


Vol.2

Journalism and the New World Order

Studying War and the Media

Wilhelm Kempf & Heikki Luostarinen (eds.)



NORDICOM

**Journalism and the New World Order.
Studying War and the Media**

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Studying War and the Media

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Introduction

Why study war and the media? Before we move on to the problems of studying media coverage of wars and crises, there are three major issues which we would like to consider and discuss.

First, there is a long tradition in Western civilization – though not only there – of glorifying and mystifying war. Innumerable products of popular culture, journalism, fine arts, architecture and oral tradition embody this longstanding mythology. Nor do depictions and accounts of the misery caused by warfare necessarily work against this mythology: endeavours that claim to reveal ‘the true face of war’ – with the destruction, strain, pain and suffering it entails – are most often part of the cultural glorification of war, because the danger and excitement portrayed therein are integral parts of the very enchantment of war. In addition, most cultural products which exploit enthusiasm for war are marketed by saying that the product is ‘anti-war’ and intended to turn its audience against war culture. This dualism is caused by the nature of the emotions created by war: comradeship gets its value from commonly borne stress and strain; heroism gets its value from danger; sacrifice gets its value from the importance of what is sacrificed. Positive and desirable emotions and experiences would lose some of their value without extreme violence as a counterpart.

When commencing research on media and violence then, it must be asked in what way the work could be presented so that it does not – intentionally or unintentionally – reproduce the mythology of war. And scholars must ask themselves whether they really are interested in the issues involved because of human rights, equality, peace, etc. or whether they are simply fascinated by war culture. In our view, one way to avoid the dual trap described above is to analyse war and its violence in their historical, social and political contexts – to analyse the reasons and structures behind aggression and violence. Mystification can be deconstructed and demystified; war is basically about politics, economy, and authoritarian and unequal relationships between individuals and social groups.

The second issue concerns the political and ethical foundations of research. Academic research never takes place without ethical and political preconditions. Scholars are members of the surrounding society; consciously or unconsciously their methods and their objects of interest are influenced by that society. This was particularly true in the case of studies on international communication during the Cold War era. While superpowers fought about control of media images, media scholars were drawn in part into the ideological battle. In this battle, the very concept of peace was exploited by both superpowers, who politicized it for their own purposes.

Now, ten years after the end of the superpowers' struggle, the question of peace can be touched upon from a more profound and principled point of view. Almost all nations and many international organizations of professional vocational groups – such as doctors, scientists, journalists, etc. – are committed to protecting human rights, freedom, democracy and nonviolent conflict solution – as expressed for instance in the United Nations Charter. If these principles are taken seriously, this means that academic research also should advance humanity and fairness. This principle naturally does not mean that the researchers are allowed to manipulate their results – the production of facts and their interpretation must happen according to the basic principles of scientific ethics – but it does mean that 'peace' as a concept can be used and discussed without the burdens of the Cold War.

We do not refer to 'peace' as some fictive state of harmony, but rather as a process which is defined by the modes in which conflicts are dealt with. Many peace researchers share an understanding of peace as meaning the reduction of violence by nonviolent means. This is a practical purpose, and manipulation of results would jeopardize its pursuit. On the other hand, however, is the problem that analytical and critical studies of media coverage of wars and crises can also be used by those people who are preparing new means for even more effective war propaganda and manipulation of the media. This problem, unfortunately, cannot be avoided.

The third question asks: What emphasis should media studies as a whole give to coverage of war and crises as compared to other issues in international and domestic life, and what forms of organized violence should be preferred in the studies as an object of analysis?

After the Persian Gulf War in 1990–91 an extraordinary scholarly effort was invested to analyse the military media-management strategies utilized by the Coalition forces. On the other hand there are several 'forgotten wars' and many forms of organized violence (such as state terrorism, uncontrolled use of violence by police and other security authorities, violence against women, etc.) in which the human and material casualties can be even bigger and more longstanding than in the Gulf crisis, but where the journalistic or academic attention paid to them is minimal or marginal. Who is to decide which wars and what forms of violence will be covered extensively and studied afterwards and which ones not?

There are several possible answers to these questions. First, media research only follows the media agenda, which is primarily defined by the media organizations. These organizations, being mainly commercial enterprises, cover issues and wars which sell. Easy access, journalistically interesting material, dramatic David-and-Goliath constellations and public relations efforts – as in the Gulf War – influence decisions made by the media outlets. War produces good material – dramatic pictures, excitement, human interest stories – but not every war. A bunch of dirty guerrillas, fighting for or against who knows what in a jungle in the middle of nowhere, does not make for good copy or footage. However, things are different if Western armies are directly involved, or if the economic and political interests of the West are at least at stake. It is also another issue if there seems to be a clash of ideologies or religions, where the Western audiences can identify with some of the belligerents. And it is another case again if the scale of the war is so large that the result will cause major changes in the geopolitical constellation of the area. But also, in a more simple way, it is another issue again if one happens to get good copy and pictures in a handy way.

Second, war is a happening, not a process, and happenings are always easier to cover journalistically. The more clear the plan and the schedule of the war – as in the Gulf War, when the Coalition war plan was decided beforehand and implemented in an extremely exact way – the more easy it is to cover the crisis: journalists covering the Gulf War, equipped with enough background information, could make their own logistic and journalistic preparations in good time before successive phases of the war. Coverage is more difficult in cases of unclear and muddled operations with unexpected turns, but even these cases are easier to cover than slowly progressing processes or those forms of violence which are so near to everyday life that often we do not even notice them. In its defence, though, it can be argued that journalism is meant to be about daily happenings, and that more longstanding processes will be followed by historians, sociologists, administrative bodies, etc.

From the academic point of view, this excuse is not good enough. Is it really necessary that media research should automatically follow the journalistic agenda? Naturally, media scholars have to analyse happenings which command great attention in the media, but is that all? Should they not also take care of black spots in journalism's map and question the routines in working practices of journalism which favour the happenings-oriented modes of coverage?

From that perspective we can give a dual answer. First, media research should have its independent agenda in which priorities are grounded in scientific values and ethical responsibilities. Second, war can also be considered as a symbol of authoritarian and non-human values and practices in international and social life. By studying war culture, the media scholar is in fact studying the roots of human suffering, economic inequality, repression of women and other issues which prevent people from living lives they might want or be entitled to. In other words, war is a concentration of political and cultural practices which block the desires of people for valuable and worthwhile lives. In that sense, every war can be used as a case-study to analyse more profound issues on the role of violence in contemporary world.

Structure of the Book

This book is part of a bigger project called 'Journalism in the New World Order'. As part of this, the first volume – *Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization*, – was produced by members of the project, edited by Stig Arne Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen, and published by *Nordicom* in late 2000. The core questions addressed in that volume concerned globalization of the media world – using the Gulf War as a central example – and processes of localization and domestication that in various countries ensure that media content remains, to a large extent, heterogeneous and based on local, national and regional cultures.

If the emphasis of the first volume was mainly empirical and linked to the Gulf War, this volume tries to touch more upon theoretical, historical and methodological problems of war reporting and war propaganda. Our aim is that this book could be used as a textbook, for instance in institutions educating future journalists.

The first part of the book deals with the role of the media in conflicts and provides conceptual and theoretical tools for the analysis of conflict coverage and war reporting.

In Chapter 1, 'Propaganda Analysis', Heikki Luostarinen examines the history of the propaganda concept, which enjoyed a prominent position in media research up to the 1950s. Why did it attain such a prominent place and why did it disappear? The chapter suggests that this change seems in part to be connected to US information policy in the Cold War. In the second part of the chapter, ways and means to unveil propagandist efforts in the content of modern journalism are discussed. Propaganda has certain characteristics which can be analysed empirically in order to evaluate its success in influencing journalistic discourse.

In Chapter 2, 'The Changing Role of the Media in Conflicts – From the Cold War to the Net Age', Heikki Luostarinen and Rune Ottosen demonstrate how post-World War II experiences with media coverage of war have contributed to our understanding of the present discussion on media-military relationships. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the political, socio-cultural and technological processes within which the media-military relationship takes its form. Two examples are emphasized in this examination: the Cold War and information warfare of the Net age.

Chapter 3, 'Conflict Coverage and Conflict Escalation', considers how the way in which conflicts are conceptualized by the media may either add to conflict prevention, de-escalation and constructive conflict resolution or add to the plausibility of war and military logic. On the basis of psychological conflict theory, Wilhelm Kempf analyzes the cognitive changes which take place during the process of conflict escalation, how these affect the work of journalists work and how they can be counteracted.

In Chapter 4, 'TV Wars, the Audience and the Public', Oddgeir Tveiten points out that television has changed our outlook on the world in substantial ways, including the ways we look at warfare. The primary features of television, relative to other media, are its pre-eminence in visual narrative and its constant presence in our daily lives. Accordingly, this chapter attempts to trace certain methodological aspects of television analysis in relation to the study of conflict, war reporting and media audiences in civil society.

Under the title 'How Did We Get Here?', the second part of the volume provides the historical background needed in order to understand the present situation of journalism in war.

In Chapter 5, 'Propaganda and Reporting in Total Wars', Heikki Luostarinen deals with the role of propaganda during the two world wars. In the first total war, World War I, propaganda was used on a massive scale. Particularly in Germany, it was commonly believed that the war was lost by Germany because Allied propaganda broke the fighting-spirit of the German home front. In point of fact, propaganda probably was not 'the decisive weapon'. However this belief inspired military thinking in many countries, and extensive preparations were made for the next conflict. In World War II, new technological and intellectual innovations, in part based on academic research on propaganda, were used in skilful ways. This chapter pays special attention to Joseph Goebbels and his principles on propaganda.

In Chapter 6, 'Sparks for a Fire: The US Media and the Vietnam War', Heikki Luostarinen considers the different and contradictory ways in which the role of the US media in the Vietnam War has been evaluated. In early 1980s the US military strongly insisted that the media, and especially their visual images depicting horrors of war, were to be blamed for the US defeat. However studies made in the late 1980s and in the 1990s seem to prove that the accusation that 'the media lost the war' is

very problematic. US mainstream media mainly supported the war policy until the political establishment itself ran into internal disputes on the means and chances for winning the war. Negative stories or emotionally striking visualizations were exceptional. In terms of influencing public opinion, the role of the peace movement as an independent social actor has possibly been underestimated.

In Chapter 7, 'Propaganda and War Reporting after the Vietnam War', Heikki Luostarinen and Rune Ottosen summarize studies on war reporting and military media-management in the Falklands War of 1982 and in US interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. The objective of the chapter is to describe how military thinking developed while the experiences of Vietnam were evaluated and new means of information policy were experienced in small-scale conflicts. This extensive evaluation and innovation process led to the media policy of the Gulf War, which was a skilful combination of restrictive means – such as prevention of access to the battlefield – and persuasive means – such as providing fascinating visualizations for the media.

The third part of this volume presents different methodological approaches to the study of war and the media, applying both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysing media discourse.

In Chapter 8, 'News, Discourse, Rhetoric, Propaganda: Conflict Journalism from a Multi-Methodological Perspective', Oddgeir Tveiten and Stig Arne Nohrstedt deal with conflict journalism from a multi-methodological point of view. In this chapter three methodological approaches – propaganda, rhetoric and discourse analysis – are discussed and assessed in relation to the need for an integrated contextual framework for analysis of conflict journalism today. The 'New World Order' and the development of media technology demand that media researchers reflect on the 'liminal dimension' and the 'attraction' of visual images, together with the rhetorical ethos expressed in journalistic narratives, when approaching mediated conflict and war discourses.

In Chapter 9, 'Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analysis in Media Research', Wilhelm Kempf deals with the analysis of escalation-oriented and de-escalation-oriented aspects in war reporting and propaganda. As this chapter demonstrates, quantitative and qualitative content analysis are not competing methods, but each of them has its own advantages and shortcomings. Both methods of analysis are valuable, and advanced methods of data analysis provide a methodological basis for integrating them.

In Chapter 10, 'Communication Disorders in Conflict Coverage', Michael Reimann provides a methodological framework for the analysis of refined propaganda techniques which make use of communication disorders such as 'two-sided messages' and 'double-bind communication' in order to integrate contradictory information into propaganda strategies.

The fourth part of the volume is dedicated to studies of the Gulf War and the Bosnia conflict and demonstrates the application of the theoretical models and methodological approaches described before.

In Chapter 11, 'Images of the UN in *Dagens Nyheter* and the *Washington Post* during the Gulf War 1990–91', Stig Arne Nohrstedt presents a qualitative analysis of UN images during the Gulf War in two leading prestige newspapers. Sweden's *Dagens Nyheter* and the USA's *Washington Post* are compared with respect to: (a) the discursive position of the UN, (b) the discursive function of the UN, and (c) the discursive

relation between the UN and US policy in the conflict. The analysis is related to the results from the quantitative content analysis presented in the first volume of this project, and the hypothesis of convergence between the Swedish and the American newspaper, which was confirmed in these results, is validated also in this study.

In Chapter 12, 'The Presentation of Alternative Ways of Settling the Gulf Conflict in German, Norwegian and Finnish Media', Wilhelm Kempf and Michael Reimann integrate quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches in order to analyse how the coverage of alternative ways of settling the conflict was transformed into support of the Gulf War by the media. Although the media placed considerable emphasis on reporting alternatives to violence, there was very little critical journalism which gave these alternatives a chance. The facts were all there, but the media put them into a framework of binary and military logic, and thereby undermined possible de-escalatory effects of promising alternatives to violence.

In Chapter 13, 'Escalating and Deescalating Aspects in the Coverage of the Bosnia Conflict: A Comparative Study', Wilhelm Kempf presents the results of an international, comparative and longitudinal study on the media construction of the Bosnia conflict in the US and European quality press. The results of the analysis show that the press was quite ambiguous about all three ethnic groups involved in the conflict. Although there were differences between the media images of the three groups, these were mainly due to the different roles in which they were portrayed. The calamity of the Bosnia coverage was not so much its partiality but its captivity in the vicious circle of war and military logic. This led into disregard and/or misinterpretation of the role of neutral third parties in the conflict, lack of support for attempts at peaceful conflict resolution and pressure towards resolving the conflict by means of military intervention.

Finally, 'Beyond Wishful Thinking', the closing part of the volume, summarizes the implications of this kind of research in terms of practical journalism.

Chapter 14, 'Peace Journalism: A Challenge' by Johan Galtung, is a plea for 'peace journalism' as an alternative to traditional war reporting. There is a clear danger in violence, and mainstream journalism often responds to this danger by interpreting conflict within a zero-sum perspective. But in human conflict there is also a clear opportunity for human progress, for using the conflict to find new ways of being imaginative and creative and of transforming the conflict so that the opportunities take the upper hand. The author investigates how journalism might contribute to this process.

In Chapter 15, 'Journalism and Cultural Preconditions of War', Heikki Luostarinen discusses the view that cultural and political preconditions for war are created during periods of peace. Through public relations, for example, military institutions try to effect all cultural spheres in the society – including schools, the media, etc. – in order to get support for material and cultural preparations for potential conflict. This type of activity could be described as 'preparatory defence information'. In addition, this concluding chapter examines the goals and means of peacetime military information activities and their effects on modern Western journalism, and discusses counter-strategies by which journalistic integrity can be maintained.

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Konstanz & Jyväskylä, December 2001

Wilhelm Kempf & Heikki Luostarinen

I. The Role of the Media in Conflicts

Propaganda Analysis

Heikki Luostarinen

In the world of concepts, as elsewhere, history is viewed through the eyes of the winners. The annals of communication studies contain many cases of what could be described as ‘a history of legitimization’. Previous studies are described in ways that support the views of the school of thought responsible for the depiction, so that the chroniclers can illustrate their own scientific progressiveness and originality (Pietilä, 1997).

This first chapter has three aims. The first is to discuss the usefulness of the concept of propaganda in analysis of contemporary Western journalism. The second is to examine the history of the concept of propaganda – which held a prominent position up to the 1950s – examining why the concept attained such an important place and why it later disappeared; the perspective adopted here above all stresses the institutional and societal conditions of research, though this is not meant to suggest that internal scientific developments would not also affect the conceptual toolbox of mass communication studies. The third purpose is to present a model with which it is possible to analyse the propaganda content of war reporting. The solution put forward implies that propaganda is still a useful concept in describing certain forms of mass communication.

To begin with, a few words on the position of propaganda in the present use of language in mass communication studies:

First, there is a label of ‘coarseness’ attached to the word propaganda in two senses. On one hand, the word is primarily connected with authoritarian, distorted communication against the will of the receivers – examples being brainwashing, psychological warfare and communications within totalitarian systems like Nazi Germany and Soviet Communism (Doob, 1989: 374). Forms of persuasive mass communication belonging to everyday life – such as election campaigning, advertising and marketing – have been placed under concepts of their own, and talk of ‘political propaganda’ or ‘commercial propaganda’ has stopped. Also the term ‘war propaganda’ is often replaced with ‘crisis communication’ or ‘defence information’.¹ Because strong pejorative undertones have been attached to the concept of propaganda, ‘practitioners have likewise avoided the term; instead of propagandists they are public relations council, information specialists, or official spokespersons’ (Doob, 1989: 375).

Second, propaganda is often connected with the simplest 'transmission view' of communication, where messages – in a fashion described by such colourful metaphors as 'mechanistic S-R theory', 'hypodermic needle theory', 'transmission belt theory' or 'magic bullet theory' – move from the brains of the sender to affect the knowledge, emotions and behaviour of the recipient. (DeFleur, 1970: 115) The more developed theories and concepts of communication are believed to understand the communication process far more subtly and better, where 'propaganda theories' are seen to refer at their best only to constructions like Herman and Chomsky's 'propaganda model' which 'traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across the public' (Herman & Chomsky, 1988: 2).

Those still involved in propaganda studies have reasons to wonder whether or not this picture is correct. At least in its practice, the phenomenon of propaganda is far more nuance-rich and more challenging in the viewpoint of new trends in mass communication studies. Nor has research remained stuck in the positions of the 1950s either – not that those were by any means as primitive as the later history-writing of mass communication has suggested.

1. Propaganda and contemporary journalism

The main qualities of propaganda – as far as one can talk about its qualities – are its mutability and adaptability to different cultural, social and textual environments. For instance, in a situation of war it is necessary to prepare for changes and surprising turns of events and for the propaganda of the enemy. Skill in using propaganda often consists of sensitivity in utilizing events advantageous to oneself and in minimizing the adverse effect of events favourable to the enemy. On the other hand, propaganda must be able to function in different media and text genres according to the target audience's consumption habits – cartoons, movies, historical studies, news, opinion columns, fine arts, computer games, music, etc. It is also essential to understand the different values and knowledge of the target audience and to apply the chosen core messages in a fashion that touches people belonging to different social classes, sexes, age groups, religious movements and the like.

In the difficult and demanding situational, generic and target-group-segmented adaptation, opinion polls and small group studies can be utilized to an extent, but much depends on practical skills and experience. A good propagandist works partly intuitively, adapting to the thinking and feelings of his audience. In Nazi Germany a network was used whose members travelled in trains, listened to what people said and casually took up various discussion themes prepared by the propaganda machine. The reactions helped in decisions affecting propaganda content (Simpson, 1996). Reardon (1991: 210) says:

So when all is said and done, the primary key to effective persuasion is a strong curiosity about the cognitive and emotional makeup of others. This may mean understanding such things as how they make decisions, what they consider rewarding, rules they use to determine behaviours, schemata they apply when interpreting experience, styles they may have learned as results of culture and gender, their likely

response to conflict, and their proficiency in negotiation. Such knowledge provides the persuader with a bridge between his own views and those of the persuadee.

What kind of a working environment for propaganda is modern journalism in the Western countries, and what kind of adaptations must propaganda make?

In the present study of journalism there exist three beliefs about journalism, which are not shared by all researchers but which all have in common the belief that in, the study of the system formed by mass communication sources, production and reception, phenomena like propaganda are not all that interesting or important in any conditions other than a total war or a state of emergency. These beliefs have for their part contributed to the marginalization of the study of propaganda as a part of the study of journalism. They are as follows: (a) Western democracies are open societies and decentralized in their use of power; there is a counter-force to all powers and counter-information to all information, and no single source can obtain in a many-voiced and diversified society such a dominance that the traditional methods used by propaganda would be useful; (b) journalism is in a relative sense an independent institution of information production, and works as guided by the trade's professional and ethical principles and in accordance with its own rules concerning production and genres; the journalistic institutions' own considerations, the working mechanisms and media formats are factors which have more influence than any eventual intentions of the senders of propaganda; (c) the habits of the public in receiving and interpreting the messages of journalism are heterogeneous, unpredictable or sceptical; the audiences are also dispersed in various subcultures, and the channels for obtaining information have multiplied in a cataclysmic fashion; as a consequence of this, there is no such correspondence between the aims of the sender of the propaganda and the reactions in public opinion as to render it sensible or interesting to study the process of mass communication from the viewpoint of the intentions of the propaganda sender.

All these ways of thinking mentioned above are relevant as such, but they do not exclude the possibility of propaganda.

From the viewpoint of propaganda organizations and actors, contemporary Western societies and their systems of mass communication are only one environment of action among others. The most important thing is practice: what can be done, can be done. For instance, according to Page (1996: 42), the question is not that the Western governments could not make propaganda, but rather what kinds of techniques are politically acceptable and most efficient. For instance, the extensively used cover-ups of information and downright lying of World War I are methods that in the present situation are far more difficult to use. They can be used only in closed areas, such as the Falklands War in 1982, and in situations where the public and the media view the crisis as so dangerous that they are willing to accept exceptional methods as a condition and price for a military success. The political risks of cover-ups and lying are always very high, though, and successful propaganda does not even need them. What is more important is to choose, stress and interpret the information.

Naturally the national and international legal status of a conflict also affects the potential for controlling publicity and the means available for that purpose. In the conditions of a state of emergency, the state leadership has at its disposal powerful oppressive and confining methods like censorship. In restricted conflicts and mili-

tary operations carried out without a declaration of war or with exceptional legal measures, the emphasis is on different persuasive methods. In clandestine operations, leaks and other means of 'black propaganda' where the source is not mentioned are important. Propaganda strategists can often base their activities on the assumption that journalists will support what is believed to be in the national interest, and it is sometimes possible to marginalize and stigmatize journalists who do not support state policy even in time of minor controversies.

There is also reason to remember that propaganda has never had as its target a homogeneous public relying on only one information source. When, for instance, the Italian central state was established in the 1860s and a project was launched to create an 'imagined community' and 'community in anonymity' (Anderson, 1991), which are essential in a nation-state, only 2% of the population spoke a language now known as Italian (Peltonen, 1996). Local ethnic, religious, class and professional identities were strong long into the 1900s, and they often transcended the borders of nation-states in the same way we now think the Net can make it possible to form virtual global communities and identities.

It is possible to claim that Western societies are at present in many senses far more homogeneous than in the period between the world wars. For instance the ideological differences between political parties are significantly lesser now, and political and economic values far more uniform. The influence of industry and multinational culture on commonly shared symbols is strong. The era of the Cold War globalized ideologies, and the rapid integration of the world economy has produced a new kind of globalization of values, possibly more extensive than ever before. The development has not been uniform, of course, nor has it abolished cultural differences, but it has made possible, say, a uniform worldwide marketing of consumer goods and entertainment. On the other hand, technological development has also made possible the development of local and regional media products and their wider distribution (Morley & Robins, 1995).

There are also grounds for scepticism in regard to the notion that the diversification of information sources would automatically limit propaganda's chances to function. The question is how diversified and many-sided these sources are in their contents, and also to what extent do people have at their disposal such mediating communities as the church, family, work collective or neighbourhood, where the meaning of the messages is localized and the interpretations discussed, denied and formulated to fit people's own sets of conceptions. The power of interpretative communities was evident, for instance, in the former socialist countries. The effect of the official propaganda – never mind how powerful and intensive – was often thwarted in fixed mutual networks of people discussing the information supplied and comparing it with other information available. Correspondingly, lack of networks can lead to a situation where the sender of propaganda meets his audience as if face to face.

There is also no reason to automatically adopt an era-centric conception that people in the early 1900s would have been less sceptical, more trusting and more childlike as receivers of mass communication messages than now. For instance, the nature of the press was previously openly political, and yet its messages were taken possibly with much more reservation than is now the case, when the press takes pride in its product image of objectivity and neutrality.

In the view of, for example, the modern PR industry, the relative independence of journalism is not a problem but a vital precondition for useful activity. The product image of independence and neutrality is the very feature that makes control of publicity through journalism very valuable. 'Free media', or positive journalistic publicity, is often cheaper and more effective than paid advertising, which a great part of the audience views with a certain suspicion anyway.

With a little cynicism, one could say that there is a hushed-up symbiosis between the journalism industry and public relations. Modern journalism could not survive without the raw material supplied to it, press releases, media events, interviews, background material, etc. – work which Oscar Gandy (1982) aptly calls 'information subsidies'. PR and other information activities lower the media's costs in obtaining information, and in return various organizations get their messages through in publicity. The media, of course, use a certain power and discretion in deciding who gets publicity and what kind of a journalistic form the message is given. The editing power of journalism can also lead to a negative or unwanted outcome in view of the PR source, but in the end that is only a price that occasionally has to be paid for the credibility of the system.

Propaganda can adapt itself also to an open and heterogeneous media system. All it has to do is to fully understand the source system of journalism, news criteria and generic conventions. It is important to attain a position as something readily at hand and available, to become an information source that is trusted and relied upon, to understand the interests and differences of the various media on the basis of their product differentiation, and to understand and make use of journalistic writing styles and work routines so that the message has the right timing and is given an eventful, visual, personalized, concise, slogan-like and drama-filled form. The diversity and immense scale of journalism means only that one's message must be modifiable to suit different generic formats, and the frequency of its repetition must be high enough. Changes in the reception of mass communication must be grasped fast, preferably in advance. A part of advertising, for instance, is already using self-irony and references to advertising's own history while aiming its message to an audience who have grown up with advertising and had it as a central cultural reference all their lives.

Modern Western journalism forms a diversified field where many discourses and interests compete. But this does not mean that a well-organized and systematic PR and information agent could not obtain therein an influential and elevated position as a source, with the ability to frequently, and using its own concepts, frame interpretations of history, the present situation and the future. Professional propaganda, advertising and public relations for large organizations work in a world of high-repetition frequencies and large audiences, where it is possible to create reciprocity between the intentions of the senders and chosen target audiences – their attitudes and decisions to buy or to vote – with such a predictability that it makes the activity profitable. The age of propaganda is not over.

2. Propaganda in power

According to many historical reviews of communication studies, propaganda was a dominant concept in the early period between the two world wars and contained, in addition to a supposition of direct and powerful effects of communication, a certain

conception of the nature of the modern society, a theory of mass society. Ruthless propagandists could 'orchestrate the sensibilities of rootless, volatile populations detached from traditional sources of information' (Robin et al., 1987: 2). According to a classical formulation by Harold D. Lasswell (1927: 220–221):

In the Great Society it is no longer possible to fuse the waywardness of individuals in the furnace of the war dance: a newer and subtler instrument must weld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass and hate and will and hope. A new flame must burn out the canker and temper the steel of bellicose enthusiasm. The name of this new hammer and anvil of social solidarity is propaganda.

According to Veikko Pietilä, the version of history based on the theory of mass society and immediate media effects is, however, a simplification constructed especially by the so-called US mass communication research (MCR) tradition. In fact, 'the thinking emphasising the propaganda power of the media represented only one strain among many others in the history of the field' (Pietilä, 1997: 39).


There are grounds, though, to see the period between the two world wars as the 'golden age of propaganda' if one focuses on the 'spirit of the time', for instance, on how mass communication was discussed by journalists, pioneers of advertising, writers of memoirs, political pundits and popularizers of science. Stuart Ewen (1996) who has studied the 'social history' of public relations emphasizes the chains of thoughts and concepts through which, for example, Gabriel Tarde's ideas stressing the new meaning and power of mass communication spread into the use of the early professionals of public relations, and through them to affect the actions of companies and journalists and their use of language.

According to Sproule, this group of people fascinated about the power of propaganda also included many scientists, sharing the spirit of more popular 'progressive propaganda critics' (Sproule, 1991: 217) like Upton Sinclair and Will Irwin:

During the decade after the Great War, academic writers not only reprised the propagandas of the war, but began to apply the concept of propaganda widely as a framework for social analysis. At the forefront of creating a scholarly paradigm were leading historians, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists who produced articles and books showing how the concept of propaganda applied to their various fields (Sproule, 1987: 65).

Notions of the power of propaganda were in the 1920s and 1930s were as commonplace as expressions like 'the information society' today. The term 'propaganda' was used in describing not only a certain form of mass communication, but a whole form of society and a system of international relations. Talk of an 'age of propaganda' was quite commonplace and the reference was in a wide variety of modern features which were seen as typical of the new century. (Sproule, 1987; 1989; 1991) To what extent this belief was connected in the USA with European ideas on mass society, like the theories of Gustave Le Bon, seems to be an issue of controversy among US historians of mass media studies (Carey, 1989b; Peters, 1989; Sproule, 1989). However, what united various scholars interested in the subject, including Walter Lippmann Robert E. Park, Herbert Blumer and John Dewey, was the concern about the possibility of genuine democracy in the new age.

The framework within which the notion of omnipotent propaganda became prevalent has possibly evolved in the following way: Research produces fledgling, interesting interpretations of a form of society in transition; these theories catch the attention of professionals dealing with popularization and applications of research; ideas that have received publicity rise to the agenda of, for instance, politics, administration and business life; resources are allocated to the study of these ideas; the funding, it is important to note, is not necessarily allocated according to the original research problems but instead to the popularized versions of them. This then, is the framework to which researchers must adapt their work:



This model would seem to help understand the process in which many of the themes of turn-of-the-century sociology concerning the Modern Era became banal during the first half of the century and were reduced to mere media-effect studies guided by the administration or business life.

The wide popularity of the propaganda theme between the world wars is probably best explained by history – the Great War, the wave of revolutions and fear of them all over Europe, the birth of new nation-states, advanced commercial and technological forms of communication, rapid urbanization and new forms of consuming and advertising linked with it, the birth of systems like Nazism and Soviet communism and anticipation of a new war.

Wherever one looked, the development of the world seemed significantly affected by propaganda, a systematic and organized persuasive communication aimed at mass audiences. Thus it is no wonder that the slogan of the time attained a prominent position also in the conceptual framework of communication studies developing at that time.

From the viewpoint of the present, it is difficult to understand how loose as constructions many of the European countries and the United States were on the eve of World War I. Taking one example, Britain took part in the Great War up to 1916 without obligatory conscription, and in the spirit of *laissez-faire* the government at first did not even intervene in gun and ammunitions production or in the securing of provisions. The prolonging of the war and the gradual exposure of its totalitarian nature, however, forced the British government to take control over new functions of society, and in 1918 it was finally time to establish an administration for the centralized guidance of propaganda and public opinion. For the previous four years of the war, propaganda work had been dealt with by voluntary organizations and newspapers, albeit under strict supervision and censorship guidelines. (Haste, 1995: 124)

A part of the political mythology of the time was the notion that the *Entente* defeated Germany with help of its propaganda machinery, that Britain and France managed to persuade the United States to participate in the war and, with the help of massive propaganda measures, broke the moral backbone of the German home

front. This line of thought was spread especially by leading representatives of the German military and right-wing politicians. For them it was a safe explanation for the defeat (Hitler, 1938; Thimme, 1932). In reality, propaganda does not seem to have been 'a decisive weapon'. The propaganda of the *Entente* did not to a great extent reach the heartland of Germany, and its main target was not in the first place Germany but Austria–Hungary. Besides, nor were the propaganda activities of the Germans completely unprofessional or ineffective (Kunczik, 1994; 1997; Wilke, 1994). However, a widespread belief in the power of propaganda motivated a large group of writers to describe and partly analyse the propaganda measures of World War I (Lasswell, 1927; Lutz, 1933).

Germany and Russia were not the only countries to experience serious social and political unrest during and after World War I. In the United States people lived through years of 'Red Scare', where political discussion was characterized by the possibility and threat of a revolution. On both sides of the political frontlines, mass communication and propaganda became central themes (Knightley, 1982: 121–154). For instance, in a fierce critique of the press, Upton Sinclair's *The Brass Check* of 1919, the capitalist press was seen as unscrupulously manipulating the rootless, uneducated population of the cities who 'accepted every word they read in it, both news-columns and the editorial page, precisely as they accepted the doctor's pills and the clergyman's sermons, the Bible and the multiplication table' (Sinclair, 1989: 141).

World War I had significantly consolidated the administrative structures of the European states and brought with it a whole new level of institutional integration of economy, culture and administration. Even the United States had its 'First Propaganda Ministry' when the Committee of Public Information (CPI) was established in 1917 (Jackall & Hirota, 1995). The notion of centralized guidance of public opinion by the state was quite foreign to US political thinking, and the CPI's activities were suspended until the Roosevelt administration began strongly marketing its New Deal projects (Ewen, 1996: 247–287; Kelley, 1956: 14–15).

In Europe, the new nation-states born after the war promoted national consciousness and identity with methodical programmes where propaganda had a prominent position. A state-led information activity – the guiding of education and mass communication along the lines of national aims and ideals – also became accepted practice in countries like Britain and France. In Soviet Russia, this activity was raised to a level quite of its own, and Russian models of state propaganda were copied by Italian Fascists, German National Socialists and in other European countries with authoritarian governments.

Even in the most totalitarian countries, though, the development was not simple. Goebbels had to fight long to break the independence of the German press, the press he characterized 'as an exponent of the liberal spirit, the product and instrument of the French revolution' (Zeman, 1995: 186). Instead, according to Goebbels, the radio was by its basic nature an authoritarian medium and thus most suitable for propaganda purposes (*ibid.*). In the Soviet Union the take-over of the propaganda machinery was not a simple process either but an instrument in, and a consequence of, the struggle where Stalinism gradually eliminated other fractions of the Party. (Kivinen, 1998)

In the United States the power and influence of the popular press, films 'detrimental to the youth' and commercial advertising began receiving growing attention

(Lowery & DeFleur, 1988: 31–54). The development was connected with rapid urbanization, consumer capitalism and the growth of a literate mass audience. Because of production growth and a need for new markets, the business world was spurred to increased advertising and information activity. There was also a need to overcome the political and everyday prejudices concerning industrial capitalism and to fight the progressive critique levied against it in the ‘muckraking era’. An effort to block legislation against monopolization and laws for more consumer protection were also among the objectives. One of the main motives for the growth of PR activities by companies from the beginning of the century to the 1950s was a political need to affect the negative attitudes towards the business world which were especially strengthened in the years of the Great Depression (Ewen, 1996; Kelley, 1956: 12–13; Sproule, 1991: 212).

In addition to the press and movie industry, the new way of life gave impetus also to the business and research of advertising, marketing and public relations. With the development of mass markets, companies were faced with new needs. They had to reach the buying public and know as exactly as possible ‘what their stockholders, their markets, and the general community wanted’ (Newsome et al., 1993: 46). World War I was indeed followed by a surge of information departments, press offices, PR companies and advertising agencies. The producers of consumer goods were not the only customers: churches, trade unions, politicians, local authorities and various civic organizations also began increasingly investing in marketing and PR. (ibid.: 46–47)

Marketing and image building of the companies were supported by the tools of the scientific knowledge of the time, especially opinion polls and (social) psychological testing. In addition to the advertisers themselves, commercial radio stations also needed research data to help them sell their airtime. At the same time, training was launched within the profession. Academic education in marketing was started in the beginning of the 1910s, and courses in PR were given in the beginning of the 1920s (Ewen, 1996: 182, 197; Kelley, 1956: 27).

In the mid 1930s intimations of a new war began to hang heavy in the air in both European and US publicity. Means of military propaganda which had been developed during World War I were looked at from a new angle, not just as history but as a basis for the further development of information activities. In countries like Britain and the United States where the wartime propaganda organs – largely based on the cooperation between the press and security authorities – had been dismantled under a general demobilization, these networks were re-activated. With advancing mobilization, a new group of specialists – communication researchers – was drawn in, particularly in the United States.

The threat of war forced the researchers to face moral choices. Is the task of researchers to unravel the mechanisms of propaganda and help people to resist its means? All in all, the memories of the war propaganda of World War I were gloomy: a hollow heroism of the war and horror stories which later to a large extent had been proven false. Was there reason to support war propaganda in any of its forms? Or were there situations where it was possible to assist in developing, for instance, counter-propaganda, when the world and the nation were threatened by an enemy like Nazism, unscrupulously exploiting propaganda? Or does the researcher simply have to accept that propaganda is necessary for a rational coordination of functions

of the modern society, not only in times of crisis but also in peacetime, and that the researcher has to put his talents to the use of rational propaganda, as Harold D. Lasswell suggested in 1934? (Lasswell, 1995). According to Ewen (1996), a major conceptual watershed was whether people were seen as a rational democratic community (public) or as a crowd, guided by emotions and images (and in need of directing) – or in which kind of social situations people behaved like a mass or like a public.

Answers to these questions were to mould and affect in a significant manner the whole research of mass media being born at the time.

3. Now you see it – now you don't

Some writers of mass communication history have paid attention to the suddenness with which propaganda in the 1950s lost its position among concepts used in mass communication studies (e.g. Cmiel, 1996; Simpson, 1993). Even different editions of the same book could change their name: *International Propaganda and Psychological Warfare*, published in 1952, carried the name *International Communication and Political Opinion* in the 1956 edition. Christopher Simpson (1993: 335–340) rounds things up:

There is something interesting happening in the rhetoric of the field of communication research [in the 1950s]. The presentation of this work has taken a strong aroma of 'science', 'objectivity', and 'professionalism'. The values and many of the political preconceptions of the psychological warfare projects are being absorbed into new, 'scientificized' presentations of communication theory that tended to conceal the prejudices of the early 1950s programs under a new coat of 'objective' rhetoric. Basic terms in the field began to change. Terms such as propaganda and psychological warfare fell out of favor.

A similar change took place also in professional literature of advertising and PR. In the beginning of the 1950s it was still natural to use concepts like 'business propaganda programmes', 'professional propagandists', 'propaganda of business, government and political parties', 'propaganda services' and 'propaganda practices' (Kelley, 1956). In a few years they disappeared, however, and were replaced by concepts like 'press agency', 'promotion', 'public affairs', 'publicity', 'advertising', 'marketing', 'merchandising' and 'public relations'.

Together with a general invasion in Europe of US communication research, social studies and marketing methods, the source of this change was also in the United States, from where the new conceptual winds blew. When a delegation of Finnish PR men visited England in 1952, one of the participants wrote in the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*:

In distinction from transmitting unbiased facts, the practice of transmitting biased facts directly under the supervision of the government is called propaganda. This word and the activities it refers to have a decidedly negative ring to them, and in the American fashion, the use of it for describing neutral public relations, information and education activities must absolutely be avoided. (Laine, 1952: 17) ²

Because of the strong influence of the United States there is cause for examining the development of US communication studies since the beginning of World War II to the 1950s. The discussion and development which took place among a group of leading researchers, the Communication Group, gathered together under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation in the years 1939–40, seems especially important. The Rockefeller Foundation worked in cooperation with the defence and security organs of the United States with the aim of preparing the country's propaganda machinery for a war which seemed inevitable. After the outbreak of the war, the foundation receded into the background and the government started funding the research directly (Gary, 1996).

According to Brett Gary (*ibid.*: 129) there were tensions among the mass media researchers in their relation to serving the state and concerning the nature of democracy. Some of them stressed the critical and independent role of intellectuals and cautioned against taking to undemocratic means, even in defence of democracy. The danger was to glide the 'slippery slope towards authoritarianism'. Led by Harold D. Lasswell, state-oriented (or policy-oriented) researchers criticized such a democratic romanticism and emphasized the role of intellectuals as an elite guiding politics. Because the capacity of the masses for rational decisionmaking was limited, democracy was not defended by mere words but by research guiding the administration in rationality and effectiveness. Under a threat like Nazism, the researchers had to put their talents into the use of the state and its security organs.

The intensive discussions and seminars of the Rockefeller Foundation ended in the victory of Lasswell and his supporters, and from among them rose the figures who during the war led an extensive state-run research programme and who after the war were recruited as directors and professors at new media departments and research institutes.

The outcome of the ethical arm-twisting also had consequences for the object of study. Perhaps the most powerful 'brass check' in mass media research was created within the Communication Group: 'who, and with what intentions, said what, to whom, and with what effects'. The main object of research was cemented to the effects of mass communication. According to Gary (*ibid.*: 138), 'the who-said-what-to-whom model indicates ... refusal to ask the kinds of questions Lippmann and Dewey raised about the larger implications of mass communication for democracy, or public discussion, or epistemology'. It was the political agenda that set the intellectual one, and thus a theoretical framework was born where there was a built-in technocratic role for the researchers. The ethos of this was crystallized by a functionary at the Rockefeller Foundation, John Marshall, in as early as 1940:

In a period of emergency such as I believe we now face, the manipulation of public opinion to meet emergency needs has to be taken for granted. In such a period, those in control must shape public opinion to support courses of action which the emergency necessitates. (Gary, 1996: 139)

The outbreak of World War II dispelled what was left of the moral scruples. Just like World War I had induced leading sociologists and historians to propaganda work, the bells now tolled for specialists of mass communication. The research projects, their results and professionalization, later known under the name of MCR tradition, the academic institutionalization and expansion of mass communication studies in the years 1945–55 – all these developments are familiar parts of the history of mass

communication research, perhaps even the best explored and most intensively debated parts of it.

With our present purposes in mind, an observation by Simpson (1993) is of utmost importance. In the decade that followed World War II, the defence and intelligence authorities of the United States were still significantly funding the research related to persuasive communication, advertising, interrogation methods, public opinion polls, propagating ideologies and the like. Over 96% of the funding provided by the federal government to social sciences came in fact from the defence sector. At least half a dozen main centres of mass communication research were fully dependent on research contracts with the security authorities. According to Simpson, 'their reliance on psychological warfare money was so exclusive as to suggest clearly that the crystallization of mass communication research into a distinct scholarly field would not have come about during the 1950s without substantial military, CIA, and USIA intervention' (Simpson, 1993: 331).

The cause for the flow of money was the changed foreign policy and defence doctrine of the United States. The period of isolationism was over and, for the first time, the United States aimed at safeguarding and promoting its interests globally. The rapid shift from the world war into the Cold War by no means diminished the importance of mass media research. On the contrary, it emphasized it further. In the Cold War, propaganda and psychological warfare were no longer only in a supporting role in comparison to material operations. Instead, they were the essential form of warfare. The battle was no longer fought over a piece of land but was now waged, with words and pictures, over the minds of people, both at home and around the world.

The fears and political reactions to the threat of nuclear war and accelerating nuclear arms build-up were a special problem. The Federal Civil Defense Administration created a dense network of military personnel, researchers and media, whose aim, apart from 'selling' security policy based on nuclear arms, was also to manipulate the frames and everyday concepts which people used while pondering the notion of total destruction. It was essential to turn a political problem into a psychological one: the real danger was not the Russian nuclear weapons but the fear Americans felt for them. With rational action and preparation, it was possible to survive a nuclear war (Oakes, 1995: 279).

The integration of the community of mass media researchers in the machinery of defence was a part in the development of the 'security state' which characterized the Cold War era. It was a continuation of the process which had started in World War I regarding total war because the security state had not been demobilized but instead continuously improved its level of military arms build-up and integrated ever more forms of culture and social life under the military logic. Different sectors of culture, such as education, art and mass communication, became 'a part of psychological battle arsenal', and not only in the strategy papers of the military and the defence administration. For instance, the development of Soviet nuclear and space technology caused in the United States an immediate need to intensify education and research, and in this process those working within cultural institutions also began to partly conceptualize their own work in military terms. The corresponding development in the Soviet Union was even more comprehensive.

In this situation there were many reasons for the United States to abandon the terms of propaganda and psychological warfare as something describing its own actions.

The image-profiling of all US information activities was essential. It was carried out by political and administrative measures under which a more important position was assigned to careful naming of various activities than previously. The terms chosen were based on the adopted strategic thinking but also on opinion polls, surveys and public discussion. Because propaganda was already connected with images of war, authoritarian government and a concept of people as a 'brainless herd', that term was reserved for describing the information activities of the enemy. Only the communists engaged in propaganda. In contrast, the United States merely informed, provided facts for the use of individuals who were capable of thinking and independent decisionmaking. This official conceptual distinction began to stress and strengthen the pejorative tones connected with the term propaganda even more than before.

Interestingly, the conceptual reform resembled the process whereby the United States chose the demonization of Saddam Hussein as its central theme in the Gulf War in 1990–91. Opinion polls and small group studies conducted by the PR company Hill & Knowlton showed that the US public was not very interested in liberating Kuwait or in the rights of small nations. However, the image of Saddam, although the public had a rather vague idea about him, was bad already, and on this a successful campaign could be built (Manheim, 1994).

In the Cold War the United States adopted the strategy of emphasizing that its own social model was based on human nature and on an order ordained as normal by God, be it in a question of family values or private ownership. Soviet communism in turn was something exceptional and artificial, perverted and against the natural God-ordained order of things. Correspondingly, the whole imagery used by US information services – linguistic and otherwise – was brimming with expressions linking the United States with everything that was normal, common, natural and objective. Therefore, all concepts describing one's own activities were to be as neutral as possible.

Connected to the same process was also the dramatic change of image of the US corporate and business community from a subject of controversy dividing the nation politically into an embodiment of the nation's values. This was a consequence of information activities, changes in political values and the real growth of general well-being in the country, but also due to the official foreign policy. One significant trump card in the global information war was the country's very prosperity and well-being, the model of the consumption-oriented 'American way of life'.

This integration of political and economic values – the turning of marketing and advertising into an official state ideology – was accelerated by the development which Andrew Wernick (1991) has called the penetration of commercial persuasive logic into all areas of social action. The promotional culture's ways of action expanded and became so natural that it was not wanted – or seen as expedient – to describe them with the term propaganda, a concept in a process of marginalization and increasingly referring only to a very exceptional form of communication. A tradition of its own in mass communication research was developed in academic institutions of economic and business education. It took the paymaster-oriented ethics of advertising, marketing and information activities as a given starting-point.

Like the mass media research integrated in state, army and intelligence organs, the market-affiliated research also adopted the use of the 'neutral' and partly euphemistic conceptual toolbox.

The third factor to erode and diminish the popularity of the concept of propaganda was connected with the central role of popular culture in the information policy of the United States. In particular, the power of the United States lay in the movie and television industries which had developed there first. In a speech held in 1961 while he was still representing Hollywood, Ronald Reagan said:

Whatever the shortcomings, Hollywood has achieved a great deal. In the finest traditions of free enterprise, 70 percent of the playing time of all screens of the world had been captured by the output of the American film capital. You may disagree sometimes with our 'boy meets girl' plot, but all over the world our pictures were a window through which less fortunate humans had a glimpse of freedom and our material comforts as well. The men in the Kremlin wanted this propaganda medium for their own destructive purposes. (Reagan, 1983: 21-22)

In contrast to the heavy, dreary, grey and theoretic Marxist propaganda, there was the seemingly non-political and entertaining US movie and TV industry. While the foreign information system of the Soviet Union was largely based on official, centralized and top-steered campaigning, the US choice was a cooperation with the private media industry and the promoting of one's own interests as a part of commercial marketing of news and entertainment products (MacDonald, 1985). Even if the United States also invested significantly in official information activities, the most prominent position was reserved for products of the cultural industry. These were to avoid the usual tell-tale signs and labels of propaganda.

As Christopher Simpson (1993) has said, the themes of propaganda and psychological warfare lived under the cover of the seemingly neutral and universal agenda of the mass communication research of the time, only as if camouflaged in new battle surroundings. Gradually, however, they began to lose both their institutional and intellectual basis. In particular, empirical media effect studies of the MCR school got into trouble and were replaced with new approaches, such as agenda setting and information processing theories. The problems did not only stem from intellectual cul-de-sacs but also had their causes in the dissatisfaction of the authorities applying the results.

While shifting to global information activities, the authorities and mass media researchers of the United States met quickly with problems of cultural differences. These problems were especially daunting in countries in the process of decolonization, where the United States and the Soviet Union fought over the political direction that would be taken by the new nations. The traditional methods of propaganda proved limited in their effect when there were various barriers of religion, language and history to overcome.

The failures affected policies so that the relative weight of economic, military and diplomatic means grew in relation to propaganda and other information activities. In foreign cultures, the language of money and violence seemed to talk loudest; the politics of material and symbolical means had at least to be carefully synchronized. The change also had its effects on research, which was directed more and more towards the complex problems of effects, especially problems of intercultural

communication, and support from the security organs was reduced. The experiences of the war in Vietnam guided the Pentagon's attention to the problems of handling the domestic media. The most famous example of this development work was the control of publicity during the Gulf War in 1990–91.

Propaganda was gone; new concepts sprung up. The problems of media effects did not vanish as such, but their approaches expanded to study the whole 'ideological environment', especially how mass communication makes natural certain ways of construing and conceptualizing various social phenomena and the relationships between them (see, for example, Hall, 1982: 65; MacQuail, 1994: 330–331).

Is it worthwhile to miss propaganda? The narrowing of the area covered by the concept has partly been expedient, because when the mass communication research expanded the term in a way 'choked' as a general term for mass communication. The development could be seen in the early 1950s in textbooks, theoretical presentations and bibliographies, where under the heading of propaganda just about any questions relating to mass communication and society could pop up (Ellul, 1969; Lasswell et al., 1969; Smith et al., 1946; Katz et al., 1954) When all was propaganda and propaganda was everywhere, the concept understandably had to get a more defined content.

On the other hand, research methods and theories developed and diversified rapidly in the 1940s. The non-empirical and non-theoretical, essayist tradition of propaganda studies carried out between the world wars satisfied neither the demands of commercial and administrative sponsors of research nor the needs of the new generation of scholars who wanted to increase the scientific status of social science in general and media studies in particular. More exact facts and more elaborated theories were demanded instead of the partly anecdotal case-studies which were common in the 'old' propaganda studies. The 'frail old man' was replaced by young and fresh newcomers with new concepts (Sproule, 1987: 68–75).

However, it can be said that the joint force of external and internal currents in research drove propaganda into a corner. Methodical persuasive communication on a mass scale has not vanished from anywhere in the world, and as a term propaganda might be useful in describing a certain form of intensity and systematic. The interests and the methods of the sender are still relevant problems.

Therefore one can but delight at old die-hards like Noam Chomsky who still doggedly speak about, among other things, 'state propaganda' or 'PR-propaganda' (Chomsky, 1997). Chomsky is consistent and true to his programme of eradicating double standards: the same concepts must be used for the same things, regardless of whether it is us, our allies or the enemy who is using them. The new direction given to the concept of propaganda in the 1950s was creating a double standard if anything ever was, and therefore it is only consistent that Chomsky should use the same terms that were reserved for the enemy countries when speaking of the information activities of his homeland.

The study of propaganda's conceptual history can be useful at least because it tells something about the density of interaction between the intellectual agenda of research and external factors.

4. Studying propaganda

The present, perhaps marginalized study of propaganda has been a meeting place of many disciplines, e.g. sociology, political science, psychology, mass communication, semiotics and historical studies. The results have been applied by professionals of advertising, politics and war.

In this connection it is neither necessary nor possible to go through all theories, models and results of propaganda studies. I settle with one, relatively simple approach: How is it possible amidst the flow of mass communication dealing with conflicts and wars, especially in journalism, to discern features indicating underlying methodical, organized efforts to influence – in short, propaganda? I act in the spirit of the short-lived but influential Institute for Propaganda Analysis (Sproule, 1991: 219), established in 1937, in whose most famous 1937 article, 'How to Detect Propaganda', the means of propaganda are described in the following way:

they tie into emotions that sway us to be 'for' or 'against' nations, races, religions, ideals, economic and political policies and practices, and so on through automobiles, cigarettes, radios, toothpastes, presidents and wars. With our emotions stirred, it may be fun to be fooled by these propaganda devices, but it is more fun and infinitely more in our interests to know how they work. (Jackall, 1995: 217)

My aim, however, stretches further than revealing rhetoric devices and elements designed to appeal to emotions. We need to examine the instruments of analysis with which research can systematically explore, for instance, to what extent reporting of a particular conflict has been carried out in accordance with journalism's own professional and ethical principles, and to what extent it has been affected by the aspirations of the parties to the conflict. My motives are also more serious than intellectual fun or anybody's particular interests. Control over message flows of mass communication is in modern conflicts an integral part of the strategic and operative action of armies and governments. Our capacity to analyse this activity can affect how we construe and understand various conflicts, and how we in general evaluate the use of military power as a means of solving national and international conflicts.

According to the model to be used here (Luostarinen, 1986; 1994a), propaganda texts have three typical distinctive features: harmonization of the referential levels of the text, motivating logic of the texts and polarization of identification suggestions.³

4.1. Harmonization of referential levels

It is typical that in propaganda texts the depictions of the conflict's various referential levels have been harmonized. By referential levels I mean, for instance, (a) concrete descriptions of topical events, daily military operations, diplomatic measures, etc., (b) contextualizing representations concerning the constellation, birth and development of the conflict, and (c) descriptions of mythical or religious levels of the conflict. The different levels support each other. A classic example is the often recurring theme in war propaganda about the killing of a priest or a nun (level a). On the level of the conflict's constellation (level b) the concrete killing is interpreted as an example of the barbaric aggressiveness of the enemy which is the very root and cause of the war. On the mythical and religious level (level c), the killing lends credibility to the idea that we are fighting for God and the enemy is the advocate of

the devil. The argument works both ways: the enemy kills a nun, therefore it is godless; because the enemy is godless, it kills nuns.

The harmonization of the referential levels leads to texts which seemingly and at the surface are often heterogeneous but which in their structures repeat with high frequency the themes which have been chosen for the core message of the propaganda. Among the various concrete events in war and politics, the ones that fit the messages of levels (b) and (c) are chosen in representations. A fully perfect harmonization is not always the aim because a modicum of incoherence may lend an air of neutrality, spontaneity and credibility to the text.

The emphasis in the referential levels seems to be connected with the war situation in the way that in a victorious situation level (a) is emphasized; in a stagnation phase, level (b); and when defeat is imminent, level (c). When, for instance, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, its propaganda stressed in the initial attacking phase of the war the description of concrete events on the front. The propaganda effect of this was sufficient as far as the attack proceeded favourably. When the onslaught came to a halt and the fortunes of war started shifting in 1942, Germany started to emphasize the overall constellation of the fight and claim it to be advantageous to itself: the Soviet Union had lost so much of its raw materials, soldiers and production capacity that it could no longer defeat the expanded Germany. After the defeat at Stalingrad and when the front began to move towards Germany's own borders, the stress in propaganda was shifted to the saving of European civilization and Germany from the barbaric, swarming hordes of the East.

It is possible to analyse the harmonization of texts for instance with various applications of myth analysis or discourse analysis. One application is to analyse first the official information of the parties of the conflicts in order to find the essential themes and expressions of levels (b) and (c). In the example of the German attack, on the part of Germany the following opposites describing the Germans and their enemy emerge as themes:

Naturalness – Perversion

Strength – Weakness

Purity – Filthiness

Higher race – Lower races

German people – Jews, Slavs

Success of Germany – Conspiracies against it

National Socialism – Bolshevism

Attack planned by the Soviet Union – Pre-emptive strike of Germany

Mighty war machine of Germany – A ragged Red Army on clay feet, etc.

When news texts are taken up for study, the chosen central themes of levels (b) and (c) must be dissolved in potential concrete narratives, in this case to the event and argumentation structures of the news and the opinion column. The question to ask

is: in which concrete fashion can the interpretations of myths and the constellation of the crisis be told? Correspondingly, what kind of concrete news and commentaries would take another direction – would, for instance, defend weakness? When this model of potentially harmonized referential levels is compared to the narratives of the texts under scrutiny, conclusions can be made about eventual coherence.

According to the professional and ethical principles of journalism, concrete news should be independent from contextualizing and mythical interpretations given by the various parties to a conflict. If analysis reveals harmonization in the contextual and mythical suggestions of some of the parties, there is reason to suspect presence of propaganda or a strong attachment on the part of the journalist to the views of one of the parties.

4.2. Motivating logic

From the military point of view, war propaganda is a non-material method of warfare based on voluntarism. The aim of it is to affect the fighting motivation of one's own troops and civilians positively, to affect enemy troops and civilians negatively, and to affect outside actors in the conflict, like states or international organizations, in a way to make them support one's own objectives (Lasswell, 1927).

Non-materiality refers to symbol-mediated communication and voluntarism to the willingness of the receivers of propaganda to act on their own accord and intentionally comply with the aims of propaganda. In democratic countries it is not possible to wage war without an extensive political acceptance and cooperation of the people and without a broadly shared feeling that the war is inevitable and socially and individually worth the eventual sacrifices.

Two specifications must be made in this definition. On one hand, communication lacking the element of voluntarism can also be linked with war, as, for instance, in a public order notifying that all civilians found collaborating with the enemy will be executed. On the other hand, some of the material actions of warfare are meant above all to have a communicative effect, to function as 'propaganda of the deed'. A typical example of this kind of propaganda is the Iraqi missile strikes against Israel in the Gulf War of 1991. These did not have a military purpose but were used to communicate the force of Iraq to the Arab world and to try to drag Israel in the war, a development which would have turned the political constellation of the conflict more towards Iraq's favour.

Because the primary target of propaganda is the intentions of people, its argumentation is typically motivating in a variety of ways. For the domestic population, the aim is to motivate to action and approval of the actions of the military leadership. In terms of the enemy, the aim is to encourage resistance against their own leaders and to promote defeatism and passivity. For third parties, the goal is to ensure acceptance and support for one's own views. The most demanding targets are one's own soldiers, who must be motivated to sacrifice their own freedom, health, and even life.

A certain balance between fear and trust is important. If the enemy is portrayed as too strong and dangerous, the reaction could be defeatist. If the enemy is portrayed as an insignificant opponent, the result might be passivity and indifference.

If we think about the situation from the viewpoint of the receivers of the propaganda, at least three factors are at play in their decision to act voluntarily for the

objectives imposed on them by propaganda. These are: a conception of the past, a conception about the present situation and a conception about the future. The action or acceptance of propaganda's suggestions is estimated in relation to these views and one's own values. Propaganda tries to affect these very things. In many cases it is not a question of downright exhortation or imperatives to act in a certain fashion or avoid acting in some other, but of an attempt to frame the interpretation of the situation so that action or approval seems like a rational decision both in view of one's own values and in view of rationality in general. The purpose of the framing and limiting of the alternatives is that the recipients then make the decisions themselves and, with that, commit to acting accordingly.

The concept of the past offered by war propaganda is conflict-oriented and partly saturated by a military world of values (faithfulness, self-sacrifice, bravery). Typically it contains the following elements: the justification and necessity of the use of military force in certain historical situations, willingness for peace and the well-meaning nature of the actions of one's own country through history; also it includes decisiveness and ability to reciprocate external aggression, the historical dangerousness of the enemy, the aggressiveness and arms build-up of the enemy, and the inevitability of the conflict because of these. To a reconstruction of history may also belong a perception of an arch-enemy or a fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism which must be solved sooner or later. All decisionmaking is to some extent based on a conception of what the teachings of the past are and what kind of forces guide history.

In the interpretations of the present situation, propaganda has three typical features: (a) There is an effort to guide the interpretation with strong and slogan-like appellations, concepts and metaphors which give a package-like crystallization of the basis of the conflict. The faster and clearer the crisis can be conceptualized, the better chances the crystallizations have to gain a dominating and naturalized position, especially in media discourse. Crude examples of this, for instance, are the names the United States has given to its various interventions: 'Urgent Fury' (Grenada), 'Just Cause' (Panama) and 'Restore Hope' (Somalia). (b) There is an attempt to direct, confine and compromise alternative perspectives concerning the interpretation of the situation. Efforts at directing perspectives mean favouring some of them; confining means the ignoring of certain viewpoints; compromising stands for representing certain viewpoints considered detrimental in a way which causes them to be conceptualized in a disparaging, depreciating fashion. They can also be shown to be tied to the interests of the enemy, or some other moral or cognitive flaw can be pointed out. A typical example of the latter is the branding of peace movements and peace groups as strange, marginal groups, as the fifth columnists of the enemy or as amateurish as far as their knowledge of military matters is concerned. (c) The situation is interpreted as one absolutely calling for action right now; if things are delayed, the moment has been lost for good.

The chosen and suggested perspective is usually supported with information appearing as exact as possible and with various representations whose reference to reality the public has grown to think as direct and genuine. Therefore, in a war situation, the material most intensively used and manipulated is often statistics and other claims based on figures, together with photographs, news films and so-called hard news.

The future is typically presented in propaganda as two polarized options: Our fight is a wall or a barrier protecting our values, traditions, community, family and property against the threatening attack of the enemy. The struggle is also a bridge, taking us over to a better world and future. With our victory we shall create a new order with peace and justice.

For instance in the official information activities of the United States before and during the Gulf War in 1991, this motivation logic was given the following form: (a) The past: The appeasement policy towards Adolf Hitler caused World War II and a catastrophe. If Hitler had been stopped early enough, the war could have been avoided. The same goes with Saddam Hussein. If he is not stopped now, after the invasion of Kuwait, he will expand his attack to the whole Persian Gulf area. References to earlier cruelties of the Iraqi government were numerous. (b) The present: Desert Shield and Desert Storm implied protection and power. Many possible interpretative frames – such as the former cooperation between the United States and Iraq and the economic and military interests of the United States – were mostly ignored. The time of the collapse of socialism and the triumph of democracy was said to be just the right moment to restore the position of the UN and show terrorist states that no gains could be attained through violence. Economic sanctions would work too slowly: while the world was waiting, Iraq might get its nuclear weapon ready or attack with chemical weapons. (c) After the war, a New World Order would be established where it would not be allowed to trample over the rights of small nations and where the rules of international justice would be respected. The alternative scenario is the world's oil reserves ending under the control of a nuclear-armed Iraq: dictators everywhere would be encouraged.

The motivation logic differs from the ideal ethical and professional rules of journalism, according to which the task of journalism is to describe events as independently and from as many sides as possible, and to leave the conclusions to the public's own judgement. It is possible to examine the amount of motivation logic in journalistic texts with various tools of textual analysis, for instance by drawing a map of alternative and potential interpretations of the conflict (its history, present and future) and by comparing the contents of journalism to it. If journalism appears as imperative, narrow in its picture of history and interpretation perspective, and offers solution models without any reference to other choices possibly available, presents menacing threat images, promises much or uses conceptualizations and slogans of only the other party of the conflict, there is cause for suspecting propaganda.

4.3. Polarization of identification suggestions

It is typical to war propaganda that it tries to utilize the feeling of communality and solidarity created by a conflict. A crisis situation offers a chance for action (discussion, helping, carrying symbols, etc.) which produces a feeling of communality and social usefulness and removes feelings of alienation (Durkheim, 1968). Commercial exploitation of these emotions belongs to the tradition of a certain kind of journalism: for instance, during the Gulf War the British tabloid *The Sun* published on its front page a picture of the Union Jack with a soldier's face embedded in it, and told the readers to pin it up in a visible place as a sign of support for the war. The emotions of communality may be also be supported, for example, by opinion polls

with expediently devised questions and interpretations which show a large support for the military leadership.

People's identities are often formed of many aspects (citizenship of a state, ethnic group, language, religion, gender, class, etc.) Propaganda tries to affect these identity structures so that people prioritize the identity of the unit at war (state, ethnic group and the like) over others. It is typical to show that interests connected to all other identity aspects depend on the military success, and that the enemy threatens them all. In the words of an old German phrase: *'Was nutzt uns die beste Sozialpolitik, wenn die Kossakken kommen'* [What is the use of the best social policy when the Cossacks come]. In the complicated networks of values, 'super values' are looked for, whose preservation calls for the fulfilment of other value goals. Also the moulding and 'communalization' of everyday value structures connected with killing and dying and visible rewarding of killing the enemy are essential, as is ceremonial collectivization of the death of one's own soldiers. The worth of the individual is linked to a social significance which transcends death.

Other means used by propaganda include: emphasizing social conceptions of the sacred and profane, extensive use of unifying symbols, utilization of authorities, a sharp distinction between communally functional and dysfunctional action, the creation of enemy images and the offering of positive objects of identification. It is also common to see a strong polarization of identification suggestions and sharp distinctions between good and bad, useful and detrimental, and between what is acceptable and what is to be rejected.

War propaganda examines carefully the values and things held sacred or profane by each target group and tries to link everything sacred to one's own action and all that is profane to the enemy. One's own warfare, for example, is always clean and based on the highest of values. This leads often to 'purposive eclecticism', because profane things in particular do not often form any logical entities. When the United States for instance, supported the war against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government, it accused the Nicaraguan leadership of internal dictatorship, of destroying US youth through drug-trafficking, of connections with organized crime, of supporting terrorism and of hatching plans to attack the United States across all of Central America. In the German propaganda of World War II, an important position was reserved for the idea that Jews, communists and 'plutocrats' with their financial power had joined forces in a conspiracy to destroy the German people. In both cases the question was primarily about an effort to associate the enemy with a wide variety of different things the public was thought to hate or at least to view as profane. It is fairly common also to see an effort to connect the enemy with very mundane qualities of the profane like filthiness, eating dirty foods, a ridiculous or ragged appearance, boorish and uncultured behaviour, etc.

In its efforts to unite the community, war propaganda utilizes historical, institutional and other symbols. Typical examples are the flag and the national anthem. Also, fallen heroes of previous wars, noted national figures and personalities, nature symbolism and events in history are used to rouse and stir the pride. The reverence for these symbols is linked to one's own troops and their defamation with the enemy (or internal opponents of the war).

There is an attempt to back the official interpretations of the situation with sources that are as authoritative as possible, sources whose communal credibility is high. Because the social values of the people vary, it is expedient to simultaneously

use authorities connected with political, economic, academic and moral institutions: state, trades union and business leaders; industrialists; sportsmen; academic scholars; bishops; etc. It is important that persons representing different sexes, social classes, religions and various ethnic or linguistic communities are recruited to support the war.

Demonization of the enemy and ignoring its perspectives and interests, heroizing of ones own activities, a distinct division between communally functional and dysfunctional behaviour and positive role models (heroic soldiers, their parents and workers) are quite familiar, even self-evident means of war propaganda. From the viewpoint of journalism, they make appealing material because they offer strong contrasts and conflicts, human interest stories and swelling emotions.

The demonization of the enemy is usually carried out in a way that the target is the leadership of the enemy group and/or the ideology it stands for. A war is seldom waged against another nation or ordinary people or soldiers because this might create an identification bridge between populations where both sides identify themselves with 'ordinary people'. On the contrary, the purported aim is often in the very saving of the enemy population from the hands of leaders who are oppressing them and taking them towards a disaster.

It is possible to analyse journalistic texts by examining textually created in-groups and out-groups: who are we, who are the others, and what qualities have been attached to both groups and the relationships between them? It is possible to dissolve the texts into 'socio-dramas', to role and relationship constellations of people and groups functioning as actors and objects of action. In addition, portrayals of emotions (grief, pride, etc.) connected with the conflict can be identified. If the dissolving of the texts reveals a strong polarization between in-groups and the out-groups or reveals identification suggestions where some of the parties involved in the war have been prioritized over other parties and identification aspects, there is reason to suspect – once again – the presence of propaganda.

It is very important in this kind of research to focus on the processes of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts as well as on 'hot' phases of the war because the effect of mass communication is possibly at its highest in the early processes. War propaganda does not begin *ex nihilo* when the conflict breaks out but is often preceded by a prolonged process of cultural preparation comparable to material build-up. In addition, propaganda can also provide a significant counter-force and obstacle to efforts to defuse the crisis and restore the state of peace.

Notes

1. An exception to this use of language is the book *Propaganda*, a collection of writings, edited by Robert Jackall (1995), which deals also with advertising, public relations and political communication under this heading.
2. Only a year earlier a guide had been published on information activities in Finland with the simple title *Handbook of Propaganda* (Hakulinen, 1951).
3. The model is based on a secondary analysis of literature on PR and information activity and on analysis of two corpuses of primary material: a study on the writings of Finnish and German newspapers about the Soviet Union during World War II (Luostarinen, 1986) and a study of the British press during the Gulf War in 1991 (Luostarinen, 1994a). See also Luostarinen & Kempf, (2000: 334–355).

The Changing Role of the Media in Conflicts

From the Cold War to the Net Age

Heikki Luostarinen & Rune Ottosen

Our objective in this chapter is to illustrate the political, social, cultural and technological processes in which the media–military relationship takes its form. In this effort, we use two examples: the Cold War and the contemporary Net Age.

Each country has its own traditions when it comes to military–media relations. One challenge is to find out whether – or in what ways – a government, through the state apparatus, has developed a strategy for including the media in the planning process for psychological defence and for wartime conditions. We use the United States as an example, not only because of its military strength and activity, but also because it has been a model for military planning in many liberal democracies.

Our perspective is presented in a model for understanding the planning process of the military’s information policy within as broad a contextual framework as possible. Of course, this model cannot cover all aspects of media–military relations, but it might clarify the significance of earlier historical experience of war coverage and the complex demands of successful media management. For instance, technological innovations and the development of the professional ideology of journalism are not static phenomena, but things in constant change. Nor can journalists themselves be reduced to mere objects; they are an active and powerful part of an ongoing process within which the agenda of reporting is constantly negotiated and redefined.

1. The Cold War heritage

The Cold War changed the very concept of war. The previous ‘classical’ war, with its clear phases (preparations, fight, demilitarization, etc.), was replaced by a continuous arms race and multiple forms of conflict varying in scale and intensity. The fact that a massive nuclear war could break out (and be over) in a few hours made the challenge for psychological defence even more demanding than before the nuclear age. Both the military and the civilian populations should be maintained in high and persistent military preparedness for decades. In both superpowers, and to a lesser degree in their satellite and allied countries, a permanent atmosphere of crisis was created – an air of ‘impending catastrophe’ – to keep people ready for war. British historian Brian Harrison has pointed out that it is beyond our imagination how much

the Cold War shaped the institutions and lifestyle of our civilization after World War II: 'The Cold War shaped almost every aspect of ...life – from party politics and civil liberties to religion and the theatre, from overseas travel to relations between the generations and the sexes' (Harrison, 1997).

In his book *The Culture of the Cold War*, Stephen J. Whitfield describes from the American perspective the process in which 'the values and perceptions, the forms of expression, the symbolic patterns, the beliefs and myths that enabled Americans to make sense of reality' (1996: 10) were reshaped by the suspicious, politicized and militarized tendency:

For nearly half a century, the geopolitical contest between two superpowers haunted public life, pervading it so thoroughly that the national identity itself seemed to become disfigured. The Cold War defined the deepest fears and stirred the most disquieting anxieties, and its startling eclipse into the more conventional international rivalries of the 1990s requires an historical perspective (ibid.: 231).

The Cold War culture made the boundaries between war and peace very unclear and vague, and penetration of militarized logic into journalism in the bipolarized world was only one consequence of that development. The media were seen increasingly as a 'nonlethal asset' in the war, and almost every single piece of news – about national economic achievements, political problems or events in the Third World – could be interpreted as a small victory or loss in the propaganda war. All international and political communication could be used for the purposes of the Cold War, and even innocent-looking entertainment had potential ideological background and consequences. International news flow was a target of manipulation efforts in order to disseminate disinformation and hidden propaganda messages. Both superpowers aimed at global information dominance, not only just by using their own media outlets, but also by exploiting international organs, individual journalists and journalists' organizations.

Demands of war shaped cultural and political structures both in East and West. The 'security state' emphasized scientific and technological progress, and systematically organized production, social life and the unified mobilization of the masses under the flags of ideology and the state. Perhaps the most profound consequences of the 20th-century 'war culture' can not yet be seen: these are embedded in our distorted and restricted understanding of such things as democracy, progress, development, rationality and equality.

As a consequence of this war culture, the media and national defence organizations integrated in a way which compromised journalistic independence, and the dominance of military thinking distorted cultural and political perspectives in the media content.

The birth of the security state not only made peacetime governmental propaganda and public relations a self-evident fact of life, but it also prevented development towards a genuinely free press. The precondition of freedom of speech, it was said, was the military strength of the state; and the precondition of this strength was inner stability and patriotic unity. If the curiosity of the media collided with the state's interests in maintaining political and cultural order, the latter had always to be preferred. It was often claimed that political controversies at home could seriously harm the national interest, and that political intrigues should be covered by the media within a security framework and with appropriate loyalties and preferences.¹

In his book *Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis*, Robert Harris writes:

The episodes ...described in this book were not necessarily unique to the Falklands crisis. The instinctive secrecy of the military and the Civil Service; the prostitution and hysteria of sections of the press; the lies, the misinformation, the manipulation of public opinion by the authorities; the political intimidation of broadcasters; the ready connivance of the media at their own distortions ... all these occur as much in normal peace time in Britain as in war (Harris, 1983: 151).

It is possible to argue that these kinds of practices indicated a period of decay in terms of tolerance, civil rights and journalistic integrity, and were typical of the Cold War culture.² The same kind of tendency could be seen, for example, in Germany during the wave of terrorism in the 1970s. When Hanns Martin Schleyer was kidnapped in 1977, the West German media voluntarily accepted watertight self-censorship and cooperation with the authorities (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982: 97, 154–158). As Hocking (1992: 102) puts it, ‘the state’s integration of the media into this national security design is, perhaps, an unanticipated consequence of the generality of counterterrorism’.

The McCarthy period in the USA was the extreme example of the atmosphere of permanent suspicion and distrust. Serious violations against freedom of speech took place. The press, which in the beginning willingly helped McCarthy by providing a lot of publicity for his allegations and actively arranging local hunts for communists, eventually realized that it was creating a monster when McCarthy started to use congressional investigations to silence his critics in the press (Aronson, 1970).

It is important to notice that the new and dominant medium of the postwar media landscape, television, started to gather mass audiences in the middle of the Cold War, and its programming was politicized in order to fight against the enemy. Television was used openly for the purposes of psychological defence. According to MacDonald (1985) the whole US culture developed in a paranoid direction because television was used so extensively for military purposes (see also Hooper, 1988). Hollywood had close links with the Pentagon already during World War II, and cooperation continued, for example, in the form of joint productions such as *Green Berets* and *Top Gun*.

The same integration of the media and national defence took place in the Soviet Union, and was even more extensive, as a consequence of its totalitarian power structure. The Soviet military had a strong position in the decisionmaking apparatus, and the entire (public) culture and mass media remained permanently militarized.

In the Cold War atmosphere there was no room for dissidence in the East; nor, for that matter, was there a great deal of room for it in the West – for instance, the Western peace movement was often publicly labelled simply as the ‘fifth column’ of the Soviet Union. The official tendency to regard independent citizen movements as potentially suspicious enforced the tendency of journalism to depend on state sources and to marginalize movements of civic society. Analyses of media coverage of security policy in a NATO country such as Norway show that opposition to established policy was often marginalized (Hellebust, 1990).

The MAD doctrine (mutual assured destruction) demanded that the obvious absurdity of threatening nuclear war had to be logically reasoned. Populations had to accept something that was against ordinary ethical codes and common sense, and

there was always a risk in the democratic countries that the very logic of nuclear defence would be rejected by the voters (Sheer, 1983).³ The audience had to be convinced that the continuous development and gathering of weaponry of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, biological and ‘conventional’ – was essential for safety and security. Hesitations of the ‘sanity of mankind’ had to be won by public relations, media coverage – and by language. Paul Chilton, a well-known researcher of ‘nukespeak’ describes the manipulation of ‘words and phrases’:

The most obvious area to look at this is the armed forces and the bureaucracies that serve them. It is here that the men who plan and perform the killing apparently have a need to be linguistically anesthetised ... weapons of mass destruction are referred to as ‘hardware’ or ‘devices’ or, worse, ‘deterrents’. The vague term ‘strike’ is now regularly used to mean a specifically nuclear attack. Military jargon of this type amounts to a semi-secret language: it has a precise meaning for the initiated but constitutes a misleading smoke-screen for the general public. In addition, such terms are basically euphemisms (Chilton, 1988, p. 80).

Weapons were humanized or mystified; they were given cultural respectability by using names from Greek mythology; killing was transferred linguistically into technical operations.

Distortion of perspectives, dissemination of enemy images and use of ‘double standards’ could be found in journalism (see, for example, Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Keeble, 1997; McNair, 1988). The same kind of violations of human rights were valued differently depending on the political orientation of the violator. Ethical principles of good journalism were often inferior to political sympathy.

Trainor (1991: 122) describes the professional spirit of modern armies:

The military is hierarchical with great inner pride and loyalties. It is the antithesis of a democracy – and must be so if it is to be effective. It is action-oriented and impatient with outside interference.... The military wants only to be left alone to carry out its assigned mission.

Military institutions took on such dominant a role that they started to destroy those democratic institutions they were originally mentioned to protect. Sacrifice, common good and public interest are slogans which often hide organizational interests. The military, like other organizations, has its own aims and goals, such as gaining resources, social respect and political influence. When organizations grow large enough and are networked with other institutions with similar interests, in certain circumstances they start to live ‘independently’ and to fulfil goals which are rooted more in the organizational culture and networks than in the democratic process. One example of this is the US ‘military–industrial complex’, which – in cooperation with political institutions and parts of the media industry – started to function like ‘state within state’ and to manipulate both the media agenda and the legislative agenda according to its own needs (Fulbright, 1970). In both superpowers, security organizations were involved so extensively in the media and in the administration that they were more or less able to enforce their paranoid ‘reality’ as the national agenda. As a result, the Soviet Union committed suicide by arms expenditure, and the United States – although it won this war – paid a huge price in economic and human terms.

One special problem with regard to security organizations is their tendency to defend their needs and ‘operational effectiveness’ (i.e. independence from demo-

cratic control) by using enemy images. Even if the danger itself – terrorism, say – is over, security authorities that were originally set up to fight the terrorists tend not to disappear. They might start to justify their existence by inventing or emphasizing new risks; and because danger sells well in the media, journalists often are willing to be used as conduits for distribution of enemy images. For instance, it has been claimed that the US security authorities have been searching for ‘new enemies’, especially from the Islamic world, following the collapse of the Soviet empire (cf. Halliday, 1996).

In the Cold War culture, security organizations managed in many countries to produce a situation in which critical or investigative journalism of military issues was considered unpatriotic and even treasonable activity. Secrecy is perhaps partially acceptable as an element of military planning, but it is also used for public relations purposes and to protect organizations from outside criticism. ‘National security’ is sometimes just an empty phrase, and especially in the United States it has been used so often that inflation is a fact (Halloran, 1991: 52). Secrecy is also an important part of the military image, and journalists who are ready to identify themselves with the military’s interests are rewarded with the honour of sharing some secrets. Getting bits and pieces of confidential information is often meant to give the journalist the feeling that he or she is one of the few who are responsible for national security.

In this identification game, defence correspondents sometimes lose sight of their role as journalists. Confidential discussions, off-the-record information, details of new weapons systems, shared travel arrangements with military officers, small leaks and so on lure correspondents into abandoning their journalistic thinking and replacing it with military interests (Wilson, 1982). Many journalists identified themselves as warriors of the Cold War, and that legacy can possibly still be seen in journalism today.⁴

The Cold War created many new challenges for the military information authorities. The main interest was no longer the propaganda of total war, with legal and moral arguments for information control and propaganda; a new ‘grey zone’ – restricted and even secret conflicts, smaller discharges of the main Cold War conflict – demanded new skills.

Besides the ‘preparatory propaganda’ (psychological defence), the main targets of the intellectual activity of military information planning were now:

- *Propaganda in restricted conflicts.* In these cases there is normally no declaration of war, no threat to national existence and no legal right for censorship and other information control. However, the military information machinery has to ensure that useful information will not be given to the enemy, that the image of the military is untainted and that no opposition will rise against the operation.
- *Propaganda in hidden operations in which one’s own country is not openly involved.* Both superpowers ‘indirectly’ implemented military operations in the Third World through the provision of military, intelligence and economic support for particular parties to the conflict. In such cases, the aim of information activities is, on the one hand, to deny military involvement and, on the other, to encourage support for ‘our’ favourite in the conflict.

The role of the media is in some extent different in different type of crises. In preparatory, peacetime propaganda the main thing is the media’s acceptance. Pro-

motion of new weapon systems, creation and maintenance of enemy images and promotion of the military world-view and system of values are in the military's interest, but it cannot force the media to do these things. The main problem in media–military relations in modern Western societies has proved to be restricted conflicts, especially military interventions in the Third World. Before the 1960s, Western audiences did not pay much attention to interventions by their troops in Third World countries. The United States, for instance, operated militarily in Central and South America without much journalistic attention. Thanks to Vietnam, interventions became loaded with political and moral tension. Vietnam separated generations and political wings of the Western world.⁵

Propaganda is not something you can switch on and off like a lamp. Even in restricted interventions one can easily find a long time-span which can best be seen later on by reconstructing information activities of the military. By doing content analyses it can retrospectively be measured how effective the propaganda campaign was. During the Cold War, in militarily active countries such as the United States there were several campaigns going on at the same time, each at a different stage. The moment of the actual operation was only one phase. The various stages can be described in the following way:

Preliminary stage

- Target country comes to the news agenda
- Reports about chaos, poverty, dictatorship and rebellions
- News conferences are arranged to express 'increasing concern' etc.

Justification stage

- Big news is produced
- Urgency and the immediate threat to neighbours, the West and the local population (the threat of genocide) are emphasized
- Goals are set: peace, freedom, democracy

Implementation stage

- News management of the military operation starts (control of access, field censorship, pool system, etc.)

Aftermath justification

- Special trips to the target country are arranged for journalists in order to get reports of improved conditions (peace, order, prosperity, democracy)
- Target country disappears gradually from the news agenda

In the United States, the Cold War culture created intense pressure upon journalism not to rock the boat; even further: journalism more or less voluntarily became a strategic and operational tool of the warfare. In these circumstances, the advantages of developing communications technology could not be used to increase independent reporting. Professional ideology, although it did slowly develop towards greater integrity and critical and investigative reporting, was more or less subordinated to national interests. An independent professional ideology of journalism did gain more

ground during the liberal years of the 1960s, but it suffered serious setbacks in the 1980s during the so-called New Cold War and the conservative atmosphere of the Reagan government.

2. Military information policy

Successful media management in times of restricted conflict must consist of a balance between how much (or how little) access the media should have to the scene of action and how freely they should be allowed to report. With limited access and censored coverage the question of controlling the flow of information is solved, but this also creates frustration within the media corporations. If you have easy access and no restrictions on coverage, the journalists are happy but the military personnel are frustrated, because of both the physical presence of too many journalists and the limited control over coverage. And even if the military and the journalistic communities might come to a understanding, the political elite might have their own agenda of achieving political gains through showing determination in times of crisis and by hiding annoying facts. The civic society and public opinion also are important factors in the outcome of the coverage.

In this respect the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Falklands conflict, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the Gulf War all presented different scenarios. In different ways experience from previous conflicts paved the ground for how the policy of media management during the Gulf War was organized. In Vietnam there was minimal control of access to the front and little control of the coverage; the military blamed the press for their setbacks in the propaganda war as well as in the war itself. In Grenada the military had full control during the first 48 hours and summarized the operation as a success; but it was a Pyrrhic victory because of the harsh media criticism. Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989 was in many ways a test case in media management, taking place just eight months prior to Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf War was an attempt to compromise, with access through pools and control through censorship. The military had found a model which it regarded as successful, but once again the media felt frustrated and on the defensive.

The experience of the Gulf War has been a reference point for conflicts in the 1990s because it was so debated, and feelings about it are strong. It showed above all that the perspectives within the communities of journalism and military are different. A journalist is eager to have as much access as possible to as large extent as possible and as quickly as possible; the military will tend to limit these possibilities accordingly. But both parties have, or at least should have, a common interest in finding a platform for cooperation which protects security and at the same time serves the democratic ideal of keeping the public informed through media coverage, even in times of war. The public's right to and interest in information about an ongoing conflict that might effect it's future should be based on a system defined on certain principles rather than on the politicians' definition of 'the interests of the nation', 'security of the journalists' or other justifications that can turn out to be pseudo-arguments for censorship.

Experiences since the Gulf War have proved that the relationship between the military and the media is still changing according to the special conditions and

situations of individual war scenarios, the levels of public support and the justifications provided for each operation. In Somalia the US military was deeply annoyed in 1993 by media pictures depicting US losses. In 1995 the media coverage in Bosnia caused no problems either in political or in military terms. On the contrary, media reports – especially those from Sarajevo – clearly paved the way for military actions by increasing public support for involvement. During the December 1998 bombings of Iraq and the air strikes of the Kosovo war in 1999, the US military had to face a more cynical media. During the Kosovo operation, the US and NATO information machinery applied many of the same techniques which had proved their effectiveness in the Gulf War. This time success was more limited, perhaps in part because of the bad memories of the Gulf War, in part because of scandals which had compromised the political position of President Clinton. Peter Goff, editor of the International Press Institute report ‘The Kosovo News and Propaganda War’, concludes:

Some Western media outlets covered the conflict with a strong sense of self-consciousness, providing background and context where appropriate, posting warnings about the propaganda and censorship policies on both sides, continually reassessing motives and justification, and sombrely presenting as much relevant information as possible under difficult conditions. But many media outlets became conduits for Nato misinformation and much of the reporting played the role of the merry alliance cheerleader (Goff, 1999: 19–20).

General Powell assured media executives after the Gulf War that the truth of the Gulf War will at some point be told: ‘every fact about Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm will eventually come to the light of day:... Historians will search and dig. After time, nothing will be hidden. Even classified information has a lifetime and is ultimately available. In America, secrets are not buried’ (quoted in Sharkey, 1992: 36).

Scott Armstrong discusses the same issue after having come up against arguments for leaving the complicated and historical-oriented issues to historians from several of his journalist colleagues in the period leading up to Operation Desert Storm. Armstrong’s answer is clear: “The journalist’s first and fundamental job is to get the story right“, and to do that Armstrong claims you have to go behind the official rhetoric and see the historical issues leading up to a conflict, and this includes investigative reporting to look behind the propaganda picture presented by the parties involved (Armstrong, 1990: 23). This controversy about the role of journalists and historians in our view touches upon key questions in war reporting. Without ambition and competence to give historical background, journalism is unable to “get the story right“. Access to the battlefield and lack of censorship are not sufficient preconditions for good reporting since war happenings can only be fully understood and interpreted in their historical context.

The technological development itself is moving so fast that media technology has an impact on media management and war coverage. In this respect the Gulf War was a watershed. Satellite technology, together with other technological innovations, has changed the very concept of journalism. Factors like electronic mail, computer-to-computer communications, digital transmissions of still photographs, facsimile transmissions, portable satellite imagery, remotely sensed satellite imagery, frame capture of video images to print, portable laptop computers, international data transmission networks, fly-away satellite uplinks and computer graphics have revolutionized war reporting and ‘visualized’ it in an entirely new way (Gannet Founda-

tion Media Center, 1991: 35). One consequence of this is that the media, consciously or unconsciously, might also be used in a new way as tool in the warfare itself.

In his memoirs General Schwarzkopf explained how he used the media to send messages across to Baghdad. At a press conference on 14 September 1990 he had stated: 'If the Iraqis are dumb enough to attack, they are going to pay a terrible price' and he wrote later that, 'With those cameras grinding away, I knew I wasn't talking just to friendly audiences, but that Saddam and his bully boys were watching me on CNN in their headquarters' (Schwarzkopf, 1992: 400).

Schwarzkopf also mentions an episode that explains why censorship can in certain situations be justified for military reasons. At one point a live television report revealed 'a major artillery duel in [the reporter's] location between the 82nd Airborne and the Iraqis, and Captain Ron Wildermuth, the Central Command public affairs chief, called the division public affairs officer and said, "You guys are supposed to be screening these reports". But by the time he said it, it was out over the satellite' (Schwarzkopf, 1992: 510).

In sum, our perspectives can be presented in a model for understanding how the military media management process is put into practice, and consequently, how it shapes the media–military relationship:

Historical experience

Historical experience and experiences from other countries are evaluated to learn from the mistakes and success stories of media management. However, lessons of history need to be applied to fit the present conditions, like:

- social and cultural situation (public image and social power position of the military, public opinion concerning the use of military force in international disputes and respect of freedom of speech);
- prospects and expectations about subsequent conflicts (scale and nature of the conflicts, possibilities to control access of journalists to the battlefield);
- technology (warfare technology, fact-finding, transmission and presentation technologies in the employ of journalists); and
- professional ideology of journalism (loyalty to the state authorities and voluntary patriotism vs. independence and critical attitude towards the state authorities).

As result of this evaluation process certain plans and preparations are made for both peacetime and wartime media management.

Military information policy

is, depending on the country, more or less openly discussed on political platforms and influenced by legislation on the state of war or emergency and the common rules of state authorities to inform. It might be also negotiated with representatives of the media. It consists of basic rules of information control and supply. Normally, some parts of it are public, some are secret for reasons of state security. Military information policy covers issues like:

- peacetime PR organization, delegation of rights and duties to inform, practices of ordinary change of information with journalists;

- preparation for wartime conditions (wartime information organization in which certain journalists in many countries have preplanned positions, meetings with journalists about psychological defence and scenarios of security threats, etc.);
- plans for information activities in restricted conflicts or in other limited involvement in military conflicts abroad (ground rules for journalists, access to the battlefield, censorship, supply of information, etc.); and
- plans for war in which the very existence of the nation is endangered (propaganda and censorship).

Military media management in time of crisis

This is the real test for plans. In most countries, there are rather few occasions of military involvement, and they often take place under the UN or NATO flag. These latter organizations have some common rules and traditions of news management, although troops from various countries often act according to their own practices. Even a minor involvement keeps information officers busy serving journalists at home, keeping an eye on them in the field, and enforcing the justifications of the operation in domestic publicity.

Evaluation

The evaluation process starts right when the arms are silenced (even in those countries which were not directly involved in the conflict). Evaluation pays attention to issues like:

- press reactions to the involvement (arguments for and against military action, differences of various media outlets and journalists in their attitude);
- interaction of press reactions, public opinion and political debate;
- media reactions to losses of own troops;
- behaviour of journalists on the field (acceptance of ground rules, cooperation with military officials, functioning of battlefield arrangements like the possible pool system); and
- success of the information policy and news management (use and editing of military produced information and material, effectiveness of restricting techniques like censorship).

After immediate evaluation the conflict changes into historical experience which is again used to fix the information policy to fit the after-conflict conditions.

The dynamic factor of the battle for 'professional ideology' reflects the social and cultural situation in a given society. At this level we must take into consideration factors such as the conditions for critical journalism. Here we must include legal and constitutional parameters like freedom of speech and other human rights issues. Nearly all liberal democracies with constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press have limitations on issues related to state security and military affairs. Within the framework of the model we can raise issues like to what extent such legislation is used for a de facto limitation of press freedom. Other relevant issues can be how press organizations handle attempts to make them responsible for state security and

enlist them actively in mobilization for national security and military defence. We also have issues such as self-censorship, where individual reporters or the media can put restrictions on their own activities on sensitive issues like national security and military affairs.

In a critical discussion of professional ideology we also need to include how press organizations, media corporations and individual reporters handle criticism of their own performance. During and after the Gulf War, there has been a vast number of attempts at criticism and self-criticism, including some from reporters who covered the Gulf War and felt bad about their own experience. One example of this is John J. Fialkas (1991) book *Hotel Warriors*. But there are also examples of reporters and media who treat criticism with contempt and hostility. The quest for a critical atmosphere should not however be confused with the 'politically correct' notion of demanding a certain kind of journalism, and where that is seen as the only acceptable kind of journalism. In any given conflict there will always be political differences in the approaches to the conflict. The journalistic coverage should reflect these differences. We will thus warn both against a servile kind of journalism in wars and conflicts which automatically accepts limitations put forward by state regulations and the military and, on the other hand, against a biased anti-military platform which automatically opposes everything that comes from official military sources.

Mark Pedelty, in the introduction to his book *War Stories*, a study of the international press corps during the conflict in El Salvador, focuses on the wide spectrum of professional and political attitudes within the corps:

This story will occasionally involve outrageous examples of press misconduct, but will more often illustrate the honest attempt of earnest and intelligent journalists whose work is influenced by a mass of traditions, rules and institutions whose purpose are often antithetical to their own. People like Joe, a young Texas expatriate who loves to play war; Paul, a giant with the strength to focus through tears; Harold, 'an old curmudgeon' whose truthful fictions have long graced the front pages; Pedro, a Salvadoran photographer who lost his hand, but not his camera; Katherine, a prizewinning journalist who cannot be bothered with little details or big truths; George, the romantic; Shawn, who refuses to let a little thing like shrapnel get in his way; Maria, the Italian humanist; and Alonzo, who sees the soul in the corpse (Pedelty, 1995: 21).

The bottom line, according to Pedelty, is that most journalists in a war zone try to do a decent job in spite of all the restrictions and limitations in their working environment.

In dealing with media–military relations one should not forget that journalists in a war zone have normal human feelings – fear, for example – and instincts for survival, despite all the myths of the tough and heroic war reporter. When one of the authors of this chapter went on a fieldtrip to Grenada to interview local journalists about their experience during the US invasion in 1983, one radio journalist working for the national broadcasting company responded like this to a somewhat academic question about his experience: 'To tell you the truth, when the bombs fell all over the place I was more concerned about the safety of my family than the conditions for journalism'.⁶

It is also important to notice that in restricted conflicts in which major Western powers are involved, news management is not like cream on a cake, added to make

the operation more tasty for journalism. The very actions are planned by keeping in mind possible media reactions and their consequent effects on political debate and public opinion. In this kind of operation, which Frank Webster calls 'Post-Fordist warfare', overwhelming force is brought to bear on the enemy by a military which is 'unwilling, perhaps incapable, of absorbing any significant casualties of its own'. In the Kosovo war, according to Webster, 'there was extreme reluctance to commit ground troops from the NATO alliance (and especially from the American themselves) for fear of taking casualties against which domestic opinion might rebel. Accordingly, the war was fought by NATO entirely from the air and, though a couple of aircraft were lost, there were no fatalities inflicted on the allies by the Serbian forces'(Webster, 1999). 'Perception management' of the population at home and around the world is also easier more if casualties amongst the civilian population and other 'non-legitimate targets' can also be avoided.

3. Effects of the power balance

The purpose of the media management, as it was experienced in the Gulf War (see, for example, Taylor, 1992), can be summarized in the following manner:

1. To limit reporters' access to the battlefield, for instance through the creation of news pools.
2. To deny military personnel the possibility of talking to reporters outside the pool and to implement sanctions against military personnel who give unauthorized comments to reporters.
3. To control the communication between journalists and military personnel, for instance by 'punishing' reporters regarded as disloyal to the pool regulations by denying access to information, interviews, etc.
4. To introduce censorship of all reports and pictures in order to control all outgoing communication from the pools.
5. To withhold any information that can put military personnel in a bad light, including stories with no military interest, such as reports of inappropriate social behaviour etc.
6. To use disinformation and misleading reports to avoid bad publicity and for operational purposes.
7. To avoid coverage of one's own losses or other sensitive information, such as civilian casualties.
8. To sanitize the warfare through focus on its high-tech elements, such as the use of 'smart bombs'.
9. To sanitize the warfare by manipulation of the language describing the operation and its methods
10. To use the media to mobilize public support.

It seems quite clear that the so-called 'organizational memory' has a more firm base in the military planning system than in journalism. Rather few war reporters stay in the business for a long time, and younger generations of journalists start from scratch when they develop their techniques. Journalism also is a very competitive branch, with constant organizational changes according to commercial demands. This means that there is little time and few resources available for time-consuming activities such as the study of historical experiences and the lessons that can be learned from them. However, it is important to remember that the military is not an all-powerful news manager. Military staff have made serious mistakes and exhibited amateurism, sometimes in vast amounts. The Joint Information Bureau in the Gulf War, for instance, was a small office, from the military point of view, with men working 18- and 19-hour days to serve the needs of the press, not the notorious Orwellian propaganda machine described in some books (Sherman, 1991: 59–61).

The complexity of military media management can be seen clearly in an example from Israeli information policy during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. When the Israeli military implemented a news black-out and severely restricted the access of journalists to the battlefield, the media switched to covering the fight in Lebanon from the Palestinian side of the front. That imbalance in the coverage effectively forced Israel to change tactics (Mercer et al., 1987: 267–289).

The Western media for a while used the Palestinian perspective for three reasons: First, they no longer identified themselves completely with Israeli interests in the region. Second, the Palestinian side saw their chance and made efforts to serve the needs of the international media. Third, wars in the Middle East are so important on the international news agenda that the big news and film agencies urgently needed footage and other material. When the Israeli side was clouded by 'the fog of war', these agencies turned to the Palestinians.

Before the war in Lebanon, the Israeli military was regarded as the master of media management and 'soft' control. It is interesting then that the Israeli military made exactly the same mistake as the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Falklands, also in 1982, and the Pentagon in Grenada, in 1983: they underestimated the urgency for modern news journalism of getting footage and still pictures from the war scene. If you are not providing visual material yourself, the media will go to your enemy. In the case of the Falklands, journalists went to Argentina; in the case of Lebanon, they went to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The importance of visual material was no secret, so why did Israel, with all its experience, make that kind of blunder? The reason was most probably the Vietnam experience. In the first post-Vietnam interventions, visual journalism was regarded as potentially dangerous and harmful. Restrictive policies were implemented to be on the safe side. However, it became clear that this kind of control was neither possible nor necessary. The political and cultural climate had changed, and the media were hailing and celebrating the interventions in the Falklands and in Grenada. They proved to be great political victories for the incumbents, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and both the Pentagon and the MoD started to see cooperation with the media more as an opportunity than as a threat.

Which methods of media management the military is able to use and which methods are effective depends in part on the power balance between the media and the military. According to Reese (1991: 325–326), if the media and the source are both powerful, the relationship is usually either symbiotic or, in a case of contradic-

tory interests, adversary. If the source is more powerful, the most probable result is positive coverage of the source. If the media organization has more power, it has the ability to marginalize and in some cases destroy the source and its public credibility. From the viewpoint of critical, ambitious and investigative coverage, the worst-case scenario is a situation in which the military's capacity to promote and control is combined with agreement and consent over the goals and means of an operation on the part of weak and non-independent media.

It is a permanent interest of the big source organizations, like the military, to strengthen their power position. Public relations activity is often combined with lobbying and policies aimed at increasing the organization's own influence and reducing the media's power, if this is seen as harmful.

Public relations takes place in a complex social and cultural setting in which influential allies and strongholds in the society's power infrastructure are searched out and needed. Nobody can be successful in public relations if the main trends of the society are against them. The experiences of Vietnam taught the US military that popular culture, political trends and other cultural factors in the civic society cannot be ignored. In publicity battles, the media do not automatically side with the power elite.

In the late 1970s, when the US military and the conservative politicians drew their conclusions about the Vietnam war experience, it became quite clear that in the media–military relationship one important factor was the power balance in a broad cultural and political context. A strategy was drawn up in order to diminish the power of the media, and a campaign – which has been called 'the war against the press' (Stoler, 1986) – was launched.⁷

It was a successful strategy, and the later developments in military–media management leading to the Gulf War practices tell not only of the growing skills in public relations, but also of the basic changes in the power balance between these two institutions and in the political and cultural climate.

4. The challenges of the Net Age

In the contemporary situation, the new aspect in the media–military relationship – besides the global hegemony of the United States – is the new technology of warfare which also provides a new role for strategic and operational media management.

The US Army has prepared itself in readiness for new kinds of war in the age of information highways. The whole army organization – from training to field manuals, from armament to strategic thinking – has been revamped. 'Information' is the key word. The army defines information as 'an essential foundation of knowledge-based warfare' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 4). The new army thinking is presented, for example, in the November–December 1996 issue of the journal *Military Review*. The incentive for the thematic issue came from the new *US Army Field Manual 100-6 'Information Operations'* (Murphy, 1996; Simpson & Brown, 1996; Starry & Arneson, 1996).⁸

The Gulf War has been regarded as the 'first information war', where the US military had a communications network that linked satellites, observations aircraft, commanders at home and in Saudi Arabia, tanks, bombers, ships and so on into a well-conducted orchestra of war. The United States, apparently quite successfully,

blinded the Iraqi air control and other communications and command systems. The Allied forces observed and destroyed the disabled and unreliable Iraqi troops when and where they wanted. In the Kosovo war, NATO's first target was the Serbian military's command & control system.

Information has naturally always been an essential tool for warfare: intelligence, espionage and propaganda are as old as war itself. What is new is the incorporation of information into the weaponry and decisionmaking system, which makes the 'nervous system' of the military an even more important object, in terms of attack and defence priorities, than its muscle, its material strength. This change can be seen also in defence expenditures: Webster (1999) estimates that half of the British Ministry of Defence's equipment procurement budget is accounted for with command and information systems.

The Gulf War also provided a new lesson on the use of propaganda. Some journalists and academics were exasperated to discover after the war that the media had unequivocally been used as a tool for manipulation, psychological operations and propaganda – as a tool for warfare. From the soldiers' point of view, the media are always a weapon; the issue is rather who wields the weapon and how effectively.

What is meant by information operations? It is the ability to gather, handle, disseminate and protect information while at the same time stopping the enemy from doing the same thing. In aggressive information operations, for example, the enemy's communication and command systems are destroyed, its information systems are hacked and the morale of its troops is devastated by means of psychological warfare. In defensive information warfare one's own systems are protected from the enemy.

Constant predominance, such as in the Gulf War, is not the goal. *Field Manual 100-6* states that, 'Realizing that absolute and sustained dominance of the information environment is not possible, commanders seek to achieve information dominance at the right place, the right time and in the right circumstances. They seek ... [to] define how the adversary sees the battlespace, thus creating the opportunity to seize the initiative and set the tempo of operations' (Starry & Arneson, 1996, p: 4) In short, the goal of information warfare is that at the onset of the operation the enemy is forced to communicate with 19th-century equipment while the USA is using 21st-century technology.

The spectrum of information operations is wide. Electromagnetic pulse generators are thought to have been used in the Gulf War against Iraqi electronic equipment. Space-based technology offers many alternatives for both intelligence and war against the enemy's information systems. According to the US Army, the good old television is a perfect tool 'to bolster or undermine the will of entire populations' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 12). The use of so-called real-time newscasts is regarded as highly important in future operations. In US military jargon, news broadcasts are 'a non-lethal asset' belonging to the global information environment. An immediate challenge, for example, is the faster and easier dissemination of so-called tactical information, covering information on troop mobility and operation results, amongst other things. Real-time news broadcasts of the CNN kind together with the multiple sources of information systems may disseminate information at the speed of light and also affect the way in which news is received at home, both in the United States and throughout the rest of the world.

When the internet was developed, it did so on the basis of the US Army Arpanet system, and until now US technological supremacy in this field has been undisputed. However, the situation is changing; reflecting this, *100-6* emphasizes defensive information warfare. Not only the distribution of information technology throughout the world but also the vulnerability of US information systems lies behind this. The army is not only concerned about the crumbling of the 'firewalls' around its own information networks in the fingers of hostile hackers: strategically important civilian systems such as those in banks, stock exchanges, media, air traffic control, telephone networks and hospitals are possibly even more defenceless. An enemy attack on civilian targets could cause such incalculable damage or create such a panic that the US political leadership was forced to give up its military operations.

There have been frequent media reports of hackers trying to break into US Army information networks. According to some reports, the information systems of the Pentagon were hacked 250,000 times in 1995 (Raivio, 1996). A BBC report in 1997 revealed that a group of Dutch hackers during the Gulf War stole information on US military bases and forwarded the information to the Iraqis. This can be an information-era urban legend, but perhaps also a reminder that the US Army is an enormous organization, where some parts have weaker than normal security levels and close connections to civilian networks. Secret information can sometimes be leaked through the weak links. The authors in *Military Review* hint that there have at least been attempts to hack the system: 'During the last decade, we have come to understand that threats to all forces, from strategic to tactical, come from a variety of new and different sources and continually exist, even during periods of relative peace' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 6).

Significant weapons in information network warfare are intelligence-type break-ins, feeding the system with misleading information, and different kinds of viruses which destroy and disturb the enemy's information systems. 'Virus bombs' can be installed in peacetime and activated when the crisis escalates to a military conflict. What is important is that the information systems operations are paced accurately with other operations such as psychological operations, electronic warfare, diversions, safeguarding one's own operative security and – finally – the physical acts of war. It can be of use just to get the enemy to suspect the reliability of its own information systems. The same can also work on the civilian side: for example rumours about break-ins in banking systems may cause insecurity and thereby lead to great financial losses.

The Pentagon has changed its enemy image to better fit the information age. Threats come not only from states or military alliances but also from groups or individuals whose motives to attack the USA are 'political, social, cultural, ethnic, religious or industrial' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 6). The adversary can incidentally be anyone who is skilful enough to break into information systems and willing to do damage to the United States. The biggest risk, however, comes from the professionals: the intelligence services of hostile governments and groups specialized in network sabotage, cyberterrorists.

Global networks break down the boundaries between military and civilian information systems. According to *Field Manual 100-6*: 'The Army is embracing a new era characterized by the accelerating growth of information, information sources and information dissemination capabilities. This new era, the so-called Information

Age, offers unique opportunities as well as some formidable challenges' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 14).

Many of the actors in 'the global information environment' are beyond the control of the US defence administration: nongovernmental organizations and interest groups, universities and research institutes – and also, to some extent, the media. The Information Highway is busy with travellers who 'may cause an unanticipated or unintentional effect on military operations' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 6).

It is therefore, even during peacetime, in the interests of the US defence establishment not only to know the command and communication systems, together with their weaknesses, of well-known enemies, but also to have all potentially suspicious groups under surveillance. The USA has therefore been reluctant to allow dissemination of encryption systems. On the other hand, other countries – and it was estimated in the mid-1990s that over 120 countries are developing their own Information Warfare systems – feel vulnerable as long as the United States maintains its overwhelming dominance in this field (Raivio, 1996).

Since the Cold War ended, the US Army has trimmed its machinery to better suit the new threats and enemy images: 'In the not-too-distant future the Army will be confronted by a wide array of new and potential adversaries and unknown dangers as war fighting technologies, including weapons of mass destruction, proliferate worldwide' (Starry & Arneson, 1996: 3). It is not only a question of information technology but also, for example, of nuclear weapons that end up in the hands of terrorists or 'terrorist governments' and have to be quickly eliminated. Threats to the US economy, especially to the availability of energy and strategic raw materials, are significant security risks.

A great number of the envisaged conflicts are such that controlling the image of the war is very important. Media pictures of the dead American soldier who was manhandled on the dusty roads of Mogadishu were more important than guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis M. Murphy writes: 'This phenomenon will be with us as long as CNN broadcasts the action as it happens ... influencing people's hearts and minds may be more important than destroying the enemy' (Murphy, 1996: 16).

Murphy uses as an example a situation in which the USA has become involved in a conflict in an African country and tries to win over the support of the local population. Something that might be more effective than weapons, for example, might be the opening of an immunization clinic close to enemy territory; the organization Médecins Sans Frontières might be asked to open the clinic; working groups in charge of psychological warfare disseminate word of the clinic through radio and handbills; local authorities are called to join in; and army information officers ensure that the clinic gains wide media publicity both locally and internationally.

What can be achieved by this? Murphy suggests: 'A local citizen, ecstatic that his family is receiving care after months of neglect, tells an interpreter at the clinic that he has heard the belligerent force will move north to attack the Americans in 48 hours' (Murphy, 1996: 18). The information itself might be irrelevant: larger troop movements are known by the Americans in any case. What is more important is 'the native's' willingness to speak up and help the Americans. No more Vietnam.

The speedy news dissemination and information networks change the role of the soldier in at least two ways: On the one hand, the actions of field-level commanders or even individual soldiers may gain strategic significance as they are quickly transmitted to a worldwide audience; for example, a war crime committed by a US

soldier in front of TV cameras could turn international opinion against the operation. On the other hand, information war can make an individual soldier appear more dangerous than a large, conventionally equipped army; it is a question of information and intelligence, not of iron, horsepower and tons.

The function of leading officers is also changed: 'IO greatly expands the commander's battlespace, including interaction with the media, industry, joint forces, multinational forces and computer/satellite networks worldwide' write Starry & Anderson (1996: 5). Soldiers' professional requirements change because all information environments and systems surrounding an operation, friendly and adversarial, military and non-military, offer chances of exploitation. Knowledge of the enemy's information structures is as important as knowledge of its strategy, tactics and other conduct.

New challenges are also on offer to those responsible for propaganda and public relations. Digital technology offers unforeseen possibilities because, with its aid, the international media flow can be fed with pictures from the battlefield that have been manipulated or even totally manufactured. Two technologically advanced belligerents can feed reporters with totally contrary visual versions of the same event. Already in the Gulf War, communication systems employed in the weapons were combined with media systems: missile systems filmed their hits for the home audience. The US lead in the international news industry gives it a permanent strategic advantage.

Contemporary technology in warfare and communication is both a threat and an opportunity for independent journalism. On the one hand, development of transmission technology and increasing diffusion of computer communications facilities make it more difficult to implement total black-outs or to control outgoing messages from a certain area. On the other hand, countries which are skilled in information warfare are well-trained in integrating the media both strategically and tactically as part of their operations. They act fast, avoid deeds which could provoke public opposition, and provide good justifications for their involvement. The operation is quickly concluded, and journalists move on to other issues.

In particular, high-tech warfare makes it easy to forget that brutal wars fought with conventional weapons have not disappeared, and that huge stocks of nuclear arms still exist. Even in a high-tech war, achieving information dominance is normally followed by material destruction of the enemy. Clean and ethical war is just an illusory luxury of the Western media audience.

Notes

1. In this sense, the British information policy in Northern Ireland is an interesting case. According to many allegations, violence, the threat of violence and black propaganda were used routinely in media control inside the UK. This practice was made possible by the political splits among the British media: some media organizations not only accepted the control but actively helped the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the security organs by publishing leaks and compromising critical investigative journalists (Curtis, 1984; Miller, 1993; Rolston, 1991). It is also claimed that the same took place during the 1984–85 miners' strike in Britain (Milne, 1995).
2. This kind of evaluation, however, depends on the definition of the Cold War era. If it is considered to cover the whole postwar competition of superpowers until the collapse of the Soviet Union, different

periods must be separated. For instance, in 1960s and 70s issues of human rights and freedom of speech received much positive attention in democratic countries. Consequently, independent and critical journalism got much more room for action.

3. Brian Harrison (1997) gives the following example: 'In 1959, Earl Mountbatten, as chief of Defence Staff, visited the American Air Force base at Vandenberg. His diary records "the staggering shock of seeing a Titan hole", large enough to house a skyscraper; "the whole thing has gruesome and horrific effect", he wrote, "which makes one really fear of the sanity of mankind".'
4. A recent Norwegian study of the relationship between the media and the secret police and military intelligence has revealed that trusted journalists from both the social democratic and the conservative press were de facto informers for these services. In some cases during the Cold War journalists also went on intelligence missions for the secret services under cover as reporters (Nilsen & Sjøe, 1998).
5. In the Soviet Union, the intervention in Afghanistan had a similar kind of effect, in part thanks to more open journalistic coverage of the conflict (Borovik, 1990).
6. The interview took place in St. George, Grenada, in January 1998.
7. One important aspect of that 'shooting war' was the attempt to prove that the US media elite – powerful newspapers and TV channels of the East Coast – were in the hands of left-wing or liberal secular snobs who did not respect traditional American values and institutions.

Another aspect of this campaign was the activation of religious and right-wing media watchdog organizations, such as Accuracy in the Media, who criticized and claimed liberal and left-wing bias in reporting. Cultural relativism, it was said, had poisoned the thinking of journalists. Third World countries were reported in a romantic light, and the economic, political and military actions of the West were always interpreted negatively. Journalism was also accused of being commercial, cowardly, irresponsible and superficial.

8. Concepts used about information operations (IO) and information warfare (IW) are not quite established yet. For instance, terms like C2W (Command and Control Warfare) and C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) are used as well. There are also varying definitions of the different formulations.

Conflict Coverage and Conflict Escalation

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Current tendencies in war journalism

Though still existent, traditional state propaganda as characteristic during the World Wars (see Lasswell, 1927; Knightly, 1975; and chapters 2 and 4 of this volume) has been partly delegated to professional PR agencies in recent conflicts (Kunczik, 1990). During both the Gulf War (MacArthur, 1992) and the Bosnia conflict (Beham, 1996), the role of PR agencies became so massive, and filters used to sort out virtual PR reality from real facts so few, that it became extremely difficult to assess the situation without knowing what the PR firms had transmitted. But this was only a first step in what may be called the privatization of propaganda (Luostarinen & Kempf, 2000). During the Bosnia conflict, journalists themselves deliberately threw away professional rules and standards of truth in the name of a moral enterprise 'that is aware of its responsibilities; and will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor' (Bell, 1997).

As one of the results of the post-Cold War military conflicts, journalists have become aware that the media do not just report about war and peace, but they play an active part in the game. As a reaction to this insight, a new school of war reporting is taking over the media world, which BBC correspondent Martin Bell (1997) calls the Journalism of Attachment.

This Journalism of Attachment says that reporters cannot remain detached or neutral in the face of modern evils like genocide in Bosnia, but that journalists have to take side with the victims and demand that something must be done.

So far, the Journalism of Attachment sounds like a worthy appeal for concerned reporting and seems to share the same values as Peace Journalism. But the problem with Journalism of Attachment is that it has no vision of constructive conflict transformation and no analysis of the political and social roots of wars. Journalism of Attachment depicts war as an exclusively moral struggle in which Right fights Wrong.

As journalists appoint themselves judges of who is good or evil in the world, and as they place moral pressure on the international community to take sides, the Journalism of Attachment replaces the rules of journalism with the rules of propaganda. The coverage of the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts is full of examples of how journalists served their moral impetus by means of information control and fabrication of news (see chapter 13 below).

Journalists suppressed news stories that satisfied all criteria for newsworthiness but did not fit with the image of the enemy (see Hume, 1997). Journalists faked empirical evidence by producing television images that did not show what they were claimed to show, but which put on stage clichés and stereotypes which propaganda had already implemented in the minds of the audiences. And – which is perhaps even more symptomatic – journalists openly justified such forgery by claiming that it did not matter whether the pictures were faked since they only showed what people already ‘knew’ and since they served the goal of opening the eyes of the public.

Martin Bell is right when he claims that journalists exercise a certain influence and that they have to know that. He also points out that such influence may be for better or worse and that journalists need to be aware of this too. But the way in which Journalism of Attachment deals with this responsibility only adds fuel to the fire. And – as always in war propaganda – this is done in the name of peace.

2. War discourse as the normal case

If journalists really want to contribute to the end of war, to the de-escalation of conflicts or to the strengthening of peace processes, they do need insight into the influence of the media and the responsibility of journalism. They also perhaps do need a sense of moral outrage. But, in addition, they do need an all-sided view on the conflict, unconditional obligation to standards of truth and a clear stand in the logic of peaceful transformation of conflicts.

Even if no systematic propaganda – whether privatized or state propaganda – takes place, the way in which the media operate – reporting on war and violence – often causes them to support those societal beliefs that maintain and escalate intractable conflicts. Thus, the media can end up serving as catalysts for unleashing violence rather than contributing to de-escalation and constructive, nonviolent conflict transformation (see Galtung, 1997 and chapter 14 below).

Under the political constraints of the Cold War, the governmental rhetoric of power and violence was adopted by the media as the ‘official discourse’. ‘Peace talk’ was tagged as ‘communist’ and ‘challenger discourse’, with low penetration into general-audience media (see Shinar, 1998). This preference for war discourse resulted in the absence – with far-reaching implications – of peace discourse in the repertoire of media professionals and, at the same time, also changed the consumption habits of the general public.

War discourse reduces conflicts to force and violence. It contains little knowledge of the dynamics of conflict and no ideas for alternatives to violence. Even journalists who feel obliged to traditional standards of truth and objectivity tend to paint pictures in black and white, often reducing conflicts to simple antagonisms in order to make news stories more thrilling and the conflict more understandable for the audience.

Particularly in societies involved in intractable conflict, there is a further reason for the preference of war discourse by journalists. Journalists usually share the beliefs of the society to which they belong, and – in particular – they share those societal beliefs which enable the society to cope with the conflict.

Intractable conflicts are demanding, stressful, painful, exhausting and costly both in human and material terms. This requires that society members develop conditions which enable successful coping. One aspect of the conditions provided by war culture is a psychological infrastructure that consists, for example, of devotion to one's own side and its leadership, maintenance of its objectives, high motivation to contribute, and endurance and readiness for personal sacrifice. Societal beliefs – society members' shared cognition on topics and issues that are of special concern for their society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness – fulfill an important role in the formation of these psychological conditions. They are part of a society's ethos and construct society members' view of the conflict; they motivate them to act on behalf of the society and to harm the enemy (Bar-Tal 1998).

According to Bar-Tal, these societal beliefs include beliefs about the justness of own goals, beliefs about security and how it can be achieved, beliefs about positive self-image, beliefs about own victimization, beliefs that delegitimize the enemy, beliefs about patriotism and about the uniqueness of the society, and – finally – beliefs about peace as its ultimate desire.

These beliefs are far from being sufficient to win a conflict. Other conditions of military, political and economic natures must also be fulfilled. But the psychological conditions are necessary for enduring the intractable conflict. Any warring nation, therefore, tries to produce and maintain these beliefs by means of propaganda. Nonetheless, these beliefs are not just the outcome of propaganda but result from psychological processes that take place whenever a conflict is conceptualized as an antagonistic process.

3. Constructive conflicts

Peace culture is not a state of eternal harmony. But it is sort of a social contract which enables society members to deal with (internal and external) conflicts within a cooperative environment.


In every conflict, there are own rights and intentions and there are actions by an opponent that interfere with these and are experienced as threats. The opponent also experiences a perception of threat when our actions interfere with his or her rights and intentions. Still, there is some kind of common ground: there are common rights and intentions and a common benefit resulting from the relationship between the two parties which may give reason for mutual trust (see figure 1).

So far, any conflict is open for conceptualization either as a cooperative or as a competitive process. Yet systematic divergence of perspectives makes it difficult for the parties in a conflict to come to such an all-sided view on the conflict (Kempf, 1996b).

Divergence of perspectives means that each of the parties focus on their own rights and intentions and on the threat to which they are exposed by the opponent's actions, which – at the same time – seem to threaten common rights and objectives as well as the common benefit (see figure 2).

This divergence of perspectives produces a slight bias towards interpreting the conflict as a competitive situation, especially if there is little communication between the parties or if they do not have a strong basis of mutual cooperation. This bias is not very severe, however, and a cooperative environment can take the edge off it.

Figure 1. The conflict constellation




In a cooperative environment, the conflict can be conceptualized according to a win-win model that deals with the conflict as a common problem which both sides try to resolve in a way which serves both sides' needs and interests (Deutsch, 1973). The process of cooperation enables the parties to negotiate in a constructive atmosphere, in which none of them feels threatened and in which mutual trust stimulates open and honest communication between the parties as well as the exchange of knowledge and information without the need to hide points of weakness and vulnerability.

Open communication reduces the danger of misunderstandings. It enables the parties to explore their interests behind the issues at conflict, to elaborate a more adequate definition of what the real problem is that has to be resolved and to optimize their contributions to resolving the problem.

Operating as a team encourages the parties to have empathy for each other and to respect their mutual needs and interests. The process of cooperation thus reduces defensive strategies and produces positive attitudes towards each other, which make the partners more sensitive to things in common and reduce the importance of differences.

All these effects of cooperation reduce the intensity of the conflict and make violent escalation less probable. There is, however a risk involved in these: relevant issues might be disregarded, or the partners might invest too little energy in exploring differences, and as a result they might agree to a hasty solution of the problem which does not prove to be stable.

Figure 2. Divergence of perspectives



If this happens, disappointment about failure will strengthen the bias towards interpreting the conflict as a competitive situation. Neutral third parties can play an important role in avoiding this. However, because of the way in which media operate, most often they do not take the role of a neutral third party. Despite professional ideology, according to which the task of journalists is merely to report facts, the media usually interpret facts in the framework of a win-lose model, according to which each party can only win at the expense of the other.

4. Destructive conflicts

In a competitive environment, however, conflicts have a tendency to spread and to escalate. This may lead to an inflation of issues, and the conflict may continue long after the original issues have lost their relevance (or even have been forgotten).

The process of competition reduces the communication between the parties. Existing resources for communication are either neglected or used for intimidation or delusion of the opponent. The opponent's statements or declarations are not believed, and available information is mistrusted in accordance with existing prejudice.

The principle of competition suggests that a resolution of the conflict is only possible at the expense of the opponent and can only be enforced against his resistance (Deutsch, 1973). Accordingly, it supports the use of more and more drastic –

and, in the end, even violent – means in order to enforce own goals. Finally, the competitive process leads to mistrust and enmification of the parties and thus reduces their sensitivity for common grounds and increases their sensitivity for differences. The parties concentrate on strategies of power and tactics of threat, pressure and fraud.

This tendency to escalate the conflict results:

- at the level of issues, from the competitive win–lose principle, which makes the parties want to win the conflict (whatever the costs may be);
- at the level of attitudes, from the misinterpretation of the opponent's actions and his or her intentions; and
- at the level of behaviour, from the process of social commitment, combined with victory as the primary goal to be achieved.

Competition between groups also effects the social structure within groups (Blake & Mouton, 1961). The coherence of the in-group becomes stronger. Group members identify more strongly with their group. Group members that are outstanding in the conflict rise in social rank order. Leadership is transferred to persons that stand for a confrontative strategy. Victory becomes the main goal, and group members who show readiness for compromising are marginalized as traitors. Unyielding belligerents are praised as heroes, and neutral third parties are disqualified if they do not intervene to the benefit of the own side.

These changes also effect the negotiation behaviour between groups (Blake & Mouton, 1962). Group members tend to overemphasize suggestions of the own side and to reject those that come from the other group. They also show a tendency to block negotiations rather than to try to find a solution which can also be accepted by the opposite side.

The escalation of conflict (see figure 3) progresses through three major levels, each of which is defined by a specific conceptualization of the conflict (Kempf, 1996b).


On the first level, the conflict is conceptualized as a competitive situation, based on a win–lose model.

The process which leads from win–win to win–lose can be described in three steps (see Glasl, 1992).

1. The first step is characterized by the hardening of positions. At this starting point of conflict escalation, cooperation still predominates but sometimes it leads to a clash of standpoints.
2. At the second step, the parties begin a debate, characterized by an unstable balance between cooperative and competitive attitudes, that goes hand in hand with the polarization of standpoints, cognition, emotions and intentions.
3. At the third step, competitive behaviour becomes predominant. The parties confront each other with settled facts, rather than expending time on unnecessary words.

If one of the parties feels hurt or fears being hurt even more, the conflict escalates into struggle: The parties start to fight each other; hurting the opponent becomes a

Figure 3. Steps of conflict escalation



goal of its own; none of them will show any weakness; and the opponent starts to be demonized (Creighton, 1992).

The process of escalation into fighting can again be described in three steps (see Glasl, 1992).

1. As a first step, the parties start to invest in image and coalitions. They push each other into negative roles and search for adherents and coalition partners.
2. As a next step, the opponent loses face. The whole person of the opponent appears in a new (negative) light, and positive experiences during the past are reinterpreted as negative.
3. Finally, the parties resort to strategies of threat. Violence has not yet broken out, but is taken into account as a possible option, and the parties try to force each other by the threat of violent consequences.

Struggle finally escalates into warfare if the physical or mental death of the opponent becomes an objective or if violence is used in order to force the opponent to give in. At this level of conflict escalation, the parties do not view each other as human any more, only as enemies. Communication and negotiations degenerate to the continu-

ation of warfare by verbal means: Every word said (as well as silence) is used as a weapon, and every word heard (also including silence) is interpreted as the use of arms. Even if the opponent tries to reduce the conflict, this is only regarded as a tactical maneuver or as an attempt at manipulation.

The mutual violence becomes the main issue of the conflict, and in the end the parties even may lose sight of their original goals. They no more fight in order to enforce their goals at the expense of the opponent; they only fight in order to keep the opponent from victory. The conflict becomes a zero-sum game, in which there is only one goal, that is, to win; and to win means not to be the loser.

The escalation of warfare into this lose–lose situation can – again – be described in three steps (see Glasl, 1992).

1. At the first step, the strategy of the opponents is still restricted to limited blows of destruction. In order to endure the casualties they suffer, the parties reverse their values into their opposites: relatively little damage is already regarded as a benefit.
2. At the second step, paralysis of the enemy system becomes the main objective.
3. Finally, it may come to total war, which leads the parties together into ruin. There is no way back, and the enemy has to be destroyed, even at the expense of own life.


5. Cognitive change during conflict escalation

During this process of conflict escalation, which can be observed not only in political conflicts but also in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts, the parties step by step apply more drastic means in order to enforce their goals. Since the use of drastic means violates ethical norms and is often subject to both social and juridical sanctions, this calls for special legitimization. This legitimization is provided by changes in the cognitive representation of the conflict which affect the conceptualization of the conflict and evaluation of the parties' rights and goals, actions and the resulting emotional involvement in the conflict (see Kempf, 1996b).

When the parties interpret the conflict as a win–lose situation, they enter into a competitive process in which common rights and intentions, along with the common benefit that stems from the parties' mutual relationship, tend to get out of sight. Mutual trust is lost. The cognitive representation of the conflict is reduced to the parties' own rights and intentions and to the threat which results from the opponents' actions (see figure 4).

In the course of further escalation from competition to struggle, the parties' behaviour and attitudes become increasingly hostile. This hostility calls for justification. Accordingly, the opponent's rights start to be denied, and his or her intentions are demonized. Own actions that interfere with the opponent's rights and intentions are justified, and one's own strength is emphasized. As a counterpart to the perceived threat from the opponent, confidence in the own side's victory and in the prevailing of own rights and intentions emerges. At the same time, these own rights and intentions tend to be idealized. Actions by the opponent, that interfere with them are condemned, and the dangerousness of the opponent is underlined. The

Figure 4. Competition




threat posed to the opponent is denied. The opponent's attacks appear as unjustified and bring about mistrust against him or her (figure 5).

Finally, further escalation to warfare reduces the perception of the conflict to military logic: Peaceful alternatives are refuted. Mistrust against the enemy is stimulated. Common interests that might provide a basis for nonviolent, constructive conflict resolution are denied, as are possibilities of cooperation with the enemy. (Justified) indignation with the war is converted into (self-righteous) indignation with the enemy: the common suffering that the war brings about, as well as the common benefit that a peaceful conflict resolution could entail, cannot be seen any more (see figure 6).

It is exactly this image of the conflict which propaganda tries to produce in order to improve and maintain both the fighting spirit of the soldiers and the civilians' readiness to make sacrifices. And, it is also this image of the conflict which finally results in the societal beliefs that help society members to endure the war.

Once these beliefs have emerged in a society, they provide a framework that interprets literally every interaction with the opponent as another scene in the big drama of antagonism between Good and Evil. And once an event has been interpreted in this way, it seemingly provides proof of the stereotypes and prejudices that created this interpretation. There is no way out of this vicious circle, unless we learn to accept facts before they are interpreted (see Martin-Baró, 1991). However, the more a conflict has escalated, the more difficult this becomes.

Figure 5. Struggle



6. Fundamental contradictions of war culture


War culture is based on fundamental contradictions. First is the contradiction between beliefs that security will be achieved by enduring antagonism and confrontation with the enemy and beliefs about peace as the ultimate desire of society.

Second, there is an immanent contradiction on which enduring antagonism itself is based: in order to stimulate the society members' fighting spirit, the enemy is portrayed as dangerous and inhuman; at the same time, the enemy is also described as not being dangerous and as human, so that the members of the society do not lose courage, are certain of victory and do not get scared by the prospect of possible defeat.

A prominent example of these immanent contradictions is the Cold War logic that legitimated the stationing of medium-range missiles and cruise missiles in Western Germany during the early 1980s. Although emphasis was placed on the need to deter the 'inhumanitarian Soviet Union' from war, reference was simultaneously made to the good will of the Soviet Union (which was supposed to be interested in protecting Europe from destruction) as the only security guarantee which would prevent the nuclear armament race from resulting in the destruction of Central Europe (see Kempf, 1986).

Contradictions like this are typical of war culture and interweave propaganda and traditional war reporting on all levels, from the explanation of the logic of history (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 2000) via the explanation of the conflict

Figure 6. Warfare/Propaganda



sources (see Elfner, 1998) and the evaluation of alternatives to violence (see chapter 12 below) down to the coverage of day-to-day atrocities (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996).

War culture thus places the members of the society into a permanent double-bind situation (see chapter 10 below), where they have to cope with contradictory messages and lack the opportunity either to react to both of the messages or to withdraw from the situation.

As a result of emotional involvement with both contradictory messages, it becomes extremely difficult to query either of them. If society members have no access to independent information, they have no other choice than to believe the conclusions they are told by their political leaders or to withdraw into selective inattentance, prejudice or evasive skepticism etc. – all of which are consequences that serve the goals of psychological warfare by paralyzing the capacity for resistance to the war (see Kempf, 1992).

7. Propaganda and war reporting

If journalists spread the same antagonistic, reduced and distorted images of a conflict as do political and military élites (see Herman & Chomsky, 1988), this is not (or at least not in any case) due to a conspiracy between policymakers and the media but rather results from the mere fact that journalists are society members themselves.

1. As members of the society, journalists usually share the societal beliefs which help official propaganda to achieve plausibility. Accordingly, the propaganda image is as plausible for journalists as it is for the rest of society.
2. Journalists are subject to the same social pressure as the rest of society. They cannot refute the propaganda image without running the risk of losing status and influence.
3. Journalists need to find an audience. If their news stories and editorials do not fit into the societal beliefs, they might be rejected.
4. Journalists use the élites as sources of information. Accordingly, a good deal of the information on which journalistic work is based is not mere facts but facts which are already interpreted in an antagonistic way.
5. Since élites are a prominent subject of coverage, most of the news stories are stories about those who are on the forefront of antagonism.

Accordingly, it is no surprise if the media coverage is prone to the same systematic distortions in the cognitive representation of conflicts as the rest of the society. Nonetheless, there are at least three turning-points where the media not only mirror the mind-set of the society (and thus function as catalysts of conflict escalation) but play an active role in stimulating the process of conflict escalation beyond its actual level.

1. The first of these turning-points is due to miscoverage of escalated conflicts below the threshold of violence. As long as violence has not yet broken out, the media give little attention to conflicts.¹
2. The second turning-point is due to journalists' habit of interpreting conflicts within a win-lose framework. When journalists take notice of a conflict, finally, they often rush to antagonistic conclusions without adequate analysis of the conflict constellation.²
3. The third turning-point is due to the journalists' devotion to élites, which makes them especially vulnerable to official propaganda. Journalists rather try to make propaganda plausible to their audience than be critical about it.³

As journalists are members of the society themselves, they are vulnerable also to the same processes of social identification with the own sides' élites, soldiers and victims and to the dehumanization of those on the opposing side.

In order to write appealing news stories, journalists tend to dramatize the events, humanize their own political and military leaders and feature their own side's victims in great detail and context. Reproaches against the enemy are delivered in a convincing style, which permits no criticism or alternative interpretations whatsoever and often features corroboration from an authority figure. The featuring of the enemy's actions makes use of an aggravating choice of words and searches for responsibility at the top (see Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Kempf & Reimann, 1994).


There is little difference between propaganda and war reporting. And, as long as journalists do not know about the social processes to which they are subject, there is little chance that this will change.

8. De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage

If a piece of journalism looks like propaganda, this does not necessarily mean that it was systematically written for propaganda purposes. It might as well be that the respective journalists became victims of a heated public atmosphere themselves. We also should not forget that orientation towards conflict escalation is – more or less – the normal thing in Western culture. But if journalists claim to be aware of their responsibilities, if they know about the influence they have and if they know that this influence may be for better or worse, they must not continue to paint the world in the same colors of black and white as the warlords do.

To take journalistic responsibility does not mean to replace war propaganda with peace propaganda. Nor does it imply a strategy of appeasement. But it does imply dismissing simple antagonisms between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.

Figure 7. De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage



In order to counterbalance the dynamics of conflict escalation and to add to the constructive transformation of conflicts, however, it is not sufficient that journalists remain neutral: they have to abandon the complete framework of war and military logic (see Kempf, 1996b). Journalists can take responsibility only if they base their work on a better understanding of conflicts and if they take into account that none of the parties in the conflict have absolute standards of truth.

De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage would have to involve the questioning of war and military logic, the respecting of the opponent's rights and an unbiased coverage of his or her intentions. It would have to include a self-critical and realistic view of own goals, and it must take into account that the opponent might also feel threatened and in acting in a defensive role.

For this purpose, a critical evaluation of own actions would be required, together with an unbiased evaluation of the opponent's actions – even if they appear to be dangerous. Furthermore, it is necessary to reduce the enemies' feelings of being under threat, and the price that has to be paid for military victory must be recognized. Last but not least, de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage requires explicit demands for peaceful alternatives. It must maintain a critical distance from both sides' belligerents, and it must be critical towards both sides' actions. It has to emphasize common rights and interests and to search for signals of readiness for peace on both sides. It has to cover the harm that the war causes on both sides and to describe the benefit that both sides could gain from putting an end to war (see figure 7).

Notes

1. An example for this is the ten years of nonviolent resistance of the Albanian civil rights movement in Kosovo, which was largely ignored by the international media.
2. When, for instance, France nominated its own candidate for the position of President of the European Currency Bank in November 1997, elements of the German press (see *Südkurier*, 11 November 1997) commented on this (limited) French–German conflict as if it had already escalated into a struggle for national dominance within the European Union.
3. The New World Order rhetoric during the Gulf War (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 2000) can serve as a striking example.

TV Wars, the Audience and the Public

Oddgeir Tveiten

‘Why study television?, Robert C. Allen once asked. ‘For starters, because it’s undeniably, unavoidably “there”. And, it seems, everywhere’, he added (1992: 1). It is, in short, the omnipresence of television that gives reason for so much concern, in ways that have served to both connect and disconnect media research from the broader study of politics and conflict resolution from which it originated. Theories and methodologies in media studies have dealt with the geographical outreach of transmission signals now encompassing the globe. They have addressed the expansion of an American way of saying and doing things on television. In terms of news, analysis has focused on the kind of political deepening that, paradoxically, follows from television’s often shallow reporting of world events. Television has, it is argued, also introduced a new level of personal and private scandal into politics. It has intensified the speed of exchange in world politics, and it has contributed to an increasing awareness of its own omnipotence. Hence, politics are increasingly dependent on spin control, while politicians, audiences and publics alike are – increasingly, but unevenly – aware of that fact.¹

In this article, I will discuss some of these aspects of television in relation to audience perspectives, as such traditions might pertain to the study of contemporary warfare.² Audiences’ use of the media may not necessarily have a political context, and it goes without saying that my comments are limited to a broad overview, lacking in the sort of detail that a more extensive literature review might have provided. My article is not a literature review as much as an attempt to formulate a new position based on works from a broad range of perspectives. Other articles in this volume highlight perspectives that are of relevance to audience studies, while not necessarily dealing with the topic in a particular sense. Let me add that although media audiences may not necessarily be an aspect of political communication, society is no doubt affected in a political way by the long term calibration of societal values that television propounds. Hence, the article seeks to address both long-term and short-term aspects of media influences, criss-crossing between news formats and other television formats that seem to have a bearing on news analysis of audiences and their news reception.

The gist of my argument is this: Television is often said to be a prime vehicle for propaganda and spin. It is said to contribute to what Richard Sennett once labelled an ‘intimisation’ of the public sphere’ (1976), where the personal life of political

actors takes the place of their political gains and problems (read: Clintongate). It should be apparent that these two aspects of television analysis – spin and propaganda – have much in common, but their intersection is in some ways diffuse. They raise rather different theoretical questions. The concept of ‘spin’ connotes spectacle, intimidation and vulgarization. Propaganda, on the other hand, adds a more ominous sense of power exercised through misinformation. No doubt, there are many definitions and many ways of understanding terms such as these. However, when President Bill Clinton signed the papers ending the war in Kosovo, we were reminded to consistently and constantly address the question of how television as a medium affects the escalation of war as well as the formulation of peace processes. A sense of directness, an appeal to a certain mood, a fragmented reality – and at the same time the center of political attention, where things ‘happen’ that have immediate effect on individuals and institutions.

1. How global television changed the face of warfare

The availability of television news from distant places in a few seconds represents just a brief period of media history, but it may still be difficult to envisage how people responded to war in times prior to television. For instance, Ignatieff (1998) notes that one hundred and fifty years after Jean-Henri Dunant got his initial shock at seeing dead and dying soldiers left in the mud at Solferino (in 1859), warfare has changed beyond recognition. Dunant went on to found the Red Cross on the basis of the horror that he saw on that battlefield. For one hundred years, the ICRC (Red Cross) and other humanitarian organizations carried out their work on those battlefields with only remote connections to the general public around the world. During the last 50 years, however, massacres have become a regular staple in television news. We have all seen them. Soldiers seem to be younger than they were. They do not march in neat ranks. And what we have come to recognize is that, contrary to what was often said during the Gulf war and before, it is not truth that is the first casualty of war, but humanity. Something comes before deception, namely, that which lies can serve to hide. The death of human beings and the way they die runs prior to the reporting of death and dying – at least for most people outside the news profession. And that order of things has not changed, although surprisingly few media scholars seem to question the neat idea that truth ‘dies’ first. It never does, and it never has. To say that truth is the first casualty of war is to assume that truth is attainable through rigor, method and systematic pursuit – whereas to say that war reporting and conflict journalism has its own narrative and discursive specificity, is to somewhat change the focus:

For practical purposes, the slogan ‘the first casualty of war is the truth’ refers to a process where commonly shared journalistic rules of ‘complete as possible’ reporting are, in a sense, suspended. In times of war, concerns with national security, the safety of soldiers and the weighing of the public’s right to know against the concern with what the enemy might learn from news dispatches, come into play in journalism. Some journalists readily accept these practices. Others contest and oppose them. Furthermore, the emergence of modern television twists that screw around one more time. Take the incident in Chechnya in December 1996, for example: Six relief workers from the Red Cross were killed by war-bands. A similar ambush of three

others occurred in Burundi in June the same year. As a media story, the tragedies were reported everywhere in a short period of time, for very good reasons. However, those responsible for the deeds attained global media attention. As with the conscious use of refugees to score points in the game for public opinion, not to mention the deployment of human shields in order to fight a mobilization war of public opinion, television offers considerably more effective means of attention-grabbing than do newspapers.

Modern warfare's toll on civilian life is a fact that predates television, but the future course of that development is tied to television, as the Chechnya incident shows well enough. ICRC relief workers were for decades respected by all warring parties, because the organization guarded its neutrality with a zeal that only a Swiss institution could. For that, the Red Cross received considerable international criticism. But, despite the criticism, few on the war fields questioned the right of the Red Cross to travel through war zones. It was a right that was based *entirely* on trust. And this was something the employees of the Red Cross well knew. Later, as warfare moved from the orchestrated battlefield to the streets and back alleys, there occurred a change not only in the amount of information that any given media audience might have at a certain time, but also in the soldiers' attitudes (Ignatieff, 1998). Not only did soldiers become younger. Not only did more people receive guns and gun training than before. The warrior's code of honour degenerated, and it did so in parallel with the development of a field of news reporting where war atrocities steadily became more visible to the public in countries around the world.

To say that television is a causal factor in this scenario would be a simplification. However, to say that the development of global television is irrelevant to this change in soldier attitudes would be equally meaningless. Television has immediate consequences for a whole range of social practices related to war. The development of television technology is part of a communications revolution that has effectively brought warfare into the everyday life of civilians, and into the everyday life of civilians in distant places, as a way of seeing – *gazing*, *gawking* or attentively *looking* at social phenomena which (ought to) concern us. Television stories from massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia have a certain feature in common with occurrences in Iraq or Afghanistan. They represent not just political tragedies, nor senselessly successful attempts at obtaining international attention; they also represent a social change that we are perhaps only beginning to connect to the analysis of wars on television. There is something new about the mental 'places' that television's collective conscience occupies in our daily lives, places that have certain rooms for suffering people and certain 'doors' that we walk through or pass by as audiences and publics. Death is difficult story material in the news. In contemporary Western society, knowledge of violent death is largely a 'seeing knowledge' or an abstraction, a register of metaphors that crosscuts between fictional and factual narrative.

The dominant narrative forms of contemporary television reporting change the public anticipation of where suffering and dying are supposed to take place. When television was invented, suffering was certainly not supposed to take place in the living room as a mix of current affairs and entertainment. It had a different social space. Once, a long time before the advent of television, the sick and the poor of Western cities sought refuge in highly public spaces – in and around the many churches that one would find in a typical town (Ignatieff, 1998; Sennett, 1990). The churches would be easy to see, as they had central positions in the urban architec-

ture. And there would be many of them, as they were central to the public life of their time. There would be no hospitals like those of present times, as medicine and caring were both more theological and private matters than they are today. In front of the churches where the suffering and sick would gather, there existed a zone which, in a sense, compares to the realm of the televised suffering of today and at the same time is completely different. All citizens passing by, to practice their religion in the sanctity of the church building on the other side of the plaza, were expected to give alms according to their state and place in society. Thus, suffering was in part God's matter and in part a public matter. Coming to worship meant passing through that zone, where the sight of depravity could not be escaped: one could not simply step over the lame and the blind and go into the church and receive communion.

In fact, Ignatieff and Sennett offer an echo of the dominant theme in Weber's (1904) classic analysis in *The Protestant Work Ethic*: Inner life was fundamentally linked to a sense of public responsibility. If one could avoid the sick, poor and dying at other times, one could not in the face of God. And God was an omnipotent presence. In our day, God and sickness have become institutionalized and compartmentalized in sub-societies. Over the course of a century, the sick and suffering people have been organized in public or private hospitals. Modernization in part also entails a transfer of religion from the religious realm to the civic, in the form of a secular culture of healing and the right to heal. I will argue that the most fundamental change that comes with television reporting is a process that follows two tracks simultaneously. On the first of these tracks, more suffering is brought into the horizon of the general public. Suffering 'far away' fills the void left after the institutionalization of 'sickness in our midst'. But it is a different suffering, in the sense that television can only represent it as pseudo-real. In other words, we have less materially real suffering in our midst and more suffering that is either fictional or materially real in some other place.

And this process builds up under the second track of (post)modernization, which is this one: the emergence of a spectator's view on the suffering of 'The Other'. Notice the presence of self-reflection in the media, on the part of politicians and journalists. We all inhale their joint expressions of a concern with the future of everything: the future of NATO, the future of warfare, the future of politics, the future of refugees. We are treated to the improbable scene of a British Prime Minister walking around a refugee camp in sandals, without a tie. There is always TV space to fill if the story is good. And Tony Blair sitting cross-legged in the company of refugees in Kosovo is a good story. From the media audiences' point of view, there is seemingly nothing one can do except to keep watching – knowing that the refugees who met Mr. Blair place much more hope in his presence than any Western television viewer can do. Suffering occurs too far away, and the ways it is brought to our attention are not necessarily those ways that engender the most civil response. Times have changed. In Kant's and Schiller's Europe, one could walk anywhere in almost any city, and there would be a church or several in sight. The churches are still there, but they no longer provide sanctuary, other than for the soul. Where the 'inner' and the 'outer' once met in public, television now appeals mostly to the inner – in often questionable ways.

Parallel to the increasingly visible suffering of 'Distant Others' in wartime, Western societies have concealed ageing, sickness, death and suffering of its own citi-

zens. As already discussed, this is an aspect of a change of mentality of Western society, just as it is a change of institutional structures. That is only to say that the modern welfare state has shifted the responsibility of caring for the sick from the family to the state, and from the home setting to the hospital setting, with resulting changes in our belief structures. Taxes and welfare states take care of the needy, and each individual is left to make emotional and cognitive room for the need to reconcile one's own well-being with awareness of the external world. Not only has caring for the suffering then moved from the religious to the secular, it has also largely moved out of our collective conscience. And that is a rather fundamental social movement, a social history of changing ideas that are related to the advent of television. But it is neither a cause nor an effect of it. One does not do television analysis credit by overlooking the scope of this social history – or its relation to the analysis of the media in wartime. That is why the term 'audience' alone is as meaningless as the term 'public' would be alone in an analysis of how television impacts on contemporary violent-conflict resolution. The two belong together, and the connection between them has something to do with our (muted) sense of collective pain.

2. Global media events: A narratological perspective

The concerns above dealt with the potential of television to induce a rearrangement of social values and social spaces. The concern in the following pages begins at that juncture and then traces a pattern more directly to the analysis of television texts. When attempting to formulate linkages between the text and the social context of its use, we should keep in mind not only a need to view television texts in the widest possible of social settings. We also have to keep in mind that some aspects of the Western modernization process – of which television is a part – are more/less generalizable than others. It is always interesting to construe theories and methodologies that are general in nature. Indeed, many aspects of global television invite a general theory, since the texts represent a basis from which to postulate at least some generalizations. On the other hand, audience analysis often places emphasis on cultural specificity.

In the middle range between the general and the specific, one finds approaches to the study of television such as the sort of television analysis offered by Elihu Katz and Daniel Dayan in their already classic text *Global Media Events. The Live Broadcast of History* (1991).³ Four arguments run through their assessments: (1) Television has the capacity to transfix events in the real world. (2) When television does, it does so according to a highly limited set of archetypal narratives. (3) These narratives have the common feature that they seek to draw the viewer into a kind of viewing that is both public and participatory. (4) And finally, such events are not confineable to a single program, but are rather ongoing, unusual and intervening events that push routine programming aside. Television has the capacity for transposing a happening in the world into a different 'setting', they argue. Like the festive occasions of Prince Charles wedding Lady Diana, or Pope John Paul II returning to Poland, some news events are altogether too big to fit routine news.⁴ Katz and Dayan say that the three, dominant archetypal news narratives might be termed the *Contest*, the *Conquest* and the *Coronation*. A typical *contest* involves two antagonists, playing out a game of power and influence, in a setting where there is a set of (at least implied)

rules. There is a mode of conduct, an arena and the necessity of marking a winner. The *conquest narrative* is different. Here, the story is about the winning; it is not about the game. The rationale of conquest is a rationale of promoting one's own worldview, and doing so through questioning the worldview of others. There is a sense in which the antagonists are at battle for something resolute and final. There is no possibility of shared settlement. Finally, the *coronation narratives* come in the form of the celebrating of victory. The prototypical event would be the already mentioned return of Pope John Paul II to Poland. The release of Nelson Mandela from Robben Island is another candidate, but if one thinks back to that day, the fact was that nobody really knew what would happen, how Mandela would respond, how 'statesmanlike' he would walk out of a lifetime in prison. Hence, television reporters had had little time to prepare the relevant props. However, that too is an argument in line with Katz and Dayan. They state that a crucial element in such media events is their 'writing of history – as it occurs'.

One sees readily the relevance of Katz and Dayan's framework to the analysis of television and the Gulf War in all three archetypal narratives. Nor is it difficult to grasp the common ground with the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, if not to say the tense days during the June 1999 peace implementation attempt. What makes extraordinary news stand out as something entirely different than regular news, according to Katz and Dayan, is that their extraordinary qualities appeal to a sense of difference and contrast. Katz and Dayan use the term 'high holidays' to describe how such extraordinary news events have the capacity to bring people out of their ordinary routines and gather – as publics – to engage in a special kind of ritual. Television news is the means, but not the occasion. For (brief) periods of time, television news events, like a war, or like the funeral of a princess, transfix a public – the news becomes the realm of a rite of passage, also for the public. One is taken out of routine life, collectively.

One might want to say much more about the relevance of this kind of reasoning. What it does, in general, is to introduce into the vocabulary of content analysis a different way of speaking – where producers of media content, the content itself and the audiences' public usage of that media content is viewed in a more coherent whole. Katz and Dayan are for one thing working from within and without the tradition of audience studies and public opinion research. The anthropologist Dayan has added a (somewhat structuralism-inspired) perspective on the rituals of human communication to the political science orientation of Katz. Katz had however already arrived there part way in his own analysis of how Americans and Israelis interpreted differently the meaning of the soap opera *Dallas*. What the two seek to do is to (re-)unite the study of news meaning with the study of audience reception. In their opinion, a story never has a singular, fixed interpretation. And for that reason they state in an extensive appendix that the critical theory of the Frankfurt School is as lopsided about media effects as are both traditional studies of propaganda and the generally ideology-uncritical, US-originating analyses of media audiences.

To say that audiences interpret news texts in different ways is not the same as to say that there are no ideological confrontations left. Katz and Dayan's argument is rather that global media events represent a specific type of interlocution between publics and their corresponding political centres. Such centres may be separated geographically by very large distances. At the same time, they must be conceived of

as publics and political centres identifying themselves with an increasingly global media-centred public sphere. It is only the analysis of media use as *transnationally shared ritual* that can begin to trace the complexities of the role of television in the global context.

3. Television wars from Korea to Yugoslavia: From content to context analysis

In a sense, the Korean War was the first television war, occurring at a time when a fairly extensive audience, especially in the USA, had a means of following television news. The Vietnam War was the first truly television-influenced war, however. The teleprompter and the starring anchors that have later become staples in the television news industry were also then part of a development that may be characterized as the gradual privileging of the visual at the expense of the verbal – and in some ways the gradual penetration of a prototypical American way of producing television texts. Then, as now, it was a privileging of the pseudo-instantaneous over the truly spontaneous, as well as the triumph of image over critical journalism (Fallows, 1996). The connection to contemporary television is clear, just as it also shows how the medium has changed and expanded. ‘Peter Arnett live from Baghdad’ – decades later – was of course an instantaneous news event where a respected journalist figured in the centre, but it was also a demonstration of the lessened relevance that strictly verbal accounts have in the television age. When CNN soared in the ratings during the Gulf War, this was not because of Peter Arnett’s talking, but rather because of the privileged access that CNN had to news from the inside. Drama and spectacle held the ground, more so than a steady flow of new facts. Then, as later, it was the possibility of instantaneous transmission of photography that was the foundation. Hence, one might add a third aspect that has become steadily more apparent as we have traversed from Korea via Vietnam to the Gulf via Grenada and onwards to Kosovo via Bosnia: The message of the television medium is itself crucial. Television ‘speaks’ in its own way, with its own intonation.

The most telling difference between print news and television news is the role of ‘place’ in the narrative, as we have discussed. As with the war in Vietnam, so it has been demonstrated in later wars, famines and catastrophes: Television does not just tell the story of what happened ‘there’. More so than print news, television tells that story by invoking in our collective imaginings what is common and sacred ‘here’, to ‘us’. Witness the parallel stories of bombings and refugees from Kosovo. The refugee stories made us identify with the plight of the people of Kosovo. At the same time, the refugee stories had obvious propaganda elements, just as they occurred in a sometimes utterly surreal context, mixed with soap commercials and the sale of summer vacation tickets to the friendly Mediterranean. From a methodological point of view, one might recall Raymond Williams (1976), who noted that television news is both the singular programme and the steady ‘flow’, the ongoing stream of meanings and utterances. In that flow, one might add, television transmits the suffering of The Other in a symbolic universe of washing detergents, food abundance, recreation and weather announcements – utterly removed from the places that suffering used to occupy in the collective consciousness of nations, cities and villages. Were it

not for that quality of the news *as flow*, it would be much easier to analyse television news as being about ‘that’ event or ‘this’ episode.

Context, in other words, has a different implication in the universe of signs and symbols in television news than it does in print news. Much research has been focused on audiences and reception in recent years, from that point of view. Three methodological relationships may be highlighted when we try to make use of this in the study of televised war from the audience point of view. On the one hand, it is not clear what constitutes the story’s content vis-a-vis its context. Where does the text end and the interpretation begin, given that it is the audience interpretation that we are after? Secondly, how active is the audience really in its interpretation – and what sort of empirical data is warranted in order to elicit that question? Third, only a truly grand-scale methodological operation can bring these concerns from the microcosm of living-room audience analysis and into the macrocosm of international politics – from the point of view of public mobilization, or the mobilization of publics.

Possibly, Ignatieff’s (1998) way of looking at the meaning of television news from war zones is a way of putting such research into the context of war journalism. Ignatieff presents a convincing argument that there is yet much to learn about the implications of the television medium in contemporary conflicts. As I have tried to show, one aspect of this is the changes that occur from one conflict to the next. Such changes have to do with new technologies in themselves, but they also concern a gradually increasing elite concern with media spin, added to the increasingly sophisticated ways of controlling news operations. In every new war where the Western media take an interest, there seems to be a mutation of the known techniques of information control.

Ignatieff writes from the television producer’s and the historian’s point of view, summing up the matter concisely. Television news from wars is in part a content-analysis matter, in part a matter of understanding the contexts of the political interests being pursued – and in part it is a cultural history of the emergence of new media. And here, the term ‘culture’ is taken in a very wide sense to mean general practices of social life and the meanings people give to it. According to Ignatieff, news reporting from Vietnam was not critical in the sense that it campaigned for a speedy resolution to the conflict on a principle level. Neither was it the case that political attitudes changed as a result of a public debate on the moral grounds of war. The ending of the Vietnam conflict was far from a moral crusade like the civil rights march on Washington. Journalism, and television in particular, was part of a cultural tide. ‘There are fashions in morals as there are fashions in clothes. Television followed moral fashions on the Vietnam War; it did not create them’, he writes (1998: 23). Neither did practitioners of Vietnam politics act independently of the media and the ebb and flow of moral sentiment in US society in the 1960–70s. The media, the politics, public opinion and the moral basis for the Vietnam intervention were part of something altogether more crucial to US identity construction in a post-isolationist political world. It was not only a world of ‘Kennedy’s and Hoover’s’. It was a world of Elvis, Joe McCarthy and returning GIs. It was a world of actress Marilyn Monroe and critical cartoonist Herbert Bloch, of everyday Charlie Brown and carbon-copy Richard Nixon – a world of discontinuities and contrast.

What Ignatieff says is that it was the *ambience* of television images that did what critical reporting and political criticism could not have managed on their own: the

tone and voice of television's 'way of saying things' eroded the public legitimacy of war. It was a matter of the constant display of suffering, a suffering in part completely detached from suburban living in Bloomington or Chevy Chase, and in part inseparable from the worry and concern with fathers, brothers and sons in the firing line. Ignatieff adds that it was not the facts of the stories being told that changed the public sentiment in favour of a withdrawal. It was the mood. Television news combines two important features of relevance: The first is the ability of television news to connect the world in instantaneous response to *events*. The second is its ability to connect the verbal accounts of such events to the visualized mix of changing contexts. In sum, the 'mood' of television is an aspect of narrative as much as it is an aspect of audience analysis, public opinion and political mobilization.

4. Seeing and the spectacular

Some aspects of the television news narrative have been inherited from newspapers, such as the idea that domestic news is more important than foreign news, that some people mean more than others and that 'news' is about what happened to the nation and to the world since the last news report. News shows are supposed to be either 15, 30 or 60 minutes long, and they typically have intermissions with commercials. They contain sports, weather, bad news and a little bit of good news in a preconceived format. Like the news narrative in newspapers, television news strengthens the public's idea that a great many 'events' have happened 'to us', that we are bound together in a transparent relationship which is the sum total of what happened to 'us' since the last news bulletin.

Also, from the study of literature and film comes another conceptualization of the term 'story', in which the emphasis is moved from the play of an event in the news pages to the various elements that, in sum, make up that play. That is to say, a 'story' in this sense is a coherent narrative out of a sequence of discrete elements that are fit together in certain ways and not in others. Any story contains events, morals, situations, people and assessments. As in fictional stories, news stories have people, plots, props, places and events. But the events that are reported in the news must have happened in real life, the props must be trustworthy, and the people who figure prominently in the news must have a relation to the event and its significance. As it goes, when the TV reporter uses and chooses jargon, selects sources and constructs the narrative according to the news format, he or she has a much more narrow range than does the reporter in printed news. With print, there is less space; there are fewer characters and sources to choose from; time and prestige narrows the selection.

Thus, a war report becomes an even more familiar thing on television than in the paper, while television at the same time is the truly expanding medium of the two. In that light, the emergence of CNN during the early 1980s changed the international role of news dramatically. The Gulf War in 1990–91 was the first war operation that had to deal with the logic of 24-hour television news. One of the fundamental changes in the news production sphere was the CNN concept of the 'live breaking news' story – where the elements of the news narrative were substantially rearranged. The Gulf War broke through the humdrum of ordinary news, and the news play reflected each and every breakthrough with consistent and flashy use of logos,

jingles and repeating news cycles – where the same talking heads kept saying the same things night and day.

The striking features of television war journalism may be summed up in three words: spectacle, mobilization and identification. The relationship between these three is as evident in the case of the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 as it was during the Gulf War almost a decade earlier. In part, the refugee issues in Kosovo are easily identified by television audiences, especially when they underpin ‘Our Side’ of the story, as they consistently do in a confused Europe seeking to make sense of itself. The refugee story is treated by news-workers as if that news priority was handed down by divine decree. Hence, the tragic reports from journalists in the frontlines are shrouded in a cloud of commentary and more or less meaningful assertions of our responsibility to help, with much less attention being paid to our own role in shaping the situation that now needs helping. It is a safe bet that the same negligence will occur in the coronation of victors – a ritual that is bound to happen at some point. In short, refugee aid turns into spectacle in itself, but does so within an uneasy tension between the audiences ‘seeing’ suffering in distant places and the audiences in fact also ‘taking action’ in the form of giving donations, responding to telethons and the like.

Returning to Ignatieff a final time, his point is that human suffering has become a central ingredient in the news and hence in our Western ways of looking at the world. Television news deals with that in different ways than print news, blurring the boundaries between news and other programming – and altering the parameters for a media-engendered civic discourse in the process. Fuelled by the lack of time in media production and lack of time-span in the news coverage, lack of context may lead to the sort of news blend that occurred when the media made ethnic cleansing in Bosnia into a Holocaust story, with all the associations that the Holocaust syndrome entails. In part, the omnipresence of news might beget a wish to help or an apathetic attitude that takes the blunt of the horror and the collective guilt we share for having it so much better. Media researchers often note the mix of these two polarities – in an ambivalence to the texts and the narratives on the screen. Also in Ignatieff’s view, television is a medium that does not first and foremost spread information nor apathy as much as it engenders ambivalence and a way of looking that is marked by senses of vehemence, insecurity and distrust in what is presented – and yet a need to know

5. Politics in the liminal stage

My argument has so far been to show that the question of television’s effect on politics has to be conceived at a very fundamental level. In part, it involves a methodological shift often referred to as a change from a ‘transmission model’ to a ‘ritual model’ in communication research.⁵ The former places emphasis on the *movement* of information, while the latter places emphasis on the complex *content* of that information in light of what people do with it. It is more than a question of chosen words to one and the same communication process. In order to show some of the things that it might entail, my last line of argument in this article will return us to Katz and Dayan, who have presented a convincing connection between the study of media spin (which they relate to an early proponent of that concern, namely Daniel

Boorstin and his study of pseudo-events),⁶ media texts and rituals of media use. My argument in this last section will turn to one specific aspect of that view: I am thinking of their reference Arnold van Gennep and his idea of a 'liminal stage' in certain social rituals:

As discussed briefly in chapter eight of this volume, Arnold van Gennep (1971) introduced the term 'limen' in his studies of rites of passage, while Victor Turner (1978) applied it in the version that influenced Katz and Dayan. Turner's concern was with adolescents in N'Dembu society, and he noted that N'Dembu rites of passage entail a period during which the adolescents step out of 'routine life' and into the 'reality of the sacred', where certain traditions and customs are enacted to seal the adolescents' bonds with the adult collective. They pass from what they are to what they will become, through a stage that has a more symbolically laden status in N'Dembu society than in our secularized and de-ritualized west. The ritual stage thus entails a 'liminal' period, where one is 'no more what one was' and 'not yet that which one will be'. It is a journey through the extraordinary, a collective manifestation of a change. Once safely *beyond* the utterly extraordinary, when the rites of passage come to a close, the rite participants re-enters the routine world and returns to everyday life in a new and collectively recognized role.

In one sense, this is what Katz and Dayan have in mind in their study of how certain media events create and transfix a social narrative. It is also a very long leap in the study of political communication, but it is promising one. It is by far the most original application of anthropological insight to emerge in media studies for a long time. Katz and Dayan, of course, seek both to apply Turner's insight and to argue that Western society is not at all as de-ritualized as many social theorists seem to believe. The concept of 'limen' – or 'margin' uproots our often staid imagery of how television intervenes in politics, by deciphering a different sort of political process where the word 'transition' takes on a different meaning. One might think of the dense and tense moments when the crowds mourning Princess Diana threatened to go amok, and where the UK Prime Minister rather than the Windsor clan recognized the volatility of the situation. Or one might point to the moment when the Earl of Spencer during his speech at his sister's funeral, delivered his devastating critique of the media, as well as of the Queen and her family for a worldwide audience. It is also a variant of such collective manifestation of transition that took place during a few dense Clinton-years in Washington, DC, where the US Presidency was taken to new depths and NATO was transformed into a fighting force on the European continent. All of these situations were dependent on the media and they were fascinatingly political in a unorthodox sense. The question here is not why these events happened, but how one explains these episodes as communicative phenomena in a mass media based society.

I have argued that the role of global television is to countermeasure the constant flow of regular, less dramatic and often domestic news with the extraordinary. As demonstrated by coverage from 'international' wars, such as the Gulf War, and 'civil wars', as in Rwanda and in Yugoslavia during the independence fights earlier in the 1990s, the public conception – and the public conscience – around the world is being conditioned by dramatic television narrative. On television, a great deal of news is mounting crisis, a sense of risk, a sense of danger. Politics and the public respond to that. There are people presenting 'both views' as the spectacular unwinds, but they are as a rule predictable talking heads – which is why they are the

chosen ones in the first place. In political periods of heightened emotion and senses of fatefulness, politics is still supposed to operate normally. But global television, essentially, works the other way. Crisis is the *sine qua non* of global news events; not necessarily of global news flow in general but of the sort of event that Katz and Dayan have in mind.

I have also argued that such events can be staged – or that they can come to seem sufficiently staged to make political opponents *claim* that they are staged. Operation Desert Fox in 1998 is a likely illustration of a general point made already by Daniel Boorstin decades ago (op.cit.). During the autumn of 1998, there had been confrontation between Saddam Hussein and the United Nations in relation to the expulsion of the UN observers at Iraqi military installations. For most of the 1990s, there had in fact been a recurring debate about the future of Iraq under Hussein's rule. But things were different now: as the bombing operations of Operation Desert Fox proceeded in the last days of 1998, the screen was again filled with the familiar sight of various Arab leaders reacting to the operation, while in the background there was the familiar green night sky and the sounds and images of missiles. However, in contrast with the previous Operation Desert Storm, there was deep internal strife in the United States running to the core of the operation: the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief Bill Clinton were questioned by his political peers, among them the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott (R). And that was a historical first. Never before had internal disagreement been allowed to reach the public in quite this manner, on account of the damage it might do to the safety of soldiers and the public backing of an operation. Speculations were spreading that Operation Desert Fox was a real-life enactment of the plot in the Hollywood box office hit from 1997, *Wag the Dog* – a film about a president who stages a military intervention in order to divert attention from his own sexual scandal at home. If nothing else, the mere fact that a respected senator would make such a parallel in public, put a new twist on the claim that US politics is essentially symbol politics. In *Wag the Dog*, Dustin Hoffman plays a film producer who is hired by the US president's spin team to stage a media story of an invasion of Albania to divert the media's attention from allegations of sexual affairs. While that plot bears resemblance to events in the real world, despite the surreal essence of the movie, it may be of more long-term significance that Hoffman, in another movie twenty years earlier, played an investigative journalist seeking the truth behind the Watergate allegations (*All the President's Men*). Then he was a reporter with integrity – now he was a spinster hired to produce a plausible lie. The main observation I wish to make is not that journalism necessarily relegated Operation Desert Fox to the role as side-show to the Clinton scandals. There is more to Operation Desert Fox and the media coverage than that. It is rather that the logic of television blurs the distinctions between the real and the fake. Operation Desert Fox was one situation in which the term 'liminal politics' definitely has meaning. The TV story was unpredictable. In terms of public opinion, the Clinton presidency was out of control. In terms of support from other Western countries, that support was mute, if present at all. In terms of contrast to Operation Desert Storm, the lesson to be learned is this: Normal politics between Iraq and 'Us' ceased to exist on both occasions. Both mobilization processes represented uncharted waters.⁷ However, when Operation Desert Fox was mounted, the world did not mobilize the way it did during Operation Desert Storm. The US Commander-in-Chief himself was now being questioned by his political peers, facing harsh criticism that

he was abusing his office; he was diverting attention from a troubled domestic political scene. The first Gulf television narrative was about ‘madman Hussein’ and ‘our’ efforts to move safely beyond him to freedom and righteousness. The second Gulf story was in a sense about Hussein, but more about a ‘wild man’ in the White House (several *New York Times* commentators called Clinton a sleazebag) whose faults endangered ‘us’ and jeopardized our ‘destiny to lead the free world’. The purge was on and, once again, television proved its capacity to induce the extraordinary.

Were it not for television, Clinton would most probably not have been impeached in the first place. And perhaps that is the level at which to study media effect in this case. If it is, then we have a liminal stage – an extraordinary event where the political terrain is a sort of shadowland, not quite dark and not quite light. In Washington, DC, December 1998, there were no heroes left – to echo Daniel Boorstin from the 1950’s. When the newspapers hit the stand on the morning of Clinton’s impeachment, Republicans in both the House and the Senate were not just adamant in rejecting the move to bomb Iraq, which they had been in favour of throughout the autumn. They were adamant in their disgust at a president whom they already hated. And the stage was not essentially American. It was essentially global, because the implication of Clintongate for Operation Desert Fox was global.

Returning to Katz and Dayan, what I want to argue is that they are right in emphasizing the global nature of contemporary television. However, I find it a troublesome aspect that they implicitly acknowledge the traditional pluralist legacy of media effects studies. Katz worked in the United States under the tutelage of Paul Lazarsfeld and Carl Hovland, and he still seems to downplay the corporate-ideological interests of the global media, reiterating the consensus orientation that was central to that research agenda. What Katz and Dayan seem to say is that participants in a media ritual return to their state of ordinary life after the extraordinary with a strengthened sense of collectivity. As such, the extraordinary collective rituals that one might analyse in connection with the funeral of Princess Diana would fit poorly with the analysis of Clintongate and Operation Desert Fox, where conflict and deep-set controversy is the only way to describe the relationship between the USA and Iraq. As Europe sooner or later is headed for reconciliation in the Balkan region, one might do well in approaching media analysis from the point of view of the liminal process: much of the NATO operation was an uncontrolled passing from one stage to another. In hindsight, it might become inscribed a successful transformation of NATO, but it was essentially a rite of passage with vaguely defined leaders, as well as vaguely defined solutions to questionable political objectives.

6. Summary

For the public, war is difficult material. As to the question about methodologies of studying war and global media, one lesson is this: fundamentally, the challenge of television analysis in studies of the media in wartime is to elicit not only the televised text – the screen and its stories – but the social narrative as well. How do the texts play themselves out in the social imaginations of individuals and collectives? In that light, I have tried to say something about how television has contributed to the transformation of the public spaces in which death and suffering are collectively

interpreted and those interpretations in a sense practiced. Secondly, I have tried to present that issue from a narratological point of view, with reference to Katz and Dayan. And finally, I have argued that there is a sense in which the act of 'seeing' in contemporary western society suggests a more political conception of media events than what Katz and Dayan offer, where the idea of 'liminal' stages in political conflicts seems to have credence. The story of television in wartime is the story of how suffering and violence during the last fifty years has entered and in a sense created a new social space. At the same time – because one does not have 'to be there', yet even so cannot escape the awareness of distant suffering – something happens in the public space of war reporting. The intersection of these two concerns seems to be a fundamental issue.

Notes

1. For a good review of media spin, see Kurtz (1998).
2. The choice of emphasis in this article precludes an in-depth discussion of the emergence and re-emergence of reception studies, including but not encompassing the notion of the actively interpreting reader. For some good reviews of these traditions, see the following books, to which I am indebted: Seiter et al. (1989), Skovmand & Schröder (1992) and Silverstone (1994).
3. See also chapter seven of this volume, in which some of these issues are treated in some detail.
4. One might add that other media events, such as the news-evergreen of Monica Lewinsky, seem to transfix a public by artificially bestowing a scandalous, pseudo-royal aura on its centre of attraction – only to rip it off or staunch it up the moment it begins to fade on its own.
5. See James Carey (1989a) and Roger Silverstone (1994).
6. Cf. Daniel Boorstin ([1961] 1987).
7. President Bush had put in a bid for Nicaragua and the General Elections there in February 1990, where the major transition was 'the coming of age of democracy'. At the same time, the eruption of civil war in Yugoslavia and the fall of the Berlin Wall suggested that a new era was about to begin.

II . How Did We Get Here?

Propaganda and Reporting in Total Wars

Heikki Luostarinen

1. World War I: Decay of journalism

The First World War was a total war not only in the sense of the amount of material resources used by the nations involved but also in the cultural sense. It was the first time the whole spectre of culture – art, education, science, mass media, etc. – was recruited for the purposes of war. As Taylor (1990) mentions, the total character of the war meant also that a country's propaganda was targeted not only to influence the soldiers and civilians in the enemy countries, or in their own and allied countries, but to have an impact in neutral states as well.

According to Taylor (1990: 164), 'the British were able to seize the initiative in what was perhaps the most vital of all the propaganda battles: the struggle for the sympathy of the American people.' In a total war, material resources in the long run are the decisive factor, and during this century the United States has been the dominant economic and military force.

According to Phillip Knightley, World War I was the lowest point in the history of journalistic integrity and ethics. The war correspondents 'identified themselves absolutely with the armies in the field; they protected the high command from criticism, wrote jauntily about life in the trenches, kept an inspired silence about the slaughter, and allowed themselves to be absorbed by the propaganda machine' (1982: 65).

Propaganda was used on a massive scale. According to a metaphorical expression by Jowett and O'Donnell (1986: 123) 'a barrage of propaganda messages ... assaulted the ears of civilians and soldiers at every turn'. All skills of journalism, film and advertising were recruited to serve war efforts. According to Lutz (1933: 509) 'from June, 1918, to the armistice 18,295,000,000 leaflets were scattered by airplane or balloon over the fronts of the Central Powers so that only the armistice saved Germany from being submerged under an avalanche of paper'.

Especially in Germany, it was a common belief that the war was lost because the Allied propaganda broke the fighting spirit of the 'home front'. This 'Dolchstoß-Legende' [stab-in-the-back legend] was repeated again and again by soldiers, politicians and academics. (Kunczik, 1997: 163–165). In other words, propaganda was regarded as 'the decisive weapon'. Hans Thimme opened his book *Weltkrieg ohne Waffen* [World War without Weapons; cf. Hitler (1938)] by saying:

The importance of propaganda was seen more clearly during the war on the side of the Entente Powers than by Germany. On the German side its impact was manifold underestimated. Among wide circles only the German defeat opened their eyes (Thimme, 1932: 1).

Thimme's statement is an exaggeration and an example of the use of lacking propaganda skills as a scapegoat for military defeat. In actual fact, the Germans were aware of the importance of public relations and propaganda, and managed to get respectable results both in domestic and in foreign propaganda (Kunczik, 1994; 1997: 137–165). However, the German propaganda was inferior to that of the Allies for two reasons. First, Germany occupied Belgium and launched an unlimited submarine war against Britain, which made it look clearly like an aggressor. Second, Germany largely trusted civil servants and university scholars with its propaganda efforts, which gave a bureaucratic and academic tone to their message. German propaganda has often been described as dogmatic and boring, perhaps legally precise but out of touch with the emotions of ordinary people (Wilke, 1994).

The main principles of propaganda in total war were carefully collected by Harold D. Lasswell in his book *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927) Lasswell summarizes his findings in the following way:

Preconditions of propaganda:

Success depends upon traditional prejudices, objective connections between nations and the changing level of popular irritability. No matter how skilful the propagandist may be in organizing his staff, selecting suggestions and exploiting instruments of transmission, his manipulative skill will go for nought if there is no favourable juxtaposition of social forces to aid him (see p. 192).

Strategic aims of propaganda:

- (1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy;
- (2) To preserve the friendship of allies;
- (3) To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals;
- (4) To demoralize the enemy (see p. 195).

Tactical objectives of propaganda:

- (1) To arouse the interest of specific groups;
- (2) To nullify inconvenient ideas;
- (3) To avoid untruth which is likely to be contradicted before the achievement of the strategic purpose (see p. 200).

Conclusion:

Success ... depends upon the astute use of propaganda means (organization, suggestions, devices) under favourable conditions (p. 213).

Newspapers were only one part of the newly invented propaganda machine, but an important one. Only journalists knew by experience all the techniques to persuade – or seduce – the audience by telling stories. As Kris (Kris & Leites, 1951: 43) puts it, 'propaganda operated then on a new level of technological perfection; the latent

possibilities of the mass communication media became suddenly manifest; in all belligerent countries, outbursts of enthusiasm for war occurred. Propagandists, like children playing with a new toy, charged their messages with many manufactured contents’.

Stories, indeed, were used in World War I propaganda. Many stories of atrocities and heroism had their roots in the oral tradition of war narrations; journalists just printed new variations: about the Germans distilling glycerin from the bodies of their dead; about hospitals filled with soldiers who had had their eyes gouged out; about enemies who wore around their neck a chain of rings taken from fingers they had cut off, etc. (Knightley, 1982; Williams, 1987).

The integration of media industry and the military also took place at the highest levels of organization; editors and owners of newspapers and advertising firms got involved in the command of psychological defence. George Creel, chairman of the Committee of Public Information in the United States, was a former journalist. Central figures of the British propaganda machine, Lords Beaverbrooke and Northcliffe, owned Fleet Street newspapers. In the USA, connections to the film industry and the advertising business were more close than in Britain, France or Germany (Haste, 1995; Jackall & Hirota, 1995).

This cooperation established a firm linkage and good channels between leading journalists and the top of the military establishment in many countries. It had long-term effects in Europe, where the strategic situation remained tense after the Versailles Treaty and political pressures for ‘patriotic and responsible behaviour’ contradicted the freedom of the press.

The belief that Germany collapsed because it lost the propaganda war increased consciousness about the military and political potential of mass communications in Western societies and caused a double reaction. Both those interested in using the press for propaganda purposes and those demanding a ‘moratorium of hate’ after the massive killing targeted their attention on the role of the press. The Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations passed a resolution called ‘Collaboration of the Press in the Organisation of Peace’ in September 1925. According to the resolution (which included recommendations for improving media performance), ‘the Press constitutes the most effective means of guiding public opinion towards a moral disarmament which is a concomitant condition of material disarmament’ (Gerbner, Mowlana & Nordenstreng, 1993: 183).

A total industrialized war and total scientifically based propaganda were both considered aspects of the modern mass society. In the 1930s, the huge ideological propaganda machines of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, together with the growth of the advertising industry, enforced the impression: the media – now also including radio – were considered a massive and powerful manipulation machine.

On the other hand, World War I and the consequent cultural reaction – ideals like duty, honour and loyalty began to wear in the trenches of the Somme and Verdun – gave inspiration to the development of professional discussions among journalists. ‘Nothing could have been more persuasive than the war experience in convincing American newspapermen that facts themselves are not to be trusted’, wrote Michael Schudson in his social history of American newspapers (1978: 142). ‘In the war and after, journalists began to see everything as illusion, since it was so evidently the product of self-conscious artists of illusion’ (ibid.).

Facts and objectivity proved to be much more difficult things than had been thought before the war. Disillusion and the end of intellectual naivete among journalists were in part fruits of the war propaganda itself. Namely, the gulf between words and reality was in many ways much too broad in the World War I propaganda. First, censorship and the state of communication technology made it possible to hide your own losses, and only rumours were spread about the results of some battles. According to Kris and Leites (1951: 42), it was kept hidden from the German public until the end of the war that German troops were beaten in Marne in September 1914. Second, invented atrocity stories – about the wounding of women, children, old people, priests and nuns; about sexual offences; mutilated prisoners; mutilated non-combatants; etc. – were used on a massive scale. Third, the cult of hate was extended to absurdities between big European nations, which in prewar Europe had rather close connections.

Both the British and the German propaganda emphasized the collective guilt and pride of the belligerent nations. For instance, the Britons not only blamed the Kaiser and his government, but also the authoritarian, militaristic and arrogant German culture. The US propaganda made a more clear distinction between the German people – who were not the enemy – and the undemocratic, aggressive leadership, which had to be stopped.

The press lost a lot of its credibility when it became clear that it had encouraged the mass-scale butchery by cynical lying. For instance, the influential Bryce report, a British book about German atrocities in Belgium, was revealed in the 1920s to be a forgery. According to Knightley (1982: 83):

The average Englishman had been accepting all his life that if something was printed in the newspapers, then it was true. Now, in the biggest event of his life, he was able to check what the press said against what he knew to be the truth. He felt he had found the press out, and as a result he lost confidence in his newspapers, a confidence to this day never entirely recovered.

In the United States, the disillusionment dramatically decreased general belief in US democracy when it was revealed that it was not only the Germans who had lied, but the US government itself had also exploited the gullibility of the audience in a reckless way. Propaganda rose into the political agenda as an issue itself:

Postwar disillusionment further established a wide popular audience for issues of propaganda. Exposé accounts showed that many tales of German war atrocities were exaggerated, mythical, or even faked by Allied propagandists.... In addition, famous war correspondents, such as Philip Gibbs ... apologized for their role in creating news propaganda that helped prolong the war by sanitizing for public consumption the horrible conditions on the Western front. Finally, the 1920s brought a new view of America's own Committee on Public Information ... the CPI propagated a blend of Wilsonian idealism and anti-German muckraking. The committee used pamphlets, news handouts, magazine advertisements, films, speakers, posters, war expositions, and every possible means to present the war as nothing less than a worldwide struggle of good versus evil.... Under the impact of postwar exposés, the CPI came to be seen as a sly purveyor of propaganda (Sproule 1991: 215; see also Sproule, 1987).

As a consequence of the exposés, the problems of mass persuasion acquired a dominant role in both the academic and the political agenda in the USA. As Walter Lippmann formulated it, the chief problem of modern democracy was protecting the channels of public communication from propaganda. Without safeguards against propaganda, public opinion was 'exposed to every prejudice and to infinite exploitation' (cited in Sproule, 1991: 215).

The popular image of war propaganda remained so low even in World War II that the Allies sometimes found it risky to talk in their propaganda about the Holocaust and concentration camps. Without documentation, there was a danger that these stories would be considered to be, once again, fanciful atrocity stories. The Nazis themselves used the British propaganda lies of the previous war in order to compromise the claims that they were torturing Jews in concentration camps (Kunczik, 1994: 29–30).

Prohibition of war propaganda and journalists' responsibility to promote peace were discussed, but in many ways 'the spirit of the time' between the world wars made these discussions empty words; the fierce battle between communist, fascist and democratic political systems demanded commitment, and most journalists took their sides: 'And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee'.

2. World War II: Facts and realism

When World War II started, it was not surprising that propaganda was more fact-based and objective than in the previous world war. In part, the reason was the technical development in electronic communication which made it difficult to lie too extremely to one's audience. People were listening to foreign radio transmissions and were able to check – to some extent – the facts. In the case of Stalingrad, for instance, the facts were in the open. What the German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels could do was to give interpretation and put a 'spin' on the facts.

Goebbels himself is a good example of the new spirit of propaganda. It is a misunderstanding to associate Goebbels purely with empty lies and pompous propaganda drama. In fact, his policy quite often was to be as exact as possible (although only as long as he regarded it as productive). He demanded propaganda with concrete substance: pictures, footage, description in details, names, figures, documents, dates, etc. It was a well-known and often used method of persuasion to pretend to have exact facts, but Goebbels went further. He wanted authentic material, and German propaganda troops took part in battles to get this material so actively that the number of casualties was as high as in the German infantry. Goebbels tried to avoid empty promises which could not be kept or lies which could be uncovered (Boelcke, 1966; Doob 1962: 508–522; Knightley, 1982: 220–221, 265).

Goebbels, however, was not allowed to decide alone about the German propaganda. In many cases, he was overruled by Hitler and the Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich. On the other hand, as long as everything went as planned, it was enough to tell the facts to the audience. The Wehrmacht was winning everywhere; that was enough to keep the fighting spirit high. After Stalingrad, Goebbels had to change the line, and this change demonstrates one general rule in war propaganda: When you do not have positive facts to be told, you have to use myths, morale obligations,

religion, great principles and other more abstract themes. And that was what Goebbels did.

It is worthwhile to sum up the principles of Goebbel's propaganda, analysed in an insightful way already in 1950 by Leonard W. Doob (1962: 508–522):

1. The propagandist must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion.
2. Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority.
3. The propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action.
4. Propaganda must affect the enemy's policy and action:
 - a) By suppressing propagandistically desirable material which can provide the enemy with useful intelligence.
 - b) By openly disseminating propaganda whose content or tone causes the enemy to draw the desired conclusions.
 - c) By goading the enemy into revealing vital information about himself.
 - d) By making no reference to a desired enemy activity when any reference would discredit that activity.
5. Declassified, operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign.
6. To be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an attention-getting communications medium.
7. Credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false.
8. The purpose, content, and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and effects of exposé; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determine whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refuted.
9. Credibility, intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda materials should be censored.
10. Material from enemy propaganda may be utilized in operations when it helps diminish that enemy's prestige or lend support to the propagandist's own objective.
11. Black rather than white propaganda must be employed when the latter is less credible or produces undesirable effects.
12. Propaganda may be facilitated by leaders with prestige.
13. Propaganda must be carefully timed:
 - a) The communication must reach the audience ahead of competing propaganda.
 - b) A propaganda campaign must begin at the optimum moment.
 - c) A propaganda theme must be repeated, but not beyond some point of diminishing effectiveness.

14. Propaganda must label events and people with distinctive phrases and slogans:
 - a) They evoke desired responses which the audience previously possesses.
 - b) They must be capable of being easily learned.
 - c) They must be utilized again and again, but only in appropriate situations.
 - d) They must be boomerang-proof.
15. Propaganda to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted by future events.
16. Propaganda to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level:
 - a) Propaganda must reinforce anxiety concerning the consequences of defeat.
 - b) Propaganda must diminish anxiety (other than that concerning the consequences of defeat) which is too high and which cannot be reduced by people themselves.
17. Propaganda to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration:
 - a) Inevitable frustrations must be anticipated.
 - b) Inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspective.
18. Propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression in specifying the targets for hatred.
19. Propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both.

These principles – and the equivalent policies applied by the Allied propaganda (Balfour, 1979) – reveal considerable professionalization of propaganda activities. Propaganda was no longer seen as something additional or supportive to military operations but as an integrated and essential part of all political and military actions.

There was some tension in several countries between those who demanded credibility and accountability in propaganda and those who liked more ‘propagandist’ emotional propaganda. In the United States, this contradiction led to a crisis inside the Office of War Information (Winkler, 1978: 63–65). In Britain, the BBC spoke in favour of accurate and independent war coverage, resisting the demands of some ‘patriotic’ politicians (Balfour, 1979: 103–132).

At the beginning of World War II, journalism was a much more professional business than at the beginning of the century. It had established its role as a central arena of public debate and as a source of information. In the United States in particular, professionalism in the quality press was clearly an answer to commercial demand: partisan, ideological, biased, untrustworthy journalism was useless for its users in making decisions in business, trade and politics. In their classic 1920 article, ‘A Test of the News’, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz emphasized the poor performance of the old-style, politically slanted news. They concluded: ‘It is habit rather than preference which makes readers accept news from correspondents whose usefulness is about that of an astrologer or an alchemist’ (cited in Goldstein, 1989: 106).

The new professional standards can be seen to some extent in the improvement of the wartime journalism. But, as Studs Terkel puts it, World War II, from the viewpoint of the Allied countries, was ‘The Good War’, and that in part eroded aims for more professional, objective performance. Journalists identified themselves easily

with the war aims because the battle had a clear objective: the bloody aggressors, Hitler and the Emperor of Japan, had to be beaten. There was a large consensus about the goals of the war, and correspondents covering the war – like Earnie Pyle in the USA – were regarded as national heroes.

For the totalitarian belligerents of World War II, most notably Germany and the Soviet Union, one of the problems in propaganda was the ideological nature of the state. After long inner political battles and purges, how could the Nazis and the Communists unite their nations? They both had difficulties, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, large amounts of the population in the German-occupied areas willingly cooperated with the occupier. Both the Nazis and the Communists appealed to the patriotic sentiments of the population and to some extent tried to reconcile with their old inner enemies.

The World War II propaganda had an increasingly 'popular' overtone. The Germans published in 1916 the book *Zum geschichtlichen Verständnis des grossen Krieges* [How To Understand Historically The Great War]. In World War II, they printed imaginative colour pin-up pictures in the famous propaganda magazine *Signal* (Mayer, 1984). In the United States, Hollywood was successfully recruited to support the war efforts.

In World War II, it was understood that rank-and-file soldiers and factory workers at home, extremely important for the arms industry, were mainly peasants and working class people without much education or interest in academic questions. News and entertainment (containing both humour and sex) were new and highly successful inventions. The goals for the battle were made more concrete and the role models for identification more realistic and human.

It has been said that while World War I began with parades and enthusiasm, World War II started with scepticism and despair. People knew what was waiting for them, and the task of propaganda was to get unwilling and hesitating people to fight.

So, what kept men fighting and the home front producing ammunition even in desperate situations? In many cases, German soldiers hating Hitler and fascism and Soviet soldiers loathing Stalin and communism fought bravely. Studies in social psychology during and after the war gave a simple answer: the group. Shils and Janowitz concluded:

At the beginning of the second world war, many publicists and specialists in propaganda attributed almost supreme importance to psychological warfare operations.... They tended furthermore to stress that military morale was to great extent a function of the belief in the rightness of the 'larger' cause which was at issue in the war.... Studies of the German Army's morale and fighting effectiveness made during the last three years of the war throw considerable doubt on these hypotheses (1965: 581).

Ideological, moral or political issues were not effective propaganda. 'At moments of primary group disintegration, a particular kind of propaganda less ... analytical, but addressing the intensified desire to survive, and describing the precise procedures by which physical survival could be achieved, was likely to facilitate further disintegration' (ibid.: 582).

Comparison of the propaganda of World Wars I and II shows that the meaning of small groups as the main source of fighting spirit and military morale had been realized. Propaganda organizations inside the military were decentralized at the unit

level in a way which ensured that local conditions were known and that propaganda was rooted in the experience of the given unit. Identification proposed by the propaganda valued individual life much more and gave reasons for the fighting on a much broader scale. It did not ignore abstract and even spiritual themes, but reduced them to the levels of family, community, comradeship, friendship, etc. This development can be seen in the army organization itself. It was much more democratic than in World War I. For instance, the authority of officers was justified by emphasizing professional skills, not social status or noble birth.

This change in part reflects changes in the very structure of the Western thinking and social reality. Social identification in 1939 usually differed from social identification in 1914 in many ways: the value of individual human life was regarded higher; identities were more complex; and secularization had made progress. The average level of education was higher, and rapid development in technology changed the world view.

From the viewpoint of an individual citizen, total war usually means that he or she has to sacrifice something, and it is the aim of propaganda to give reasons for the sacrifice. This task was much more difficult in World War II, where the old loyalties and obligations did not work anymore.

Humankind fought the bloodiest war of its history being more cynical and more educated than ever, and that is why professional and realistic propaganda, exploiting the rapidly developed methods of electronic and visual communication, was needed and used. It was no longer enough to claim that 'our cause is right; theirs is wrong'. In the cynical atmosphere of modern industrial society, the moral argumentation was replaced partly by argumentation in terms of indulgence and deprivation (profit or loss): 'We are winning; they are losing' and 'These will be the blessings of victory; these the calamities of defeat' (Kris & Leites, 1951: 42).

German propaganda in particular had a rather materialistic and secular overtone. In his speeches and memorandums in 1942, Goebbels occasionally said that Germany was not fighting because of values or principles, but 'because of land'. It was after Stalingrad that Germany started to emphasize strongly in its propaganda that the fight against bolshevism was for European culture and civilization.

In propaganda, there is a permanent demand – in one sense paradoxically – to give at the same time unified but diversified messages. Unified in the sense of organizational structure and planning, diversified in the sense of targeting various audiences. Harold Lasswell puts the latter goal this way:

The nation as a whole, is divisible into a almost infinite number of constituent groups, which are in possession of special aspirations of their own. The war ought to be interpreted to them as something in which they have a stake, not only as members of the general group. The war ought to be fought to save business, family and church, and to add to prosperity, security and faith (1927: 70).

This demand was not completely understood in World War I. Twenty years later, propagandists offered something for everybody.

In a total war, the enemy always is depicted as a murderous aggressor who is threatening everything we feel valuable. We are fighting for peace, progress, freedom, justice, culture and values like religion. We are free men and women who freely decide to fight and not to accept slavery. We are united, we honour human dignity and the rules of war.

In spite of these basic and permanent claims, the practical realization of propaganda and enemy images must be flexible and changing. One peculiar example is that of German propaganda in World War II. New enemies emerged and disappeared so quickly that nobody could create stable enemy images in a credible way: today we hate the Norwegians, tomorrow the Greeks, on Friday the Belgians – impossible!

Good examples of the flexibility of propaganda are the changes in the German propaganda concerning the Soviet citizens living in the German-occupied territory. In 1941–42 they were described mostly by using the *Untermensch* stereotype: lazy, Asian, uncivilized, etc. In 1943, when Germany realized that it needed the support of the local population in order to win the battle, the description turned around. German propaganda magazines started to publish pictures and stories about heroic, intelligent, Aryan-looking Ukrainians, Russians, etc. fighting alongside the Germans against bolshevism. In 1944, when Germany retreated from the Soviet territory, there was no reason to flatter: the ugly, ape-looking, dirty *muzhik* came back (Luostarinen, 1986: 22–25).

This example supports two hypotheses. First, enemy images are purposeful social constructions created or deconstructed for military and political purposes. This can be seen in an interesting way in the official US image of Russia and the Soviet Union. When the USA entered the World War I in 1917, Russia – according to Woodrow Wilson – was ‘a fit partner for a league of honour’ and ‘in fact democratic at heart’. (Filene, 1968: 3) In March 1942, the former US ambassador to the USSR wrote in *Reader’s Digest*:

The devotion with which Russians have defended their homes, the unity they have achieved in fighting the Germans leave little doubt that the Stalin regime commands widespread confidence. What is the secret of Stalin’s success? The answer lies, in large measure, in the youth and vigor of Soviet leaders.... Stalin ... is the ‘easy boss’ type – quiet, self-effacing, personally kindly. Like all the other Soviet leaders, Stalin works hard, lives simply, and administers his job with complete honesty (Filene, 1968: 144–145).

Between the world wars, and in the Cold War, the picture was – to put it mildly – rather different.

Second, the skilful propagandist works like an artist who every morning alters the same painting: the basic figure is the same, but the characters and their faces can be changed, colours added or removed, etc. In the German case, the main figure was the political setting leading to the war. When the war began, it gave its own logic to the rest of the propaganda, and the details of the day-to-day propaganda and enemy images were changed according to the needs of the war.

That is one of the basic skills of war propaganda. You have to be very quick to react, even anticipate, happenings in the war scene. War is always to some extent unforeseeable, so the propaganda machine must be highly flexible to face new challenges.

When studying World War I propaganda, Harold Lasswell already emphasized the importance of fast reactions and the sense of everyday life in propaganda. How to nullify inconvenient ideas and the effects of lost battles? How to answer accusations by the enemy or by other countries? How to make the most out of small victories? How to explain shortages of food and clothes at the home front? There are

plenty of questions and unpleasant happenings to be explained, and the propagandist must be ready to take care of all of them.

World War II illustrated the various military uses of propaganda in a total war. Improvement in skills and targeting meant that propaganda could be used as an integrated part of military operations. In particular, black radio propaganda and psychological tricks in leaflet propaganda seem to have had military importance at the operational level (Overdyck, 1968: 130–131). After the war, the results were analysed in various government-sponsored research projects, especially in the USA, and used when plans were made concerning the possibly coming nuclear war.

For propagandists, total war seemed not to be very problematic after the generous lessons of two world wars. It proved to be other types of conflicts, such as the Cold War and restricted conflicts, which caused problems and inspired the development of new methods of war propaganda. The Cold War highlighted the importance of durable enemy images. The task of psychological warfare was to keep the public in military preparedness for years, and that proved to be an impossible task without the cooperation of the media and other branches of cultural production.

In Korea in the early 1950s, the World War II model still functioned. US journalists fought with pens along the soldiers. However, the world started to change, and in the 1960s many journalists could no longer identify themselves with the military objectives of their nation. Some French reporters started to hesitate in their support of their government's policy in Algeria and Indochina (Behr, 1992). In the process of decolonization, many journalists in various countries started to see the world from the Third World perspective, and this changed their way of reporting. Ethnocentric simplicities and stereotypes, which were still typical of journalism in the 1950s, partially disappeared.

The US Media and the Vietnam War

Sparks for a Fire

Heikki Luostarinen

Joseph Goebbels once defined truth by saying that 'truth consists in what benefits my country' (Balfour, 1979: 431). The Pentagon spokesman Arthur Sylvester raised media attention in 1962 by saying that the government had an inherent right 'to lie to save itself'.

Sylvester was obviously following the policy of his master, President John F. Kennedy. Talking in 1961 to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York City, Kennedy said:

In time of war, the government and the press have customarily joined in an effort, based largely on self-discipline, to prevent unauthorized disclosures to the enemy. In times of clear and present danger, the courts have held that even the privileged rights of the First Amendment must yield to the public's need for national security.... I am asking the members of the newspaper profession and the industry in this country to reexamine their own responsibilities – to consider the degree and nature of the present danger – and to heed the duty of self-restraint which that danger imposes on us all (quoted in Wyatt, 1995: 37).

That was the mood in which the US Executive Branch went to war in Indochina. The U-2 incident in 1960 and the Cuban missile crisis two years later highlighted the peak of the Cold War, and World War III was during these years perhaps more close than ever. In this atmosphere, the war in Vietnam was seen as an episode in a global war which demanded cooperation between all institutions of society (Whitfield, 1996). One purpose was to 'wed the pen and the sword', as Sylvester put it. 'Today in a cold war, the whole problem of information, how it is used and when it is used, when it is released becomes a very vital weapon.... The results, in my opinion, justify the methods.' (quoted in Wyatt, 1995: 45)

Goebbels formulated the idea slightly differently: 'In propaganda, as in love, anything is permissible which is successful ... propaganda has nothing to do with the truth – we serve the truth in that we serve a German victory' (quoted in Balfour, 1979: 428).

1. Changing images of the media

The role of the US press in the Vietnam War has been evaluated in different and even contradictory ways. Journalists have been regarded as heroes and as traitors – and everything between – depending on the point of view of evaluation and the period of observation. There is no simple answer, for many reasons. First, the media are a very heterogeneous bunch of different outlets. Second, the Vietnam conflict took place during three US administrations, with each of them applying a different media policy and creating different circumstances for the media coverage of the conflict. Third, during the long time-span of the intensive US involvement in the conflict – over 10 years – the role of the news media in US society went from that of lapdog of the Cold War consensus to the institutional rivalry of the Watergate scandal. Fourth, a new generation of journalists, inspired by the political and moral turbulence of the 1960s, and new genres of critical and investigative journalism emerged during the war period. And, finally, evaluation of the role of the press depends on political convictions and beliefs to see the constitutional and societal role of the media – and the Vietnam War.

The Vietnam War is still an emotionally loaded and volatile question in the US society. That became clear when former defense secretary Robert McNamara published his memoirs, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, in 1995. According to McNamara, the US policy in Vietnam was totally wrong, based on false assumptions of the Cold War frame. According to his critics, the US policy was basically right, as the collapse of the Soviet Union had proved. Vietnam was the place to stop the communist attack, and the only mistake made by the United States was its lack of determination to fulfil the task in Indochina.

In the early stage of the US involvement, 1961–64, the media coverage of the war was more or less merely an issue of elite dispute. Both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations were occasionally dissatisfied with the negativity and disloyalty of US news staff in Vietnam, the Kennedy administration even hostile. Presidents and their advisers contacted editors and owners of the media outlets, and in some cases they were able to change the editorial line so that it was more supportive of the war effort (Knightley, 1982: 346–351).

For the broader US public, the media coverage of the war was not an important issue in the first place. But when domestic controversies concerning the war increased in the wake of the conflict's escalation and increasing casualties in 1964–68, the media coverage became interwoven with political disputes and took its place on national agenda. People opposing the war criticized the media for being hawkish, and those who supported the war blamed the media for defeatism.

During the war's latter US phase in 1968–73, and until mid-1980s, the role of the media was most often seen as independent, influential and critical. In the 'living room war' (Arlen, 1968) 'the horror of war was for the first time brought directly to a mass audience in living colour in the confines of the home' (Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 221). A popular myth was created according to which regular exposure to the ugly realities of battle turned the US public against the war, forcing the withdrawal of US troops and leaving the way clear for the eventual communist victory.

Representatives of the media, politicians, the US military and media scholars – all had a common interest in emphasizing the influence and integrity of the US press

in the war. Journalists underlined their societal importance – which peaked during the Watergate scandal – by using the Vietnam war as an indicator and proof. The US military and politicians made the press into a scapegoat after the US withdrawal in 1973 and the collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 1975. Media scholars saw the ‘media war’ as an example of the ‘mediaization’ of public life and, consequently, an supporting argument for additional authority and resources for their own discipline. Marshall McLuhan formulated the nature of the new era in the following way:

When electric immediacy has got everybody involved in everybody, all wars are world wars, under electric conditions. TV brings them into our homes and some American parents have seen their own sons killed on TV news programs. Seeing them on TV, moreover, we experience all sons as our own (quoted in Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 224).

The book *Big Story*, by Peter Braestrup, was published in 1977. Braestrup claimed that at the turning-point of the US involvement in Vietnam, during the 1968 Tet offensive, the US press misinterpreted and misrepresented the offensive as a military defeat for the South Vietnamese and the US side. The Tet was in fact a victory, but the press was not capable of understanding and explaining it correctly because of lacking strategic knowledge and the demands of journalistic production. Braestrup’s work was useful for the rising conservative political movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ronald Reagan distributed his message of new American patriotism. This new political atmosphere peaked during the Grenada intervention of 1983, when the US government ignored the interests of the media and proudly stated that the US military was now free to operate without disturbances caused by the unpatriotic media.

The story about the role of the US media in the Vietnam War started to change gradually during the latter half of 1980s, revealing more and more about dependence, ineffectiveness and uncriticality. In particular, Daniel Hallin’s 1986 book, *The ‘Uncensored War’: The Media and Vietnam*, inspired new approaches to re-evaluating the media’s influence (see also Hallin, 1994a and 1994b). For instance, studies and contributions by Wyatt (1995), Williams (1993), Mercer, Mungham & Williams (1987), Arnett (1994), Page (1996) and Braestrup (1995) elaborated old approaches and came to new conclusions. Peter Braestrup, often close to the military perspectives (e.g. Braestrup, 1991), crystallized the new credo and consensus by saying that ‘one cannot blame the news media, even television, for losing Vietnam’ (Braestrup, 1995: 44).

This is not to say that the ‘media lost the war’ myth was not questioned before the late 1980s. In 1983, Lawrence Lichty published empirical results which showed that, until the autumn of 1966 and into 1967, the vast majority of the reporting of Vietnam was positive. The proponents, the hawks, very much outnumbered those on television who criticized the war (see Williams, 1993: 311).

John Mueller, studying polling figures in his book *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, noticed as early as 1973 that the slow declines in public support for the Vietnam War policy and the 1950–53 Korean War were roughly the same over comparable time periods, despite the fact that there was censorship and no TV coverage of the Korean conflict. In both cases, declining support seemed to follow lengthening casualty lists. Americans did not need television to understand the cost of the

war (Braestrup, 1995: 36). During the whole post-Vietnam period, there were voices among the American left and liberal circles who claimed that the 'media's fault' myth was simply a pretext for the US political right and the military to save their face after humiliation. In the atmosphere of the 'second cold war' of the early 1980s, with personal experiences of the Vietnam War still fresh and painful in US society, this kind of self-critical discussion did not get much public response. In the 1990s, when the Cold War was over and temporal distance from the Vietnam conflict was greater, it was easier to see the Vietnam coverage in its historical context without so much political pressures.

Now the pendulum has swung to the opposite side and away from the perceptions of the early 1980s. In one of the most comprehensive contemporary studies, Clarence R. Wyatt's (1995) *Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War*, the performance of the US media in the Vietnam War is seen inferior and as a sign of the power of the US administration to manipulate and orchestrate the media coverage. According to Wyatt, the Vietnam War coverage is not an exception but an example of the close media–military relations during the Cold War period:

A cult of secrecy that goes far beyond legitimate security considerations has evolved in American government. This obsession with secrecy, from the Bay of Pigs to the Persian Gulf, has bent and occasionally broken the machinery of the American system of government. As the Vietnam War showed, the ability and inclination of the Executive Branch to restrict and manipulate information is largely beyond the press's ability to resist (Wyatt, 1995: 219).

According to Wyatt's logic, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded largely in doing what Goebbels favoured: getting the media to replace the truth by what the Executive Branch interpreted to be the interest of the country.

Wyatt's approach is interesting, but seems to ignore the fact that some of the news staff did an extraordinary job in giving an independent and detached picture of the war. As Phillip Knightley writes:

No doubt some of the reporting improved the image of some officers and there were Ernie Pyle type correspondents who wrote nice things about GIs for their folks back home to clip and keep, but the stories that are fixed in international memory about the U.S. military in Vietnam are the atrocity of My Lai, Tomalin's account of a day with General Hollingsworth ('The General Goes Zapping Charlie Cong'), Herr's stories about GIs and drugs and Pilger's description of American servicemen 'fragging' their officers (Knightley, 1982: 395).

It is obviously an empirically correct fact that most TV news reports from Vietnam showed no blood and gore, body bags, or cries of pain (Arlen 1982). Network television's war news were often shown during the dinner hour, and news executives were 'extremely sensitive to the limits of the public's taste for reality' (Wyatt, 1995: 148); they knew the limits and their ethical and political responsibilities and burdens.

On the other hand, the most memorable visual images of the war were the negative ones, and their cultural significance can be seen, for instance, in art depicting the war (e.g. Herzog, 1992; Louvre & Walsh, 1988). Mercer, Mungham & Williams (1987: 221) describe this in the following manner:

Ten years after the fall of Saigon the war is remembered through images on the television screen; the pictures of a U.S. Marine using his zippo lighter to set fire to a Vietnamese village, the execution of a Vietcong suspect in a Saigon street, a Vietnamese girl running down a road after being burned in napalm attack. These images dominate our recollections of the Vietnam War.

The symbolic importance of the few critical and shocking articles and visual images is obvious. They were not numerous, but they were influential when they resonated with anti-war sentiments in the public. Scenes of US soldiers burning Vietnamese houses came at a time when Third World countries were becoming independent, student radicalism was increasing and race relations were being discussed with new seriousness in the United States while the citizens' rights movement was progressing. The routine news flow from Vietnam was no problem for the US military and the government; they were able to manage and control the images. But, in a volatile political situation, those occasional exceptional pieces that they could not handle were important sparks which helped to cause a major fire in public opinion.

It is also difficult to explain why the US military invested so much energy in changing the media rules and practices in anticipation of the next post-Vietnam conflict if they had no real and severe reasons to be unsatisfied with the Vietnam experience.

In the history-writing of war reporting, the media policy of the Vietnam War is recollected as the most open and least restricted in contemporary war history. That, however, was not a deliberate purpose of the Johnson administration, which launched the 'maximum candor' policy in 1964. It simply had no other reasonable alternatives and no reason to suspect that the press would misuse its freedom. The administration operated in the frame of the Cold War consensus, and it was because of fractures in that frame, not disloyalty of the media, that the 'maximum candor' policy eventually became dysfunctional for the Executive Branch.

But how did that happen in concrete terms?

2. War without censorship

War censorship has been the 20th-century rule to which Vietnam provided an exception. However, this does not mean that there were no security orders at all in terms of news coverage. The World War II-type rules of news coverage were mainly in force, but compliance with them was not controlled through preventive censorship. This was only done afterwards.

Originally the US military did not favour journalists. The Kennedy administration escalated US involvement secretly, and with the re-election campaign looming in the near future it had no use for extensive media coverage. The famous 'telegram 1006' sent in 1962 has remained in history as an example of the initial attitudes of the US government. It said, among others, that reporters 'should not be taken to such military operations which will easily lead to negative reports' (Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 213–214). Pentagon spokesman Arthur Sylvester stated that the 'patriotic duty' of US correspondents in military situations was to 'relate only the kind of information which would make the United States look good' (ibid.: 246).

The period of 1962–64 is often described as a ‘heroic age’ with ‘courageous and skilled correspondents fighting a long and determined action for the right to report the war as they saw it’ (Knightley, 1982: 348). They had enemies everywhere: the corrupted and brutal South Vietnamese government and secret police; the US government trying to hide its military role in Vietnam; the reluctant and evasive US ‘advisers’ in Vietnam; the Vietcong, who roamed the streets after dark; and their own editors at home who wanted to avoid confrontation with the government and to keep the Vietnam story down.

But, as Phillip Knightley points out, there is one flaw in this heroic story: ‘The correspondents were not questioning the American intervention itself, but only its effectiveness. Most correspondents, despite what Washington thought about them, were just as interested in seeing the United States win the war as was the Pentagon’ (1982: 348). Reporters like Charles Mohr (1983) and David Halberstam were outspoken enough to gain the antipathy of the Kennedy administration, but it is evident that their criticism was not directed against the objective of the war (Knightley, 1982: 348; MacArthur, 1992: 112–122).

Correspondents’ basic support for the US war effort, and consequent self-censorship, lasted for the whole period of the US involvement (Arnett, 1994: 258). For example, the My Lai incident was unearthed in the United States, not by the Saigon press corps.

Most writers, like Wyatt, agree that during the early stage of US involvement in Vietnam, ‘the American press’s coverage of the war was at its most courageous and imaginative’ (Wyatt, 1995: 217). But did it make any difference? Criticism was restricted merely to some quality newspapers, and the mainstream US media largely ignored Vietnam before the number of US soldiers in the country started to increase and there was ‘an American story’ to be covered. As Wyatt writes: ‘The press’s traditional ethnocentrism contributed to this lack of attention. American news organizations cared little about Vietnam while it was primarily a fight between Vietnamese’ (ibid.: 217).

The military’s publicity policy got its more open form in 1964, not before. The ‘maximum candor’ approach aimed at increasing cooperation between the media and the military. The research team of the Gannett Foundation Media Center in its report *The Media at War* (1991: 14–15) believes that the open policy was adopted to awaken the US media, to get it to take an interest in the war and to lend the war its support. Censorship would not have furthered this effort. On the other hand, during the early stages of the US mission in Vietnam, the US military experienced that it was better to provide information voluntarily for journalists because otherwise they would try to find other, possibly unfriendly, sources. It was simply good public relations and news management to give ‘the story of the day’ and to keep the strings in one’s own hands by providing information.

The United States government and military officers decided to implement and maintain for several years this policy of few restrictions and comprehensive information services for many reasons.

Mercer, Mungham and Williams (1987: 250–251) point to the era’s general political atmosphere, which emphasized the open nature of administration. Johnson’s government was preparing the Freedom of Information Law, which was passed in 1966, and it would have gone against the grain of the ideal of an open society to establish censorship on political grounds in a war which did not risk national survival.

While assessing the intervention in Vietnam, it must be kept in mind that the United States never officially declared war. The battles escalated gradually, and a sudden adoption of censorship would have been tantamount to confessing failure; it would have lowered the credibility of the administration and would probably also have given a new boost to the anti-war movement. Preventive censorship would also have led to difficult constitutional disputes which might have damaged the relations between the President and Congress.

Peter Arnett writes in his book *Live from the Battlefield*:

As Johnson geared up for substantial hostilities, he also endeavored to line up America's news organizations, coaxing editors and news executives to color their product to his hue, trying with an arm squeeze to achieve a censorship that other presidents enforced by executive orders.... Officials on the ground in Vietnam agreed that realistic control was impossible because of the necessary involvement of Vietnamese officials in the process, and that the large numbers of reporters from many countries would be difficult to oversee (1994: 144).

As Arnett noticed, there were also purely practical reasons for not trying to implement censorship. It was difficult to control transportation and communications in Vietnam. Thus, it would in any case have been possible to circumvent censorship. Also, South Vietnam was formally an independent state, and journalists could arrive there as 'civilians', without accrediting from US military officials. The third reason was that journalists followed the ground rules closely and caused harm for operational security in only a very few cases.

The military administration of the United States was compelled to rely on its publicity and information machinery, whose multiple activities ranged from paying foreign journalists' trips to Vietnam to arranging lecturing tours of the United States by top generals.

The US information efforts during the Vietnam war were awesome and targeted on influencing not only correspondents in Vietnam but also the press and the public at home, the South Vietnamese society and all US allies in the world, especially in Asia and Europe. The US government and the military had the best salesmen in their employ, but the product had its problems.

Caroline Page, studying US foreign propaganda during the Vietnam war, has observed that the Johnson administration was largely uncertain and indecisive about its strategy and consequently unable to form a firm and trustworthy information policy. The Johnson cabinet walked a tightrope between two evils: it could neither admit that a major land war in Asia was necessary to 'keep Vietnam' nor risk the humiliation of losing Vietnam. Against all rules of effective propaganda and public relations, the Johnson administration resorted to fabrications which proved later on to be false. This policy could occasionally win some time but caused a credibility problem in the long run:

the Administration made and implemented its crucial decisions in secret, invariably suppressed as much information on these decisions as it could, and on occasions deliberately misled the press and public in its vague statements or its abrupt denials of rumored actions. Thus, when subsequent events invariably contradicted U.S. official 'information' – particularly on negotiations and the steady escalation of the war

– the Administration was open to a wide range of press and public criticism....
Nixon too created the same trap for himself (Page, 1996: 306).

Mistakes made in Washington were repeated in Saigon: the US military publicity organization resorted every now and then to half-truths and even outright lies. In a situation in which the reporters were able to verify the information with their own eyes, this policy quickly backfired, and the daily US military briefings in Saigon were nicknamed 'Five O'Clock Follies'. The practice of the 'maximum candor' policy started to look suspicious.

US foreign propaganda in Europe also suffered from the administration's secrecy about its policymaking, long-term planning and ultimate goals in Vietnam. Even under these conditions, concludes Page, the Johnson administration 'still managed to enlist the support of its own public and, publicly, of its main allies in Europe, Britain and West Germany' (1996: 305).

Some of the domestic public relations techniques used by the US military were already described and criticized during the war by Senator J. W. Fulbright in his 1970 book *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine*. At the time of this book's publication, the Pentagon was trying to circumvent the increasingly critical East Coast quality press by targeting its public relations efforts on local communities in order to reach people on the community level directly or via friendly local media. This policy included lots of trips to Vietnam for local media representatives and local opinion leaders like educators and ministers, and arrangements of local media happenings that provided positive news:

The Pentagon can pick up a town's leading citizens and fly them to Florida or California. It can provide generals and admirals whose names make the headlines as speakers for the local Kiwanis Club or Chamber of Commerce. Military units and bands and color guards are available for celebrations. Skydiving paratroopers can enliven the county fair. Towns with deep harbors can be visited by impressive Navy ships, open to public visiting.... And all at no expense to the local citizen – except in his tax bill (Fulbright, 1970: 44).

Among the Vietnam press corps, the military had to use indirect methods instead of authoritative power. Particularly in the closing years of the 1960s, journalists working in Vietnam were very eagerly offered help in terms of transportation, accommodation and food supplies, but there were conditions regarding cooperation. For example, the trips were first and foremost arranged to locations which were most suitable from the military's perspective.

The large numbers and unequal skills of the reporters – Vietnam tempted a number of budding journalists dreaming of instant careers – nevertheless overstrained the resources of the publicity machinery. While several hundreds of reporters – over 600 in 1968 – were simultaneously in Vietnam for prolonged periods of time, unofficial control and manipulation occasionally lost their efficiency (Taylor, 1990: 225). The journalists who were not in the officials' favour could establish information networks and groups of their own, and a few were also temporarily working on North Vietnam's side of the border. One of the most famous of these was Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times*, whose reports on the effects of US bombings, published at the turn of 1966–67, caused a very similar reaction to that created by Peter Arnett's reports from Baghdad about 25 years later.

In the end, it was a question of solidarity to get journalists to follow the official line. This feeling of solidarity was often created on the battlefield. Reporters sharing the same feelings of fear and tension with the troops socialized to the military way of thinking. Peter Arnett describes one such moment:

I looked about me and felt ill. I was an interloper, a voyeur on desperate ground. I had been proud of my certain professional detachment, but now I felt ashamed of my neutrality, useless with my notebooks and cameras and water bottles. I didn't even carry a gun, so I was just one liability for the surviving defenders (Arnett, 1994: 240).

There were occasional tensions and disputes between soldiers and reporters. However, most of the reporters were young, male Americans sharing the same basic political values of the Cold War era and aware of their technological and cultural superiority in the 'backward' Vietnam: they were representatives of Western civilization in the Asian wilderness. They had their quarrels, but when things went tough, they knew who they could trust (Arnett, 1994: 233; Wyatt, 1995: 114).

As US reporter Neil Sheenan later recollected: 'Our ideological prism and cultural biases were in no way different.... We believed in what our government was trying to accomplish in Vietnam and we wanted our country to win' (Braestrup, 1995: 39).

The 'maximum candor' policy of the Johnson administration did not get full support among the military corps. Soldiers did not appreciate the liberties of the journalists. Free reporting was against their organizational memory of proper warfare, but the conditions were also otherwise exceptional. The war was not waged 'openly' between two fronts, and the major operative hazard was the infiltration of the South Vietnamese Army by the enemy. The harm caused by reporters manifested itself principally in a roundabout way through the development of political opinion in Washington and the United States.

However, when the Nixon administration gradually started to turn back to the more restricted 1961–63 information policy – trying to hide the weakness of the South Vietnamese side and the still-heavy US involvement in the war – the US military was relieved. The 'Vietnamization' policy also made the situation more easy for the military: when the number of US soldiers started to decrease, the US media turned their attention from Vietnam to other issues. The war was again between the Vietnamese, and not interesting for the mainstream US media.

3. Elite and citizens

The general belief of the connection between the TV pictures and photographs of war and the anti-war opinion has been challenged by several researchers (Hallin, 1986, 1994: 40–57; Williams, 1993), for example by citing an official nationwide opinion poll published by *Newsweek* in 1967, according to which 64% of the respondents were of the opinion that TV coverage had increased their support for the war (Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 224–225).

This result, as others, argues against the assumption that TV reports would automatically cause a 'pacifist' reaction among the audience. On the contrary, they can either enforce patriotic sentiments, develop a tolerance of the brutality or make the

war less real for the audience, a part of the entertainment- and fiction-dominated programming. As Charles Mohr has pointed out, the London Blitz, with all its horrors, did not make the London people less willing to fight. Why should television coverage have an opposite effect? (Williams, 1993: 308–309; Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 225).

Most scholars studying the coverage of the Vietnam War by the US media seem to agree that years 1968–69 were a turning-point. The Tet offensive, the ‘Vietnamization’ policy of the newly elected Nixon government, the intensification of diplomatic efforts to stop the conflict, the growing visibility of the peace movement in the USA and its allied European countries and the gradual withdrawal of US troops starting from 1969 – all these developments indicated that the US government was forced and ready to leave Vietnam. It was more a question of time, conditions and honour – the war itself started to look impossible to win.

The Kennedy administration tried to keep its involvement secret, and the Johnson cabinet rallied the media behind the escalation. The Nixon administration had no other choice than to minimize political casualties caused by prolonging the period of retreat. The Nixon cabinet temporarily escalated the conflict by attacking Cambodia and by massively bombing North Vietnamese cities. However, these actions did not change the basic direction, which became clear as early as 1969: Nixon wanted out of Vietnam.

The best summary of changes in the media coverage between the periods 1965–68 and 1968–73 is contained in Daniel Hallin’s 1994 article, ‘Images of Vietnam and the Persian Gulf Wars in U.S. television’.

During the first period, the war was presented in the frame of masculine courage and mastery. The war was seen as a national endeavour, and US troops were often called ‘our forces’. The war was interpreted out of its historical context and instead made a part of a timeless US tradition of war, often through the use of references to the heroism of World War II. War was also seen as manly, because it was thought to give a man, and the nation, the opportunity to prove they could ‘take it’. Winning was what counted. War was often presented as like a sporting event or a day’s work, ‘doing the job’. On the level of language, it was a commonplace to use words that portrayed war as a technical process, and violence was trivialized through the use of cartoon-like expressions. Finally, the war was seen as rational: most reports described US success; the war was manageable and possible to win.

During the second period, the image of the war changed partially. Television still framed the Americans as the ‘good guys’ and primarily supported the government line. But war had become an object of political debate, and journalists took some distance from their own troops. World War II was not mentioned as a point of reference. Casualties were no longer pictured as heroic proof of manhood, and instead of military victory, peace started to be the main frame in which day-to-day events were interpreted. Finally, the image of the efficient US war machine moving inexorably toward victory was supplanted to a large extent with an image of war as eternal recurrence, leading nowhere (Hallin, 1994a: 46–52).

It seems obvious that both domestic and international controversies encouraged the media to change its point of view: increasing intrigues among the governing elites of the United States, the hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating on the streets, growing concern abroad and the damage the war occasioned to the

image of the USA. There was no dramatic change from 'hawkish' to 'dovish' coverage, but gradually a new news frame emerged, in which peace was the dominant criterion when evaluating the news value of various happenings.

It is important to notice the role of the anti-war movement, domestically in the USA and internationally, in this process of changing news values. The peace movement was an independent social actor and political force. Naturally, there was reactive interaction between media images of the war and the growth of the civic movement, but the media effect should not be overestimated. The anti-war activists had a lot of personal channels in accessing information from Vietnam, and the grassroots movement developed its own independent networks rapidly. The peace movement succeeded in its effort to make peace a serious alternative news frame. By creating media happenings and providing a visible opposition to the government, the peace movement created what the media needed: drama, contradictions, personalities. Every now and then the peace movement was marginalized and ridiculed by the media, but it got its message through. Coverage of the anti-war movement was not favourable, but as a mass-scale movement it could not be ignored (Hallin, 1994b).

In previous discussions about the 1968–69 change in the media coverage of the Vietnam War, the role of the political elite has been emphasized. When the US establishment started to disagree, first behind the scenes and later publicly, about the means and possibilities for winning in Vietnam, it produced leaks and statements for the media. Because of their close connections with official sources and the establishment, the media reflected these quarrels in its content. What looked like critical media coverage was in fact an echo of the inner fractions and critical discussions taking place within the foreign and defense policy establishment.

This is a reasonable approach, but the importance of the citizen activism cannot be ignored. Thus far, the story about the Vietnam War and the media has mainly been told from the point of view of the media, the military and the government. The picture could look different from the perspective of the anti-war movement and grassroots activism. As Williams puts it, 'only after public opinion had moved decisively against the war did the media begin to regularly challenge the official explanation' (1993: 306).

When the United States withdrew militarily in 1973, and the war in Vietnam finally ceased in 1975, military circles in most Western countries began to assess the information activities of the United States. The grade awarded was not a high one.

Propaganda and War Reporting after the Vietnam War

Heikki Luostarinen & Rune Ottosen

After the Vietnam War, the soldiers widely agreed that, for political reasons, it would be necessary to return to the preventive censorship in use in World War II and the final stages of the Korean War. However, a widespread belief in the UK and the USA – a belief based on Vietnam's special conditions – was that, because of the rapid development of communications and transportation technology, it was no longer possible to execute front censorship. Preparedness plans were improved, but it appears that their efficiency was not greatly trusted (Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 18; Gannet Foundation Media Center, 1991: 15).

One should, however, be careful not to overemphasize the picture of total freedom for reporters during the Vietnam War. As a matter of fact, journalists during the Gulf War continually called for a return to the media policies of the Vietnam War, forgetting that many of the techniques used to control journalists during the Gulf War – including restricting access to military bases and requiring reporters to be accompanied by a military escort – were also used at times in Vietnam (Sharkey, 1992: 40).

Nevertheless, the success of the information control exercised by the British government during the Falklands War and the Reagan government's new attitude towards the public nature of administration in the United States changed the agenda in the media–military relationship. This development led to the Persian Gulf War information arrangement, in which the traditional preventive censorship was united with the informal manipulation technique of mass media, developed in Vietnam.

1. The Falklands War

In Great Britain, the Falklands War publicity and journalism has resulted in a lot of research in which the issue is either central (Adams, 1986; Harris, 1983; Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987; Morrison & Tumber, 1988; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985) or extensively discussed (Aulich, 1992; Cockerell, Hennessy & Walker, 1984).

A partial reason for the lively discussion and research is the political significance of the war. While Prime Minister Thatcher's personal popularity figures in early 1982

were 24%, the lowest in British history, by the end of the war the percentage was 60. Thatcher decided to arrange a parliamentary election as early as in June of the following year, well in advance of the end of the parliamentary session and while her personal popularity was still strong. The Falklands War strengthened Thatcher's political position, which was weak in the early years of the 1980s, and it made possible the development of 'Thatcherism', which characterized British social life throughout the 1980s.

The Falklands War has become an exemplary case of how governments of Western countries can strengthen their political position through military operations. The research is inspired by the wartime cooperation between government, pro-Conservative mass media and the army, the success of which some critics (e.g. Glasgow University Media Group, 1985) have interpreted as a sign of a kind of neo-totalitarian age. However, the publicity did not function without problems and conflicts.

Both the nature and the geographical location of the Falklands War were polar opposites of those of Vietnam. This was a clearcut operation to oust Argentinean troops from remote and sparsely populated islands. Journalists had no opportunity to witness the military activities without the cooperation either of Argentina or the United Kingdom. The war was also morally and politically more unambiguous than Vietnam. In its Resolution 502, the United Nations Security Council had insisted that Argentina withdraw and had confirmed Britain's right to act in order to protect its area. Thus, if there were moral problems regarding the war, these did not concern Britain's right to use military force. Instead, the issue was the human and economic cost of the operation in relation to the importance of the islands, and the question of whether other means of exerting pressure were used before resorting to arms. As the British government did not declare war against Argentina, it did not have special powers to manipulate the mass media.

The Conservative government and Ministry of Defence made a strong contribution to public relations. Defence Minister John Nott later reminisced that he had in broad terms spent as much as one third of his working hours dealing with the questions of PR and information activities (Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 17). The problem, however, was that there was no unified plan. The Ministry of Defence claimed to a Parliament committee which was subsequently assessing publicity in the war that it had forgotten the existence of information-preparedness plans devised in 1977 and therefore had to improvise (*ibid.*: 23–24).

Two decisions were made at the beginning of the war which were to have an important effect on later news management. The first of them was a decision to place 29 media representatives – reporters, press photographers and technical crew – on the Royal Navy ships departing for the Falklands. The navy was reluctant to accommodate such a big team, but presumably gave in to the demand of the Prime Minister herself. The presence of the media on board caused conflicts, because in close quarters the edges of the two ways of life and organizational cultures rubbed against each other and the journalists' reports burdened the ships' communications systems. On the other hand, a hoped-for process took place in which the reporters partly internalized the army lingo and logic of action and began to identify with the soldiers (Harris, 1983; Morrison & Tumber, 1988).

The other important decision meant that the Ministry of Defence initially kept all its press conferences open, and confidential information was not dealt out in the usual British lobbying style. This decision diminished the publicity machinery's chances

of manipulating the media, because the unified 'off the record' information and disinformation were replaced by different speculations. Alan Hooper (1988: 161) deduced:

The failure to brief the media off the record led to all sorts of difficulties. Unable to check on a number of facts and lacking any form of in-confidence briefing, the media reported all they saw and heard. Worse still they speculated. The result was a mass of information about ships' movements, the composition of the task force, weapon capabilities and continuous comment about the various options open to the task force.

Apart from civilian experts, retired soldiers in particular were used in these speculations, a fact which led to open conflicts between officers in active service and the 'armchair strategists'.¹

According to the critics, wild guesses inevitably proved correct at times, and thus useful information leaked to the enemy. On the other hand, it is hardly likely that the opponent would not have been aware of the different military options (Adams, 1986: 7–12). As for weapons systems, there was hardly anything to reveal that would not already have been told by the book *Jane's Fighting Ships* or that the Argentineans had not learned already while the British were selling them arms and training them in their use (Morrison & Tumber, 1988: 242).

The return to the policy of dealing out confidential information took place ten days before the first landing operation. The change in tactics was probably related both to internal organizational changes in the Ministry of Defence's publicity and criticism of the earlier procedure and as well as to an obvious operative interest: as the stakes were growing, so too did the need for disinformation and media manipulation.

The reports of the journalists escorting the troops were censored somewhat, at the place of origin, in London, or both. The broadcasting techniques of film provided special problems because, in the absence of satellite connections, the films took their time reaching London. Whether there actually was a real technical obstacle or just a problem which the army could have overcome had it seriously wanted to do so was a subject of public debate after the end of the war. According to the critics, such as the media research group of Glasgow University, the final result was what the army had hoped for:

the public had to make do with film which was weeks old. There were no pictures of casualties from the land fighting until after the final ceasefire.... Was it just by chance that the celebrated picture of a San Carlos villager offering a Marine a cup of tea achieved such instant currency? (1985: 8–9)

On the other hand, it is clear that lack of filmed material guided the TV in particular into a direction which is not entirely positive from the point of view of publicity goals. Instead of impressive documentary footage, there were experts and discussants whom the army could control much less than censored film footage. At the same time, it became tempting to use the material that Argentina was delivering all the time in accordance with its own propaganda goals.

In the Falklands War, the proper location of the borderline between the operative and the political content of censorship was debated very much in the same manner as it would be less than 9 years later in the Persian Gulf. In both cases, the

issue of the dispute was especially those news items which had a negative effect on the mood of the audience. These were without military importance, but had a negative political effect from the government's point of view (Glasgow University Media Group, 1985: 9).

The proper role of the media was a hot issue both on political and journalistic platforms. The tabloid newspaper *The Sun*, which had gained quite reputation with the headlines 'Stick It Up Your Junta!' and 'Gotcha!'² (in reference to the sinking of the cruiser *General Belgrano*), in its editorial of 7 May 1982 slapped the *Daily Mirror* for supporting a political solution. *The Sun* attacked: 'There are traitors in our midst. Margaret Thatcher talked about them in the House of Commons yesterday' (Harris 1983: 50–51).

The Sun was pointing to a debate in Parliament where Conservative MPs had accused the media, and especially the BBC, of cold, even treasonable acts towards the military. Special indignation was reserved for Peter Snow, the presenter of the BBC's current affairs flagship *Newsnight*, who had commented on information from both British and Argentinean sources.

On 10 May, BBC's *Panorama* broadcast a programme with interviews of opponents of government policy, mainly Conservative MPs as well as the leader of Argentina's UN delegation. The programme resulted in a strong counter-reaction, in both the conservative press and the Parliament. Thatcher considered an independent or a neutral attitude towards the government's policy and the goals of the war both insulting and disturbing (Adams, 1986: 9–10). In her talk in Parliament on 11 May, she said:

I share the deep concern that has been expressed on many sides, particularly about the content of yesterday's *Panorama* programme. I know how strongly many people feel that the case for our country is not being put with sufficient vigour on certain – I do not say all – BBC programmes. The chairman of the BBC has said in vigorous terms that the BBC is not neutral on this point, and I hope his words will be heeded by the many who have the responsibility for standing up for our task force, our boys, our people and the cause of democracy (cited in Cockerell, Hennessy & Walker 1984: 158).

Thatcher's talk is worth attention because it clearly demonstrates the tactics of mass media manipulation used in limited wars and interventions: pitted against each other are 'us' and journalistic integrity.³ Thatcher's public performances and the confidential performances of her PR chief Bernard Ingham communicate support to those media that took the side of the government and the army. The message was received, for example by ITV, which attempted to present a patriotic and reliable profile.

Thatcher waged a political war for her own future with Bernard Ingham as her chief of staff. Ingham was later accused of using, for political reasons, tactics and leaks which endangered operative security (Harris, 1991: 95–100), accusations which he has understandably denied (Ingham, 1991: 283–303).

Leadership and control of publicity was dispersed in a way which provided a lesson especially to the United States Department of Defense. There were too many centres of power, and their internal relations were unclear. On individual ships, PR officers and the ship's captain had plenty of power to interpret the ways in which

reporters were treated. A part of the power lay with the navy commanders in charge of the operations at sea, another part at the headquarters level at home.

The massive machinery of the Ministry of Defence was in charge of the daily flow of information. Above all these was officially the War Cabinet, whose wishes the Ministry of Defence, however, did not always respect. Furthermore, the War Cabinet had its own internal political struggles. Margaret Thatcher's person was seemingly above these disputes, and her public image often preceded all other objectives. Michael Cockerell (1988: 275) tells about the end of the war:

The Prime Minister was determined to break the news of the final military victory herself. On 14 June Downing Street imposed a complete news blackout on reporters in the Falklands – for nine hours they were unable to file a story to London. In the middle of News at Ten, Mrs Thatcher stood up in the Commons to announce that White Flags were flying in Port Stanley.

This performance ignited a series of victories which continued all the way to the October party conference of the Conservative Party (in which the background of the meeting hall had been staged to resemble a grey battleship) and to a trip to the Falklands in early 1983, which according to Cockerell (1988: 277) was broadcast on TV – a couple of months prior to the election – like a royal visit. All in all, the Falklands PR and information events can be presented as a list of experiences which were helpful in developing both political and military publicity organization:

- A major part of future operations were likely take place in conditions in which it would be possible to arrange relatively tight control over the reporters. The complete control over outgoing material experienced in the Falklands became an objective in all future crises.
- The obvious weakness of British publicity was the lack of centralized leadership and planning. It was necessary to create a detailed preparation plan by the next intervention, in order to make possible a coordinated information and publicity activity which would be submitted to the political leadership. It would also be necessary to make the various ladders of the organization realize the strategic importance of publicity.
- The production of film footage was to be organized better. A picture blackout was considered a better alternative than the Vietnam practice, but it still left much to be hoped for because footage was spread internationally, primarily by Argentina.
- It was possible to be relatively confident of the support of the mainstream of mass media, because it tended to support the government in crisis situations both for political and for commercial reasons. It is possible to undermine those forms of media that strive for journalistic integrity by a campaign proving that they endanger operative security and, in a wider sense, the interests as well as the unanimity of the nation. Demands for freedom of speech can be countered with the following argument: When a war is waged, only victory is important. After the victory, there will be plenty of time to discuss the details of the means.
- A conflict may yield a government significant political gains, provided that it is able to play its cards right. The national enthusiasm created by the war must first

be personified in a political leader, then the popularity must be transformed into permanent recognition of the leader's image, and finally the memory of war must be refreshed regularly until it can be utilized politically, for example in the form of winning an election.

The war also had some lessons to offer journalists. Together with Whitehall's brutal assault against the BBC, it forced them to analyse the limits of professional independence. The answers polarized the entire profession and divided it more and more distinctively into conservatives and liberals. The difference is illuminated by two quotes, in the first of which Edward Furdson of the *Daily Telegraph* describes the people's 'right to know' as arrogant nonsense in wartime conditions:

The commander-in-chief has got to win and there is nothing else that matters. If there is something to be kept under wraps which may help him to win the battle, it is his ultimate priority and responsibility to the nation to do so ... once the battle is under way the public has no right to expect any information which the commander-in-chief considers may diminish or endanger his chances of victory because that is all that matters (quoted in Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 118).

The other is a statement by Peter Snow of the BBC's *Newsnight*:

I see myself as a citizen of the world, a detached journalist. I don't think it is our job to twist things so that you put the British case over in the most favourable light.... People make their own judgements after seeing what we do. It is up to us to give them the information upon which they can make those judgements. None of this exempts us from the problem of whether or not we are helping to inform the enemy but my case is that our role is not different in times of war and that the principles are actually perhaps more important rather than less important (quoted in Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 119).

The issue was essentially the preservation of journalistic professional identity during such limited conflicts, which do not involve survival as a nation. The interesting thing was that although the media cherishing their integrity were pressured by both government and their own colleagues, the opinion polls seemed to imply that the audience in fact supported open information and a neutral use of language that avoided nationalistic figures of speech (Morrison & Tumber, 1988: 310–344).

The obvious problem of the reporters who went to the theatre of war on the Royal Navy ships was to reconcile their experience of the navy and their technical knowledge with an independent perspective. Mercer, Mungham and Williams (1987: 111) write: 'One army CO noticed how the journalists began by saying "British" and "Argentines" yet ended up saying "us" and "them". He added: "I got the feeling we bought their souls".'

In the operation of Grenada in 1983, the United States made use of the experience gained by Britain in the Falklands. Politically, the lessons were adequate. It is, indeed, possible to create a wave of patriotism and political profits from the conflict. But when it comes to military–media relations, the practice of strict media control to some extent backfires.

2. Grenada

The US decision to occupy the small island of Grenada was related to a coup half-way through October 1983, when the left-wing government of Maurice Bishop was replaced by groups still further to the left. The intervention was justified by appealing to the safety of US students studying medicine on the island. In the background was also an international airport, which Grenada had been building with the assistance of, for example, Cuba. According to the interpretation of Reagan's government, the airport was the Soviet Union's move in the power struggle of Central America. Operation 'Urgent Fury', which began on 25 October, was not, according to Block and Mungham (1989; see also Mercer, Mungham & Williams, 1987: 291–295), a quick operation true to its name but a deliberate strategic choice.

The occupation of the island state was interpreted in the European press in the context of Great Power politics. The occupation was undoubtedly an illegal intervention in the matters of a sovereign state, but the atmosphere of the 'new Cold War' in 1983 did not encourage attempts to approach the problems of Grenada through the perspectives of international law or the country's own social background (Servaes, 1991).

Critics paid attention to the intervention's significance in terms of domestic policy. The US Army had experienced one humiliation after another: Vietnam; the failed operation to rescue the hostages in Iran; and, two days before the invasion of Grenada, almost 300 US soldiers had been killed in Beirut by a suicide strike. Michael Deaver, one of Ronald Reagan's closest assistants, later commented that the United States government was not concerned about how ridiculous it might seem that a nation of 200 million would attack a midget state of 100,000 inhabitants:

No, because I think this country was so hungry for a victory, I don't care what size it was, we were going to beat the shit out of it. You know ... two little natives someplace, if we'd have staked the American flag down and said, 'It's ours, by God,' it would have been a success (Hertsgaard, 1988: 211).

Ronald Reagan's government had realized a series of actions increasing the secrecy of the administration and preventing leaks right at the start of its time in office (ibid.: 221–226). It was therefore no surprise that the US Army denied reporters access to the island when the Grenada invasion took place. The *Los Angeles Times* stated in its editorial of 12 November 1983: 'as bad as the Grenada news blackout was, it was a logical continuance of the policy carried out by Reagan administration.'

The expression 'blackout' used by the paper is slightly inaccurate. Both the Pentagon and the White House arranged press conferences and delivered brochures to the media on the progress of the military activities. Instead of a blackout, attempts were made to prevent any information not under official control from leaking from the island. Ships attempting to sail to Grenada were to be intercepted by force; attempts were made to stop radio amateur broadcasts from the island; and the first 15 reporters were allowed to make a brief and carefully supervised visit no sooner than two and a half days after the beginning of the attack. The first independent news team got on the island four days after the intervention had begun.

The most important official ground for the prohibition was the maintenance of operative security based on surprise. The objective was considered so central that even the publicity people of the government and the Department of Defense were

not informed. It is nevertheless questionable whether an operation like Grenada, which was preceded by political and military negotiations between the United States and several Caribbean states, can ever be kept secret enough to preserve the advantage of surprise. Political commentators had for a long time already been predicting the attack. The head of the information department of the White House, David Gergen, later commented that actually the occupation of Grenada 'came as a surprise only to the United States press and people' (Hertsgaard, 1988: 214–215).

The news blackout decision was also officially affected by the fact that the army had no preparations for handling the large number of reporters who were expected to try to get to the island immediately after they learned about the attack.

There were other reasons in the background, however. The Reagan administration wanted to convey both to the army and to the audience an impression that it would let the soldiers take care of their task as effectively as possible: under Reagan's government, the United States Army would not be forced to fight with one hand tied behind its back. When the soldiers did not want the media to be present, the government agreed. Another reason was the attack's ideological justification, whose validity had to be secured at least for the early days of war. Because the only film teams working in Grenada at the time were the army's own units, the world received information aimed at proving correct the claims that Grenada was a stronghold of terrorism and revolution. The third ground was to prevent Vietnam-type pictures of combat and the resulting political analogy. Andersen states:

There were no on-the-spot reports of the inter-service snafus that bedeviled the operation, of the high incidence of US casualties from 'friendly fire', or of the 30 inmates killed in an air strike on the local mental hospital.... Instead the press was shepherded to Charleston Air Force Base in South Carolina where the photo opportunity of returning medical students kissing the tarmac led to television and newspaper reports repeating the claim that 'We got there just in time' (Andersen, 1991: 23–24).

According to Block and Mungham (1989:109–110), Pentagon claims about strong Cuban troops and arsenals of modern weaponry were disinformation (see also Marro, 1985 and Ottosen, 1991: 10–14). Hertsgaard (1988: 217) found out that, during the first day of news after the intervention, none of the leading US media paid any attention to the tactic of 'preventive censorship' which the Pentagon was using.⁴ In other words, the media did not tell the audience that they had no first hand knowledge of the situation.

Criticism towards the government's claims grew day by day, however, as did the visibility of news manipulation as a news item. Eventually the criticism escalated to a point where the organizations representing the media considered suing the Department of Defense for the violation of constitutional freedom of speech. However, the charge was dropped, because it was believed that losing the case would lead to a legal sanctioning, as it were, of the blackout realized in Grenada (Block & Mungham, 1989: 112).

Instead of laying charges, the organizations representing the media condemned the Pentagon – even the conservative American Newspaper Publishers Association characterized the government actions as 'unheard of and intolerable' – and decided to begin negotiations in case of future interventions (Hertsgaard, 1988: 220). Subsequently it can be said that the media organizations were both correct and wrong.

They were wrong in that the development led to the Persian Gulf publicity arrangements which caused even more severe criticism in the media than those of Grenada; they were correct in that the US Constitution with its amendments does not protect freedom of speech in a way which would stop soldiers from restricting the access of reporters to theatres of military operations. According to the US Department of Defense, the media confuse censorship and the access of journalists to a given place; the latter is not guarded by the US Constitution. On the other hand, it may be claimed that physical restriction of journalists' moves without wartime special authority, and furthermore in areas where the US Army may not always under international law have the right to be or to exercise authority, is very close to censorship, at least in spirit.

The above reveals the hypocrisy which characterizes the US discussion about freedom of speech during interventions. The situations are often such that there is no point in discussing them in the context of either international law or domestic US law. Interventions are acts of *realpolitik* whose most fitting interpretative framework is the military and political framework in which the US government acts at home and abroad.

Andersen quotes the speech of George Shultz, Secretary of State during Grenada:

These days in advocacy journalism that's been adopted, it seems as though the reporters are always against us and so they are always trying to screw things up. And when you're trying to conduct a military operation, you don't need that (Andersen, 1991: 24).

During the occupation of Grenada, the political position of the US media was such that they had neither willingness nor possibilities to influence the country's government through freedom of speech or any other argument considered liberal.⁵ In addition, the White House utilized the fact that, under strong commercial and political pressure, the US media were tempted to construct media plays with patriotic action out of the interventions. Even the Pentagon noticed that the media's own internal development made possible a role in which the army could act rather 'as a sponsor than a censor', but during the Grenada operation it was not yet capable of making use of this opportunity.

President Reagan reaped the benefit of the events in Grenada. The victory gala in Washington and other festive occasions received considerable media coverage, and Reagan's foreign political and personal prestige took a boost, which strengthened his position in the progress towards the victorious election campaign of 1984.

During the aftermath of Grenada, mainstream press gave up even the attempts to strive for Vietnam-type freedom of action. The research team of the Gannett Foundation estimates that the complete ban on the media 'persuaded at least a part of the members of the media community to accept a return to military censorship in order to gain access to theatres of military operations in future conflicts' (Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991: 15). A concrete example of the new unanimity was the so-called Sidle Commission, which delivered its report on 24 August 1984. Although the media did not participate officially in the commission's work, they had no difficulty accepting its relatively liberal principles, according to which the pool arrangement (Department of Defense Media Pool) would operate for 3 days following the beginning of an operation, after which time the activities of the media would be independent of the army. As Block and Mungham (1989: 21) comment, the starting-point of the Sidle Commission was nevertheless the precedence of operative

security, and it left the final restriction decisions to the army. Taylor has succeeded in describing the goals of the pool arrangement to the point:

the Pentagon had compromised with the (media) establishment of a media pool system in which a small group of designated journalists from the various branches of the media industry (newspapers, magazines, wire services, radio and television) were rotated in news pools so that, if a war broke out, those currently on call would be flown out to the scene of the conflict. There ... following a 'security review' of their copy by military officials, their reports would be sent back to Washington by military channels for distribution by the Pentagon to the rest of the news media (1992: 35).

It may be discussed to what extent this was a question of compromise and to what extent a solution which served the goals of the Pentagon even more effectively than a news blackout. In favour of the compromise is the fact that, as in the time after the battles in Vietnam, in 1983–84 modern information technology was believed to ruin all possibilities for compulsory censorship; in accordance with this belief, it was better for the army to let the mass media work under control than to strive for prohibitions which were impossible to realize in practice. Against the compromise is the fact that news blackouts are politically dangerous operations. They involve the risk of rumours and disinformation, and, on the other hand, freedom of speech is not always so undervalued on the political agenda as it was in the early 1980s. Thus it would also serve the army's own interests to relate war events through the media in a controlled way, as this would have more credibility than official propaganda, despite censorship. Subsequent developments, especially in Panama in 1989 and the Persian Gulf in 1991, prove that, in its own interpretation, the army emphasized the Sidle Commission's recommendation of control and largely neglected to adopt its premises defending freedom of speech.

The pool arrangement did not face its real test until Panama, but it did not remain idle until that time. On average twice a year, a team of reporters was taken to observe military rehearsals of the US Army or small-scale shows of power at home or abroad, especially in Central America. A variation of this tactic was also used in the Persian Gulf when the United States began to protect the Kuwaiti oil tankers and during skirmishes with Iran's navy starting in the summer of 1987 (Thompson, 1987; Willey, 1991).

The Persian Gulf operations in the spring of 1988 quite clearly reveal a certain aspect of the media pool arrangement: one could cynically comment that it was an arrangement for organizing audiences for military spectacles provided by the US Army. The US media were not willing to waste the impressive military actions and drama in the way they had wasted them in Grenada.

In April of 1988, the US Navy took its revenge on Iran after one of its ships was damaged by an Iranian mine. The objective was to destroy two Iranian oil rigs and to sink a frigate. On the commanding ship, attempts were made to facilitate the activities of film media in particular:

The video and still cameras and crews, with military escort, maintained a position on the O-3 level, the very highest observation platform on the ship ... staff public affairs officer for the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, remained on the bridge with the wire and TV correspondents. These locations proved to be optimal in view

of the audio, visual, and command and control aspects of the operation that were readily observable (Willey, 1991: 86).

As the US Army often operates against technically and educationally inferior developing country enemies, the ringside seats provided for the media to watch the operations are safe and soft.

Interestingly enough, the military themselves are now seeing the experience from Grenada as a watershed in relations between themselves and the media.

After the Gulf War, the head of the Grenada operation, Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, summed up his own experience from Grenada:

Saddam Hussein declared the conflict over Kuwait to be the 'Mother of All Battles.' He may have been right. History may show that this war with the United Nations fundamentally changed the Middle East. History may also show that while Grenada was a skirmish in terms of warfare, it may also have been the information-warfare 'mother of all battles'. At the time of the Grenada invasion, relations between press and the US military had eroded to an appalling state. The root of the problem was the ill will between the press and military that emerged from Vietnam. A pall of mutual misunderstanding still enveloped these two elements of US society, eight years after the last shots were fired. The military brooded over the loss of Vietnam and many blamed the press (Metcalf, 1991: 56–58).

Metcalf had no concern for liberal principles like freedom of the press and had only military considerations in mind. He expresses satisfaction with the lack of critical attitudes among journalists who arrived in the first group in Grenada. His perception of 'professionalism' should cause some embarrassment for the journalists involved. One may wonder how many of the reporters in question, in retrospect, feel proud of the following attestation from Metcalf:

My impression of the ... correspondents was that they were very professional. They also gave the impression that many were more interested in just being there than in finding out what was going on ... the first group was not particularly rigorous in their questioning (Metcalf, 1991: 56–58).

Later press criticism of the Grenada invasion was severe. Metcalf admits: 'Looking back after seven years I would say that the story was not adequately reported to the public.' Nevertheless, he sums it up as a success story both for the military and the press:

Were the military and the press well served by Grenada? The answer is yes. When the medical students from Grenada stepped off the aeroplane in the United States and kissed the ground, media and military relations – now that they finally had hit bottom – started upward (Metcalf, 1991: 56–58).

3. Panama

The publicity arrangements of the Panama intervention were, according to the media and also partly in the army's own view, a clear failure. The information department of the US Department of Defense had a clearance made of the events in March 1990 (Hoffman, 1991), and the following is largely grounded on it. Operation 'Just

Cause' replaced Panama's leader Manuel Noriega, who was a 'fallen ally' of the United States much like Saddam Hussein. Noriega was involved in drug trade and grew more and more hostile to the United States, which resulted in Washington's attempting to get rid of him from 1987 onwards. The change of power was realized in a military strike commenced on 20 December 1989, in which, according to the Pentagon, 23 US soldiers and 202 Panama civilians lost their lives (other sources place higher estimates on the number of Panamanian casualties, with up to 4000 dead; see MacArthur, 1991: 144). Noriega was captured and taken to the United States to face a trial. In the manner of Grenada, the operation's justification in terms of international law was weak.

In order to secure the safety of the operation, the Department of Defense Media Pool was alerted only a few hours before military operations commenced. The fact that a decision was made to send in a pool was a contentious act in itself. Under the recommendations of the Sidle Commission, the pool arrangement was meant to be used in operations 'in remote areas where no other American press were present'. This was not the case in Panama, where there were several US reporters. Transport links between the United States and Panama were also good. Instead of sending the pool reporters from Washington, they could have been recruited from the correspondents already in Panama, or the entire arrangement could have been cancelled and free entry and reporting could have been allowed. In fact, a controversy occurred between Pentagon and US Southern Command (SouthCom) officials about whether to send the Washington-based DOD national media pool or to set up a pool based on reporters already present in Panama. Defense Secretary Cheney wanted to use the DOD pool because 'we were accustomed to it' and pool members 'knew the groundrules' (quoted from Sharkey, 1992: 93).

Cheney later claimed that he wanted to avoid criticism for not using the DOD pool. Looking at the experiences of the Gulf War in retrospect, the expectations of the established pool that they would receive the first priority raise questions about whether such a pool can ever be a basis for independent reporting. The loyalty and common expectations that such a system creates – among the reporters involved, the military and the political heads at the Pentagon – has proven to be powerful and dubious.

Politicians with their own agenda to defend in many cases seem to be even more eager than the military to control the reporters. According to the Hoffman Report, the military had no role in delaying the pool. Vice-president Dan Quayle had expressed concern about whether the pool could keep the operation secret but had finally left the decision to Cheney who authorized Williams to call pool members so late that they missed the very start of the invasion (Sharkey 1992: 93).

The pool's activities in Panama were a series of journalistic disappointments. The journalists arrived in Panama five hours after the attack had begun – some of them without their writing equipment, some in their winter clothes, some without a passport (the Pentagon had intelligently deducted that a passport was not necessary when a reporter was working 'from the US military bases in Panama'). They had been informed of their destination only in the airplane.

The pool did not have sufficient transportation and communications, partly because of the weak planning due to the secrecy of the operation, partly an incapability concerning practical realization of publicity and partly, perhaps, because of a deliberate political choice. When the reporters were taken out of the army barracks,

they went – according to the official announcement – ‘for safety reasons’ only to places where the battles had already ceased (Hoffman, 1991: 101).

In fact, the pool members as a result found themselves sitting for hours on the Fort Clayton Base, watching television and drinking coffee. ‘We actually watched a Bush news conference’, according to *Dallas Morning News* reporter Kevin Merida. ‘We were right there with the viewer watching CNN’ (quoted from Sharkey, 1992: 94).

The opinion of the reporters was that they should have a right to assess their safety themselves; otherwise the restriction would resemble censorship.⁶ In the Hoffman report (1991: 102), the reporters’ situation is described, for example with the following examples:

Photographers and reporters were incensed when they were told they could not interview or take pictures of American wounded ... pool photographers were turned aside ... when they sought to photograph caskets bearing men killed in action. The question of notification of next-of-kin did not apply in this case because the caskets were closed and bore no identification of the bodies inside.... Members of the pool were indignant when they were denied access to a place where Panamanian prisoners were being held ... photographers ... could not photograph damaged helicopters at Howard AFB.

Owing to poor communications connections, the pool reports arrived in the United States either as incomplete versions, late, or not at all. The journey of the first photographs to the United States took three days. Nevertheless, the position of the pool reporters was better than that of the 300 reporters coming in on ‘the second wave’, who were shut within the US military facilities until the combat was mainly over (Ottosen, 1991: 14).

Because the objective of the operation was strongly related to the person of Noriega, his qualities and peculiarities had a central position in the Pentagon publicity. The Pentagon revealed that the marines had found pornography, a portrait of Adolf Hitler, voodoo paraphernalia and some cocaine in Noriega’s head quarter. According to the British *Guardian* (25 September 1991) the pornography proved to be Spanish copies of Playboy, Hitler’s picture was found in the history of World War II published by Time-Life and the cocaine was in fact tortilla flour (see also The Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, 1991).

President Bush had an experience with the media during the Panama invasion that had direct impact on his policy towards the media during the Gulf War. On 21 December 1989, ABC, CBS and CNN used a split screen showing simultaneous live coverage of President Bush’s press conference about the invasion together with the return of the dead bodies of servicemen killed in Panama to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. The President was shown chatting with reporters during the ceremony. This caused a lot of mail to the White House from viewers who found the President’s attitude insensitive. Bush had to call a new press conference assuring his empathy with the victims and their families. He also asked the networks to inform him if they were going to use a similar technique in the future, so he could ‘stop the proceedings’. Afterwards, CBS News President David Burke released a statement assuring that the network ‘understands’ President Bush’s frustration over the incident. CNN stood by its decision to use the split screen. One year later, the Bush administration barred journalists from Dover when the bodybags arrived (Sharkey, 1992: 103).

The outcome of the Hoffman report resembles in many ways the clearances made by Britain's army after the Falklands: the problems were weak preparation plans, the dislike of the lower command strata towards journalists and all publicity and communications traffic. Hoffman admitted the validity of the journalists' professional criticism but denied the claim of political criticism that the work of journalists would deliberately have been hindered. The Pentagon's self-criticism partly calmed the mass media's criticism. Little attention was however paid to Secretary of Defense Cheney's reply to the Hoffman report, in which he commented that ultimately the safety of the operation always surpasses the needs and rights of the media (Matthews, 1991: 107–109).

Later, when the Persian Gulf conflict began, it became obvious that the Pentagon had interpreted the lessons of Panama in its own way. The pool was a successful solution, but the policy had to be veered towards even tighter cooperation. The control of movement and outgoing information was not to be bargained, but the Pentagon's own publicity had to provide the journalists with the information and visualizations they needed, with more class and alertness.

How did these working conditions for journalists affect the reporting? Jaqueline Sharkey sums up some areas where misleading information had consequences for the content of the reporting: deaths and injuries among US personnel from 'friendly fire'; casualties of US soldiers resulting from parachute jumps during the invasion; the performance of the Stealth aircraft which missed heavily their bombing targets; and sanitization of the coverage of the war included avoiding attention to civilian casualties.

4. Impact on the foreign media

What impact can media management like that during Operation 'Just Cause' have on the conflict coverage outside the United States? Reporters from other countries tried to get first hand access to the battle scenes. A reporter from Swedish Radio was among those who came in with the second wave of journalists and had the frustrating experience, together with 300 other reporters, of being locked up at the US base with no access to information and with little opportunity to communicate with the outside world (Nyberg & Palme, 1990).

Basically, the European media had to rely on reports from the US pool through their US-based correspondents, and their most important sources were of course the US media itself. The extent to which US television and newspapers were able to communicate anything of substantial interest besides the official PR version determined the picture the rest of the world got of this conflict. Here, CNN offered an alternative through its coverage from Atlanta, based on hundreds of telephone calls from Panama City in which ordinary people could give their eyewitness reports about frightened civilians seeking shelter from the fighting, as a supplement to the official version of the events (Sharkey, 1992: 101).

An important question is to what extent the media management, pool system and censorship were an issue in the reporting. One would think that this was an important issue, but a Norwegian example proves the opposite.⁷

A story in *Bergens Tidende* (BT), the largest regional newspaper in Norway, was based on a report from a correspondent in Chicago who had US television as his

only source.⁸ In its first news report from Operation 'Just Cause', BT had as its main story an article with the title 'Remains Until The Job Is Done' – a direct quotation from President Bush's press conference broadcast on US television. The quotation continued in the article; in the title and leader, no distinction was made between the president's own rhetoric and the story itself. In a declamational form, the newspaper made the president's words its own. The only regrettable thing about the operation, according to BT, was that Manuel Noriega still had not been caught (this was before Noriega eventually was captured). In the editing, BT thus went directly into the official version of Operation 'Just Cause' – that the 'hunt for the drug criminal Noriega' played the key role. Talking about casualties, BT referred to Bush 'himself a former pilot with active duty during the Second World War'. Bush regrets 'unfortunately (that) it is not possible to fulfil an operation like this without loss of human life'. The only concrete casualties referred to by BT, however, were US soldiers: the civilian population was almost invisible in the article.

The news story referred to massive support in the USA for the operation, without referring to the fact that it was a violation of international law, later condemned by the UN, and without using the word 'invasion' in the news text at all. Beneath a subtitle 'News Is Important', the reporting from Panama was given explicit attention, without mention of the media restriction and the pool system. A general statement declared that 'news broadcasting and especially the larger networks seems to play an important role during the operation.' In explaining the importance more concretely, BT referred to how the US government used polls from CNN to argue that the US people are behind the operation, with support from 91% of the CNN viewers. The only media restrictions referred to in the article were the restrictions placed upon CNN by Noriega during the elections in May 1989. There was no reference to the censorship or other restrictions imposed by the Pentagon. But journalists were supplied with a martyr role in the article when it referred to the death of an 'unnamed American journalist' and a photographer from the Spanish newspaper *El País*. 'News is not transmitted without cost', declared BT.

This example is not necessarily representative of Norwegian coverage of Operation 'Just Cause'. However, an analysis of editorial in BT and in the leading Norwegian morning paper, *Aftenposten*, does indicate a supportive attitude from the mainstream Norwegian press, in which principle issues linked to media restrictions are totally absent. Thus, one should not underestimate what impact the Pentagon's media-management techniques have on news reporting in a global context.

Notes

1. Great Britain's Ministry of Defence paid so much attention to the role of military experts used by journalists that it funded research on the matter (Adams, 1986).
2. 'Gotcha' was created in a situation where it was not known that the ship had sunk. When the seriousness of the situation became clear, the editorial leadership of *The Sun* replaced it in the next editions with the more neutral headline 'Did 1200 Argies drown?' (Chippindale & Horrie, 1992: 118).
3. Thatcher's indignation for this particular *Panorama* programme has later been explained to a great deal by the fact that the programme revealed political conflicts within her party in the middle of a crisis situation (Cockerell, Hennessy & Walker: 1984: 157). Subsequent research has maybe even unnecessarily underlined the BBC's striving for independence. Throughout the war, the BBC was

forced to consider government criticism, because its political position was weak; the major part of its programmes satisfied also the propagandistic views of the government.

4. Hertsgaard studied the newscasts of ABC, CBS and NBC and the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*.
5. The reactions of the US audience to the news blackout were conflicting. In the first opinion polls, the blackout gained wide support, but when the principle aspect got stronger after actual combat situations, opinions changed. At the end of 1983, a result was received according to which 63 % opposed the government's actions (Hertsgaard, 1988: 220).
6. William Boot (Christopher Hanson) (1990) later wrote that appealing to the safety of war correspondents is like forbidding the journalists to follow the presidential campaigns because they are 'too political'.
7. This is a summary of a major analysis of a Norwegian newspaper's coverage of Operation 'Just Cause' (Ottosen, 1994: 57–82).
8. In an interview with Rune Ottosen on January 12 1993, the reporter confirmed that he had based his story on US television news.

III. Methodological Approaches

News, Discourse, Rhetoric, Propaganda

Conflict Journalism from a Multi-Methodological Perspective

Oddgeir Tveiten & Stig A. Nohrstedt

In his book *World Orders, Old and New*, Noam Chomsky writes: ‘The Cold War confrontation provided easy formulas to justify criminal actions abroad and entrenchment of privilege and state power at home’ (1994:1). The quote is worth looking at closely. It does not say that the Cold War provided *formulas* to justify criminal actions, but rather that it provided *easy* formulas. Moreover, it refers specifically to *criminal* actions by the (US) government, and it draws up a clear line connecting foreign politics to a domestic social system of privileges and rights. The quote also refers to a certain tension between the *content* of US foreign policy and the *civil consensus* required to legitimize it, a tension which is never far from the centre of Chomsky’s work and which found its formulation as a media theory in *Manufacturing Consent* (1988), which he coauthored with Edward Herman. Here, they take the media as the starting point for the analysis of perception – and the manipulation of it – as a key component in foreign politics. According to Herman & Chomsky, the media provide a ‘screen’ between wanted and unwanted points of view. The process is described as one in which essentially decent human beings together produce horrendous policies, with the media providing little more than tacit support of ‘state terrorism’.

That view is not representative of contemporary propaganda analysis, as chapter one in this volume fully documents. On the other hand, it does present a forceful argument, to which one might append a number of other theories of persuasion. There is much in the Chomskyan framework that has found its way into a wide range of contemporary propaganda analyses in recent years. Whether one agrees with their conclusions or not, their rich empirical material can hardly be overlooked. Taken literally, the quotation above might indicate that Chomsky–Herman propaganda theory is no longer valid after the fall of the Soviet Union. But it is neither the world order prior to 1989, nor the Soviet Union as such, that is their main concern. What seems to attract many researchers is the compelling simplicity of their critique of those political mechanisms in the US political culture that require a projection of external enemies in order to work domestically. US foreign policy institutions engage in a non-democratic game of Us and Them legitimization tactics, shifting focus as the world situation requires: ‘Latin-America today, Eastern Europe tomorrow’.

To the extent that propaganda research is based on content analysis – and it often is – it is especially vulnerable to politicized argument and counter-argument. That is so for the very reason that it works from within the texts that may – or may not – have a propaganda origin. Its empirical basis may itself be an aspect of propaganda. By way of an illustration: At the time of writing, with airplanes constantly taking off on TV accompanied by political declarations of the humanitarian purposes of the Kosovo operations, it would be easy to find daily inspiration for a media critique in the Herman–Chomsky vein. As viewers, we are emotionally, ideologically and politically involved in the dramatic events whether we want to be or not. We may react in various ways and reflect more or less critically about the media coverage. It is in fact often difficult to distinguish the journalistically authentic from the results of censorship, closed borders and clichés. From an academic point of view, there is a world and a society on which we ideally comment critically. On the other hand, there is a need for distance and detachment, different but not unrelated to its parallel in journalism.

So how does one bring a compelling theory of propaganda into the view of journalism, a view of content analysis and a view of media effect? Certainly, a methodology that does so must contain an approach to political agency that is complex enough to address the issues of the changing international political structure but also simple enough to retain the fact that communication is produced by someone, somewhere, for some purpose. In this article, we suggest that the emergence of discourse analysis and the re-emergence of rhetorical analysis of political communication during the last decade or so hold promises to that effect.

1. War images and social narrative

As Alexander (1997) notes, the study of media-related aspects of social organization is just beginning to come into the mainstream of sociology as a topic in itself, while in a different sense it has always been central to the study of modernity; for Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Kracauer – to mention some sources of inspiration – the study of modernity also contained the study of modernizing changes brought about by the media and new communication technology. With Alexander and many others, Thompson (1993; 1995; 1997) has made it a central research issue to contextualize media analysis in the complexity of the ‘the modern’ of modern society. The media and its fleeting imagery are a crucial marker in modern society vis a vis other epochs. On that order, the Gulf War and other international conflicts in recent years represent a profound change in the operations of states in the global political sphere. Today, conflicts happen in real-time, which fundamentally alters the concerns of political and military planners, just as it completely alters the ontological status of these conflicts as narratives in our everyday lives.

Our view here is that a closer look at this essentially ‘discursive’ nature of the media’s dealing with warfare and the interests of the involved parties should be brought onto the level of a social analysis. Much has been said about the differences in interest amongst the Coalition powers during the Gulf War, for instance. Much has also been said about the orchestrating role played by the USA vis a vis its partners and the UN. The sum total of this invites an integrated theory of international relations, organization, routinization and rationale, if not to say individual constraint

and individual creativity in state organizations and professional activities. Equally important is the question of the ways in which changes in media structure influence the range of operating capabilities in contemporary media management during times of war and war reporting. It has been noted that while Vietnam (or perhaps Korea) was, in a sense, the first television war, the Gulf War brought CNN and the global-audience dimension. In short, the question is how to integrate content analysis with theories of changing forms of propaganda flows and resulting changes in processes of nation-state interaction during times of war.

In that context, there is something to be said for the combination of a discourse-analysis tradition – which centres on analysis of propositions and truth claims in news content – with analyses of persuasion – often more eloquently formulated in theories of rhetoric than in theories of propaganda. Rhetorical analysis, too, centres on the sender of communicated messages. Jørgen Fafner (1996) notes the clear relationship between propaganda and rhetoric, but he emphasizes that rhetoric is something more than propaganda. It concerns persuasion, as does propaganda analysis. But it is also, to a greater extent than propaganda theory generally is considered to be, a theory of ethics and a theory of society. Its concern with persuasion is more correctly understood as a concern with the art (*tekne*) of *convincing*.

In addition, its anthropological view of communication is the key to that difference. One element of that anthropology has to do with orality, which strikes a chord with contemporary propaganda analysis in the context of television content production and reception. With the emergence of television – let alone global television – the oral aspect of communication returns, in a sense, to that which was the arena for the classical rhetors: the auditorium. But television's orality is quite different than that of the classical persuasion situation. The auditorium has become the living-room, separating the audiences into totally different units than that of the mass audience. Thompson (1995) calls the televised contact between sender and receiver a *quasi-contact*, and one might add that this quasi-interaction is not only due to the types of contacts it makes possible but also to its preferred mode of content presentation. Television has no room for literacy, philosophy or learning, it is often said. Monica Lewinsky is (or was) as central and newsworthy as Saddam Hussein or the Pope; Bill Clinton equally newsworthy whether he speaks to the General Assembly of the UN or is broadcast 'live' on CNN as someone's favourite 'sleazebag'.

On TV, the speaker's contact with the audience is in reality both indirect and consciously staged. It is seldom instantaneous, but is often made to look instantaneous because instantaneousness is embedded in so many of the television forms. In applying a rhetorical analysis, this conscious delusion is important not primarily as an element of manipulation, but as an aspect of the form.

2. The origins of the propaganda approach

Traditional propaganda theory and methodology sprung out of a view that modern media, especially radio and newspapers at the time, were powerful agents of social change. The 'hypodermic needle' approach of early propaganda is an interesting element in this story, for parallel to the analysis of propaganda as an aspect of powerful media effects on masses, comes the emergence of symbolic interactionism, as conceptualized by George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer. Walter Lippman,

whose work in the area of media and persuasion can hardly be overlooked, stood closer to the pragmatism inherent in symbolic interactionism than did his contemporary Harold Lasswell, who is more often associated with the emergence of propaganda research. Although it is an issue much too big for the present article, there is in Lippmann's work an early sense of the inadequacy of the so-called 'transportation' model of mass communication (sender–message–receiver). Although Lippmann's work is not often quoted that way, there are many signs of a communication theory that is much more akin to the so-called 'ritual-oriented' communication model that one tends to find more in cultural theories of communication.

And here we might return a second to Noam Chomsky, whose propaganda concept is very different from Lippmann's, yet strikingly similar on the surface. Despite Chomsky's emphasis on propaganda as an outcome or a systematic effect of modern state institutions and the way they work, his vocabulary is often a vocabulary of will and volition, invoking the planned government manipulation of the public's knowledge of events:

The pattern persists with little change. One revealing example is the standard current interpretation of the campaign of slaughter, torture, and destruction that the United States organized and directed in Central America through the 1980's to demolish the popular organizations that were taking shape, in part under Church auspices. These threatened to create a base for functioning democracy, perhaps allowing the people of this miserable region, long in the grip of U.S. power, to gain some control over their lives; therefore they had to be destroyed (Chomsky, 1994: 3).

Lippmann could have written the same, but he might have continued differently, just as he might have drawn different conclusions. There is little reason to contest the notion that planned and manipulative policymaking is based on a 'consciousness industry'. Willful manipulation is certainly an aspect of politics, with the penchant for media manipulation being unevenly distributed amongst individuals and government institutions. However, the contrast between Lippmann and Chomsky comes clear in the sense that Lippmann envisaged a 'paternalistic role' for the media: the élites would lead, not manipulate; and they would do so in part through the media. For Chomsky, the dynamic and the political rationale is the reverse: the élites manipulate; therefore the public must lead and seek its own leaders. And that places the essence of media propaganda in an entirely different light. The key issue here is the conceptualization of the audience. Something is gone, no one is quite sure of what is coming. Chomsky and others do a good job in deciphering both news content and the change from the Cold War to a new world order, but what is often missed is that there is a quite fundamental realignment of publics and audiences in the making. New alliances may produce realignments within elites and other interests groups. Pressure is placed also on the management of change and hence the maintainance of the integrity of the elites.

3. Rhetoric: Return to sender

Both theories of propaganda and theories of rhetoric have the persuasive role of the sender as focal point. However, the rhetorical tradition places emphasis on the distinction between the act of *persuading* and the act of *convincing*, a difference that is

not as clear in English as it is in some other languages – for instance German: the difference between *überzeugen* and *überreden* respectively. Kurt Johannesson frames his (1990) book on rhetoric by pointing his readers to the essentially dialogic nature of good rhetoric, and does so with an illustrative rhetorical manoeuvre of his own. An argument must be *made*, and its elements must be made *plain* (*delectare*), he states. It must contain the right factual knowledge (*docere*), but it must have something more – it must *identify the audience* in order to communicate with it in a way with which the audience in turn can identify. And that refers to the rhetor's ambition to persuade (*movere*). Johannesson shows this with the familiar argument that takes place between Brutus and Marcus Antonius in Shakespeare's play *Julius Ceasar* after Brutus has murdered Caesar and is facing an angry crowd. In his attempt to win them over, Brutus appeals not to his action but to his family honour. He can hardly appeal to his action, although he has claimed convincingly that Caesar was becoming a tyrant. He is facing a moveable crowd, and the fact is that he has stabbed Caesar in the back. His opponent, Marcus Antonius, on the other hand, wants to question Brutus's claim that Caesar was becoming a tyrant, but cannot say directly that Brutus murdered him. He might have the attention of an audience which at that time favours Brutus. He cannot use words like 'stabbing', 'betrayal' and 'degeneration' without risking a public consolidation in favour of Brutus. So, he passes out quite carefully his disbelief in Brutus's line of defense. According to Johannesson, Antonius wins the audience not by what he says but by what he does not say.

The play *Julius Caesar* is timeless, which is why Johannesson can use it to illustrate the potential for contemporary rhetorical analysis. But still, today's political rhetoric occurs in a completely different setting. It is difficult to not see the rhetorical element of George Bush's speech as he declared war against Iraq, for instance. But his rhetorical situation was a written speech, prepared by aides and broadcast to an audience neither present nor in a position to question him. The intensity of the psychological state was extraordinary, as was the kind of rhetorical skills required. But President Bush, for all practical purposes, was no great orator. His personal sense of the implications of the emergent global media for politics seems not to have been that advanced. Taylor (1994) notes how both Bush and Prime Minister John Major in the UK commented on the unreality of the first images of the air attacks from the Gulf War. It was a television war, placing the key actors in the role of media audience as well. Both Bush and Major first learned of the actual air strikes from television, not from their aides (Taylor, 1994).

One might argue that the complex implications of television were not as clear to the Coalition leaders as it might have seemed. Already, Johannesson's example from Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* has reminded us of the need to balance *regularity*, *institutions* and *everyday life* with moments of particularly heightened tension, which deserve a different kind of attention. Propaganda has an everyday aspect, and it has an extraordinary aspect. The declaration of war against Iraq is one such extraordinary moment. Or, to invoke Geertz's memorable analysis of the Balinese cockfight (1972), where he argued that the extraordinary act of cockfighting could only be caught in a 'thick description' of the event and the social practices surrounding it, the role of the media in wartime is much more than senders, contents, structures and effects. It is in this sort of extraordinary situation, where participants in a given collective event are brought together in a process of heightened tension, that rhetorical analysis most clearly comes into question. These are situations where a few

select words might make all the difference. Although the question of the media's influences on everyday life is the *sine qua non* of media-effects studies, propaganda analysis in brief and tense conflicts like the Gulf War may benefit from the 'thick description' of critical events in wartime, such as speeches and exchanges like those mentioned.

4. Discourse

In comparison with rhetorical analysis of the singular event or episode, as outlined above, discourse analysis may be said to have a wider purpose – related to rhetorical analysis but more oriented towards communicative interactions over a longer period of time. This depends, of course, on what sort of discourse analysis one had in mind and on what sort of meaning one attaches to the term 'discourse'. A general definition might be the mental 'ordering' of concepts, ideas and things in the world through the way we talk and write about them. And a place to begin a layout of an analytic approach to the discourse of war journalism might be the *instantaneousness* of contemporary media, especially television. Taylor (1994) notes that on the night of the outbreak of the Gulf War, all UK and US broadcast networks switched to 24-hour news reporting. In the beginning, they all utilized CNN coverage from the attacks on Iraq. In the first 24 hours of the war, the scarcity of fact was veiled in a flurry of wheeled-in experts who covered practically all aspects of the war situation in their comments. Taylor adds that although the commentary in some ways was impressive, it was largely candy floss that had the effect of hiding the lack of concrete information behind an image of the media as serving the people's right to know, when there was in fact almost nothing to know. Taylor does not himself relate such observations to a discussion of various content-analysis modes, other than in his introductory comments on past and contemporary propaganda. His concern lies elsewhere. But even so, his observations move right into a discussion of discourse analysis as methodology.

Few content analyses are completely decontextualized, whether one speaks of the tradition of positivist content analysis or other less positivist but still quantitative analysis strategies. In all variable schemes, content is related to some form of social process, whether one agrees with the conceptualization or not. However, with the emergence of a strictly formulated discourse-analysis tradition, such as that, for instance, of Teun van Dijk or Norman Fairclough, context is no longer understood as an aspect of a variable design of causal relationships but more as a quest for more detailed analysis of the contextual elements inherent in the news texts themselves. A typical example from conversation analysis may serve as an illustration. It depicts a mother who asks her son, 'What's your homework assignment?' The son answers, 'I've already done it,' thus indicating that he not only understands the question but also anticipates her next question, which is going to be when he plans to do it. He answers that question as well. The point is that in the context of the two utterances lies meaning which may be lost if one were to focus entirely on the two single sentences. Social conventions and types of role relationships elicit the richer meaning of the statements. In this case, moods of the exchange may be inherent in the conversation while not necessarily clear from the sampled passage, while the passage still contains clues to the relationship between mother and son.

There is a long media studies tradition behind such concerns (see Nohrstedt, 1986; Tveiten, 1993). Discourse analysis as proposed by van Dijk is in debt to conversation analysis, symbolic interactionism and semiotic analysis. In a two-volume book from 1988, van Dijk expands on arguments he already had produced in collaboration with others (see Van Dijk, 1985), but then introduced the beginnings of discourse analysis in social theory more distinctly. Noting the legacy of semiotics tied to Ferdinand de Saussure and C. S. Peirce, van Dijk referred also to Harvey Sacks and Harold Garfinkel as practitioners of a context analysis. Both of these were sociologists who represented both breaks and continuities in relation to the dominant US sociology paradigm of the time. With those two volumes, van Dijk's aimed at bringing this seemingly broad range of theories and traditions to bear on the analysis of *news* – an intent further achieved in his founding of the journal *Discourse and Society*. If nothing else, this serves as a reminder that propaganda analysis requires a positioning vis a vis other traditions that have long since pointed out a direction for a media sociology of communicative action. The references to Garfinkel and Sacks also brought to discourse sociology certain pathways to Parson's theories of human action, and, if one will, to Alfred Schutz and beyond that to a *phenomenology* of news discourse. How does the aspect of human conduct come to terms with both nature and behaviour, without being reduced to one or the other? How does one understand communicative conduct as something more than structure and function? Where do mental elements come into play? How does one connect what journalists *do* with what they *think*? How does one connect what *sources* do with how they think about *journalism*, or what journalists think about sources? Journalism is about words. Clearly, usage of words is behaviour, but in Mead's sense of the word – it is *conduct*, and that distinction between behaviour and conduct is more important than it may seem, for it invites nothing less than an anthropology of discourse.

5. A multimethodological approach as alternative?

The different orientations which we have briefly presented above all have their limitations, but also clear advantages as analytical perspectives in studies of war and conflict journalism. The Herman and Chomsky propaganda approach reduces media to tools for the state and capital. In this, it is by far the only propaganda-analysis model available. However, their analysis points a way for a critical approach to the 'thin descriptions' of media effect – whether these are applied to the productive or receptive agencies. Their analysis takes its point of departure mainly in the policy interests of nation-states and how these are realized through the media as a form of contest with the individuals and collectivities of civil society. From their point of view, it makes perfect sense to prioritize as they do, since their concern is with US foreign policy and the US news in relation to that. But it cannot be denied that their analysis is less developed when it comes to the media logic and journalism as a set of practices. The journalists' professional options and ethical considerations, in short the professional subjective rationality, are hardly reflected in the approach. A yardstick of contemporary propaganda analysis might then be whether other theories of propaganda do reflect these issues. The introductory chapter to this volume provides a clearly affirmative answer to this.

Rhetorical criticism, on the other hand, contributes a more elaborate view on the persuasive aspects of communication. One might argue that the rhetorical approach is still relatively undertheoreticized when it comes to integration of modes of persuasion with contemporary media development and processes of globalization in politics. Hence, one might also take this juncture to call for a more complex approach to studies of the rhetorical potential offered to some players in the New World Order. Discourse analysis, finally, represents another relevant perspective. Not least, the attention to interdiscursive relations and recontextualization of meanings offers important points of departure for studies of how propaganda and political rhetoric are treated within news journalism (Fairclough, 1995).

6. News events and news narratives

Earlier we mentioned a concern with rhetoric and the anthropology of communications, to which we might add that Elihu Katz and Daniel Dayan's (1991) analysis of media events comes a long way. In their tripartite typology of media events as either *Contests*, *Conquests* or *Coronations*, they show how a fairly limited number of social narratives repeat and reoccur in global happenings as portrayed on television. Voicing a diverse range of inspirations, from Claude Levi-Strauss to Gladys and Kurt Lang, their concern is to apply narrative approaches to the question of how certain media stories stand out as somehow differently real than happenings in the world. They point to the propensity of television events of global magnitude to present themselves as extraordinary in a quite specific sense, drawing media audiences into a sort of participation that is equally extraordinary. Never forgettable, events such as royal weddings or papal visits work on the collective consciousness of society in what they term 'high holidays' – as events of celebration, mourning or otherwise fundamental social ritual. In short, the public engages in a set of rituals whose aim is to reinforce the collective (see Katz & Dayan, 1991: chapter 10).

The intellectual heritage on which they draw in this theory is quite diverse: On the one hand, it is Daniel Boorstin's analysis of the management of 'pseudo events', such as televised presidential debates or other forms of hero construction (*Contest*) in US society (see Boorstin, 1963). Boorstin, of course, was concerned with the capacity of television to present a fundamentally manipulated world view. On the other side, they draw on Victor Turner and especially his conception of 'liminality', which Turner himself took from van Gennep (van Gennep, 1967). For Turner, the 'liminal phase' occurred for instance in initiation rites in traditional society, where adolescents were removed from everyday life and subjected to a ritualized situation (a passage) that would socially demarkate their existence as children from their new existence as adults. Turner's analysis centred on the symbolic forms involved and invoked in this process. For Katz and Dayan, Turner's point was equally applied to show that certain processes of social life occur outside the everyday reality – in liminal or 'marginal' situations, where different rules apply. Katz and Dayan argue, for instance, that the wedding of Princess Diana and Prince Charles functioned in this way for a world media audience. It *transfixed* the ordinary and, for a moment, *transcended* the ordinary by invoking something more densely laden. People were moved out of the ordinary for a period, and the 'ritual' was for a period 'liminal', as was the funeral of Princess Diana years later.

Whether one subscribes to their analysis or not, it raises a quite crucial theoretical issue: For lack of a better comparison, in the realm of Ndembu society to which Victor Turner devoted his attention, initiation rites concerned a process where the elders guided the youths through the (liminal) process of becoming (adult). However, for Katz and Dayan, the somewhat unspoken assumption is rather a sort of ritual in which the elders and the youth (allegorically speaking) are all on a journey with no known destiny. The funeral of Princess Diana, for instance, threatened to become a social upheaval in the UK, until Tony Blair, more wise in media appearance than the Windsor clan, intervened by defining the funeral as a national ceremony. In contrast with all of that, the Gulf War was a media ritual in different sense: In the opening stage, it was quite obviously a liminal event, in that it transposed the routines of everyday into the *extra*-ordinary. It would be quite misleading to think that those in charge of the Bush administration's media strategies were completely on top of this process, in the sense that they guided and controlled every aspect of it. On the contrary, it had its own dynamic. But the *liminal* aspect of the Gulf media event did not take place in a small and identifiable society, such as Turner's Ndembu world; it did not conform to ritualistic practices having been shaped over many generations; and it did not involve a guided process where all symbolic aspects were known to the leaders/elders. It can be thought of as a liminal event evidencing the fragile foundations of James Baker's and George Bush's announced New World Order. In this phase of the Gulf War, the liminal aspect of politics was demonstrated as a military intervention. It became a major prime-time news event, with all the insecurity and lack of predictability that such an occurrence – in hindsight – produced.

7. Propaganda – aesthetics

Katz and Dayan's media events reasoning ties into rhetorical analysis in several ways, among them the aesthetic aspects of global television. Visual material in television propaganda has two primary rationales, both resemblance of basic lessons in classic rhetorical analysis: the first is the requirement to arouse curiosity and attention; the second is the requirement to persuade the receivers through what their own minds tell them. Visual propaganda in the age of moving images seeks, quite literally, to enable target audiences to 'see for themselves', and one might take note that both of the root definitions of propaganda are kept intact in that phrase. Appealing messages, informative and entertaining, may serve the highest virtue, may provide solid insight, and thus be propaganda in a less negative sense than what is often associated with television propaganda. John Reith's conception of public service broadcasting is as close to such a propaganda definition as one might get. On the other hand, spectacle and amusement may naturally be applied to processes of public persuasion more in the conception of 'blinding' the public. Modern propaganda of the latter sort has among other things roots in early film aesthetics, in 'cinema of attraction', which had its greatest moment at the beginning of the 20th century.

Cinema of attraction was a genre inspired by a range of entertainment spheres, the spectacle of vaudeville and folk culture. The concept 'attraction' is found in the works of the young Sergej Eisenstein and was central to his attempts at developing

an alternative analysis model for theatre. According to Tom Gunning, Eisenstein sought an alternative to the realistic and representational theatre aesthetic that would entail stronger experiences for the audience: 'An attraction aggressively subjected the spectator to "sensual or psychological impact"' (Gunning, 1994: 59). What set cinema of attraction apart from other genres was its aim of displaying something for the audience – unique events, preferably something sensational or spectacular – and also its revealed relation to the public in the form of the vaudeville announcer's gestures to the audience, eye contact with the camera, and the like. Its aesthetic is consciously exhibitionistic, with a penchant for erotically laden scenes and a fascination with the technological wonders of its day – including film itself. Close-ups of pin-ups and rolling locomotive wheels belonged to its common repertoire.

This aesthetic form has of course been present as an underlying rhetorical effect in journalism, just as it has in later narrative film. The newspaper and television have both been dependent on visual images and impressions in order to attract attention. The newspapers of the 19th century applied drawings and lithographs in order to visualize important happenings, such as military battles or new inventions. Photography started to be applied in journalism only at the beginning of the 20th century, while television is today the dominant medium through its attempt to entertain, report and attract by way of film and video technique. At bottom lies the same rhetorical means as those applied by cinema of attraction, but of course with the additional influences of later narrative traditions in film throughout the 20th century.

A current example of how attraction has been incorporated into television journalism can be found in the coverage of the Balkan conflict in March 1999. On Swedish television, a news story during the first days of the NATO attacks placed the viewer in the cockpit of the attacking planes. Through animation techniques, the events were dramatized in ways that made the audience part of the action – of course on the side of the technical and military superior. Hence, at the same time as this reportage had all the dramatic appeal that is associated with good television, it was seductive in its choice of viewer's perspective. One might argue that it takes a critical and reflective mind on the side of the audience not to identify with NATO, unless one is placed in the airstrikes' target areas.

8. Journalism and the ethos of detached neutrality

As an aspect of narrative, journalism also faces fundamental concerns about its ethos. When CNN came on the scene, journalistic claims to neutrality became more crucial than ever before, more difficult to define, more vague in practice and more contested. This issue lies at the heart of journalistic concern over press censorship during the Gulf War, but in our present framework there is reason to contextualize the issue of censorship within the context of all those other means available to journalism that are not directly influenced by censorship, as for instance the scope of the commentary that is being brought forth. It would be wrong to construe the question of Gulf propaganda as a question of critiquing US government and Coalition forces in their application of strategy to contain the media and coerce the public through misinformation. Clearly, both global television networks and the many national broadcasting venues that either use the footage provided by global vendors or provide their own have means of disseminating opinion far beyond what governments can

control. For instance, CNN anchor and long-time CBS man Bernhard Shaw said after the Gulf War that his neutrality was now more contested by ever so many fellow Americans. He could no longer think of his reporting in terms of a US constituency. He had to think globally – acting professionally neutral in ways that could possibly appear to Americans as not very American.

As in cinema of attraction and its forebears in entertainment and vaudeville, there is in journalism an epistemology that exploits visualization in the establishment of plausibility and truth with regard to the information that is being disseminated. The journalistic trade has in different ways been shaped so as to make news and other public affairs material seem trustworthy, correct and true. In the reportage, the reporter visits a place and accounts for a happening or a reality to which he or she is witness, presenting a trustworthy narrative on the basis of his or her presence and reliance on conventions for reporting it. Through striking detail from the local surroundings, the language of the field reportage may add to the story's validity. Film footage may add even more, and may in fact replace the verbal appeal to authenticity. According to theory, the journalist seeks to construe an 'image' or a 'blue print' for the audience to see, through different symbolic means.

Although the ambiances of visual and verbal narrative differ, the rhetorical element concerns the ethos, logos and pathos of journalism. In terms of ethos, in other words how the reporter constructs and connects his or her own role in the context, the question is whether and how to remain the neutral disseminator – the messenger who carries back with him or her (see *rapporé* in French) a certain reality, mirrored rather than refracted, with no vested interest in one or the other side. In his already famous book *Breaking the News*, James Fallows (1997: 10–15) recounts a public television talk show where Mike Wallace and Peter Jennings were asked whether they would intervene, as US citizens, if they as journalists were in a position to prevent a US platoon from being killed in a (fictional) war. Jennings first replies that he would, whereupon Wallace turns to him in astonishment and exclaims, 'But you're a reporter!' As the story goes, Jennings backtracks and changes his mind, whereupon the other panelists – among them General Westmoreland, who led the operations in Vietnam, and Brent Scowcroft, who was national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush – look at both of them as if they were aliens from outer space. According to Fallows, such dilemmas are as central to the journalistic ethos as they are to the explanation of US journalism always has had relatively low standing with the US public. Professional ideals such as universal value do not rhyme with the interest of the national collective during war. To journalism, the idea that there be no human intervention between the public and the reality which is being reported is the essence of the trade, hence its narrative of event, fact and consequence.

At the same time, visual material functions from a rhetorical point of view, complementary to the narrative of fact, as its indexical dimension itself has a persuasive appeal on the basis of its seeming authenticity – or for lack of a better term its 'thereness'. What is showed on the screen has verifiably 'happened', although it may have done so in a different context from what is presented. To the extent that journalism in any given situation thus succeeds in constructing its ethos, it also obtains much of its logos effect. If the public accepts the appeal to the ethos as neutral transmitter, it is also halfway to accepting the appeal to trustworthiness, correctness, completeness and plausibility. Against this comes the emergence of

modern television's entirely different sense of appeal: As in cinema of attraction, there is an appeal in having seen 'the attraction'. Following Gunnig (1996: 75), if there is violence and aggressive sensation, as in cinema of attraction, all the more reason for the public to be bewildered, scared, moved – hence a successful appeal to *attention*. To this one might add that as media cultures change, the spectacular and the seemingly ordinary merge in the virtual vaudeville of global television – creating new rifts between the kind of news that Mike Wallace idealizes and news, Jerry Springer style.

9. Propaganda, popular culture and journalism

As Fafner (1996) notes, one does not have to study ancient society for long to realize that people were no more virtuous in their communication then than we are today. But that fact is no reason to not reassess what rhetoric, as an intellectual endeavour, has to offer. Propaganda, in new and old forms, refers to the consciously instrumental aspect of *persuasion*. Speeches in classical rhetoric may have had this effect, but rhetorical analysis refers as much to a holistic anthropology, of which *persuasion* is one part. In relation to journalism and international conflicts, propaganda analysis can no longer be approached as *persuasion* through information or misinformation, control and manipulation. It ought to include the analysis of the performance, the content of the performed, the reaction and counter-argument – in short the full range of that which is communicated and those who do it. It ought to investigate the very conditions under which journalism operates, placing the profession of journalism and the journalists themselves squarely in the arena. Accordingly, it seems more natural to view propaganda as the 'milieu' or the habitat in which certain types of communicative exchanges occur.

Propaganda – or *propagare* – is a term from agriculture originally used to convey the meaning of *to plant* or *to cultivate*. In mediaeval times, it found a different use as the sowing of the right faith – literally the Catholic Church's world view. In that sense, propaganda refers both to a long-term and a short-term communicative activity, to trivial and eternal matters. Like the sower in the New Testament returning to harvest the fruits of his labour, propaganda may also be referred to as a seasonal activity in politics: without long-term cultivation of cultural seeds, the mobilization for Operation Desert Storm would not have been possible. In short, a wider cultural discourse than that produced in news-related discourse comes into play. The film *Independence Day* from 1996 (ID4) suffices as example. The story about an invasion from space is really a story about human greatness, where the outer enemy's attack is fenced off in the final instance by an alliance led by the USA. The film's narrative is conventional in every aspect, as it offers little in the way of anchoring any resistance for the audience. It is too conventional for that. The only unconventional aspect of the film was its earnings on the first day of release, incidentally July 4th: \$50 million (and a total of \$800 million dollars by the year's end).¹ The film's propagandistic function is neither to change the audience's general outlook on the world nor to consciously enhance it in any politically manifest sense. Its *main* rhetorical objective is to make money, not to politicize, and we all know it. But in a wider setting, its sub-propaganda value is recognizable. According to Mral, the film has clear similarities with the mobilization movies made during World War II. To-

getherness never works better than during times when an outer enemy seems invincible. ‘The mobilization movies were conscious propaganda, but if one sees this in connection with the actual content of ID4, the distinction seems less clear-cut’ (Mral, 1998: 153), she writes (*our translation*). One might add three things to this. First, ID4 works well as propaganda in the sense that most people would not think of it as such. Secondly, it also makes sense to target propaganda towards youth audiences, but in this case the targeting had rationales that were clearly more commercial than political. Thirdly, narratives of the ID4 kind would seem to have a cultural framework that inspire a polysemic reading: for some, the movie may be strictly entertainment; for others, it may confirm a basic societal value; while for others still, it may invite ridicule simply because it is so utterly American.

10. Summary

With such a view of the contextual element of propaganda, the logical end point in this article is to advocate a contextual and interpretative approach to propaganda analysis – an approach that considers the integration of the three methodological approaches discussed in this article. More discussion of such a framework may, among other things, contain the following points of departure:

- a The global political order has changed since 1989, stimulating formulations of new political possibilities as well as threats, utopias and dystopias. New political agendas have both new and reconfirmed strategic implications for the policies pursued (witness the new rationale for NATO, as demonstrated in the Kosovo crisis).
- b Media technology has dramatically changed the conditions for propaganda warfare. First it has altered conditions particularly in terms of immediate or instant coverage. Second, the importance of visual images is increasing. Both these aspects underline an epistemological turn in propaganda analysis towards persuasion via an impression of *directedness*, i.e. the impression that the viewers have immediate access to the actual events.
- c Journalistic practices are based on professional routines and judgements, even during tense conflicts. Hence, analysis of war reporting should not only be conceptualized in the light of the propaganda activities to which they are subjected or the restrictions reporters and editors face in war situations. To varying extents, journalists decide their own priorities, for example whether to publish or to refuse propaganda material and whether to make critical comments about the sources from which the material has been supplied. The variation in freedom to choose, the differences and similarities of media across nation-state borders, if not to say the extraordinary nature that make some happenings stand out over others, are aspects of a continued discussion on the future of the journalistic environment in conflict reporting.

Our objective is to indicate an encompassing perspective on the role of the media in contemporary international conflicts. If anything is typical of contemporary political crises, it is their lability and fast change once they reach the media. Media discourses will swing rapidly, from one theme to the next, from utopian to dystopian images,

from criticism to celebration, from news report to soap commercial. Immediate reporting and the attraction of the visual material will complicate government attempts to control the media discourses. As Kosovo war in 1999 demonstrates, such lack of total control is evidenced even for the strongest superpower. Our point is that a multimethodological framework, in which propaganda analysis, rhetoric and discourse analysis are combined, has the potential to render conflict journalism from a more complete angle. States, political players, the media and the élites have a clear place in analysis of conflict journalism. Our argument has sought to emphasize that an equally clear place is not so evident for the finer nuances of texts and audience relationships.

Our purpose has therefore been to contribute to a discussion of the distinction between discourse, rhetoric and propaganda as three related approaches intrinsically dealing with the media as a site for deliberation, dialogue, argument and persuasion. There is a clear danger in overstating a typological comparison, but we have sought to highlight how propaganda essentially refers to a process of *speaking to the audience*, whereas rhetoric in a more sophisticated application is understood as a process of *persuasion through speaking with the audience*. The notion of 'speaking with' implies a dialogue, a deliberation. It would not be correct to draw a finite line between the two. However, there is still a sense in which the question of media content and its effect comes out differently in the latter – with a keener sense of the potential for participation, choice and reciprocity in processes of mobilization.

Note

1. Internet Movie Database, <http://movielink.imdb.com/>; quoted from Mral 1998:153.

Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analysis in Media Research

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

Since the dispute between Berelson and Kracauer in the early fifties (see Berelson, 1952; Kracauer, 1952), the controversy about quantitative or qualitative content analysis focuses on two aspects: manifest vs. latent content, and representativity vs. exemplarity of the analysed texts. Both schools, quantitative and qualitative social science, seem to agree about the existence of a basic dilemma, according to which:

1. quantitative methods are suitable for the analysis of manifest content only; whereas
2. qualitative methods are time consuming, can rarely be applied to a large number of texts and, therefore, cannot meet the requirements of (statistical) representativity.

While quantitative analysis tries to escape this dilemma by emphasizing the importance of representativity and disregarding the significance of the latent content, qualitative analysis seeks the opposite way out by focusing on the latent content and disregarding the problem of representativity. None of these approaches is really convincing.

Using the example of war reporting and propaganda, I will first try to show that 'manifest' and 'latent' are not categorical terms, but that there is a continuum between 'manifest' and 'latent' content. The more refined propaganda methods are, the more are they hidden in the latent content. The analysis of propaganda, therefore, must not be restricted to the manifest content only. Based on these foundations I will then demonstrate:

1. The capacity of quantitative analysis for getting access to the latent content is underestimated and can be improved by use of advanced methods of data analysis.
2. Though it can be improved, the capacity of quantitative analysis for getting access to the latent content is, however, still limited. The more refined propaganda methods are, the more difficult it becomes to detect them by use of quantitative methods. Qualitative analysis is therefore unrenounceable.
3. The mere combination of quantitative and qualitative methods does not yet solve the sampling problem, and as long as representativity cannot be achieved,


qualitative research can always be rejected by disqualifying the analysed material as an arbitrary selection which cannot serve as a basis of generalization. Advanced methods of data analysis, however, provide a methodological basis for integrating quantitative and qualitative methods, which solves the sampling problem.

2. Propaganda techniques

As we all know, the aim of war propaganda is to maximize public support for a war. In order to do this, propaganda applies various techniques, which can be roughly divided into:

- methods for controlling the information that is made available to the public, and
- methods for controlling whether the available information is accepted by the public (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Means of propaganda



Selection of information is the most ‘primitive’ form of propaganda. It includes (1) emphasizing facts or arguments that increase support for the war, and (2) suppressing facts or arguments that reduce this support (see Chapter 1).

Both of these means deal with the manifest content, and our research question would be: *Which* facts or arguments are presented to the public and which are not? There is no problem in using quantitative content analysis to answer this question.

In democratic societies, however, information control rarely means simple black-and-white painting, and usually there is both positive and negative information to be covered. This brings about the problem of meaning. And, as we all know, the meaning of a text cannot be found on the surface of the text but must be searched for between the lines.

Even the meaning of a single statement is often not in the statement itself but depends on the context in which it is placed. Analysing *contextualization*, therefore, is a first step towards the analysis of latent content. Our research question will now be: How are facts and/or arguments combined with each other? Accordingly, we would not so much be interested in isolated facts or arguments, but in the *patterns* into which they are combined (see Kracauer, 1952).

From social psychology, we know that the more we are involved in a conflict, and the more this conflict has escalated, the more difficult it becomes to learn something about the reality of the conflict before it is determined in this or that way, and the more difficult it becomes to accept facts before they are interpreted (see Chapter 3). Propaganda also knows about that and, therefore, does not present plain facts but evaluates and interprets them; often it even replaces the facts with interpretation of the facts.

Our research question would now be: How are the facts evaluated? Or, since we already know about the relevance of contextualization: What patterns of facts, arguments and interpretations are presented to the public?

Analysing the *evaluation* of facts – or the replacement of facts by their interpretation – is a further step in the direction of both latent content and qualitative analysis: even if the analysis focuses on evaluations that are explicitly formulated in the text, we are now interested in aspects of the text which cannot be identified without entering into an interpretive process ourselves.

Although some aspects of the evaluative means of propaganda can be translated into variables for quantitative content analysis (see Chapter 12), the capacity of quantitative analysis for studying these aspects is limited. Therefore, in order to code large numbers of news items within an economic time load and with satisfying intercoder reliability ($Kappa > 0.65$), only rough indicators, which are still located more or less on the surface of the text, can be used for variable definition.

Finally, there are other aspects of latent content to which quantitative analysis has definitively no access: the dynamics of how a theme is developing during the text, as well as the *manipulative means* of propaganda, such as two-sided messages and double-bind communication.

'Two-sided messages' refers to a form of propaganda presentation which anticipates possible criticism and thus makes the propaganda more resistant to counter-propaganda (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953). The critical point with two-sided messages, however, is that the counter-information must not be accepted by the public. This can be stimulated by incentives for social identification with the source of the propaganda message and, at the same time, incentives for social devaluation of the source of the counter message (see Chapter 10).

'Double-bind communication', on the other hand, refers to a form of communication pathology that was first described in the context of clinical psychology (Bateson et al., 1956). It is characterized by inherent contradictions in the propaganda message, and the lack of an option either to react to both of the contradictory messages or to withdraw from the situation. As a result of emotional involvement with both contradictory messages, it becomes difficult for the audience to query either of them (see Chapters 3 and 9). If the public has no access to independent information, it has no option other than to either believe the conclusions it is told by the propaganda or to withdraw into selective inattention, prejudice, evasive skepticism, etc. All these are consequences that serve the goals of psychological warfare by paralysing the capacity for resistance to the war (Kempf, 1994).

Both of these propaganda methods include some strictly manifest aspect, which is the information that is presented. They also include an aspect of weak latency, which is the coexistence of contradictory information within the same text; and they include some aspect of stronger latency, which is the (implicit or explicit) evaluation

of the respective sources. Finally, they include some strictly latent aspect, which is the functioning of these aspects within the overall direction of the text.

3. Latent styles analysis

In the following I will present a methodological approach, for which I have introduced the term *Latent Styles Analysis* (Kempf, 1997a, 2001). Based on a statistical method dating back to Lazarsfeld (1950), this methodology improves the capacity of quantitative content analysis for getting access to the latent content and provides a methodological basis for integrating quantitative and qualitative methods in the analysis of the same empirical material. For better understanding, I will not only describe the statistical procedures but will demonstrate the capacity of the methodology with an example from the Gulf War study of the *Journalism in the New World Order* project (Kempf, 2000). In this study, we analysed the media coverage of various issues, one of which was the presentation of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict (see Chapter 12).

Selection of information


Traditional quantitative analysis revealed that the issue of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict was quite prominent in the Gulf War coverage. In both US and European media, this issue was among those themes that were covered most extensively. A total of $n=740$ (18.1%) of the analysed news items dealt with alternative ways of settling the war by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of the following arguments or issues:

- 1 military force against Iraq was the only possible or most effective way of settling the conflict;
- 2 economic embargo on trade with Iraq should be given or should have been given more time to be effective;
- 3 Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks;
- 4 coalition's or member-state's (excluding the UN) initiatives for negotiations or peace talks;
- 5 UN initiatives for negotiations or peace talks; and
- 6 third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

As the overall frequency distribution in Figure 2 shows, all these issues or arguments were quite popular in the Gulf War discourse. Still, none of them were left completely undisputed.

This is not surprising. It illustrates what we already know about the media discourse in democratic societies: the media do not paint things completely in black and white, and usually present both positive and negative information. In particular, we see:

Figure 2. Alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict: overall distribution of variables. F= Force against Iraq; E = Economic means; I = Iraqi initiatives; A = Allied initiatives; UN = UN initiatives; 3p = Third party initiatives



- force against Iraq was the most intensively and most controversially discussed mode for settling the conflict. In 28.4% of the relevant news items, it was presented as the only possible or most effective way. In 20.0% of the news items, this was denied, doubted or questioned; and
- third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks followed in the second place (39.6% allegation; 6.8% query).

So far, as the study deals with the selection of facts and arguments, it seems that the media gave considerable support to a peaceful resolution of the conflict:

- there was a broad coverage of initiatives for negotiations or peace talks, especially from third parties; and
- the use of military force was rarely left undisputed.

This rather optimistic picture might change, however, if we take contextualization into account. Also, President Bush referred to peace initiatives in his war speech on 17 January 1991. But he did so in order to pin blame on Saddam Hussein for their failure and to portray military force as the only reasonable option that was left to the international community – although he himself, the USA and the whole world would prefer if they did not have to make use of it.

The overall distribution of arguments in Figure 1 seems to resemble this line of argumentation, and it might well be that the media coverage simply followed the same line of argumentation as the US president. In this case, there would be no reason for optimism at all.

Maybe none of the alternatives are correct, neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic one. In all probability, the media discourse was more pluralistic and included various lines of argumentation that went in different directions. But the frequency distribution in Figure 1 does not tell us about this.

Contextualization

As Kracauer put it in his dispute with Berelson: the direction of a text does not so much depend on the frequency of variables but on the patterns into which they are combined. In order to learn about contextualization we have to look at these patterns themselves, and we should not look on pairwise variables only (as in correlation studies) but at the patterns into which the variables are combined.

In our example, we have 12 binary variables. Accordingly, there are $2^{12} = 4096$ possible patterns. For several reasons, it will not be useful to simply count the frequencies of the various patterns. The number of possible patterns is too big. Only some of them will have a clear meaning; others will be nearby; and some will have no meaning at all.

On the other hand, we can expect to find a clear structure in our data: some patterns that are ideal prototypes of given meanings; some patterns that are not so typical but nearby; and others that do not appear in the data at all.

The task of statistical analysis will then be to identify classes of ideal and nearby patterns. This can be done by use of the statistical method of Latent Class Analysis (LCA), which describes the overall distribution of the data as a mixture distribution resulting from the blending of several latent distributions, each of which describes a specific (probabilistic) combination of variables.

In other words: the analysed news items are assumed to belong to one of several *latent classes*, each of which defined by a specific distribution of the content analytical variables and describing a specific *style* of combining them into the coding patterns that are manifest in the data.

LCA identifies the number of latent distributions that are blended in the data; it describes the (relative) size of the latent classes;¹ it describes the distribution of the variables within the latent classes; and it produces so-called membership probabilities, which tell how likely a given coding pattern is to stem from any of the latent distributions. Based on these membership probabilities, different media or different types of texts (say, news items and editorials, etc.) can be compared with respect to their (relative) preference of the various styles, and, finally, those texts which represent a style most clearly can be identified and selected for more in-depth qualitative analysis.

4. Statistical foundations²

Consider a sample of n coding units and k content analytical variables. Formally, coding units will be indicated by $v = 1, \dots, n$. Variables will be indicated by $i = 1, \dots, k$.

Each variable can be coded in several categories. For example:

0 = statement is not mentioned at all

1 = mere allegation of the statement

2 = factual corroboration and/or arguments in favour of the statement.

These categories may or may not be the same for all variables being analysed. Even the number of categories per variable (indicated by m_i) may differ. In the simplest case, only binary variables have to be dealt with. In our example, we have two types of binary variables: variables describing whether a given statement is either

0 = not alleged, or
 1 = alleged

and variables, describing whether a given statement is either

0 = not queried, or
 1 = queried

in the analysed coding unit. In general, the categories of a variable i may be indicated by $x = 0, \dots, m_i - 1$.

In constructing content analytical variables, one must make sure that the categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive (see Holsti, 1969). In order to avoid pseudo-empirical results with respect to the relations between variables, one must caution against logical and terminological dependence of variables also. If Latent Class Analysis is to be applied to the statistical analysis of the data, logical and terminological independence of the variables is also a formal requirement of the statistical model.

Traditional quantitative analysis

Traditional quantitative analysis is based on the assumption of one style of coverage that is characteristic for all coding units. This style is described by the overall probability distributions of the variables (see Table 1, where $p_{ix} = p(X_{vi}=x)$ denotes the probability of a randomly chosen coding unit v being coded in category x of variable i).

Table 1. Overall distributions: the case of polytomous variables

Categories	Variables					
	1	...	i	...	k	
0	p_{10}	...	p_{i0}	...	p_{k0}	
:	:		:		:	
x	p_{1x}	...	p_{ix}	...	p_{kx}	
:	:		:		:	
m_i	p_{1m}	...	p_{im}	...	p_{km}	

In the case of binary variables, this table will have two lines only. Since each column sums up to 1, each of these lines contains the complete information on the probability distributions of the variables. Hence, one of these lines can be omitted (see Table 2).

Table 2. Overall distributions: the case of binary variables

Categories	Variables					
	1	...	i	...	k	
1	p_{11}	...	p_{i1}	...	p_{k1}	

As an example, Table 3 describes the overall distribution of our data on the coverage of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict by showing the probabilities $p_{i1} = p(X_{vi}=1)$ for each of the variables 1+, 1-, 2+, 2-,.... These are also the same probabilities shown in Figure 1.

Table 3. Alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict: overall distribution of variables

	Variables											
	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-	6+	6-
p_{i1}	0.284	0.200	0.111	0.031	0.145	0.049	0.092	0.008	0.103	0.016	0.396	0.068

Latent class analysis

Since it is not reasonable to assume that all coding units belong to the same style, the (manifest) probability distributions in Tables 1–3 may rather be mixture distributions, resulting from the blending of several latent styles. These latent styles may be indicated by $g = 1, \dots, h$.

In analogy with the description of (manifest) styles in Table 1–3, any latent style can be described by a set of (latent) probability distributions (see Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4. Description of latent styles: the polytomous case

Latent Style	Categories	Variables				
		1	...	i	...	k
g	0	$p_{10/g}$...	$p_{i0/g}$...	$p_{k0/g}$
	:	:		:		:
	x	$p_{1x/g}$...	$p_{ix/g}$...	$p_{kx/g}$
	:	:		:		:
	m_i	$p_{1m/g}$...	$p_{im/g}$...	$p_{km/g}$

Table 5. Description of latent styles: the binary case

Latent Style	Categories	Variables				
		1	...	i	...	k
g	1	$p_{11/g}$...	$p_{i1/g}$...	$p_{k1/g}$

Generally, $p_{ix/g} = p(X_{vi}=x | v \in g)$ denotes the probability of a coding unit v being coded in category x of variable i if that coding unit belongs to the latent style g .

If the probability distributions in Tables 1 and 2 result from the mixture of h latent styles, then the model Equation (1) holds, where $p_g = p(v \in g)$ denotes the probability of a randomly chosen coding unit to belong to the latent style g . In Latent Class Analysis, p_g is usually called the class size of class (style) g .

$$(1) \quad p(X_{vi}=x) = \sum_{g=1}^h p_g p_{ix/g}$$

The likelihood of a coding pattern $\mathbf{x}_v = (x_{v1}, \dots, x_{vk})$ can thus be expressed by Equation (2), where $p_{ixvi/g} = p(X_{vi}=x_{vi} | v \in g)$ denotes the probability that a coding unit v belonging to style g will be coded in that category (x_{vi}) of variable i , in which it is actually coded.

$$(2) \quad L(\mathbf{x}_v) = \sum_{g=1}^h p_g \prod_{i=1}^k p_{ixvi/g}$$

The likelihood of the full data matrix of n lines (= the coding patterns of a total of n coding units), finally, results from Equation (3). In order to identify the latent styles, this likelihood is maximized by use of the so-called EM algorithm of parameter estimation.

$$(3) \quad L(\mathbf{X}) = \prod_{v=1}^n L(\mathbf{x}_v)$$

In the case of our data on the coverage of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict, Latent Class Analysis identified nine latent styles, as shown in Table 6 (see also Figures 3–5).

Table 6. Alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict: Latent styles and overall distribution of style characteristics

g	p _g	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-	6+	6-
1	0.290	0.034	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.067	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.999	0.141
2	0.167	0.999	0.099	0.001	0.024	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.009	0.001	0.008	0.040	0.005
3	0.143	0.380	0.999	0.058	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.018	0.010	0.001	0.001	0.134	0.001
4	0.114	0.134	0.026	0.001	0.001	0.970	0.410	0.064	0.001	0.028	0.001	0.133	0.001
5	0.101	0.130	0.202	0.982	0.253	0.013	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.023	0.001	0.001	0.001
6	0.078	0.001	0.026	0.041	0.018	0.001	0.001	0.099	0.013	0.982	0.062	0.102	0.001
7	0.063	0.076	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.060	0.001	0.999	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.310	0.001
8	0.023	0.497	0.406	0.001	0.001	0.066	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.920	0.990
9	0.020	0.392	0.293	0.001	0.001	0.382	0.084	0.490	0.203	0.999	0.500	0.798	0.135
	1.000	0.248	0.200	0.111	0.031	0.145	0.049	0.092	0.008	0.103	0.016	0.396	0.068

Since binary variables were analysed, Table 6 contains only one line per latent style. Each of these lines corresponds to Table 5, with an additional column (p_g) added, which contains the class size parameters. The bottom marginal of Table 6 shows the overall distribution of the analysed variables and thus corresponds to Table 3.

Parameter estimation

Although the LCA model had already been suggested by Lazarsfeld as early as in 1950, no satisfying algorithms for parameter estimation were available until Goodman (1974) developed a stepwise procedure for estimating the unknown parameters p_g and $p_{ix/g}$. As Andersen (1982) shows, the Goodman procedure is a special case of the so-called EM algorithm by Dempster et al. (1977), and thus delivers a maximum-likelihood solution for the parameter estimates.

The rationale of the procedure is the following: If the unknown parameters p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ are known, then the conditional probability $p_{g/\mathbf{xv}} = p(v \in g | \mathbf{xv})$ that a coding unit v will belong to style g if it is coded with the coding pattern \mathbf{xv} can be computed from Equation (4).

$$(4) \quad p_{g/\mathbf{xv}} = \frac{p_g p_{\mathbf{xv}/g}}{h \sum_{d=1}^h p_d p_{\mathbf{xv}/d}}$$

In this equation, $p_{\mathbf{xv}/g}$ denotes

$$(5) \quad p_{\mathbf{xv}/g} = p(\mathbf{xv} | v \in g) = \prod_{i=1}^k p_{ixvi/g}$$

Once, the so-called membership probabilities $p_{g/\mathbf{xv}}$ are computed from Equation (4), we can then compute the expected values e_g and e_{gix} of the frequencies

n_g = number of coding units which belong to style g , and

n_{gix} = number of coding units which belong to style g and are coded in category x of variable i ,

given the data matrix \mathbf{X} , from Equations (6) and (7).

$$(6) \quad e_g = E(n_g | \mathbf{X}) = \sum_{v=1}^n p_{g/\mathbf{xv}}$$

$$(7) \quad e_{gix} = E(n_{gix} | \mathbf{X}) = \sum_{v: x_{vi}=x} p_{g/\mathbf{xv}}$$

The sum in Equation (7) is taken over all coding units which are coded in category x of variable i .

Vice versa, the probabilities p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ can be computed if the expected frequencies e_g and e_{gix} are known:

$$(8) \quad p_g = e_g/n$$

$$(9) \quad p_{gix} = e_{gix}/n$$

and finally

$$(10) \quad p_{ix/g} = p_{gix}/p_g$$

The EM algorithm makes use of these results and estimates the parameters of the LCA model for a given number (h) of latent styles (classes) by use of a recursive procedure:

1. Choose starting values of the unknown probability parameters p_g and $p_{ix/g}$.
2. E-Step (Expected values): compute the expected frequencies e_g and e_{gix} from p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ and the data matrix \mathbf{X} .
3. M-Step (Maximum-Likelihood estimation): compute the parameters p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ from the expected frequencies.
4. Replace the former values of the probability parameters by the ones computed in the M-Step and go back to the E-Step of the algorithm.

This procedure is carried on until the maximum of the likelihood is attained.

For any given number (h) of latent styles (classes) the computation of a Latent Class Analysis thus results in Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of the parameters:

$$(11a) \quad p_g = p(v \in g)$$

for $g=1, \dots, h$, which is the class size of the respective style g (= probability that a randomly chosen coding unit will belong to style g).

$$(11b) \quad p_{ix/g} = p(x_{vi}=x | v \in g)$$

for $g=1, \dots, h$; $i=1, \dots, k$; and $x=0, \dots, m_i$, which are the class-specific category probabilities. Moreover, we also obtain estimates of the membership probabilities, which tell us, how likely it is that a given coding unit v with coding pattern \mathbf{x}_v belongs to a latent style g :

$$(12) \quad p_{g/\mathbf{x}_v} = p(v \in g | \mathbf{x}_v)$$

for $g=1, \dots, h$ and $v=1, \dots, n$.

Although the EM algorithm seems to be circular at the first glance, this is not the case, since in every E-Step the statistical information of the data matrix \mathbf{X} is reinterpreted on the basis of the results of the foregoing M-step.

From a logical point of view, this is analogous to the hermeneutic circle involved in qualitative analysis, which also is no circle, in fact, but rather a hermeneutic spiral, producing a deeper understanding of a text with every step of the process.

Uniqueness of the parameter estimates

In similarity with qualitative analysis, where often (or at least sometimes) there does not exist the one and only correct interpretation of a text, the solutions of the EM algorithm must not necessarily be unique. The likelihood function in Equation (3) may have several local maxima and even more than one global maximum.

1. If there exists one global maximum of the likelihood function, this can always be found by using the EM algorithm, if suitable starting values have been chosen. In order to avoid less likely solutions, it is advisable, therefore, to run the procedure from several starting values and to select the solution which has the highest likelihood.

2. If there are more than just one global maximum present, however, then more than just one latent structure can be found. They are equally good explanations of the analysed data matrix, and there is no criterion for deciding which one should be chosen.

In Latent Class Analysis, this problem is usually discussed under the somewhat misleading headline of ‘identifiability’ of latent structures.

Sufficient conditions for the identifiability of a latent structure in the surrounding of given parameter estimates have been formulated by McHugh (1956; 1958). According to his theorem, the latent parameters p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ are locally identifiable if the following conditions hold:

$$i) \quad n(C) - 1 = \prod_{i=1}^k m_i - 1 \geq \sum_{i=1}^k m_i - k + h - 1 = n(P) \quad ,$$

where $n(C)$ is the number of possible coding patterns and $n(P)$ denotes the number of (independent) parameters to be estimated.

$$ii) \quad \sum_{u=1}^{n(C)} p(\mathbf{x}_u) = 1$$

iii) The functions $p(\mathbf{x}_u)$ are continuous and have continuous first- and second-order derivatives with respect to p_g and $p_{ix/g}$.

iv) At least $n(P)$ of the $p(\mathbf{x}_u)$ are functionally independent.

The first of these conditions is a necessary condition and states that the number of independent estimation equations must not be smaller than the number of parameters to be estimated.

Condition (ii) is highly redundant and follows directly from the model assumptions. As a consequence of (ii), the number of independent equations cannot exceed $n(C) - 1$.

While the first two conditions for identification are a simple matter of counting, the sufficient conditions are more complicated (see Rindskopf, 1987: 84).

Condition (iii) can be tested after parameter estimation only, though, according to McHugh (1956: 337), a violation of this condition is rather improbable.

Condition (iv) results from the circumstance that all $p(\mathbf{x}_u)$'s are polynomials in p_g and $p_{ix/g}$ (see Equation 1). Accordingly, the Jacoby Matrix

$$(13) \quad J = \partial p(\mathbf{x}_u) / \partial \mathbf{p}_w$$

must have full rank $n(P)$. (The term \mathbf{p}_w denotes the vector of all $n(P)$ independent model parameters).

Usually, the larger the size of the sample of coding units, the less critical the problem of identifiability becomes. As a rule of thumb, Formann (1984: 30) suggests, therefore, that the sample size (n) should always be chosen to be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated:

$$(14) \quad n > n(P)$$

Model selection

A crucial question for the application of Latent Class Analysis is to decide how many latent classes (styles) should be assumed. The best solution would be to assume

- as few classes as possible (which would result in a small number of parameters $n(P)$ to be estimated); and
- as many classes as necessary (in order to obtain a high likelihood of the observed data).

Accordingly, we would choose that solution (number of latent classes) for which the AIC Index (Akaike’s Information Criterion) is the smallest (see Akaike, 1987):

$$(15) \text{ AIC} = -2 \ln(L(\mathbf{X})) + 2 n(P)$$

Alternatively, one might also use the BIC Index (Best Information Criterion), which puts a higher penalty on additional parameters (see Bozdogan, 1987):

$$(16) \text{ BIC} = -2 \ln(L(\mathbf{X})) + \ln(n) n(P)$$

As compared with the AIC, the BIC tends to favour solutions with fewer latent classes, though both criteria quite frequently produce equivocal results.

In the case of our data on the coverage of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict, the nine-class solution was chosen according to the AIC.

Table 7. Goodness of fit criteria for the Latent Class Analysis of the data on the coverage of alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict

h	ln(L(X))	n(P)	L-ratio	df	AIC
1	-2869.618	12	1292.601	4083	5763.23
2	-2708.930	25	971.225	4070	5467.86
3	-2657.564	38	868.492	4057	5391.12
4	-2557.404	51	668.173	4044	5216.80
5	-2456.286	64	465.937	4031	5040.57
6	-2427.489	77	408.343	4018	5008.97
7	-2368.420	90	290.204	4005	4916.83
8	-2354.040	103	261.444	3992	4914.07
9	-2326.360	116	206.084	3979	4884.71
10	-2319.250	129	191.864	3966	4896.50

Saturated model: -2223.318

Together with the AIC, which has its minimum value at $h=9$ latent classes, Table 7 also shows the logarithmic likelihood of the data matrix ($\ln(L(\mathbf{X}))$), the number of independent parameters to be estimated from the data ($n(P)$), the results of a likelihood-ratio test (L-ratio), which compares the h -class solution with the so called saturated model, and the degrees of freedom ($df = n(C)-1-n(P)$) of this chi-square-distributed test statistic.

The saturated model assumes each possible coding pattern to be a class (style) of its own. Accordingly, it produces the best ever possible description of the data,

and the logarithmic likelihood of the saturated model, which is shown in the bottom line of the table, is the upper bound of $\ln(L(\mathbf{X}))$, which cannot be exceeded. At the same time, however, the saturated model describes the data by use of the highest possible number of parameters, which is $n(C)-1$, and thus results in a rather poor AIC.

In our example, the AIC of the saturated model would be

$$AIC = -2 \times (-2223.318) + 2 \times 4095 = 12636.64$$

The nine-class solution produces both a much better AIC and a likelihood which is as good as that of the saturated model: with $df = 3979$ degrees of freedom, the L-ratio statistic is far from statistical significance.

Contingencies with criteria variables

Once latent styles of coverage have been identified, we might be interested in their correlation with criteria variables like type of media (TV news, tabloid, regional press or prestige papers), type of text (news item or editorial), country (US or European media), the time spot during which an item was published, etc. This can be done by inspecting the (conditional) distributions of the latent styles within the subsample of items from different types of media, different types of texts, etc. These can be computed from Equation (17)

$$(17) \quad p_{g/y} = p(v \in g \mid Y=y) = \sum_{v:Y_v=y} p_{g/\mathbf{xv}}/n_y$$

In this equation, y denotes the different categories of the criterion variable Y . n_y is the number of coding units which are coded $y_v = y$. The sum on the right hand side of Equation (17) is taken over all coding units which are coded in category y of the criterion variable Y . Statistical significance of differences between the various conditional distributions can be tested by the usual chi-square test for contingency tables.

As an example, Table 8 shows the usage of the various styles of covering alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict in the USA, Germany and in the Scandinavian countries (see also Figure 6). In addition to the various styles of coverage, as identified by LCA, the complete non-coverage of this topic is included as 'Style 0'.

Table 8. Alternative ways of settling the war: Style usage in Western media (Chi-square = 544.20, $df = 36$, $p < 0.001$)

Country	USA	G	FIN	N	S	Total
Style 0	0.8691	0.6114	0.8259	0.8886	0.8440	0.8155
Style 1	0.0398	0.0459	0.0693	0.0421	0.0634	0.0525
Style 2	0.0271	0.0917	0.0178	0.0147	0.0169	0.0313
Style 3	0.0027	0.1319	0.0119	0.0029	0.0046	0.0267
Style 4	0.0229	0.0377	0.0214	0.0158	0.0113	0.0214
Style 5	0.0160	0.0249	0.0176	0.0119	0.0257	0.0188
Style 6	0.0068	0.0171	0.0107	0.0160	0.0203	0.0138
Style 7	0.0155	0.0124	0.0131	0.0065	0.0107	0.0117
Style 8	0.0000	0.0152	0.0068	0.0009	0.0008	0.0044
Style 9	0.0000	0.0118	0.0054	0.0005	0.0023	0.0037
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

5. From quantity to quality

Latent styles

In case of the present data, Latent Class Analysis unveiled that the overall distribution is a mixture distribution of nine latent styles of coverage, which presented specific patterns of information to the public:

A total of 41.1% of the news items focused on the use of military or economic force against Iraq (see Figure 3).

1. 16.7% of the news items presented pure military logic that described military force against Iraq as the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict (99.9%) and that did not take notice of any other alternative (see also Table 6, style 2).
2. Although nearly the same number of items (14.3%) doubted or denied the necessity or effectiveness of force against Iraq (99.9%) and sometimes referred to third party peace initiatives (13.4%), these items, however, did not reject the use of force unequivocally but even corroborated it quite often (38.0%) (see also Table 6, style 3).
3. Another 10.1% of the news items argued in favour of economic rather than military means (see also Table 6, style 5). Although it was said in these news items that the economic embargo on trade with Iraq should have been given more time to be effective (98.2%), only some of them explicitly doubted the need for military force against Iraq (20.2%). Moreover, these items also did not unequivocally favour the alternative of an economic embargo, but quite often doubted or denied it (25.3%), and sometimes they even described military force as the only reasonable alternative (13.0%).

Military logic obviously set the agenda even for those news items which were critical about the use of military force or which supported an economic embargo against Iraq.

One quarter (25.5%) of the news items focused on either of the war parties' initiatives for negotiations or peace talks (see Figure 4).

1. Although 11.4% of the news items took notice of Iraqi initiatives (97.0%) and sometimes also referred to neutral or third party initiatives (13.4%), these items often doubted, denied or questioned the Iraqi initiatives (41.0%) and tended to present military force as the only reasonable solution to the conflict (13.4%) (see also Table 6, style 4).
2. Those 7.8% of the news items, on the other hand, that reported about UN initiatives (98.2%) raised only little doubt about these initiatives (6.2%) (see also Table 6, style 6). They tended to link them both to third party (10.2%) and Allied initiatives (9.9%), and they made no positive reference to the use of military force (0.1%).
3. Another 6.3% of the items focused on Allied initiatives (99.9%) without any doubt or questioning (0.1%) and often contextualized them with third party or neutral initiatives (31.0%) (see also Table 6, style 7). Though these news items sometimes even referred positively to Iraqi initiatives (6.0%), they still showed some tendency towards the approval of military force (7.6%).

Figure 3. Military or economic force against Iraq. F= Force against Iraq; E = Economic means; I = Iraqi initiatives; A = Allied initiatives; UN = UN initiatives; 3p = Third party initiatives





Figure 4. War parties' initiatives for negotiations or peace talks. F= Force against Iraq; E = Economic means; I = Iraqi initiatives; A = Allied initiatives; UN = UN initiatives; 3p = Third party initiatives



The comparison of these patterns unveils two basic principles of an escalation-oriented conceptualization of the conflict: idealization of Allied intentions, against which no doubt may be raised, and demonization of Iraqi intentions, which were highly mistrusted. Moreover, it mirrors the ambiguous role which the UN played in the conflict, which was defined as a UN war and, at the same time, one in which the UN was portrayed as some sort of neutral instance (see Meder, 1994).

One third (33.3%) of the news items focused on third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks (see Figure 5).

1. The majority of these items (29.0%) reported or at least mentioned third party initiatives (99.9%) (see also Table 6, style 1). Although they sometimes doubted these neutral initiatives (14.1%), these items expressed only little approval of military force (3.4%) and even made some positive reference to Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks (6.7%).
2. A rather small number of news items (2.3%) put third party initiatives in the context of military logic (see also Table 6, style 8). In doing so, these items either presented arguments pro and contra or two-sided messages, and they showed a clear bias towards refuting the initiatives and backing up a military solution: Though third party initiatives were also mentioned positively (92.0%), they were doubted or denied nearly without exemption (99.0%), and the need of military force against Iraq was rather approved (49.7%) than questioned (40.6%).
3. The remaining 2.0% of the items referred to third party initiatives in the context of a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (see also Table 6, style 9): in most cases these items referred positively to third party initiatives (79.8%) and only sometimes did they express doubt about them (13.5%). The focus of the items was put on UN initiatives, which were however evaluated much more ambiguously (allegation: 99.9%; query: 50.0%). Allied initiatives were reported less often but with the same ambiguity (allegation: 38.2%; query: 20.3%) as the UN initiatives. Against Iraqi initiatives, on the other hand, which were given the same positive reference as the Allied ones (38.2%), only less doubt was expressed (8.4%).


Although these news items were more critical about UN and Allied initiatives than they were about neutral and Iraqi initiatives, it cannot however be concluded that they took a pro-Iraqi point of view. Although they quite often questioned the need for military force against Iraq (29.3%), they rather approved of it (39.2%).

Style usage

Once different styles of coverage have been detected, we can achieve an even better understanding of the selection of facts during the Gulf War discourse by analysing things like


- changes of style usage during the course of the conflict,
- differences in style usage in different types of media, and
- differences in style usage in the various countries that were included in the study.

Figure 5. Third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks. F= Force against Iraq; E = Economic means; I = Iraqi initiatives; A = Allied initiatives; UN = UN initiatives; 3p = Third party initiatives



Let us take a look at the last of these issues: how did German and US media select the patterns of information which they presented to their publics?

Figure 6. Alternative ways of settling the Gulf conflict: Style usage in different countries.



As Figure 6 shows, in the US media the presentation of alternative ways of settling the war was clearly determined by the strategic interests of the USA.

- UN and third party initiatives were paid much less attention than was the case in the European countries;
- there was extremely little questioning of military logic; and
- there was no comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives at all.

The German media, on the other hand, presented the most extensive and the most controversial discussion of alternative ways of settling the war:

- In particular, they followed the pattern of military logic three times as often as the average Western media;
- on the other hand, questioning of military logic was presented even five times as frequently; and
- a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives was also presented three times as frequently as in the average.

Again, this result becomes meaningful only in the historical context of the Gulf War discourse. While the USA was the leading nation of the Gulf War coalition, Germany was not directly involved in the Gulf War. According to the valid interpretation of the German constitution (at that time), the deployment of German troops was restricted

to the defence of German (or NATO) territory. The Gulf War was used by German politicians and the media, however, in order to start a constitutional debate about the future role of the German military after the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification. In order to do this, they had to do two things: give attention to the arguments of the anti-war movement, which was very strong in Germany, and counterbalance this by emphasizing the unrenounceability of military force in order to stop dictators like Saddam Hussein – wherever they might rise in the world, and wherever they might affect German interests (see Kempf, 1994; Meder, 1998; Schlurhoff, 1998).

Linkage to qualitative analysis

At least one aspect of the results reported so far seems to be quite surprising: nearly a third of the news items that dealt with alternative ways of settling the Gulf War reported about third party peace initiatives in a way which seemed quite likely to display at least some critical distance to the Gulf War. By informing the audience about third party peace initiatives, they counterbalanced both the depiction of military force as the only reasonable alternative and the picture of its worldwide consent. The high proportion of news items which followed this pattern makes the Gulf War coverage look less biased than would have been expected.

On the other hand, we must be aware that the results reported so far only tell us about the control of information during the Gulf War. They do not, however, address the mechanisms of acceptance control. No doubt, there was a broad coverage of third party peace initiatives during the Gulf War, and, usually, these initiatives were not overtly rejected by explicit demands for (the continuation of) military force against Iraq. But the media might have used more subtle means of influencing the audience in order to reject these initiatives. In order to detect these means, a more in-depth analysis of the material is needed.

Latent styles analysis is a powerful method, which is apt to cope with several of the shortcomings of traditional quantitative analyses. At the same time, it preserves the advantages of quantitative content analysis and fulfills the requirements of both representativity and a systematic comparison of the sources. All the same, latent styles analysis is no substitute for qualitative analysis and it cannot supersede it.

Documents which are not simply agglomerations of facts participate in the process of living, and every word in them vibrates with the intentions in which they originate and simultaneously foreshadows the indefinite effects they may produce. Their content is no longer their content if it is detached from the texture of intimations and implications to which it belongs and taken literally; it exists only with and within this texture (Kracauer, 1952: 641ff.).

If these properties of a text are to be dealt with, there is no alternative to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative analysis is extremely time consuming, however, and this brings about the problem of representativity.

Qualitative analysts often claim that, though they cannot establish representativity of their analyses, their method is apt to reconstruct the typical instead. And, indeed, there are cases where representativity is not really a problem. If we, for instance, analyse President Bush's war speech on 17 January 1991, the speech stands for itself; it has relevance of its own; it is exemplary of itself. Maybe it is also typical of US

presidents' war speeches in general. Whether this is the case can easily be found out by comparison with other war speeches of other presidents, which still are a limited number of items to be analysed. The problem of statistical representativity simply does not arise.

In the present case, however, as we study the US and European media coverage of the Gulf War, the situation changes dramatically. There are thousands of thousands of news items, and only a handful could be selected for qualitative analysis. Hence, qualitative social science would suggest selecting some typical news items for analysis. But how can we identify items as typical before we have analysed them? In order to select some typical items for qualitative analysis, one would have to know in advance in which documents the typical is to be found.

Latent styles analysis can help to cope with this problem by selecting those coding units for further qualitative analysis which are most typical for the identified latent styles. For each latent style, those coding units can be selected which have the highest likelihood of belonging to the respective style.³ Conveying qualitative analyses of a so-defined sample of typical coding units can then unveil those aspects of the respective texts which cannot be covered by quantitative analysis (see Chapter 12).

6. Qualitative content analysis

In any conflict, there are own side's rights and intentions and other side's actions that interfere with them and threaten their pursuit. But the other side also has rights and intentions that are threatened by our actions. Last but not least, there are also common rights and common benefits, which may serve as a basis for mutual trust. So far, any conflict is open to either take a constructive course or to escalate into a destructive one. Which will be the case depends on whether the conflict is conceptualized as a cooperative (win-win model) or as a competitive process (win-lose model). Competitive processes tend to escalate the conflict, and the more a conflict has escalated, the more the parties in the conflict tend to idealize their own rights, intentions and actions, the more they tend to deny their opponent's rights and to demonize his or her actions and intentions, and the less they recognize common interests and common gains (see Chapter 3).

Media coverage of conflicts may either join into these escalation dynamics, by taking the position of either party in the conflict, or may counterbalance the escalation by emphasizing those aspects that can be realized from a position of critical distance only.

In order to investigate whether the media coverage contributes to the escalation or the de-escalation of a conflict, Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen (1996) developed a qualitative method which analyses escalating and deescalating aspects of conflict coverage along a total of seven dimensions and three referential levels.

Evaluative means of propaganda I: cognitive representation of the conflict

The first three dimensions of the content analytical system deal with the cognitive representation of the conflict (see Table 9):

1. While escalation-oriented journalism conceptualizes the conflict in a way that gives support to war and military logic, de-escalation-oriented journalism keeps itself open for peaceful solutions and queries war and military logic.
2. While propaganda journalism evaluates the war parties' rights and intentions in an antagonistic way, peace journalism aims at a balanced evaluation of both parties' interests.
3. While propaganda evaluates the war parties' actions in a framework of confrontation, de-escalation-oriented journalism maintains a critical distance to both of them and focuses on chances for cooperation.

Table 9. Conceptualization of the conflict and evaluation of the war parties' rights, intentions and actions.

Escalating aspects: War propaganda		De-escalating aspects: Peace journalism	
1. Conceptualization of the conflict			
W1	Support of war and military logic	P1	Query of war and military logic
W1.1	Construction of the conflict as a competitive process	P1.1	Query of the competitive character of the conflict
W1.2	Emphasis on military values	P1.2	Query of militarism and military values
W1.3	Designation of military force as an appropriate means for conflict resolution	P1.3	Query of the adequacy or effectivity of military force
W1.4	Refutation of peaceful alternatives	P1.4	Demands for peaceful alternatives
2. Evaluation of the war parties' rights and intentions			
W2	Antagonism	P2	Balance
W2.1	Denial of rights of the enemy and demonization of his or her intentions	P2.1	Respecting of rights of enemy and unbiased description of his or her intentions
W2.2	Idealization of own rights and intentions	P2.2	Realistic and self-critical evaluation of own rights and intentions
W2.3	Denial of common interests or of possibilities for cooperation	P2.3	Critical distance to both war parties; emphasis on their common interests; support of anti-war oppositions; signals of peace readiness; mediation efforts
3. Evaluation of the war parties' actions			
W3	Confrontation	P3	Cooperation
W3.1	Justification of own side's actions and underlining of own correctness	P3.1	Critical evaluation of own side's actions
W3.2	Condemnation of actions of the enemy	P3.2	Unbiased evaluation of the other side's actions
W3.3	Conversion of indignation with the war into indignation with the enemy	P3.3	Redirection of indignation with the enemy against the war itself by critical evaluation of both sides' actions, description of both sides' harm and description of the benefit that both sides could gain from ending the war

Evaluative means of propaganda II: social identification and emotional involvement

The next two dimensions deal with incentives for social identification and emotional involvement in the war (see Table 10). ‘So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern nations’, wrote Harold Lasswell in 1927, ‘that every war must appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor’.

Table 10. Emotional involvement and social identification.

Escalating aspects: War propaganda		De-escalating aspects: Peace journalism	
4. Emotional involvement in the conflict			
W4	Destructive emotions	P4	Constructive emotions
W4.1	Denial of threat to the enemy	P4.1	Recognition of threat to the enemy
W4.2	Confidence in own side’s victory	P4.2	Recognition of the price of the victory
W4.3	Stimulation of the feeling of being threatened by the enemy	P4.3	Reduction of the feeling of being threatened by the enemy
W4.4	Stimulation of mistrust of the enemy, his or her allies, and of neutral third parties that try to mediate in the conflict	P4.4	Depiction of perspectives for reconciliation
5. Social identification and personal entanglement			
W5	Confrontative social commitment	P5	Cooperative social commitment
W5.1	Incentives for identification with own side’s victims as ‘worthy’; dismissal of the other side’s victims as ‘unworthy’; or minimization of suffering on both sides	P5.1	Incentives for identification with both sides’ victims as victims of the war itself
W5.2	Incentives for identification with own side’s (non-élite) actors; dehumanization of the other side’s actors; and/or dehumanization of those who strive for a peaceful conflict resolution	P5.2	Impartiality towards both sides’ (non-élite) actors and/or incentives for identification with those who strive for a peaceful conflict resolution
W5.3	Incentives for identification with the own side’s élite; dehumanization of the other side’s élite; and/or dehumanization of élites that strive for a peaceful conflict resolution	P5.3	Impartiality towards both sides’ élites and/or incentives for identification with élites that strive for a peaceful conflict resolution

The purpose of war propaganda is to maximize the will of own soldiers and civilians to fight and to minimize the fighting spirit of the enemy. As regards the own public, this requires making it identify strongly with one’s own side and maintain a delicate balance between the emotions of feeling threatened by the enemy and feeling confident that one’s own side can win the war.

4. While escalation-oriented conflict coverage stimulates destructive emotions like mistrust of the enemy, his or her allies, and third parties that try to mediate in the conflict, peace journalism would rather try to reduce the emotional stress of the audience and to focus on perspectives for reconciliation. While propaganda stimulates confidence that the war can be won, de-escalation-oriented journalism would rather point towards the price that has to be paid for a military victory.
5. While escalation-oriented journalism aims at a confrontative social commitment and gives incentives for partial identification only with one’s own side and rejec-

tion of those who strive for a peaceful conflict resolution, peace journalism would rather aim at a cooperative social commitment, rather try to stay impartial towards both sides and give incentives for identification with peaceful alternatives and their actors.

Manipulative means of propaganda I: communication disorders

Social identification also plays a crucial role in the last two dimensions (see Table 11), which deal with the communication disorders that are used by propaganda as manipulative means: two-sided messages and double-bind communication (see Chapter 10 for more detail).


Table 11. Communication disorders

6. Two-sided messages	
#6.1	Anticipation of criticism
#6.2	Rejection of the anticipated information
7. Double-bind communication	
#7.1	Inherent contradictions
#7.2	Emotional involvement with both contradictory messages

Manipulative means of propaganda II: harmonization of referential levels

Conflicts take place not only on the level of the issues which are a matter in dispute, but they involve the levels of behaviour and attitudes as well (see Galtung, 1987). These levels are not independent of each other, and any modification of a conflict on one of these levels affects the complete system (see Figure 7). In conflict coverage, they correspond to different referential levels of the text (see Chapter 1), such as interpretations of the conflict context (issues), concrete descriptions of topical events (behaviour) and descriptions of mythical or religious dimensions of the conflict (attitudes).

Figure 7. Galtung's Conflict Triangle



Any successful propaganda is a coherent construction with tight links between the different levels. The different levels support each other.

- On the level of the *conflict context*, propaganda tells us the roots of the conflict, why it was unavoidable, what we are defending and why the enemy did attack.

- The level of *topical events* contains classical propaganda material, such as description of battles, expressions of support coming from other countries, heroic stories and stories of atrocity, etc.
- On the *mythical level*, finally, material about the logic of history, about the meaning of life, etc. is provided.

A typical pattern of war propaganda might be that single day-to-day stories are selected and written in a way that fits into the conflict context which supports the suggested identification and which enforces the myths. 'Myths, as we know, are told in the form of concrete stories, and the order of the elements in the story tells the myths' (Luostarinen, 1994: 3).

The harmonization of the referential levels leads to texts which often seem heterogeneous at the surface, but in their structure they repeat the same theme which has been chosen for the core message of the propaganda and thus seem to give proof to its truth from a variety of angles.

The content analytical method of Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen (1996) adheres to these levels and their mutual dependence in terms of analysing the argumentative structure of a text: which level does it start from, how does the escalation process proceed through the various levels, and on which levels is it counterbalanced by the introduction of deescalating aspects?

7. Applied propaganda techniques

Applying this method of qualitative analysis to a selection of typical news items reporting about third party peace initiatives (see Kempf, 1997b) brought about results that demonstrated a gross orientation towards conflict escalation in the US and European media. Although the media placed high emphasis on reporting alternatives to violence, there was extremely little critical journalism that gave peace a chance.

As a basis for analysis, one typical news item was chosen from the quality press of each of the five countries that were included in the study. Two of these news items were published at the very beginning of the air raids against Baghdad in the *Washington Post* (USA) and in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany). The third item was published in *Helsingin Sanomat* (Finland) on the same day that reports about the bombing of the Amirya bunker provided evidence of Iraqi civilian victims for the first time. The other two items were published in *Aftenposten* (Norway) and *Dagens Nyheter* (Sweden) during Gorbachev's last peace proposals before the start of the ground offensive.

The only item that did not frame the peace initiatives in an escalation-oriented context was the article from *Helsingin Sanomat*. Reporting mainly on the level of day-to-day events about two (futile) diplomatic efforts to stop the Gulf War (the visit of Yevganij Primakov to Baghdad and the meeting of the non-aligned countries), this article involves quite a few escalating elements. Since most of these are denials of the efficiency of diplomatic or political means of conflict resolution, however, they seem to be rather unavoidable in reporting the events which are the topic of the article. As the article gives space to third party initiatives as an attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait, it also includes a number of de-escalating

elements: the questioning of military force as suitable; demands for peaceful alternatives; perspectives for reconciliation; and critical distance from both sides. Again, however, these are a result of the facts being reported and not of the specific journalistic presentation.

The articles from *Aftenposten* and *Dagens Nyheter*, on the other hand, are more or less straightforward propaganda, discrediting Gorbachev's peace plan either by expressing concern about the prospects of Saddam Hussein remaining in power (*Aftenposten*) or warning of the risk that 'the new Iraqi indulgence is merely a trick' (*Dagens Nyheter*). Both texts are dominated by escalating aspects, such as military values, framing the conflict in a win-lose model, negative references to mediation efforts and refutation of peaceful alternatives, emphasis on threat from the enemy and stimulation of mistrust of the enemy, demonization of enemy intentions, and incentives for identification with one's own side's elite.

Finally, more refined propaganda techniques were applied in the articles from the *Washington Post* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, which mentioned third party peace initiatives mainly in order to put the blame for the war on Saddam Hussein. Both these articles took up a last-moment peace initiative by Mikhail Gorbachev in order to portray the attack on Iraq as unavoidable. Both articles reported on Gorbachev's initiative to postpone the bombing only after assuring the audience that the Soviet Union had expressed support of the attack and put the Soviet reaction to the Allied attack on Iraq into the context of positive reactions all over the world. Some of the world's nations expressed concern but supported the war nonetheless. Only Cuba, North Korea and Iran condemned the bombing raids.

While the article from the *Washington Post* was clearly dominated by escalating aspects (mainly support of military solutions and construction of the conflict as a competitive process)⁴ and followed a pattern of two-sided messages (expressing support for the war and anticipating possible counter arguments), the strategy of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was even more refined. The article devoted much space to critical voices that regarded the outbreak of war as a tragic event (which was, however, unavoidable since Iraq had shown itself to be unyielding) and to Gorbachev's mediation efforts. The Soviet efforts were covered quite positively and in great detail. They were neither queried nor explicitly rejected. There were even incentives for social identification with Gorbachev. At a first glance, the article seems, therefore, to be a confusion of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented elements. Under closer inspection, however, the text breaks down into five sequences, which represent five argumentative steps towards the conversion of indignation with war into indignation with the enemy (see Chapter 12). The whole article has the form of a two-sided message, in which the positive coverage of Gorbachev's peace initiative plays an essential role. Criticism of Allied policy as well as indignation with the outbreak of war and the failure of the international community are turned against Saddam Hussein. In this scenario, the detailed description of the Soviet mediation efforts and the incentives for identification with Gorbachev serve to reinforce the outrage at Saddam Hussein. The more the Soviet mediators have striven for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and the more this is appreciated by the article, the more it is justified to blame Saddam Hussein for the failure of the mediation efforts, the more responsibility can be attributed to Saddam Hussein, and the more it seems justified to fall back upon military means.

The differences in orientation towards conflict escalation and propaganda techniques applied in the analysed articles may be due to the events reported and their discursive context as well as to the overall direction of the respective papers.

The article from *Helsingin Sanomat* appeared during a phase of the Gulf War in which it had become visible for the first time that the Gulf War was not a clean and merely technical war between weapon systems but a real war that produced real casualties and also affected the Iraqi civil population. During that time-spot, it would not have been wise for propaganda to reveal itself openly and, moreover, the Finnish media were also much more hesitant about supporting the Gulf War and reported about it in a more detached way (see Kempf, 2000).

The articles from *Aftenposten* and *Dagens Nyheter*, on the other hand, were published during a phase of the war in which the enemy image of Saddam Hussein was well established. On the eve of the ground offensive, it was essential for propaganda to dismantle any initiative that could have disturbed the strategic plans of the military, and there was little risk in doing so quite openly. Public opinion had come to terms with the war already, and the peace movement (which was not so strong in Norway and Sweden) had nearly broken down.

At the outset of war, when the articles from the *Washington Post* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* were published, the situation was quite different. There was still a strong peace movement (even in the USA, and more so in Germany); the enemy image of Saddam Hussein was much weaker; and a good deal of the public (especially in Germany) was still reluctant about the war and confused about its objectives. During this time-spot, it was essential for propaganda to integrate critical voices into its strategy, to intensify the enemy image, to justify the allied attack as an *ultima ratio* and to pin the blame on Saddam Hussein. Accordingly, propaganda had to be much more cautious and refined.

Notes

1. That is, i.e. the share of coding units (e.g. news items) that stems from each of the latent classes.
2. Reading of this section can be omitted without loss of continuity.
3. That is, selecting those news items that have the highest membership probability (see Equation 4) for that style.
4. De-escalating aspects – such as the (implicit) recognition of the price of military victory and the questioning of military force as suitable or necessary – are also reported, but little emphasis is given to them.

Communication Disorders in Conflict Coverage

Michael Reimann

In April 1999, after the first few weeks of NATO attacks against Yugoslavia, after the first 'collateral damages' and the first civilian victims, several contradictions of the war became obvious and were widely discussed: Can peace be achieved by martial means? Can human rights be secured by breaking international law? Can the destiny of some people be saved by destroying the future of others?

Contradictions such as these are inherent in every war, not just the Kosovo conflict. 'So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern times, that every war must appear to be a war of defence against a menacing, murderous aggressor', wrote Lasswell in 1927. And yet, the menace and the price to be paid should not appear to be too great, because that would have discouraging effects on the public.

War reporting therefore often has to deal with contradictory information: There might, for example, be some criticism about one's own side, its actions or intentions, and there might even be some good news about the enemy side! Such information cannot simply be 'forgotten' or 'ignored' by the media. In fact, it must be communicated to the public, or else the media can be very easily accused of not doing their job properly.

Yet, our analyses show that there are ways to include such 'subversive' information into conflict coverage: two-sided messages and double-bind communication.

Both of these methods consist of rather complex patterns of argumentation: they include some kind of critical or 'subversive' information and some means of taking the edge off its 'subversiveness'. In an analogy to clinical psychology, we call these 'communication disorders' since, as in disordered face-to-face communication, facts are not openly communicated and discussed but are presented in a distorted way.

And just as in face-to-face situations, both sender and receiver are victims rather than perpetrators: the senders, the media and the journalists in particular are not deliberately 'using' two-sided messages or double-bind communication in order to manipulate the public;¹ indeed, they themselves are caught in the contradictions that every conflict brings with it and they feel the need to resolve these contradictions just as everybody does.

1. Two-sided messages

1.1 Definition

The concept 'two-sided propaganda presentation' derives from a classic study in media research by Lumsdaine & Janis (1952), which showed that propaganda can be made more effective when possible criticism is taken up and refuted. 'Two-sided messages', as defined in our project, contain two separate features (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996):

- The anticipation of (possible) criticism of one's own side and/or arguments that may question one's own point of view;
- and the rejection of the anticipated information (criticism, argumentation) – not by counter-arguments, but by:
 - 'turning the tables' – turning the criticism etc. into a reason to believe and to be confident in one's own side, in its strength, correctness, leadership, etc.;
 - turning the criticism of one's own side into criticism of the other side; or
 - devaluating the 'subversive' information and/or conclusions to be derived from it.

In short, the function of two-sided messages is to make one's own position 'water-tight', to avoid doubt and to reject possible criticisms before they intrude on the centre of public interest.

1.2 Examples and systemization

On a first level, it is possible to ward off critical facts simply by not elaborating upon them, by depicting them as a mere standpoint with no reasonable argumentation behind it (see Reimann, 1997). Two-sided messages, in the narrower sense of the definition, can be classified into 'choice of context' and 'sequence'. Both classes require the analysis of context that surrounds the possibly critical news. 'Choice of context' relates to the selection of material that forms the context of criticisms – it refers to what information is given as context information and how it is presented². 'Sequence', on the other hand, relates to the order in which the information is presented – it refers to what information is given first, what information follows, what argumentation is built up, and where and how critical information is built into it.

1.2.1 Choice of context

'Choice of context' relates to means by which critical or 'subversive' information is put into a context that makes the critical content vanish. It is a strategy that consists of redirecting attention away from critical facts or argumentation and towards something that may support one's own point of view. Social identification, in particular, is often used for this purpose: the context of a criticism can either be chosen in a way in which the criticized, 'endangered' standpoint is backed by incentives for social identification or in which social identification with the criticism or its promoters is warded off.

a. *Social obligation to one's own point of view*

One means of rejecting criticisms is to give incentives for social identification with people or institutions that represent one's own standpoint and thereby to commit the audience to it. In his speech on the night the Gulf War started, President George Bush gave a series of incentives for social identification with politicians of the Western and Arab world and with institutions like the UN or the Arab League and thereby tried to oblige the public to accept his point of view of the conflict and its roots:

This military action ... follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States and many, many other countries.... Our secretary of State, James Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva, ... the Secretary General of the United Nations went to the Middle East with peace in his heart (*New York Times*, 17 January, 1991).

Bush is trying to oblige the reader (or the listener) to accept his point of view by implicitly stating: 'We (including me and you, "our" Secretary of State, the UN and "many, many other nations") have good intentions ("peace in the heart"), and we did everything ("virtually endlessly") to avoid this war.' The purpose seems obvious: it is to ward off possible critical questions concerning the actual pursuit and content of all these diplomatic efforts. Who, for example, would dare to criticize 'our' man, James Baker, and who in the world would dare to criticize a man 'with peace in his heart'?

b. *Warding off social identification with the carriers of the critical information and/or the enemy's point of view*

This method is the counterpart of the first one: On the one hand, you can try to oblige people to accept your point of view; on the other hand, you can try to ward off attempts to oblige people to accept a different point of view. This may be achieved by using different strategies, such as marginalization, devaluation and allocation of guilt.

i) Marginalization

'Marginalization' is the attempt to depict a different point of view or a critical argumentation as the standpoint of a (more or less small) minority.

Only a few believe that the disfigured faces of the prisoners were the result of bailing out of their aircraft with ejector seats' (*Die Welt*, 23 January, 1991; see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996).

Here, a reasonable supposition, the 'ejector seat supposition', which was also transmitted by other media on the same day (see Kempf, 1995), is rejected by labelling it the 'belief' of 'only a few'.

ii) Devaluation

'Devaluation' marks the attempt to press back criticisms or their promoters by attributing negative connotations to them. In an article of the German regional paper *Südkurier*, published right before the outbreak of the Gulf War, speculations about a meeting of the Iraqi Parliament were reproduced:

Baghdad gave no reason for the meeting of 250 members of parliament, who have, to date, followed all of Saddam's recommendations. Diplomats in the region considered discussion of peace initiative possible, even though there were no signs ... of a readiness to compromise on Iraq's part. (*Südkurier*, 14 January, 1991)

The information that 'diplomats in the region considered discussion of peace initiative possible' could in fact question the Allies' standpoint that Iraq is absolutely heading for war. So instead, the article focuses on depicting the members of the parliament as not being fit for political discussion, as politically immature and not accustomed to democratic procedures. This devalues the enemy and its behaviour by attributing negative characteristics to them, and thereby wards off criticism about the Allies' heading for war.

iii) Allocation of guilt

Conflicts seem to raise a need for finding someone or something that can be called 'guilty' for what is happening. By allocating guilt to the enemy side, possible critical remarks about one's own side can more easily be rejected.

In an article from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (18 January, 1991), such an 'allocation of guilt' is embedded into a whole string of argumentation. The headline of the article already states 'Gorbachev blames Saddam Hussein', and later on the text reads:

The 'tragic turn of events' was ... caused by the refusal of the Iraqi leadership to accept the international community's demand that it withdraw from Kuwait.

Soviet mediation efforts are only depicted by the article within this context. Questions like 'Why not wait with military action, when the Soviets are still trying to mediate?' are swept away by the allocation of guilt to Saddam Hussein. His guilt actually seems to become even greater, the more the Soviets strive for peace.

iv) Compound forms

The various forms of two-sided messages described so far sometimes occur in combination with each other. For instance, an 'allocation of guilt' may also transport a notion of 'marginalization':

French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas also assigned the blame for the outbreak of hostilities to Saddam Hussein. Because of his 'intransigence', history would assign him 'grave responsibility for having exposed his country and its citizens to the misery of war', said Dumas (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 January, 1991)

Here, guilt is allocated to Saddam Hussein, and he is also marginalized with respect to 'history', his country and the Iraqi population.

Incentives for – and the warding off of – social identification may also occur in combination with each other, as in:

While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war. (George Bush, quoted in *New York Times*, 17 January, 1991; cited in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 January, 1991)

Here, strong incentives for identifying with the Alliance's view of the conflict are given ('the whole world prayed for peace'); then, Saddam is made guilty of the war ('prepared for war') and marginalized ('Saddam against 'the world').

c. *Linguistic means*

i) Devaluating expressions

The rejection of criticisms can also be achieved by use of expressions that in some way devalue either the criticism itself or those who express it. The focus here is on single words, whereas the devaluation method described above rather relates to more complex argumentation.

The expressions used for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War are a prominent example of this method: 'dictator', 'Saddam = Hitler', etc. The formula used by *Voice of America* to describe the Gulf War is yet another example:

'Gulf Challenge – Good Versus Evil' (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996).

The *Die Welt* article on the fate of captured allied airmen in Iraq gives another example. It qualifies the 'ejector seat supposition' mentioned above as a 'belief' of some people; on the other hand, it states that friends and relatives of the POWs are 'convinced' that they were mistreated by the Iraqis. The use of the word 'belief' clearly implies that it has less informational value and that it should be given less attention than the 'conviction' of the majority.

ii) 'Hiding' critical information in subordinate clauses

Critical or 'subversive' information may be hidden in subordinate clauses; one's own point of view, however, will be presented in the main clause. The following example is interesting as it makes use of this method twice, within two subsequent sentences.

Even though 83.6% of all Israelis are against military intervention at the present time ... pressure is mounting within the government.

Although only four ministers have come out in favour of military action against Iraq so far, this number will increase sharply (*Südkurier*, 23 February, 1991).

1.2.2 Sequence

'Sequence' focuses on such questions as: What is the overall sequence of arguments presented by a certain text? Is a certain statement part of a greater string of argumentation and thereby acquires a certain function? By what kind of statements is a certain statement preceded, what kind of statements follow? Thus, the notion 'sequence' broadens the focus of attention from the context within a certain statement up to the more general context formed by strings of arguments. So far, three different forms of 'sequence' have been detected: framing, shifting and embedding.

a. *Framing of (possible) criticism*

Framing consists of repetition of one's own point of view in a way such that potentially critical information is surrounded or framed by statements that reject it.

Canada as well as the United States considered the Soviet peace plan to be inadequate. President Mikhail Gorbachev acted with good intentions, said Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. However, he added that as far as he could tell, the plan fulfilled 'few of the requirements of the UN resolutions' (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 February, 1991).

The string of argumentation within these lines can be summarized as follows: The Soviet peace plan is inadequate. Gorbachev acted with good intentions. Still, his peace plan is inadequate. Thereby, the appraisal of Gorbachev's intentions is 'framed' by notions that reject what he is actually doing.

b. *Shifts from one level of argumentation to another*

According to Luostarinen (1994b), argumentation used in conflict coverage can be roughly classified into three different levels: argumentation on the level of day-to-day events, on the level of the conflict context and on the level of myths. 'Shifting' can then be summarized as follows: The predominant level of argumentation of an article sets the agenda; it defines which arguments are appropriate and which are not. Abrupt and inexplicable 'shifts' to another level will make argumentation appear out of place or not connected to the rest of the text, and they are thereby rejected.

The paragraph from the *Südkurier* on the public opinion poll in Israel (see above) is mainly located on the level of day-to-day events. Yet, within the context of the article, this is the only paragraph that is located on that level; with some minor exceptions the rest of the article refers entirely to the level of conflict context. On that level, the possibility of an immediate ceasefire is rejected and called 'the worst possible solution' for Israel. The paragraph reporting on the public opinion poll thereby looks like argumentation at a 'wrong' level, and its critical content is devaluated by that shift.

c. *Embedding critical information into chains of argumentation*

Potentially critical argumentation sometimes is depicted with detail and without the use of any of the other means to reject possible criticism described so far. It is still possible, though, to take the edge off even these detailed descriptions of facts that may question one's own point of view. This can be achieved by 'embedding' them into a string of arguments that, in the end, supports one's own standpoint.

In an article of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (18 January, 1991) Soviet mediation efforts are depicted with great detail, and incentives for social identification with Gorbachev are given. He is depicted as one who strives for peace even during the last minutes before the war. Yet, within the overall argumentation of the article, the description of the Soviet peace initiative acquires a certain function: it is taken as an occasion for reproaching the Iraqi president with responsibility and guilt for the failure of these efforts. The more Gorbachev had striven for peace, and the more this is appreciated by the article, the more it appears justified to blame Saddam Hussein and to fall back on military means of conflict resolution.

1.3 Summary

As the systemization and the examples above show, there is a large variety of methods for rejecting possible criticism. They range from the usage of single devaluating expressions up to the construction of strings of argumentation that cover a whole article. Means of rejecting criticisms in particular include attempts to socially oblige the reader to accept one's own point of view and different methods for warding off social identification with a different point of view.

2. Double-bind communication

2.1 Definition

Whereas 'two-sided messages' are a phenomenon that mainly occurs on a rhetorical level, 'double-bind communication' takes up conflicting perceptions and emotions that already exist in people and societies involved in escalating conflicts: fear and hope. On the one hand, the 'other side' is perceived as threatening one's own rights; on the other hand, one's 'own side' is perceived as strong enough to overcome the situation and the enemy.

This emotionally confusing situation is reproduced by 'double-bind communication'. The term 'double-bind' refers to a type of communication disorder that was first described in the context of clinical psychology (Bateson et al., 1956) and was introduced into propaganda studies by Kempf (1986). It is defined by:

- a relationship to another person or institution that is so intensive that it becomes crucial to exact understanding of his or its messages in order to be able to react in an appropriate manner;
- an utterance by the other person or institution that simultaneously carries two contradictory messages;
- the person concerned is not given the possibility to react to both contradictory messages, nor can he or she withdraw from the situation.

The occurrence of double-bind communication in war reporting is caused by three analogous factors:

- the need to get information about what is happening – actual use of media become greater in times of armed conflicts (Kempf & Reimann, 1994b); for most of the public (especially people living outside the war zone), the only access to information and the only possibility of having this need fulfilled is via the media; it therefore becomes crucial for the public to understand exactly what it is told by the media;
- inherent contradictions of war reporting;
- the social identification and personal entanglement of the public that is produced by the media.

Since the close relationship between public and media in times of war is a constant background feature of war reporting rather than a feature of actual news items, the

empirical assessment of 'double-bind communication' in war reporting involves the latter two factors only:

1. logical inconsistency or inherent contradictions of the message, and
2. incentives for social identification and/or personal entanglement with both contradictory parts of the message.

As an effect, it becomes more difficult for the audience to maintain a distance from the sender or the content of the contradictory messages. It becomes harder to come to an independent opinion and to decide autonomously which of the contradicting messages is to be believed. At the same time, to withdraw from the situation is rendered more difficult, as it is crucial to fully understand what is said in the media.

It is possible to distinguish two different types of double-bind communication: a 'simple' or 'basic' form and a 'compound' form, in which it is dissolved into a two-sided message.

2.2 Basic form

The 'basic' form of double-bind communication relates to the above mentioned definition, and it may cause effects as described above: emotional confusion based on personal entanglement with contradictory messages and inability to withdraw from the situation. If these effects occur, the audience will long for a way out and may be glad to accept solutions offered by the sender of the message.

In an article from *The Times* dealing with the fate of Western prisoners of war in Iraq, feelings of threat and danger are massively aroused. The POWs are described 'hostages' used as 'human shields' by Iraq. The article then continues:

A former British hostage in Iraq, who spent months as a human shield at a chemicals plant near Baghdad, said yesterday that captured allied airmen had nothing to fear from the Iraqis. Joseph Wild, aged 59, a marine biologist, said that they were of such high propaganda value to Saddam that he would want to keep them alive and well. He added: 'Even his own people believe that the vanquished should be looked after. It's in their religion' (*The Times*, 22 January, 1991; see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996).

The information given here clearly contradicts what had been said before in the same article. Furthermore, each of these contradictory pieces of information are reinforced by incentives for social identification with those who carry the information:

- a. The scary piece of information is linked to the relatives and friends of the POWs, whose fears, sorrow, utterances, etc. are given a comprehensive and understandable description.
- b. The relieving piece of information is attributed to an expert whose fate as a 'human shield' had been reported comprehensively by the media.³ He is someone whom the reader already 'knows', and who, at the same time and owing to his comparable experience as a 'human shield', is capable of feeling with the current victims.

This double offer to social identification leaves the reader helpless amidst contradictory messages. The reader cannot decide between hope and fear without rejecting

any of the offered social identifications. Therefore, an obvious solution to this dilemma would be to accept the solution offered by the article: 'outrage'.

2.3 Compound form – Dissolution of a double-bind communication into a two-sided message

A compound form of two-sided messages and double-bind communication has been detected as well. It consists of a double-bind communication which is then dissolved into a two-sided message. A prototype of this can be found in the article of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (18 January, 1991) already used before as an example.

First, the article creates emotional confusion supported by incentives for social identification: 'Shock worldwide', 'Gorbachev blames Saddam Hussein', 'concern', 'the international community has failed' etc. The article itself summarizes the situation with the expression 'conflicting feelings'.

This emotional confusion is followed by detailed descriptions of the last-minute Soviet peace initiative. Yet, as already shown, the description of Soviet mediation efforts is made part of a two-sided message. The Soviet initiative is not taken as a motif for questioning the allied war policy but as an occasion to allocate guilt to Saddam Hussein. The initial emotional confusion is thereby dissolved into rage against Saddam Hussein.

3. Summary

In times of conflict and war, the media cannot simply ignore criticisms of the 'own side' or good news about the enemy side – they somehow have to handle them. But, as a consequence of the social–psychological dynamics of conflicts, journalists – like everybody else – become victims of distorted perceptions. And, like everybody else, they long for a resolution of the contradictions that are inherent in every war.

Two-sided messages and double-bind communication allow the 'saving' of a congruent picture of the conflict, of the self and of the other. Accordingly, contradictory pieces of information are sometimes included in the reporting in the various forms of two-sided messages and double-bind communication described in this chapter. As a consequence, war reporting gains more credibility and looks much more like well-balanced news coverage, although important pieces of information are actually warded off. Thus, in the end, the spiral of distorted perception is revolved for one more turn.

Notes

1. This might not be the case with politicians or PR-agencies.
2. It may also refer to the external context of the text, as 'choice of context' takes into account, that certain information is *not* given by the text.
3. If not his own personal fate, then at least that of others who experienced to be used as 'human shields'.

IV. Studies on the Gulf War and the Bosnia Conflict

Images of the UN in *Dagens Nyheter* and the *Washington Post* during the Gulf War 1990–91

Stig A. Nohrstedt

1. Introduction

The study reported here compares two leading prestige newspapers, Sweden's *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm) and the USA's *Washington Post*, with respect to their coverage of the role of the United Nations in connection with three vital junctures in the events leading up to and following the Gulf War, namely, (1) the vote taken by the UN Security Council on Resolution 678 in November 1990; (2) the decision taken by the US Congress in January 1991, authorizing President Bush to order the military attack on Iraq; and (3) the intervention in April 1991 to protect the Kurds in the northern part of the country.

The purpose of the analysis is dual: to examine the two newspapers' manner of describing the United Nations against the backdrop of the national political contexts in Sweden and the USA, respectively, and to test the hypothesis that the influence of US propaganda in international news tends to increase over time. Naturally, the findings of the present analysis cannot be generalized beyond the effects, if any, noted in the Swedish newspaper, but it is interesting to test the hypothesis on a newspaper in a nonaligned country since US propaganda may be expected to be less pervasive in countries which are not members of a military alliance in which the USA participates. Should the reporting in *Dagens Nyheter* be found to converge with that of the *Washington Post*, we may assume that the tendency is also present in many other media in Europe and other industrialized countries.

2. Theoretical background: The discourse on globalization

The problematization of the theory of cultural imperialism during the last decades constitutes the theoretical backdrop of the study. Whereas this theory about Western, or rather US, cultural and media dominance over the rest of the world had considerable currency within international communication research in the 1970s, it has come under harsh criticism in recent years (see, for example, Golding & Harris, 1997; Hannerz, 1996; Thompson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1997; Srebreny-Mohammadi, 1991).

This development has doubtless been beneficial. Space does not allow me to go into details, but let it suffice with a rhapsodic reference to the critique's new emphasis on heterogeneity and pluralism, together with concepts such as 'domestication' (Gurevitch, 1991; Cohen et al., 1996), 'nationalizing' (Riegert, 1998) and 'local appropriation' (Thompson, 1995) when theorizing about international news flows, in contradistinction to the cultural imperialism theory with its focus on dominance and hegemony.

Hegemony or not, my point is that the validity and relevance of the thesis about US dominance in international news is not mainly a theoretical matter. As an empirical question, it has to be tackled in adequately designed studies. Studying the differences in media constructions and audience receptions at any given time, or in relation to a discrete event, is not enough. It is necessary also to analyse differences over time (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 1998). In the present case study, this is done in the form of a comparative analysis of reporting during three phases of the Gulf conflict, with a view to determining whether, and to what extent, the US perspective successively came to dominate the reporting of one of Sweden's leading newspapers.

This is not to say that the analysis is based on some kind of injection model or one-way, linear conception that US propaganda is irresistibly spread via the media to a global audience. The present approach subscribes to the undoubtedly well-founded notion of 'local appropriation'. More precisely, my point of departure is that an international conflict of this order arouses a complex of fears and hopes among statesmen, journalists and the general public. This complex constitutes a complicated emotional background against which the propaganda operates. The background will vary between national and local political-cultural contexts. Thus, globally distributed propaganda will be perceived and will work differently at different times in different places.

It is important that research take these variations into account. But it would be hasty indeed to conclude for that reason that issues of hegemony and dominance have been rendered irrelevant to the study of international communication. More sophisticated persuasive strategies for transnational influence take such local variations into account and aim to address this problem, as well as the resistance initially aroused by the proposition of military aggression. Thus we have – despite, or perhaps precisely because of, the phenomenon of local appropriation – reason to examine the extent to which US propaganda regarding the Gulf War managed to dominate news reporting in other countries' mass media.

Popular attitudes to armed conflict are another theoretical point of departure for this study. In most national cultures, the predominant value is that war is something to be avoided (see Haines, 1995). Not least, the knowledge that modern warfare increasingly kills more civilians than soldiers gives rational grounds for popular resistance to the idea of war. This resistance to go to war is an obstacle to the propagandistic strategist. But sophisticated propaganda makes no secret of the fact that the cost of war is suffering and sacrifice. Instead, it describes the object of the conflict in such a way that it appears to be worth making the sacrifice. In the present study, this propaganda aspect will be studied in terms of how various central actors – primarily the USA and the United Nations – are associated with such hopes and fears.

Given the uncertainty and anguish which the threat of war presumably arouses on the part of the civilian population, we may expect that the media, seeking as they

do to reflect popular sentiment while also affording a platform for war propaganda, will contain a spectrum of attitudes and valuations concerning the risk of the outbreak of military hostilities. It is especially important to identify and closely examine the actors in the media discourses who are presented as bearers of rhetorical visions, i.e. mobilizing ideas and principles regarding how the situation at hand can be dealt with so as to secure a positive future (Åsard & Bennett, 1997; Foss, 1989).

This reference to rhetorical principles and concepts should not be taken to mean that cleverly formulated slogans and formulas are the only reason some actors are portrayed as successful leaders in the media. Elsewhere we have discussed the question of causality regarding the effects of persuasive communications and propaganda (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2000). In a summary fashion, let it here be concluded that at least three levels should be integrated in a causal interpretation of propaganda impacts on news journalism in connection with international conflicts: (1) the opinion agenda, where journalists, as well as others, adopt to the views and values that appear to be most widespread; (2) the cultural level, where journalists and media in a ritual way express and confirm their overall cultural affinities and identities, e.g. as members of the Western world; and (3) the level of journalistic practices, from which it is reasonable to expect that the normal professional routines and priorities will encourage extensive coverage of the USA, as the remaining super-power, at least among media in Western countries.

These three levels should be understood together, not as independent factors, and in that way they seem to support the argument that the USA would take a dominant position in almost any international conflict in which the Washington administration is involved. It should, however, be stressed that this does not mean that US views are automatically adopted or assimilated by the community of nations or by global public opinion. But it does mean that the USA's views constitute a point of reference in relation to which other nations and political figures position themselves. Clearly, this gives the USA a propaganda advantage in connection with international conflicts like that in the Persian Gulf.

There are, of course, many other factors which influence whether and how the media take sides in conflicts. But I would argue that the factors mentioned above contribute a substantial part of the explanation and that they, together with the relevant criticism of the cultural imperialism theory, constitute a fruitful analytical perspective, one which takes into account national and local variations in transnational reporting of global propaganda as well as the factors which favour US dominance in the media coverage of such a conflict as the Gulf War. The ambitions of the present study are limited to that conflict, but the approach presented here might equally be used to improve our understanding of the reporting of other conflicts and, for that matter, of the international news system.

3. Analytical procedure:

A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods

The analysis reported in the following is purely qualitative, a close reading of mostly news in the two newspapers studied. But the study is part of a larger project, whose design includes both qualitative and quantitative methods. This is advantageous in that the use of different methods makes it possible to test the cross-validity of the

findings, enriches the interpretation and extends the generalizability of the findings. The first volume from the project presented several quantitative and qualitative studies (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2000). These form the basis for the questions addressed in the present study and, as we shall see, for the interpretation of its findings.

The present analysis is inspired by the kind of 'critical discourse analysis' developed by van Dijk, Fairclough and others. Three aspects are focused on here as an attempt to put the Gulf War discourses in the two newspapers into the theoretical context outlined above: (1) the UN's discursive position; (2) the UN's discursive function; and (3) discursive relations between the UN and the Bush administration's policy. I apply the method somewhat freely, however. In particular, the available space here does not allow complete description of the elements and structures of the articles. However, the texts have been analysed minutely with respect to the actors, relations between actors, article structure, layout, use of graphics and photography, micro- and macro-contexts, narratological aspects, etc. Consequently, I shall present quotations and summaries of article content only as is needed to illustrate the principal findings.

Thus, the contextual analytical perspective is otherwise similar to the discourse analyses applied by van Dijk and Fairclough. The political and persuasive context in which the reporting is situated is also squarely in focus; in that sense, the focus rests on 'socio-cultural practice' (Fairclough, 1995) or, to put it more simply, what the text does as a social and political force (Nohrstedt, 1986: 49). In the present study, this implies that the role of the media in the propaganda war in connection with the conflict in the Persian Gulf and for the US potential power to influence global opinion are addressed. Through a comparative study of the content in the *Washington Post* and *Dagens Nyheter*, the aim is to find out whether the image in the Swedish newspaper accommodates to the image in the US counterpart. As a background assumption, I presuppose that the *Washington Post* is initially more influenced by the propaganda image of the conflict that the White House promotes than *Dagens Nyheter*. In other words, I find it reasonably well documented by previous research that the media will voluntarily line up behind the national foreign policy in crises in which vital national interests are involved, provided that the political establishment is not divided (for an overview, see Bennet, 1994; see also Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Cohen, 1963; Hallin, 1986; Nohrstedt, 1986; Parenti, 1993). This does not, however, imply that I regard the *Washington Post's* way of depicting the conflict as identical with the Bush administration's propaganda. Of course, there are certain degrees of independence and integrity in the newspaper's stand, both with respect to the news coverage and to the views expressed in editorials and letters to the editor. Nevertheless, this does not exclude that it is reasonable to assume at the point of departure that the US newspaper is more prone than the Swedish newspaper to devoting attention to official US policy, as well as more sensitive to it.

A note about the status of *Dagens Nyheter* within the Nordic political public sphere may be relevant for non-Nordic readers. This Swedish newspaper is indeed the leading daily prestige paper in Sweden, with a central position on the political agenda and a circulation of 361,000 copies per day, only exceeded by one tabloid. Its political line is officially declared 'independent liberal'. Both during the 1950s, under the chief editor Herbert Tingsten, and today, its editorials argue for Swedish membership in NATO, i.e. for a definite change in the traditional non-alignment policy of Sweden. *Dagens Nyheter* is a standard reference point not only in the

domestic political discourses, but also for the political debates in Finland and Norway in matters of common interest in the Nordic countries. Thus, it is probably the most influential prestige paper in the Nordic countries.

4. Previous (quantitative) findings

An earlier quantitative analysis of some 30 media in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany and the USA found that Swedish and Finnish media gave the United Nations more prominent coverage than US media, particularly in the earlier phases of the conflict. The study also found that the US media tended to link the UN to military aspects, which may be interpreted as an indication that from the start of the conflict the UN was discursively incorporated into the Bush administration's military strategy by the US media; this was not the case with the European media. Finally, the study suggested convergence in the media's coverage in that the European media successively came to associate the UN with military aspects (Nohrstedt, 2000).

Meanwhile, it is clear that quantitative data are of relatively limited value if our aim is to determine empirically whether and to what extent US propaganda has influenced news discourses in Europe. This is why the present study has been conducted. The question is whether or not the qualitative analysis confirms or contradicts the interpretation of the quantitative findings, i.e. the hypothesis of a growth in US influence regarding the way in which the United Nations and the organization's role in the Gulf conflict are portrayed. In contrast to the quantitative analysis, the material in the present study includes other kinds of content besides news copy. To broaden the basis for the contextual analysis of the image of the UN in the two newspapers, opinion pieces have also been included along with leaders/editorials.

Thus, the purpose of the present study is to follow up the previous quantitative study with closer readings of the material in *Dagens Nyheter* and the *Washington Post* during three crucial moments of the conflict's development when the role of the UN was particularly delicate: In period I (28–30 November 1990) the Security Council's Resolution 678 was taken, allowing military intervention to liberate Kuwait; in period II (12–14 January 1991) the US Congress with reference to Resolution 678 authorised engagement of US military forces; in period III (26–28 April 1991) the USA and the UK, without a UN mandate, intervened with troops in northern Iraq to protect Kurdish refugees. In quantitative terms, the two papers' mention of the UN varies; the patterns for the three periods of analysis are also somewhat ambiguous.

The number and share of articles in which the UN plays a leading role during the three periods are as follows:

DN 4 (31%) 12 (57%) 3 (25%)

WP 4 (15%) 1 (2%) 1 (6%).

We see that in proportional terms, the United Nations is given much greater prominence in *Dagens Nyheter* throughout; in absolute terms, however, the difference is not as great. In fact, only in the second period does the UN play a significantly more prominent role in the Swedish newspaper in absolute terms. In the last period, the number of articles in which the UN plays an important role is greater in the Swedish paper, but the difference is less dramatic.

5. Findings

Period I (28–30 November 1990):

The UN Security Council passes Resolution 678

Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes member states to ‘use all necessary means’ to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Naturally, both newspapers report this news, but the differences are marked. There are two principal points on which the papers differ in this phase. First, in Sweden, the resolution and the diplomatic manoeuvres leading up to it are somewhat overshadowed by domestic political controversy over a letter sent by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson to President Saddam Hussein. In the letter, whose purpose is to secure the release of a group of Swedes imprisoned for illegal entry into Iraq, Carlsson expresses some sympathy with Iraq’s insistence that a conference on the Middle East which considers all the political conflicts in the region, including the situation of the Palestinians, should be held.

Under the headline, ‘APPROCHEMENT TO IRAQ’,¹ *Dagens Nyheter* (DN) 28 November 1990 cites two opposition leaders’ interpretation of the prime minister’s letter, although neither of them is directly identified as the source of the quotation in the headline. Other articles the same day and on the following days present Carlsson’s explanation of his motives for the letter (of which the text is still secret) and summarize a discussion of the prospect of a Middle East conference in the Swedish Parliament/Riksdag.

The second main difference is that DN, unlike the *Post* (WP), characterizes Resolution 678 as an instrument of diplomatic pressure on Iraq, i.e. as an incentive for Baghdad to retreat from Kuwait, rather than as a *carte blanche* for a military solution to the conflict. The following commentary, dated 30 November, is typical of the Swedish paper’s interpretation of the passage about using ‘all necessary means’ against the Iraqi occupation forces:

This does not necessarily mean that war will break out in the Persian Gulf after 15th January. The resolution aims, among other things, to give Iraq one last chance to retreat without bloodshed.

The only instance where DN characterizes the purpose of Resolution 678 as other than trying to keep the peace is a front-page article (of one column) under the headline MAJORITY FOR UN USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ. The headline distinctly links the possible use of force to the United Nations. This, too, is characteristic of DN’s reporting during the period. The paper is markedly hesitant to characterize Resolution 678 as a US initiative, which was driven through the Security Council by high-power US diplomacy and pressuring of Council members.

DN also addressed the Kuwait conflict in its editorials. The headline of a principal leader on 1 December expresses strong criticism of Prime Minister Carlsson’s letter to Hussein: ‘UNREASONABLE POSITION’; CARLSSON CRITICIZED FOR IRAQ–ISRAEL LINK. The piece also defends the UN resolution. Towards the end, the editor is critical of mass media. Media around the world should be careful with their rhetoric, the article cautions: ‘Thoughtless prattle about the USA having got its way can cloud the message and, moreover, create a psychological fixation with violence as the only solution’.

The *Post*’s coverage during the first phase is distinctly different. The US newspaper hails Resolution 678 as a foreign policy triumph for the Bush administration, point-

ing out that it was pushed through the Security Council in the last days of US chairmanship. Both headlines and copy make it clear that the resolution gives the green light to the use of military force. A typical article, dated 28 November, bears the headline UN AUTHORIZES USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ. The lead paragraphs speak of a far-reaching decision in the Security Council fully in line with US intentions:

The Security Council today gave the United States and other countries with forces arrayed against Iraq the most sweeping authorization to engage in warfare under UN sponsorship since the 1950 Korean war.

Closer analysis reveals not a single statement from the Bush administration during this period to the effect that Resolution 678 might be a means to exert pressure and thereby reach a peaceful solution. The total absence of such statements suggests that it must have been a conscious strategy. On one occasion (30 November 1990), the possibility that the resolution may create the preconditions for a peaceful settlement is broached, but this instance would appear to be the exception that proves the rule. The source of this discussion, it should be noted, is not a spokesman for the Bush administration but rather British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd. Hurd comments that Iraq now has every reason to choose the path of peace and reason. 'But later, he [Hurd] declared that "the military option is reality, not bluff. If it has to be used, it will be used, with the full backing of the council".'

Period II (12–14 January 1991): Congress authorizes Bush to deploy US military forces

The focal events during the second period are the decision of the US Congress to authorize President Bush to use military force to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's trip to Baghdad in a last-minute effort to mediate. Both events receive prominent coverage in the two newspapers but, here too, interesting differences emerge.

The coverage in DN evidences waning hopes that war can be averted and increasing ambivalence in the discussion of Resolution 678 and the US strategy. A remnant of hope that war still can be avoided lingers on in the paper's columns; the hope is concretized in the Secretary-General's trip to Baghdad. In the news columns, the ambivalence is expressed in a somewhat dualistic view of the USA and the UN. Whereas the UN represents the hope of a peaceful solution, the USA is associated with a violent military confrontation. DN carries several extremely critical pieces on the Bush administration's handling of the conflict in both news, opinion and leader columns during the period. The following examples are illustrative of the pattern.

On 12 January 1991, DN's front page carries the headline UN CHIEF LAST HOPE OF PEACE. The text of the article gives the reason why this 'last hope' has at least some prospect of success. The proposal the Secretary-General takes to Baghdad is described as potentially acceptable to President Hussein. The points are presented in the present tense, which can be taken to suggest that they are already on their way to being implemented despite the fact that the Bush administration has flatly rejected the idea of a 'Middle East conference':

The peace plan presumes that Iraq leaves Kuwait 15th January. The community of nations will guarantee that Iraq will not be attacked. The USA and its allies withdraw their forces.

DN's foreign news columns express a much more pessimistic view of the prospects of peace and acceptance of the plan. British Foreign Minister Hurd is cited as claiming that the plan does not involve any direct linking of an Iraqi retreat to a 'solution of the Arab–Israeli conflict'. Furthermore, statements from the Secretary-General are cited, in which he is extremely cautious about arousing any hopes, while another article reports an anything but conciliatory response on the part of President Hussein: the President categorically denies that Iraq might be prepared to retreat from Kuwait.

But the ambivalence in DN's coverage is more than just a matter of a difference in outlook regarding the prospects of peace between the front page and the world news. The domestic news pages the same day, 12 January, carry an interview with Jan Eliasson, Sweden's ambassador to the UN, who lays out an interpretation of Resolution 678 as a peacekeeping effort. Ambassador Eliasson is worried by the mounting threat of war, but expresses confidence that in retrospect the crisis will be seen to have strengthened the UN. This scenario is based on the assumption that the pressure applied to Iraq will prove sufficient to persuade President Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait:

If we succeed this time in keeping the peace and still achieve our basic objective, namely, maintaining the territorial integrity of a member country, it may mean a real turning point for the UN.

In the next breath, however, Eliasson admits that if the peace is not kept, the UN will experience severe difficulties in years to come. He goes on to point out that the risk the Security Council has taken is in total conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles on which the organization was founded.

A final example from this same day is a commentary written by DN's correspondent in Geneva, Mats Lundegård. The title of his article adds an interesting dimension in the tense period immediately before war broke out: **BLOCKADE EFFECTIVE: STAPLE FOODS ARE THERE, BUT IRAQI INDUSTRY IS HIT HARD**. The article expresses a clearly dualistic perspective, in which the UN stands for a peaceful – and the USA a bellicose – approach to resolving the conflict. Two excerpts – the first from the beginning, the second from the conclusion – serve as illustrations:

When the TV lights had been switched off and Messieurs James Baker and Tariq Aziz had both gone home, the threat of war suddenly seemed much more overhanging; in less than a week the murderous machinery might be in full swing in the Middle East. In like measure, an old impertinent question was awakened: Had the sanctions, the UN blockade of Iraq, been given a chance to work?

The answer is quite definitely No. Perhaps the world has forgotten it, but from the very outset of the crisis, the UN chose to use peaceful tactics to force Iraq to give up its occupation of Kuwait....

The efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of the blockade seem fairly irrelevant today. The coalition which has mounted its forces against Iraq, with the USA in the lead, seems to have started rolling. They have done so, whether or not the policy of sanctions has worked and for reasons that presumably have quite little to do with that policy.

The big-power political coalition and the war machine have been set in motion for fear they would fall apart had they been left standing still.

The following day, 13 January, all illusions of a peaceful solution have vanished from DN's front page. A banner headline declares: BUSH GETS GREEN LIGHT FOR WAR. The lead paragraph reports that Congress has voted to give the President a mandate to deploy forces against Iraq, whereas a resolution calling for a delay to give the sanctions time to work had been voted down. 'The resolution is de facto a declaration of war,' the paper comments. Meanwhile, the world news columns that day carry a statement by Bush, who terms the Congressional resolution a last chance for peace: 'The President welcomed the decision and said that it gives peace "one last chance".'

Perhaps the most drastic example of the mixed picture DN gives of the events immediately preceding the attack on Iraqi occupation forces and the discrepancy between hopes for peace and ominous developments occurs on 14 January, the day before the deadline for Iraqi compliance expires. The headline of a front-page article quotes an optimistic Yassir Arafat: ARAFAT AFTER MEETING WITH UN CHIEF: WAR CAN BE AVOIDED. The story, which covers four columns, relates that the Secretary-General has met with Saddam Hussein in hope of 'averting war in the eleventh hour'. But neither party revealed what was said during the meeting, and Perez de Cuellar seems wary of arousing expectations: 'Only God knows if there will be war.' This contrasts sharply with Arafat's reading of the situation, which is related as follows: 'Earlier in the day the Secretary-General met with PLO leader Yassir Arafat. After the meeting, Arafat said that he believes war can be averted, even though 15th January is the deadline.' The grounds for Arafat's optimism are not reported in the article.

One wonders even more about the Arafat story on page one when one compares it with the reporting in the world news columns. Arafat is not even mentioned in the article about the Secretary-General's mission to Baghdad. He is, however, cited in a different context, and with a diametrically different outlook than in the story on page one:

At a meeting of Palestinians in Baghdad Monday, PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat said that he 'welcomed' a war. Iraq and Palestine share a common will. We shall stand shoulder to shoulder, and after the great battle we shall, God willing, pray together in Jerusalem, Arafat exclaimed.

A principal leader on 13 January elaborates on the dualism which to such a large extent characterizes DN coverage during this second period. The first few words speak of the ambivalence and strong feelings which the crisis arouses, but also moral–ethical doubts concerning the role the media have played:

Anguish and anger are natural in the face of what looms over the Persian Gulf. In a comparative perspective the media's coverage of the preparations for war appear almost indecent.... How did we get where we are today? What went wrong?

The editor goes on to point out that the situation is the consequence of deliberate steps taken by a number of countries and by the UN Security Council:

The fact that the UN is prepared to release massive violence is virtually inconceivable for most of us. The global organization is the champion of reasoning and peace. But it also has a responsibility to maintain the peace and the international rule of law. Must that imply something as distorted as the threat of violence to, at best, bring about peace?

Referring to the previous day's interview with Ambassador Eliasson, DN answers that the UN, thanks to the end of the Cold War, can now 'serve, as was originally planned, to protect us all', though this may involve some risks. The UN can lose control over the course of developments and risk falling apart. The editorial continues with reflections upon the US motives in the conflict. On the one hand, it notes: 'Were it not for the quick intervention of the superpower, USA, the question is whether the UN would have been able to reach a decision.' On the other hand, it recalls the previous US support of 'mass murderer Saddam Hussein' and concludes that control of the region's oil reserves is the US reason for now appointing Saddam Hussein 'Public Enemy Number One'. Its final remark is about US violations of international law in comparison with Iraq's occupation of Kuwait:

We have every reason to criticize other violations of international law, such as those committed by the USA in Panama, but how can anyone not demand that Iraq get out of Kuwait? And if the world were not to care what happened to Kuwait, what prospects would the Palestinians face? And so, here we stand – still in hopes that Saddam Hussein will back down.

Compared to the ambiguous and ambivalent picture of the conflict in DN, the *Post* during this second period offers an internally consistent construction of the conflict, in which the points of view of the USA and the UN harmonize. WP reports essentially the same facts concerning Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's trip to Geneva and Baghdad as DN did. The meeting with President Hussein is described as 'the last opportunity to avert war'. The Secretary-General's 'plan' is said to entail the positioning of UN forces along the Iraq–Kuwait frontier following Iraq's retreat and a conference on the Middle East, including the Palestine issue. But some interesting differences in rhetoric and perspective also emerge between the two papers. In WP, right from the start, the proposal of an international conference on the Middle East is characterized as a European initiative:

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar heard assurances from European foreign ministers that they would push for an international conference on the Middle East soon after a complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The difference may seem trifling: whereas the Swedish paper in both headlines and copy describes the initiative as a peace plan drawn up by the Secretary-General, WP describes it as a European initiative. The difference is hardly sheer chance; it should be interpreted against the background of divergent views between the papers regarding the Secretary-General's ability to influence the situation and the realism of the plan as such. DN depicts it as Perez de Cuellar's initiative and neglects to point out its incompatibility with US policy, with the result that it appears more realistic than WP makes it out to be. WP, on the other hand, characterizes the plan as an initiative of European politicians and makes no secret of the clash with US policy. As a result, the plan appears quite unrealistic. Furthermore, the depiction allows associations with the policy of appeasement, which proved so hopelessly inadequate vis-à-vis Hitler before the outbreak of World War II. Thus, DN and WP give quite different impressions of the likelihood that the peace plan would succeed, though – paradoxically enough – by not playing up a conflict between the UN and the USA in both cases.

Period III (26–28 April 1991):
US and British troops defend Kurdish refugee camps

In the third period, both newspapers focus on the situation of the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the refugee camps established by the US and British military forces. The second theme during this period is the efforts being made to plan a conference on the Middle East.

On Saturday 27 April 1991, DN's world news columns carry two stories in which the UN figures. To the left, a headline: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ABOUT PEACE. To the right, a one-column article under the headline BRITS GREETED IN ZAHKO. The UN is mentioned but does not play a leading role in either story. The former article notes that President Bush has promised that US troops will remain in northern Iraq as long as their presence is needed. Further, it mentions that Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar has announced that the UN will assume responsibility for the camp in Zahko, a decision taken after deliberations with the USA and Iraq.

The second article relates how the people of Zakho [sic] celebrated the British commando soldiers who built 'shelters for Kurdish refugees'. The article also mentions the participation of US Marine Corps personnel in the operation. 'The townspeople celebrated when British commando soldiers and US Marines paraded down the streets, surrounded by throngs of radiant happy children.' The UN is mentioned in several connections: first, as the source of the report that the death toll among Kurds who sought refuge in Iran is 2,000 people each day as a consequence of disease; second, one of the principal Kurdish nationalist organizations demands 'that the UN act as guarantor of the recently concluded agreement with the Hussein regime to give the Kurds in northern Iraq self-determination'. It is likely (albeit not entirely certain) that the organization in question is the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which is cited as not trusting Saddam Hussein and as urging 'the allied forces [to] stay in Iraq in order to guarantee free elections and self-determination for the Kurdish people'.

A four-column photo in the national news pages carries the caption 'Guardian: A British Marine holds a little girl's hand while making his rounds in Zakho, Iraq. Armed Iraqi militiamen have withdrawn after an ultimatum by the USA.'

The Kurdish refugees are also the focus of DN's coverage the next day. Headline news in DN's world news section, 28 April, is that the Kurds are returning to northern Iraq: KURDS FLOWN HOME: FIRST GROUP OF REFUGEES FROM IRAQ ARRIVE IN ALLIED CAMP. The article is illustrated with a four-column photo showing happy Kurds walking toward the observer with a helicopter in the background. The caption for the picture reads 'Joy in Zakho. One of 250 Iraqi Kurds who has arrived at the USA-installed refugee camp. They were transported by an American Chinook helicopter.' The lead paragraphs underline the humanitarian efforts of the US forces:

The first Kurdish refugees were flown in to the USA-allies' camp in northern Iraq on Saturday. Military helicopters carried 250 Kurdish refugees to blue-and-white tent-camps outside the town of Zakho, where the allies have promised to protect them from Iraqi government military forces.

The article notes that the camp is estimated to have a capacity of 25,000 refugees, 'mainly women and children'. The article quotes one of the refugees:

'We are happy to be back. This is our home,' said one Kurdish refugee, who had spent twelve years in the Iraqi Army before fleeing over the border to Turkey last month. 'We are not afraid as long as the American soldiers are here,' he said, but added, 'But what will happen when they go back home? Then we will flee up in the hills again.'

The United Nations is mentioned only twice, toward the end of the article, in two related notices. First, the paper reports that France has suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council meet to discuss the situation in Iraq. Second, the article refers to a statement by the UN Secretary-General. The notices follow a brief report of dozens of cases of cholera in Iraq and a statement that 'the country is battling against epidemics among children because of the damage done to water supplies during the war'. Medical doctors' reports of parents coming to hospitals in Baghdad with their dead children and rampant vomiting and diarrhoea are also mentioned. As reported by the German wire service DPA, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar laments the delay in member-states' efforts to rescue the Kurds: 'Unfortunately, the reaction to the official plea has been rather weak so far, particularly with respect to activities inside Iraq, said Perez de Cuellar.'

The Kurdish refugee camps are also given prominent coverage in WP. And with respect to the role of the UN, the two papers' coverage is also quite similar. Consider, for example, a front-page story in WP on 26 April, under the headline IRAQ ACCEPTS ORDER TO LEAVE CAMPSITE. UN SEEN CLOSER TO TAKING OVER REFUGEE AID. Here, too, Iraq is in the centre, with the UN in the background, prepared to contribute; but the actual role pattern and who has the initiative is more clearly delineated in the lead paragraphs of the story:

After a blunt warning from the United States, Iraq agreed yesterday to pull its military forces away from the refugee camp being created for Kurds near Zakhu, while the United Nations appeared to be moving closer to taking control of refugee enclaves in northern Iraq.

No reader of WP need wonder on whose initiative these events take place, even though the article goes on (in the inside pages) to note that President Bush is anxious to avoid stationing US troops in the area. The Secretary-General is quoted regarding the prospect of assuming responsibility for the camps: 'I think that everybody is in agreement – the Iraqis, the coalition and myself.' The role of the United Nations is, in other words, to manage certain humanitarian aspects of the situation, but otherwise the WP story does not accord the organization any decisive role.

The next day, 27 April, aid to the Kurdish refugees again tops the news in WP. As on the day before, President Bush is the main actor on the front page, and the United Nations is given a subordinate position. In the world news pages, however, the UN assumes a principal role, inasmuch as the Bush administration has come under pressure to bring US troops home from northern Iraq: UNITED NATIONS PREPARES TO OPERATE REFUGEE FACILITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ/PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAYS CIVILIANS WILL REPLACE US ALLIED FORCES. The text of the article somewhat modifies the information in the headline. UN diplomats warn that the Secretary-General's timetable may be too optimistic. What is more, the article relates that the UN still lacks an overall plan for the administration of the camps, that the process is expected to be complex, and that both money and logistic capacity are

lacking. According to the Secretary-General, a plea for financial and material assistance from the UN has not received a vigorous response. Furthermore, doubts are expressed as to whether the UN can in fact guarantee the refugees' security, inasmuch as only civilian personnel will be stationed there.

6. Summing up

Certain pronounced patterns emerge in DN's and WP's coverage. In the following, I shall concentrate on the following three aspects: (a) the positioning of the UN, i.e. the extent to which the organization is given a central or a marginal role in the newspaper's reporting; (b) the discursive function of the UN as a symbolic agent, either to legitimize the use of violence or to sustain the hope of peace; and (c) the UN in relation to the USA's policy.

The discursive position of the UN

In the first period, DN shows only a casual interest in what is going on in UN Headquarters in New York. Instead, a letter from Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson to President Saddam Hussein dominates the paper's coverage of the conflict. When the conflict becomes aggravated and the US Congress in January 1991 gives the President the go-ahead for the use of military force, the Swedish paper discusses UN Resolution 678 and the Secretary-General's efforts to mediate. Criticism of US policy intensifies in both news and debate columns, but not to the extent that it completely dominates DN's coverage. The Secretary-General's trip to Baghdad is played up on DN's front page as the last chance of peace. In an interview, Swedish Ambassador to the UN Jan Eliasson describes the situation as crucial to the future of the United Nations, but he also expresses hope that Resolution 678 will lead to a peaceful solution to the conflict. A major article in the world news section during the period contrasts the UN policy of trade sanctions and the military strategy which the USA has pushed through. In the third period, the prime focus rests on the defence of the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq, and neither DN nor WP accords the UN more than marginal interest. US and British aid to the returning refugees is given extensive coverage. The issue of the UN taking over responsibility for the refugee camps is treated quite similarly in the two papers. From a US point of view, the transfer of responsibility to the UN is important in that it is linked to the possibility of bringing US troops home from northern Iraq.

These qualitative findings provide a broader basis for the interpretation of the quantitative results obtained in our earlier study. In both the US and the Swedish newspapers, the image of the United Nations is somewhat shadowed by domestic events, and naturally more so in WP than in DN. Relatively speaking, this means that the UN occupies a position of less prominence in WP than in DN during the first period. In the second period, the UN is the prime focus of DN's reporting, whereas WP shows only lukewarm interest in, for example, the Secretary-General's trip to Baghdad and instead focuses on the debate in Congress. In the third period, both DN and WP cast the UN in a subordinate role as a humanitarian complement to the coalition's troops in northern Iraq.

The discursive function: legitimization of violence or hope of peace?

In order to determine the function the UN serves in DN's discourse, we need to view the organization in relation to the paper's account of domestic political events having a bearing on the Gulf conflict. DN consistently describes the Swedish position in the conflict – for example in connection with Prime Minister Carlsson's letter to Saddam Hussein – as seeking a peaceful solution through supporting the idea of a Middle East conference and the UN's policy of economic sanctions against Iraq. The first articles dealing directly with Resolution 678 describe it mainly as giving Iraq time to withdraw from Kuwait. Even when, on the third day or 30 November 1990, DN explicitly mentions the resolution's authorization of the use of force, it stresses that the 'purpose' is to 'give Iraq one last chance to retreat without bloodshed'.

DN's principal leader the following day (1 December) criticizes those who have characterized the resolution as a 'resolution of war', commenting that such 'thoughtless prattle' can 'cloud the message and, moreover, create a psychological fixation with violence as the only solution'.

In the second period, DN's interpretation of the UN resolution – and of the role of the UN in general – is decidedly ambivalent. Authoritative statements on the part of Swedish UN Ambassador Jan Eliasson, who characterizes Resolution 678 as an instrument for reaching a peaceful solution, are mixed with voices which criticize the UN for lending legitimacy to a military confrontation that the USA has worked to bring about ever since the occupation of Kuwait, a conflict which will mainly cause suffering among the civilian population.

In the third period, the UN plays the role of the humanitarian agent which replaces US and British soldiers as guardians of Kurdish refugee camps at the request of Iraq and Kurds, who have urged the Security Council to guarantee the agreement reached between the Kurds and the regime in Baghdad. The thoroughly propagandistic representation of the US and British aid to returning Kurds means a taking of sides for a violation of Iraqi territorial sovereignty. Although well motivated from a humanitarian standpoint, the reporting takes its point of departure in a unilateral (Anglo-US) interpretation of collective security and the Security Council's mandate. Thus, we find that, in the third period, DN no longer criticizes the Bush administration's use of force; indeed, the Swedish paper appears to turn a blind eye to the legal and political problems associated with the US policy.

In the *Washington Post*, on the other hand, it is made clear from the start that the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 678 meant the authorization of military coercion, i.e. approval of the course of action favoured by the USA. WP also mentions that the resolution gives Iraq a chance to withdraw its occupation forces from Kuwait and expresses the hope that the increased pressure from the community of nations will persuade Saddam Hussein to take advantage of the opportunity, thereby avoiding bloodshed. But the emphasis in WP's reporting of the resolution rests not on its peacekeeping motive but on its far-reaching authorization of the use of military force – in the words of the paper, 'the most sweeping authorization to engage in warfare under UN sponsorship since the 1950 Korean war'.

In January 1991, in conjunction with the vote of the US Congress to give President Bush *carte blanche vis-à-vis Iraq*, WP stresses that it is not for its own interests that the USA takes this step, but rather to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations. The paper no longer speaks of the 'use of force', now it is a matter of

‘waging war’. It is in this period that President Bush first speaks of the US policy as a peace strategy: ‘the last, best chance of peace’. He also links US policy to the new world order, in which the UN will have a more important role: ‘that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be effective’. In Bush’s usage, this means not that war with Iraq is to be avoided, but, on the contrary, that the new ‘peacekeeping’ mission of the UN demands that Iraq be driven back out of Kuwait with military force.

In the third period, the UN assumes, qualitatively seen, a much more prominent position in WP’s reporting than previously. This is in connection with the UN’s replacement of US and British troops at the refugee camps in northern Iraq. There is no difference between the two papers’ treatment of the UN on this point: both papers cast the organization in the role of humanitarian complement to a military mission.

Identification of the UN with the Bush administration’s policy

DN’s reporting is largely silent on the topic of how US policy relates to that of the UN. The subject is treated in passing at best. By contrast, WP loudly and explicitly extols the UN whenever its policy coincides with that of the Bush administration.

Thus, in the first period, DN is remarkably quiet about the fact that Resolution 678 was a US initiative and that the USA manoeuvred frenetically to get it adopted before the period of US chairmanship of the Security Council came to an end. The contrast with WP is particularly striking in this regard. WP stresses the Bush administration’s role in the process.

DN is looking in another direction, namely that of the domestic political row over the Swedish Prime Minister’s letter to President Hussein with a diffuse reference to an ‘important resolution on Iraq’.

In the second period, DN’s reporting is disparate and contradictory with regard to the relationship between the UN and the USA. Here, too, the newspaper seems to be preoccupied with aspects other than the USA’s role in the development of the conflict. DN focuses on the Secretary-General’s trip to Baghdad and, in contrast to WP, lets optimism regarding the prospects of peace take the upper hand. Whereas WP underlines that the ‘plan’ Perez de Cuellar has with him is a ‘European’ idea, DN gives the impression that the mediation attempt has at least some chance of success. DN’s optimism is possible only because the paper does not examine the USA’s position more closely.

All in all, one notes a marked dualism in DN’s reporting during the second period. The UN represents the idea of a peaceful solution, whereas the two adversaries Iraq and USA represent confrontation and war. This is perhaps most pronounced in a remarkable front-page headline which quotes Yassir Arafat in connection with the Secretary-General’s mission to Baghdad to the effect that war can be avoided (further examples are mentioned above).

In the third period, this dualistic perspective has faded away. DN no longer describes a contrast or contradiction between US belligerence and the peacekeeping, humanitarian mission of the United Nations. The USA and Great Britain are active, protecting the Kurds with ground forces stationed in the north, while the UN is reduced to a complementary role, to some extent calling attention to the situation

of the civilian population and serving as a buffer between the victorious powers and the Iraqi leadership.

We have noted above how the US newspaper in the second period, on the eve of hostilities, stresses that the USA is only acting to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations. Otherwise WP is not particularly inclined to accord the organization much significance, least of all as a rival or alternative to the USA in dealing with the conflict. Instead, the paper typically points out that the Bush administration's strategy has succeeded, its 'hard line' against Iraq having won international support. From the start, WP describes Resolution 678 as a triumph of US foreign policy, pointing out that the Bush administration has worked hard to keep the members of the Security Council from exercising their veto on the resolution. In the second period, unity with the UN is emphasized, not only through references to the resolutions of the Security Council, but also through President Bush's explicit approval of the Secretary-General's efforts to mediate. In the third period, the UN represents an opportunity for the USA to bring US troops home from Iraq, which is a major issue in the US paper. As in DN – but with a more salient link to national self-interest – WP casts the UN in the role of 'bystander', whereas the USA clearly plays the lead.

7. Conclusions

When we consider the results of the qualitative analysis in combination with those of the previous quantitative analysis, we find a successive rapprochement between the US and European newspapers in terms of their treatment of the United Nations. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the convergence is due to a shift in the position of the Swedish paper's reporting toward that of the US paper.

Prior to the Gulf War, DN accords the UN a central role, while the organization is also closely associated with a peaceful solution to the conflict. In WP, the organization plays only a secondary role, and its policies are described as the result of and as support for the US strategy. Particularly in the second period, when the US Congress moved to authorize President Bush to deploy military forces against Iraq, DN polarizes the relation between the UN and the USA, associating the former with a peaceful solution and the latter with a military resolution to the conflict. In the same period WP, identifies US policy with the UN resolutions perhaps more closely than either before or later, after the outbreak of war.

The quantitative analysis found European media associated the UN with military themes to a greater extent after the war than before it. That means that their reporting swung toward that of the US media, which displayed such a thematic pattern even earlier during the conflict. The qualitative analysis gives us a better understanding of the relationship. In the third period, both the US and the Swedish newspaper represent the UN as a humanitarian actor which stands in for and complements coalition troops as a guarantor of the Kurdish refugee camps in northern Iraq.

In relation to the debate on globalization, we may conclude that DN's local appropriation of the US propaganda meant a shift away from an essentially hesitant and ambivalent position in the first and second periods toward wholehearted support in the third period. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the hope of a peaceful solution was kept alive by focusing on the motives behind Resolution 678 rather than its possible consequences. But the fact that the strategy failed to keep the peace

is neither reviewed nor lamented. On the contrary, DN's reporting from the refugee camps in the third period may be taken as a sign of the paper's having assimilated the US perspective, whereby military force combined with humanitarian assistance channelled through the UN form the basis for collective security in the new world order.

Methodologically, using both quantitative and qualitative analysis has afforded greater certainty in testing our hypothesis of US dominance in global news flows than had been the case had only one of the methods been employed. But once again, it should be stressed that the qualitative analysis includes no more than two quality newspapers, one US and one Swedish, and only ten days of a conflict that has gone on for years and in fact continues at the time of writing, in mid-April 1999. It is reasonable to believe, however, that the tendencies noted in *Dagens Nyheter*, a leading paper in a non-aligned country, may be even more pronounced in media in countries which have extensive defence cooperation with the USA through alliances such as NATO.

Note

1. Headlines are given in capitals; quotation marks are used only when present in the original.

The Presentation of Alternative Ways of Settling the Gulf Conflict in German, Norwegian and Finnish Media

Wilhelm Kempf & Michael Reimann

1. Media and conflict escalation

The current discussion among journalists and scholars in media research and peace studies focuses on the question of how the media can become vehicles for conflict prevention and constructive, nonviolent conflict transformation. This proposal of critical peace journalism as an alternative to traditional war reporting is not suggesting that violence should not be reported or that what is reported as facts should not be empirically correct. However, it emphasizes the point that the form in which conflict is reported may contribute either to the escalation or to the de-escalation of the conflict.

Escalating conflicts entail systematic distortions of how the parties in the conflict view themselves, their opponents and impartial third parties who try to mediate in the conflict, and of how the parties evaluate their goals and actions etc. (Kempf, 1996b). The more a society is involved in a conflict, the more will its public and its media be susceptible to such distortions.

Even propaganda does not just invent some sort of propagandistic view of the conflict but rather takes up and fosters those natural processes. Therefore, if a piece of journalism looks like propaganda, this does not necessarily mean that it was systematically constructed for propagandistic purposes. It may appear propagandistic simply because the journalist responsible for it became the victim of a heated public atmosphere. Critical peace journalism therefore has to take such processes into account in order to break the propaganda trap.

In his book *The Ancient Foe* (1986), Luostarinen developed a model of war propaganda according to which both restrictive and supportive methods of information control are used in propaganda in order to get people to strongly and personally identify themselves with the goals of war. Restrictive methods try to minimize all information which could cause negative effects on the fighting spirit, while supportive methods try to maximize all information with a positive effect. According to Luostarinen, this latter goal is handled by fabrication, selection and exaggeration of information.

From this point of view, the coverage of alternatives to violence may be regarded as a minimum requirement for peace journalism. However, it is not simply the facts which are reported but also the way in which they are presented which contributes to the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. Though truth is only raw material for the propagandist (and if you have to lie, that is only a technical and operational question, not a moral one), it is better if no lies are needed. This can be achieved if the propagandist succeeds in manipulating the audience's entanglement into the topic of propaganda in order to influence its interpretations in such a way that is apt to reorganize its hierarchy of values 'so that winning the war is on the top and all other values – for instance the truth, ethical considerations and individual rights – are only subservient to the goal' (Luostarinen, 1994b: 1).

2. Design of the study

An interdisciplinary and multinational content analytical study of the Gulf War coverage (Kempf, 1996a; 2000) has shown that alternative ways of settling the war are among the themes that were covered most extensively during the Gulf War.

The sample of media that was analysed in this study included European, US and some Third World media and covered a total of 31 dates pertaining to 10 time-spots between 2 August 1990 and 15 January 1993. At these times, the Gulf War coverage in the biggest nationwide prestige paper, in the biggest tabloid paper, in a major regional paper and in one of the most important non-commercial television channels in Germany, Finland, Norway and Sweden were analysed. The sample of US media followed the same rationale, though it included no regional paper, and the US TV material only covered time-spots 3–7 for the television channels *ABC*, *CBS* and *NBC* as (partially) distributed by *Sky News* over Europe. The sample of Third World media included two Ethiopian prestige papers (for time-spots 1–10) and the Iraqi *Baghdad Observer*, which ceased publication after the start of the air strikes, however, and therefore could only be analysed for time-spots 1–3.


In order to make accessible the changes in the Gulf War coverage over a longer period of time, the selection of dates included time-spots from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until after the end of the Gulf War. Included in the content analysis were all news items and reportage dealing with the Gulf conflict on these dates. Altogether, a total of $n = 4096$ news items were included in the analysis.

A total of $n = 740$ (18.1%) of the analysed news items dealt with alternative ways of settling the war by allegation (+) or query (–) of one or several of the following issues or arguments:

1. Force against Iraq is the only possible or most effective way of settling the conflict.
2. Economic embargoes on trade with Iraq should be given, or should have been given, more time to be effective.
3. Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.
4. Initiatives by the alliance or its member-states (excluding the UN) for negotiations or peace talks.

5. UN initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.
6. Third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

Figure 1. Alternative ways of settling the war: overall distribution of style characteristics. F = Force; E = Embargo; I = Iraqi initiatives; A = Allied initiatives; UN = UN initiatives; 3p = Third party initiatives¹



The overall distribution of these arguments (see Figure 1) shows that force against Iraq was the most intensively and most controversially discussed mode for settling the conflict. In 28.4% of the news items, it was presented as the only possible or most effective way of settling the conflict. In 20.0% of the news items, this was denied, doubted or questioned. Third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks follow in the second place (39.6% allegation; 6.8% query). The alliance's or member-states' initiatives for negotiations played the least significant role (9.2% allegation; 0.8% query).

Statistical data analysis based on Latent Class Analysis revealed that the distribution in Figure 1 is a mixture distribution of nine latent styles of coverage that presented specific patterns of information to the public (see Chapter 8).

Three of these styles (41.1% of the analysed news items) focused on the use of military or economic means against Iraq:

- Pure military logic (16.7%),
- Query of military logic (14.3%), and
- Economic rather than military means (10.1%).

Three styles (25.5% of the analysed news items) focused on either of the war parties' initiatives for negotiations or peace talks:

- Coverage of Iraqi peace initiatives (11.4%),
- Coverage of UN peace initiatives (7.8%), and

- Coverage of Allied peace initiatives (6.3%).

Three styles (33.3% of the analysed news items) focused on third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks:

- Coverage of Third Party initiatives (29.0%),
- Query of Third Party initiatives (2.3%),
- Comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (2.0%).

As these styles only describe *what* information was actually given by the media, qualitative content analysis was needed in order to unveil *how* this was done. Therefore, a qualitative method specifically designed to analyse escalation- and de-escalation-oriented elements of news reporting (see Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996; see also Chapter 8) had to be employed. As this method is very detailed and time-consuming, only a subsample of German, Finnish and Norwegian media underwent this part of the study (see Table 1).

As a first step of the sampling procedure, those news items in the original sample that most exactly represent the various styles – or patterns of information – were identified. Since prestige papers used to claim the highest standards of critical journalism, this sample was then reduced to those items that had been published in one of the national prestige papers. If there were no items representative of a certain style in the prestige papers of a country, the sample included the regional papers instead. If there were no representative items in the regional papers, the sample included the tabloid papers; and only if there were still no representative items in the tabloids, did the sample include items from TV news. Finally, from this choice of news items, one item was randomly chosen for each style in each of the three countries.²

3. Empirical results

3.1 Military and/or economic force against Iraq

Pure military logic

16.7% of the news items presented pure military logic which described force against Iraq as the only possible or most effective way of settling the conflict (99.9%) and did not take notice of any other alternative (see Figure 2).

In particular, the days shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in mid-January 1991 were the days when pure military logic ruled the media. A look at some headlines of that period may demonstrate what ‘pure military logic’ may look like:


- ‘Iraq’s president calls for a holy war’ (14 January 1991; document 1),
- ‘Broad Norwegian support for the offensive’ (14 January 1991; document 3), and
- ‘Bush rather satisfied so far (with operation “Desert Storm”)’ (18 January 1991; document 4).

Public debate in Germany, Finland and Norway had been narrowed to only a small range of perception, suggesting that war had become inevitable; it had lost its horror, and military logic had become the *ultima ratio*. Peaceful alternatives were no

Table 1. List of documents analysed, sorted by country of origin, style and group of styles

Group of styles	Style	Country	Doc. No.	Headline, Medium, Date	
Military and economic means against Iraq	Pure military logic	G	1	Iraq's president calls for a holy war. <i>heute</i> , ZDF, 14-01-91.	
		SF	2	Kuwaiti soldiers confused: what to think about the Iraqi people. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 23-02-91.	
		N	3	Broad Norwegian support for the offensive. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 14-01-91.	
			4	Bush rather satisfied so far. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 18-01-91.	
			5	Disappointment and dejection. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 22-02-91.	
	Query of military Logic	G	6	Moslems: We do not want blood to be shed. <i>Bild</i> , 19-01-91.	
		SF	7	UN ready to use force. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 29-11-90.	
		N	8	Muslim pray for peace in the Gulf. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 18-01-91.	
	Economic rather than military means	G	9	Kohl says Iraq alone bears the responsibility. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 18-01-91.	
		SF	10	US congress ready to allow to use armed force. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 13-01-91.	
		N	11	War by majority vote. <i>Bergens Tidende</i> , 16-01-91.	
War parties' initiatives for negotiations and peace talks	Coverage of Iraqi peace initiatives	G	12	Saddam Hussein's offer a trap. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 22-02-91.	
		SF	13	Hint from Arabic sources in the UN: Iraq will submit. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 12-01-91.	
		N	14	Bush still has hopes for peace. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 14-01-91.	
	Coverage of UN peace initiatives	G	15	Bush says the world could wait no longer. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 18-01-91.	
		SF	16	Bush authorized to use armed force. <i>Turun Sanomat</i> , 13-01-91.	
		N	17	Baker: We mean business. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 13-01-91.	
	Coverage of allied peace initiatives	G	18	Iraq and Kuwait are silent. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 02-08-90.	
		SF	19	Saddam will meet Arab leaders. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 04-08-90.	
		N	20	No gains for Mitterand. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 19-01-91.	
	Third party peace initiatives	Reporting of third party initiatives	G	21	Gorbachev blames Saddam Hussein. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 18-01-91.
			SF	22	Poos says that Baghdad should set a date for withdrawal. <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 21-02-91.
			N	23	No progress in peace process. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 13-02-91.
		Query of third party initiatives		24	USA troubled over cease-fire. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 21-02-91.
			25	Soviet will in the arena again. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 22-02-91.	
			26	Ultimatum to Saddam. <i>Aftenposten</i> , 23-02-91.	
Comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives	Query of third party initiatives	G	27	"The worst possible solution": <i>Südkurier</i> , 23-02-91.	
		SF	28	Saddam asserted Iraq will continue. <i>Helsingin Sanomat</i> , 22-02-91.	
		N	-	-	
	Comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives	G	29	Chances for Peace Uncertain. <i>Südkurier</i> , 14-01-91.	
		SF	30	Parliament of Iraq declares Iraq is ready for war. <i>TV-uutiset</i> , <i>YLE-TV1</i> , 14-01-91.	
		N	-	-	

Figure 2. Pure military logic



longer given any chances, and yet the slightest criticism had to submit to military logic.

At that time, nearly the whole range of escalation-oriented features of conflict coverage was in use. Common features of the media coverage of the conflict in the three countries were:

- the fixation on military conflict resolution, and the construction of military force as the only suitable means for conflict resolution;
- the refutation of peaceful alternatives;
- military values;
- incentives for partial social identification; and
- élite reporting.

Similar patterns of argumentation arose everywhere, in Iraq as well as in the USA, and in nations supporting the US policy. One striking example of this is the (mis)use of religious symbols in support of militaristic argumentation: Saddam Hussein is reported to ‘call for a holy war’ (document 1), and George Bush, too, seeks ecclesiastical assistance as he takes ‘with him most of his cabinet members to a service in a military camp ... conducted by the evangelist Billy Graham’ (document 4). Interesting enough, the media that reported about these events – the German TV news broadcast ‘heute’ and Norway’s *Aftenposten* – in no way ever questioned such misuse, and thereby took over such argumentation.

Differences between the countries can only be seen with regard to the ‘refinedness’ of war propaganda:

- The Norwegian *Aftenposten* mostly adhered to rather ‘crude’ war propaganda. For instance, it quoted without comment cynical remarks like: ‘If [the Iraqis] are prepared for martyrdom, we are prepared to help them in that’ (document 5). In two *Aftenposten* articles, almost no de-escalation-oriented elements appeared at


all (documents 4 and 5); in a third article, the allied policy was occasionally criticized, but these criticisms stayed within the framework of military logic (e.g., ‘Norwegian authorities were in no manner informed about the ... attacks’; ‘Isn’t it incomprehensible that one reacts so quickly against Iraq and not against Serbia?’; document 3).

- The excerpt from the German TV news broadcast *heute* (document 1) is quite similar with regard to the occurrence of de-escalation-oriented elements: it contains none at all. Yet, as it conveys war propaganda on two levels, it can be regarded as more refined. On the first level, it simply quotes Iraqi propaganda; on a second level, it is a piece of propaganda against Iraq, as it ridicules Iraqi habits and parliamentary procedures, and quotes without comment exaggerated Iraqi propaganda formulas that must sound strange to Western ears.
- The Finnish article from *Helsingin Sanomat* (document 2) can be regarded as ‘high-quality’ war propaganda. It tells its readers about the thoughts and beliefs of Kuwaiti soldiers, who even mention self-criticism and understanding of their Iraqi opponents. Yet, this seemingly balanced picture turns out to be highly refined propaganda: the article, for instance, makes use of a two-sided message by which self-criticism can be warded off, and the massive incentives for social identification only serve to draw the readers into double-bind communication that causes emotional confusion and makes the readers long for ready-made, ‘easy’ solutions (see chapter 10).

Query of military logic

14.3% of the analysed news items doubted or denied the necessity or effectiveness of force against Iraq (99.9%) and sometimes referred to third party peace initiatives (13.4%). However, these items did not reject the use of force unequivocally, but also corroborated it quite often (38.0%) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Query of military logic



Nonetheless – and particularly in contrast to ‘pure military logic’ – at a first glance, this style of querying military logic looked quite promising as a candidate for de-escalation-oriented reporting. And, in fact, the respective articles from Germany, Finland and Norway do contain quite a lot of de-escalation-oriented elements. In all the three countries, emphasis was laid on questioning war and military logic by questioning military force as necessary, suitable and/or effective, by questioning the competitive character of the conflict, by demanding peaceful alternatives or by exploring the basis for cooperation. In addition, the German and Norwegian articles transmitted indignation with the war and reported on critical evaluations of both sides’ actions. They also quoted civil actors striving for peaceful conflict resolution and gave incentives for social identification with such actors. Finally, they contained hardly any escalation-oriented elements.

Yet, this is only one side of the coin. In all the three countries, these de-escalation-oriented elements of conflict coverage are relativized, if not warded off completely. Surprisingly, very similar mechanisms were used to achieve this, and these can be classified as ‘rejection of criticism by marginalization’.

In Germany and Norway, the topic of the respective articles is the same. It consists of sympathetic descriptions of how Muslims who live in Germany or Norway view the conflict shortly after the beginning of the war in January 1991. The headlines read:

- ‘Moslems: We do not want blood to be shed’ (document 6), and
- ‘Muslims pray for peace in the Gulf’ (document 8).

Such statements, on the one hand, support the thesis that Saddam Hussein alone is responsible for the war and that he stands isolated in the Muslim world. Yet, they can also be understood as critical remarks which question the allied war policy. However, these statements are made by representatives of a religious minority that is at least unfamiliar for many people; in addition, these representatives mostly do not use political but religious arguments against the war policy. Thus, their point of view loses importance for the large majority of the German and Norwegian population. Their criticism is made harmless by marginalizing it. Still worse, the Norwegian article even ridicules it at one point: ‘May Allah step in and stop this madness’ (document 8).

Another kind of marginalization can be observed in the Finnish article. Here, remarks which might question the use of military force are embedded into a framework of military logic: the occurrences of escalation-oriented elements are presented as standard, against which the de-escalation-oriented elements are deviations.


Therefore, qualitative analysis shows that ‘query of military logic’ cannot keep the promise of a peace-journalistic style of conflict coverage. De-escalation-oriented elements are in fact included, yet strongly relativized.

Economic rather than military means

10.1% of the news items argued in favour of economic rather than military means. Although it was said in these news items that the economic embargo on trade with Iraq should have been given more time to be effective (98.2%), only some of the items explicitly doubted the need for force against Iraq (20.2%). Moreover, these items did not unequivocally favour the alternative of an economic embargo, but

quite often doubted or denied it (25.3%) and sometimes they even described force against Iraq as the only reasonable alternative (13.0%), (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Economic rather than military means



Moreover, economic sanctions against Iraq were discussed as a means of conflict resolution only until war actually started (see Kempf, 1996a: 18): at that point, sanctions became ‘yesterday’s paper’ – there was no need to talk about them any more. As long as economic means had a chance to be an alternative to war, they remained in the public debate.

By the time war had begun, two patterns of argumentation had arisen:

- Some, like the German Opposition Leader Hans-Jochen Vogel, argued against military action and said that sanctions had had ‘an insufficient period of time to work’ (see document 9);
- others, like President George Bush, said that sanctions had shown ‘no sign of accomplishing their objective’ (see document 15) and thereby tried to legitimize the use of armed force.

The articles from Norway, Finland and Germany, although randomly chosen for qualitative analysis, all have one thing in common: they all describe parliamentary discussions in which both patterns of argumentation were used. The Finnish and the Norwegian articles (documents 10 and 11) contain comprehensive descriptions of the political discussion in the USA, right before the US Congress is about to vote on the final resolution before the war; the German article (document 9) describes a ‘tumultuous’ parliamentary discussion in the German Bundestag right after the outbreak of hostilities.

In all the three articles, the style of coverage clings to the parliamentary majority:

- In Finland, the argument ‘economic rather than military means’ in fact is mentioned. Yet, support for military solutions as possible and effective is the backbone of the article; all in all, the text gives the impression that there is not much

left to do for finding a peaceful way out of the conflict constellation (document 10).

- The Norwegian article reports on self-critical evaluations and on a preference for economic means rather seldom; on the contrary, it is dominated by military logic and the idealization of the intentions and actions of the USA. The Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, who speaks in favour of economic means, remains in the framework of binary logic: he describes sanctions as just another means to 'torment' Saddam Hussein (document 11).
- The German article comes very close to a balance between escalation- and de-escalation-oriented elements of conflict coverage. Yet, it gives the legislative majority clearly more impact: it puts the militaristic arguments of the majority in first place. Some arguments on the de-escalation-oriented side, on the other hand, are rather mythological and need war as a precondition – like the suggested 'comprehensive development plan for the Middle East for the post-war period' (document 9).

Economic sanctions were no 'peaceful' alternative to war. They could only be regarded as 'de-escalation-oriented' in the sense that they represented a lower level of escalation than war. Still, qualitative analysis showed that the articles included here are not candidates for a de-escalation-oriented style of conflict coverage even in that sense: sanctions are mentioned rather scarcely, and even if they are mentioned, they remain embedded within a framework of military logic. In one case, they are even depicted as being nothing more than a possibility for political aspirants 'to make themselves visible' (document 11).

Summary

The articles pertaining to this largest group of styles represent 41.1% of all items analysed. They all deal with more or less violent options to resolving the conflict, that is with war or economic sanctions. Although they range from slightly critical queries of military means to pure military logic, they are all grounded in a framework of binary logic: the tenor is 'Good vs. Evil', and only the means of overcoming the evil is sometimes a topic of discussion. Even the more critical articles never go beyond a reconstruction of the conflict as a competitive process: the standard is escalation-oriented elements of conflict coverage, while de-escalation-oriented elements appear as deviations.

In that sense, the analysed articles do not differ very much with regards to their country of origin. Yet, the analyses showed that the degree of refinedness with which the military solution is promoted differs: the Norwegian media included here tended to use very crude war propaganda, supporting the military option most openly and marginalizing or even ridiculing potential critics. The German and Finnish media, on the other hand, sometimes included more 'balanced' pictures of the conflict: for instance, incentives for social identification with self-critical Kuwaiti soldiers are given (document 2), Muslims living in Germany are quoted with critical statements on behalf of both parties to the war (document 6), or critical remarks made by German opposition leaders are given quite some space (document 9). Yet, the common ground of binary logic is never left: in order to achieve this, the more complex and


refined patterns of two-sided messages and double-bind communication are employed.

3.2 War parties' initiatives for negotiations and peace talks

Coverage of Iraqi peace initiatives

11.4% of the news items took notice of Iraqi initiatives (97.0%) and sometimes also referred to neutral or third party initiatives (13.4%). However, these items often doubted, denied or questioned the Iraqi initiatives (41.0%) and tended to present military force as the only reasonable solution to the conflict (13.4%), (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Coverage of Iraqi peace initiatives



Qualitative analysis confirmed that Iraqi initiatives were not taken seriously. In typical representatives of this style of coverage, such initiatives were rather taken as an occasion to spread mistrust against Iraq and to dehumanize the Iraqi élite.

Even more surprising is the fact that this tendency is dominant in all the three countries included in the qualitative analysis. One possible explanation for that might be that Iraq's information policy in fact was rather unclear and that the media all around the world depended on rumours or anonymous sources while analysing Iraqi policy.

Yet, this cannot explain the harsh rejection of Iraqi initiatives common to the articles from all three countries. To quote rumours and anonymous sources (e.g., 'Iraqi opposition circles in Syria', document 12) is one thing; to use them in order to stir up mistrust against the other side is another.

While mistrust against Iraq is a common feature, the articles differ on the actual points of main emphasis:

- The German article from *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (document 12) contains the crudest propaganda against Iraq. It includes no de-escalation-oriented elements at


all, and it mainly bases its argumentation on mistrust. Its headline already shows where it is heading for: ‘Saddam’s offer a trap – “After the withdrawal from Kuwait, Baghdad will launch a terrorist war”’.

- The Finnish article also contains no de-escalation-oriented elements (document 13). Yet it differs from the German article in that mistrust is not expressed so openly: the paper rather observes Saddam Hussein’s actions as turns in a game – which, however, is not so far away from describing Saddam’s offer as a ‘trap’. Its focus is on the construction of the conflict as a competitive process and on the revelation of antagonistic intentions of the parties in conflict.
- Although the Norwegian article starts with the headline ‘Bush still has hopes for peace’ (document 14), it doesn’t give much hope for peace but focuses on military action as the only effective way of dealing with Iraq. It is the only article of the three that contains some self-critical remarks and some perspectives of reconciliation; yet these are counterbalanced by idealizations of own intentions and actions and by the ever-prominent mistrust of Iraq.

Coverage of UN peace initiatives

In contrast to the coverage of Iraqi peace initiatives, those 7.8% of the news items that reported about UN initiatives (98.2%) raised only little doubt against them (6.2%). They tended to link them both to third party (10.2%) and allied initiatives (9.9%), and they made no positive reference to the use of military force (0.1%), (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Coverage of UN peace initiatives



Right before the outbreak of war, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar made a last desperate attempt to prevent war and went to Baghdad to negotiate with the Iraqi leadership. Several Arab leaders also tried to find an ‘Arab solution’ for the conflict in order to avoid military action.

These initiatives are included in all three articles from Germany, Finland and Norway (documents 15, 16 and 17). In fact, they are covered quite positively: appeals for peaceful conflict resolution are mentioned; perspectives for reconciliation are described; and the depiction of UN and third party initiatives is – at least in the article from Germany – supported by incentives for social identification.

Yet, these initiatives are only of secondary importance:

- the Norwegian article lays most emphasis on the threat that Iraq represents (document 17);
- the Finnish article puts its focus on the escalation process, and other processes are seen as reactions to it (document 16);³
- the article from the German paper is a transcript of President Bush's speech two hours after 'allied forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait' (document 15); its main tone is that of binary logic: it converts possible indignation with the war into indignation with the enemy, and throughout the speech Bush dehumanizes Saddam Hussein, holding him responsible for the outbreak of war.

George Bush's speech can be regarded as a Pandora's box of modern war propaganda. Bush uses nearly the whole spectrum of escalation-oriented arguments and a great variety of rhetorical gadgets, which makes the speech quite instructive for propaganda research. He summarizes the political discussion up to that day and even takes up criticisms, hesitations and doubts (e.g., 'Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait?'). Yet, in the end, he manages to turn the tide: all critical arguments are swept away and turned into outrage with Saddam Hussein and into reasons to wage war. He achieves this by:


- using two-sided messages: e.g., 'For the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety' (see Chapter 10);
- by constantly repeating formula-like sentences: 'While the world waited, Saddam Hussein (... raped, pillaged and plundered, etc.)';
- by describing the conflict as one of 'the world versus Saddam': 'the world waited, Saddam ...', '28 nations – from five continents ... – have forces in the Gulf area ...', etc.;
- by giving incentives for social identification with US politicians and 'ordinary soldiers': 'Our Secretary of State, James Baker, ...', 'listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she says ...', etc.;
- and, finally, by developing the famous mythological vision of a 'New World Order'.

In this context, the sympathetic descriptions of Perez de Cuellar's last-minute mission ('the Secretary General of the UN went to the Middle East with peace in his heart ...') and of Arab leaders' initiatives only serve to reinforce outrage with Saddam: 'While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.'

Coverage of allied peace initiatives

6.3% of the items focused on allied initiatives (99.9%). They did so without direct doubt or questioning (0.1%), and often contextualized them with third party or neutral initiatives (31.0%). Though these news items sometimes even referred positively to Iraqi initiatives (6.0%), they still showed some tendency towards the approval of military force (7.6%), (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Coverage of allied peace initiatives



The first observation to be made here is that no peace initiative from the ‘core’ of the allied war coalition, that is to say from the United States of America, could be detected among the typical items following this style. Furthermore, in the light of the qualitative analyses, the question arises of whether peace initiatives which were launched from the ‘periphery’ of the coalition were ever taken seriously at all: the ‘Arab solution’ was reported with great reservations, and French mediation efforts were even dismissed openly. This tendency to ward off such peace initiatives grew over time; therefore, the articles included here show a specific dependence on their date of publication:

- The article from Germany (document 18) dates from 2 August 1990. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which happened on the very same day, is not yet reported; the article’s topic are the ‘reconciliation talks’ between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which had been encouraged by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
- The Finnish article (document 19), published two days after the invasion (4 August 1990), reports on Saddam Hussein’s willingness to meet Kuwaiti leaders at a top-level meeting of Arab countries, following an initiative by King Hussein of Jordan.
- The article from Norway (document 20), published on 19 January 1991, right after the first allied attacks on Iraq, reports on French foreign policy and peace initiatives.

The first two articles are quite ambiguous in their manner of describing peace initiatives by Arab leaders. This may be due to the actual constellation in early August 1990, when public debate was still more open and not yet purely anti-Iraq. Both articles are written in a rather neutral style and contain explorations of the basis for cooperation and arguments in favour of peaceful alternatives. Yet they also make use of escalation-oriented arguments by doubting possibilities for cooperation between the parties in the conflict and by quoting mutual allocations of guilt.

The Norwegian article, on the other hand, stems from a time when anything that might have disturbed the clean picture of 'Good vs. Evil' received harsh criticism. It contains sharp propaganda against the French last-minute peace initiatives and against the 'imagined (French) position of a very unique and special country as an international peace mediator' (document 20). Its main purpose is to stir up mistrust of French motives for mediating in the conflict. According to the article, there is no 'special French desire for peace, but rather a French version of isolationism combined with opportunism'. The open, sometimes ironically expressed mistrust is accompanied by warding off social identification with members of the French *élite*. Thus, the content of this article can be described in just one phrase: 'French-bashing'.

Summary

Quantitative analysis showed that more than one fourth of all articles dealing with alternative ways of settling the conflict reported about war parties' initiatives for negotiations and peace talks. Thus, the public was actually given the facts about initiatives from the United Nations, Iraq or the allies.

Yet, this is only one side of the coin: qualitative analysis showed that the way the media presented these facts was in no way useful for supporting de-escalatory processes. Although in principle such initiatives open up the possibility of overcoming camp mentality, the media stuck to binary and military logic.

Obviously, this can be seen most clearly in the treatment that Iraqi initiatives were given by the media: these initiatives were met with *a priori* mistrust. More surprisingly, initiatives from the 'periphery' of the alliance, such as France, were also harshly criticized and mistrusted. Last but not least, UN initiatives were not mistrusted but they were misused in order to legitimize war by holding Iraq responsible for the failure of these initiatives.


The three countries included here do not differ very much with respect to these tendencies. One can only say that the Finnish media were more moderate in their orientation towards escalation, while the Norwegian and German articles include some pieces of rather rude anti-peace-initiative propaganda. In one case, however, the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* took advantage of highly refined US war propaganda, which does not need to get 'rude', by printing a translated version of a speech by George Bush.

3.3 Third party peace initiatives

Reporting of third party initiatives

29.0% of the items reported or at least mentioned third party peace initiatives (99.9%). Although they sometimes doubted these neutral initiatives (14.1%), these items expressed only little approval of military force (3.4%) and even made some positive references to Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks (6.7%), (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Coverage of third party initiatives



As this style comprises nearly one third of all news items dealing with alternative ways of settling the conflict, it deserves a closer look. At time-spot No. 6, which covers 21–23 February 1991, its usage exceeds that of all other styles of coverage at all time-spots; consequently, most articles chosen for qualitative analysis stem from that period, when the last peace proposals before the start of the ground offensive were made.

Yet, as the results of qualitative analysis show, ‘reporting of third party peace initiatives’ does not necessarily mean that initiatives, like the one launched by the Soviet Union at that time, were taken up positively and supported by the media. In particular, the Norwegian media did not care much about Gorbachev’s initiative from mid-February 1991. Of course, they had to mention it, but they rather took up the event in order to describe eventual problems that Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait would create (document 24), to promote inescapable conditions imposed on Saddam (document 26) or to stir up mistrust of Moscow (document 25).

Yet the situation in Germany and in Finland is not that different: the headlines of the analysed news articles already show that in all three countries the proposal of ‘Moscow’s peace plan’ was not taken as an occasion to foster such peace efforts. On the contrary, it is rather taken as an occasion:

- to discourage the public (Finland’s *Helsingin Sanomat*, document 23);
- to lay emphasis on preconditions imposed on Iraq (Germany’s *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, document 22; Norway’s *Aftenposten*, document 26); and
- to ward off concrete steps towards peace (*Aftenposten*, document 24).

Although the existence of mediation efforts by third parties in general (or ‘in theory’) gives the media the possibility of turning to peace journalism more easily, closer examination of the articles shows that in all three countries the media would rather stick to the usage of conflict-escalating style elements. All through these articles:

- Peaceful alternatives are refuted by denying the effectiveness of diplomatic means of conflict resolution and by emphasizing how limited the possibility of success is for them.
- Military logic is predominant in large parts of the articles: as the conflict is conceptualized as a competitive process, military force is constructed as (the only) suitable and necessary means for conflict resolution, and military operations are even depicted in a positive or glorifying manner.
- Social identification with mediating politicians is warded off by marginalizing them, and mistrust of them is even stirred up.

De-escalation-oriented elements, on the other hand, clearly have a tough job. In all three countries, they are used rather seldom. In some cases, they hardly appear at all (see document 26). In some, they are embedded into surroundings that are biased towards conflict escalation (e.g., document 24). Sometimes they are even misused by making them part of two-sided messages (see document 21). As far as de-escalation-oriented elements appear at all, they consist of:

- perspectives for reconciliation, represented by the depiction of attempts to mediate between both sides on behalf of neutral third parties;
- impartial elite-reporting and social identification with efforts towards peaceful conflict resolution by members of the elite, and/or impartial social identification with victims of the war;
- critical evaluation of own side's rights, intentions and/or actions, and/or critical evaluation of both sides' actions; and
- recognition of the price that has to be paid for military victory.

Yet, all in all, de-escalating elements of conflict coverage are marginalized, and news items that dismiss the peaceful settlement of the conflict in a straightforward way are most typical for this style of reporting about third party initiatives.

An example of this is an article that was published in the Norwegian *Aftenposten* (document 24). The main concern of this article is the eventual problems that Saddam's withdrawal from Kuwait will create. The headline 'USA troubled over cease-fire' shows how the UN mandate has become synonymous with the US involvement in the war. The US concern is evident in the lead, where top political leadership is reported as worried over an Iraqi decision to abide by the peace proposals. The president himself refuses to elaborate on the subject. As we are told, it is not the prospects of peace but Saddam's remaining in power that concerns the USA. The peace proposals initiated by Gorbachev are pointed out, but not much credence is attached to the actual contents of the proposal.

As the elimination of Saddam does not appear in any UN mandate or resolution, the Americans and the British do not officially talk about any attempts on the life of Saddam but the desire is definitely present. Another important aspect of the article is the actual war efforts and the talk about precision bombing and destruction of Iraqi military infrastructure. The article is loaded with symbols of war and war propaganda, i.e. destruction of tanks, superiority of US war technology and its humane side (precision bombing), and the necessity of preparedness (Iraqi forces breaking down but still capable of inflicting damage), etc.

The whole text is dominated by escalating elements, such as military values, emphasis on threat from the enemy, demonization of enemy intentions and incentives for identification with one's own side's élite. Only with a certain amount of good will, some (implicit) tendency towards critical evaluation of the allies' intentions, can be detected on the de-escalating side.

In particular, the last paragraph of the article is war propaganda, pure and simple. The details on precision bombing, the technological superiority of the US war arsenal and the number of helicopters destroyed seem like excerpts from Schwarzkopf's press conference.

As Kempf (1997b) showed for US and Swedish media, news items reporting on third party initiatives often demonstrated a dramatic lack of critical journalism, and a wide variety of modes were used in the coverage of third party peace initiatives in order to raise support for the war – even if the initiatives themselves were not questioned explicitly. Similarly, the article from the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* included here (document 21) takes up a Soviet peace initiative only in order to portray the war as unavoidable.

The article begins by summarizing international reactions to the air attack on Iraq as worldwide 'shock and concern' over the outbreak of war in combination with 'restrained to unreserved support for the actions of the multinational force', while there was 'hardly any support' for Iraq. The Soviet mediation efforts are not reported until the audience has been told that Mikhail Gorbachev reacted immediately to the airstrikes by putting the blame for the war on Saddam Hussein.

Next, the article lines up the reactions of various Western (mainly European) states and politicians, of which most support the US policy. The tenor of these reactions, however, is to regard the outbreak of war as a tragic event which was unavoidable since Iraq had proved to be unyielding. Consequently, it is the Iraqi leadership – and in particular Saddam Hussein – who is to blame for the outbreak of war and the further course of the conflict. Critical voices are quoted from Cuba, Yemen, North Korea, Jordan, Iran and Libya. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar feels 'only sorrow over the war', and Pope John Paul II regrets the outbreak of war as 'a grave defeat for international law and the world community' and expresses his 'deepest grief' and 'especially his sorrow for victims on both sides, as well as his doubts whether war is 'an appropriate means for solving problems among nations'. After these critical voices, the article ends with a statement from the Gulf Cooperation Council, which welcomed the attack, and with further reproaches against Saddam Hussein, who made the outbreak of war 'inevitable'.

The Soviet peace efforts are covered quite positively and with great detail. They are neither queried nor explicitly rejected. There are even incentives for social identification with Gorbachev. As qualitative analysis unveiled, however, the whole article has the form of a two-sided message, for which the positive coverage of Gorbachev's peace initiative plays an essential role. Criticism of the allied war policy, as well as indignation with the outbreak of war and the failure of the international community, are turned against Saddam Hussein. In this scenario, the detailed description of the Soviet mediation efforts and the incentives for identification with Gorbachev serve to reinforce the outrage at Saddam Hussein all the more. The more the Soviet mediators have striven for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the more this is appreciated by the article, the more it is justified to blame Saddam Hussein for the failure of the mediation efforts; and the more the responsibility and

guilt for the war can be attributed to him, the more one ought to boil with indignation at him and the more it seems justified to fall back upon military means. Although it reports about third party peace initiatives quite positively, the article does not give any perspectives for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. It simply misuses the Soviet mediation efforts in order to add to the plausibility and acceptance of the war.

Yet, the results of qualitative analysis also show that the mere dominance of escalating aspects in conflict coverage does not necessarily imply that a piece of journalism has stepped into the propaganda trap. Quality journalism claims to mirror and reflect facts and to escape judgements. Even a story of diplomatic efforts to put an end to the war can thus involve escalating elements, just because these efforts have failed.

The Finnish article from *Helsingin Sanomat* (document 23) is such a piece of journalism. The article is a news text, written partly in telegram style, concerning two diplomatic efforts to stop the Gulf War. The first theme of the article is the visit of Yevganij Primakov to Baghdad (as a special representative of Gorbachev), whose mission failed since he did not succeed in meeting anyone. The second theme is the meeting of the non-aligned countries who 'were in dispute' about the means of stopping the war.

Reporting mainly on the level of day-to-day events, the article involves quite a few escalating elements. However, since most of these are denials of the efficiency of diplomatic or political means of conflict resolution, they seem to be rather unavoidable in reporting the events which are the topic of the article.

When the article, for instance, underlines the 'loneliness' of Gorbachev's representative in Baghdad, this might be read as some tendency towards marginalizing a member of the third party élite who tries to mediate in the conflict. But this marginalization is due to the facts reported and not to the specific journalistic presentation of them. On the contrary, by quoting his own words saying that he has nothing to tell and that he has met no one, the article rather takes up Primakov's own view.

The only critical sequence of the article which might indicate some bias towards conflict escalation is when Gorbachev's spokesperson is described as assuring that there are no secret deals between Iraq and the Soviet Union. Reported quite abruptly and without any visible reason on the surface of the text, this sequence might rather stir up mistrust of the Soviet mediation efforts than build up trust in the mediating third party.


Yet, as a whole, the Finnish article differs from the German and Norwegian news items representing the 'reporting of third party initiatives' in that it shows no tendency to misuse the apparent problems that mediation efforts have to face. Here, the appearance of conflict-escalating elements is grounded in facts, not in judgments or attempts to ward off possible criticisms of one's own side. The Finnish article might thus serve as an example to study in order to improve journalistic treatment of facts that, like the failure of mediation efforts, are apt to escalate an ongoing conflict.

Query of third party initiatives

A rather small number of news items (2.3%) put third party initiatives in the context of military logic. In doing so, these items either presented arguments for and against, or two-sided messages, and they showed a clear bias towards refuting the initiatives

(Allegation:Query = 92.0%:99.0%) and backing up a military solution (Allegation:Query = 49.7%:40.6%) (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Query of third party initiatives



The two articles included here (documents 27 and 28)⁴ relate to an initiative launched by the Soviet Union in mid-February 1991, right before the start of the allied ground offensive, containing the proposal of an immediate ceasefire. Neither article reports on the initiative itself, but on reactions to it:

- The article from the German provincial paper *Südkurier* (document 27) describes the public opinion in Israel with regard to the Soviet initiative. Its tenor is summarized by the headlines: “The worst possible solution”. Israeli politicians see an increased danger to their country in an immediate ceasefire’.
- The Finnish article (document 28) reports on a radio speech by Saddam Hussein, relating it to the Soviet mediation efforts. The headlines read: ‘Saddam asserted Iraq will continue. He didn’t answer to the peace proposal made by the Soviet Union’.

Both articles have several style characteristics in common: they both clearly put the Soviet initiative in the context of military logic; based on a construction of the conflict as a competitive process, both articles try to promote military solutions as possible and effective, and to ward off the irritation that the Soviet proposal might cause; finally, they both make use of partial élite reporting by holding Saddam Hussein responsible for the situation.

In addition, the German article contains a two-sided message (see Chapter 10), that makes it possible to ward off critical information. It reports on an opinion poll in Israel: ‘83.6% of all Israelis are against military intervention at the present time, and 62.7% even believe that Israel should refrain from future involvement in the war’. Yet, the critical impact of this information is ignored by the article:

- The critical argumentation behind this standpoint is not mentioned.

- Critical facts are hidden in subordinate clauses; ‘mainstream’ facts are presented in main clauses.
- When presenting critical information, the argumentation shifts from the conflict-context level to the day-to-day level, which – in the context of the whole article – seems to be the inadequate level of argumentation.
- The standpoint of the majority of the Israelis is devaluated to a seemingly irrational ‘belief’, while growing support for military intervention is presented as a quasi-natural development.


Therefore, neither article discusses the Soviet initiative impartially by presenting arguments for and against; instead, they discuss it in the framework of binary and military logic and thereby devalue it to a minor irritation in the course of martial events.

Comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives

A very small number (2.0%) of the items referred to third party initiatives in the context of a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (see Figure 10):

- In most cases these items referred positively to third party initiatives (79.8%) and only sometimes they expressed doubt against them (13.5%).
- The focus of the items was put on UN initiatives, which were evaluated much more ambiguously, (allegation: 99.9%, query: 50.0%).
- Allied initiatives were reported less often but with the same ambiguity (allegation: 38.2%, query: 20.3%) as the UN initiatives.
- Against Iraqi initiatives, on the other hand, which were given the same positive reference as the allied ones (38.2%), only less doubt was expressed (8.4%).

Figure 10. Comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives



This is the rarest and most complex style of covering alternative ways of settling the Gulf War. Interestingly enough, it can be characterized as a TV-news style of mid-January 1991 (see Kempf, 1996a: 17ff.). At that period of time, right before the outbreak of the war, one got the impression that the events went head over heels. Television and radio news broadcasts seemingly became the only possibility for fulfilling the need of people to keep up with the events (see Reimann & Kempf, 1994a). Information given in such news broadcasts, however, was often restricted to telegram-style listings of events and opinions. Therefore, 'comprehensive discussion' does not mean careful considerations of arguments for and against certain theses; it just points to the fact that the pros and cons of different peaceful *and* military options are (at least briefly) mentioned.

The characterization as 'telegram-style' applies to both documents included here.⁵ The German article from the provincial paper *Südkurier* contains a listing of events of 13 January 1991 (document 29). This article, however, is one of the few examples in which de-escalation-oriented elements are predominant. In particular, it reports on Perez de Cuellar's last mission to Baghdad a few days before the outbreak of the war and on other appeals and diplomatic efforts to prevent military action. Although the article also makes use of a two-sided message and other escalation-oriented style-elements, it is dominated by the questioning of war and military logic, and by demands for peaceful alternatives. In addition, the de-escalation-oriented argumentation is supported by constructive emotions and by incentives for social identification with mediating politicians.

The Finnish text is a typical representative of TV news broadcasts from that period (document 30). Several 'events of the day' (14 January 1991) are reported: negotiations between the United Nations and Iraq, a peace proposal made by Yemen, the decision of the Iraqi parliament to give Saddam Hussein the authority to wage war and reactions to all of these events.

The text constructs the current situation as follows: there are two parties in a rapidly escalating conflict constellation in which cooperative interaction no longer exists. Consequently, discourses of both parties are drifting to war and military logic, and to refutation of peaceful alternatives. Still, there is a third party which tries to open perspectives for reconciliation.

Yet, although it is called 'a sudden ray of hope', the position of Yemen's mediation effort is rather marginal. In the course of the whole text, Yemen's proposal rather fulfils the role of a dramatic opener for the news. Yet, once again,⁶ the dominance of escalating aspects in the text does not necessarily imply that it has stepped into the propaganda trap. It rather reflects the fact that both parties in the conflict themselves devaluated Yemen's efforts: the Iraqi side was occupied with making harsh war propaganda and, on the other side, James Baker is quoted as commenting laconically that he has never heard about this proposal.

Therefore, the pessimistic tone at the end of the news is also due to the facts reported: Yemen's initiative in fact was nothing more than a footnote to the events.

Summary

Third party peace initiatives were discussed in the media quite often: 33.3% of all articles included here dealt with this matter. The greatest part of this group can be characterized as 'reporting' on such initiatives (29.0%), while 'query' and 'comprehensive discussion' were rather marginal phenomena (2.3%, and 2.0%).

'Reporting of third party initiatives' is quite a good example of the ambiguity of the Gulf War coverage. At first glance (which is methodologically caught by quantitative methods), the media fulfilled their function, in that they actually gave the facts the public deserved. A closer look, methodologically represented by qualitative methods, reveals that through the way in which the media reported on these facts, they undermined their potential de-escalatory effects. Once again (see the summaries of 3.1 and 3.2), third party peace initiatives were only depicted within a framework of binary logic and were kept out of the framework of sensible alternatives by the spreading of mistrust of their promoters, by denying their effectiveness, by marginalization or by two-sided messages.

'Query of third party initiatives' tops that by its frankness: the Soviet initiative from mid-February 1991, for instance, is repeatedly labelled 'the worst possible solution' (document 27). The most seldom style of all, the 'comprehensive discussion of third party initiatives', on the other hand, is much more open to peaceful alternatives of conflict resolution. Yet, this may be partly due to its form of presenting facts: typical representatives of this style consist of telegram-style summaries of the 'events of the day', which also contain 'sudden rays of hope' – and which may be forgotten the next day. Nevertheless, this style actually contains rare examples of predominantly de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage.

Again, the respective countries of origin differ only slightly. The Norwegian media, however, contain the most open refutations of peaceful alternatives and, interestingly enough, there is no Norwegian representative for the most balanced style of all, the comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives. The German and Finnish media, on the other hand, give peaceful alternatives at least some space. The Finnish pessimism towards them seems to be based on facts, rather than on an orientation towards escalation.

4. Conclusions

The results of the study demonstrate a gross orientation towards conflict escalation in the Gulf War coverage. Although the media put high emphasis on reporting about alternatives to violence, there was extremely little critical journalism that gave peace a chance. The facts were all there, but the media placed them within a framework of binary and military logic and thereby undermined possible de-escalatory effects of promising alternatives to war.

With regards to this overall orientation, the media in the respective countries included in this study differ only slightly. On the contrary, the media in these countries sometimes even use the same journalistic techniques to ward off possible criticisms of camp mentality and orientation towards war (see the remarks on documents 6 and 7 in 'Query of military logic').

However, the Norwegian media can be described as the most escalation-oriented: compared to Germany and Finland, it devoted the least space to reporting on alternatives to violence (only 11.14% of all items) and most openly expressed its adherence to the military option and its rejection of peaceful alternatives. The German media, on the other hand, devoted the most space to reporting on alternatives to war and, in particular, the 'query of military logic' (38.86%, and 13.19% of all items). Yet, if the German reporting looks more 'balanced', this is mostly due to

more 'refined' style elements, such as two-sided messages or double-bind communication; just like the Norwegian media, the German media hardly ever left the common ground of binary and military logic. Finally, the Finnish media also fit into that framework. However, the style of reporting is more cautious: refutation of peaceful alternatives, for instance, is hardly ever expressed openly and is rather based on facts than on an orientation towards escalation.

This 'Finnish pessimism' also demonstrates some of the difficulties that the enterprise of critical peace journalism has to face. If a peace initiative has failed, the mere coverage of this event may contribute to the plausibility of war and military logic. Critical peace journalism, obviously, demands more than avoiding judgements and reporting facts only. It requires an intellectual capacity which goes beyond antagonism.

Notes

1. The same abbreviations are used also in Figures 2–10.
2. The authors wish to thank Risto Suikkanen and Rasjesh Parashar for the qualitative analysis of the Finnish and Norwegian material.
3. In its second half, however, wind turns towards questioning of war and military logic.
4. 'Query of third party initiatives' is irrelevant in Norway (0.0009%), and therefore no 'typical' Norwegian article was determined by LCA.
5. Once again, this style of reporting was irrelevant in Norway (0.0005%).
6. See the comments on document 23 in 'Reporting of third party initiatives'.

Escalating and Deescalating Aspects in the Coverage of the Bosnia Conflict

A Comparative Study

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

No shot had yet been fired, but when Croats and Serbs started to refer to each other as Tschetniks and Ustascha, people in the former Yugoslavia knew that they were at war. All the same, the Yugoslavian civil wars did not – or at least did not primarily – result from ethnic conflict, but rather from the process of transition to democracy (see Puhovski, 1996). In examining this, there are several factors that must be taken into account:

First: The former Yugoslavian state was a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. All ethnic groups had the same rights, they were constitutive state people. Borders between Yugoslavian states were not ethnic borders.

Second: The former Yugoslavia was a totalitarian state, based on a communist ideology according to which all legitimate interests were common interests of all Yugoslavian people. There was also a taboo on ethnicity.

Third: Democracy needs parties who represent interest groups. However, since the Serbian élite (in particular Milosevic and his clique) aimed both at maintaining the Yugoslavian state and at maintaining it as a socialist state (under Serbian leadership), only interests common to all Yugoslavian people were legitimate. Therefore, interest groups could only be formed in opposition to the Serbian élite; and as Milosevic was identified with those he claimed to represent, oppositional interest groups formed themselves in opposition to ‘the Serbs’ as national or ethnic groups. As a result, the process of transition from totalitarian to democratic society ran into ethnic antagonism long before a democratic culture could be established.

Fourth: The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely complex and involved a multitude of actors:

- a) *internal (Yugoslavian) actors:* power-hungry élites (Serbian, Croat and Muslim); indoctrinated normal people, especially members of minorities, who feared losing their rights (Serbian, Croat and Muslim); normal people who did *not* want to

fight their neighbours and who might have been the real chance for transition to democracy in the former Yugoslavia; people who did not belong to just one ethnic group and who were the real victims of the Bosnia war but received little attention from the media (and even then only as refugees); etc.

- b) *international actors*: the Austrian, German and EU diplomacy, supporting the independence of the Yugoslavian republics; the UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who had warned the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of the explosive consequences that a premature recognition of the independence of some of the Yugoslavian republics would bring about (see Nilsen, 1994); the UN peacekeeping mission; mediating third parties (UN, EU, OSCE, etc.). NGOs that tried to provide humanitarian help and to contribute to reconciliation (who also received little media attention); and, finally, the UN/NATO peace-enforcement mission.

Fifth: Ethnic antagonism revitalized historical conflict, prejudice and enmification that had survived under the surface. Also, the international community had different historical affinities to the conflicting parties, and in the early stages of the conflict, the stance of the European states was quite divided. In Austria and Germany, the enemy image of the Serbs could build upon historical traditions reaching back to World War I and before. However, taking the USA and the EU partners (particularly France and England) into consideration, open support of the Croat side was inconceivable.

On the other hand, the EU members and the USA were united by common political and economic interests which were affected by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavian state. It is not surprising therefore that they had sympathy for those groups in the former Yugoslavia who were ready to join the Western democracies and to open their economy to the free market. Thus, the Serbs had poor cards from the very beginning.

In the end, international public opinion identified the Serbs as *fascists* and called for a military clearance in order to prevent humanitarian disaster and to release the people in the war zone – particularly the Bosnian Muslims – from the atrocities endured.

Contributing to this consensus was not just the high share which the Serbs had in the atrocities committed by all sides during the war (see Greve, 1995). The exploitation of the atrocities – both by PR agencies and by journalists drawing inspiration from the Journalism of Attachment school (see Luostarinen & Kempf, 2000) – also played a role.

A prominent example of this is Ruder & Finn, who received from the Public Relations Society of America a silver medal in crisis communication for their Bosnia engagement. According to James Harff, who was in charge of the operation, the most difficult part was to win support amongst Jewish circles (see ID-Dokumentation, 1994; Beham, 1996):

- In his book *Wastelands of Historical Reality*, the Croat President Tudjman had made statements that could easily be interpreted as anti-Semitic, and
- in his book *The Islamic Declaration*, the Bosnian President Izetbegovic had openly voted for a fundamentalist Islamic state.

Moreover, the history of Croatia and Bosnia was marked by brutal anti-Semitism, and tens of thousands of Jews had been killed in Croat camps during World War II. Accordingly, the prerequisites were present for hostile attitudes from Jewish intellectuals and organizations towards Croats and Bosnians. The task of the operation was to reverse this situation, which Ruder & Finn managed to do. After *New York Newsday* had reported about Serbian concentration camps in August 1992, Ruder & Finn persuaded three Jewish organizations to publish a statement in *New York Times* and to organize a protest demonstration at the offices of the United Nations. Thus, bringing the Jews into play on the side of the Bosnians was a great bluff. In one single blow, it put the Serbs on the same level with the Nazis in public opinion.

When, finally, the British TV journalist Penny Marshal presented her prize-winning videotapes from the Serbian camp in Trnopolje – men with naked chests behind barbed wire fences – this judgement about the Serbs was accepted as a matter of fact by public opinion – not because Milosevic was compared with Hitler as was Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, but because the audience believed that it had seen what it needed in order to come to this judgement.

When Thomas Deichmann (1997) revealed that the videotapes were faked – they did not show men behind a fence but were filmed from within a neighbouring site that was surrounded by barbed wire – the Austrian journalist Erica Fischer (1997) attacked him with the words:

Why does he do so? After all, the photo shook up the world.... Did Penny Marshal claim that she stood outside? I don't know, and basically I don't mind.

In addition, Mick Hume, editor of the small left-wing *LM Magazine*, was sued for liability by the British television channel *ITN* because he had reprinted Deichmann's article.

2. Method

There can be little doubt that PR agencies and the Journalism of Attachment had a strong influence on the formation of public opinion during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They set the mood, and there is the danger that this mood had an impact on all of the Bosnia coverage and jeopardized both plurality and objectivity of the media. To examine whether and to what extent this was the case is the subject of the present study, which analyses the content of the day-to-day coverage of the Bosnian war in the prestige press of Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Israel and France. In each of these countries (except Germany), one conservative quality paper was selected for analysis. In Germany, the whole range of quality papers, covering the complete political spectrum from the post-communist *Neues Deutschland* to the right-wing *Die Welt*, were included in the study (see Table 1).

From each of these newspapers, the major articles reporting on a total of 98 events organized in 16 time-spots, dating from 25 July 1990 (declaration of autonomy of the Serbian people in Croatia) until 19 March 1996 (reunification of Sarajevo), were analysed (see Table 2). Since not all of these events were reported in each of the analysed newspapers, the number of articles per newspaper ranges from 75 (*Le Monde*) to 95 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*). The total number of articles in the analysis was 1132.¹

Table 1. Papers included in the study

Country	Paper	n
Finland (FIN)	<i>Helsingin Sanomat</i>	78
Switzerland (CH)	<i>Neue Züricher Zeitung</i>	94
Austria (A)	<i>Die Presse</i>	84
Germany (D)	<i>Neues Deutschland</i> (ND)	93
	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i> (FR)	91
	<i>Die Tageszeitung</i> (taz)	84
	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> (SZ)	95
	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> (FAZ)	92
	<i>Die Welt</i> (Welt)	90
United States (USA)	<i>New York Times</i>	92
Great Britain (GB)	<i>The Times</i>	85
Israel	<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	79
France (F)	<i>Le Monde</i>	75

Table 2. Time-spots analysed (based on a chronology by Meder & Reimann, 1996)

Timespots (date of first and last event)	
1.	The war in Croatia begins (25/7/90 – 2/5/91)
2.	Recognition of Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia (15/1/92 – 6/4/92)
3.	Peace demonstrations in Sarajevo and Belgrade (5/4/92 – 14/6/92)
4.	Grenade attack against Sarajevo, first UN sanctions (27/5/92 – 30/5/92)
5.	Maslenica Offensive, Vance–Owen Plan (22/1/93 – 15/5/93)
6.	Battle of Mostar, Serbian–Croatian plan to divide Bosnia into three parts (23/7/93 – 30/7/93)
7.	Croatian–Bosnian confederation, UN/NATO sanctions (28/2/94 – 3/3/94)
8.	Peace plan of the Contact Group, Milosevic dissociates from Bosnian Serbs, Isolation of Bosnian Serbs (6/7/94 – 24/9/94)
9.	Bihaj, Coalition between Serbs and Abdic (31/10/94 – 19/11/94)
10.	Peace initiative by Jimmy Carter (17/12/94 – 2/1/95)
11.	Prolongation of the UN mandate in Croatia (12/1/95 – 12/3/95)
12.	Sharpening of confrontation between Bosnian Serbs and UN/NATO (22/5/95 – 16/6/95)
13.	Krajina Offensive (28/7/95 – 28/8/95)
14.	NATO attack on Bosnian Serbs, first deployment of German military (29/8/95 – 1/9/95)
15.	Dayton agreement (8/9/95 – 14/12/95)
16.	Handing over of Sarajevo (10/1/96 – 19/3/96)

Since most of the articles reported about several *conflict constellations* (see Table 3), it was not the articles themselves, but the conflict constellations which served as coding units for content analysis. Based on the events presented in the text, one or several conflict constellations could be identified per article. The total number of conflict constellations was 3651.

Table 3. Definition of coding units

Conflict constellation (who against whom):	
•	A conflict constellation is always defined by a first and an (opposing) second party. At least one of the two parties includes an internal actor (Serb, Croat or Muslim).
•	There may also be a third party involved. Third party is always external actors (from the international community).
•	All parties may be composed of one or several actors.
•	Internal actors are always first or second parties.
•	External actors are considered third party in so far as they adopt a trans-party position and/or make efforts on behalf of a peaceful end to the dispute. Otherwise, they are first or second party.

The content analytical coding schedule was based on the escalation model by Kempf (1996b) and resulted from simplification of the qualitative method by Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen (1996).² Inter-coder reliability was continuously monitored and sufficiently high (see Table 4).³

Table 4. Inter-coder reliability

Coefficient Kappa:					
•	Min	= 0.685	•	Max	= 0.932
•	Range	= 0.274	•	Median	= 0.836
•	1st Quartile	= 0.761	•	3rd Quartile	= 0.909
•	Quartile difference	= 0.148			


Statistical analysis of the data was carried out separately for the three ethnic groups of internal actors (Serbs, n=2022; Croats, n=884; and Muslims, n=1131) and for actors from the international community involved in the conflict either as external actors (first or second party, n=1050) or as neutral third party actors (n=1188).

3. Internal actors

The results of the study showed that the international press was quite ambiguous about all three ethnic groups involved in the Bosnia conflict. So far, the negative image of the Serbs does not necessarily result from a biased coverage (as assumed by Serbian counter-propaganda; see Malešić, 1998), but it might simply be due to the fact that the Serbs fought against both Croats and Muslims, and accordingly Serbian actors were covered by the media twice as often as each of the other groups (see Figure 1).

Moreover, Serbian actors were more often involved in internal conflict (see 'Bosnian Serbs Against the Serbian State'); they were more often involved in conflict with external actors; and they found less support with actors from the international community (see Jaeger, Mattenschlager & Meder, 1999).

Figure 1. Involvement of internal actors in conflict constellations



Conceptualization of the conflict

The depiction of all three ethnic groups (see Figure 2, Table 5) was dominated by the description of confrontative behaviour, such as reports of military strikes, escalation, extortion or intransigence. Cooperative behaviour, such as willingness to negotiate, military withdrawal, de-escalation and/or compliance, was reported quite seldom.

Figure 2. Internal actors: conceptualization of the conflict (relative frequencies)




Table 5. Internal actors: conceptualization of the conflict (absolute frequencies)

Conceptualization of the conflict	Serbian	Croat	Muslim	X ² , df=2	sign.
Confrontative behaviour	1278	522	579	43.2407	p<0.001
Cooperative behaviour	67	40	43	2.5500	n.s.
conf:coop	1:0.05	1:0.08	1:0.07		
Military logic	639	354	379	19.7010	p<0.001
Negation of military logic	273	155	169	9.7696	p<0.01
ML:Negation ML	1:0.4	1:0.4	1:0.4		
Negation of peace logic	170	82	80	3.3703	n.s.
Peace logic	204	13	106	66.0815	p<0.001
Negation PL:PL	1:1.2	1:0.2	1:1.3		

All of the parties were depicted as constructing the conflict according to a win-lose model, thus following military logic by promotion of, agreement to or argumentation for the necessity, effectiveness, morality or appropriateness of confrontative behaviour. Negation of military logic was also reported on all sides but played a minor role (ML:Negation = 1:0.4). Peace logic, promoting peaceful measures, de-escalation or compliance were reported even less.

Still, there are differences between the three groups:

- While Serbian behaviour is depicted as the most confrontative, both military logic and negation of military logic are reported least on the Serbian side.
- Croats are portrayed as giving most emphasis to military logic (both positively and negatively) and rejecting the logic of peace most decidedly (Negation:PL = 1:0.2).
- Muslim behaviour is depicted as least confrontative.

Evaluation of rights and intentions

The international press was also quite ambiguous about all three groups' rights and intentions (see Figure 3, Table 6). Denial of rights and/or imputation of 'bad intentions' dominated the recognition of rights or 'good intentions' by a ratio of 1:0.7 (Serbs and Croats) up to 1:0.6 (Muslims).

- While Serbian rights and intentions received the least attention in the press (both positively and negatively), the media put high emphasis on describing common rights and possibilities for cooperation of Serbs and their opponents, which they also denied less often than those of the other ethnic groups (Negation:CR = 1:2.9).
- Croat rights and intentions received the most attention (both positively and negatively), and common rights and possibilities for cooperation of Croats and their opponents were denied most often (Negation:CR = 1.2).

Figure 3. Internal actors: evaluation of rights and intentions (relative frequencies)




Table 6. Internal actors: evaluation of rights and intentions (absolute frequencies)

Rights and intentions	Serbian	Croat	Muslim	X ² , df=2	sign.
Denial of rights and/or imputation of bad intentions	348	273	307	80.2776	p<0.001
Recognizance of rights or good intentions	239	188	178	43.7835	p<0.001
Bad I:Good I	1:0.7	1:0.7	1:0.6		
Denial of common rights or possibilities for cooperation	67	53	50	11.1394	p<0.01
Common rights and/or possibilities for cooperation	194	66	54	23.6442	p<0.001
Negation CR:CR	1:2.9	1:1.2	1:1.1		

The emphasis on military logic (both positive and negative) and the rejection of peace logic by the Croats was thus supported by giving high priority to their rights and intentions and rejecting cooperative alternatives.

Serbian rights and intentions, on the other hand, were given little emphasis, and as possibilities for cooperation between Serbs and their opponents were accentuated, the confrontative Serbian behaviour appeared to be all the more unjustified.

As a consequence, it was more or less unavoidable that the audience got the (right or wrong) impression that the Serbs were especially dangerous and evil: If the Serbs are permanently in the media; if (as with the other war parties too) this happens mostly in a negative context; and if we learn little about their intentions, it is only plausible to assume that they cannot have good intentions.

Evaluation of actions

Similarly, the international press put the least emphasis on explicit evaluation of Serbian actions (whether positive or negative), as well as on the common gain which Serbs and their opponents could get from putting an end to war. On the other hand, the press stimulated the least outrage about the opponents of the Serbs and pre-

sented the suffering of the Serbian side most often together with the suffering of the opponent, thus inducing indignation about the war rather than about the enemies of the Serbs (Indign. a.E.:Indign. a.W = 1:9.7) (see Figure 4, Table 7).

Figure 4. Internal actors: evaluation of actions (relative frequencies)




Table 7. Internal actors: evaluation of actions (absolute frequencies)

Actions	Serbian	Croat	Muslim	X ² , df=2	sign.
Justification or unbiased evaluation	368	259	278	47.7894	p<0.001
Criticism or demonization	178	117	199	53.2546	p<0.001
Justification: Criticism	1:0.5	1:0.5	1:0.7		
Indignation about the enemy	63	48	69	17.6770	p<0.001
Indignation about the war	613	264	235	36.1144	p<0.001
Indign.a E: Indign. a.W.	1:9.7	1:5.5	1:3.4		
Denial of common gain from ending the war	4	2	2	0.0613	n.s.
Recognition of common gain	156	106	118	15.1064	p<0.001
Denial of CG: CG	1:39	1:53	1:59		

While indignation about the war was nearly as high in the context of the coverage of Croat actions, there was also rather high indignation about the enemies of the Croats (Indign. a.E.:Indign. a.W. = 1:5). And – owing to the need for cooperation between Croats and Muslims – the possible common gain from putting an end to the conflict was stressed most often in the context of Croat actions, which – at the same time – were justified more often than those of the other ethnic groups.

Although Muslim actions were most often criticized or demonized, the press directed the indignation about war most often against the enemies of the Muslims (Indignation a.E.:Indignation a.W. = 1:3.4).

Interpunctuation of the conflict

While both Serbs (Defense:Attack = 1:2.7) and Croats (Defense:Attack = 1: 2.9) were portrayed as aggressors, the Muslims were depicted less often in a position of attack and more often in a defensive position (Defense:Attack = 1:1.5) than Serbs and Croats. While Serbs were portrayed as least defensive, the Croats appeared as attacking the most (see Figure 5, Table 8).

Figure 5. Internal actors: interpunctuation of the conflict (relative frequencies)




Table 8. Internal actors: interpunctuation of the conflict (absolute frequencies)

Actions	Serbian	Croat	Muslim	X ² , df=2	sign.
Defence	190	109	153	13.9134	p<0.001
Attack	520	311	231	30.0753	p<0.001
Defence:Attack	1:2.7	1:2.9	1:1.5		
Emphasis on own strength	495	185	293	7.04	n.s.
Price of military victory	40	35	43	12.7852	p<0.01
Own strength:Price of V	1:0.08	1:0.19	1:0.15		
Distress	30	51	48	42.1043	p<0.001
Reduction of Distress	67	41	55	7.1875	n.s.
Distress: Reduction of D	1:2.2	1:0.8	1:1.1		
Mistrust of the opponent	20	14	19	3.3124	n.s.
Reduction of mistrust	28	34	32	18.1188	p<0.001
Mistrust: Reduction of M	1:1.4	1:2.4	1:1.7		


While emphasis on strength and confidence to win the war was stressed by the media on all sides, the price which the parties would have to pay for military victory found only little attention. Nor were distress, mistrust of the opponent and the reduction of these prominent topics of coverage.

Nonetheless, the media tended to support the cooperation between Croats and Muslims by giving more attention to the price of military victory and to the reduction of mistrust between the parties than in the Serbian case. Moreover, they put more emphasis on the distress caused to Croats and Muslims by their opponents' dangerousness and thus disqualified the Serbs even the more.

The unequal inter punctuation of the conflict becomes more evident if we look at the latent styles of coverage which are blended in the frequency distributions in Figure 5.

In most cases, the press put little emphasis on the inter punctuation of the conflict. The coverage of the Serbian party in particular followed this main tenor of inter punctuation (74% of all reports on Serbian actors), which – though with little frequency – depicted them as aggressors. The same holds for the Croats (in 69% of the reports about Croat actors). The main tenor of portraying Muslim actors (69%), on the other hand, put them less clearly in an attacking position, and rather stressed their strength and thus tended to support confidence that the Muslims would endure the war (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. The main tenor of inter punctuation



The second style (see Figure 7) is either ambivalent or results from the presentation of two-sided messages (see Reimann, 1998). It presents each of the ethnic groups as attacking and defensive at the same time; it stresses both their strength and the price they would have to pay for military victory; it tends to emphasize the dangerousness of the enemies but also tends to the reduce the distress that results from the threat; sometimes it stimulates mistrust against the opponent, but also tries to reduce it.

This style, which plays only a little role in the coverage of the Muslims (3%), is most frequently used for depicting the Croat side (14%). In the case of Croat actors, this ambivalent inter punctuation exists in two variants (see Figure 8), one of which gives less attention to the inter punctuation than in the case of reporting about Serbian or Muslim actors (12.6%), while the other is only used quite seldom (1.4%).

Figure 7. Ambivalent interpunctuation





Figure 8. Croat variants of ambivalent interpunctuation



The third style (see Figure 9) puts most emphasis on the conflict parties' own strengths and is most frequently used for depicting the Muslim side (28%), for which it exists in four variants (see Figure 10).

Variants 1 and 2 are used most frequently.

- Variant 1 (16.8%), which shows the Muslims often in a position of attack, is most similar to the Serbian (19%) and Croat (17%) form of this style (see Figure 9), but gives less emphasis to their strength, thus making them – though attacking – look less dangerous.
- Variant 2 (9.3%), on the other hand, which clearly depicts the Muslims in a defensive position, also stresses their strength most clearly.

Variant 3 and 4 focus on the price the Muslims would have to pay for military victory.

- In variant 3 (1.2%), where they are also portrayed rather in a defensive position (though much less than in variant 2), their strength is also emphasized to a

considerable amount, and some attention is given to the reduction of mistrust of their enemy (1.2%).

- In variant 4 (1.1%), which puts the Muslims clearly into an attacking position, finally, the dangerousness of the Muslim side is reduced by giving much less attention to its own strength and instead stressing the distress which is caused to the Muslims by the dangerousness of their enemies.

Figure 9. Emphasis on own strength





Figure 10. Muslim variants of emphasis on own strength



Incentives for social identification

The uneven coverage of the three ethnic groups becomes even more evident if we look at the incentives for social identification that were provided by the press. While

incentives for social identification were twice as high for Croat and particularly for Muslim victims than for Serbian victims, the press not only disregarded Serbian victims but even dehumanized them to a considerable amount. Vice versa, dehumanization of Muslim and also Croat élites was much lower than in the Serbian case (see Figure 11, Table 9).

Figure 11. Internal actors: incentives for social identification (relative frequencies)





Table 9. Internal actors: incentives for social identification (absolute frequencies)

Incentives for social identification	Serbian	Croat	Muslim	X ² , df=2	sign.
Dehumanization of victims	150	35	37	29.1664	p<0.001
Identification with victims	178	137	228	84.4206	p<0.001
Dehumanization:Identification	1:1.2	1:3.9	1:6.2		
Dehumanization of actors	26	12	5	5.8179	n.s.
Identification with actors	4	0	1	—	—
Dehumanization:Identification	1:0.2	1:0	1:0.2		
Dehumanization of élites	61	10	5	29.4897	p<0.001
Identification with élites	32	24	31	6.2978	n.s.
Dehumanization:Identification	1:0.5	1:2.4	1:6.2		


Though Latent Styles Analysis revealed that the main tenor of the press coverage of all three groups was oriented towards identification with their victims, these incentives were much weaker in case of Serbian victims than in case of Croat or – especially – of Muslim victims, where this main tenor was the one and only style of coverage that guided 100% of the reports about Muslims (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. Identification with victims




Both in the coverage of Serbs and in the coverage of Croats, the media also used another style, which dehumanized the victims and was never used in the coverage of Muslims. While this style was used slightly more often for Croats than for Serbs, the dehumanization of victims was three times higher in the Serbian case than in the Croat case (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Dehumanization of victims



This partiality of the press is also present in the third style, which focuses on dehumanization (mainly with actors) in the case of Serbs, and on social identification (with both élites and victims) in the case of Croats (see Figure 14).

Figure 14. Dehumanization of Serbian actors vs. identification with the Croat élite



Conclusions

Summarizing the results presented so far, we come to the conclusion that the coverage of the three ethnic groups involved in the Bosnia conflict was quite uneven. The differences between the media images of the three groups were partly due to the different roles in which they were portrayed by the media.

The most positive role was constructed for the *Muslims*, whose behaviour was depicted as least confrontative. The Muslims were depicted less often in a position of attack and more often in a defensive position than the Serbs and Croats. And although Muslim actions were more often criticized than those of the other groups, the press directed the indignation about war most often against the Muslims' enemies. It also presented more incentives for identification with Muslim victims than with those on the other side(s).

The main tenor of inter-punctuation of the conflict put the Muslims less clearly into an attacking position than the others. It rather stressed their strength and thus tended to support confidence that the Muslims would endure the war.

Often, the Muslims were depicted in a clearly defensive position. In this case, the strength of the Muslim side was emphasized even more. If the Muslims were shown in a position of attack, on the other hand, their dangerousness was reduced by giving less attention to their strength and/or by emphasizing the distress which was caused them by the dangerousness of their enemies.

Both, Serbs and Croats were rather portrayed as aggressors. While Serbs were portrayed as least defensive, the Croats appeared as most attacking.

Although military logic was the least reported on the *Serbian* side and the press put the least emphasis on explicit evaluation of Serbian actions (whether positive or negative), the negative image of the Serbs resulted from other factors.

First of all, Serbian actors were covered by the media twice as often as each of the other groups, and Serbian behaviour was depicted as the most confrontative.

Second, Serbian rights and intentions were given little emphasis, and as possibilities for cooperation between Serbs and their opponents were accentuated, the confrontative Serbian behaviour appeared to be even more unjustified.

Third, the press stimulated the least outrage about the opponents of the Serbs and presented the suffering of the Serbian side most often together with the suffering of their counterparts.

Fourth, incentives for social identification with Serbian victims were extremely low and there was even a considerable amount of dehumanization of victims (and also, to some extent, of actors) on the Serbian side.

Moreover, the media tended to support the cooperation between Croats and Muslims by giving more attention to the price of military victory and to the reduction of mistrust between the parties than in the Serbian case. They also placed more emphasis on the distress caused to Croats and Muslims by their opponent's dangerousness and thus disqualified the Serbs even more.

While it is not surprising that the international press portrayed the Muslims in a defensive role and the Serbs in the role of the evil-doers, the really striking result of the analyses is how the press managed to get the Croats out of the line of fire.

The *Croats* were portrayed as giving most emphasis to military logic (both positively and negatively) and rejecting the logic of peace most decidedly. Indignation about the war was nearly as high in the context of Croat actions as in the Serbian case.

On the other hand, Croat actions were justified more often than those of the other ethnic groups, and Croat rights and intentions received the most attention (both positively and negatively).

Although the possible gain from putting an end to the conflict was stressed in the context of Croat actions, possibilities for cooperation of Croats and their opponents were rejected more often than in case of the other groups, and there was a rather high level of indignation about the enemies of the Croats.

Thus both the Croat emphasis on military logic and the rejection of peace logic by the Croats were seemingly justified by giving high priority to their rights and intentions and by the rejection of cooperative alternatives.

This two-sided strategy of reporting facts that risk unmasking the Croats as the real hardliners and warmongers while raising understanding of their position becomes evident also in the high percentage of ambivalent interpunctuation of the conflict and in the relatively strong incentives for social identification, both with Croat victims and with the Croat élite.

4. International actors

Despite the fact that the international press reported about the three ethnic groups quite unevenly, it did not just take sides and spread propaganda which put Muslims and/or Croats on the good side and the Serbs on the evil side. The press was quite ambiguous about all three of them.

The depiction of every single group was dominated by the description of confrontative behaviour, and all of the groups were depicted as following military logic. Denial of rights and/or imputation of 'bad intentions' dominated the recognition of rights or 'good intentions', regardless of which group was covered.

The international press identified itself with none of the Bosnian war parties, but rather with the international community, which had a problem with the war parties down at Bosnia. In doing so, however, the press did not so much support the efforts at peaceful conflict resolution but rather supported a policy of power heading towards military intervention. The more international actors became involved in the conflict as external actors, the greater the media sympathy for them.

Conceptualization of the conflict

Differences in the coverage of international actors involved in the conflict as external actors and those who were acting from a mediating third party position demonstrate the gross dominance of the war discourse in modern media. Logic of peace was reported mainly on the side of external actors, where it served to legitimize predominantly confrontative behaviour, which – at the same time – was put in the context of military logic (whether positive or negative) much less than third party mediation efforts (see Figure 15, Table 10).

Figure 15. International actors: conceptualization of the conflict (relative frequencies)




Table 10. International actors: conceptualization of the conflict (absolute frequencies)

Conceptualization of the conflict	External actors	Third party	X ² , df=1	sign.
Confrontative behaviour	452	91	379.8399	p<0.001
Cooperative behaviour	61	48	3.7651	n.s.
conf:coop	1:0.1	1:0.5		
Military logic	226	482	95.7429	p<0.001
Negation of military logic	91	289	96.9653	p<0.001
ML:Negation ML	1:0.4	1:0.6		
Negation of peace logic	35	61	4.4052	n.s.
Peace logic	200	78	79.8235	79.8235
Negation PL:PL	1:5.7	1:1.3		

Evaluation of rights, intentions and actions

Third party actors were accused of bad intentions more than twice as often accused of bad intentions as external actors (see Figure 16, Table 11).

Figure 16. International actors: evaluation of rights, intentions and actions (relative frequencies)




Table 11. International actors: evaluation of rights, intentions and actions (absolute frequencies)

Rights, intentions and actions	External actors	Third party	X ² , df=1	sign.
Denial of rights and/or imputation of bad intentions	37	91	17.6832	p<0.001
Recognition of rights or good intentions	172	219	1.6299	n.s.
Bad I:Good I	1:4.6	1:2.4		
Denial of common rights or possibilities f. cooperation	4	4	0.0306	n.s.
Common rights and/or possibilities for Cooperation	41	30	3.4530	n.s.
Negation CR:CR	1:10.3	1:7.5		
Justification or unbiased evaluation of actions	307	320	1.2349	n.s.
Criticism or demonization of actions	174	230	2.9304	n.s.
Justification:Criticism	1:0.6	1:0.7		

Incentives for social identification

Incentives for social identification, both with victims and with élites, were much stronger for external actors, and third party actors were even dehumanized in some cases (see Figure 17, Table 12).

Figure 17. International actors: incentives for social identification (relative frequencies)




Table 12. International actors: incentives for social identification (absolute frequencies)

Incentives for social identification	External actors	Third party	X ² , df=1	Sign.
Dehumanization of victims	0	4	—	—
Identification with victims	131	34	75.4418	P<0.001
Dehumanization:Identification	0:131	1:8.5		
Dehumanization of actors	0	19	16.9367	P<0.001
Identification with actors	1	1	—	—
Dehumanization:Identification	0:1	1:0.05		
Dehumanization of élites	2	2	—	—
Identification with élites	124	30	74.9796	P<0.001
Dehumanization:Identification	1:62	1:15		

In most of the reports about third party actors (95%), the press presented (nearly) no incentives for social identification at all (see Figure 18). In those few reports where the press presented (rather) strong incentives for identification with third party actors, the dehumanization of third party actors was as strong as the incentives for identification with third party victims (presumably both mostly members of peace groups or NGOs).

Strong incentives for social identification with external actors were presented much more often (22%); they were stronger; and they never involved dehumanization of actors (see Figure 19).

Figure 18. International actors: weak incentives for social identification






Figure 19. International actors: strong incentives for social identification



Coverage of third party actors

How little support the international press gave to third party mediation efforts becomes even more visible from the results of latent styles analysis, which identified five different styles of reporting about third party actors. Figure 20 shows the (relative) frequency with which these styles were used during the different time-spots of the Bosnia conflict that were analysed (see Table 2).

Figure 20. Third party actors: style usage during 16 time-spots of the Bosnia conflict



The first of these styles (Style A) is representative for 53% of the reports and gives only little attention to third party actors (see Figure 21). It rather reports about confrontative behaviour and puts it in the framework of military logic (whether positive or negative) and an ambivalent evaluation of third party actions (see Table 13). This is the dominant style of coverage throughout the whole conflict, except time-spot 10 (the peace initiative by Jimmy Carter), time-spot 14 (the NATO attack on Bosnian Serbs) and time-spot 15 (the Dayton agreement).

Figure 21. Third party actors: confrontative strategy, but little emphasis





Table 13. Ratio of escalation and de-escalation oriented framing in the coverage of third party actors

	Style A	Style B	Style C	Style D	Style E
Confrontative B:Cooperative B	1:0.2	1:0.2	1:0.6	1:1.5	1:0.9
[ML Ú NegPL] : [PL Ú NegML]	1:0.8	1:0.3	1:0.9	1:0.9	1:1.9
Bad Intentions : Good Intentions	1:1.5	1:3.9	1:41.7	1:1.5	1:2.4
Justification of A: Criticism of A	1:0.8	1:0.6	1:1.7	1:0.6	1:0.6


Style B (see Figure 22) follows in second place (19%) and is used particularly during time-spot 7 (the first time NATO reacts with force to the violation of the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia) and 14 (the NATO attack on Bosnian Serbs in August 1995). This style puts third party actions strictly into a framework of military logic; it emphasizes the justification of the third party's actions and (though with little emphasis) attributes good intentions to them (see Table 13).

Figure 22. Third party actors: confrontative strategy with strong emphasis on military logic




Style C (see Figure 23) is also used throughout the whole conflict (12%), particularly during time-spot 3 (the peace demonstrations in Sarajevo and Belgrade), time-spot 4 (the grenade attack against Sarajevo, first UN sanctions), time-spot 5 (the Maslenica offensive, Vance–Owen Plan), and even more so during time-spot 8 (the Peace Plan of the Contact Group, the isolation of Bosnian Serbs), time-spot 9 (Bihaj) and time-spot 12 (the sharpening of the confrontation between Bosnian Serbs and UN/NATO). This style is the only one which gives some attention to common rights and possibilities of cooperation between third party and one or both of the parties at conflict. Third party actions are framed ambivalently between military logic and the logic of peace, and though great emphasis is given to the good intentions of third parties, this style is most critical of their actions (see Table 13).

Figure 23. Third party actors: good intentions but poor performance




Style D (see Figure 24) is characteristic for the coverage of peace initiatives, especially the initiative by Jimmy Carter (time-spot 10), during which it is the predominant style, but also the Dayton negotiations (time-spot 15) and the Vance–Owen Plan (time-spot 5). This style is the only one that depicts third party behaviour as cooperative rather than confrontative, and which presents incentives of social identification with third party actors to a considerable amount. As in Style C, third party actions are framed ambivalently between military logic and the logic of peace. Great emphasis is given to the relative justification of third party actions and to the evaluation of third party intentions, about which, however, this style is not so positive (see Table 13).

Figure 24. Third party actors: ambivalent strategy, rather supported



Style E (see Figure 25), finally, is the only one which frames third party behaviour within the logic of peace. This style, which also puts great emphasis on (relative) recognition of the good intentions of third parties (see Table 13) is used mainly during time-spot 2 (the recognition of Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia), time-spot 10 (the peace initiative by Jimmy Carter) and time-spots 15–16 (the Dayton negotiations and their aftermath).

Figure 25. Third party actors: (relative) emphasis on logic of peace



Conclusions


The dominance of war culture in the coverage of third party interventions becomes evident if we summarize:

72% of the articles supported a policy of power by focusing on confrontative behaviour (Styles A & B) and framing it with a bias towards military logic.

19% of the articles had both a strong focus and a clear bias towards military logic (Style B).

This style of coverage was most frequently used by the British *The Times* and the Israeli *Jerusalem Post* (see Figure 26), which demonstrates the damage which civil

Figure 26. Third party coverage: differences between countries (chi-square = 123.57, df = 28, p<0.001)




war in Northern Ireland and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have caused for the political cultures of the two countries. In the French *Le Monde*, this style was used even less than in the Finnish *Helsingin Sanomat*.

53% of the articles had the same sort of bias but more or less disregarded third parties and gave them little attention (Style A).

This is the predominant style in all of the analysed papers, and especially in *Helsingin Sanomat*, where it is characteristic of 87% of the coverage (see Figure 26). From a position of Finland’s relative historical, political and geographical distance from the Bosnia conflict, *Helsingin Sanomat* presented the most detached coverage, though sharing the consensus of the international public opinion which put the blame on the Serbs and promoted an international intervention.

Figure 27. Third party coverage: differences between German newspapers (chi-square = 5.9472, df = 20, n.s.)



The Austrian *Die Presse* and the German papers also made use of this detached style of reporting more frequently than the other papers. At risk of raising reservations that might be caused by Germany’s and Austria’s historical links to fascist Croatia and their historical enmification with Serbia dating back to World War I, the German and Austrian press was quite reluctant in its Bosnia coverage.

In Germany, where the whole political spectrum of national newspapers was analysed, this reluctance was national consensus, and there were no significant differences in coverage from the post-communist *Neues Deutschland* to the right-wing conservative *Die Welt* (see Figure 27). Never since the end of World War II was public opinion about a war as unified in Germany as it was over the Bosnia conflict, in which German diplomacy was more involved than in any other military conflict since 1945.

12% of the articles put great emphasis on the criticism of third parties’ actions, which – though depicted as less confrontative than in Styles A and B – were framed ambivalently between military logic and the logic of peace (Style C).

This style, which criticized third parties either for not being strict enough or for acting within the framework of military logic was used more often by *Le Monde* than by any other of the analysed papers.

Only 15% of the articles reported about third parties in a slightly more positive way:

Though with strong focus, but only with slight bias towards military logic, 7% of the articles reported rather about cooperative behaviour and presented some incentives for social identification with the third party (Style D).

This style, which was predominant during Jimmy Carter's peace initiative (time-spot 10) and during the Dayton negotiations (time-spot 15) was used by the US *New York Times* more than twice as often (20%) as in the papers from the other countries. In *Die Presse*, this style was characteristic only for 3% of the third party coverage, which reveals how little public opinion in Austria was interested in giving peace a chance rather than in defeating the Serbs.

Only 8% of the articles focused on peace logic and framed third party actions within the logic of peace rather than within military logic (Style E).

This style, which was used mainly during time-spot 2 (the recognition of Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia), time-spot 10 (the peace initiative by Jimmy Carter) and time-spots 15–16 (the Dayton negotiations and their aftermath), is characteristic of the coverage of *Le Monde*, where it was found more than three times as often (27%) as in the other countries' papers. While French public opinion obviously had great interest in peaceful conflict transformation, it is once more *Die Presse* (5%) which⁴ showed the least readiness to support alternatives to the use of military force in order to put an end to war.

5. Conclusions

Compared with the animosity with which the propaganda war was fought among Western journalists, the day-to-day coverage of the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina seems to be surprisingly untendentious. As the present study of the prestige press in Europe and the US shows, the Western media did not take sides during the Bosnia conflict as clearly as they had during the Gulf War.

At least the day-to-day coverage was quite detached from all three of the Bosnian war parties. The depiction of every single ethnic group was dominated by the description of confrontative behaviour, and all of them were depicted as following military logic. Denial of rights and/or imputation of 'bad intentions' dominated the recognition of rights or 'good intentions', regardless of which group was covered.

However, the press reported about Serbian actors much more often than about Bosnian or Croatian ones. This is in accordance with the judgement of the Norwegian human rights expert Hanne-Sophie Greve (1995), according to which all sides had committed crimes during the Bosnia War, but the number and atrocity of Serbian trespasses was the highest.

A similar result was found by Susanne Jaeger (1998). According to her results, the German press reported about rape incidents in a more differentiated manner than would have been expected. More than 50% of the analysed texts dealt with the

topic quite dispassionately and kept away from interpretations. On the other hand, there was also a reasonable high share of texts that dealt mainly with Serbian violence against non-Serbian women. These texts in particular showed a tendency to use the suffering of the victims in order to assess which side was the most guilty.

As the present study shows, the differences between the media images of the three ethnic groups were mainly due to the different roles in which they were portrayed by the media.

The most positive role was constructed for the Muslims, who were depicted as behaving least confrontatively and depicted most often in a defensive situation. In accordance with this, the press also presented more incentives for identification with Muslim victims than with those on the other side(s). Both Serbs and Croats, on the other hand, were rather portrayed as aggressors.

While it is not surprising that the international press portrayed the Muslims in a defensive role and the Serbs in the role of the evil-doers, the really striking result of the analyses is how the press managed to get the Croats out of the line of fire: the Croat emphasis on military logic and the Croats' rejection of peace logic were justified by giving high priority to their rights and intentions and by the rejection of cooperative alternatives.

Nonetheless, the international press did not just take sides and spread propaganda which put Muslims and/or Croats on the side of good and the Serbs on the side of evil. The press was quite ambiguous about all three of them and identified itself with none of the Bosnian war parties, but rather sided with the international community which had a problem with the war parties down at Bosnia. In doing so, however, journalists' shortage of understanding of the logic of peaceful conflict resolution became crucial. As a result, the coverage supported a policy of peace enforcement (by military intervention) rather than a policy of peacemaking (by third party mediation efforts). The more international actors got involved in the conflict as external actors, the greater was media sympathy for them.

The calamity of the Bosnia coverage was not so much its partiality, nor its commitment to human rights. The calamity of the Bosnia coverage was its captivity in the vicious circle of war and military logic.

72% of the reports about neutral third parties supported a policy of power by focusing on confrontative behaviour and framing it with a bias towards military logic. 12% of the articles placed great emphasis on the criticism of third parties' actions, and only 15% of the articles reported about third parties in a slightly more positive way.

Up to the present day, leading media officials are proud to have convinced (particularly the US) public opinion of the necessity of a NATO intervention and thus to have contributed to putting an end to war in Bosnia–Herzegovina.

The results of the present study are in accordance with this assumption. But they also show that the media failed in so far as they gave little support to attempts at peaceful conflict resolution during earlier stages of the conflict and also gave too little attention to diplomatic efforts that could have prevented the escalation of the Yugoslavian crises into a murderous civil war. When the UN Secretary-General warned the German minister of foreign affairs of the explosive consequences that a premature recognition of the independence of some of the Yugoslavian republics would bring about, the media did not even take notice of the exchange of letters between Pérez de Cuéllar and Genscher.

Notes

1. For a detailed documentation of the sample, see Jaeger, Mattenschlager & Meder (1999).
2. The author wishes to thank Gerhard Meder and Michael Reimann for contributing to the construction of the coding schedule.
3. The author wishes to thank Caroline Chevat, Gerhard Meder, Andreas Mattenschlager and Risto Suikkanen for coding the voluminous data material.
4. If we disregard of the little attention that *Helsingin Sanomat* paid to third party actors in the Bosnia conflict.

V. Beyond Wishful Thinking

Peace Journalism – A Challenge

Johan Galtung

1. What is peace journalism?

Imagine a blackout on everything we associate with medical practice, never to be reported in the media. Disease, however, is to be reported fully, in gruesome detail, particularly when elite persons are struck. The process of disease is seen as natural, as a fight between the human body and whatever is the pathogenic factor, a micro-organism, trauma, stress or strain. Sometimes one side wins, sometimes the other. It is like a game, even like a sports game. Fair play means to give either side a fair chance, not interfering with the ways of nature, where the stronger eventually wins. The task of journalism is to report this struggle objectively, hoping that our side, the body, wins.

That kind of journalism would be disease-oriented, and the journalists could refer to themselves as disease journalists or correspondents. They would be firmly rooted in the tradition of midwifing negative events hitting elites into news. Their concern would not be to highlight how diseases might be overcome, except by means as violent as the disease itself (open heart surgery, chemo- or radiotherapy). Softer approaches would go under-reported, as would anything known as preventive medicine.

Fortunately, reporting on health and disease has liberated itself from much of that fatalistic tradition. There is also a clear tradition of health journalism.¹ But there is not yet a corresponding tradition of ‘peace journalism’, whereas ‘war and violence journalism’ seems to be in good standing. But exactly what could be the content of that concept, peace journalism?

In general, there seem to be two ways of looking at a conflict, the high road and the low road, depending on whether the focus is on the *conflict* and its *peaceful transformation*, or on the metaconflict that comes after the root conflict, created by *violence* and *war*, and the question of *who wins*. Media even confuse the two, and talk about conflict when they mean violence.

The low road, by far the dominant one in the media, sees a conflict as a battle and the battle as sports arena and gladiator circus. The parties, usually reduced to the number *two*, are combatants in a struggle to impose their goals. The underlying reporting model, often very visible, is that of military command: who advances, who capitulates short of their goals, counting the losses in terms of numbers killed or wounded and in material damage. The zero-sum perspective draws upon sports

reporting where ‘winning is not the only thing, but everything’. The same perspective is applied to negotiations, seen as verbal battles: who outsmarts the other, who gets the other to say yes, who comes out closest to their original position. War journalism has sports journalism – and court journalism! – as models.

The high road, the road of peace journalism, would focus on conflict transformation. Conflicts would be seen as a challenge to the world, like having 2,000 nations wanting a nation-state in a world with only 200 countries and only 20 nation-states. As people, groups, countries and groups of countries seem to stand in each others’ ways (that is what conflict is about), there is a clear *danger* of violence. But in conflict there is also a clear *opportunity* for human progress, for using the conflict to find new ways, for being imaginative and creative, and for transforming the conflict so that the opportunities take the upper hand – without violence.

In this, there is no argument that violence should not be reported. *But the first victim in a war is not truth. That is only the second victim. The first victim is, of course, peace.* That good reporting, low road or high road, should be truthful, is obvious. But truth journalism alone is not peace journalism. And truth does not come easily given the tendency to take sides once the ‘who wins’ perspective has been adopted. If one side is backed by one’s own country, nation, class or a particular paper/station/channel, then the low road invites untruthfulness, as witnessed in the wars in Somalia, Yugoslavia and the Persian Gulf.

Here is a short list of tasks for peace correspondents, intended as an introduction to the elaboration below:

1. What is the conflict about? Who are the parties and what are their real goals, also counting the parties beyond the conflict arena where the violence, if any, takes place? This list is often long.
2. What are the deeper roots of the conflict, in structure and culture, including the history of both?
3. What kind of ideas – particularly creative, new ideas – exist about outcomes other than one party’s imposing itself on the other? Can such ideas be sufficiently powerful to prevent violence?
4. If violence occurs, what about such invisible effects as trauma, hatred and desire for revenge or more glory?
5. Who is working to prevent violence? What are their visions of conflict outcomes? What are their methods, and how can they be supported?
6. Who initiates reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution, and who is only reaping benefits like reconstruction contracts?

With more reporting of this kind, the conflict in and over Northern Ireland would have entered a more peaceful phase long ago. Focus on the violence of the IRA and the RUC only hides the conflict and nourishes more violence. With focus on nonviolent outcomes and empathy with all parties, creativity and peace may come.

Building on this introduction, Table 1 below is an effort to fill both concepts with operational content.²

Starting with the first two victims of a war, peace and truth, we then add the next two victims: people and solution.

Table 1. Peace/conflict journalism vs. war/violence journalism

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p>I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explore conflict <i>formation</i>, x parties, y goals, z issues, general 'win-win' orientation • open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture • making conflicts transparent • giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding • see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity • humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons • <i>proactive</i>: prevention before any violence/war occurs • focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture) 	<p>I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • focus on conflict <i>arena</i>, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, general zero-sum orientation • closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone • making wars opaque/secret • 'us–them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us' • see 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war • dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapons • <i>reactive</i>: waiting for violence before reporting • focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
<p>II. TRUTH-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • expose untruths on all sides • uncover all cover-ups 	<p>II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • expose 'their' untruths • help 'our' cover-ups/lies
<p>III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless • give name to all evil-doers • focus on people peacemakers 	<p>III. ELITE-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece • give name of their evil-doer • focus on elite peacemakers
<p>IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • peace = nonviolence + creativity • highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war • focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation 	<p>IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • peace = victory + ceasefire • conceal peace initiative, before victory is at hand • focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society • leaving for another war, return if the old flares up

Both categories are given content reading the table vertically. And the position taken here is *not* that good reporting on conflict is some kind of compromise, a little from the left-hand column, a little from the right; the position taken is in favour of peace journalism and against war journalism. There is a challenge in the term 'peace journalism', and that is entirely intended. If a society sees a need for war reporting the way in which it is described here, then it would be better to leave it to the ministries of (dis)information, of defence (war), of foreign affairs, etc., and better not to corrupt the media by giving the task to them, whether having them take it on voluntarily or forcing them into such journalism, as the Pentagon did in the Gulf War, following the UK model from the Falklands/Malvinas War.³

As a normative model, the table clearly favours the left-hand column. But as a model descriptive of what actually happens in the world today, some comments

have to be added. Most media are in-between. When a war peaks, as in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, the war journalism column is clearly activated. But, before and after, there are often some hesitant, amateurish moves into the left-hand column, as against the professionalism and courage (!) of the seasoned war correspondent doing his propaganda for war.

A note: we tend to focus on wars between states. But what is said here also applies to violence between other groups, to rape and wife battering, mistreatment of children, race and national strife and class conflict. The violence is reported, and the blame is usually fixed clearly on one side. In fact, all of the advice for peace journalism applies to all of these cases.

The war focus in war journalism will polarize and escalate, calling for hatred and more violence to avenge and stop 'them'. This is in line with a neo-fascist theory of war termination: let them fight and kill each other till they get 'ready for the table'.⁴ The broader category is 'peace enforcement', peace by warlike means. For some it matters that peace comes about 'the old way', forcing the other party to submit to one's own will and superior force, saving own status in the world hierarchy, the status of the war machine and the status of war itself as an institution (and war journalism as a form of journalism). The old content may dress up in new clothes still for some time.

Peace journalism tries to depolarize by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence. How successful this is remains to be seen. But changing the discourse within which something is thought, spoken of and acted upon is a very powerful approach.⁵

Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies, 'truthful journalism' being, as mentioned, one aspect of peace journalism. It is not 'investigative journalism' in the sense of only uncovering lies on 'our' side. The truth aspect in peace journalism holds for all sides, just like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (*glasnost*) to all.

Peace journalism is a 'journalism of attachment' to all actual and potential victims; war journalism only attaches to 'our' side. The task is to report truthfully both war and peace, shaming the adage that 'peace must be working, there is nothing in the media'.⁶ The task of peace journalism is serious, professional reporting, making these processes more transparent. The task of peace advocacy is better left to peace workers.

2. Why peace journalism; why war journalism?

The first question is normative: Why do we need a peace journalism that we do not have? What we have is war journalism, so the second question is descriptive: How do we explain that?

The first question is easily answered, in two parts. For many, a moral answer would be both necessary and sufficient: because a focus on solving conflicts rather than winning them, given the horrors of modern warfare, may reduce human suffering.

But there is also a non-moral (not amoral) answer: because what is described as 'peace journalism' gives a more realistic image of what goes on in the world. What is

described as ‘war journalism’ reflects the warrior logic of a world of states pitted against each other, with international conflict and war being matters of states and statesmen, not to be touched by the common folks. The world comes nicely divided into nation-states (in fact only about 10% of these are close to uni-national). The citizens are supposed to identify with their state, and that also goes for the media. Consequently, the reporting will take the form of – and indeed be informed by – communiqués from the top military command, will reflect their world views and will contain what they deem good for people to know.

But today’s world is globalizing, alphabetizing and democratizing. If the world is to move closer to one country, then issues have to be seen from more angles than one’s own. Moreover, education is no longer an elite privilege: in today’s world very many are as well or better informed than the elites. And democracy makes them demand the right to participate in matters affecting them. Conflict and wars do affect them. War journalism is simply passé, a relic of the past. Change is overdue.

But there are more factors sustaining war journalism than the zero-sum patriotism of the classical state system. Media feed on news, and news is something reported today that happened yesterday (or one hour ago, or right now if the media report in real time) and was not the case the day before yesterday (or two hours ago, or a split second ago). The time cosmology of news is punctual, based on *events*. *Processes* that need more time to reveal where they are headed need more time to unfold. The difference between one day and the next may pass unnoticed; moreover, the direction may not be typical of the long-term trend. And then there are the *permanents*, phenomena that do not change, or only at glacial speed, and for that reason usually pass unnoticed, not only by journalism but also by the professionals, the social scientists. These phenomena are taken for granted since they have always been around, like the coastline and the mountain range. It is usually assumed that processes and permanents (such as the historical background or the cultural parameters) would be the stuff *commentary* (on news) is made of.

Does it make sense to say that war journalism is news, and peace journalism is commentary? No doubt the violent act, a bullet fired in anger, an explosion, is made to order: it is an event, neither process, nor permanent. To analyse a conflict formation is commentary. To dis/uncover the stakes that parties far removed from the arena have in the outcome of the conflict, and how they try to influence that outcome, is news. Peace proposals by important groups of NGOs about the abolition of landmines is news. But it may still take some time for journalists to see it that way, in spite of the fact that today such NGOs, like Pugwash, may have more impact than most states in the world.

But even if it is news, is it ‘hard news’? If hard news is about hard power, violence, sticks and carrots, and not the soft power of persuasion and nonviolence, then this is so by definition. Hard news is produced by war journalism, and is compatible with that kind of mind-set. But there is another and more interesting interpretation: hard news is (1) indisputable facts and (2) consequential. Soft news satisfies neither one nor the other.

But is that really the case? Typical peace journalism items that did not really make it as news, although were all known at the time they happened, would include the following:

- The real end of the Cold War in the streets of Leipzig on 11 October 1989, with 75,000 people (the majority women) demonstrating nonviolently and defying Stasi forces one month before the fall of the Wall.
- The cover-ups in the Gulf War:
- Hill and Knowlton news management: incubators, organized demos – the oil bombing by the coalition, the fake bird;
- the depleted uranium contamination;
- the ‘tractor’ mass killing – with soldiers buried alive – on the Road to Basra;
- the bunker bombing;
- the number of military and civilians killed in Iraq;
- smart bombs not being smart;
- the significance of bombing Basra;
- Saddam Hussein’s goals: honour, dignity and courage, not victory;
- Saddam Hussein’s proposals for negotiation in Autumn 1990;
- King Hussein’s peace initiatives; and
- the talk with the US ambassador before the invasion of Kuwait.
- The Pérez de Cuéllar peace approach for Yugoslavia in his strong letters to Hans Dietrich Genscher against early recognition.
- The mediation of numerous Yugoslav peace groups, consisting mainly of women.
- The massive conscientious objection in Yugoslavia and Western fear of recognizing these objectors as political refugees.
- Joe Camplisson, a peace worker from Northern Ireland, and his mediation between Moldova and Transdnistria.⁷
- The Mothers of the Russian Soldier peace initiative in Chechnya.

Nobody can claim that these are not important, verifiable and highly consequential events. But they are not captured by the war journalism mind-set, the major factor behind missing key facts. To ensure that an adequate job is done, that mind-set has to be changed.

However, such a conclusion presupposes rationality. In the real world, strong factors counteract that commodity, adding deeper perspective on why the media are so irrational. News communication operates under the strong influence of many factors, and four of them seem particularly relevant:⁸

The ‘ideal’ top news event is something negative (not positive – that is less interesting) happening to a person (not structural/institutional, abstract – less interesting) in the elite (not ordinary people – less interesting) in an elite country (not a second, third or fourth world country – again less interesting). The tragic death of Diana and Dodi on the night of 31 August 1997 will be the archetypal example for years to come, overshadowing even the Kennedy assassination on 22 November

Table 2. A four-factor news communication model

		Person		Structure	
		Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive
Elite country	Elite people	No problem: any gossip; however false (4)	Happy family events (3)	Cabinet falls (3)	Elections, even minor change (3)
	Non-elite people	Accidents (3)	Prizes, lottery, wealth (2)	Economic crashes (2)	Economic growth (1)
Non-elite country	Elite people	Scandals (drugs) (3)	Prizes, lottery, wealth (2)	Coup d'etat (2)	Elections, but major change (1)
	Non-elite people	Mega-accidents (2)	Miracles (1)	Revolutions, 'trouble', riots (1)	No chance; however true (0)

1963, possibly because Kennedy was more institutional and Diana more personal (and not only because of better media coverage all over).

By far most events are not 'ideal' but can be ranked on a scale from 0 to 4, depending on how many of these four criteria are fulfilled. 0–4 is something external, the frame for the event, and the lower the ranking of the event, the more enormous the internal content has to be for the event to make it as news. For elites in elite countries, even some small piece of gossip will do; for common people in a common country, the event has to be an enormity like a major earthquake killing the thousands. And thus we get the image – produced by the external frame, not by the internal content – of the first world as a quiet place, laced with some court gossip, and the third world always replete with social and natural catastrophes.

How do the low and high roads, war journalism and peace journalism, fit into this model of factors influencing news production? By and large, they tend to favour war journalism. Peace journalism starts with a major handicap: while violence is obviously negative, peace is positive, hence boring, trivial, not to be reported. But beyond that external frame, the internal content would direct the reporting in the sense that the frame serves to reconstruct what happens, making it more fit for war than for peace journalism (and further removed from reality).

More concretely, if common countries have to compensate for their 'commonness' by producing something negative, and elite persons in elite countries enter news even if what they produce is positive, then the ideal construction of a conflict would be:

- something negative, violence, happens in common countries;
- something positive, peace, is brought to them through the patient and costly intervention of elite persons and elite countries.

And that seems to be the construction of Israel–Palestine, the Gulf War, Yugoslavia and Somalia. The cases of Rwanda and Congo were different; they somehow fended for themselves – and went under-reported.⁹

The conclusion will have to be that the general bias in news communication only partly tips the balance in favour of war journalism. Peace journalism could also be very personal in reporting the dreams and daily work of the people and organizations that end up getting peace prizes for work that changes the world (such as the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for work against landmines and the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize for work against nuclear weapons). But this is not negative enough, and is very often done by less famous people. Thus, when the Pugwash movement was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, it was referred to as 'unknown', obviously by people with war journalism mind-sets. If the first-order news factor is a filter for the flow of events, then the second, deeper order would be to redefine the events to fit the frame so that the conflict can be reported. In a reinterpreted world, dissonant events would go unreported:

- peace initiatives taken by common people in common countries: not even noticed, by definition unlikely and inconsequential;
- peace initiatives taken by elites in common countries: how can something positive come out of such people? – they would have to be of Havel or Mandela magnitude to break the barrier;
- peace initiatives taken by common people in elite countries, such as NGOs: to some extent reported when in line with elites;
- war initiatives (such as giving or selling arms, training locals for war) taken by elites in elite countries: not reported and by definition unlikely since these countries are so peaceful).

This theory of dissonance relative to the news filter-generated construction of reality also explains the missing news mentioned above. No theory of political bias, even control, is needed to explain this pattern of highly biased war reporting.

Or, put differently: news filter theory and political bias theory, steering *Freund-/Feindbilder*, would lead to the same media image of reality. This may also be taken to mean that the news filter factors have grown out of political attitudes and behaviour, or, more interestingly, that news images function as primary political socialization. One might also settle for the trite formulation of 'codependent origination', interdependence.

Two hypotheses: in order for media to sell or be read/heard/viewed,

1. the external frame has to be mind-set compatible;
2. the internal content is frame-compatible.

The second hypothesis is in Table 2: the frame decides the content to the point that the story is written in advance. The first hypothesis tries to anchor this in reader-listener-viewer psychology. That people in general, the famous 'masses' in the terrible expression 'mass media', should be more interested in persons than in structure and more in elite than the common sounds plausible. But how about the negativism of media?

The standard argument is: *it sells*. But of course it sells: it may even contain a warning to oneself – watch out lest this happen to me! One car accident tells more than thousands of impeccable kilometres if the damage is deep and broad. Moreover, even better than gazing at elites in the sky is to watch them fall.

But that is no proof of disinterest in positive news, except if we assume that negative–positive is a dichotomy so that acceptance of one automatically implies rejection of the other. If ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ are both seen as dimensions, then we get four types of news: the negative, the positive, the ambivalent and the bland, neither one nor the other. Maybe the interest is in the first three and not in the fourth, the bland?

At this point a gender difference may enter, with men more interested in the negative (e.g., violence, where the male hunter-warrior has to be on guard) and women more in the positive (e.g., romance, where the female gatherer-reproducer is stirred). Under the sway of patriarchy, male tastes would prevail, and women would feel more alienated by the newscasts, ‘only bad news’. This sounds plausible but calls for empirical explorations.

That women should be more interested in peace news than in war news tallies well with the assumption of women as the better peace workers/peace carriers. If women believe more than men in horizontal networking for the care of other humans, then that is more similar to modern peace work by people, NGOs, etc. than to the traditional male faith in vertical organizations like states for the glory of princes, their successors and principles.

But is it really true that men would be disinterested in the news offered by peace journalism? The political left–right axis would play a role if we assume the political right to believe more in ‘my country, right or wrong’ values. But that would only exclude a limited fraction, and even they may be interested. In short, the hypothesis is at best to be doubted, at worst simply false. Moreover, if sports creates elites out of the winners, how about peace creating new type heroes? Who is more admired, Rabin or Netanyahu, Mandela, Gandhi or Nehru? As these examples indicate, heroes can come from countries that are not so ‘big’.

But peace journalism requires more work in space and time, political geography and history. Good journalists would love it; the mediocre would stay in a hotel picking up violence gossip. And after some time, they would have their networks in the peace community, not only in the security/intelligence community.

3. Peace journalism: Who shall do it?

Any journalist can do the Table 1 left-hand column work, just as anyone can do the right-hand column job. Right now, the left-hand column may require more psychological courage, and the right-hand column more physical courage, but the differences are small.

One problem is the mind-set of the editors, such as the proverbial night editor composing war journalism headlines for peace journalism content. One answer is to start with schools of journalism, and the editors will in due time peter out. But the owners will stay and may not like what is going on.

A more promising approach would probably combine intensive summer courses for the highly motivated with cooperation with media organizations (newspapers, radio stations, TV channels, news agencies) that themselves are motivated. They see the writing on the wall and are in need of no persuasion. Courses organized for the whole staff would produce results quickly. One successful media organization will have impact on others. There will be more peace/conflict transformation news and

less war/victory news. A clever newspaper may even introduce a special weekly or fortnightly page on the 'World Conflict Situation': how are conflicts moving, if at all? If they have finance and sports pages, written by specialists, why not also pages on something even more important?

One reason why all of this is going to succeed is the high number of peace prizes defining individuals and groups through their peace work in the same way that medals and decorations made heroes out of soldiers, defining their war work. The world is changing, and so is the military, from war tasks to defence tasks and from defence tasks to peace tasks, all in one century.

At this point, a plug could be made for gender as a crucial dimension in answering the *who* question. Most of the violence, well above 90%, in the world is done by men, with women the victims in probably more than 50% of the cases. This also applies to collective violence in the form of war. The vested interest for women to change the situation is obvious; just as there is a vested interest for males in preserving the status quo: wars offer opportunities to display courage and gain honour, as well as opportunities for upward social mobility. This is perversely expressed in war reporters in bullet-proof vests portraying the cruelty of war by having the courage to be there, without compassion.

But there are also other reasons why women may be better at peace journalism, though this is in no way meant to suggest that the burden of this civilizing mission should fall on women alone. Peace is more holistic than war; women may be more sensitive to a broader range of variables than men (expressed in a tendency for women to use more adjectives?). Peace is a complex process, not linear, demanding a style of reporting which reflects multitudes of small dramas rather than one big dominant narrative. War is more linear, towards 'victory' for one side or a stalemate. War may render itself more suitable to male writing – linear, logical in the sense of letting conclusions flow from the premises presented in the beginning of an article. Female writing may be more circular, trying to keep in mind many more aspects than one overriding dramatic *leitmotif*. As matter of fact, because of the way in which journalism has developed (see Table 2) it may be custom-tailored to male rather than female styles. And if males are more attracted to hardware and women to human beings, then we may be entitled to expect an explosion in peace reporting – from women.

4. Peace journalism: How to do it?

Essentially, peace journalism can be done by doing what journalists do anyhow, while keeping in mind a maximum number of items from the left-hand column. The eye for the essential, the devotion both to facts and to hope, the need to be a good writer, to work quickly and hence to be a good administrator of one's own time – all of that remains the same. But new types of knowledge would be needed. Some examples might be:

As mentioned above, an indispensable beginning is to identify the conflict formation, the parties, their goals and the issues, and not fall into the trap of believing that the key actors are where the action (violence, war) is. In medicine, no physician would make the mistake of seeing a swollen ankle as an 'ankle disease'; he or she would be on the watch for possible disturbances in the cardio-vascular system, and

direct the attention to the heart. The problem is not necessarily where it shows up; this holds for the body as well as for the conflict, for a ‘race riot’ and a case of mistreatment of children as well as for inter-nation and inter-state conflicts. But in order to know where to look, some knowledge is indispensable, even if learning from more experienced colleagues also goes a long way.

But so does negative learning from the past, exploring peace reporting in Yugoslavia, Somalia, the Gulf War, the Indochina Wars, World War II. What would peace reporting have looked like?

How can the drama of working for peace, the struggle to see the violence and the festering conflict as the problem, and from there to arrive at conflict transformation, be reported in such a way that it becomes exciting news? How is excessive moralism avoided, keeping in mind the basic point: reduce human suffering, increase human happiness? This is not easy, but nor is it impossible.

An example: reporting on peace proposals. Somebody has come up with a plan: an intergovernmental organization, NGO, government, some other conflict party or an individual. The task of the peace journalist is to identify such initiatives, give them voice, highlight positive points, stimulate dialogue, avoid signalling any agreement or disagreement, and add the plan to the peace culture of the conflict provided it stands for *peace by peaceful means*. But the task is also to ask difficult questions, pointing out possible deficits. Here is a short checklist aiming more at the plan than at the person or group behind it:

1. What was the method behind the plan? Dialogue with parties, and in that case with all the parties? Some trial negotiation? Analogy with other conflicts? Intuition?
2. To what extent is the plan acceptable to all parties? If not, what can be done about it?
3. To what extent is the plan, if realized, self-sustainable? If not, what can be done about it?
4. Is the plan based on autonomous action by the conflict parties, or does it depend on outsiders?
5. To what extent is there a *process* in the plan, about who shall do what, how, when and where, or is it only *outcome*?
6. To what extent is the plan based on what only elites can do, what only people can do, or on what both can do?
7. Does the plan foresee an ongoing conflict resolution, or is the idea a single-shot agreement?
8. Is peace/conflict transformation education for people, for elites, or for both, built into the plan?
9. If there has been violence, to what extent does the plan contain elements of reconciliation?
10. If there has been violence, to what extent does the plan contain elements of rehabilitation/reconstruction?

11. If the plan doesn't work, is the plan reversible?

12. Even if the plan does work for this conflict, does it create new conflicts or problems? Is it a good deal?

In other words: do not take peace & conflict work lightly!

5. Conclusion: When and where?

Given the urgency, the task is much overdue, but better late than never. And as conflict is a part of the human condition, and violence may be the outcome anywhere in the world when the parties see no way out, the place to start is everywhere. Very soon this will lead to more advanced problems, like:

What would a code of peace journalism look like? A war journalist is basically operating under the rules imposed by his military command, his or her work being guided by norms of patriotism. To whom or what does the peace journalist owe his or her allegiance? To 'peace'? Maybe that is too abstract. To present and future victims of violence/war? This is better, but what does it mean? How about keeping secrets? Some peace operations, like military operations, may depend on timing, and even if the long term goals, the what and why, are clear and out in the open, the who, how, when and where of a major nonviolent campaign may have to count on a surprise effect.

How could a monitoring process be initiated? Peace journalism, like anything else, should be evaluated. There are several levels, such as the quality of peace reporting (with prizes, of course), the quantity of peace reporting (what percentage of the media are carrying material of that kind), and the extent to which this reaches the reader/listener/viewer. The hypothesis that the public is disinterested could be tested and differentiated: who accept (women? young people? middle class?) and who reject (men? middle aged? lower/upper class?).

For good peace work, empathy, creativity and nonviolence are needed. Exactly the same is required of the peace journalist. And that includes dialogues with war journalists.¹⁰

Notes

1. An example would be the excellent Health (and Science) page in the *International Herald Tribune*, which could serve as a good model for a Peace/Conflict Transformation page, filled with information, reports on new thinking and critical evaluation.

To explore this analogy, consider the typical finding from a UCLA study about TV violence as reported in the *Washington Post*, 6 February 1996, in an article entitled 'Study Finds Real Harm in TV Violence':

- 'Perpetrators of violent acts on TV go unpunished', 73% of the time: 'When violence is presented without punishment, viewers are more likely to learn the lesson that violence is successful'.
- Most violent portrayals fail to show the consequences of a violent act, 'no harm to the victims' (47%), 'no pain' (58%).
- Few programs (only 4%) emphasize nonviolent alternatives to solving problems.

Translated into illness/health reporting this means:

- Nothing is done about a disease 73% of the time.
- Disease does no harm (47%), or leaves no pain (58%).
- There is no alternative to disease, such as prevention (96%).

Centuries ago this was a relatively adequate description of attitudes to illness/health: nothing or little was done, nothing could be done, disease is bad luck and it makes no sense to describe the harm or the pain in any detail. Fortunately, we now take the problem of disease head on, no doubt enormously reducing suffering per person-year lived. Reporting has followed suit.

But violence in media has continued by and large unabated; see Thomas E. Radecki (1987).

2. Lest the journalist reader come up with the facile remark that this is only theory constructed in some office, permit me to add that for three years I worked part time as a journalist for the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (1960–62 and 1965), producing a number of radio and TV programmes. I remember very well the thrill of interviewing the Dalai Lama, Fidel Castro, etc. and recall how much interviews with more common people were more meaningful in terms of understanding what was going on.
3. This is described very clearly by the leading specialist on war reporting, Philip Knightley, in his (1975) basic book in the field, *The First Casualty* ('truth' is his first casualty; but it should always be kept in mind that the first casualty of war is actually 'peace'). Also see Mira Beham's (1996) excellent *Kriegstrommeln: Medien, Krieg und Politik* on the war reporting from Yugoslavia. In that case, the role of the public relations agencies (particularly Hill & Knowlton and Ruder Finn) seems to have been so massive, and filters to sort out PR virtual reality from real reality so few, that it is difficult to assess the situation without knowing what the PR firms transmitted.

For material from an earlier period, *Reporting World War II: American Journalism, Parts I (1938–1944) and II (1944–1946)*, Library of America, 1995 is an excellent source. Here we find the great names, such as William Shirer, Edward R. Murrow, Margaret Bourke-White, Erik Sevareid and some of their articles. War is described as 'organized insanity', as 'madness'; attacks are not 'surgical', civilians are not 'collaterals' (that kind of sanitized Newspeak is the predicament of our generation). There is much focus on people, soldiers and civilians alike. Maybe ultimate winning was taken for granted, for that does not seem to be a major focus. Of course, the war is mainly seen from 'our side'. And the focus is certainly on war, not on peace.
4. Anybody advocating anything like that might ask whether they themselves would be willing to be killed for the sake of the 'table'. In that case the faith in the 'table' as peace instrument must be as high as the patriotism of yesteryear.
5. See Johan Galtung and Richard Vincent (forthcoming). This is the basic theme of the whole book.
6. A good example would be many years of disarmament and cooperation in reconstructing the country in Nicaragua by the Centro de Estudios Sociales (Apartado 1747, Managua, Nicaragua), headed by Alejandro Bendaña and Zoilamérica Ortega..
7. See Joe Campplisson and Michael Hall (1996). For an account of the Chechnya war from a man that certainly made a major contribution to bringing it to an end, see Sergei Kovalev (1997). His conclusion is: 'The war was won by those few dozen, and only a few dozen, nongovernment organizations all across the country – the Soldier's Mothers and Memorial, among others – which from the first day raised their voices against the meat grinder. They were seen and heard by only a small percentage of citizens' (on p.31). He then goes on to praise the few journalists who could be called peace reporters, and castigates the citizens who did not 'shake Moscow with a 500,000 strong demonstration in the first days of the Chechen adventure – as we did in January 1991 after events in Vilnius. The price of our civilian passivity was 100,000 corpses in the North Caucasus'. Excellent. A peace reporter should also report the negative causes, that which does not happen, the speeches not spoken, the ideas not thought.
8. See Chapter 2 of Johan Galtung and Richard Vincent, ([1961] 1992), summarizing research by the present author on news flows.
9. For an excellent in-depth article, see Philip Gourevitch (1997) and compare that with the frame-ridden news reporting.
10. Many, reporting war or peace or both, are 'Journalists Who Risk Death' (Anthony Lewis, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 August 1997): 'In the last 10 years, 173 Latin American reporters, photographers, columnists and editors have been murdered... They were just doing their ordinary job: trying to publish the truth'. Risk should unite all kinds of journalists.

For an excellent introduction for any kind of journalist to the intricacies of conflict, see Richard E. Rubinstein et al., (1994). Part II of the present author's (1996) study *Peace by Peaceful Means* is about conflict analysis and resolution.

A checklist of what to look for in conflict is also found in Robert Karl Manoff (1997). In that article, Manoff also mentions the possibility of using the media for mediation, like CBS's Walter Cronkite's on-the-air negotiation between Sadat and Begin and ABC's Ted Koppel's mediation between de Klerk and the newly free Nelson Mandela. Two objections in that connection: maybe the task would be better left to professional conflict workers, the job of making society in general, and conflict in particular, transparent being more than difficult enough for journalists to handle; and good conflict work is rarely done with millions watching and the parties playing to that enormous gallery.

For the reality of war reporting, see Wilhelm Kempf (1996a; 1997). See also the excellent paper by Heikki Luostarinen and Rune Ottosen (1998), which contains a checklist of what to look out for.

Journalism and Cultural Preconditions of War

Heikki Luostarinen

In the current research on war and the media, far too little attention has been paid to peacetime journalism. From the military point of view, peace is just a preparation time – used better or worse – before the next conflict. This means that the cultural and political preconditions for war are created during periods of peace. It also means that military institutions try to influence (through the use of public relations, for example) all spheres of a society – including schools, the media, etc. – in order to gain support for material and cultural preparations for war.

Alan Hooper, an officer in the British Royal Navy, provides a good example of this issue in his (1988) book *The Military and the Media*. He describes the importance of some BBC documentaries depicting the military life:

The programmes were watched by 15 million people, the majority of whom were not only fascinated by being allowed to see behind the scenes of a profession about which they previously knew little, but they were also impressed with the dedication and competence of those officers who contributed to the programme. They were also reassured by the professional way in which the Army prepared its officers for a future war.

This reassurance in the military was subsequently justified when the Forces were called upon to prosecute an extremely difficult military operation over 8,000 miles away in the Falkland Islands. Confidence in the military was extremely important to the success of that operation and television documentaries such as 'War School' and 'Sailor' were significant in that they had contributed to that public confidence prior to 1982. (p. 88)

To say this is not to accuse military institutions of some evil conspiracy; in fact, it is a legal and accepted task of the military in many independent countries to take care of activities which could be called 'preparatory defence information' (PDI). These activities include strategically planned tasks, such as psychological defence, as well as purely informative tasks, such as the ordinary exchange of information between journalists and military PR personnel about happenings inside the military. The goals of PDI activities can be summarized in the following way: First, citizens should have a realistic picture about the security risks of the nation, about threatening happenings in the international environment and about preparations needed to protect the country's safety (knowledge). Second, citizens should be aware of necessary actions

and behaviour in times of war and crisis, both as objects of civil defence or active combatants on the battlefield (preparedness). Third, citizens should understand the need for and be willing to work for the defence and security of the nation (motivation).

The problem is which of these tasks should be in the hands of the military or other defence authorities and voluntary organizations and to what extent. More specifically, there is a constant risk, proved on many historical occasions, that the PDI implemented by military institutions will start to function in a way that serves the organizational interests of the military more than it benefits the nation as a whole; and, in extreme cases, badly planned PDI can endanger the security of the state more than it contributes to security and peace. For instance, demands for over-estimated arms buildup can provoke neighbour countries into an arms race, or jingoistic rhetoric to bolster fighting spirit, as well as dissemination of crude enemy images, can have a similar effect. For this reason, all operations linked to psychological defence should be strictly under democratic control, and preferably not solely implemented by the military staff or civil defence organizations. Purely informative activities can naturally be carried out by the military's own information personnel.

In this chapter, I would like to touch upon questions of 'ordinary' peacetime journalism on domestic and international issues and the influence such journalism might have on whether a society becomes increasingly 'militarized', by which is meant that cultural and political acceptance of the use of violence in various forms of conflict tends to increase. In order to do that, I briefly summarize some means used by military public relations in peacetime and also some counter-strategies which might help journalists safeguard their independence and integrity. Wartime journalism can be better or worse in terms of professionalism and ethical standards, but there are very few cases where it can actually stop the violence, which proceeds under the war's own logic. However, in (relative) peace, and especially during early escalation processes when the seeds of war have been sown, the media can play a much more influential role.

At the end of the chapter, I will also discuss some ethical principles of journalism. Is peace an issue to which journalists should be committed and which they should actively promote? And how would such commitment affect other professional duties and principles they might have?

1. Peacetime military PR

Journalism has often been described as a 'meta-discourse', an 'interdiscursive genre' or a 'discourse of discourses'. What this means in practical terms is the fact that journalism often collects under some theme (such as a news item or reportage) speech acts, documents and similar items expressed and produced by various persons or representatives of groups – politicians, authorities, civic organizations, etc. In this context it is worth noting, however, that one of the basic and most trustworthy results of mass media studies is that journalism tends to prefer official, powerful sources which have arranged easy access to information and professional personnel to serve the needs of journalists.

From the point of view of the source, the crucial point is whether it is an object talked about by others or whether it is also able to act in the role of a subject that

talks about itself and others. It is typical of powerful sources that they have this ability to be active subjects, that they can make their voices heard and that their ways of conceptualizing and interpreting the social reality are widely disseminated by journalism. What is most important from the point of view of this presentation, a high-status source is able to make history via journalism: to predict, to set goals, to demand, to hope, to fear and to intend. At the very least, such a source is able to make its own aspirations concerning the future into a noteworthy alternative on journalism's agenda.

In questions of war and peace, these differences in source positions are often seen in publicity battles between representatives of the military and the peace movement. Peace groups are not automatically marginalized or ridiculed by journalists – as was seen in the case of Vietnam war – but their visibility is often restricted to conflict situations. Naturally, one reason is that peace organizations become more active before and during military actions, when they arrange public events and get increased media visibility through these. But on the other hand, such organizations also work (as do more academic peace and conflict research institutes) during peacetime, though then their visibility is very low compared with that of the military. The military does not demobilize its public relations personnel during peacetime: it is permanently at the disposal of the media. Whatever happens in international relations in the world, the military PR machine is ready to provide a helping hand for the media in the form of interviews, confidential meetings, background material, etc. This practice leads often to good and confidential relationships between foreign and defence correspondents on the one hand and military public relations staff and 'media experts' on the other. In contrast, however, peace groups or academic institutions interested in questions of peace and war most often disappear from the public platform when once peace comes because they do not have resources for permanent public relations and their scholars go back to concentrating on research.

Let us imagine a crisis in which either our country is involved or there is a political debate on possible involvement. For various reasons, the military public relations apparatus has an upper hand compared with the peace groups. First, they have been able in the media to conceptualize and interpret international events from the military perspective for a long time. Naturally, this does not mean that they automatically prefer a military solution, but as soldiers they have a professional language and world-view which emphasize certain ways of looking at international relations and events. Secondly, the military has specialists who are well-known to the audience and journalists and who are used to appearing in, say, TV news and current affairs programmes. Third, by having continuing media visibility, the military has established its role as an authoritative and trustworthy source, a factor which brings with it all the advantages of a high-source position.

For these reasons, it would be a sign of good and professional journalism to use experts and representatives from the peace movement and peace and conflict studies not only in time of war and crisis but as an active source during all international events that have a potential for conflict. This would ensure that different concepts, frameworks, explanations, perspectives, and interpretations could be compared by journalists and the audience, in this way providing alternatives to the military's world-view, vocabulary and way of speaking.

By saying this, I am not demanding more airtime for peace researchers or peace activists. Journalists themselves can provide the alternatives, for instance by staying

in touch with the information and research material produced by peace groups and scholars during peacetime. To have permanently open and close relations with foreign desk journalists and defence correspondents also demands activity and awareness of the importance of peacetime cooperation in the news process on the part of peace groups and peace researchers. A large number of journalists are ambitious and open-minded professionals who want to do their job as well as possible. Most often, the problem they face is lack of time and alternative information.

One special problem in the formation of news discourse concerning war and peace and alternative ways of solving conflicts is belligerent nations and groups who try to influence the content of the international news flow. A new phenomenon here is the use of professional public relations firms, which were used extensively in the Gulf war in 1990–91 and in the wars inside the former Yugoslavia. In many cases, the main target of the propaganda efforts are those media outlets which are used by the US foreign policy establishment as sources of information – and those outlets also have a great impact as agenda-setters of the content of the international news media. According to empirical studies by Manheim and Albritton (Manheim & Albritton, 1984; 1987; Albritton & Manheim, 1985), the manipulation of the US media is a surprisingly easy task if the client hires a qualified US public relations agency. This practice in part feeds into the international news media's bellicose rhetoric, which tends to naturalize ways of thinking that suggest conflicts should be solved by use of military force.

And here lies one of the main problems: Having immense amount of wars and conflicts in our recent history; living in a deeply militarized culture in which many ordinary metaphors have their roots in war (have a look for example at the sports pages of a tabloid newspaper) and where popular culture is full of war material; having self-evidently strong military institutions as influential parts of our political and social fabric – living this phase of history, using this language shaped by war, consuming war as a natural part of everyday entertainment, the 'war logic' is a naturalized part of our way of outlining social reality and international life. If an alternative way of thinking tries to take root, it must penetrate through the naturalized 'war logic', and it often appears unnatural, unrealistic, strange and obscure.

One task of peace-oriented journalism, therefore, is to deconstruct and question the naturalized ways of 'war logic' in order to show that it is a social construction, created in specific historical conditions; that it is not universal and not everlasting; and that there are also alternatives to it. In my view, this task does not violate any Western professional standards of good journalism. It only requires critical attitude towards ossified ways of thinking and willingness to provide for the audience a many-sided picture of the possible ways of thinking.

One of the main goals of military public relations is to maintain a hegemonic position on the definition, conceptualization and interpretation of – broadly speaking – 'security issues' concerning international relations and the home country. As such, it is important how 'security issues' are understood by the media and in what kind of issues military specialists are used as sources and to provide background information. However, to a large extent in contemporary societies, hegemony battles happen not on the streets or in elections but at the level of language in the media. If you manage to get journalists to use 'your' language – your concepts, slogans, metaphors, etc. – you have managed to get the greatest breakthrough which can be imagined in public relations: journalists are then working for you voluntarily.

There is no need in this context to go through all the means used in military public relations, because most of the techniques are just applications of ordinary PR, and those can be studied in innumerable textbooks and research reports. For this reason, the following presentation is not meant to be complete. However, it is worthwhile to notice some special characteristics of military PR and to discuss possible ways how journalists can resist temptation to follow the PR agenda – as professional journalists should.

First, the military almost without exception emphasizes its professionalism. The military itself – not politicians, journalists or citizen movements – knows best what it needs in terms of weaponry and rights of action. In all democratic countries, the military should be subordinated to the democratic organs of the society, i.e. to politicians. In some cases, politicians are regarded inside the military as an obstacle in the way of the military's needs and wants. Soldiers cannot openly show any disloyalty towards the democratic institutions – in fact their military oath obliges them to loyally protect and sacrifice their lives for the same institutions that, in practical contests about policies and money, are often regarded as enemies. In terms of public relations, this situation sometimes leads into a paradoxical situation where politicians are honoured explicitly but implicitly and in off-the-record situations they are blamed as unprofessional in security issues, partisan, unpatriotic, and so on.

In some cases, the media can also find themselves in a position where they are regarded as a potential obstacle to the implementation of plans made inside the military bureaucracy. This was the case, for instance, in the USA after the Vietnam war, when the US military was haunted by the shadow of a lost war – a sign of non-professionalism – and by charges revealed by investigative reporters. The military hit back, in the spirit expressed by Peter Braestrup (1991: xx):

Journalists reduce complexity to a changing set of clichés. They have little time or temperament for reflection on the national interest or the Big Picture; they must operate on professional instincts; their memories are overwhelmed by the daily rush of new experiences, new faces, new facts – indeed, they prize such novelty. As storytellers, they prefer stories of people to stories of organizations; they prefer politics to government; they prefer action or events to patterns or trends. They like to be in the know; they are quickly bored or frustrated when there is no news, no new turn of events.

Naturally, this controversy – rivalry with the media – could not be solved by using the most ordinary means of public relations: it would not be very successful to distribute press releases claiming that journalists are unprofessional and unpatriotic people without much sense of the general interest of the nation. However, a lot could be done: First, pressure could be exerted from below and from above to encourage, for example, local civic defence organizations, supportive politicians and political groups both to express their views about the media's failure to understand their patriotic duty and to belittle the ability of the media to cover military issues. Second, favourable journalists, preferably in leading or professionally authoritative positions, could be carefully picked and then fed with information and provided with hospitality. After the Vietnam War, the US military arranged plenty of seminars and other social occasions which were meant to 'ease tension' between the two professions. Personal contacts have probably been even more effective. Third, the general audience could be influenced through collaboration with the cultural indus-

try to produce movies and so on which aimed at improving the image of the military and dethroning journalism from its powerful post-Watergate position.

The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) faced the same problem when the Government decided to increase the number of British troops in Northern Ireland in the beginning of 1970s. The Northern Ireland issue was highly volatile, and increasing casualties meant that public relations activities were needed to address the growing criticism from the media. In this effort, the MoD could exploit the deep political controversies among British journalists. The MoD had to find those media outlets and journalists which were favourable to the government's policy and were willing to cooperate. At the same time, it was highly important to influence the popular image of the British military presence on the territory: this should not be described as an occupation but a peace mission. Liz Curtis (1984: 247) describes the public relations activities by the British military in Northern Ireland:

One of the army's most successful publicity techniques has been the running of all-expenses paid 'facilities trips' for reporters. 'They jet you from wherever you happen to live in England,' explained a journalist who used to work for a Yorkshire paper, 'and then you live in barracks with the boys for three days or so. Then you go home with lots of pictures of local lads from your own area and a nice little piece about our brave boys going out there'.... These facilities trips have resulted in a steady flow of 'satisfied soldier' stories in British provincial papers.

In the military image policy, the right balance between the hard and masculine killer and the human servant of people is an important and difficult question. Animals and kids are used to 'soften' the image in case it tends to be too brutal.

In Western culture, there is a permanent fascination – especially among males – towards technical innovations, like new cars, computers – and weapons. This cultural habit can easily be exploited by the military through the arrangement of exhibitions, parades, open days in garrisons, military museums, etc. Science and technology are a permanent theme in military PR, appositely described already by Senator J. W. Fulbright in 1970. Fulbright writes how the Johnson administration tried to sell politically the missile defence system called Sentinel. Fulbright obtained the military documents about the PR campaign and unearthed its aims:

There would be more news releases and pictures of the Sprint and Spartan missiles to be used in the system and of hitherto unpublicized firings of these missiles at the Kwajalein Missile Range in the South Pacific. Film clips would be distributed to television stations. Editors, reporters, and broadcasters would be taken to Kwajalein and to the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to watch missile firings. 'Information kits' would be distributed for use in countering criticism. (Fulbright, 1970: 4–5)

The list of the PR stunts was endless. It included personal contacts with media owners and editors and – which Fulbright found unacceptable – ways to misuse scientific authority:

It is essential that all possible questions raised by the opponents be answered, preferably by nongovernmental scientists. We will be in contact shortly with scientists who are familiar with the Sentinel program and who may see fit to write articles for publication supporting the technical feasibility and operational effectiveness of

the Sentinel System. We shall extend to these scientists all practical assistance. (ibid.: 5–6)

Documents told about a close cooperation between the Pentagon, the media and public relations departments of the weapons industry. Fulbright summarizes the ability of the military public relations in a sarcastic manner:

In use is every device and technique of the commercial public relations man and even some that he cannot afford such as cruises on aircraft carriers and 'firepower' demonstrations by battalions of artillery and squadrons of aircraft, all designed to shape public opinion and built an impression that militarism is good for you. (ibid.: 11)

This example by Fulbright is an old one, but it seems that the basic techniques have not changed (see also Heise, 1979). As a consequence of the exploitation of 'weapon fetishism', there is a habit in some parts of the media to use, when discussing military issues, a way of language which combines the technically oriented military language with war-oriented forms of popular culture.

Although some of the above examples deal with wartime public relations and journalism, they can *mutatis mutandis* also be applied in the analysis of peacetime information activities. For instance, many journalists tend to write about military training or manoeuvres – obviously to increase dramatic elements in the story – as though they were writing about 'real' war. Let us summarize the main special techniques of military public relations in peacetime:

1. Efforts to maintain and increase social status and independence by emphasizing one's own professionalism as compared to political and journalistic institutions, peace movements, etc.
2. Efforts to influence the discourses of the news media and popular culture concerning security issues in order to have dominance in the conceptualization and interpretation of happenings on the field.
3. Close cooperation with parts of the media and journalists who share the military's perspective and work as a mouthpiece of the military in the 'discursive battles' on the platform of journalistic publicity.
4. Exploitation of fascination with weapons technology.

2. Counter strategies

Good professional journalism should be independent of all efforts made by powerful institutions to influence its content and agenda. If journalism wants to safeguard its image as 'the fourth estate', it should be especially critical towards those institutions who have the legitimacy to use physical power towards individual citizens of the society: the police and other internal security organizations, the military, the judicial system and the prison administration. Where the power is greatest, the media's examination should be most extensive and critical.

What, then, could be 'counter-strategies' used by journalists. Naturally, there are no ready-made or easy answers for this, but I would like to open discussion about

the following means for improving the performance of journalism on wars and military issues in general:

1. *Reliability considerations.* All quality media outlets should be ready and able, when necessary, to admit that information provided for the audience is uncertain and might include errors; in addition, 'take with pinch of salt' warnings could be used where necessary to indicate possible unreliability of reported information. Clear mistakes should be corrected voluntarily and in a prominent way. However, the demand to safeguard the product image (rhetorical self-confidence) is often so strong that it seems to be difficult to admit that there are errors in news services. Presumably, the audience knows that fast transmitted news may include errors; however, the generic convention to hide uncertainties in news discourse does not help readers to reach their own conclusions. Tools for questioning are not given; the audience has to take on trust. In journalism concerning military issues this practice is not only unethical, it is also dangerous because it can lead to hesitation over political decisions and can mislead public opinion. Fortunately, according to Shephard, this practice is changing, at least in the US media:

More and more newsmongers are adopting a philosophy that goes something like this: We are putting out a daily product under fierce deadline pressures. Mistakes are inevitable. No longer will we pretend we are infallible; we're not. It's crucial for our credibility to admit we make mistakes of all kinds every day. And we are willing to correct our errors. (Shephard, 1998: 52)

2. *The amount of source criticism and 'interest checks' of sources.* As Leon V. Sigal (1986: 15) says, 'sources make the news', but the source itself is very seldom scrutinized by the journalist. Many journalists are very aware of the need to avoid bringing their own opinions into the news, but are not worried about uncritically transmitting the opinions and interests of their sources. Modern journalism is a battlefield of different interest groups and social definitions. Very often the correct way to describe journalist's role is not as that of a gatekeeper but as a referee. The role of the journalist is not only about giving media access to some and denying it to others, but also includes taking care of rules in publicity struggles – to provide space for weaker groups, to ignore obviously unethical PR tricks, etc. Journalists should always ask why a particular source is saying this or that; they should unearth vested interests and uncover 'straw men'. This is not an easy job, but it is extremely important – especially in security and military issues.

Very often journalists act in the opposite way. Sources are named by using authoritative, rather than informative, attributes: 'former deputy foreign minister' sounds better than 'Sikorsky helicopters lobbyist'.

3. *The amount of counter-sources and active questioning.* One problem with modern journalism is an unwillingness to question sources, which makes for a dull, 'X said Y' style of journalism'. In active journalism, a follow-up question would emerge immediately: 'You say this, but what about that', and person X would not be the sole performer. (Pietilä & Sondermann, 1994) When one's government decides something, wrote Anthony Marro in 1985, always check the figures and facts, ask the opposition's opinion and talk with people affected by the

decision. These are very reasonable principles, but how often do we see them followed? Newspapers, for example, are often passive and unimaginative when using sources (Luostarinen, 1994a). They do not organize contacts and confrontations between different sources and interest groups. Everything goes on in a very civilized fashion: opinion A on page 3, opinion B on page 4. In times of war and crisis and in other cases where military issues are involved, news reports are often separated from moral, religious and political considerations and discussions. What is needed, in my view, is a much more active editorial policy which forces sources to meet, argue and fight.

4. *The amount of media journalism.* According to Kiku Adatto (1990: 5), in election time US journalists are obsessed by 'theatre criticism'. They cover the campaign as a performance produced for them, not as a contest of ideas and ideologies. News management is important; political programmes are not. Spin doctors and media strategies are in; real problems of the country are out.

On the other hand, journalism is one of the most important forms of communication in the Western world, and huge material and cultural resources are used to influence that communication. For instance, in political decisions about buying new weapons, the security concerns and the interests of the arms industry are such large issues that media strategies and even single stunts are important factors. Let us take the Gulf War as an example. In many cases, journalists accredited to Saudi Arabia did not cover the actual war, but covered the presentation skilfully produced by the US information machine. Why shouldn't the presentation be one of the major targets of analysis and criticism?

In my vocabulary, the concept 'media journalism' means journalism in which the media themselves are covered critically, using professional techniques and standards similar to those of other powerful institutions in society. The amount and standard of media journalism would tell us whether a news outlet is working independently and making conscious and reflected decisions.

5. *The amount of 'uncontrolled media'.* From the point of view of the PR industry, media content can be classified in the following – perhaps cynical but practical – way:

- Paid media (advertisements and advertorials, sponsored programmes, etc.)
- Free media (unedited coverage of press releases and press conferences, 'packed' editorials, uncritical interviews, etc.)
- Uncontrolled media (agenda, editing, interpretations, etc. are made by journalists, and the outcome is unpredictable for the source).

For instance, in press conferences and photo opportunities very skilful means can be used to control the media. In press conferences, trusted journalists and 'planted questions' can be used to avoid annoying questions. Slogans and 'one liners' are invented to make headlines. Still pictures can be manipulated, produced by PR agencies or taken under controlled conditions.

New codes are possibly needed to tell the news audience about the production conditions and degree of independence of news coverage. Quality journalism should mainly be based – in terms of sources – on 'uncontrolled' material. This is an expensive way of doing journalism because a lot of independent

work is needed and ready-made material cannot be used. However, in the long run it is the only way to protect quality journalism against the pressures of growing PR influence. The Gulf War coverage provides a good example of these questions.

6. *Critical use of 'off the record' information.* In time of war and crisis, one of the most effective news management strategies is the steady flow of non-attributable information. Because it is well known that off-the-record information is used by the military on both strategic and operational levels as a means of warfare, this type of information should not be used uncritically. The issue of the use of such information should be discussed within the various media outlets, among professional staff and also – with the intended audience – as a public topic.

It is easy to give advice as I have done above, but is there any realistic chance that such practices might materialize? Theoretically, it is indeed possible to evaluate sources, discredit them, write about news management, raise discussion about the use of off-the-record information, neutralize the source's message by comments and interpretations, etc. But are these practices no-news techniques which make for boring journalism? Would journalism lose some fundamental communicative advantages if every short news story included evaluations, hesitations or descriptions of the production process? And would such journalism underestimate the ability of the audience to make their own judgements?

The answer is yes and no. It is not reasonable to expect that every single news item should include source criticism, reliability considerations, etc. But in the case of large domestic and international issues, such as questions about war and peace, this would be useful – and also interesting from the audience's point of view. The interests and loyalties of sources could in themselves be important news elements. And every quality media outlet should regularly produce material describing its production structures and opening the inner problems of the news industry to its consumers.

3. Give peace (journalism) a chance...

The problems and means of peace journalism have already been discussed in this book by Johan Galtung. There is not much to add to his points. However, I would like to add two final comments.

First, there is empirical evidence to support the claim that the role of the media can be very influential and positive in peace processes. For instance, Miiä Nuikka's (1999) study of the Salvadoran media after the peace treaty in 1992 shows that journalism can help the democratic process by offering an open platform, an arena for argumentative fights and discussions which gradually can replace violence as the primary means of solving disputes and controversies. A precondition for this is independent, critical, many-sided, impartial, professional and outspoken journalism. In this process, journalism can achieve a high status among social institutions, as has happened in El Salvador.

In the same way, good and fair journalism can prevent escalation processes in which opponent groups typically start to isolate themselves from each other and each gradually loses the ability to see the conflict from the other's point of view.

Secondly, peace journalism is a concept which often raises suspicion among professional journalists. It is regarded as a partisan, non-professional, biased, non-objective and politicized form of journalism, tasting slightly of the political slang of the Soviet bloc. Professional journalism, it is said, is not the advocacy of particular issues but the reporting of the reality of the world.

It is true that 'peace' as a concept of political discourse in part became dirty during the struggles of the Cold War. But if we try to forget this history and think about peace as a genuine and common goal of the international community, not linked to any particular ideological or political system, it takes on a different meaning, implying respect for human rights, dignity – and life.

In my view, under no circumstances can it be a professional fault for journalists to give peace a chance. It is not even necessary to give such journalism a name like 'peace journalism', 'peace-oriented journalism', 'de-escalation oriented journalism', etc. What we are discussing is simply good and many-sided journalism which is conscious about the fact that no profession can escape the social reality and ethical considerations of the community. As long as peace is a desired goal of the international community, it must be a major point of view in the coverage of conflict issues. Indeed, it is not such journalism, but journalism which fails to pay attention to or analyze the possibilities for nonviolent conflict resolution that is partisan and biased.

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This book is part of a larger project called 'Journalism in the New World Order'. As part of this project, the first volume – *Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization* – was produced by project members, edited by Stig Arne Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen, and published by Nordicom in early 2001.

Whereas the emphasis of the first volume was mainly empirical and linked to the Gulf War, the present volume touches more upon theoretical, historical and methodological problems of war reporting and war propaganda. Our intention is that this volume could be used as a textbook, for instance in institutions educating future journalists.

The first part of the book deals with the media's role in conflicts and provides conceptual and theoretical tools for the analysis of conflict coverage and war reporting. Under the title 'How Did We Get Here?', the second part of the volume provides the historical background needed to understand the present situation of journalism in war. The third part presents different methodological approaches to the study of war and the media, applying both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysing media discourse. The fourth part is dedicated to studies of the Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia and demonstrates application of the previously described theoretical models and methodological approaches. Finally, 'Beyond Wishful Thinking', the closing part of the volume, summarizes the implications of this kind of research in terms of practical journalism.



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