in Article 3 “to settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and that by signing the UN Charter they promised in Article 4 to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. Only the Security Council can, on behalf of all member states, decide to use military means and force to uphold the spirit of the UN Charter. We agree that this criticism is valid and important, but it is also somewhat limited for studies of media discourses and that is why we suggest a more elaborate concept of super-ideology, which makes it possible to expand beyond the legal field and to also (inter-discursively) relate the media discourses on legality and legitimacy to the neorealist (Livingstone 2011) theory of international relations.

In what follows we will present a small comparative analysis of the coverage of the chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue in the Syrian War of August 2013 in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten (AP) and the Swedish Dagens Nyheter (DN). Both newspapers are leading representatives of the quality press in Scandinavia. By a coincidence, the chemical attack on August 22, 2013, which killed around 1,400 civilians, among them several hundred children, happened just two weeks before President Obama visited Stockholm on his way to a G20 meeting in St Petersburg. The gas attack, and the US’s and other international reactions to it therefore became a hot political issue during and after the President’s visit. Swedish media, of course, reported massively from this historical visit – the first official visit by an American president – and this media hype offers rich material for analyzing some aspects of the “mediatization” (Cottle 2009: 110-111) of war journalism in threat society (Nohrstedt 2010). The Norwegian-Swedish comparison will as a consequence be somewhat unbalanced since the voluminous Swedish media material on the Obama visit makes accessible dimensions of the conflict reporting that do not come out as clearly in the media of other countries, including Norway. Hence, there will first be some details about reporting in Dagens Nyheter of the complex Obama visit and Syrian gas attack, and thereafter the comparative conclusions from Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter.
The first main question for the analysis of DN is related to the central theme of this book: whether war journalism is capable of reporting legal aspects in a proper way. Or, more concretely: How does DN describe a legitimate response from the international community to the gas attacks? Is it legal and/or legitimate to punish the al-Assad regime with missiles? The week before Obama’s visit, Dagens Nyheter ran several articles (editorials, commentaries and news) discussing the legal and moral issues connected to a possible US military attack. Following its traditional media logic the focus is on the political power game involved and sometimes complemented with quite detailed speculations concerning the reasoning and inner thoughts of the main actor, President Barack Obama. In particular his credibility problem is emphasized frequently, with reference to his “red line” warning to al-Assad a year earlier – for example on August 27 (editorial), August 29 (commentary by Micheal Winiarski), August 30 (editorial), August 31 (commentary by Winiarski) and September 4 (editorial signed by the editor-in-chief Peter Wolodarski). Although the reasoning is full of comments about what Obama really “thinks”, “wants”, and “prefers” (even the president’s “instincts” are mentioned) the legal aspects are handled lightly. It is not that they are never mentioned; the problem is that they are not taken seriously owing to the neorealist super-ideology that dominates the newspaper’s position. This perspective is consistently pursued in editorials, in “analyses” and in commentaries. The main editorial on the day Obama arrived in Stockholm, September 4, 2013, is typical. On the front page that day, the American president is greeted: “Welcome to Little USA, Mr President” (Välkommen till Lilla USA, Mr President). The headline to the editorial signed by Peter Wolodarski is “The Indispensable American”. In the opening paragraphs the editor-in-chief admits some second thoughts, but “ …if the US does not act, it sends unwanted signals to the oppressors in the world”. And: “The truth is that the world is helped by a policeman.” The UN option is rejected in rather derogatory words: “Syria has shown up the UN’s absolutely worst side. When Russia and China decide that no resolution should be taken against al-Assad the alternatives for action are exhausted.” The conclusion is: “A democratic world order can never be controlled by authoritarian regimes such as the Russian and the Chinese.” In the Swedish public sphere the editor would of course not be regarded seriously without some critical comments on the history of US foreign and security policy, although his critical remarks are modest: “Unfortunately the US sometimes uses its power in a frightening way.” Snowden’s exposure of espionage is mentioned, as well as Guantánamo and the civilian casualties of the drone attacks – the latter, however, defended with the comment “ … even if the conditions for normal police work are absent in the Pakistan wilderness”. Right at the end, the editor expresses support for the Swedish prime minister’s plan not to bring up “American shortcomings” in the meetings, and urges him to concentrate on topics of mutual interest (Wolodarski 2013; see also Andersson 2013).
Wolodarski’s argument is clear enough when it comes to legality and legitimacy. Even though he avoids explicit reasoning about the legality, he is by implication, no doubt, arguing for the legitimacy of a unilateral military attack on Syria by the US. Other articles before and after the editorial carry the same ideological position (see for example Wolodarski’s commentary September 8, 2013). A few days earlier, August 30, 2013 an editorial in the newspaper had argued that the Obama statement of a year ago, that the use of chemical weapons was a “red line”, had now “forced” him to act after the gas attacks in Damascus. And the UN alternative is scornfully rejected: “Those who want the Council ‘to sit down and produce a solution’ have either missed the developments of the last two years or are ignoring them. It is easy to wish for negotiations, but the preconditions are not there.” On the same day, August 30, 2013, in the foreign news section, Dagens Nyheter presents the facts of the legal matters as the answer to the question “On what legal grounds could an attack take place?” The answer is divided into four parts: (1) It can be stated that Syria has committed crimes against humanity according to the UN Charter (however this “demands evidence that the attack is justified”); (2) The UN Security Council must agree that a crime has actually been committed; (3) If this does not occur, a way forward could be “to argue for self-defense, but that is difficult in this case”; and (4) According to the British government’s legal advisory board, a military intervention would be legal under the doctrine of human intervention, even if the Security Council had not given a green light. The legal board argued that “the intervention would then be pursued with the aim of reducing the overwhelming human catastrophe in Syria by ending the continued use of chemical weapons” (Dagens Nyheter August 30, 2013). Two days after Obama’s visit a one-column editorial repeats the newspaper’s lack of confidence in the UN’s capacity: “UN – Potty Does Not Stop the Gas”, ridiculing the Social Democrats’ demand that the Syrian crisis should be handled by the UN: “The UN has not functioned for two and a half years … The view is legitimate that no one has the right to use military violence without a yes from the UN Security Council. That is the letter of international law. But the honest thing is then to admit that since Russia says no, the world must abide by it. It is ridiculous to pretend that the UN is an unbiased institution” (Jonsson 2013a; see also editorial September 7, 2013).

Soon after a press conference at which the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said (probably unintentionally and without any expectations, according to media pundits) that the only way of stopping a missile attack on Syria would be if the Bashar al-Assad regime handed over all their chemical weapons, Russia proposed negotiations with the Syrian regime about such a move. This came as surprise – not least, probably, for the editors and commentators at DN, who had completely denied the UN a positive role in the conflict. How did Dagens Nyheter then respond to Russia’s suggestion? And what about the Norwegian Aftenposten in comparison?
It is hardly surprising that the editorial department in *Dagens Nyheter* suddenly lost most of its interest in the Syrian matter after the Russian initiative. Only two minor editorials signed by Gunnar Jonsson on September 12 and 13 brought up the Syrian war during the next two weeks. In those articles the question of legality and international law is totally absent, while the super-ideology is clearly present, with the focus on power games and on reasons why Russia’s motive could not be trusted – and the consequences of the “Putinization of world politics” (Jonsson 2013b). Jansson refers to the Iraq War 2003, but only to denounce any hopes that al-Assad would yield to pressure from the international community and the UN which had, over the years, “made fruitless attempts to get Saddam Hussein to co-operate”. But there is no reference to the consequences of the US-led intervention and the occupation of Iraq – or the chaotic situation in the country a decade later.

The Norwegian *Aftenposten* concentrates, as does its Swedish counterpart, on the power game aspects of the Russian initiative and the cynical view that Putin would come out as the political winner and the man who halted the escalation of conflict in Syria. Both newspapers’ editorials regret this, with references to Russia’s obstruction of effective conflict resolution in the UN in the past two years. But there are also differences in the two Scandinavian newspapers’ coverage. In particular, *Aftenposten* makes more references to the UN than *Dagens Nyheter*, and mentions the UN resolution on chemical weapons, the UN Charter, and the regrets of the general secretary, Ban Ki-moon, that the world community had failed in the Syrian conflict and that it was a “collective failure” (Andreassen September 12, 2013; Rønneberg & Dyrnes September 13, 2013; Rønneberg September 12, 2013). Even more relevant is that at least the Norwegian newspaper makes an attempt to report Putin’s arguments in favor of negotiation which implies invoking international law, the international “modern order”, and the need for solid proof of which party to the conflict is responsible for the use of chemical weapons. Putin is quoted in *Aftenposten* saying that Russia was not defending the Syrian regime but, rather, the UN system, which would be in jeopardy if the US took military action against Syria (Dragnes September 12, 2013).

Although this brief comparative analysis could not be generalized statistically, it seems plausible on theoretical grounds that it is relevant and offers valid results. First, in relation to our previous findings from the Gulf War 1990-91, the present findings indicate that the gap between media framing in the two Scandinavian countries has narrowed over the years; today the Norwegian newspaper is even more pro-UN than the Swedish. Second, the specific over-ideology in *Dagens Nyheter* is given more prominence by the controversial foreign and defense political positions promoted by the paper (NATO membership) when regarded in its national political context. In the choice between the UN system and the NATO alliance as international norm-setting institutions
and guarantees for collective security, *Dagens Nyheter* takes a contested and polemic view against the general public opinion. Third, in this ideologically compressed situation the Obama visit initiated vividly expressed identity constructions typical in a threat society. Not only did the editors at *Dagens Nyheter* emphasize, like the Swedish government, the “special relationship” between Sweden and the US, with notions such as Sweden’s being “little USA”; but “otherism” was displayed in so many words against Russia in particular. The democratic price of this ideological bias is that the newspaper’s readers are denied relevant information about legality and the alternative to the neorealist view that *Dagens Nyheter* represents.

**Conclusions**

The focus of this chapter has been on the legal aspects of the Libyan War 2011 and in particular on how the Norwegian and the Swedish media covered two crucial legal elements in the conflict, the first being the implementation of UN Resolution 1973. In this case, the analysis is limited to two tabloids, the Norwegian *Verdens Gang* and the Swedish *Expressen*, and to the main period of the violent conflict, from March 17, 2011, when UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was decided, until the NATO chairman’s announcement of the closure of the military operations by NATO on October 28 of the same year. The main research question was whether the two newspapers managed to provide their readers with relevant information regarding the content of the UN mandate in Resolution 1973 and whether the text was respected. The second case in the Libyan War was the killing of Gaddafi, and here we used two separate but related case studies – one on the same two tabloids and the other on two broadsheets, the Norwegian *Aftenposten* and the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter*. Furthermore, as an epilogue to the study of the media discourses on the Libyan War we added a short analysis of the coverage in *Aftenposten* and *Dagens Nyheter* of the responses to the gas attacks on civilians in the Syrian War of 2013.

The analytical focus on the legality aspects in these case studies is based upon the normative assumption that the globalization, in particular of military conflicts, in the present world makes it essential for the media in democratic societies to encourage debates and opinion-building about issues in the field of international law and human rights. However, previous media studies do not give reasons for optimism. Rather, it seems that a general conclusion is that the media, by and large, are national institutions communicating to a national audiences with a “domesticated” ideological perspective rather than a global outlook.

According to several researchers of American security and foreign policy, preventive military attacks for regime change in countries that are regarded as a threat or are simply not compatible with US interests have a long tradition.
The legality of such interventions (for example, in Libya in 2011) is a matter of dispute and therefore a problem when it comes to upholding the respect and legitimacy of international law, at the same time as they change legal practices – first de facto and then potentially de jure. Against this background it seems evident that journalists and media have a democratic duty to report, discuss and problematize the legal aspects of regime change enforced by an alleged UN mandate.

Our study of the coverage of the implementation of Resolution 1973 in the two tabloids in Norway and Sweden has shown that:

1. The editorials in *Expressen* and *VG* never discuss and problematize the controversial legal aspects of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in the Libyan War 2011.

2. Neither did the editorials describe, discuss and analyze the US security and foreign policy tradition of regime change and its implications for international politics and/or conflict escalation in the Libyan case. Besides the abovementioned democratic deficits in the two newspapers’ reporting and deliberations, they show some patterns related to the respective homeland’s security policy, patterns that we have seen in previous studies and which consequently seem to be stable over the two decades after 1989.

3. Both papers emphasize the importance of the UN.

4. The Norwegian paper is more enthusiastically supportive of the NATO operations in the Libyan War than its Swedish counterpart.

5. *VG*, but not the *Expressen*, also mentioned that the NATO countries had a responsibility for the consequences of the regime change and a partial responsibility for the new regime’s actions.

6. In their final editorials, after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, *VG* argues for pride in the participation of the Norwegian air force in the liberation of Lybia, whereas the *Expressen* does not even mention the Swedish airplanes that took part.

7. Finally the Swedish *Expressen*, but not the *VG*, points out a legal aspect: namely, that war crimes have probably taken place on both sides and should be brought to court. *VG* also mentions legality, but only implicitly: that the NATO intervention showed there was a middle ground between occupation and doing nothing, thus indicating that Resolution 1973, with its explicit refusal to accept a foreign occupation of Libya, had been followed.

In the other Libyan War case study of how the two broadsheets *Aftenposten* and *Dagens Nyheter* reported the extra-judicial killing of Gaddafi, one can find indications that the Swedish newspaper is slightly more accepting of critical remarks on US policy than the Norwegian (the US government’s statement about
wanting Gaddafi dead or alive is reported in the former but not in the latter). But neither the *DN* nor the *AP* takes issue with the US position by explicitly disputing the legitimacy of the way Resolution 1973 was implemented or by urging NATO and its members to accept responsibility for the extra-judicial execution of Gaddafi.

The study on the Syrian War coverage gives somewhat different results. The legal aspects in connection with a possible US military response to the gas attacks in Damascus are not properly reported and are not discussed in either of the Scandinavian newspapers. Both apply the neorealistic frame in which the US’s intentions, as a democratic superpower, are trusted, while Russia’s are not. But in this case the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter* is far more disregarding of the legality and negative about the role of the UN than the Norwegian *Aftenposten*. It seems that in this case the national political context, with its tradition of non-alignment, incites the Swedish newspaper’s editors and commentators to a more aggressively pro-NATO discourse than does its Norwegian counterpart. This is an interesting finding (although based on a limited sample) because it relativizes the pattern we have found in several previous studies, namely that Norwegian media usually show a more pro-NATO framing than does its Swedish counterpart. It may indicate that the latent conflict about future NATO membership is becoming more intensive in the public discourse in Sweden and that promoters of such a development feel the moment is ripe for an offensive.

To sum up: by and large the media studied in Norway and Sweden failed to provide readers with relevant information and different views on the controversial legal aspects of the NATO intervention in Libya and the killing of Gaddafi. Instead of criticizing their governments for contributing with military forces to what was possibly an illegal implementation of Resolution 1973, they avoided discussion of these matters and thereby also avoided democratic accountability. On the contrary, they tended to assure the public that everything was above board, and the Norwegian *VG* even suggested that there were reasons for being proud of what NATO had accomplished. Our focus on the journalistic achievements in connection with the Libyan War 2011 does not incline us to talk about pride. It seems instead that we should regret the status of war journalism. Considering that our third study, as well as the Syrian study, focused on two quality newspapers, we do not expect that other mainstream media in Norway and Sweden fared any better. We believe, therefore, that it is high time to plead for radical reforms in the fields of journalism education and professional learning such as the integration of international law, international politics, and peace and conflict research into the syllabuses.
Notes
1. The responsibility to protect is a United Nations initiative established in 2005. It has three pillars:
   A state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities.
   The international community has a responsibility to assist the state if it is unable to protect its population on its own.
   If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities, and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort (UN 2005).
President Obama created hopes during his first electoral campaign with its slogan for “change” and an explicit promise to close Guantánamo and restore respect for human rights and lawful conduct on the international scene and in the “war on terror”. Some way into his second term, Guantánamo still holds over a hundred prisoners. Obama has changed the laws that were used to justify torture but has at the same time vetoed all attempts to prosecute those in the CIA with grave responsibility for the torture (The Guardian August 31, 2012). In one area Obama has escalated a way of war that among most legal experts is regarded as an unlawful practice in the “war on terror”: the use of drones. According to the New York Times, in February 2013 the White House directed the Justice Department to release to the two congressional intelligence committees classified documents discussing the legal justification for killing American citizens abroad who are considered terrorists. The White House announcement appears to refer to a long, detailed 2010 memo from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel justifying the killing of two men (Shear & Shane 2013).

This announcement came on the eve of the confirmation of John O Brennan, President Obama’s choice to be director of the CIA, who has been the chief architect of the drone program, as Obama’s counter-terrorism advisor.

Critics accused Obama of hypocrisy for keeping the legal opinions on targeted killing secret, noting that in 2009 he had ordered the public release of the classified memos governing CIA interrogations under President George W Bush. Administration officials replied that the so-called enhanced interrogations had been stopped, while drone strikes continue. In his book and the film by the same name, Dirty Wars, Jeremy Scahill takes us inside America’s new covert wars where the use of drones is a key factor. The soldiers in these battles operate outside and inside the US on orders from the White House. Drawn from the ranks of the Navy Seals, Delta Force, former Blackwater and other private security contractors, the CIA’s Special Activities Division and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operate in secret commandos and
on a global scale. They are engaged in grabbing individuals and using drones in targeted killing operations. President Obama has expanded their operations and given them new scope and legitimacy (Scahill 2013).

The drones – some background

In 2001 the United States began arming an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), or drones, with missiles. They were used in battle for the first time early in October 2001 (based on Ottosen 2014b). One of the first-known controversial use of drones was in Yemen in 2002, when named individuals were killed. It was later revealed that the US Air Force refused to carry out that operation and the CIA took over in co-operation with the White House (US Congress 2010).

One of the concerns about the use of drones expressed by Greg Miller in the Washington Post has partly removed the traditional border between the CIA and the US armed forces. Using Yemen as a case study, Miller points out that the air strikes in that country in 2012 have been split fairly evenly between operations carried out by CIA Predators and those conducted by JSOC using drones as well as conventional aircraft. The CIA has, for a long time, pushed for an expansion of the targeting rules in Yemen, seeking to replicate aspects of its drone campaign against al Qaeda in Pakistan. According to Miller, President Obama gave in to the pressure and authorized the agency and JSOC to carry out strikes based on patterns of suspicious behavior, even when the identities of those who would be killed is not clear (Miller 2012).

Drones have been used in Somalia, Iraq, and in Pakistan since 2004. The number of attacks in Pakistan increased dramatically in 2008 and continued to climb in 2009. The number of drone attacks doubled between 2009 and 2010 and became a key element in the warfare against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Until May 2012, Obama ordered 268 attacks with drones, three times as many as George W Bush during his entire presidency. According to Micah Zenko, more than 3,000 claimed terrorist have been killed by drones and as many as 400 civilians had been killed as collateral damage by January 2013 (Zenko 2013). In January 2012, Obama made a rare acknowledgement of the use of drones during a video chat on Google+. He said that the drone strikes were a “targeted focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists” (Amnesty International 2012). Obama asserted that the strikes targeted al Qaeda suspects “who are up in very tough terrain along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan”.

A legal reference to the use of drones came when, on March 25, 2010, US State Department legal advisor Harold Koh stated that drone strikes were legal because of the US’s right to self-defense. The argument was very much the same as was used to justify the attacks on Afghanistan in 2001. During a hear-
ing in the US Congress in April 2010, several legal experts stated that the use of drones was illegal unless a war was declared against the country targeted. The official self-understanding in the US government is that since the country is involved in armed conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, drones can be used as a means of force because of the right to self-defense under international law (US Congress 2010).

**The US Congress debate on drones**

In a report from a hearing in Congress on April 28, 2010, several of the principal issues involved in the use of drones were discussed. The hearing was led by Congressman John F Tierney, a Democrat from Massachusetts from the subcommittee on national security and foreign affairs (US Congress 2010).

One of the invited speakers was Kenneth Anderson, professor of law at American University in Washington, who criticized the administration and its senior lawyers for not having expressed any views as to the legality of the use of drones and targeted killing practices. Anderson addressed the question of whether this is extra-judicial execution, and hence in violation of international treaties and covenants. Here he clearly made a distinction between whether it is legal in an armed conflict governed by the laws of war or in a situation when the United States is engaged in legitimate international self-defense operation. Thus concluding that there was nothing unlawful in itself in using such weapons, he made a strong case of the fact that it was illegal for the CIA to be involved in the use of these weapons. Anderson was crystal clear on this issue:

> So let me bring this to a close by saying that the discussion that we are having is really the discussion about the lawfulness of the CIA using this kind of weapon outside of traditional battlefields. And that it for any reason that is considered not to be OK, that is considered to be criminal, that is considered to be a war crime, somebody had better tell the CIA about it, somebody had better tell the president about it, somebody had better tell the vice president about it. Because they are all enthusiastic participants in this (US Congress 2010).

The minutes of the Congress hearings later in the documents picked up on this. In the summary from the minutes it is expressed as follows:

> … although there were disagreements on several issues most of the legal expertise seemed to agree that there was no legal basis for the CIA to operate the drones. No, under the international law of armed conflict, the CIA does not have the right to carry out battlefield killings.
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, David Glazier and Professor Kenneth Anderson all agreed that the international law regulating the battlefield does not give the privilege to kill without warning and not face prosecution to persons who are not members of the regular armed forces of a country, who are not under military discipline in a chain of command, and not trained in the law of armed conflict. When O’Connell was questioned about this she went even further:

We are already facing, 17 of our CIA agents are under indictment in Italy for attempting to kidnap someone off the streets of Milan, an alleged person with ties to al Qaeda. If that is what the rest of the world thinks is the right result with regard to kidnapping, you can imagine how the rest of the world views killing persons by the CIA. It is just a clear violation of international law.

Later in the debate, one of the participants argued that there is nothing to discuss about the legality of the use of drones because the answer is obvious. What should be discussed is what we do with it:

But more importantly, when we don’t follow the rule of law, and everyone knows that when these drone attacks occur in places like Yemen or rural Pakistan, everyone in the world is watching us. And they know there is something wrong with this. We are not holding ourselves up as the beacons of the rule of law. We are not sending a signal that we want to see all countries suppressing violence and promoting the rule of law. This is a very dangerous policy, because it is not consistent with the law (quoted from Ottosen 2014b).

The legal dispute

Some US politicians have condemned the drone strikes, among them US Congressman Dennis Kucinich. He has used the argument that when they attack countries that have never attacked the US, the drones are violating international law. Professor Rosa Brooks at Georgia University has argued that the use of drones makes it impossible to distinguish between legal and illegal warfare (De Beer 2011).

Pakistan has repeatedly protested against the drone attacks and claims that they are an infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty. It has angered the government in Pakistan that many civilians, including women and children, have been killed in the drone attacks (The New York Times April 29, 2012). The many attacks have created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the countryside. One example is of a village in Waziristan where the inhabitants no longer use their traditional building for council meetings since March 17, 2011. On that day a group of people met to solve a local dispute; at 11 o’clock in the morning the building was struck by a hellfire rocket fired from an unnamed drone, killing 50 people. Among the dead was Din Mohammed, a father of two living...
by selling minerals from the mine. When his father came to the building he saw bodies scattered around. These facts have been documented in a lawsuit from the Pakistani human rights organization Foundation for Fundamental Rights. This, and other human disasters, might occur because the CIA sometimes relies on false intelligence from informers who want to make some easy money (Kibar 2012).

Amnesty International worried

In May 2005, Amnesty International called upon the US to stop all operations aimed at killing suspects instead of arresting them and putting them on trial. In January 2006 Amnesty International referred to Israel’s targeted killings by drones as “extra-judicial executions/assassinations” and expressed concern that the new practice of the US would create a spiral of violence in future (quoted in De Beer 2011: 31). Again in January 2012, after Obama’s public statement, Amnesty International called for the US to monitor civilian casualties inflicted by drone attacks in Pakistan. “The US authorities must give a detailed explanation of how these strikes are lawful and what is being done to monitor civilian casualties and ensure proper accountability,” said Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific director Sam Zarifi. “What are the rules of engagement? What proper legal justification exists for these attacks? While the president’s confirmation of the use of drones in Pakistan is a welcome first step towards transparency, these and other questions need to be answered” (quoted in Amnesty International, op. cit.)

UN worried

Philip Alston, professor in law at New York University, also serving as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Execution in May 2010, published a report for the UN General Assembly. The issue of drones is discussed. It is not stated clearly that the use of drones to target individuals is illegal, but he finds it a “highly problematic blurring and expansion of the boundaries of the applicable legal framework – human rights law, the laws of war, and the law applicable to the use of inter-state force.” (De Beer 2011: 34) In his report, Alston (2010) concludes that states using drones have a commitment to specify the legal basis for them every time they are used. This transparency is a key point in his conclusion when he states that:

They [these states] should specify the bases for decisions to kill rather than capture. They should specify the procedural safeguards in place to ensure in advance of targeted killings that they comply with international law, and
the measures taken after any such killing to ensure that its legal and factual analysis was accurate and, if not, the remedial measures they would take. If a state commits a targeted killing in the territory of another state, the second state should publicly indicate whether it gave consent, and on what basis.

In October 2013, two UN human rights investigators called for more transparency from the US and other countries about their drone programs, saying that their secrecy was the biggest obstacle to determining the civilian toll of such strikes (AP December 12, 2013).

Obviously this has not been respected in the case of the US use of drones in Pakistan.

The report also concludes that it should be publicly documented how many civilians have been killed in each attack, and that measures should be taken to avoid such casualties. In a speech to the Harvard law school during the presidential campaign of 2012, Ben Emmerson, a UN special rapporteur, said that the UN would set up a dedicated investigations unit in Geneva early in 2013 to examine the legality of drone attacks in cases where civilians are killed in so-called targeted counter-terrorism operations. He also condemned secret rendition and waterboarding as crimes under international law. His forthright comments, directed at both US presidential candidates, will be seen as an explicit challenge to the methods used by US in the “global war on terror” (The Guardian 25 October 2012).

US-Pakistan relations

Several drone attacks causing civilian casualties have damaged the relations between the US and Pakistan. The drone attacks are deeply unpopular in Pakistan where it is estimated that as many as 3,000 people has been killed. In May 2012 drone attacks demolished a mosque in Mir Ai Bazar, a village in the North Waziristan tribal area bordering Afghanistan. Local officials reported that the unmanned plane fired two missiles, demolishing the building and leaving 10 dead and several others wounded. Many people have been killed in attempts to rescue people from hit buildings and then meeting a second attack.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office condemned these drone strikes, describing them as a “total violation” of Pakistani territory and sovereignty. Foreign Office spokesman Moazzam Khan characterized the US attacks as “illegal violations of international law and unacceptable”. Asked by a reporter why Pakistan did not bring the matter to the UN, Moazzam stressed that Islamabad wants “to resolve the issue bilaterally”. He described US-Pakistani ties as “an important relationship” and stressed that there is “a mutual desire” to reach an agreement between the two countries. While the Zardari government has long issued public condemnations of the drone strikes, it had previously offered its tacit
collaboration, going so far as to allow the CIA to launch the pilotless aircraft from a landing strip inside Pakistan. Following last November’s strike on the Pakistani border posts, it forced the closure of this facility (Alston 2010).

The idea that drones are efficient weapons in the “global war on terror” has been challenged both by opposition groups and politicians in Pakistan due to all the civilian casualties. Pakistan’s UN ambassador, Zamir Akram, put it like this: “[drones] are working against the purpose [to kill terrorists]” (Siddique 2012). Akram also said: “We find the use of drones to be totally counterproductive in terms of succeeding in the ‘war against terror’. It leads to greater levels of terror rather than reducing them.”

The Obama administration has of course noticed the controversies around the use of drones. In his State of the Union address in February 2013, President Obama promised more transparency for the drone program.

According to the New York Times there are signs that the Obama administration may itself have grown wary of the convenience of targeted killing – or may be running out of high-level targets. After a sharp rise in Obama’s first two years, the total number of drone strikes in the spring of 2013 is in decline. In Pakistan, strikes peaked in 2010 at 117; the number fell to 64 in 2011, 46 in 2012, with 11 by April 2013 (Shane 2013).

Obama has tried to convince the public that he doesn’t take easily to the killing by drones. He was quoted in CNN saying killings are “something that you have to struggle with”. Trying to meet the critics that portray the drone war as a “computer like” way of warfare he added: “If you don’t, then it’s very easy to slip into a situation in which you end up bending rules thinking that the ends always justify the means. That’s not who we are as a country.” (quoted in Shane 2013)

**Living under drones**

A comprehensive documentation of the effect of drones came through the report “Living Under Drones”, published by the Stanford University International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at the University of Stanford and the Global Justice Clinic of the New York University School of Law. On several points they underline the seriousness for the civilian population in those areas most affected by drones:

First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by the US government, there is significant evidence that US drone strikes have injured and killed civilians. In public statements, the US states that there have been “no” or “single digit” civilian casualties. It is difficult to obtain data on strike casualties because of US efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability, compounded by the obstacles to independent investigation
of strikes in North Waziristan. The best currently available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ)*, an independent journalist organization. *TBIJ* reports that from June 2004 through mid-September 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562 to 3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474 to 881 were civilians, including 176 children. (Living Under Drones 2012)

While the press regularly reports on al Qaeda suspects being killed in drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia, the consequences for the civilian population is usually ignored in the everyday news reporting. The report “Living under drones” shows how innocent civilians pay the highest price:

… US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury. Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in the north-west Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims.

While strategic theories are being debated, some important features of US strategy in the Indian Ocean are raised by David Brewster, who predicts that there will be a change in the nature of US power projection in the region. This could involve much greater reliance on the US navy and much less on ground forces. Perhaps the drones are meant to replace the military muscle traditionally upheld by ground forces? Another issue related to US-Chinese rivalry is whether the Chinese will also, in the short run, adapt the drone technology (Brewster 2012). In a report on the US drone policy, senior analyst Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) writes that America’s monopoly in the use of drone attacks will be weakened in the course of the next decade. Earlier, in January 2012, *The Guardian* wrote that border issues between China and Japan had stepped up a drone race between the countries. China and Japan say the purpose is merely to conduct surveillance of the archipelago (*Klassekampen* January 24, 2012). In November 2011 the Chinese arms exhibition turned up with eight new drone models, but it is highly uncertain that they are operative. Two of the models that were showcased in Zhuhai, CH-4, Wing Loong, should have emerged as clones of the US Reaper and Predator drones, which are often used in attacks on al Qaeda targets. A model called Xianglong (Floating Dragon) looks like the Global Hawk. A notorious drone on display, Anjian (Dark Sword), allegedly could carry weapons and has stealth features that make it difficult to detect on radar.
According to Chinese state media, there are plans to build eleven drone bases along the Chinese coast in 2015. Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the online magazine Kanwar Defense Review asks whether China’s goal is to conduct reconnaissance missions as far away as the Pacific Guam, one of the US military footholds in Obama’s Asia strategy. This naturally brings up the issue of what the Pentagon’s answer to this development might be. It is one thing for the US to be losing the advantage of having a monopoly on the technology (shared with the UK and Israel), but what if China, in the future, uses drones against “their” terrorists in other countries? And it would be even worse if terrorist groups like al Qaeda obtained the technology. David Wood put this issue on the table in a recent article in The Huffington Post. He referred to retired admiral Dennis Blair, who served as President Obama’s first director of national intelligence, and who told reporters he was concerned that the proliferation of armed drones – a potential outgrowth of the US reliance on drones to attack and kill terrorists – could well backfire.

“I do fear that if al Qaeda can develop a drone, its first thought will be to use it to kill our president, and senior officials and senior officers,” Blair said during a conference call with reporters. “It is possible without a great deal of intelligence to do something with a drone you cannot do with a high-powered rifle or driving a car full of explosives and other ways terrorists now use to try killing senior officials,” he said (Wood 2013).

Drone attacks covered by the media as everyday routine

Drone attacks are mostly reported in Norwegian media as an “everyday routine”. In a small news brief it can typically look like this: “Eleven killed in drone attack in Yemen”. This was a small news article in Aftenposten on January 31, 2012. The story is based on a news item from the Norwegian News Agency (NTB). The short news brief is typical for other news stories with the main focus on al Qaeda as targets for the drones, without any mention of legal issues: “Eleven militants, among them several said al Qaeda leaders, were killed in a drone attack in Yemen the night before Tuesday, local inhabitants inform … it is not known who is behind the attacks, but the US is known to have used drones in earlier attacks.”

The framing of drones in the Western media is mainly seen from “our” perspective. Since this also can be seen as part of the international war against terrorism where “our” own security is involved, this can seem fair enough. Who would argue against preventing new terrorism attacks through preemptive attacks on these evildoers? What is not asked in this and similar articles are questions such as: Can we be sure that the victims are al Qaeda activists? Are these attacks legal? Are there any innocent civilians harmed by the attack?
What are the long-term consequences of these kinds of warfare? How do these attacks look from the receiving end? (Ottosen 2013)

Media reporting drone-warfare: A comparison between a US, a Norwegian and a Swedish quality paper

From the above debates about the problematic legal aspects of drone warfare it seems natural to ask whether the media has covered the issue in a responsible democratic way that encourages public discussion, opinion-building, and respect for international law and human rights. In a brief framing analysis of three quality press outlets, The New York Times, Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter we have studied the number of articles and the frames used by these newspapers in the period January 1 to July 1, 2012 when reporting about the military usage of drones. The material was categorized according to the following frames and for genres (see table in Appendix):

1. War on terror-news frame
2. Military technology frame
3. Human rights/legal issue frame
4. Diplomatic controversy frame
5. Civilian casualties frame
6. Civilian use/technology frame/entertainment
7. Domestic/regional frame
8. Other

In all the three newspapers most of the material on drone warfare is published on the news pages. It comes as a continuous stream of short telegrams with a stereotypical format and headline: “X persons killed by US drones”. In terms of framing, the news reporting is mostly on the “war on terror” or on military technology. If we combine the first two frames that refer in the Scandinavian newspapers to the use of drones as a new Western way of warfare, this area of the content covers the lion’s share of both AP’s and DN’s reporting: 62 and 54 per cent respectively, while in the NYT it accounts for only 28 per cent. But if the articles on the opinion pages are also included in both the NYT and the AP the human rights frame becomes more prevalent, in particular in the US newspaper. What is even more interesting is that if we combine the human rights and civilian casualties frames this combined category takes a third (35 per cent) of all the articles in the NYT and the DN (31 per cent) but only less than one fifth (17 per cent) of the AP material. Even though Aftenposten has no article with main focus on civilians a couple of articles raised critical concerns on the use of drones. However, both Kjell Dragnes and U.S. correspondent
DRONES AND THE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN THE WAR ON TERROR

at the time Alf Ole Ask contributed with critical articles on the use of drones in which legal issues were discussed. On June 7, *Aftenposten* journalist Kjell Dragnes published a critical commentary with the title: “War by remote control.” He also touched upon the legal issues, raising the question: “Is the drone use a significant change in international law, a lower threshold for the use of weapons with unknown consequences?” Dragnes also made another critical commentary during this period. On May 12 he published an article with the title “The dark side.” Here he asks the rhetorical question: Is there a moral distinction between the methods of Bush and the ones Obama has continued (including the deployment of drones)? Instead of answering his question, Dragnes refers to former CIA-agent Jose Rodriguez, who had recently published a book with the title: *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions Saved American Lives*. Dragnes uses this debate to distance himself from the positions of both Obama and George W. Bush. On the whole, Dragnes contributes significantly to the public discussion by presenting critical perspectives on the drone issue.

*Aftenposten*’s U.S. correspondent, Alf Ole Ask, followed up on criticism by UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heynes (South Africa) in a commentary on June 22 with the title “US Criticized by UN for drone warfare.” The report in question was presented to the UN Human Rights Council, which has 47 members, including Norway. Ask refers to Heynes’ position that US deployment of drones violates several points of international law. Overall, the articles by *Aftenposten*’s US correspondent made a noteworthy contribution to the public debate on the drone strike issue (for details see Ottosen 2014b).

In terms of genres, the US and the Norwegian newspapers take up the legal and humanitarian aspects of the drone warfare primarily in the opinion articles (letters to the editor, editorials, and commentaries), while in *DN* these aspects are only mentioned in the news and the reportages. All three newspapers have one editorial on the drone topic, which we will now analyze.

**Deliberations on the editorial pages**

As indicated in the framing analysis above, critical questions were asked in letters to the editors and in commentaries in *NYT* about the use of drones. The Obama administration, through John Brennan, President Obama’s top counter-terrorism advisor, responded in a speech referred to in the *NYT* on April 20: “Top US Official Says ‘Rigorous Standards’ Are Used for Drone Strikes”. He offered what the *NYT* claimed to be the “first extensive explanation of how American officials decide when to use drones to kill suspected terrorists.” Defending drone strikes as “legal, ethical, and wise”, Brennan said that the president had directed officials to be more open about how they “carefully, deliberately, and responsibly” decide to kill terrorist suspects – including what he described as
“the rigorous standards and process of review to which we hold ourselves today when considering and authorizing strikes against a specific member of al Qaeda outside the ‘hot’ battlefield of Afghanistan.”

The legal argument takes the form of a statement. Brennan claimed that the use of drones was “in full accordance with the law”, but also had to admit that civilian casualties were an issue: “We only authorize a strike if we have a high degree of confidence that innocent civilians will not be injured or killed, except in the rarest of circumstances”. He had to admit, however, that “despite the extraordinary precautions we take civilians have been accidentally injured, or worse, killed in these strikes”. In a letter, Jamel Jaffer, the legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Nathan Freed Wessler, fellow in the National Security Project, openly berated the Obama administration for the use of drones and called the use of drones “important” but said the administration should disclose “the memo that authorizes the extra-judicial killing of American terrorism suspects”. They further stated that “the evidence [the administration] relied on to conclude that an American citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, could be killed without charge, trial or judicial process of any kind” should be made public.

On the editorial page of the NYT, Andrew Rosenthal commented on the speech by Brennan on May 8, “Are targeted killings legal?” and revealed that the NYT had asked for the legal documents in the case:

On the bad side, Mr Brennan stuck to the line that if an American citizen ends up on a target list, judicial review is wholly unnecessary – a position I strongly oppose. In 6,500 plus words, Mr Brennan never mentioned the Sept 30, 2011 drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American living in Yemen who the US government said was high up in a Qaeda-affiliated group. The strike also killed Samir Khan, another American citizen. Mr Awlaki’s 16-year-old son was killed in a separate attack. Mr Brennan didn’t acknowledge that a single specific killing had been carried out.

Brennan talked about the program at great length and so did the attorney general, Eric Holder. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has repeatedly mentioned targeted killings. So has President Obama. But, in court, the administration clings to its absolute secrecy argument. Pick your literary reference: Is that more Orwellian, or Kafkaesque?

“If Mr Brennan’s so sure that targeted killings are legal and ethical under international law, why not at least release the memos justifying that position?” Rosenthal concluded. This particular issue was the topic for the only editorial in the NYT sample with the headline “Too much power for a president” and published on May 20. The editorial refers to a news article on the previous day that revealed:
who was actually making the final decision on the biggest killings and drone strikes. President Obama himself. And that is very troubling. Mr Obama has demonstrated that he can be thoughtful and farsighted but, like all occupants of the Oval Office, he is a politician, subject to the pressures of re-election. No one in that position should be able to unilaterally order the killing of American citizens or foreigners located far from a battlefield – depriving Americans of their due-process rights – without the consent of someone outside his political inner circle.

It seems relevant to also include another article in the NYT. On June 24, former president Jimmy Carter joins the debate. In a strong message, “A Cruel and Unusual Record”, he writes:

The United States is abandoning its role as the global champion of human rights. Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues.

Carter also refers to the UN Declaration of Human Rights and argues that it represented “a bold and clear commitment that power would no longer serve as a cover to oppress or injure people, and it established equal rights of all people to life, liberty, security of person, equal protection of the law and freedom from torture, arbitrary detention or forced exile.” (Carter 2012)

Carter argues that instead of strengthening these principles, the US government, by using drones, “clearly violate[s] at least 10 of the Declaration’s 30 articles, including the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Carter refers to the ongoing use of drones in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. He then expresses concern about the many civilians suffering from these attacks:

These policies clearly affect American foreign policy. Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations, aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior.

The only editorial in Aftenposten during the sample period was published on June 24 under the title “Problematic Warfare with Drones”. Interestingly enough, this was on the same day that The New York Times published Jimmy Carter’s harsh condemnation of the use of drones, referred to above. The editorial concludes that something had to be done with what are called “grey zones” in
international law in relation to “basic principles such as state sovereignty and
the legal protection of individuals”.

In the Dagens Nyheter the only editorial on the drones, published on January
10, 2012, is actually more general in scope and deals with the new defense
strategy that President Obama had presented a week earlier. The headline ad-
dresses the implications for Europe that might follow: “The USA slims down
the defense forces. Obama’s strategy brings perplexity to Europe”. Drones are
mentioned as one of the new forms of warfare, but nothing is mentioned or
discussed about the legal aspects of using this weapon. The reduction of US
military strength is nevertheless regarded a problem for Europe to reflect upon:
“The US stood for half of NATO’s defense budget ten years ago; today it is
three-quarters.” The editor ends with the remark that without the Americans
shouldering the major economic burden the Europeans might have to carry it
by themselves – a comment that goes well with the newspaper’s continuous
lobbying for Swedish NATO membership. But this editorial also shows that
this political agenda comes with a democratic price: the readers are not invited
to consider what kinds of illegal warfare NATO membership could involve.

Conclusion

We mentioned in this chapter the similarities in everyday reporting on drones in
the New York Times, Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter as routine events. There is
one big difference between the three. The New York Times, during the period
of investigation, printed several critical letters to the editor. In one of them
former US president Jimmy Carter claims that the use of drones represents a
violation of the UN declaration of Human Rights (Carter 2012). The experts
invited to speak in the US Congress seem to agree with Jimmy Carter that the
present use of drones cannot be justified. The Obama administration eventu-
ally responded by announcing a new set of guidelines to be implemented after
condemnation from Micah Zenko, the author of “Reforming US Drone Policies”.
Zenko warned that not to address the legal and moral issues of using drones
would backfire on US policy. Among Zenko’s recommendations were that the
relevant Senate and House committees in the US Congress should: “Demand
regular White House briefings on drone strikes and how such operations are
coordinated with broader foreign policy objectives, in order to hold the execu-
tive branch accountable for its actions. Further: Hold hearings with government
officials and nongovernmental experts on the short- and long-term effects of
US targeted killings.” (quoted in Zenko 2013: 26-27)

If these and some other recommendations were not respected, Zenko
suggested, the US Congress should “withhold funding and/or subpoena the
executive branch if co-operation is not forthcoming”.

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There is also an Scandinavian angle to this. In the summer of 2012 it was revealed by the newspaper *Dagbladet* that a Norwegian male in his early thirties with a middle class background from the suburbs of Oslo had converted to Islam and was training in Yemen and planning a terrorist attack in Europe. He thus fulfilled all the criteria for being a “legitimate” target for the CIA. This man had no criminal record. Would it be acceptable to the Norwegian public if this man was killed in a drone attack without a trial and on the basis of this loose evidence? This was not long after the Norwegian press and public had congratulated themselves for holding high the banner of human rights and respect for the legal system, giving another home-grown Norwegian terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik, a decent trial after he bombed government buildings and killed 79 people in cold blood, most of them attending the Social-Democratic Party’s youth camp at Utøya outside Oslo.

Note

1. For a more detailed and comprehensive study of the drone coverage in *Aftenposten* see Ottoesen 2014b.
## Appendix

### Table 1. **New York Times** – Framing and genre January 1, 2012 to July 1, 2012

<table>
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<th>Editorial</th>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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### Table 2. **Aftenposten** – Framing and genre January 1, 2012 to July 1, 2012

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Chapter 8

Conclusions
Challenges and What to Do

Democracy will hardly survive if journalists do not. In the chapters in this book we have represented the serious threats that war correspondents and other conflict journalists have to face during their assignments. They are targeted by professional military as well as by insurgents, resistance groups and terrorists with the intention to silence critical reporting. But there are also other democratic problems – or even “crimes against democracy” (Schechter 2012) – where the role of war journalists is at the center stage – for example, the reduction of safety training and protection measures inside the media companies, the growing military-entertainment complex with close collaboration between the crucial power institutions of physical force and mental force, concentration in the national media landscape to very few players with enormous power over hearts and minds owing to their hegemonical and dominating position (Idås 2013). Internationally, the media landscape is more varied, but far from the utopian dream of a global public sphere (Hafez 2007).

In the following conclusions we concentrate on some general historical trends in international politics, foreign and security policies, new wars and Western ways of warfare, and how these trends affect the conditions and challenges for conflict journalism. In particular, the professional shortcomings of journalism, when it comes to the legal issues involved in the recent wars, have to be tackled. If they are not, the democratic accountability of decision makers in politics and the military apparatuses will be a mockery.

The chapters in this book spring from our long-time interest in studying the media coverage of war from a contextual point of view. The analyses of war reporting should be conducted with an eye constantly on what Cottle (2009), for example, has called the communication ecology surrounding and affecting the journalists’ work and production. Attention to interactive relations, the impact of different stakeholders, and media organisations and market conditions are crucial in such an endeavor (cf. Livingstone 2011). But in addition we want to emphasize the need to consider the changes in the media landscape, international
politics, international laws, media, and military technology. In that way, our approach might stray against the grain of the micro-oriented, empirical research that seems to have become the fashion of the time in media and social research in the first decade of the second millennium. In our view, however, a macro-contextual approach is probably the only way for media researchers to avoid being marginalized into the position of spectators providing random comments offside the game without being noticed by the players on the field. In fact we hope that our research findings will eventually make a modest contribution to the ways in which wars will be reported in the future, because if nothing is done about the current low professional standards in war journalism we sincerely believe that democracy as we have known it will be under pressure.

A media-military-entertainment complex

So what are the main important historical developments to be considered? President Dwight D Eisenhower became famous for his speech in 1960 on “The military-industrial complex” as he was leaving the White House at the end of his presidential term. His message was, in short, that the alliance between the arms industry, the armed forces and influential segments of the political elite represented a threat to democracy (Ottosen 2009b). He admitted that as president he had been unable to control this segment of society.¹ More than 50 years later, the power of the military-industrial complex is even stronger, but very few politicians invite the electorate to reflect on the consequences of this power concentration for the future of democracy.

Eisenhower’s frank statement has been supported by findings from peace researchers who predict that the mechanisms at work in the arms race and military spending on a global scale will even be stronger in the future (SIPRI 2013). Robin Andersen (2006) has contributed to the literature in this field and warned of the “media-military-entertainment complex”, which she believes has played a central role in making the 1900s “a century of wars”. The close collaboration and dependency between media, entertainment industry and the military establishment led to journalism and Hollywood being embedded as propaganda tools, with the weapons industry and political hawks keen on military interventions whenever they thought US interests demanded it. The structural relationship between Hollywood and the Pentagon is significant to an understanding of the cultural-industrial complex. Through fiction films, documentary films and docu-dramas, history is framed in a manner that creates notions of the past, present, and future. Ottosen shows that the television series The Reagans also can be read as propaganda due to the way the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the Contras scandal in the 1980s are framed in the series (Ottosen 2007b).
The commercial media logic made this cosy relationship into an irresistible temptation for media moguls, journalists and film producers alike, for dramatic stories, simplified into atavistic narratives about fights between heroes and devils, good guys and bad guys, have a strong appeal to the male public (von der Lippe 2011, cf. Orford 1999) and a guaranteed market – in visual war reporting men appear far more often than women, and when women are shown in war photographs they are usually on the media-country’s side in the conflict (Keith & Schwalbe 2010). The borders between war propaganda and journalism, between journalism and fiction movies, and between movies and military PSYOPS, were blurred. Film producers were employed by the military, and PSYOPS units went into the newsrooms. Journalists were “media managed” to disseminate threat images that massaged the general public into supporting military intervention to hunt down the most farfetched enemy figures and threats. Influenced by what Bob Woodward called “group-think” (Washington Post 12 August 2004; quoted in Nohrstedt 2005: 224), leading US media swallowed, digested and spread stories for public consumption about threats to the US that nobody would have taken seriously if not for being brainwashed, or because of trust in instincts rather than rationality. And off they went, soldiers and journalists together, to invade Iraq in 2003 (Katovsky & Carlson 2003).

A threat society emerging

The US “global war on terror” strategy as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 is not the only indication of the threat society, as a new stage of late-modernity and the risk-society that Beck has analysed (Beck 1992). But this policy definitely has a number of features typical to threat society, in particular a culture of fear marked by speculative threat images floating around and being exploited for political gains by unscrupulous politicians (Furedi 2006; cf. Nohrstedt 2010; also Mylonas 2012). The professional tragedy is that rarely do journalists and media – even retrospectively – evaluate their own role in the proliferation and circulation of unfounded threat images, whether or not they are projected onto other regimes or other ethnic groups. An exception, though, is when, in 2004, the New York Times and the Washington Post came out with excuses for having misled the public before the invasion of Iraq 2003 (Nohrstedt 2005). It seems that Roosevelt’s credo, that the only thing the Americans had to fear is fear itself, has disappeared and been replaced by threat politics mostly unchallenged by the critical investigations of mainstream media – on the contrary, more often amplified by media logic (for example, Altheide 2002; Furedi 2006; Nohrstedt 2010).
A long US tradition of regime change

Besides the historical development of a military-media-entertainment complex and the advent of the threat-society, a third major trajectory can be noticed in international politics and more specifically in the US foreign and security policy tradition of regime change (Freedman & Thussu 2012). One may even draw this historical line back to the Second World War, which in many ways had a seminal impact on American self-conception and how the US was perceived worldwide and specifically in Western Europe. Later, and after the end of the Cold War in 1989, it has become even more obvious that US politics do not halt at regime change (Chomsky 2000). In retrospect one can even wonder why the US government was so active in putting the UN system in place after the Second World War, when its government has so frequently chosen to violate the UN charter, other international laws, human rights, and legal procedures on which the international community has agreed. In the previous chapters we have dealt with several of those violations, in particular the no-fly zones in Iraq after the Gulf War 1990-91 and in Libya 2011 as well as the humanitarian intervention by NATO in the former Yugoslavia in connection with the Kosovo conflict 1999. Another case is the Afghanistan War initiated in October 2001 after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. As we have described in this book (see Chapter 2), the US decision to take revenge on the terrorists in their Afghanistan camps was sanctioned by the Security Council, as was the intervention in Iraq 1990 after the Saddam Hussein regime’s occupation of Kuwait. But in Afghanistan 2001 it soon became obvious that US policy was not only designed to hunt down the al Qaeda terrorists but also to eliminate the Taliban regime in Kabul, applying “warfare by proxy”; in this case mainly the Northern Alliance and other warlords. And in 2003 the US and the UK attacked Iraq although the Security Council had not voted for intervention (Solomon 2005).

This US policy, aiming at regime change whenever practicable to secure what Washington sees as America’s interests, has been a dominant trend in international politics, with dramatic consequences for the entire world community – not because this policy has been a success story but, rather, the opposite. If one takes the official objectives seriously the policy is seen to have failed almost completely in Iraq and Afghanistan (Surkhe 2012). The international relations expert John Ikenberry identifies a grand strategy as a “fundamental commitment to maintain a unipolar world in which the United States has no competitor”. According to Ikenberry this is linked to the notion that: “… no state or coalition could ever challenge [the US] as global leader, protector or enforcer” (Ikenberry 2002, quoted in Chomsky 2003: 11). This must ultimately be seen in the context of what Chomsky calls an “imperial grand strategy” the roots of which can be traced back to before 9/11 although obviously 9/11
enforced its development. Chomsky quotes the National Security Strategy from the fall of 2002: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States” (White House 2002, quoted in Chomsky 2003: 11). As early as 1992, Paul Wolfowitz and the circle around the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) were already arguing, through the plan Rebuilding America’s Defense, for more military resources for the fight against terrorism and to secure US global interests. The project made it clear that without a “new Pearl Harbor” the necessary resources would not be made available. Through the presidency of George W Bush, PNAC progressed from a conservative think tank to a power position close to the president. Then came 9/11, and the obstacles to strengthening the global muscles of the US disappeared. Richard Falk puts it like this:

The events of 9/11 dramatically removed this obstacle, overnight creating unified and essentially mindless support in Congress, the media, and the public for a total embrace of the agenda of Bush geopolitics of war and imperial encroachment, including tightening the noose of government around the American citizenry beneath the banner of “homeland security” (Falk 2007: 119).

This must also be related to the Bush doctrine (see Chapter 1). In a sensational interview on March 2, 2007 with General Wesley Clark, made by the programme Democracy Now, at the website of Global Research (a Canadian nonprofit NGO), he talks about a visit to the Pentagon immediately after September 11, 2001, and how he heard that the Bush administration had a plan to attack not only Iraq but also six other countries in the region:

I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decision, we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.”
So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” – meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office – “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it classified?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, “You remember that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!” (Democracy Now! March 2, 2007)

This is not the only example of a high-ranking retired officer giving personal evidence to the fundamental problem of democratic legitimacy to the ways the “global war on terror” was decided and conducted. We mention another case in the chapter on the Libyan War. However, Wesley Clark is a retired four-star US army general, and he was the supreme allied commander of NATO during the 1999 War on Yugoslavia. After retirement from the army he started a political career and joined the Democratic Party. He published two books about modern warfare and in one of them, *Winning Modern Wars* (2003), he writes about the Pentagon visit.

Although Barack Obama, president and commander-in-chief since 2009, has avoided the notion of “global war on terror”, his administration has nevertheless continued the policy of ignoring the UN and the limitations set up by the Security Council, for example in Libya 2011. The civilian wars in Syria, after the protests against the Bashar al-Assad regime started as an offspring from the Arab spring in 2011, and in Mali, as a consequence of the Libyan War the same year, are other cases where special forces and proxy warfare came to use under the Obama presidency.

The Syrian War obviously triggered bad memories from the previous wars, which caused political antagonism in the US Congress and delicate maneuvers by Obama and his administration. The false accusations by the Bush administration in 2003 against Iraq were frequently mentioned in the debates about a possible military intervention in Syria after the gas attacks outside Damascus in August 2013. With these previous events in mind, questions were raised as to the credibility and accuracy of the assertions that the Bashar al-Assad regime was responsible. As in 2003, several countries suggested that the upcoming reports from the UN inspectors must be on the table before any military actions would be legitimate. However, some American politicians – both Republicans and Democrats – demanded an immediate military punishment for the al-Assad regime, claiming that all evidence pointed in that direction. In both the political debate and the media comments there was a lot of speculation about the president’s and the US’s credibility – but what was not much mentioned was
that the credibility issue was related to the US imperial grand strategy. Two of
the domestic critics of the Obama policy, the Republican senators John McCain
and Lindsey Graham, expressed their worries about the “provocative weakness”
that the negotiations with Russia and Syria were said to reveal (Tracz 2013).
And within the Obama administration obviously different opinions made the
decisions difficult. John Kerry, the vice-president, took a more hawkish posi-
tion than his superior. It should come as no surprise, against the backdrop of
the military-industrial complex, that both Kerry and McCain, for example, have
received excessive financial support from Raytheon, the company that delivers
the Tomahawk missiles, and other companies in the weapons industry (Hen-
riksson 2013). More surprising is that leading media pundits and commentators
in Swedish mainstream media also urged for the US to be more of a world
police force considering the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya after the
US interventions. However, both in Dagens Nybeter and in Svenska Dagbladet
that demand has frequently been promoted by leading journalists (Andersson
2013; Wolodarski 2013; Tracz 2013). The US imperial grand strategy, it seems,
even has promoters globally. They prefer not to take notice of critical U.S. voices
like Seymour M Hersh who in an essay in the London Review of Books reports
about military and intelligence sources that were doubtful about the rationality
of an air attack on the Syrian chemical weapon facilities because of indications
that also the jihadist al-Nusra Front had access to such weapons. Hersh criticizes
President Obama’s selective use of sources when only putting the responsibility
on the side of President Assad. According to Hersh “White House had no direct
evidence of Syrian Army or government involvement, a fact that was only oc-
casionally noted in the press coverage.” (Hersh 2013)

As we indicated in Chapter 6, this demagogical foreign and security discourse
in the media is not only jeopardizing the democratic right to information and
political accountability, when failing to tell the public about the risks involved
– it is even a national security risk in itself because of the promotion of fatal
military missions, as exemplified in Afghanistan.

A superpower waging war by proxies,
including Norway and Sweden
The US military and political dominance is based on alliances – not only
loosely organised such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan 2001 or the
“alliance of the willing” in the Iraq War 2003 – that make it possible for the US
to share the costs and the disapproval with its partners. On December 3, 2011
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDDA) that
authorized keeping terrorist suspects in prison without any time limit or trial
(Klassekampen February 21, 2012).
This strategy has been complicated to pursue, not only in Central Asia, the
Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia, but also to get fully approved in North-
ern Europe. As mentioned in the Introduction, some countries in the Middle
East (for example, Turkey) participated actively in the Gulf War 1990-91, but
objected vehemently at joining the “alliance of the willing” before the Iraq War
of 2003. Then again, in connection with the Libyan War 2011, Turkey took part
with military staff and aircraft. The explanation of this seemingly inconsistant
policy in the Turkish case, as for many other countries, is whether there is a
UN Security Council resolution to back up the intervention.

In the Nordic countries the US strategy has not been accepted without dissent.
In fact in Sweden it has created a national crisis for the security and defence
policy – again a major and sensational story that the media has missed! Not
the story that the Swedish supreme commander went public with the message
that the military forces only had capacity to defend the country for a week (see
more below), but in the context of a gradual downsizing and reorganisation
of the entire defense system so as to accomodate NATO standards and the
requirements for becoming an effective partner of the US-led military alliance.
In a historical context the Afghanistan War and the Libyan War are the two
main milestones in this development, especially from a Swedish point of view.
Denmark and Norway, as NATO members, had already participated militarily
in the Kosovo conflict 1999 and in Iraq 2003. But, starting with the Afghanistan
War and officially as a contingent of the UN humanitarian deployment (the ISAF
forces) Sweden has also contributed to the failed military and political project
of replacing the Taliban regime with the Hamid Karzai administration. In the
Libyan War, Sweden took the next step towards becoming part of the NATO
operations, presumably under the humanitarian label “partnership for peace”,
and supplied airplanes for reconnaissance as a brother-in-arms of the NATO
forces. However, perceiving themselves to be “humanitarian superpowers”,
both Norway and Sweden (like Turkey, but in contrast to Denmark) needed a
Security Council resolution to legitimate the intervention. When Resolution 1973
was “put in place” (to cite the Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt) it became
possible for the governments in Oslo and Stockholm to offer so-called mili-
tary humanitarian assistance. However, and as in previous conflicts, the no-fly
zone mandate for the protection of the Libyan people was soon transformed
into a regime-change project – without the warm-hearted Scandinavian politi-
cians ever raising any objections or disapproval, at the time it happened or
afterwards (this is indeed remarkable, and a topic for lessons in democracy).
Not only did the air strikes hit government buildings, infrastructure, homes
and people in Tripoli as collateral damage – they were actually targets for the
military “humanitarian operations” (see Chapter 6).

While the Norwegian officers had reason to reflect upon the legality and
legitimacy – as well as the ethical aspects and long time consequences – of
the deadly war operations they took part in, their Swedish colleagues had less dangerous operations and lighter consciences. Their orders during the sorties over Libya only admitted the use of weapons in self-defense (Swedish Government webpage 2013).

It is too early (December 2013) to evaluate the consequences of the Libyan War 2011. But it is already evident that double standards were applied in a number of ways when NATO and the Nordic governments drew their official conclusions after the war. Not only are the actual figures of civilian casualties, the “real face of the war”, difficult to find in the political reports and in the media, but little discussion has appeared in the mainstream media about the proportionality of the human costs in relation to the aims and goals of the intervention. Worse even, there is credible information to document that the intervention was a repeat of traditional colonial wars in the nineteenth century. It was planned at least as early as October 2010 and pursued with the geopolitical objective of taking control over Libya’s oil reserves, the largest in Africa, and to get an unco-operative dictator out of the way of British, French and US interests in northern Africa (Tunander 2012). Ola Tunander refers to reports that describe how the resistance movement in eastern Libya, the NTC forces, committed indiscriminate killings of civilians in the city of Tawergha who belonged to ethnic groups other than the groups and peoples that supported the rebellion. Although small countries like Norway and Sweden were invited – or willingly invited themselves – under Resolution 1973 and the UN responsibility to protect principle, in practical terms they took part in the war as supporters of rebels who committed war crimes and acts that even came close to genocide. From Tunander’s analysis it follows that the claims of legality and legitimacy of the military intervention should be questioned – not to say denied. As demonstrated in previous chapters of this book, such a discussion and critique in the media and other public arenas is still pending. The media and the political elites in the Scandinavian countries prefer not to have their mistakes and shortcomings aired in public.

That also goes for lack of continuous reporting about the aftermath of the intervention, which threw a long shadow into the neighboring regions. The Libyan War spread to Mali and other countries in the south. But whatever the humanitarian effects, the military aircraft industry behind the JAS Gripen used by the Swedish Air Force had reason to be pleased as the airplane had been hard to sell because before the Libyan War it could not be advertised as tested in real combat.

Politically, the consequences in the Scandinavian countries of warfare by proxy are, so far, possible to detect by some minor protests: in Norway, against the silence about the country’s participation in actual wars, not in the “peace and humanitarian operations” as the euphemism has it; and in Sweden – with its tradition of non-alignment – as a major crisis within the defense
and security establishment which broke out when the supreme commander Göransson declared that the country could be defended for only a week or so if invaded. Göransson left for sick leave after a couple of months, claiming to be exhausted. The newly appointed defense minister tried to limit the damage and calm the opposition (which said that the defense was in jeopardy under the Alliance government) by confirming that the timeframe and military strength were good enough in view of the threat. The critical issue for the defense establishment that the war by proxy has brought to the surface is whether prioritizing capacity-building in order to contribute to international operations (peace, humanitarian or no-fly operations) is compatible with the need to protect the national territory and its people in case of a military crisis in the immediate surroundings.

What did journalists and media manage to do with this scoop? Almost nothing. Some disapproval appeared in the media, of course, but only in the margins. Even more remarkably, in Sweden journalists seem either to be ignorant about the background and context of Göransson’s inner exile or they are muted, voluntarily or not. The analysis by Wilhelm Agrell that we mention in the Introduction does not seem to have been noticed or understood by journalists or commentators in the field of defense and security policy. That the Swedish military forces in Afghanistan and in Libya have been collaborators in proxy wars with a regime change agenda has been ignored. There has been no public notice or debate. Consequently, neither the legality nor the legitimacy of these military interventions has been democratically tested.

The lack of journalistic efforts to scrutinize the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1973 in the Libyan War is a major reason for complaining about the lack of professional competence in reporting the legal issues involved in the “new Western ways of war”. This is not the place to go into all the journalistic shortcomings, but it is necessary to mention the systemic character of this incompetence. When Gaddafi was killed on the spot without any attempt to bring him to trial for his crimes, it was briefly reported in the news as a regrettable event. But neither Norwegian nor Swedish journalists or commentators ever connected the event to the strategy of extra-judicial executions that has been a dominant element in the “global war on terror” as pursued under the administrations of George W Bush and Barack Obama even though it was out in the news telegrams a few days previously that Hillary Clinton had unexpectedly visited Benghazi and urged that Gaddaffi should be caught “dead or alive” (see Chapter 6).

As an epilogue to the Libyan War chapter we presented a limited study of how two leading quality press outlets in Norway and Sweden – Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter – reported and commented on the US military threat against the Syrian regime after the gas attack on civilians in August 2013. As with the findings from the Libyan War, the legal aspects and the role of the UN are
seriously underreported. In particular, the *Dagens Nybeter* displays a rather extreme argument for a military intervention by the US, irrespective of its lack of legality, combined with derogatory rejections of the Russian proposal for disarmament negotiations with the Bashar al-Assad regime. In our view this is clearly below the standards of what is demanded by mainstream media in a democracy, and it amounts to disinformation.

**Media and journalists as military targets in the new wars**

Perhaps one of the more remarkable deficiencies in the recent history of war journalism is its failure to deliver thorough and relevant reports about military attacks on media and journalists as a clear violation of international laws, particularly the Geneva Conventions. If it was only because they did not want to use accessible mediated platforms for talking in their own and their colleagues’ interests, that would have been reason to praise the profession. But considering the democratic importance of media and news journalism it is, rather, the opposite – a major blow to democratic debate and the realization of accountability for the responsible decision makers. In this book we have covered the long history of deliberate military attacks on war correspondents, from the Bosnian War in 1992 through the Libyan War of 2011 (see Chapter 2). In an overview of death tolls from modern wars the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) concludes that the Iraq War of 2003 was the most costly: “Fatalities in Iraq far surpass any other documented wartime death toll for the press.” (Smyth 2013)

Although the deaths of some international correspondents have been brought to global attention, the absolute majority or 85 per cent of the total number of 204 journalists and media workers killed between March 2003 and December 2011, when the war was declared over, were Iraqis. The CPJ further specifies the responsible forces behind the death toll and concludes that “insurgent forces” were responsible for 157 and the US forces for 22, while the Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein killed three journalists and the post-invasion Iraqi forces two journalists. It was not known who was responsible for the rest of the cases. From a legal point of view the occupying state’s responsibility for the civilian death toll, including journalists and media workers, widely extends the number of deaths that their own forces have caused. Actually, from the moment the American and British troops took control of Iraqi territory they were in charge of protecting civilians and of general security, as they were after the occupation had formally (but not in reality) ended (see Andersson 2013a: 104 ff.). However, even the fact that the US forces killed more than 10 per cent of the journalists and media workers is a worrying sign that the Western way of warfare is a lethal threat to war journalism as a profession.
In the Libyan War 2011 the picture was not very different. It is worth repeating the dual strategy in the “Western way of war” of, on the one hand, generous services to the reporters (including press centers; pool-system opportunities for interviews at the front; a wealth of graphic illustrations and photo material of “smart” bombs and “surgical” military operations) and, on the other hand, restrictions, threats, and even the killing of reporters who do not play according to the media management rules established by the civilian and military authorities. Again, this dual strategy was applied in the Libyan War 2011.

Two days after the demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime begun, a press center was established in Benghazi, professionally equipped and ready to assist all journalists from “day one” (Tunander 2012: 92; see also Bakke Foss 2012). This is in itself one of several indications of the rebellion being a planned operation prepared for several months with external support from countries such as the UK, France, the Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the US. The other side of the NATO media management strategy was to eliminate the propaganda capacity of the Gaddafi regime by bombing the television building in Tripoli, which resulted in three journalists killed and fifteen media workers wounded, according to the IFJ (August 3, 2011; cf. The Guardian July 30, 2011). A few days later, August 8, 2011, the Unesco director general, Irina Bokova, condemned the attack as a violation of international law and the Security Council Resolution about the protection of journalists and media personnel (Bokova 2011).

Drone war and international laws
The Obama administration has officially avoided taking over the “global war on terror” rhetoric from the George W Bush presidency, but in many ways the drone warfare has continued in the same way when it comes to the legal aspects. It violates international laws and the distinctions between war and peace, and between soldiers and civilians. This kind of warfare makes it extremely difficult for media and human rights NGOs to investigate the civilian deaths and the level of collateral damage (Taylor 2012; see also Chapter 7). No doubt the drone warfare is the most evident and sophisticated form of the “risk-transfer-war” that Martin Shaw (2005) has analyzed. For the “pilot” in his or her armchair the risks are of the same kind as when playing computer games, but on the “enemy” side the risks are as lethal as attacks by airborne missiles or the navy-based cruising missiles.

Drone warfare, as we argued in this book (see Chapter 7), is a complement and not an alternative to the regime change strategy, as the ex-head commander of the Norwegian defense forces explained when he stated that “counter regime” (CORE) operations are often followed by “counter insurgency” (COIN) operations, since the new regime (for example, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen,
CONCLUSIONS. CHALLENGES AND WHAT TO DO

and Libya) seldom manages to take full control of the country and to defeat the insurgents (Eliassen 2013: 72-74). In the chapter on drones and extra-judicial killings, we document some partly surprising findings from a comparison between reports about drones in Aftenposten, Dagens Nyheter and the New York Times during the first six months of 2012. In our previous studies the general pattern has been that possible war crimes and civilian casualties, so-called collateral damage, as consequences of the Western countries’ warfare, have been more exposed in Swedish media than in Norwegian and American media. Our basic interpretation of this pattern is that the national foreign and security policy has an influence on the media framing, which can be labeled patriotic or nationalised. Probably, ideological hegemony combined with self-censorship among journalists is the main explanatory factors. The findings regarding the coverage of the drone warfare (in Chapter 7) seems to indicate that neither the Norwegian nor the Swedish mainstream media are qualified to report the legality problems properly. In the New York Times, however, at least this is discussed on the opinion pages. Usually the two Scandinavian newspapers follow the American reporting quite closely, but in this case they deviate. At least for Dagens Nyheter, with its super-ideology, this could be explained by the combined effects of, on the one hand, an ever more NATO-oriented foreign policy in Sweden and, on the other hand, the newspaper’s reluctance to criticize the US for ignoring international law and the UN. Only later, and after the Human Rights Watch had published accusations against the US for violations of international law, does it catch the attention of Dagens Nyheter (October 22, 2013; cf. Human Rights Watch 2013).

Journalistic shortcomings
The conclusions of our projects during a period of more than 20 years of research are that there are a number of professional shortcomings in war and conflict journalism. We are not discussing minor flaws or mistakes in stressful situations where there is not much time for planning and preparations before the reports are due to air. There are of course often such demanding situations for the war correspondents, but the deficits that we are addressing are of a much more serious and democratically dangerous kind. Generally and continuously, war journalism fails to provide the general public with relevant and correct information concerning both military interventions and catastrophic war adventures and the juridical and human rights implications of these new wars. It is striking that the most critical comments about the NATO bombing in Libya 2011 concerning the legality and whether the operations really were in accordance with the Scandinavian countries’ security interests were raised by Norwegian military officers and not by journalists. However sad it might
be, we cannot but agree with the accusation from the experienced editor, blogger and filmmaker Danny Schechter, that the media “… must be held accountable for its role in promoting aggressive war, a certified war crime.”

(Schechter 2012: 315)

When even so-called quality press such as Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter fail in reporting concrete facts, political context, and the legal aspects and implications of the wars, not only are well-founded public opinions in the actual conflicts at stake. In the era of globalization there is great need of legitimate normbuilding for nonviolent conflict resolutions, based upon globally elaborated, well-reasoned and rational opinions. From this point of view the shortcomings of the mainstream media also threaten the globalization processes in politics and international lawmaking. The unlimited belief of editors and journalists in a real-political super-ideology, according to which smaller states such as the Scandinavian countries can only build security through alliances with the superpower US, is a major obstacle for a development towards a system for collective security with the UN as the main agency for conflict resolution. If this mediatized ideological offensive is successful it can only result in the Scandinavian countries being dominated by US interests as explicated in the imperial grand strategy mentioned above. Dismantling of the UN system is not the only risk. Perhaps even more threatening is that Scandinavia will be a theater, not for fewer conflicts, but for increased political and military friction and uncertainty. With the present low standards of conflict journalism, this will happen without the citizens having an informed choice of influencing the situation. In Chapter 4 we referred to Wilhelm Agrell’s analysis of the Swedish Afghanistan policy and his critique of the lack of transparency and public information about the “mission creep” in 2007, when the ISAF peace operations under US command changed to a counter-insurgency strategy with substantially increased risks. Previous UN missions to that Swedish troops contributed have never been so censored as the Afghanistan mission, according to Agrell. Even more alarming is his conclusion that Norway’s and Sweden’s engagement in Afghanistan had more to do with rescuing NATO’s credibility as a security system than building a safe and peaceful society in Afghanistan (Agrell 2013).

As Christensen has argued, the neglect by mainstream media when it comes to revealing the political power mechanisms in processes such as these is perhaps the most important explanation of the impact of new investigative information providers. It is the failure of mainstream media “… that has created a vacuum filled, at least in part, by WikiLeaks and Anonymous”. It is not the technology that has been the driving force behind these and other noticeable agents of revelations, but rather that they provide at least glimpses of the political power system, the processes and the contexts that explain the development of conflicts and how they are reported in the mainstream media (Christensen 2013). Christensen’s point was confirmed by Chelsea (Bradley) Manning when
she in New York Times explained her motive for the disclosure of secret documents published by WikiLeaks that caused her prison sentence for 35 years:

The embedded reporter program, which continues in Afghanistan and wherever the United States sends troops, is deeply informed by the military’s experience of how media coverage shifted public opinion during the Vietnam War. The gatekeepers in public affairs have too much power: Reporters naturally fear having their access terminated, so they tend to avoid controversial reporting that could raise red flag. (Manning 2014)

The need for change

Journalists, media organizations, NGOs, media researchers, and others aware and concerned about the state of the profession’s standards must urgently find ways and means of improving the situation – and not only because these lethal military adventures and illegal wars keep the piles of the dead growing. And we are not only talking about the dead soldiers but, even more importantly, about the ever-growing numbers of innocent civilians terrorized and murdered as the wars keep dragging on. During “the century of war” that Andersen writes about and into the new millennium’s first decade, the relative proportion of civilians to soldiers has increased from 2:3 (40 per cent) in the First World War to 3:2 (60-67 per cent) in the Second World War; in the Afghanistan War 3:1 (75 per cent); and in Iraq War 4:1 (80 per cent) according to UN estimates. In the same period the number of journalists killed in wars has risen from two in the First World War to 68 in the Second World War. In the Gulf War of 1990-91 four journalists were killed, whereas in the Iraq War between 2003 and 2005 the figure rose to 41 (International News Safety Institute 2013). The deadliest war for journalists so far is the Iraq War, according to the Committe to Protect Journalists (CPJ). “At least 150 journalists and 54 media workers were killed in Iraq from the US-led invasion in March 2003 to the declared end of the war in December 2011, according to CPJ research.” (CPJ 2013) This must be stopped! The reason is not solely the human cost, however unacceptable it is. For peace and security in the international community the shortcomings of war journalism will have devastating consequences since the democratic accountability in cases where decision makers take risks in “the people’s name” will not be upheld.

It is of course unacceptable from a democratic and a professional point of view that journalists and media have failed in reporting the content and the practical implementations of almost all the UNSC resolutions, with one possible exception (Resolution 678), regarding the wars after 1990. That goes for the Iraq wars from the Gulf War 1990-91 (the no-fly zone for the southern and northern parts of Iraq (Resolution 687)), to the accusations that Iraq did not
follow the conditions in the peace treaty (whether it legitimized the use of military intervention (Resolution 1441)), and to the official end of the occupation after the Iraq War (the transfer of territorial power to the interim government (Resolution 1546)). The same applies to the Kosovo conflict 1999 in which NATO ignored the Security Council and attacked without a UN mandate. UN Resolution 1244, which was meant to settle the peace conditions for Kosovo within former Yugoslavia, was also ignored by the US, EU, and NATO in 2008 (see Introduction). It has been argued that the experiences of the Kosovo conflict led to a modification of international law so that “the responsibility to protect” (R2P), as stated in Resolution 1674 from 2009, would open for unilateral military intervention without Security Council permission (Bring 1999; quoted in Andersson 2013b). But that interpretation is hardly valid – not de jure or de facto (Andersson 2013b). Similarly, in the Afghanistan War 2001-14 the Security Council resolutions have been interpreted and implemented in ways that are disputable, to say the least. There are serious reasons, from a legal point of view, for questioning whether the presence of the ISAF, including the Norwegian and Swedish troops, is a violation of international laws. It has often been claimed, for example by the Norwegian and Swedish authorities, that Resolution 1368 and 1373 of 2001 and Resolution 1510 of 2003 offered the retrospective UN mandate that legalized the NATO intervention and occupation from 2001. However, according to some legal experts that is not correct, at least not in relation to the UN Charter’s raison d’être. In essence, the argument is that an invitation by a puppet government in an occupied country is not a valid legal ground for a military intervention – and certainly not in retrospect. It is more than remarkable that Swedish mainstream media has let the government’s repeated claim that the ISAF has been invited by the Karzai regime pass without comment since it has been shown that no such invitation could be verified by the the Swedish Foreign Office (Liljestrand 2013). Finally, in the Libyan War 2011 the Security Council decided to sanction protection of the civilian population by a no-fly zone in Resolution 1973, which NATO, together with partners such as Sweden, translated into a regime-change mission (see Chapter 6).

However regrettable these shortcomings are, even more serious is the lack of professional learning from these failures in the war and conflict journalism field. There are no signs that the media coverage of the last war in this series of new wars was any better than the first. To some extent the horizon of the mediated war reporting has widened by the inclusion of some Arab-speaking channels and voices, but with regard to the lack of relevant and accurate reports and analyses about the legal aspects and the manipulations of the international community’s mandates, nothing has improved. It is indeed remarkable that, for example in connection to the Libyan War 2011, it is military experts in Norway and Sweden rather than journalists who point to the disputable ways that the
UN Security Council resolutions are massaged to suit NATO’s regime change strategy, and how the Scandinavian countries’ defense planning is adopted to that strategy rather than to the need of protecting their own territory and people.

**Professional remedies?**

Many of the problems with war and conflict journalism that we have described and discussed in this book are no news among media researchers in the field. On the contrary, much of the critique has been legion over almost half a century, but without the journalism profession taking much notice – not to mention any corrective measures. It should be mentioned, though, that civilian casualties are reported more in the later conflicts than before, and the same trend can also be detected for media reflexivity regarding attempts to manipulate media by the belligerents (Nohrstedt 2009). We refuse, however, to believe that journalists as a profession cannot learn from critique and improve. Like several others, whether media scholars, journalists or journalist teachers, we urge the profession and its democratic stakeholders to make all possible efforts to encourage new ways to raise the professional standards of war journalism. Considering the dimensions and chronic character of the problems, we suggest that institutional reforms of journalism education at all levels are important steps.

Different reforms have been suggested over the years, from Johan Galtung’s early call for peace journalism in the 1970s followed up by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick in the 2000s, to Ibrahim Shaw’s “human rights journalism” credo in 2012, but until these ideas are integrated with the curricula of journalism education they are but well-intentioned wishes in the wind. This is absolutely not to say that these distinguished colleagues should not have realised the need to reform the professional education programmes in the field. But so far the proposed remedies are more individual projects than co-ordinated and organised reforms, and they are scattered geographically and do not have a global scope. There is a need for a joint approach together with universities, colleges, training institutes, NGOs such as the RSF and the IJF, and the European Council and the UN, in particular Unesco. In our view these agencies are trustworthy partners in a joint effort to make a difference when it comes to establishing journalism as an important contributor to international norm-setting and to raise the profession’s ethical standards with regard to violent conflicts. A combination of Johan Galtung’s peace journalism approach and the CDA approach offers a way of managing the demand on contextual reflexivity that has been raised in the debate about peace journalism (see Chapter 4). CDA offers an opportunity to address war and peace issues in a more comprehensive manner, integrating analysis of the propaganda discourses during peacetime, underestimated by Galtung in his model. The historical CDA
approach suggested by Wodak et al. offers an additional dimension to the peace journalism debate. This perspective should be included in future teaching of war and peace journalism.

For want of such concerted efforts between journalism schools, NGOs, Unesco and other key players in the field, we would like to present at least a small contribution, a checklist, for the improvement of conflict and war journalism. A first version has been published before, but not for an international audience (Ottosen 2009). All through this book we have discussed cases where the legal issues have been underreported in international conflict coverage. Since lack of legal competence seems to be a collective problem in the newsrooms we will suggest a checklist for journalists regarding principle issues in cases which involve the interpretation and implementation of international law; controversies around whether humanitarian intervention is legal or legitimate; the status and role of the UN for judgements regarding legal and/or legitimate actions; and conflicts between international and national legislations. What we need is a new global standard for conflict reporting as suggested by Jake Lynch (Lynch 2013). This global standard combines insights from the theoretical discussion of peace journalism with practical insights from journalistic work on the ground in conflict zones.

Checklist for professional conflict and war media reporting

1. Is there a legal basis for military action? If so, what international law or norm is applicable? Are arguments for the legality of military actions based on singular legal or moral principles or on the international jurisdiction as a whole?

2. Are the legal motivations for military intervention that politicians and military experts refer to contested by experts in law? If so, make sure that the public is informed in order to make democratic deliberations, opinion-building, and norms-setting possible.

3. If a big power with resources available for information warfare and spin is involved, to what extent are the official arguments for intervention founded in legal documents (conventions and resolutions)? Check the actual text and compare it with the rhetoric used by politicians and military spokespersons.

4. Are there peace suggestions and alternatives to military action promoted by peace groups, NGO and critical intellectuals? And have they been reported in a relevant way?

5. Have hidden agendas and strategic interests linked to oil, minerals or strategic positions (military bases) been reported independently and critically?

6. What restrictions on journalists in the form of censorship or denial to access to conflict zones are making obstacles for the reporting? In what ways can this
influence the news flow and what potential effects do they have on the texts and visuals?

7. What is the security situation like for journalists in the conflict zones? Is there evidence of physical attacks and threats on journalists by governments or the parties involved? Make sure that conditions referred to are in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1738 (2006).

8. What information management and/or propaganda strategies as well as PSYOPS operations are pursued by the parties involved in the conflict? What are the main goals for these activities?

9. Is there promotion of otherism and enemy images based on racism, prejudice, and xenophobia that could incite war crimes and civilian casualties?

10. What historical, social, political and cultural dimensions of the conflict are not visible in the news but have the potential to shed light on the conflict? Are there experts on those contextual aspects of the actual conflict who should be used as sources, besides the traditional elite sources?

11. Have you and your colleagues analyzed the reporting from previous similar or related conflicts and benchmarked the high points and the shortcomings? How will you make sure that you can do the best in future and be satisfied professionally?

12. In addition it should be noted that UNESCO 2013 published the report “Journalists safety indicators”, which is a useful tool for journalists and news rooms work (UNESCO 2013).

New and social media as a platform for improvement?

Technological optimism, not to say utopianism, has surrounded new ICTs from the beginning, and very much so regarding the Internet and web-based communication online. It is quite natural that we expect – or at least hope – that new tools and methods should help in solving the eternal questions of wars, pandemics, and famine. Usually, the promises of why and how the new technology will save humanity suffer from collapsed distinctions between what is technologically possible, socially wanted, and economically affordable, as once formulated by a skeptical Swedish critic Lasse Svanberg (1979). When the so-called Arab Spring or “the Facebook revolution” blossomed in 2011-2012, the media were full of comments that pointed out social media as a major factor. In particular in the Western media the temptation to see the demands of political changes as outsprings of Western technological innovations and ideological influences was irresistible, whereas media in Iran saw influences from the Islamist revolution, and Egypt media pointed to social and economic
problems as the main explanation behind the revolts (Tahir 2012). But, what about new media as a resource for improvements in war journalism? Would that be to replace socioeconomic realism with technological optimism?

There are definitely features of the Internet and web-based communication that give reason for some positive expectations, although most studies indicate that the traditionally mainstream media are still more important for opinion-building and political agenda-setting (see Introduction; cf. Jordan 2007). However, as Berenger (2006) concludes, the mobilization ability of the new ICTs was demonstrated in February 2003, before the Iraq War, when what was probably millions took part in anti-war protests around the world. And he may well be right when he speculates about the possibility that future research using methodologies dedicated to digital media will change the conclusion of relatively limited political impact of the new media (cf. Livingstone 2011) because there is a plentitude of sources for information, comments, and debates about war crimes and international law. As mentioned above, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the Committee for Protection of Journalists (CPJ) are two organizations, for example, that work hard online to inform the global public about the severe obstacles and attacks that tend to make war journalism an increasingly dangerous vocation. They are both respected and used by mainstream media as sources in news reporting. Others, such as Iraq Body Count, the world’s largest database of its kind, provides continuously updated statistics of civilian casualties following the invasion of Iraq 2003 (between 115,173 and 126,337 deaths in November 2013), but they are used less frequently by media in general – not to mention that the steadily growing numbers are not what daily-news editors find newsworthy. In US mainstream media alternative war blogs such as the Iraq Body Count have even been reprimanded for “presumed violations of journalistic conventions such as not deferring to the Pentagon even on issues upon which the Pentagon refused to comment” in attempts to discipline information seekers to regard these alternative sources as “irresponsible” and perhaps even “dangerous” (Jordan 2007: 287). Other NGOs also deserve mention: one of the most commonly used by the media is Human Rights Watch (HRW) while two others are Index on Censorship and Article 19. These organizations usually publish annual reports about the state of human rights and freedom that often are covered by the mainstream media. But rarely do they receive equal attention to the latest political statements by, for example, the president in the White House or the prime minister at 10 Downing Street, which is remarkable since what the NGO defenders of human rights say probably has more public relevance in the longer-term perspective from a democratic point of view.

Moreover, one should absolutely not forget the outputs of WikiLeaks and the later revelations of transnational intelligence surveillance of cable and telephone communications by the American NSA, the British GCHQ, and the Swedish
FRA, displayed by Edward Snowden in collaboration with WikiLeaks and liberal newspapers such as *The Guardian*. Obviously, those kind of disclosures – about the ways new ICTs are applied to control the who, whom and what of communication – could by definition only happen because of the new media, and nor could the impact they had be the same without the enormous reach and volume offered by the technique of dissemination technique. However, as we have argued above, the distribution capacities and encryption techniques that enable whistleblowers to retain anonymity, do not guarantee that alternative information providers such as WikiLeaks are fully effective globally. For this to happen, professional collaboration with experienced journalists and traditional media is also necessary. This is first because only the traditional, mainstream media has the wide reach needed to influence public opinion. Second, without the stamp of quality from well-known and trusted journalists and media the general public will not trust the information, since traditional media are sometimes quite successful in defending their brand names (Jordan 2007). However, co-operation between old and new media is what made the revelations by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden so difficult for the responsible politicians and authorities to ignore, while some other leaks that WikiLeaks disseminated without professional collaboration with established media were easier to downplay by the politicians involved.

With examples such as these, is there then not reason to expect considerable improvements in war journalism because of the new media technology? To follow the analyses of Berglez (2013) and others (Dimitrovas & Neznanski 2006, Christensen 2010, Gerhards & Schäfer 2010, El Gody 2012, Riegert 2013, Riegert & Ramsay 2012) what is also missing in the new media is a global outlook as journalistic practice: the new capabilities, and social media's technical innovations, are not used to the full extent in today's mainstream media. It is especially the hyper-textual and hyper-linking advances that are not fully realized, according to Berglez (2013: 112 ff.). He envisions a global journalism that manages to translate movements online (between websites, blogs, and so on) to perceptions and even experiences of a world where conceptions of space, power and identity are all globally integrated in coherent narratives. In the present context, particularly, the power dimension is of relevance since it captures the capacity – or lack of it – to report about the complex and multi-level political processes that affect international norm-construction and lawmaking. However, it is important not to neglect the institutional powers that are also at play online in the battles for hearts and minds. In a study of the “war and terror blogosphere” between 2001 and 2011, Daniel Bennett (2013) found that several types of bloggers have emerged, but their influence on traditional media is mainly limited to providing eyewitness accounts and other reports from the field where war correspondents have little or no access. Although they can be important as sources for mainstream media in specific cases, they rarely meet
the expectation of being providers of alternative information with an impact on the content of mainstream media. Bennet also shows how the frontline soldiers’ blogs, for which the US “global war on terror” was a catalyst, have, after 2008, been co-opted by the military establishments in the US, the UK, and Israel; and he considers that the exact implications of this development should be studied further. But Bennet’s general conclusion concerning online warfare is clear: “What is certain … is that a very short period of media history when the war and terror blogosphere was a relatively unknown space for journalists and the public to access ‘alternative’ accounts of conflict has come to an end” (Bennet 2013: 50).

The consequences of new ICTs being used in the new wars provide additional support for the emphasis that Nancy Fraser (2007) gives to the need for multi-level and transnational analysis of the legitimation processes, which Berglez draws from in his argument for a global journalism (see more below). Fraser raises two fundamental concerns for the theory of the public sphere remaining a critical instrument in the post-westphalian world: (a) how to uphold the idea of legitimate public opinions/publicums, and (b) how to pursue the idea of political efficacy and accountability. In particular, the identification of the “members” of the publicum and the responsible agencies/authorities is complicated when political processes and normmaking cross national borders. As Berglez points out, even though journalism today (including online journalism) seldom overcomes the domestic outlook, there are still embryonic elements of a wider scope in reporting, and this also goes for war journalism. Neither Fraser nor Berglez deals explicitly with war and conflict journalism and therefore they have less to say when it comes to applying critical theory to empirical processes of legitimate opinion-building and prerequisites for political efficacy in the field of violent conflicts and collective security. In our view, though, the various forms of Internet communication are examples of such embryonic forms that may announce a future transnational or even global public sphere in this field.

Here we think about online activism and campaigning, for example Avaaz.com, which has mobilised worldwide protests with some documented effects in a number of issues such as the protection of the Masai community; the rape of women in the Maldives: corruption in Brazilian political institutions; websites being shut down by the US government; and influencing governments to stop tax evasion. Other examples, such as blogs and websites, and Facebook and Twitter, which exemplify the new media’s role as a platform for a multitude of views and opinions, are nevertheless fragmented, and often very local in their outlook. Together with other forums for transnational or international norm-setting, such as the UN system, international NGOs and public movements, there is, globally speaking, a plethora of voices and channels, for which the Internet is a connecting tool that has yet to be fully used.

Late-modern society – or “liquid modernity” to use Bauman’s (2000) term – is notable for its fluidity not only for processes of identity constructions but
also when it comes to the actual public spheres and their addressed authorities/agencies (cf. Bauman 2000; also Mylonas 2012). As Fraser argues, legitimate opinions/publicums include all individuals and groups that are affected by a certain decision or action. We would add that consequently the higher the numbers of affected individuals that take an informed stance, the more legitimate is the opinion. And, complementary to Fraser’s open answer regarding the accountable authority or agency, we would argue that accountability also has to be fluid in the ever more globalized world. If Bauman is right that in the liquid modernity power is in the hands of “nomadic and exterritorial elites” (Bauman 2000: 13), the unavoidable conclusion is that the accountable power varies with the issue. This fluidity is not a reason to abandon the idea of democratic accountability but, rather, to develop specific variants of public spheres for each field. The priority should be violent conflicts and collective security, where all humankind, in so many ways, is one and the same. And here, no doubt, the addressees are located in the interrelated nexus comprising the UN system, different defence alliances, regional organisations such as the EU, and nation states.

The fluidity of social relations in liquid modernity puts extra weight on the need to integrate the manifold public spheres and to direct appeals and propositions towards the relevant agencies. This is the mission of journalism with a global outlook.

A final note

A globalizing world demands journalism with a global outlook and the competence, in its reporting, to connect local and national events with global conditions and processes. As Peter Berglez has argued, this is not only something distinctively different to local or domestic journalism, but also something beyond traditional foreign news reporting (Berglez 2013). This global outlook is particularly important in the field of war journalism because of the ramifications of the new and assymetric wars for international norm-construction, in particular with respect to conflict management and collective security (for example, Mumford & Kuhrt 2011). Consequently, the challenge for journalism is huge considering the historic origin of journalism as a societal institution embedded in national values and outlook. As we have mentioned above, the general lack of competence among editors and journalists regarding international politics and law is a problem, but that is only one of the reasons why this is such an enormous professional challenge for journalism. Another crucial factor is the fact that the local-national context is a much more familiar communication ecology, for example in terms of information flows, analytical discourses, and political debates, than the transnational and international context. There are
traditionally many more sources and discussions available for journalists to draw upon within (to simplify) one and the same “public sphere” at the local/national level, because the nation state has been the major unit for policy-making and societybuilding since the start of journalism. In comparison, the transnational and international levels are more stretched out, thinner and therefore more difficult to catch and take in.

It is a simplification to say, as we did above, that there are basically two conflicting perspectives – or competing embryonic “global outlooks” – on the events and processes that take place at the transnational and international levels, but this dichotomy is nevertheless analytically fruitful in studies of how journalism, at least war journalism, understands and considers global norm-building. First, there is the real-political outlook, which directs its attention on inter-state relations. Second, there is the UN-based outlook, with its focus on the supranational level and its relations. The crucial difference in our analysis is that the first deduces legitimacy of, for example, conflict resolution propositions or actions from the inherent nature of the nation states, while the second regards the UN system as the only legitimate source for binding rules or norms. In actual politics as well as in actual journalism reporting, the two are mixed and blurred in various ways, which has a lot to do with the fact that conflicts develop through processes that relate to both the inter-state and the supranational levels. Typical contemporary examples are when the USA, as the only remaining superpower, may strategically choose between unilateral or bilateral options such as so-called “alliances of the willing” or multilateral options via the UN Security Council, or a combination of the two. The bipolar character of the dichotomy is also a simplification in the sense that we can easily find additional perspectives such as that religion is the foundation for norm-building globally – for example, Sharia laws.

Our findings from a series of war journalism studies indicate clearly that at least mainstream media leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to delivering facts and views to the general public about international laws. Although it is obvious that conflict politics and conflict management are increasingly and rapidly globalized, journalism is disconnected from this development of globalization and does not satisfy the democratic needs of reports, analyses and debates about what norms are – and should be – established and upheld for global security and protection. The main shortcoming seems to be the result of a dominant real-political or neorealist (Livingstone 2011) perspective in the rudimentary global outlook of mainstream media. In leading newspapers such as Dagens Nyheter the framing, whether in the news or in the commentaries and analyses, is in essence based upon the characteristics of the actual nation-state actors. Instead of a serious scrutiny of, for example, the legality of a US-led military intervention – say, in Iraq, Libya, or Syria – the mainstream media publish speculation about power games, possible political gains and
losses, and the motives of different actors; speculations that usually end up with more trust in the legitimacy claims coming from leaders in democratic Western countries than from those coming from leaders in other countries, but without presenting any substantial and relevant legal grounds for the selective conclusions. This critique is not only valid for explicitly pro-US media such as the Dagens Nyheter, but also for media with a more US-critical attitude such as Aftonbladet. In both cases it is the “nature” and track records of the US as a nation state that guide the framing of reports or commentaries, irrespective of whether it is the “good” or the “bad” intentions and deeds of the US that are at the forefront. However, in media critical about the US, such as Aftonbladet, this real-political perspective is often modified by slightly more emphasis on the UN system as the authoritative source of global norms – as when the US is censured for unilateral military interventions without UN Security Council support.

Such shortcomings of war journalism are evident in news reporting as well as in commentaries and analysis. But the deficiencies are never so prominent, not to say alarming, as in the media’s contribution to public demands for accountability at the global level in relation to the legality and legitimacy of the regime changes resulting from recent military interventions. Or concerning the responsibility of the occupying forces for the security and protection of the occupied population. It is not easy to say what the effective cure would be for such professional neglect. We have suggested reforms of the curriculums at the journalism schools and, together with Berglez, development of professional practices with a global outlook. Jon Stephenson, a freelance foreign correspondent, has also said that journalist education needs to be improved:

Ideally, we could start in journalism schools, with classes in foreign affairs reporting as part of the syllabus. It has always amazed me that … we teach almost every aspect of journalism except this – despite the fact that we live in such an interconnected world. If we took foreign affairs reporting seriously we would encourage journalism students to develop their knowledge of world events, to study language, or learn the basics of international law (Stephenson 2010: 59).

It is hoped that future research on war and conflict journalism will also contribute deeper knowledge about the necessary improvements so as to make journalism fit for its role in a globalized world marked by new conflicts and wars.

Notes
1. In the speech, Eisenhower said: “… now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in
the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society” (Eisenhower 1960).

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IN THIS BOOK, the authors discuss media coverage of major conflicts, from the Gulf War in 1990/91 to the NATO military operations in Libya in 2011 and the now ongoing civil war in Syria. Through in-depth analysis of Norwegian and Swedish media coverage of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Afghanistan War from 2001, the Iraq War from 2003 as well as more recent conflicts, the authors claim that legal issues are poorly covered in the running news coverage of major conflicts. Underreporting of legal issues is especially problematic in relation to new forms of warfare involving extra-judicial killing by drones of targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. While historically Sweden and Norway have had different security policy orientations, the tendency is toward the two countries becoming more closely oriented through Nordic defense cooperation and participation in the wars in Afghanistan and Libya.

The authors criticize mainstream media for under-communicating what security risks this support for the regime change strategies pursued by the US/NATO in the so-called ‘global war on terror’ implies for the Nordic countries. The book further discusses the challenges war and conflict reporting face when confronted with major security leaks through WikiLeaks and the classified information revealed by Edward Snowden. Theoretically, the findings are related to the theories of threat society, new wars and risk-transfer warfare as well as to Johan Galtung’s theory of war and peace journalism. Analyses are inspired by critical discourse analysis as elaborated in Norman Fairclough’s and Ruth Wodak’s works.

Stig A. Nohrstedt is Professor Emeritus in Media and Communication Science at Örebro University and holds a PhD in Political Science from Uppsala University, Sweden. He has published a number of books and articles on war journalism, journalism ethics and crisis communication.

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